APPENDIX For the convenience, all figures and tables used in this study are included in the appendix

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APPENDIX

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Institutional and environmental factors/requirements

Corporate arguments

1. Collusion

2. Cooptation and

Monitoring

3. Legitimacy

Note: the dashed circular lines indicate the dynamic character of the network over time. Moreover, industry concentration is displayed in grey, since it is not part of this research.

Source: Heracleous and Murray (2001), Mizruchi (1996), Nollert (2005), Palmer, Friedland, and Singh (1986).

Reasons to interlock

Industry concentration

Board positions

of individuals

(per year)

Firm Network

Individual arguments

1. Career advancement

2. Social Cohesion

Stability Stability

Individual Network

FIGURE 1.

Visualization of social network concepts

FIGURE 2.

Conceptual model concerning this research

TABLE 1.

Datasets (1995-2007) used in this thesis

Total positions

Executive Positions

Non-Executive

Positions Firms Directors

Dataset used to answer Initial dataset 10173 3844 (38%) 6200 (61%) 96 1590 Sub quest. 2/3 Yearly Networks 9099 3420 (38%) 5562 (61%) 951 1504 (Sub quest. 1) Interlocks 2675 278 (10%) 2385 (89%) 88 218 Sub quest. 1

Actor

Dyad / Edge

Relation

Note: In this figure, de actors are the firms, and the relation (line) is represented by an interlocking director, creating a dyad or an edge

Clique

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TABLE 2.

Missing values (firms)

Firms in sample Firms missing

1995 53 18 (25%) 1996 55 17 (24%) 1997 56 18 (24%) 1998 60 20 (25%) 1999 62 20 (24%) 2000 70 14 (17%) 2001 73 7 (9%) 2002 73 5 (6%) 2003 80 4 (5%) 2004 79 2 (2%) 2005 82 1 (1%) 2006 83 1 (1%) 2007 83 1 (1%)

TABLE 3.

Number of dyadic ties (edges) for interlocking directors (n(n-1)/2)

Number of simultaneous positions 2 3 4 5 6 7 Number of dyadic ties between firms 1 3 6 10 15 21

TABLE 5.

Cliques

3 4 5 6 7 Total 1995 36 16 9 2 - 63 1996 34 17 7 2 - 60 1997 46 13 4 1 1 65 1998 29 16 5 1 1 52 1999 33 21 5 1 2 62 2000 31 14 4 2 1 52 2001 26 16 6 - 1 49 2002 19 21 6 1 - 47 2003 37 19 4 2 - 62 2004 25 22 4 1 - 52 2005 27 8 1 1 - 37 2006 29 2 2 - - 33 2007 22 1 - - - 23

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TABLE 4. DESCRIPTIVES OF INTERLOCKS 1995 – 2007 2 3 4 5 6 7 Interlocking Individuals Interlocked Firms Interlocking Positions (IP) IPs / Indiv. Edges Edges / Position Degree Between-ness Distance Compact-ness4 Density 1995 45 14 7 4 2 - 72 (15%1) 48 (91%2) 192 (33%3) 2.7 174 0.91 8.292 25.375 2.176 0.486 0.1764 1996 44 14 8 3 2 - 71 (15%) 48 (87%) 189 (32%) 2.7 169 0.89 8.083 30.625 2.303 0.507 0.1720 1997 47 20 4 3 1 1 76 (16%) 53 (95%) 198 (33%) 2.6 176 0.89 7.434 38.774 2.491 0.475 0.1430 1998 50 17 7 3 1 1 79 (15%) 57 (95%) 207 (32%) 2.6 180 0.87 7.333 44.807 2.600 0.455 0.1310 1999 52 21 7 3 1 2 86 (16%) 58 (94%) 230 (34%) 2.7 207 0.90 8.414 41.879 2.469 0.476 0.1476 2000 50 21 7 2 2 1 83 (14%) 62 (89%) 220 (30%) 2.7 195 0.89 7.290 54.677 2.793 0.433 0.1195 2001 45 17 9 3 - 1 75 (12%) 63 (86%) 199 (27%) 2.7 180 0.90 6.381 57.794 2.864 0.417 0.1029 2002 49 12 12 3 1 - 77 (13%) 65 (89%) 203 (28%) 2.6 183 0.90 6.215 60.400 2.888 0.412 0.0971 2003 53 19 9 4 2 - 87 (14%) 73 (91%) 230 (30%) 2.7 221 0.90 6.384 61.658 2.811 0.398 0.0887 2004 54 16 10 3 1 - 84 (14%) 69 (87%) 217 (29%) 2.6 192 0.83 5.971 56.290 2.866 0.371 0.0878 2005 60 17 5 1 1 - 84 (13%) 66 (80%) 202 (27%) 2.4 156 0.72 5.030 62.333 3.040 0.368 0.0774 2006 63 16 2 2 - - 83 (13%) 66 (80%) 192 (25%) 2.3 132 0.64 4.333 56.424 3.170 0.305 0.0667 2007 73 16 1 - - - 90 (13%) 69 (83%) 198 (25%) 2.2 122 0.59 3.681 72.710 3.410 0.311 0.0541

