They want to break free: the effect of power imbalance on
information sharing in the criminal justice supply chain
by
Laura Nauta
Supervisor: dr. Carolien de Blok Co-assessor: dr. Kirstin Scholten
University of Groningen
ABSTRACT
As problems are arising regarding efficient information exchange in the criminal justice supply chain, this research focuses on what kind of information is shared in the chain. The aim of this research is to gain insight into the relationship between information sharing and power imbalance in the criminal justice supply chain. Although the benefits of sharing information are clear, the influence of differences in power among chain members on sharing different types of information remains unexplored. Therefore, this research will shed light on how power is distributed between the members of the criminal justice chain and the effect of this difference in power on the types of information that are shared. A multiple case study was used to take an in-depth look at the information exchange process between members of a subpart of the criminal justice chain, the Violent Offences Compensation Fund (Schadefonds) and the victim counters. The findings show that the four types of information sharing are influenced by seven different sources of power. The sources of power increasing the power of the less powerful member enhance the information exchange in the chain, whereas sources of power for the more powerful member hamper the information exchange. Insights are provided on how the power of chain members is influenced by the sources of power, and how they influence the four types of information sharing. Furthermore, characteristics of the criminal justice supply chain that influence the relation of power on information sharing in the chain are explained.
Keywords:
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. INTRODUCTION ... 4
2. THEORY ... 6
2.1INFORMATION SHARING ... 6
2.2POWER IN TERMS OF DEPENDENCE ... 7
2.3CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUPPLY CHAIN ... 10
2.4MODEL DEVELOPMENT ... 12
3. METHODOLOGY ... 14
3.1RESEARCH DESIGN ... 14
3.2RESEARCH SETTING ... 14
3.3CASE SELECTION AND CONTEXT CHARACTERISTICS ... 16
3.4DATA COLLECTION ... 18
3.5DATA CODING AND DATA ANALYSIS ... 20
4. RESULTS ... 22
4.1POWER DISTRIBUTION IN THE CHAIN ... 23
4.2THE EFFECT OF POWER ON INFORMATION SHARING IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUPPLY CHAIN ... 23
4.2.1 Transactional information ...24
4.2.2 Operational information ...25
4.2.3 Strategic information...27
4.2.4 Product related information ...27
4.2.5 Sources of power ...30
4.3INFLUENCE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUPPLY CHAIN CHARACTERISTICS ... 32
5. DISCUSSION ... 33
5.1THE EFFECT OF POWER ON INFORMATION SHARING ... 33
5.2CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUPPLY CHAIN CHARACTERISTICS ... 35
6. CONCLUSION ... 37
6.1ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION ... 37
6.2MANAGERIAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS ... 37
6.3LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ... 38
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ... 39
APPENDICES ... 46
APPENDIX I–INTERVIEW GUIDE ... 46
APPENDIX II–CONSENT FORM ... 52
APPENDIX III–EXAMPLE OF CODING TREE... 53
APPENDIX IV–WITHIN CASE ANALYSIS ... 55
APPENDIXV–OVERVIEW INFORMATION SHARED BY THE VICTIM COUNTER ... 76
1. INTRODUCTION
The effectiveness and efficiency of criminal justice systems is being questioned on a global scale (Dandurand, 2014). One of the problems associated with the performance of this system is slow criminal proceeding, resulting in long throughput time of cases (Dandurand, 2014). In order to address this problem and increase the effectiveness and efficiency, members of the criminal justice supply chain should collaborate more intensively (Baggs & Schmitt, 1998; Stein-parbury & Liaschenko, 2007). According to de Blok et al. (2014), collaboration could be achieved by information sharing, as information sharing is an important component of supply chain integration and coordination. According to Ellram et al. (2004) coordinating information in the chain also improves the chain’s effectiveness and performance. Currently, information is not shared optimally, which leads to an increase in throughput time of cases. An important reason for hampered information sharing in the chain could be power differences between chain members, as power can impede cooperation (Corsten & Kumar, 2005; Cox, 2001; Zajac & Olsen, 1993). For example, when maximizing value, power can lead to tension between chain members (Zajac & Olsen, 1993), and alter the nature of self-interest (Cox et al., 2001). Therefore, the effect of power imbalance in the criminal justice supply chain should be diminished. However, Chung and Kim (2003) considered power also as a positive force, as it can stimulate innovation. It might be the case that power in this chain, is required in order to let the chain perform well. Therefore, this research will examine the effect of power imbalance on information sharing in the criminal justice supply chain.
Examining this effect is not only important due to the positive effect of information sharing on collaboration (de Blok et al., 2014; Gebo & Kirkpatrick, 2002). In fact, information sharing can also enhance supply chain performance (Ding, Guo, & Liu, 2011; G. Q. Huang, Lau, & Mak, 2003; Ye & Wang, 2013; Yu, Ting, & Chen, 2010; Zhou & Benton, 2007) and improve supply chain relations (Barratt & Barratt, 2011; Ding et al., 2011; Lalonde, 1998). Improved supply chain relations will increase the success of collaboration even more (Stank, Keller, & Daugherty, 2001).
(Mohr & Nevin, 1990). Furthermore, when members of the chain have high power, frequent communication may create conflicts and the member with low power may experience the powerful member as dominant (Mohr & Nevin, 1990) and the former might not want to share information openly because he is afraid of losing power (Croom, Romano, & Giannakis, 2000). The effect of power imbalance has already been acknowledged in several sectors such as the healthcare sector (power imbalance between nurses/doctors and patients (Henderson, 2003; Koeck, 2014) and private sector between suppliers and buyers (Edirisinghe, Bichescu, & Shi, 2011; George, 2002). The criminal justice supply chain faces other risks and uncertainties than the manufacturing sector (Koh & Tan, 2006) and has barriers which could disrupt the service (Pramod, Banwet, & Sarma, 2015) and consequently information sharing. For example, forced collaboration influences the effect of power on information sharing, as it leads to stiffness in existing processes, which decreases improvement possibilities (Pekkanen & Niemi, 2013). This stiffness might increase the possibilities of a powerful member to not provide information when they do not want to. However, one could also argue that the characteristics of this chain pursue power imbalance because of the trias politica and the mere character of the public serves provided by the criminal justice supply chain. In order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness/power of the chain, the exact effect of those characteristics on power imbalance and information sharing needs to be explored. Therefore, the following research question will be dealt with:
What is the effect of power imbalance on information sharing in the criminal justice supply chain?
