The legitimacy of an external transitional government as a tool in peacebuilding

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(1)Thesis for the Master’s Degree of Arts from the University of Groningen. The legitimacy of an external transitional government as a tool in peacebuilding An analysis of social well-being in Timor-Leste. MYRTHE L. WAJER May 2011 Supervisor: Drs. B. L. Aardema b.l.aardema@rug.nl.

(2) “The more we sweat in peace the less we bleed in war” Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit.

(3) TABLE OF CO TE T LIST OF ABBREVIATIO S. 4. I TRODUCTIO. Problem Statement Objective of the Study Methodology. 5 5 7 7. 1. THE FRAMEWORK OF A ALYSIS 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Concepts 1.2.1 Peacebuilding Definition Peacebuilding as a Strategy Approaches to Peacebuilding Spoilers 1.2.2 Host ation Ownership from a Peacebuilding Perspective Local Ownership Local Capacity and the Strengthening Thereof 1.2.3 Transitional Authority and other Degrees of Intervention Transitional Authority Designing the Response 1.3 Theoretical Framework 1.4 Conclusion. 11 11 11 11 11 12 13 13 14 14 15 16 16 17 19 21. 2. BACKGROU D O TIMOR-LESTE 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Geographic and Socio-Economic Features 2.3 Historic Synopsis 2.4 Conclusion. 22 22 22 23 25. 3. ACCESS TO A D DELIVERY OF EDUCATIO. 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Significance of Education 3.2.1 Education as a Supporting Factor to Peace 3.2.2 Education as a Supporting Factor to Social Well-Being 3.3 Educational State of Affairs 3.3.1 Access to Education 3.3.2 Equal Access Ethnicity Gender Location 3.3.4 on-Formal and Adult Education 3.4. Conclusion. 27 27 27 27 28 29 29 31 31 32 33 34 37.

(4) 4. RETUR A D RESETTLEME T OF REFUGEES A D I TER ALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Significance of ‘Return and Resettlement of Refugees and IDP’s’ 4.2.1 ‘Return and Resettlement of Refugees and IDP’s as a Supporting Factor to Peace 4.2.2 ‘Return and Resettlement of Refugees and IDP’s’ as a Supporting Factor to Social Well-Being 4.3 Voluntary, Safe and Dignified Return or Resettlement into ,ew Homes 4.3.1 The State of the Displaced: Returned or Resettled? 4.3.2 The Return and Resettlement Criteria Voluntary Return Return in Safety Return in Dignity 4.4 Sustainability of the Return 4.4.1 Restitution or Compensation 4.4.2 Rehabilitation of Livelihoods 4.5 Conclusion. 38. 5. ACCESS TO A D DELIVERY OF BASIC EEDS SERVICES 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Significance of Basic ,eeds 5.2.1 Basic eeds Fulfilment as a Supporting Factor to Social WellBeing and Peace 5.3 Access to and Delivery of Water 5.4 Access to and Delivery of Food 5.4.1 Characteristics of the Agricultural Sector 5.4.2 Food Intake 5.4.3 Acquiring of Food 5.5 Access to and Delivery of Shelter 5.6 Access to and Delivery of Health Services 5.6.1 Health Care Infrastructure 5.6.2 Usage of Health 5.7 Conclusion. 54 54 54 54. 38 38 38 39 41 41 42 43 45 47 48 48 50 53. 55 57 57 58 59 60 61 61 62 65. 66 6. SOCIAL RECO STRUCTIO. 66 6.1 Introduction 67 6.2. Significance of Social Reconstruction 6.2.1 Social Reconstruction as a Supporting Factor to Peace 67 6.2.2 Social Reconstruction as a Supporting Factor to Social Well- 67 Being 67 6.3 ,ational Identity 6.3.1 Creation of a Common Identity 68 6.3.2 Community Institutions 71 73 6.4 Peaceful Coexistence 76 6.5 Legacy of Past Abuses 78 6.6 Conclusion 7. CO CLUSIO. 80.

(5) BIBLIOGRAPHY United ,ations Documents and Pieces of International Humanitarian Law Books, Articles and Internet Sources. 83 83 83. A. EXES Annex I Map of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Annex II U Involvement in Timor-Leste Annex III Structural dividing lines in Timor-Leste. 93 94 95. FIGURES Figure 1. Visual representation of the problem statement Figure 2. Degrees of intervention Figure 3. Social well-being Figure 4. Who qualifies as a refugee or as an IDP? Figure 5. Map of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Figure 7. Structural dividing dines in Timor-Leste. 7 17 20 38 93 95.

(6) ML WAJER │. LIST OF ABBREVIATIO S •. CAVR. - Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation. •. CEDAW. - Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. •. CNRM. - The National Council of the Maubere Resistance. •. CNRT. - National Congress for the Reconstruction of East Timor. •. CRP. - Community Reconciliation Procedures. •. CTF. - Commission on Truth and Friendship. •. DPKO. - Department of Peacekeeping Operations. •. ETAN. - The East Timor Action Network. •. FAO. - Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. •. FALANTIL. - The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor. •. FRETILIN. - The socialist Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor. •. HREA. - Human Rights Education Associates. •. HRW. - Human Rights Watch. •. IDEA. - Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. •. IDMC. - International Displacement Monitoring Centre. •. IIEP. - International Institute for Educational Planning. •. INTERFET. - International Force for East Timor. •. IRC. - International Rescue Committee. •. MDG. - Millennium Development Goal. •. OECD. - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. •. SCR. - Serious Crimes Regime. •. TLAVA. - Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment. •. UCDP. - Uppsala Conflict Data Program. •. UN. - United Nations. •. UNDP. - Unites Nations Development Programme. •. UNESCO. - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. •. UNHCR. - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. •. UNICEF. - United Nations Children’s Fund. •. UNIFEM. - United Nation Development Fund for Women.. •. UNSC. - United Nations Security Council. •. USIP. - United States Institute for Peace. •. UNTAET. - United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. •. UK. - United Kingdom. •. WB. - Worldbank. •. WFP. - World Food Programme. •. WHO. - World Health Organisation. 4.

(7) ML WAJER │. 5. I TRODUCTIO After the Cold War, the world faced a shift from interstate war to conflict classified as new, dirty or total wars. These modern wars are characterised by warlordism and practices such as the deliberate terrorisation of civilians, including humanitarian aid workers. The rationale behind this is that civilians as well as humanitarians are seen as a resource base, since it provides the non-state actors with means to sustain themselves (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 139). These relatively new developments brought to the peacebuilding community a new horizon of challenges (Philpott and Powers 46). Problem Statement It is currently widely acknowledged that the end of civil war is not the equivalent of the end of the underlying conflict (A/55/305 2). Therefore, the post conflict phase is regarded as one of these enormous challenges (Collier 27; A/63/881 1; A/59/565 2). This year, it is exactly ten years ago that the United Nations (UN) published a critical report addressing their work in this phase and drafted new tools to address these difficulties. However, today many previous conflict-affected countries still experience a relapse into violence. Paul Collier and colleagues found that forty percent of the civil war affected countries experience such a reoccurrence in the first decade after a peace agreement (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 7). Moreover, for a country that has once gone through the experience of war, the risk that new conflict results in violence doubles. The consequential wars are generally even deadlier than the preceding ones (Collier 27-34; Simonovic 253). Others came to lower, but still significant percentages. Barbara Walter, from the University of California, concluded that 36 percent of the countries experiencing civil war sink back into violence (Walter 371). The study quoted as the “most sophisticated study of peacebuilding to date” (Philpott and Powers 7) on civil war by Yale and Columbia University professors Doyle and Sambanis presents a relapse percentage of around thirty percent (Doyle and Sambanis 89). All roughly measured from the end of the second world war to the beginning of the 21st century. In general, the countries most at risk for civil war are poor states (Collier 17). On average, a low-income country has a chance of 14 percent for conflict to erupt in an arbitrary five year span (Call and Cousens 4; Collier 20). These figures show that a country that has experienced a civil conflict is at the highest risk for a new violent conflict to erupt. Or, borrowing the humanitarian scholar Mary Anderson’s words: “Wars are self-perpetuating” (15)..