1) The percentage indicates the contribution to the total amount of individuals in that year (also including non-interlocks) 2) The percentage indicates the contribution to the total amount of firms in that year

3) The percentage indicates the contribution to the total amount of positions in that year 4) Ranges from 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness

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TABLE 6.

Linkages between indices (percentages)

AEX AEX-AMX AEX-AScX AEX-Local AMX AMX-AScX AMX-Local AScX AScX-Local Local

1995 50.8 22.6 0.0 14.6 3.5 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 100 1996 49.0 25.3 0.0 12.9 5.2 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 100 1997 46.2 19.3 0.0 19.3 3.6 0.0 8.6 0.0 0.0 3.0 100 1998 44.0 20.1 0.0 19.1 2.9 0.0 9.6 0.0 0.0 4.3 100 1999 40.2 22.5 0.0 21.7 3.7 0.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 6.1 100 2000 31.4 27.9 0.0 15.5 8.4 0.0 9.7 0.0 0.0 7.1 100 2001 29.4 32.8 0.0 13.4 7.5 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 100 2002 30.7 29.7 0.0 10.4 9.9 0.0 10.4 0.0 0.0 8.9 100 2003 26.6 24.5 0.0 16.6 9.6 0.0 15.7 0.0 0.0 7.0 100 2004 28.0 29.0 0.0 11.1 11.1 0.0 15.9 0.0 0.0 4.8 100 2005 32.5 18.7 7.2 4.8 7.8 12.7 6.0 5.4 2.4 2.4 100 2006 33.6 20.3 8.4 7.0 9.8 9.1 4.9 2.8 3.5 0.7 100 2007 32.0 21.9 10.9 7.8 10.2 6.3 2.3 5.5 3.1 0.0 100 TABLE 7.

Involvement of indices concerning linkages (percentages)

AEX AMX AScX Local

1995 87.9 32.2 0.0 23.1 1996 87.1 37.1 0.0 20.6 1997 84.8 31.5 0.0 31.0 1998 83.3 32.5 0.0 33.0 1999 84.4 32.0 0.0 33.6 2000 74.8 46.0 0.0 32.3 2001 75.6 50.2 0.0 30.3 2002 70.8 50.0 0.0 29.7 2003 67.7 49.8 0.0 39.3 2004 68.1 56.0 0.0 31.9 2005 63.3 45.2 27.7 15.7 2006 69.2 44.1 23.8 16.1 2007 72.7 40.6 25.8 13.3

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TABLE 8.

Multiplicity of edges

1) This incidental high number of multiplicity is due to the privatization of TNT, where this year five members had a position in both TNT and KPN (also a former SOE).

TABLE 9.

Stability and reconstitution of edges (N=503 edges)

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FIGURE 3A.

Stability of edges between Dutch firms (1995, N=45 edges)

Note: The dotted lines indicate links that have been present for 9 years since 1995, suggesting the possibility of being active for 10 years consecutively, i.e. being present in 1994 or earlier, is substantial (18 linkages, of which 4 sustained by 2 directors). The single solid lines indicate linkages active for 10 or more consecutive and sustained by only one director (11 linkages). Finally, the thick solid lines indicated linkages sustained for 10 or more consecutive years by 2 or more directors (16 linkages, of which 6 seem to have a reconstituted character). See appendix for the firm codes.