In this research, the effect of power imbalance on information sharing will be examined by means of a case study. By addressing this literature gap, this research provides insights in why power imbalance influences information sharing in the criminal justice chain by shedding light upon different sources of power that characterize the criminal justice system. The result of this research could also be beneficial to practitioners in the public sector, as ineffective information sharing can lead to lower performance and in the criminal justice supply chain particularly to a loss of customer value (i.e. longer lead time for victims who want to leave the ‘event’ behind as quickly as possible). By highlighting why and how power influences information sharing, this problem could be prevented and the performance of the members of the criminal supply chain improved. This also counts for chains that are characterised by power imbalance or organisations that want to share information but experience power differences.
2. THEORY
2.1 Information sharing
Information sharing can be defined as the extent to which one member in the chain communicates critical and proprietary information to another member in the chain (Monczka et al., 1998, p. 559. Sharing information is “fundamental to most aspects of organizational functioning” (Monczka et al., 1998, p. 559). There is extended literature available on the benefits of sharing information for organizations. Not only can information sharing lead to decreased costs and an increased customer service level (Li & Lin, 2006; Yu et al., 2010), it can also lead to improved relationships between members of the supply chain (Barratt & Barratt, 2011; Li & Lin, 2006; Maloni & Benton, 2000) and faster delivery (Zhou & Benton, 2007) which will lead to an enhanced supply chain performance (Ding, Guo, & Liu, 2011; Ellram, Tate, & Billington, 2004; Huang, Lau, & Mak, 2003; Li & Lin, 2006; Yu et al., 2010; Zhou & Benton, 2007).
2.2 Power in terms of dependence
Power can be defined as “the ability of an organization to own and control critical assets in markets and supply chains that allow it to sustain its ability to appropriate and accumulate value for itself by constantly leveraging its customers and suppliers” (Cox et al., 2003 IN Belaya & Hanf, p. 2, 2011). Multiple sources of power may be applicable to a situation (Petersen, Handfield, Lawson, & Cousins, 2008). For example, the possibility to grant a remuneration or imposing a punishment can grant someone power (French & Raven, 1959). Furthermore, Maloni and Benton (2000) divided power sources into mediated and non-mediated sources of power. With mediated sources of power the focus is on changing the behaviour of a member consciously and deliberately, while with non-mediated sources of power people exercise their power in a more indirect way (Terpend & Ashenbaum, 2012). Power conditions within the supply chain can be symmetrical, where power is balanced between parties, or asymmetrical, with a power imbalance (Dwyer & Walker, 1981 IN Mohr & Nevin, 1990). In this section, the effect of different levels of power on the three types of information sharing will be examined.
Power imbalance covers the difference in power of each actor over the other (Piskorski & Casciaro, 2005). It exists when a chain member depends on another chain member, but this dependence is not reciprocal (Hoejmose, Grosvold, & Millington, 2013). Dependence covers the existence of bilateral dependencies (Emerson, 1962), and can be defined as “an organisation’s need to maintain its business relationship with a partner to achieve its goals” (Yilmaz, Sezen, & Ozdemir, 2005, p. 237). When the dependence between members in the supply chain is unequal, power imbalance is likely to harm the
weaker member (Thompson & Emerson, 1976 IN Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Thompson, 1967 IN Gulati & Sytch, 2007). Therefore, the chain member with the least power could receive less needed information than the more powerful member. Also Schmitz, Schweiger, and Daft (2016) highlighted the negative effect of dependence on supply chain relations. When power is equally distributed in the chain, it is essential for chain members to have the ability to control or influence the behaviour, and to some degree grant or deny, facilitate or obstruct the satisfaction of the other member (Emerson, 1962). This confirms the idea that the more powerful member could exercise his power over another member and receive more information than members with less power.
Various mechanisms can lead to dependency, such as dedicated knowledge that is only available by a specific relation (Bendapudi & Berry, 1997; Geiger et al., 2012), close exchange relationship, or joint investments (Corsten & Felde, 2005; Laaksonen, Pajunen, & Kulama, 2008; Piskorski & Casciaro, 2005). In addition, switching costs that “can arise from the transaction specific investments of the relationship, which locks both supplier and buyer into the transaction because the value of this capital in other uses is much smaller” (Laaksonen et al., 2008, p. 911) are a source of dependence. Dependence has positive influences, such as increased information sharing (Barnes, Naude, & Michell, 2005), and increased relational performance (Buchanan, 1992), but also negative influences, such as “loss of strategic flexibility and the risks of opportunism” (Schmitz et al., 2016, p. 23). The dependence of a supplier can be increased by integrating activities with the buyer, which leads to information asymmetries that favours the supplier (Schmitz et al., 2016). Furthermore, as mutual collaboration enhances the information exchange (Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Piskorski & Casciaro, 2005), we expect that unilateral dependence hinders the information exchange. As it is stated that less powerful suppliers are more likely to commit to a relationship based on information sharing (Kähkönen, 2014), we assume that when a member does depend on another member, and therefore has low power, he will be more likely to facilitate the performance of another member by sharing transactional, operational and strategic information, and vice versa. Emerson (1962) stated that dependence is a function of resource criticality and the availability of alternative providers of critical resources.
Resource criticality
resources in the chain. A member in this chain depends on another member in such way that this other member can fulfil this member’s need for resources (i.e. information). Information relating to or being the critical resources, which could be covered by transactional, operational as well as strategic information, is therefore crucial. Power is the result of having resources that another member needs (Hallen, Johanson, & Seyed-Mohamed, 1991), so when a member has valuable resources available for other members, his power increases as low power members will respond to the demands of members that control the critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Furthermore, power relations following from “the exchange of resources lead to dependencies from the weaker member” (Schmitz et al., 2016, p. 23). Therefore, we assume that when a chain member depends more on another member in receiving critical resources, this member is more eager to share transactional, operational and strategic information in the chain (see figure 1).