(8) ML WAJER │. 6. In order to prevent reoccurrence of violent events, the international community has developed different peacebuilding strategies. In the last decades there have been a small number of cases in which external actors took over control from the local authorities on a temporary basis. These so called transitional administrations govern a country when there is not sufficient capacity in the host country itself in the immediate aftermath of conflict.1 Illustratively, Timor-Leste did not govern itself straight away after its independence. Clearly, there is a paradox between the goal and the available means: a large third party intervention to establish a locally accepted peace. Although the external intervention is meant to strengthen the local capacity, authority is taken away from them by external actors in the short run. Accordingly, the local actors are overridden in the short run with the consequence that the operation will effect the opposite in the short run of what it intends to achieve in the long run. Hence, there is a negative relation between external intervention and local ownership of the peace building efforts. Previous studies have shown that local ownership is a requirement for sustainable peace. This means that for the long run, local ownership is a necessity (e.g: c.f. Doyle and Sambanis; Anderson, M. 35; Lederach 93-94; Narten 252-255; Scheye and Peake 235). Accordingly, it has become common to include local ownership in international peacebuilding strategies. However, Sheye, Peake and others make the remark that it is also referred to as ‘a rhetoric device’ and ‘not a practical device’ (Sheye and Peake 240; Reich qtd. in Narten; Hansen 240). Still, he concludes in line with e.g. Mary Anderson and Doyle and Sambanis that local ownership is “indispensible to guaranteeing long-term and sustainable implementation of postwar statebuilding and can, thus, be considered a conditio sine qua non of international peacebuilding efforts” (Narten 254). Thus, ownership is an acknowledged prerequisite for sustainable peace in the long run. The figure on the next page presents the relation between the concepts in a visual manner.. 1. The terms transitional government, administration or authority refer to the same concept in this study..

(9) ML WAJER │. 7. Figure 1. Visual representation of the problem statement. Transitional Administration. 2. Peace 1. 3. Sustainable Peace. Local Ownership - Conditio sine qua non -. 1) A transitional administration is implemented to establish peace. 2) When a transitional administration is implemented, the peacebuilding lacks ownership. 3) Without local ownership peace can not become self sustainable.. This paradox between transitional administration as a tool to build sustainable peace and the lack of ownership of such a measure triggers the question whether a transitional government is a legitimate tool in peacebuilding. Since short term outcomes must be measured by their long term effects (Lederach 75). Objective of the Study To prevent a relapse into conflict, social and political reconstruction of a war-torn society is emphasized, so the peace will become durable, or self sustainable. In this role peacebuilding is as much preventive as reconstructive action (S/2001/394 2). This implicates that the phase following war also provides an important window of opportunity for the international community to prevent human suffering (A/63/881 1). From a humanitarian perspective it is thus essential to review the actions undertaken by the international community to address threats in the post conflict recovery period. The objective of this research is to contribute to the discussion about the post conflict recovery phase and, more specifically, about a transitional government as a tool to establish self sustainable peace. Methodology Peacebuilding is an overarching concept that includes many different professional fields. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) researched the elements that generate sustainable peace, based on the experiences of five decades of peacebuilding initiatives (Cole, B. E.). The authors examined over a hundred strategic papers and identified five priority areas that need to be addressed in order to achieve a self sustaining peace. Using the results of this.

(10) ML WAJER │. 8. study, they authors drafted the stabilisation and reconstruction framework.2 The five priority areas of the framework constitute five end states that “will be the final arbiters of whether peace has been achieved” (USIP 9). Because USIP analysed the priorities that are set by a wide range of different actors it is reflective of the current discussion in the field. Accordingly, the framework will serve as a good and up-to-date tool in this study. The five identified sectors of peacebuilding are: safe and secure environment, rule of law, sustainable economy, stable governance and social well-being. The degree of peace will be analysed in one of the relevant sectors, namely the ‘Social Well-Being Sector’. Focus on the social well-being sector is valuable by itself, since social well-being is a prerequisite for sustainable peace. However, it has particular value as the missing piece of the puzzle. The social well-being sector seems neglected in the peacebuilding discussion, while the other sectors are already studied at length.3 Analysis in the social well-being sector is thus the most valuable. A high level of well-being is the concluding factor that facilitates the consolidation of peace in society (c.f. USIP). As such, a lack of social well-being hinders a society in its transition from the volatile post conflict phase to the state of development. Thus, in the light of the formulated problem statement of the self perpetuating nature of war, the well-being sector serves as a good tool to predict the continuity, or sustainability, of the peace. Subsequently, for the overall state of peacebuilding in a later phase, focus on well-being is appropriate and reflective of the original goals of peacebuilding (namely to establish a self sustainable peace). The focus on social well-being does not indicate that this sector has the highest priority in the direct aftermath of conflict. It is clear that e.g. providing a safe and 2. The terms ‘reconstruction’ is more broadly used in North America to refer to economic and social dimensions of peacebuilding (Call and Cousens 3). 3 As will be explained below, Timor-Leste serves as a case study for this research. For an example of analysis on the Rule of Law see Laura Grenfell. “Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law in Timor-Leste.” Leiden Journal of International Law, 19 (2006) : 305–337. Anita Doraisami. “Fiscal Policy Challenges in Timor Leste: Is the Resources Curse on the Horizon?” ASEA' Economic Bulletin 26.2 (2009) : 164-173. will give a good impression about the economic situation in Timor-Leste. On stable governance see e.g. Deborah Cummins. “Democracy or democrazy? Local experiences of democratization in Timor- Leste” Democratization 17.5 (2010) : 899-919. With regard to the security sector, there is a lot of attention for Security Sector Reform. see e.g: Yoshino Funaki1. The U' and Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste: A Widening Credibility Gap. New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2009. and Gordon Peake. “A Lot of Talk But Not a Lot of Action: The Difficulty of Implementing SSR in Timor-Leste” in: Born, Hans and Albrecht Schnabel eds. Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments. Münster: LIT, 2009. There are also studies that review the general situation in Timor-Leste, from a peacebuilding perspective, such as: Peter Blunt. “The Political Economy of Accountability in Timor-Leste: Implications for Public Policy.” Public Administration Development 29 (2009) : 89 – 100. However, well-being is not considered in this study..