Note: The dotted lines indicate links that have been present for 9 years until 2007, suggesting the possibility of being active for 10 years consecutively, i.e. still in 2008 or later, is substantial (4 linkages, of which 0 sustained by 2 directors). The single solid lines indicate linkages active for 10 or more consecutive and sustained by only one director (9 linkages). Finally, the thick solid lines indicated linkages sustained for 10 or more consecutive years by 2 or more directors (16 linkages, of which 7 seem to have a reconstituted character). See appendix for the firm codes.

FIGURE 3B.

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TABLE 10.

Gender, percentage (no missing values)

All directors Interlocks Non-interlocks

Women Men Women Men Women Men

1995 2.0 98.0 1.5 98.5 2.3 97.8 1996 1.8 98.2 1.4 98.6 2.0 98.0 1997 1.8 98.2 1.4 98.6 2.0 98.0 1998 2.3 97.7 2.1 97.9 2.4 97.6 1999 2.4 97.6 2.0 98.0 2.7 97.3 2000 2.6 97.4 0.8 99.2 3.4 96.6 2001 3.3 96.7 1.3 98.7 4.0 96.0 2002 3.3 96.7 1.3 98.7 4.2 95.8 2003 3.4 96.6 2.7 97.3 3.7 96.3 2004 3.4 96.6 2.4 97.6 3.8 96.2 2005 3.8 96.2 1.6 98.4 4.6 95.4 2006 4.6 95.4 3.9 96.1 4.9 95.1 2007 5.2 94.8 4.2 95.8 5.6 94.4 FIGURE 3C.

Stability of edges between Dutch firms (2007, N=17 edges)

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TABLE. 11

Nationalities (percentages)

BE FR GE NL SW SU UK US Others Missing1 Total 1995 2.1 0.9 1.9 52.8 0.4 0.2 1.9 1.7 1.1 36.9 100 (466) 1996 2.1 0.8 2.1 53.6 0.4 0.2 1.7 1.9 0.8 36.4 100 (478) 1997 2.1 0.8 2.1 54.8 0.0 0.2 2.5 1.8 1.2 34.5 100 (487) 1998 2.1 0.8 2.1 54.8 0.0 0.2 2.5 1.8 1.2 34.5 100 (487) 1999 2.3 2.1 1.7 57.7 0.0 0.2 4.0 3.4 1.3 27.2 100 (523) 2000 2.6 2.1 1.5 55.4 0.2 0.3 4.6 3.6 1.8 27.8 100 (605) 2001 2.8 1.8 2.0 56.8 0.3 0.3 5.1 4.1 2.0 24.8 100 (606) 2002 2.8 2.0 1.8 56.0 0.5 0.5 5.5 6.1 2.1 22.6 100 (605) 2003 3.1 2.8 2.6 57.4 0.5 0.5 5.7 6.5 2.6 18.5 100 (617) 2004 3.1 3.9 2.6 56.6 0.8 0.8 6.3 6.8 2.6 16.7 100 (622) 2005 4.3 4.7 2.7 58.3 0.9 0.8 6.6 5.4 2.8 13.4 100 (633) 2006 4.2 5.0 2.2 57.4 1.6 0.9 7.1 7.3 2.8 11.6 100 (645) 2007 4.0 5.3 2.5 56.3 1.2 1.2 7.4 7.7 5.0 9.3 100 (675) Note: BE = Belgium, FR = France, GE = Germany, NL = The Netherlands, SW = Sweden, SU =

Switzerland, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States. ‘Others’ include those countries where the percentage is never above one percent per year. ‘Missing’ include those directors where the nationality is not explicitly stated (even when a name would be typically Dutch for example). The number between brackets mentions the absolute number of directors per year.