Availability of alternative suppliers
The second component of dependence is the availability of alternative suppliers of critical resources. For each stage in the supply chain, multiple alternative suppliers are normally available to satisfy processing requirements (Huang & Keskar, 2007). The availability of alternative suppliers is the degree to which a buyer has alternative sources of its needed resources (Walter, Müller, Helfert, & Ritter, 2003). According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) not taking into account a readily available supplier may be a source of uncertainty and dependence. In literature, the ability of the partner to replace a supplier (i.e. replaceability) is often used to refer to the availability of alternative suppliers as a variable to measure dependence (Geyskens, Steenkamp, Scheer, & Kumar, 1996; Walter et al., 2003), which refers to the difficulty of replacing one’s channel member because of switching costs or the lack of alternative suppliers (Buchanan, 1992). When there is only one supplier available for the critical resources that are required by a buyer, this supplier can influence the buyer to comply with the supplier’s needs (Hallen et al., 1991). It could therefore be the case that a less powerful member is more eager to share information than the more powerful member. Furthermore, Kauffman and Mohtadi (2009) stated that a buyer is less willing to share information when there are only a small
number of suppliers available, and vice versa. This can be explained by the fact that when a buyer faces many suppliers, a buyer is more willing to share sensitive information, as their gain (i.e. less demand and supply uncertainty) from information sharing is greater with a large number of suppliers (Kauffman & Mohtadi, 2009). This will influence the amount of strategic information that is shared in the chain the most, as this type of information is the most sensitive one (see figure 1).
2.3 Criminal justice supply chain
In this research we particularly look at the effect of power imbalance on information sharing between the members of the criminal justice supply chain. Criminal justice covers police activities, and criminal law or formal criminal justice (Rakar & Ticar, 2016). It represents “a system of state (and largely governmental) institutions responsible for establishing and maintaining systems for criminal justice, the prosecution and curtailment of criminality, the enforcement of criminal sanctions (prisons) and the rehabilitation of convicted criminals” (Rakar & Ticar, 2016, p. 139). According to Dandurand (2014), the criminal justice supply chain can be seen as a service supply chain, in which institutions collaborate to deliver criminal justice. Information plays an important role in the service supply chain, as it is crucial to let the members in the service chain collaborate (Ellram et al., 2004), and enhances coordination and operational performance (i.e. customer satisfaction and on-time delivery) (Sengupta, Heiser, & Cook, 2006). At the moment, there are multiple subsystems organized around the suspect, and others around the victim.
In this chain, information is the input of the process, what is being processed and the output of the process. Consequently, in this chain, information as the product will be treated as a different information sharing type. Particular characteristics of the criminal justice supply chain be highlighted that possibly influence the effect of power on the operational, transactional, strategic, and product related information shared. The chain is characterised by different objectives among parties, unnecessary steps in the process, long age of cases, and forced collaboration (Dandurand, 2014; Pekkanen & Niemi, 2013). These characteristics (see table 2) show the distinctive character of the chain and influence the variables of this research.
Characteristic Explanation Result Reference
Different objectives
A clear tension exists between opposing visions (desire for peace and public safety vs. affirmation of legal rights and reliance on a formal process).
The absence of shared
vision/aligned objectives could lead to an increased influence of power on information sharing in the chain
Forced supply chain
Members of the chain are forced to work together
Could enhance the influence of power in the chain and therefore hamper information sharing.
Pekkanen & Niemi (2013)
Time to disposition and age of cases
The total length of the criminal justice process (time to disposition) and the average age of cases (that are not completed yet) are increasing
Could make the members leading the investigation, and possessing the required information more powerful
Dandurand (2014)
Table 2 – Specific characteristics of the criminal justice supply chain (Pekkanen & Niemi, 2013; Dandurand, 2014)
The criminal justice chain is characterised by competing objectives of the purpose of the criminal justice system (Dandurand, 2014). According to Dandurand (2014), two different objectives can be identified: the objective inspired by the desire for peace and public safety, focusing on preventing crime, resolving conflicts, and problem solving in general, and the more traditional objective, covering the affirmation of legal rights and a reliance on a formal process (Dandurand, 2014). The absence of shared vision could lead to having less sympathy for each other’s objective, and less often meeting each other’s requests. We expect that members of the chain obtain power due to law, therefore a powerful supplier will experience an increase in power as he will be stimulated to receive his own objectives, and give his own objectives priority. This might lead to less often meeting the information requirements of a less powerful buyer with a different purpose. Resulting in a negative influence of power on the amount of transactional, operational and strategic information shared. However, having one powerful member in the chain that sets the pace, could positively influence the collaboration and coordination, and indicate the joint direction of the chain.
The criminal justice supply chain has no alternative members as our legal and ethical system allows for one of each member in the chain. This combined with the forced collaboration of members in the chain (Pekkanen & Niemi, 2013) and the stability of the system, might lead to standardized processes. Which might indicate stable/permanent dependence in the chain, and the most powerful member keeping its power. Furthermore, as the fixed roles of the chain members decrease the possibilities to collaborate in the process (Pekkanen & Niemi, 2013), the negative effect of power differences in the chain might be fixed as well due to this characteristic.
operational information, this type of information will experience the largest influence of this characteristic.