(11) ML WAJER │. 9. secure environment is prioritised over such efforts. This does not mean that the rehabilitation of well-being should be delayed into a later phase, since peacebuilding is not determined strictly sequentially. Efforts aiming to increase well-being should start from the outset of the operation. The study will make use of a case to see whether the implemented efforts have indeed led to a high degree of social well-being. Timor-Leste will function as such. A UN transitional government administered Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2002. The so-called The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) exercised the legislative, executive and judicial power. Subsequently, the local community played a very minimal role. The UN is the body most responsible for the development of practice in the peacebuilding field (Durnan 2). Analysis of a case in which the UN has designed the peacebuilding strategy is thus most relevant. Moreover, a decade has passed since the first international efforts to establish peace in the country were implemented. As made clear above, the social well-being sector is best measured in a later phase, since it is not the first priority in the direct aftermath of conflict. Consequently, it is relevant to measure the degree of the well-being in this country. Because both aspects (dominant presence of the UN and the right phase of peacebuilding) are at hand in Timor-Leste’s peace process, the analysis will provide a rich source of evidence. Concluding, the legitimacy of the use of a transitional government will be assessed on whether it has been able to develop a high degree of social well-being, which is partly indicative for the sustainability of the peace. Timor-Leste is used as a case study. Accordingly, this research aims to answer the question: “to what extent did the external transitional government in Timor-Leste succeed in creating sustainable peace, analysed a decade after independence in the social wellbeing sector?” The first chapter will give insight in the different concepts, by providing a background on the discussions around these concepts. Accordingly, the guiding research question is: “How can host nation ownership, external intervention, social well-being and the interrelation of ownership and intervention be understood from a peacebuilding perspective?” In the following chapter, a historic synopsis of the conflict will be presented by answering the question: what are the relevant geographic, socio-economic and historic features that influence the dynamics relevant to peacebuilding in Timor-Leste?.

(12) ML WAJER │. 10. The core of this paper will analyse the degree to which there is social well-being in Timor-Leste. USIP found four sectors that together construct social well-being. Each of them will be addressed in their own chapter. This will be done by analysing the extent to which the different features (access to and delivery of basic needs services, access to and delivery of education, right of return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons and social reconstruction) that contribute to well-being are achieved in the Timorese society. Finally, a conclusion will be given, in which the main question will be addressed by combining all of above. To formulate an answer to the research questions, an interpretative and qualitative approach is used. This study is based on literature. As such, conclusions are based on document sources from academics and practitioners. The main body of this research will rely on articles published in academic journals and books from reputable publishers. However, also so-called grey literature will be used, mainly reports from the larger non-governmental and international organisations, such as the UN and USIP. Moreover, some statistical information will be used to support the qualitative conclusions. Literature is predominantly accessed from the libraries of Uppsala University, University of Groningen and Columbia University. This research is carried out to finalise the masters programme in Humanitarian Action from the Network On Humanitarian Action (NOHA) at the University of Groningen and Uppsala University. No field research in Timor-Leste is conducted for this research. However, a number of the documents are final reports of extensive field studies. Literature based research has several advantages. First, nobody serves as a research object, so that the Timorese society does not experience any inconveniences. Moreover, it limits the danger of subjectivity, since the study does not rely on personal observations exclusively. Additionally, the sources can be verified by the reader that would like to make use of the study for further research. However, literature reviews in general are prone to selectivity and the use of false, or outdated data from other sources. For this reason, the data from documents is cross-checked and supplemented with information from formal and informal interviews. This has been made possible by the mobility programme with Columbia University for which an Erasmus Mundus Scholarship was granted. In addition, the usage of the documents presented above limits the chances of being confronted with false data..

(13) ML WAJER │. 11. 1. THE FRAMEWORK OF A ALYSIS 1.1 Introduction This chapter will introduce the concepts host nation ownership, external intervention and social well-being from a peacebuilding perspective. Subsequently, the question that will be answered in this chapter is the following: “How can host nation ownership, external intervention, social well-being and the interrelation of ownership and intervention be understood from a peacebuilding perspective?” A sound understanding of peacebuilding as an independent notion facilitates the apprehension of the other concepts. Subsequently, peacebuilding will be clarified in the first component of this chapter. Then, an assessment of the significance of local ownership in peacebuilding will be made before external intervention will be addressed. These will be followed by an analysis on the interrelation of the concepts. When defining the concepts, attention will be given to the relevant dilemma’s and questions that underpin the debate on the concepts’ roles in peacebuilding. This part of the chapter aims to present a set of elements that have to be considered in the post conflict phase. The second part of the chapter will outline social well-being as an element of sustainable peace. This part will serve as the theoretical framework for the remainder of the study. 1.2 Concepts 1.2.1 Peacebuilding Definition Peacebuilding efforts aim to create a so-called positive peace (Call and Cook 3). This affirmative term is created by Johan Galtung, one of the founding fathers of conflict resolution as an academic discipline. He operationalises violence by dividing it into smaller pieces. According to this scholar, violence consist of three elements that together form the socalled conflict triangle: structural violence, cultural violence and direct violence. They respectively represent contradiction, attitudes and behaviour in a society (Weber and Galtung 1-24). The absence of violent behaviour, whilst the contradiction or the attitudes are not solved, indicates a negative peace. Positive peace refers to a situation in which none of the different types of violence are present in a society (Galtung, Jacobsen and Brand-Jacobsen 32). Original, or so called first-generation peacekeeping operations tried to establish negative peace, while current peacebuilding efforts aim to create positive peace (Ramsbotham,.

(14) ML WAJER │. 12. Woodhouse and Miall 147). Accordingly, the goal to maintain status quo is replaced by a more ambitious plan of managing the transition from war to peace (Eide et al 14). Since peacebuilding stresses the end goal, it elaborates further and relies on successful attempts of peacekeeping that provide a non-violent atmosphere. Although the concept was initially introduced by Boutros Ghali’s An agenda for peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in 1992 as the latest phase in a conflict continuum, this notion of sequential phases is no longer valid.4 Yet, in the diplomatic scene and within the UN, the term peacebuilding still has the connotation of the continuance of peacekeeping. To distinguish reference to this later phase from peacebuilding, the term peace consolidation can be used, following the example of the Centre of International Coordination in New York (Chandran et al 14). Accordingly, the whole spectrum of intervention over the complete time span is set under the peacebuilding umbrella. This includes security, political, humanitarian, and development issues. Therefore the definition of Call and Cousens fits this study. According to these two scholars, peacebuilding is “[a]ctions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and a modicum of participatory politics. Post-conflict peacebuilding is the sub-set of such actions undertaken after the termination of armed hostilities” (Call and Cousens 3). Peacebuilding as a Strategy The report of the Secretary General 'o exit without strategy from 2001 presents peacebuilding as a strategy (c.f. S/2001/394). Indeed, peacebuilding is commonly regarded as an exit strategy for the international interveners (c.f. S/2001/394; Call and Cousens 2; Lederach 109; Doyle and Sambanis 64; Gowen and Johnstone 6). For the two political scientists Doyle and Sambanis the term strategic refers to matching means and ends. For Lederach, strategic refers to the need to look “beyond the immediate and most visible aspects of a given activity” (Lederach 109). So peacebuilding should be about the means and the long term end of withdrawal. This is in line with the realisation of the UN, after the debacles in e.g. the Balkans and the Horn of Africa, that they had to make their efforts more sustainable. Thus, when the peacebuilding efforts have achieved a certain degree of positive peace, at which it becomes self-sustainable, the peacebuilders can legitimately leave the country. Sustainable peace can therefore be regarded as a state in which a country coming out of conflict can sustain its own peace and drive its own development, without the help of external. 4. Boutros Ghali dropped this notion himself in his Supplement to an Agenda for peace in 1995..