1) Since the share of missing values in quite significant, a cross-check is done for 1995, 2000, and 2007 concerning the names of the directors. Under the assumption that it is relatively easy to identify Dutch directors, a differentiation was made between assumably Dutch and non-Dutch directors. For 1995, of the missing values, 74 percent seems to be Dutch. In 2000, 65 percent is likely to be Dutch. Finally, concerning 2007, 55 percent seems to be Dutch. The percentage of non-Dutch is mainly due to firms that been (partly) acquired by a foreign firm, like BE Semidconductors, Sopheon, Hunter Douglas etc. These firms contribute substantially to the missing values for both 1995 and 2007.

TABLE 12.

Country of origin for directors (with >= 10 consecutive positions)

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70 52 2 POSITIONS (11) 32 37 12 15 >3 POSITIONS (3) 3 1 9 25 2 3 POSITIONS (4) 7

₁

1 2 4 9 1 POSITION (23) TABLE 13.

Categorization of directors holding at least one position for 10 or more consecutive years

FIGURE 4.

Career steps expressed in the number of positions the director holds

(N=171 directors; 3358 positions)

Category Description Number of

directors

Number of positions

Positions/ director 1a Director holding 1 or more supervisory positions over the

period consecutively (thereby creating no interlock).

50 566 11.3

1b Director holding 2 or more positions (both executive (no ‘retirement’) and supervisory) over the period with maximum 2 simultaneously (thus creating an interlock)

28 491 17.5

1c Director holding only supervisory positions, including at least more than 2 positions for 2 consecutive years

18 368 20.4

2a Director holding an executive position with at least 2 supervisory positions during the 2 years before ‘executive retirement’, followed by at least 2 supervisory positions.

11 677 61.5

2b Director holding an executive position with maximum 1 supervisory position until 1 year before the ‘executive retirement’, followed by at least 2 supervisory positions within 2 years.

36 929 25.8

2c Director holding only an executive position before the ‘executive retirement’, followed by 1 supervisory function (or more, but then consecutively).

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Exec

utive

Exec

+ Sup

Exec

+2Su

p

1 Sup

2 Sup

3 Sup

4+ Sup

Exec

+3+S

up

26

9

1

35

23

8

23

12

29

40

76

10

15

5

2

12

58

4

2

6

2

1

4

3

1

2

1

2

4

6

2

10

11

3

4

7

1

3

1 EX +

>2 SUP

EX

only

EX +

1 SUP

Exec +

2 SUP

3 SUP

EX +

2 SUP

Exec+

>3 SUP

1 SUP

only

>3 pos 3 pos 2 pos 1 pos

Note: ‘EX’ stands for (one) executive function, whereas ‘SUP’ stands for supervisory function. The thickness of the lines indicates the number of directors contributing to a step (see figure 5B, page # for the absolute numbers). The red arrows indicate a decrease in the number of positions, and a green arrow an increase. Then, the blue arrows indicate the directors retiring from their executive function and moving to a supervisory ‘career’ instead, while holding the same number of positions. Finally, the grey dotted line indicates the border of this dataset.

FIGURE 5.

Career steps between the specific composition of positions (N=171 directors; 3358 positions)

FIGURE 5B

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TABLE 14.

Average Tabaksblat points per director

1995 1998 2001 2004 2007

AEX 2.60 2.63 2.66 2.66 1.87

AMX 2.16 2.15 2.24 2.27 1.86

Local 1.75 1.86 1.84 1.93 1.741

1)

In 2007, the AScX firms are included in the Local firms, to allow easy comparison.

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FIGURE 6

Average Tabaksblat points per firm, per index (concerning the supervisory positions).

(Each square represents one firm)

Tabaksblat points (firm average)

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 AEX AMX Local

1995

2001

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 AEX AMX Local

2004

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TABLE 15.