2.4 Model development
As a result of developing the theory section, a conceptual model can be drafted that focuses on the empirical part of this research: the influence of power imbalance on sharing different types of information (i.e. transactional information, operational information, and strategic information). In the conceptual model (figure 2) the relations explored in this research are situated. Currently, we do not know the effect of resource criticality and the availability of alternative suppliers on the three types of information sharing. Based on current literature, it might be expected that power imbalance positively influences the amount of information shared by the less powerful member, and negatively influences the three types of information shared by the more powerful member because this member will be likely to exert his power to not share information when he does not want to. However, in this research we also want to find out how power influences the information shared. Furthermore, because of the forced character of the chain and no alternative suppliers, we expect that resource criticality negatively influences the amount of transactional, operational and strategic information shared and the information shared as the product in the chain, between the buyer and supplier. When there are alternative suppliers available for the critical resources, the supplier’s power will decrease, and the buyer’s power increases, which will probably have different influences on the three types of information shared between them. The focus of this research is not on the strength of the relation between power imbalance and information sharing, but on how and why power imbalance influences the different types of information sharing in the criminal justice supply chain. The exact effect on these types of information, as well as the underlying mechanisms that tell us why the effect is there, will be investigated. Therefore, the emphasis of the conceptual model is on the arrow of power imbalance on the information sharing line between the supplier and buyer. The specific characteristics of the criminal justice supply chain have been taken into account, which influenced the variables of the conceptual model.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research design
In this research, the effect of power imbalance on information sharing is examined by means of a multiple case study (Eisenhardt, 1989). As we are focused on developing new theory and ideas, while taking into account the specific characteristics of the criminal justice supply chain mentioned by amongst others Dandurand (2014) and Pekkanen and Niemi (2013), a case study is suitable for this research (Voss, Tsikriktsis, & Frohlich, 2002). Furthermore, given that the criminal justice context is especially important in this study, as particularly those characteristics are studied, case studies were chosen for this research as it is suitable for researching a specific case in its natural context (Eisenhardt, 1989; R. Yin, 1989), while a survey does not enable an in-depth understanding of the context (Sousa & Voss, 2008). As the criminal justice supply chain and the relationship between power and different types of information sharing are both relatively unexplored, qualitative research is a logical step. A multiple case study design was used to gather comparative data, which enhances external validity and prevents misjudgement of observing only a single case (Voss et al., 2002). The unit of analysis of this research is (the information exchange process in a part of) the criminal justice supply chain, this in order to gather information on a supply chain level.
3.2 Research setting
prosecution service or police employees for the right access or more detailed information, who are the indirect suppliers of information. Based on the information possessed by the Police and PPS, for example documents containing or information regarding case details, the VOCF can decide whether the victim meets the criteria to receive a financial compensation (i.e. intentional violent crime, severe injuries, and no own share in the crime). The Netherlands contains a total of ten different regional victim counters. At the moment, the police are the largest member of the chain with more than 63.000 employees. However, it is expected that the public prosecution service is the one with the most power due to rules and regulations (amongst others, Public Prosecution Service (Settlement) Act, and PPS being part of the judiciary). As power is not distributed equally in this subpart of the criminal justice supply chain, this setting suits the research.
Furthermore, as information is the product of the process, and plays an important role in the chain, highlighting the effect of power on different types of information will be interesting. The information requested by the VOCF at the victim counters needs to be provided within 20 days, as the applications of the victims must be handled within 26 weeks. In case the VOCF does not receive the information on time, the victim’s application for a financial concession needs to be postponed or even rejected. At the moment, these limits are often exceeded because the Police or PPS decide not to share the requested information, which makes it an interesting case to look at the effect of power on information sharing. On average, the VOCF sends out 206 information requests per month (see table 3). A more detailed overview of the number of requests per month can be found in figure 4. Most of the time, an information request asks for a record or official report and is the information requested possessed by the police, or the PPS.
July August September October November December Total
Number of information requests send 220 213 169 206 224 205 1237
Table 3 – Overview information requests send per month in 2016
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
July August September October Novermber December
Number of information requests send
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5
On 15 July 2016, the chain members agreed to new process agreements regarding the information exchange with the VOCF in order to provide the requested information within the prescribed period. In the new process, the VOCF sends the information requests of both the PPS and police to the victim counter. The victim counter ensures any further proceedings; processing the request, forwards the request to the PPS or police, or requests if required the permission of the right person. Previously, the VOCF had to send the information requests to the concerned PPS or police department. Therefore, the new process agreements changed the dependence in the chain.
3.3 Case selection and context characteristics
Five cases were selected, based on the region and immediate victim counter superior (supraregional coordinator; SC) of the victim counter. Each case covers the information exchange relation between the VOCF and two regional victim counters that are directed by the same top regional coordinator, which means that all the 10 regional victim counters are covered in this research.
Cases were selected by applying theoretical replication in order to find contradicting results on the influence of power differences due to the current circumstances/different theoretical conditions, such as differences in dependence, and the way of dealing with the requests in the cases as the PPS and police have different information systems and not every employee has the authority for all systems. Furthermore, cases differ on the amount of information that is shared as well as the perceived quality. However, some of these specific differences are not known beforehand. In total 21 interviews took place, of which the interviews with the SC were by way of introduction (see table 4). An overview of the cases can be found in figure 5.
3.4 Data Collection
The data for this research was collected between October 2016 and December 2016, by means of exploratory semi-structured interviews with employees working in the criminal justice supply chain. By using semi-structured interviews, it is possible to gather data that focuses only on the topic of the research (Yin, 1999). A total of 21 respondents were interviewed. The diversity of respondents provided a more detailed and complete picture of the context and helped to ensure construct validity (Jick, 1979; Stuart et al., 2002). A comprehensive selection of the chosen interviewees was made according to their positions in the victim counter in order to effectively gather relevant information (Belaya & Hanf, 2011). The concerned manager/supervisor of the victim counters nominated employees with extensive experience, who are working in a role where interaction with the victim counter takes place. As the counters consist of people of the police as well as public prosecution service, employees of both organisations were selected. Furthermore, employees of the VOCF were nominated by their supervisor as well, and needed to work in a role with interaction with the victim counter. All interviewees and victim counters needed to be willing to share information. The interview guide (see Appendix I) was developed from existing literature focused on resource criticality, the availability of alternative suppliers, transactional, strategic, and operational information, to standardize the interviews. This increased the reliability of the research by standardizing the interviews (Voss et al., 2002; R. K. Yin, 1994). The interviews started with questions on the information shared between the VOCF and the victim counter. An example question in this category is: “Can you shortly explain how you share information between the VOCF and the victim counter?” The purpose of this first
category was to indicate which information is shared in the chain, and through which medium. Thereafter, questions on power imbalance were asked. An example of the second group of questions is: “How important/dependent are you to the VOCF regarding information sharing?” The purpose of the second category was to find out how power is distributed and how it influences the information shared in the chain. Finally, questions on the characteristics of the criminal justice supply chain were posed. An example of the third category is: “How do you think the setting that you are operating in i.e. the criminal justice, influences the information exchange?” The purpose of the last section was to indicate which characteristics of the chain influence the effect of power on information sharing, or the relation between the chain members.