(15) ML WAJER │. 13. interveners. It would be more appropriate to refer to this ability than to the possibility to withdraw as the ultimate goal of peacebuilding. In practical terms it refers to the same state of affairs. Philosophically however, it lacks aspiration to focus on and favour the latter. Approaches to Peacebuilding There is no common agreement on the degree to which the positive elements should be targeted by peacebuilders. Some favour what Call and Cousens refer to as the maximalist approach in which the root causes of the conflict and a set of societal elements, such as inequality and respect for human rights are addressed (Call and Cousens 5). Illustratively, Roland Paris in his book At war’s end advocates for this approach (c.f. Paris). Whereas the minimalistic approach is essentially concerned with violent behaviour alone, thus aiming at the establishment of negative peace. However, such an approach does not ‘fit’ under the peacebuilding umbrella as presented above. Many scholars and organisations adopt a middle stance, such as Call, Cousens, Doyle and Sambanis. One of the elements of positive peace that peacebuilding addresses when implementing the maximalist approach is the degree of social well-being in the post conflict society. As a consequence, this study adopts the maximalist approach. Lederach specifies that peacebuilding requires a long term vision in which a culture of violence has to be transformed into a culture of peace. He emphasises that this requires “genuine responsibility, ownership and participation” by the society affected” (Lederach qtd. in Philpott and Powers 186-187). Spoilers A main challenge in the post conflict phase regarding the rebuilding of the well-being sector is the threat of spoilers (USIP 98). Civil war generally hurts the large majority of the population. Nevertheless, there are always certain groups that benefit from it (Anderson, M. 13). Illustratively, the parties that illegally exploit the natural resources of the country have financial gains and warlords that dominate the area often experience a substantial increase in terms of power. Consequently, there are always small groups that will lose privileges when peace returns to a country. These groups might sabotage the peace process and are therefore referred to as spoilers. Conflict often leaves the country with a power vacuum. Spoilers might take advantage of this and try to maximise their power or they might even try to destabilise the peace as a whole to continue their fruitful exploitations. When there is an acceptable level of well-being achieved in society, the gap between the benefits of the rebel life and normal society will shrink. Consequently, the costs of living a rebel life will start to exceed the.

(16) ML WAJER │. 14. benefits. Moreover, looting and theft can no longer be excused as the only available means for survival if there is an adequate level of social well-being. 1.2.2 Host 'ation Ownership from a Peacebuilding Perspective Local Ownership In the discourse of the international community concerned with the reconstruction of war-torn or failed states, ownership does not refer to its literal meaning as possession over property or something intangible. Rather it addresses the degree to which a host nation drives the reconstruction path of the country, that is often drawn up by international actors. They will drive these actions when they perceive the policies as their own. The term ownership in the peacebuilding literature refers to this sentiment (Chesterman “Ownership” 4-9). Ownership as a peacebuilding concept entered the international scene in 1995, when the Development and Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted the paper on Development Partnerships in the 'ew Global Context. This document states that the people of a country should be the owners of their own development (OECD 2). Full host nation ownership indicates that a country drives its own long term development needs and priorities. There is an underlying assumption that the country has the responsibility to do so (USIP 22). However, during the transition from war to peace, authority is occasionally and temporarily in the hands of the international actors, as described above in the case of Timor-Leste. In such cases, ownership is perceived as the degree to which the national actors support the international efforts in the country. This is what Chesterman refers to as buy-in (Chesterman “Ownership” 4-9). Local ownership can be regarded as an outcome, but also as a process. In the form of the first it appears as the sum of the built capacity and institutions. However, Annika Hansen, Senior Scientist at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, points out that it is useless to address ownership solely as an outcome, since externally created capacities and institutions are often inappropriate. If local ownership also fulfils the process function, the outcome will be more appropriate to local structures and thereby stronger (Hansen 296). Richard Caplan acknowledges this and emphasises that imposed institutions that do not reflect the population’s values will encounter difficulties to produce a genuine change (Caplan 58). Jens Narten builds on this awareness and defines local ownership in the context of peacebuilding as: “the process and final outcome of the gradual transfer to legitimate representatives of the local society, of assessment, planning and decision-making functions, the practical management and implementations of these functions, and the evaluation and.

(17) ML WAJER │. 15. control of all phases of statebuilding programmes, with the aim of making external peaceand statebuilding redundant” (Narten 254). For the local actors to be able to take up the responsibility for reconstruction of their country, they need capacity. Consequently, to obtain host nation ownership in post conflict settings, capacity will more often than not need significant strengthening. Accordingly, local ownership and capacity building are both strategic elements of peacebuilding. Local Capacity and the Strengthening Thereof Local capacity is a broad concept that encompasses numerous elements and is widely used in different fields of interest. There is no common agreement on the meaning of ‘local capacity’ from a peacebuilding perspective, despite the fact that local capacity is abundantly cited in peacebuilding literature. Clearly, capacity refers to the ability to effect something. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) makes reference to individual as well as collective abilities to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives (UNDP 3). Lederach complements ability with the understanding of challenges that conflict poses (Lederach 109). Brinkerhoff, affiliated to the George Washington University combines above and defines capacity as “having the aptitudes, resources, relationships and facilitating conditions that are necessary to act effectively to achieve some intended purpose” (Brinkerhoff 4). Local capacity building predominantly refers to the process in which a capacity is strengthened (Lederach 108; Brinkerhoff 4). Building local capacity can therefore be understood as the strengthening of the local aptitudes, resources, relationships and facilitating conditions that are necessary to act effectively to achieve some intended purpose. Local is often used to describe a sub-national level. However, in the context of peacebuilding in Timor-Leste, local is considered as a sub-international level and refers to the national level. From a peacebuilding perspective, it is generally acknowledged that local structures are weakened during conflict. However, this assumption is challenged in the case of fragile states or states in the immediate aftermath of conflict, such as Timor-Leste (Strohmeyer). In this case it is argued that the local structures might have been completely eroded as a consequence of the conflict. This means that capacities should be established, rather than strengthened in the two above-mentioned environments. This assumption clearly neglects the ability of people to cope with extreme situations and the resilience of affected societies (c.f. McCabe). Coping mechanisms will be stretched, but indigenous self-help structures are.

(18) ML WAJER │. 16. present in any society (Quinn, Mick 1-2). Moreover, countries in war often have a well educated diaspora that is willing to invest in its country. 1.2.3 Transitional Authority and other Degrees of Intervention Transitional Authority Intervention in the post conflict phase can be based on a moral or humanitarian imperative. Especially since peacebuilding efforts are seen as to prevent a country from falling back to the use of violence. An enormous difficulty for this kind of interventions is that they are dependent on political will. Involvement in the restoration of a war-torn or failed state is extremely costly, not at least in providing a secure environment so reconstruction efforts can take place. The main debate that surrounds this type of interventions is about whether a host country should give consent for intervention or whether a threshold of suffering allows the UN – or a ‘coalition of the willing’ – to intervene in the state, for issues that were originally regarded as domestic affairs. However, after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the spread of values like liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society took a more prominent place in the international discourse. These values are now regarded as legitimate and just motives for intervention by a substantial part of the actors (Weissman 1). Moreover, this view mobilised nations, since this type of intervention was perceived to be strategic in a sense that it would enhance the international security situation, that had just proven to be vulnerable. It is partly due to these developments that the amount of missions and military troops deployed increased significantly over the last decade (Gowen and Johnstone 2). However, even when political will is found, not all interventions share the same means. The desired scope of intervention has particular value in this study, since the value of a transitional government will be assessed. The creation of a transitional authority can be set at the one end of the continuum regarding the degree of intervention and passive involvement at the other side. In Hansen’s terminology, a transitional government is a form of substitution of the normal structures, what is set opposite to the monitoring of actions (Hansen 296-303). The middle ground in the overlapping phases is reform. Reformation aims at the transformation of the old structures, rather than empowerment of the already existing ones. These relations are depicted in figure 1..