Firm Abbrevations

Abbrev Firm

AAL Aalberts ABN ABN AMRO

AEG AEGON

AHO Ahold AKZ Akzo Nobel

AM AM

AMI Arcelor Mittal

AOT AOT

ARC Arcadis (Heidemij) ASI ASM International ASL ASM Lithography ATH Athlon Holding (Groep) BAL Ballast Nedam BAM BAM Groep BBH Beter Bed Holding

BES BE Semiconductor Industries BIN BinckBank

BOS Boskalis (Westminster) BRU Brunel International

CEX Corporate Express (Buhrmann) CGG Cap Gemini (Group)

CMG CMG

COR Corio CRS Corus CRU Crucell

CSM CSM

DRA Draka Holding

DSM DSM

EUR Eurocomm Properties EXA Exact Holding FBI Fornix Biosciences FOR Fortis

FUG Fugro (cert.) GAM Gamma Holding GET Getronics GRN Grontmij GRO Grolsch HAG Hagemeyer HBG HBG HEI Heineken HEY Heijmans HOO Hoogovens KLM KLM (Air France) KNP KNP BT (CEX later) KPN KPN

KTC KTC (Koninklijke Ten Cate) LAU Laurus

LOG LogicaCMG

MAC Macintosh (Retail Group) MOO Vd Moolen

NSI Nieuwe Steen Investment NUM Numico

NUT Nutreco

OCE Océ

OPG OPG Group (cert.) ORD Ordina

PHA Pharming PHI Philips RAN Randstad REE Reed Elsevier SBM SBM Offshore SDB Super de Boer

SHE Shell (Royal Dutch Shell) SLI Sligro Food Group (Beheer) SMI Smit Internationale SNS SNS Reaal SOP Sopheon STO Stork TEL Tele Atlas

TMG Telegraaf Media Groep

TNT TNT

TOM TomTom U4A Unit 4 (Agresso) UNI Unilever UNV Univar

URO Unibail-Rodamco USP USG People VED Vedior

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Last name Initials Nat. Year of birth 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Aalberts J. NL 1939 - - - 4 4 4 4 - - Bax J.D.R.A. NL 1936 - - - 4 4 - - - Boonstra C. NL 1938 - - - 4 - - - - Bouw P. NL 1941 - - - 4 4 4 - - - - - Braakman T.C. NL 1926 4 4 - - - - Choufoer J.H. NL -1 4 4 - - - - Dahan R. NL 1941 - - - 4 - - Dekker M.W. NL 1938 - - - 4 4 4 4 - - - - Dik W. NL 1939 - - - 4 4 - - - - Engelshoven, van J.M.H. NL 1930 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - - - Eustace D.G. UK 1936 - - - 4 4 4 4 - - -

Fentener van Vlissingen F.H. NL 1933 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 - - - -

Fröhlich F.W. DE 1942 - - - 4 4 4 4 Hazelhoff R. NL 1930 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - - - Hessels J.M. NL 1942 - - - - 4 - - 5 5 5 4 - - Hommen J.H.M. NL 1943 - - - 4 - Hooglandt J.D. NL -1 4 4 - - - - Hovers J.C.M. NL 1943 - - - 4 - - - - Jacobs A.G. NL 1936 - - - - 6 6 5 5 6 6 6 5 - Kalff P.J. NL 1937 - - - 4 4 - - - - - Kok W. NL 1938 - - - 4 - - -

Lede, van C.J.A. NL 1942 - - - 5 5 5 -

Liemt, van H.B. NL 1933 5 4 - - - - Loudon A.A. NL 1936 6 6 7 7 7 6 5 4 - - - - - Maas A. NL 1934 4 4 4 4 - - - - Nelissen R.J. NL 1931 5 5 5 5 4 4 - - - - Oort C.J. NL 1928 4 4 - 4 4 - - - - Pennings J.V.H. NL 1934 - - - 4 4 4 - - - Risseeuw A.H.J. NL 1936 - - - 4 - - - - - Roef P.A.W. NL 1932 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - - - Ruiter, de H. NL 1934 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 6 6 4 - - - Schaik, van G. NL 1930 - - - - 4 - - - - Storm K.J. NL 1942 - - - 4 4 - - - Tabaksblat M. NL 1937 - - - 4 4 - - - - Veen, van M.C. NL 1935 - - - 4 4 5 4 - - - Ververs M. NL 1933 - - - 4 5 5 5 5 5 - - - - Vuursteen K. NL 1941 - - - 4 4 - - - Wit, de F.J. NL 1939 - - 4 - - - - Zwartendijk R. NL 1939 - - - 4 4 4 5 5 4 - -

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