The interview process started with emailing the respondents a general outline of the research and main research questions in advance. At the start of the interview, shared interests were determined by means of a consent form (see Appendix II). For each case, multiple interviews were held in person or via phone, where the same questions were asked in the same sequence in order to enhance triangulation of the collected data, and increase the reliability of the research. In addition, the same researcher conducted all interviews in order to provide similar style and form in the results. Besides the multiple interviews per case, data was gathered from the VOCF on (the lead-time of) the information requests to gain insight in the problems that occur in the exchange, and observations during meetings took place, which increased the construct validity by means of data triangulation as multiple sources of evidence were used (Yin, 1994) (see table 5). All the interviews were conducted in Dutch and recorded. Recording the interviews increased the internal validity of the research. Thereafter, the interviews were transcribed.
3.5 Data Coding and Data Analysis
After collecting the data, the interviews were analysed and transcribed by the researcher. In order to increase construct validity, the transcripts of the interview were emailed to the respondents for review (Yin, 1989). Furthermore, the interviews were individually coded by the two variables of power imbalance and three variables of information sharing from the theory section. By coding the data received from the interview (see table 6), data could be reduced and organized, and conclusions could be drawn (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The supplementary material reviewed was coded in the same way as the interviews. As can be seen, the subcategory ‘other’ under power imbalance has been added in order to cover typical sources of power imbalance in the criminal justice supply chain of which we currently do not have any knowledge available. The same goes for the variable ‘other’ under information sharing.
Excel was used in order to structure the data and maintain the overview of the content, which increased the reliability of the research. Furthermore, from the data gathered in Excel, quotes that were relevant for answering the research question were selected (first-order indicators). In order to support the internal validity of the research, data analysis techniques were used (i.e. first within case analysis and thereafter a cross-case analyses) (Voss et al., 2002; R. K. Yin, 1994). The within case analysis was
Category Subcategory Description Code
Power imbalance
Resource criticality All statements that refer to the lack of available resources, such as certain information or documents
PI_RES
Availability of alternative suppliers
All statements that refer to alternative providers of information or documents that are readily available
PI_ALT
Other All statements that influence power imbalance and are not yet covered by the two subcategories above
PI_OTH
Information sharing
Transactional information All statements that refer to transactional information that is shared in the chain
IS_TRA
Operational information All statements that refer to operational information that is shared in the chain
IS_OPE
Strategic information All statements that refer to strategic information that is shared in the chain
IS_STR
Information as a product All statements that refer to information as the product being shared in the chain
IS_PRO
Other All statements that refer to information shared and not yet covered by the above subcategories
IS_OTH Criminal justice supply chain characteristics Different objectives Age of cases
All statements that refer to different objectives of members All statements that refer to the long lead time of cases
CJ_OBJ CJ_AGE Forced supply chain All statements that refer to a forced collaboration in the chain CJ_FOR Other All statements that refer to influences of the chain, but not yet
covered by the above subcategories
CJ_OTH
performed in order to verify if underlying assumptions were not taken out of context, and to research certain patterns of data. In Appendix IV, an overview of the within case analysis can be found. Data that covered information sharing, or one of the other variables, was analysed. For example, if a type of information shared was mentioned, this was described as a comment next to the quote (second-order quotes). The same was done for quotes containing information regarding power or chain characteristics. In this way, it was possible to identify which types of information were involved, and relations between power, chain characteristics and information sharing. Which lead to deriving third-order themes. Secondly, the cross-case analysis was performed. In this analysis, cases were compared in order to find similarities and differences in, and to put up linkages between, information shared, the distribution of power, the effect of power on information sharing, and the effect of the chain characteristics on this relation. An example of the coding method can be found in table 7. In addition, a more detailed overview of coding can be found in appendix III.
Quotes (descriptive coding/first-order indicators)
Related information sharing type
Related power Related chain characteristics
Second order codes
Employee K: “The VOCF needs information to deal with their clients. When it comes to sharing documents of a sensitive case, we need to ask the public prosecutor’ permission. We discuss what we can share.”
Product related information Permission of PPS is required The permission of the PPS influences whether product related information is shared
Employee J: “When the VOCF was here because of their information campaign, I was surprised that some of my colleagues raised objections against sharing [product related information] with the VOCF. I think this is mainly due to their
unfamiliarity with the VOCF. Also some public prosecutors did not want to share the information with the VOCF. There is then the need to defend the VOCF. The letter that is attached to the information request mentions that the VOCF has the right to receive the information according to the law.”
Product related information
Unfamiliarity with the VOCF. VOCF has the right to receive information based on the law. Law Unfamiliarity influences whether product related information is shared, despite the fact that sharing this is legally allowed.