(19) ML WAJER │. 17. Figure 2. Degrees of intervention (Source: Hansen 303). A. transitional. government. distinguishes. itself from the other, lighter, forms of intervention, since a transitional government has actual. authority. over. the. national institutions (Caplan 53).. Subsequently,. transitional. authority. a has. executive powers that are normally. reserved. for. a. national government, such as the design of new laws and structure that give form to a post war society. With the effect that this type of intervention changes society more fundamentally than reformation. Therefore, it can be regarded “the most total form of international administration” (Chopra “Building” 979). In conclusion, substitution of national authorities is an extreme tool for extreme situations and should be depicted on the left side of figure 1. A second characteristic is that a transitional authority, per definition implies a limited timeframe. The duration of the external governance is dependent on the goals set on forehand. Thirdly, such interventions can and have been applied to a variety of situations. A former government might lose its authority and disintegrate, the sovereign power can be forced to leave office or a transition from occupying power to sovereign state authorities can take place (Chopra “Building” 980). What al these situations have in common is that local capacities are considered low and that there is a real or a fear for a power vacuum and its accompanying threats. Designing the Response The debate on the manners of intervention in response to anarchy emerged in the 1990’s. As the former higher UNTAET official Chopra describes, several scholars advocate for a new type of trusteeship as a possible solution for collapsed or failed states (Chopra “Building” 980). However, the discourse of opponents is different towards this concept. They speak about concepts as neo-colonialism or even more proactively about post-modern imperialism. They argue that interventions might be based on Western instead of universal.

(20) ML WAJER │. 18. values. The criticism stating the gravity of a situation in which a group of states can legitimately breach sovereignty for these values also comes from the same corner (Koshy). Regardless the normative values in this debate, it is clear that there are several technically different options for intervention. These options range from passive monitoring to temporary replacement of the government. The choice for what type of intervention is appropriate is dependent on many factors. According to Hansen the main factors that determine the type of intervention are the status quo at the beginning of the operation, the dynamics of the conflicts, the condition of the local political structures and lastly, the international commitment on the political level. (Hansen 296). Also Doyle and Sambanis make a relation between what they call local capacities, the international capacities and the degree of hostility. The relation between those concepts defines the peacebuilding triangle that symbolises the space for peace in a post conflict society. The degree of hostilities and the existence of local capacities determine the needed international capacities to create enough space for peace. Thus, the international capacities will fill up the gap that the intensity of the hostilities and the lack of local capacities will create in the conflict environment, so that space for peace remains. All conflicts are characterised by different dimensions, thus all conflicts will have their uniquely shaped peacebuilding triangle. Consequently, conflict resolution mechanisms should be tailor made to suit all different conflicts, depending on the conflict’s location on the peacebuilding triangle map. Accordingly, the decision on the type of intervention will be based on how the above described concepts relate to each other. Consequently, local capacities play a central role in the normative debate on the international responses. On the one hand there are advocates of methods such as the ‘light footprint’. This approach was developed by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Brahimi for UN intervention in Afghanistan and is designed to bolster capacity in the affected state by means of supporting the local community rather than taking control (Chopra “Building” 982). In this ‘light footprint’ a state designs its own political trajectory (Chesterman Walking Softly 38). The method thus takes the local capacities as a starting point. This approach is supported by other scholars and organisations that advocate for a bottom-up approach, such as Lederach, M. Anderson, Chopra, Etzioni, Interpeace and the Life and Peace Institute (c.f. Lederach; c.f Anderson, M.; c.f Chopra “Building”; Hansen 301; Svensson 21; Interpeace). Others such as Chesterman and Caplan argue that the severe situations demand a temporary override for peacebuilding initiatives to have a chance for success. This full executive authority is considered necessary, since the local population might otherwise try to frustrate the efforts of the international community, as their strategic objectives might differ.

(21) ML WAJER │. 19. from the international vision (Chesterman You, the People 1; Caplan 63). Chesterman states that “Political ownership may well be the end of a transitional administration, but it is often not the means of achieving it” (Chesterman “Ownership” 20). The use of a transitional authority, such as done in Timor-Leste, fits within this school of thought. According to the Stanford University scholar Krasner, this debate is not as bipolar as the previous discussion makes believe. He argues that the available peacebuilding tools, largely governance assistance and transitional administration, are inadequate. Rather he opts for a shared sovereignty. Under which individuals chosen by international organisations, powerful states, or ad hoc entities would share authority with nationals over some aspects of domestic sovereignty (Krasner 89). Noticeably, not everybody favours the UN’s path in Timor-Leste. Nevertheless, reality is that implementation of a transitional government under the auspices of the UN is currently regarded as one of the available responses to post conflicts societies where the degree of hostilities has been so high, that local capacities are significantly diminished or otherwise unavailable as a result of war. 1.3 Theoretical Framework After having discussed the different dilemma’s in peacebuilding and given an insight in the interrelation between the different concepts relevant to this research, this part of the chapter will present social well-being as an element of peacebuilding. The USIP model presents five end states, namely: rule of law, safe and secure environment, social well-being, sustainable economy and stable government. When sufficient progress has been booked in all five sectors, peacebuilding has reached its goal, as the peace is considered to be sustainable. The five working area’s are interdependent. This indicates that none of the end states can individually be achieved. However, only one branch of the model will be of interest to this research, namely the one that focuses on the well-being of TimorLeste’s nationals a decade after the departure of the Indonesians. As explained above, focus on well-being is reflective of the original goals of peacebuilding and relatively neglected as a possible threat to the sustainability of peace in the peacebuilding literature. Accordingly, the well-being end state will be the focus of attention in this research. When the other sectors clearly influence the well-being sector, the other indicators will not be left out artificially. Instead reference will be made to the other sectors. Influence of the well-being sector can also.

(22) ML WAJER │. 20. be found in the other sectors. However, since this research does not studies these sectors, this function of the interdependent relation will not be clarified. Social well-being is the “[a]bility of people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement” (USIP 161). Social well-being is a vague concept that is not easily measurable. However, the analysts of USIP, that created the stabilisation and reconstruction framework, found that there are four variables that serve as conditions to achieve this end state. The first is Access to and Delivery of Education. Peacebuilding efforts should aim to reform the education system, so that it will promote peace and other values important to peacebuilding. It is exceptionally important that all children have equal access to education, and that no distinction between, gender, ethnicity or location is made. The second condition is Right of Return and Resettlement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. A safe, voluntary and dignified return or resettlement should be guaranteed. An accompanying problem involves land properties. When people flee their home, property it is often taken over by others or destroyed. It is impossible to claim their land without official documents, which are often lacking. Furthermore, reintegration and rehabilitation is necessary to ensure that the return or resettlement can succeed and last in the long run (USIP 178-186). Figure 3. Social well-being (Source USIP 161). Access to and Delivery. of. Basic 'eeds Services is the third condition that influences social well-being. Original basic needs, such as water, food and shelter are the first to be addressed in this case. A minimum standard of health services needs to be present as well (USIP 196-172). This is especially important. since. conflict. often.