4. RESULTS
In this research, the influence of power imbalance on transactional, operational and strategic information sharing in the criminal justice supply chain was analysed. The following sections show the findings of the cross-case analysis. The results of the within-case analysis can be found in appendix IV. The first section introduces the distribution of power in the chain. Thereafter, the differences in information shared between the VOCF and victim counters will be given. In addition, the influence of power on information shared in the criminal justice supply chain will be highlighted.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
Product related information: - Average number of information requests (per month) 45 46 18 47 40 Transactional information: - Checklist - Acknowledgement of receipt - Deadlines Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N/A N/A Operational information:
- Percentage reminders send from the VOCF to the VC - Description VOCF - Reminder 25% N N 40% Y N 20% Y Y 36% N N 20% N/A N/A Administration and telephony
combined N N Y Y N
General mailbox Y Y Y Y Y
Requests divided per system N Y Y N -
Role Handling requests Handling requests Monitoring requests Handling requests Handling requests
Process under construction N Y N N N
The relation in the chain,
VOCF depends on VC and Police
VC, PPS and
police PPS and police
VC, PPS and police
VC, PPS and police The VC is familiar with the
VOCF Y (3) Y (4) Y (4) Y (3) Y (4)
The VC is familiar with the
agreements N (2) Y (4) Y (4) Y (3) Y (4)
The PPS and police are familiar
with the VOCF and agreements N (1) N (1) N (2) N (1) N (2)
The VOCF is a priority Y N Y/N N Y
VC is focused on victim Y (4) Y (4) Y (5) Y (4) Y (5)
PPS and police are focused on
victim N (2) N (2) N (2) N (2) N (2)
4.1 Power distribution in the chain
Interviews revealed that there is a one-way relation in the chain between the VOCF and victim counter; “The victim counter does not need something from the VOCF, it is a one-way relation” (employee B). From the point of view of the VOCF, critical resources are the confidential documents provided by the victim counter. Sometimes, those documents are not readily available and the victim counter needs to receive the documents from the Police and PPS. The cross-case analysis revealed that this dependence is not the same in every case (see table 8). For example, in case 3 the victim counter depends more on the PPS and police as the victim counter rather has a monitoring role. In addition, as the victim counter itself can handle almost every PPS request, the VOCF depends in case 1 not on the PPS. Due to the new process agreements, the victim counter is the only member who can provide those documents; “The victim counter is extremely important to the VOCF. If we cannot provide the information, then the VOCF has no alternative possibility. The VOCF can only request the information at the counter” (employee O). The VOCF has no alternative suppliers, which increases the dependence of the VOCF on the victim counters (and indirectly the PPS, and police). As power in this research is seen as being dependent (i.e. resource criticality and availability of alternative suppliers) on another chain member, we can state that the VOCF has the lowest power in the chain.
4.2 The effect of power on information sharing in the criminal justice supply chain
Table 9 – Overview of power sources and information shared in the chain
4.2.1 Transactional information
The interviews revealed that in all cases two types of transactional information are shared from the VOCF to the victim counters, i.e. they share timelines; “I let the victim counter know how much time they have, 4 weeks, to respond to my request” (employee B), and specify which documents they need; “In the information request, I declare which data I need in order to take care of the request of the victim” (employee B). Sharing this information in the chain can be seen as the VOCF ‘placing an order’. The transactional information is shared in this direction, because the VOCF needs certain information from the victim counter in order to handle the victim’s applications, and is therefore influenced by the VOCF’s dependence on the victim counter. A detailed overview of how transactional information sharing is influenced by power can be found in appendix VI.
as a priority; “There are a lot of victims that want to reach us, and although it is clear to us that the VOCF works for the victim, we do give priority to victims that contact us directly” (employee N). In those cases, the perceived importance of the VOCF’s requests negatively influence the transactional information shared from the victim counter to the VOCF, as the victim counters decide in which sequence they want to execute their tasks. Secondly, only in case 1 an acknowledgement of receipt is not sent from the victim counter to the VOCF; “(…) because it just costs us too much time to send them” (employee G), despite the fact that the VOCF is seen as a priority in this case. In the other cases, the agreements force the victim counters to deal with the requests in a normal way, of which sending an acknowledgement of receipt is an example. Due to the agreements, more transactional information is shared from the victim counter to the VOCF. Finally, in some cases the goals of the victim counters and VOCF are more aligned: helping victims. When this objective is shared, it enhances the transactional information sharing in the chain as it stimulates the victim counter to keep track of deadlines and the information requests by sending reminder or sharing deadlines. For example, in case 3 timelines are shared from the victim counters to the PPS and police, which influences the power of the VOCF; “We put the deadline of the VOCF in an Excel file. At the victim counter we use a tighter deadline of 14 days” (employee N). However, this could also be explained by the fact that in this chain, the victim counter merely has a monitoring role, which leads to the victim counter being better organized. By stimulating the information exchange in cases, the importance of the VOCF’s information requests increases and therefore the importance of the VOCF. To conclude, from the cross-case analysis we found that agreements, perceived importance, and shared objectives influence whether or not transactional information is shared (see figure 6).
4.2.2 Operational information
In all cases, two types of operational information are shared from the VOCF to the victim counters. First of all, a description of the VOCF is shared to make the VOCF’s expectations and goals in the chain clear; “In the request, we mention what the VOCF is, what we do and the reason why we request information” (employee C). Secondly, a reminder letter is shared from the VOCF to the victim
counters in the situation the victim counter did not provided the information within the agreed period (28 days). In case the information is not provided on time, the only option the VOCF has is to wait and send a reminder due to the VOCF’s dependence on the victim counter and no alternative suppliers being available. Furthermore, the interviews revealed that not in every case the same operational information is shared from the victim counter to the VOCF. Only in case 4 the workload of the victim counter is shared in this direction; “In the situation we face a lot of work, we share this with the VOCF” (employee R). Furthermore, in all cases except for case 4, the progress of the information request is sent from the victim counter to the VOCF; “I reply to every request of the VOCF. I then inform them to whom the request is forwarded” (employee P). The interviews showed that only in case 3, a reminder is send from the victim counter to the PPS and police regarding the information requests; “If the victim counter does not receive the files within one week, I send them a reminder letter” (employee P), which stimulates the PPS and police to share information. A detailed overview of how operational information sharing is influenced by power can be found in appendix VI. Finally, in cases 2 and 3 a description of the VOCF is shared from the victim counter to the PPS and police; “We share a reduced version of what the VOCF is and does” (employee L). Sharing this description increases the familiarity with the VOCF. However, despite the fact that familiarity with the VOCF is also low in case 1 and 4 (see table 8), the interviews did not reveal that this information was shared in those cases. Much operational information shared from the VOCF to the victim counters is shared in order to increase the familiarity of the VOCF. Although the VOCF is well known at the victim counters, its familiarity at the PPS and police is in most cases low, which often hampers the information exchange. Due to the fact a description of the VOCF is send in cases 2, 3 and 5 from the counters to the PPS and police, the familiarity with the VOCF and the process can increase, which positively influences the information exchange in the chain. In the situation the PPS and police were more aware of the VOCF, there is no need to share this description. Understanding the importance of the VOCF and their information requests increases the VOCF’s power in the chain. To conclude, from the cross-case analysis we found that familiarity influences whether or not operational information is shared in the chain (see figure 7).