(23) ML WAJER │. 21. deteriorates all existing infrastructures and war increases the health needs, e.g. widespread rape is a common feature of war. Lastly, Social Reconstruction is the fourth parameter for social well-being. This concept addresses questions on reconciliation between the previous warring parties and the creation of a common identity (USIP 186 -192). 1.4 Conclusion This chapter shed some light on the concepts peacebuilding, local ownership and the different forms of external international intervention in the post conflict phase. Peacebuilding is explained as an overarching term that encompasses several initiatives that aim to build peace, including efforts that aim to change attitudes and culture. Local ownership is linked to the way the local community perceives the peace process and whether they feel involved, as well as the outcome in which the community drives its own development. Additionally, the existence of local capacity is necessary for ownership. A transitional government is set next to other forms of intervention and is explained as the most extreme peacebuilding tool. Moreover, an interrelation is found between the last two concepts when designing the international response. Since the choice of the intervention mechanism is inter alia dependent on local capacity. Local capacity is necessary for a country to drive its own peace process, or to have ownership of the peace. The shape of the external intervention will thus depend on the possible degree of ownership. While the chosen intervention mechanism influences the degree of local ownership. Since local ownership of the peace process is inherently low if the international community implements a transitional government. The second part of the chapter defined and disentangled social well-being so that it can be measured. Social well-being is the ability of people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement. The different elements that contribute to social well-being are used as the guiding principles for stabilization and reconstruction. The guidelines prescribe four elements that will indicate the level of well-being, namely: access to and delivery of basic needs services, access to and delivery of education, the right of return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons and social reconstruction. All of these sectors will be dealt with in the core of this thesis..

(24) ML WAJER │. 22. 2. BACKGROU D O TIMOR-LESTE “It is a test case, therefore it is even a laboratory case where we can transform utopia into reality. But I think we can try and get it right in the case of Timor” (Sérgio Vieira de Mello on CNN).. 2.1 Introduction The current situation in Timor-Leste can not be understood independently, but should be analysed in its history and context. Since these factors influence the dynamics in society that peacebuilding targets to change or uses a resource base. Consequently, without understanding the background of the crisis, the current situation can not be well interpreted. This chapter will outline background information by answering the question: what are the relevant geographic, socio-economic and historic features that influence the dynamics relevant to peacebuilding in Timor-Leste? 2.2 Geographic and Socio-Economic Features East Timor consists of the eastern part of the island Timor, that is located in the south of the Indonesian archipelago (annex I). It includes a northern enclave in the western part of Timor, Oecussi, and the islands Atauro and Jaco. Together the territory forms a generous 15,000 km². The country produces sandalwood and the surrounding water has large gas and oil reserves. It has a tropical climate with a harsh seasonal variety, characterised by droughts, floods and tropical cyclones (drought-monsoons cycle). Due to its location on the border of two continental plates, the country is mountainous and vulnerable to landslides, earthquakes and tsunami’s. The heterogeneous country is inhabited by an estimated 1,1 million people. TimorLeste is one of the countries with the highest fertility rates in the world, with an average of seven children per woman (World Fertility Data 2008). This, combined with harsh living circumstances, causes that the nation’s population is among the youngest in the world. Over 42 percent is under the age of 15, and 16 percent under the age of five (UNFPA). The Austronesians, also known as the Malayo-Polynesians, are the largest ethnic group of TimorLeste. The Austronesians are subdivided in several different subgroups, of which the Tetum form the largest group. They predominantly live in the North and in the surroundings of the capital Dili. The mountainous terrain has in the past kept the different groups isolated from each other. This explains the linguistic diversity that is still found on the island. Over thirty languages/dialects are spoken in the country. The lingua franca of Timor-Leste is the Dili variant of Tetum (Nicolai “Learning” 120). The social cleavages are also found along these.

(25) ML WAJER │. 23. lines. Generally the Mestiço, with Portuguese ancestors have the highest status in society; they speak Portuguese. The urban inhabitants speak Bahasa Indonesia and the Tetum, or speakers of another indigenous language reside in the rural parts of the country (Schöndorf 218). The groups share the catholic religion, there is only a small minority of Muslims and Protestants. The population is predominantly rural and the majority of the city dwellers live in the capital. After years of rankings of Low Human Development, Timor-Leste is currently considered to have ‘medium human development’. However, the achieved 120th place in de Human Development Index is below regional average. When calculated in purchasing power parity, the country has a GDP of 906 US$ per capita (Human Development Report 2010). 2.3 Historic Synopsis Since the beginning of the 1550s, the island Timor has been exposed to Portuguese colonial interests. However, not only the Portuguese were interested in the territory. Competition with the Dutch led to violent skirmishes. The Treaty of Lisbon from 1859 ended this series of clashes and left the Portuguese entitled to the eastern part of the country. Finally, the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal caused a shift away from the overseas colonies. Violent internal struggles between three Timorese political parties emerged in the power vacuum that arose due to the reduced Portuguese influence. The socialist Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) aspired independence after a short transitional period. The Timorese Popular Democratic Association (APODETI) was pro integration with Indonesia and the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) represented the interest of the elite and favoured progressive autonomy with Portuguese presence. Portugal left Timor-Leste on 28 August 1975. Internally, FRETILIN had the upper hand and unilaterally declared independence on 28 November 1975. However, the independence was short-lived. Indonesia, under the approval of the United States, invaded the country only nine days afterwards (Lisson 1478). They claimed that yet another communist state in the region was a threat to regional stability. Moreover, they were afraid that independence might stir up other separatists movements of the archipelago (UCDP). In December the Indonesians reached the capital Dili and in June 1976 Timor-Leste was officially inaugurated as the 27th province of Indonesia. The Indonesians violently suppressed the Timorese population. Human right violations of all sorts were widespread. An estimated 183,000 Timorese were killed, many others arbitrarily detained, tortured, sexually abused etc. (ICTJ). Moreover, the Indonesians “systematically prevented [the East Timorese] from seizing influential posts in the local administration as well as in the economy” and “exploited the East Timorese workforce at the.

(26) ML WAJER │. 24. bottom of the working chain” (Schöndorf 216-220). The heavily militarised, harsh and discriminative Indonesian rule created support for FRETILIN and its armed wing, the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL), among the population. FALANTIL continued resistance after the inauguration. Phases of strong resistance and periods of tranquillity alternated. As a result of the continued suppression, the different East Timorese movements united in 1988. At this time, the FALINTIL leader Xanana Gusmão founded the overarching political organisation, the National Council of the Maubere Resistance (CNRM) what sparked another round of violence (UCDP). Change was brought forth during the economic crisis in Southeast Asia. The fall of the long standing President Suharto resulted in political instability, which created a window of opportunity for independence (Reiger and Wierda 4-5). The new Indonesian president Habibie agreed upon a popular consultation in the 5th May Agreement. The UN set up the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to arrange and conduct a popular consultation. On 30 August 1999, 78.6 percent in a 98.6 percent turnout favoured independence in combination with a UN transitional administration over autonomy (UCDP). The Indonesian forces, who were unfortunately put in charge of the security around the referendum, together with the pro-integrationist internal groups, retaliated against the outcome with ´Operation Clean Sweep´. The ‘scorched earth method’ employed clearly aimed to destroy Timor’s survival (Power 288). Orders included to kill ‘those 15 years and older, including both males and females, without exception” (Da Silva Tavares qtd. in Chopra “Kingdom” 27). Approximately eighty percent of the population got displaced, of which a large percentage was ‘kept hostage’ in Indonesian ´refugee camps´ by pro Indonesia militia (Fawthrop 15; Wissner 1). An estimated 1200 civilians were murdered and “anything of value destroyed” (Schöndorf 231). Also property was a clear objective of the militia. Illustratively, a milk truck was used to pump fuel into houses before they were lit on fire (Fitzpatrick 9). In response all non-essential UNAMET staff was evacuated and the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was deployed, with approval from Jakarta.5 Authorised under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the mission was mandated to restore peace and security with all necessary means (UN Charter Art. 41). The mission was not a classical multinational force, rather the UN subcontracted Australia.6 As a consequence the first troops 5. The international community had been able to mobilise the right tools to pressure President Habibie. In short, this consisted out of two elements: coercive leverage of withdrawing IMF and WB loans, as well as the broadcasting of Indonesia as an international pariah (Wheeler and Dunne 818). 6 It is argued that Australia agreed to lead this mission, since they had disregarded the Indonesian violent suppression of the East Timorese. Australia had de jure recognised Indonesian authority, albeit the UN had.

(27) ML WAJER │. 25. arrived as early as on 20 September. Resulting in a rapid return of all Indonesians to Indonesia. In October, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established “to maintain security, provide interim governorship of the territory, and prepare the country for the transition to independence.” (Schöndorf 236). In order to do so, they were given the authority in the executive, legislative and judicative sectors (Schöndorf 236). The mission was led by the Department for Peacekeeping Operations that considered Timor-Leste as “political as well as administrative vacuum” (Schöndorf 243). Although several actors have challenged this assumption on the grounds of the above outlined arguments, DPKO did not reconsider its stance. It is this assumption that lies at the foundation of the UN’s decision to implement an external transitional government in Timor-Leste (Schöndorf 242 and 268). Despite the actions of anti-independence militias, the international agencies declared the end of the emergency phase in March 2000 and started a focus on sustainable development (Alonso and Brugha 208). Moreover, the transition towards independence followed according to plan. In May 2002, the Democratic Republic of East Timor7 became a sovereign, independent state. UNTAET was replaced by the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). Later that year, it became a UN member state. Gusmão’s CNRM was transformed into the National Congress for the Reconstruction of East Timor (CNRT) and in 2002 he became the first elected president of the independent country with 83 percent of the votes. In 2006 the country faced a violent political crisis that was contained with military intervention by the states that had previously supported INTERFET as well. This crisis resulted in the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and the resignation of the prime minister (annex III). In 2007, Ramos-Horta succeeded Gusmão as President. After parliamentary elections in August, Gusmão was chosen as Prime Minister. 2.4 Conclusion This chapter outlined the relevant geographic, socio-economic and historic features of Timor-Leste that influence the dynamics relevant to peacebuilding. Timor-Leste is a small island in the eastern Indian Ocean that is vulnerable to several natural hazards. Despite the condemned the occupation (Cribb in: Europa Publications 423). The motivation for this is not clear. However, the link to the Agreement between Australia and Indonesia for joint exploitation of oil and gas reserves in the Timorese sea is easily made (Wheeler and Dunne 811). 7 For the remainder of this study the country will conventionally be indicated as Timor-Leste..

(28) ML WAJER │. 26. country’s gas and oil reserves, it remains relatively poor and the country has a medium human development. The population of around one million is one of the youngest and most fertile of the world. Historically, the different social groups have lived isolated from each other. As a consequence many different native languages are still used. In 1859 the country was colonised by the Portuguese and in 1975, it was annexed by Indonesia after nine days of independence. The Indonesians implemented a brutal and discriminative rule, while different East Timorese fractions continued the struggle for independence in a guerrilla war. Under the auspices of the UN, the country voted in favour of independence in 1999. The Indonesians retaliated the outcome with exceptional violence, causing severe destruction of the country. The UN forced the Indonesians out of East Timor with military means and installed an external transition government that would govern the country until May 2002. At that time, the county independently governed itself for the first time. In 2006, political tensions escalated to violence. The UN contained the violence with a peacekeeping force. The first prime minister resigned to diminish the tensions and in 2007 the current government got elected..

(29) ML WAJER │. 27. 3. ACCESS TO A D DELIVERY OF EDUCATIO 3.1 Introduction The first building block for social well-being is access to and delivery of education. This is a condition in which: “every child receives primary education, even in times of war and without regard to ethnicity, gender, or location. This condition also includes access to higher education for advanced learning, development of professional skills, and non formal education for youth and adults who may have never received or completed formal education” (USIP 173). To examine to what extent the condition ‘access to and delivery of education’ is achieved in the Timorese society, the different elements of the definition will be addressed in this chapter. However, to put this in perspective, the first paragraph will shed light on the correlation of peacebuilding and education. In the following paragraphs, each of the different elements of the definition will be analysed: school attendance, equal access, non-formal education and further learning. The condition of education in times of war is not of interest to this research, since this study focuses on well-being of the population ten years after the end of the conflict in order to see to what extent the conditions for sustainable peace are at hand in the East Timorese society. 3.2 Significance of Education 3.2.1 Education as a Supporting Factor to Peace It is commonly accepted that education contributes to sustainable peace in a sense that education has a pacifying effect on existing conflict and educational investment lowers the probability of a relapse in the aftermath of unrest (Miller-Grandvaux 6). An especially strong correlation is found with secondary enrolment, male secondary enrolment and increasing literacy rates (Thyne 750). The effect is established through different mechanisms. First, if the government invest clearly in education, this will be regarded as a strong commitment of the government to improve the lives of the people. Moreover, when this is done on an equal basis, this will diminish grievances (Thyne 733). Grievances, in their turn, are a potential cause of conflict (Stewart). Thus, equal access will reduce tensions in a heterogeneous society. Secondly, education can render economic, political, and social stability by addressing potential destabilising factors and enabling people to resolve disputes peacefully. Illustratively, young people will be less vulnerable to the temptations of inter alia joining rebel armies if educated (Thyne 733). Moreover, violent opposition will decrease since the.

(30) ML WAJER │. 28. population will be more likely to understand and accept that long term goals as sustainable peace and development may have trade-offs in the short run. Additionally, a school provides an environment in which children can come in touch with specific ‘peace education programmes’. Peace education teaches about the conflict, the root causes, the particular tensions in the affected society and highlights the revenues of peace. These education programmes will facilitate the reform of attitudes in a post conflict society. As a result, the initiatives contribute to positive peace through ‘cultural peacebuilding’. Unsurprisingly, the teachings will only have this effect if they are not abused by one group to consolidate their power. 3.2.2 Education as a Supporting Factor to Social Well-Being In general, education can serve as a tool for well-being because it contributes for many to a feeling of satisfaction. Nevertheless, statistically the correlation is surprisingly weak (Diener et al. 293). However, there is a strong correlation between life satisfaction and occupational status and income on the one hand and education has a high correlation with these two elements on the other hand (Diener et al. 293). Therefore, education is an indirect determinant via occupational status and income of well-being. With regard to the post conflict phase, education also contributes to the overall well-being of a person, because it fosters a sense of normality. During war, normal, daily life is disrupted. Going back to school gives a routine that provides structure and enables parents to go to work. Moreover, school is a protected area of familiarity and comfort in which youngsters that need psychosocial services can be identified (Tomlinson and Benefield 1; USIP 177). It is therefore not surprising that the transitional administration found that seven out of ten East Timorese mentioned education as their top national priority (WB “Education” xi). Additionally, education becomes a much stronger determinant of well-being for people with a low income (Diener et al. 293). And as indicated above, conflict occurs most often in low-income countries (Collier 17). Consequently, there is a strong connection between education and well-being for populations in the aftermath of conflict. The positive relations between education and peace on the one hand and peace and social well-being on the other hand are so evident that access to education is one of the first concepts that got recognised as a human rights. The entitlement to education is well defined in different bodies of international law. First and foremost, the UN Convention on the Rights of.