4.2.3 Strategic information
In all cases, strategic information (i.e. information regarding the process agreements) is only shared from the VOCF to the victim counters. Due to the introduction of the new process agreements, strategic information is shared in this way to inform the victim counters; “After the introduction of the agreements, the VOCF did an information campaign to clarify those agreements” (employee J). As the victim counter, PPS and police are important to the VOCF in fulfilling its goal there is the need to share strategic information from the VOCF to the chain members. This, in order to inform them, and increase the familiarity with the new processes and stimulate the information exchange. By sharing the agreements, the VOCFs power increases, as the victim counter needs to comply with those agreements. The VOCF needs to share more strategic information when the familiarity with the VOCF and the process agreements is lower. This means that more strategic information needs to be shared from the VOCF to the victim counter, PPS and police in cases 1 and 4 as the familiarity with the VOCF and agreements is lower in those cases. Furthermore, the interviews revealed that in none of the cases strategic information is shared from the police and PPS to the VOCF. This shows that the PPS and police do not see the VOCF as important enough to share strategic information. To conclude, from the cross-case analysis we found that critical resources, agreements and perceived importance influence whether or not strategic information is shared in the chain (see figure 8).
Figure 8 – Power sources per chain member: strategic information sharing
4.2.4 Product related information
with the victim counter due to the VOCF’s dependence, in order to enhance the information requests, as the victim counter needs information in order to handle the applications.
speak” (employee O). However, the victim is often still not a concern of the public prosecutor, which delays the information exchange process as the permission of the public prosecutor to share product related information is often not given. Besides the differences in focus and the priority of the chain members, the familiarity with the VOCF also differs per case. For example, the PPS and police often see the VOCF as an insurance company. Due to the fact that insurance companies have a very low priority at the PPS, the information requests of the VOCF regarding confidential documents are also not seen as a high priority; “What the VOCF does is often unclear to public prosecutors. Most of the time when I email a public prosecutor, I receive questions of what the VOCF is and does” (employee P). In addition, unfamiliarity with the new process agreements influences the product related information exchange negatively; “People are most of the time not aware that agreements have been drafted. In case the reporting officer is more aware of the VOCF and the process agreements, I think information would be shared faster” (employee N). This unfamiliarity makes the VOCF less a priority, and leads to information requests being omitted from the agenda of the PPS; “The reporting officer prefers to be on the ground, instead of doing a lot of administrative nit-picking” (employee F). However, this ignorance of the VOCF is decreasing; “Until a few months ago, people did not know what the VOCF was, now the problem is rather that they do not know which information they can and cannot share. We then explain what the VOCF is, so it is getting better. This is truly a piece of ignorance, but this ignorance is decreasing” (employee H). In all cases, if no permission is given to share information, the only option the VOCF has is to wait for the information. Due to the forced collaboration, and no alternative suppliers available, the VOCF has no other option. To conclude, from the cross-case analysis we found that law, agreements, shared objectives, authority, and familiarity influence whether or not product related information is shared in the chain (see figure 9).
4.2.5 Sources of power
From the cross-case analysis and comparison we found various sources of power that determine whether or not the four types of information are shared in the chain (see table 10).
Table 10 – Overview of the influence of different sources of power on information sharing
Power source
Information Sharing type
Example
TI OI SI PRI
Power due to critical
resources + +
“We can only request the information we need in order to handle the victim applications at the victim counter” (employee D)
Power due to no alternative suppliers available
+ +
“We need files which can only be provided by the victim counter” (employee B)
Power due to
agreements + +
“Due to the new process agreements, the victim counters are obliged to deal with our information requests and provide us the right information” (employee B)
Power due to
perceived importance - -
“The reporting officer prefers to be on the ground/street, instead of doing a lot of administrative nit-picking (i.e. dealing with the information requests)” (employee F) Power due to shared
objectives + -
“It is getting more and more important to share information. This is mainly due to the rising importance of the victim within the PPS and police. The victim has now more privileges, such as the right to speak” (employee O) Power due to
familiarity +
“In my opinion, more people are getting familiar with the VOCF, and what the VOCF does. (...) It would be good that more public prosecutors are familiar with the VOCF for the information exchange process” (employee R)
Power due to law +
“The letter of the VOCF contains an explanation of the fact that the VOCF has the legal right to receive information” (employee A)
Power due to
authority -
Figure 10 – Relevance of perceived importance per case Figure 11 – Relevance of agreements per case
Figure 12 – Relevance of familiarity per case
Figure 16 – Relevance of critical resources per case
Figure 14 – Relevance of authority per case
Due to the different characteristics of the cases, we found in the cross-case analysis that the influence of power sources differs per case. Based on the interviews and observations, the influence of a power source per case is compared in figure 10 – figure 16.
0 1 2 3 4 5Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
Power due to agreements 0 1 2 3 4 5Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
Power due to perceived importance
0 1 2 3 4 5Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
Power due to shared objectives 0 1 2 3 4 5Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
Power due to authority
0 1 2 3 4 5Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
Power due to critical resources 0 1 2 3 4 5Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
Power due to familiarity
4.3 Influence of criminal justice supply chain characteristics
Based on the cross-case analysis we found that several chain characteristics influence the effect of power on information sharing. First of all, the different objectives of the PPS and police, and the victim counter and VOCF were a source of power in the chain. Secondly, from the analysis it came clear that forced collaboration leads to the VOCF having often no other choice than to wait for the information from the PPS, police, and victim counter to the VOCF. Although the long age of cases was confirmed by the interviews; “Some cases just take ages. Is it possible to wait an entire year for information, I do not think so. Sometimes the proceedings are being stayed, each time the court decides to stay the proceedings the lead-time increases with 90 days. I do understand why the public prosecutor does not want to share information in that case” (employee H), it does not have a direct effect on power, but only influences the throughput time of the information request. Finally, the interviews revealed that in this chain, the type of crime and phase of the investigation influence the permission. “Particularly in the case of vice crimes is it important to ask the permission of the reporting officer” (employee F), and “The information of vice crimes is not visible to us, neither to most of the police employees” (employee H). This increases the authority of the PPS and police, as more often the permission of the PPS and police must be asked.