(31) ML WAJER │. 29. the Child8 established the right to primary education. In addition, this right is enshrined in the Geneva conventions9 and several UN resolutions10 (Tomlinson and Benefield 10). The Dakar agreement of 2000 increased international attention for its goal ‘Education for All’ (UNESCO). It also emphasised that households should not bear direct costs from sending their children to school. A few months later, the right to ‘Achieve Universal Primary Education’ was adopted as the second Millenium Development Goal (MDG) in New York (UN “Millennium”). This is particularly important since the MDG’s, next to attention, also attract funding. Recently, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the right to education in emergency settings in an attempt to support the achievement of MDG-2 (A/RES/64/290). 3.3 Educational State of Affairs 3.3.1 Access to Education Before independence statistics on illiteracy fluctuate from thirty percent to two thirds of the population. Moreover, literacy accounts are likely inflated (Pederson and Arneberg 84). Consequently, it is impossible to give exact numbers. However, it can be concluded that a significant part of the Indonesian population could not read or write in 1998. Moreover, enrolment was far from universal and Indonesian public spending on education accounted for only 2.9 percent of the Indonesian GDP in 1998/1999 (WB “Education” 4). Additionally, in a comparative study of Pradhan and Sparrow at provincial level, it became clear that TimorLeste scored well below the Indonesian national average on education (Pradhan and Sparrow qtd. in WB “education” 5). Furthermore, the excessive post referendum violence left 95 percent of the schools damaged and/or understaffed. The latter because the teachers, overwhelmingly Indonesians, had to flee the country (WB “Education” xviii). The objective set by the first East Timorese government is to reach the MDG of universal enrolment in 2015 (WB “Education” xi). According to Susan Nicolai, education advisor for Save the Children UK, Timor-Leste “boosted up enrolment” (Nicolai, “Rebuilding” 23). In addition, the Worldbank (WB) called “the massive increase in enrolment by poor, girls and rural children[,] … the most 8. The Convention on the Rights of the Child from 2 September 1990 and was the first legally binding international instrument to incorporate the full range of human rights—civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. Article 28 provides in the right to primary education. 9 According to article 4 (3)(a) of the Additional Protocol II from 1977, “children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular … they shall receive an education” (Additional Protocol II). 10 UN Security Council resolutions 1261, 1314, 1379 and 1460 on “Children and Armed Conflict” all make reference of education..

(32) ML WAJER │. 30. phenomenal accomplishment.” (Nicolai “Learning” 82). The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) from the UN also recognizes a positive trend in primary school enrolment (CEDAW 7). United Nations Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF) State of the World’s Children report from 2009 presents the most recent available figures as from 2003 to 2008. The report indicates that Timor-Leste had a net school enrolment of 64 percent for boys and 62 percent for girls in this period (26). The net school enrolment measures “the enrolment of the official age-group for a given level of education expressed as a percentage of the corresponding population” (Edstat). The same report indicates that the gross school enrolment was 94 percent for boys and men and 88 for girls and women (26). The gross enrolment measures “the enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in a given school-year” (Edstat). The difference between the two variables thus says something about the enrolment of children outside the official target age group. UNICEF’s study also took school attendance into account. 76 percent of the enrolled boys and 74 of girls attended school (26). These figures are in line with Marie Quinn’s findings. She conducted numerous interviews with Timorese teachers and concluded that 20 percent of the enrolled children rarely attends classes (Quinn, Marie 112). Government expenditures on education increased to 4.5 percent of the Timor-Leste’s GDP under the transitional administration in 2001/2002 (Nicolai, “Learning” 175). Under independence, this percentage has risen 7.1 percent in 2008 (International Human Development Indicators). Countries that score high on the quality of education spend equivalent percentages. Illustratively, Finland, a frontrunner in the educational field, spent 6.5 percent of its GDP to education in 2008 (Childinfo; PISA). Several conclusions can be drawn from these figures. First, despite the encouraging developments, there remain a lot of boys and girls of school-going age that do not receive education (52 and 54 percent respectively).11 It also shows that a substantial amount of people of other age groups receive primary education. Moreover, the statistics show a small disadvantage in terms of access for girls. The data does not indicate the percentage of the children that actually learn how to read etc. The WB conducted an assessment on reading skills among 900 students in grade 1, 2 and 3 of Timorese schools. The results were put in their own words “worrying” (WB “Analysis” 2). “More than 70% of student at the end of 11. 76 percent attendance of 64 percent net enrolment indicates that 48 percent goes to school and 74 percent attendance of 62 percent net enrolment indicates that 46 percent goes to school..

(33) ML WAJER │. 31. grade 1 could not read a single word of the simple text passage they were asked to read.12 40% of the children were not able to read a single word at the end of grade 2; and the share of children scoring zero dropped to about 20% at the end of grade 3. The assessment provides clear evidence that many children spend years in primary schools in Timor-Leste without learning to read” (WB “Analysis” 17). Since reading is a fundamental skill for further learning, this has a cumulative negative effect on the future development of the children. 3.3.2 Equal Access Ethnicity Access to education should be equal for everyone to have the pacifying effect. Thus no discrimination should be made on ethnicity. In the past discrimination was common practice. During the Portuguese colonisation around fifty percent of the population received education, of which a disproportional part was of Portuguese decent (Schöndorf 218). Also the Indonesians practised a discriminative rule (Schöndorf 227). Currently there are no discriminative rules or laws applicable that limit access for certain ethnicities. In addition, there is no animosity between the ethnic groups (Schöndorf 218). Rather, “[t]he conflict in modern times – after the Portuguese left presence on the island – has been over the occupation by Indonesia and its consequences.” (Nordquist 4). Dividing lines that are perceived as “impossible/very difficult to change” (Nordquist 7) are found along linguistic lines, urban-rural professions and east-west residency (Nordquist 8) (annex IV). Since ethnicity is not perceived as one of the main dividing lines of society, it is not of great significance when analysing the destabilising factors in a post conflict environment. Nevertheless, a remark in regard to equal access for all needs to be made. There is currently still indirect discrimination in the educational system. Descent, that determines social group in Timor-Leste, might not be the direct and obvious factor to define access to education. However, differences along social lines are still found in Timor-Leste. This phenomenon is explained by the determinant income. Children whose parents have a higher average income attend school more often (Ministry of Education and Culture 11-19). As shown above, the original population lives mainly in the rural areas. As a consequence, they are largely dependent on agriculture, which is a low profit yielding sector (Schöndorf 227; Nordquist 8). As a result of their modest income, the children of the lower social group (the 12. Grade 1 is the first year in which children are taught to read. In a normal cycle children have the age of seven when they enter grade 1..

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