To conclude, power is not distributed equally, for example, as the VOCF has no alternative suppliers for the critical resources. Seven sources of power were identified in the criminal justice supply chain, all influencing information sharing in a positive or negative way. Mostly, the sources of power that increase the power of the less powerful member have a positive influence on information sharing in the chain, whereas the sources of power that enhance the power of the more powerful member negatively influences information sharing.
0 1 2 3 4 5Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
Power due to law
5. DISCUSSION
It is crucial to know how power imbalance influences information sharing in the criminal justice supply chain, as an increase in information sharing enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of the chain. This section will discuss the results of the multiple case study, analysing the influence of power on information sharing. This research contributes valuable empirical insights into the influence of power imbalance in the criminal justice supply chain. In total, seven different sources of power have been identified that clarify and/or influence whether information is shared or not. Within the criminal justice supply chain, those sources of power influence one or more type(s) of information sharing. Finally, product related information sharing was influenced by the largest number of power sources compared to the other types of information sharing.
5.1 The effect of power on information sharing
critical resources, the transactional, strategic and product related information shared from the less powerful member to the member with more power was enhanced.
This study revealed that power does not solely depend on critical resources of the chain, but also on the authority of employees, law, shared objectives, perceived importance, as well as agreements made in the chain. All the possible sources of power and the types of information sharing they influence can be found in figure 17. Power due to agreements, law, shared objectives, familiarity positively increase the power of the less powerful firm and positively influence information sharing in the chain. Power due to dependence and perceived importance increase the power of the more powerful member and negatively influence information sharing in the chain.
Some identified sources of power are in line with current literature. First of all, the power sources law and agreements show similarities with legitimate power, which can be seen as “power which stems from internalized values in the power recipient which dictate that the power holder has a legitimate right to influence the power recipient and that the power recipient has an obligation to accept this influence” (French & Raven, 1959 IN Terpend & Ashenbaum, 2012, p. 54). Those sources oblige members to behave in a certain way, or in this research oblige to comply with certain processes and share transactional and product related information. As the criminal justice supply chain is characterized by forced collaboration, members of the chain are forced to collaborate also on the long-term. As literature showed that “in case long-term collaboration is important, firms with power advantages will attempt to meld strong and effective relationships rather than maximizing self-interest” (Frazier, 1999, p. 228). However, the research found that maximizing self-interest does happen in the chain. As the collaboration in the chain is not necessarily perceived as important, and different objectives characterize the collaboration, this leads to maximizing self-interest of the more powerful member in this chain. Having shared objectives is important in order to increase the effectiveness of the collaboration, because a shared focus guides the process (Van Knippenberg, Dawson, West, & Homan, 2011). Although the chain is making an attempt to overlap the two different objectives more (increased importance of the role of the victim), at the moment the objectives hamper the information exchange and increase the power of the more powerful member. Furthermore, this research identified power due to authority. This power source is in line with Emerson (1962) who noted that authority is “power vested in an office or role” (Emerson, 1962, p. 38)
5.2 Criminal justice supply chain characteristics
In summary, the four types of information sharing are influenced by seven different sources of power, which can be categorized into two categories; mediated sources of power, and non-mediated sources of power. Furthermore, the three characteristics of the criminal justice supply chain influence the relation of power on information sharing in the chain.
6. CONCLUSION
This section will provide the answer to the research question that was addressed at the beginning of this thesis:
What is the effect of power imbalance on information sharing in the criminal justice supply chain?
6.1 Answering the research question
In this chain, power imbalance negatively affects transactional, operational, strategic, and product related information shared from the more powerful member towards the less powerful member, but positively influences the information shared from the less powerful member to the more powerful member. Furthermore, the different sources of power identified in this research (i.e. perceived importance, shared objectives, agreements, dependence, familiarity, law, and authority) influence one or more types of information sharing. Finally, the forced collaboration between members, the fact that the chain has no shared objectives, and the long age of cases influence the relation between power and information sharing via seven sources of power. In the criminal justice supply chain, power imbalance negatively influences information shared from the more powerful member to the less powerful member. In order to increase the information exchange in the chain, the information shared from the less powerful member to the more member, is positively influenced by power imbalance. The member in the chain with the most power largely defines the processes and way of working in the chain, which helps the chain to guide processes. However, as the information exchange is of great importance in this chain, the negative influence exceeds the positive influence in this research.
6.2 Managerial and theoretical implications
As the collaboration of the chain will remain forced in the future, and power will stay imbalanced, the contribution of this study is larger than merely the added theoretical knowledge. Although the positive effects of information sharing are known in theory, this research provided new insights by understanding how and why differences sources of power (i.e. perceived importance, shared objectives, agreements, dependence, familiarity, law, and authority) influence information sharing (i.e. transactional, operational, strategic, and product related information) in the chain. Therefore, this research can help managers with sharing and receiving information while experiencing a power imbalance, by for example drafting agreements in the chain.
justice supply chain mentioned by Pekkanen and Niemi (2013) and Dandurand (2014), on the influence of power imbalance on information sharing, which helps managers to understand the influence of the characteristics of the chain. This study expands the literature about different sources of power identified by amongst others French & Raven (1959). In additions it adds to literature by shedding light on the effect of power imbalance on information sharing. This all contributes to literature by adding a new perspective in the public service supply chain. When extending the scope of the findings of this research towards other networks characterised by power imbalance; we advise the low powerful member to share amongst others, more strategic information in order to show its importance, as well as increase their own power by drafting agreements.
6.3 Limitations and future research
Besides the fact that this research provides new insights, it also has limitations. The fact that there were different numbers of interviews per case leads to a limitation, as not all members of the chain were interviewed in each case. However, per case employees of at least two different organizations were interviewed, it therefore might be assumed that enough relevant knowledge was provided. Furthermore, not from all organizations higher-level employees, or employees with authority were interviewed. It can therefore be the case that not all sources of power, or all relevant influences of those sources were identified during the research, which limits the generalizability of this research. In addition, only one researcher conducted all interviews and coded the data. This combined with the explorative nature of this research, decreases the possibility to reflect on the accuracy of the transcripts of the interviews. As the criminal justice supply chain has some very personal characteristics, the generalizability of the results decreases. However, the results could be applicable for criminal justice systems in other countries, as criminal justice systems look similar in other countries.
