Disturbing incidents and tragic accidents
A constructivist study into the use of framing, masking and ritualization during international crisis management by international organizations
For Jos
– A friend loves at all times – (Proverbs 17:17)
On the front page:
Top left: A young refugee girl accepts humanitarian aid from a NATO soldier at Brazda refugee centre in Macedonia.
Top right: Boutros Boutros-Ghali visits UN soldiers in Somalia during UNOSOM II. Bottom left: Kofi Annan addresses the UNs General Assembly
Index
INTRODUCTION ... 3
CHAPTER 1. THE ROLE OF IOS IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT... 6
IOS AS ACTORS ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE... 6
THE FUNCTIONS OF IOS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY... 8
Centralization...9
Independence ...9
IOs as community representatives ...11
IOS IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT... 12
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK... 14
DESCRIBING ‘T HARTS THEORY AND EXPLAINING ITS SEMANTICS... 14
Defining crisis and crisis management...14
Strategies of crisis management... 16
THE APPLICABILITY OF ‘T HART TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS...17
FRAMEWORK FOR THE CASE STUDIES... 19
CHAPTER 3. THE UN AND THE INVASION OF IRAQ 2003 ... 23
A FACTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE INVASION OF IRAQ...23
THE UN AND TRADITIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT...25
Sense making...25
Decision making ...25
Terminating...27
THE UN AND THE LOST DIMENSIONS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT...27
CONCLUSION OF THE CASE STUDY...30
CHAPTER 4. THE UN AND THE CRISIS IN SOMALIA 1991-1995 ... 32
A FACTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE CRISIS IN SOMALIA...32
THE UN AND TRADITIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT...34
Sense making...35
Decision making ...36
Terminating...39
THE UN AND THE LOST DIMENSIONS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT...39
Communication towards the public...39
Communication towards the Somali population...43
CHAPTER 5. THE AU AND THE CRISIS IN DARFUR 2003-2007 ...47
A FACTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE CRISIS IN DARFUR...47
THE AFRICAN UNION AND TRADITIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT...49
Sense making...49
Decision making ...50
Terminating...54
THE AU AND THE LOST DIMENSIONS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT...55
CONCLUSION OF THE CASE STUDY...58
CHAPTER 6. THE NATO AND THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO 1999 ...60
A FACTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE CRISIS...60
NATO AND TRADITIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT...62
Sense making...62
Decision making ...65
Terminating...69
NATO AND THE LOST DIMENSIONS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT...71
Ritualization during the Kosovo crisis...71
Framing: Kosovo as an epic tale...72
Framing and masking: Racak ...76
Framing and masking: Operation Horseshoe ...78
CONCLUSION OF THE CASE STUDY...80
CONCLUSION...82
LITERATURE... 87
Monographs and Articles...87
Documents... 91
Reports...92
Official Statements ...93
Press Articles...95
Introduction
Every year the Union of International Associations (UIA) publishes the so-called Yearbook of International Organizations. In this yearbook the UIA tries to list all international organizations that are active in the world today. Last years yearbook contains 60.000 entries, on organizations working in every possible field of human endeavour.1 About a fifth of these organizations are intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the members of these organizations are national governments. The others are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); their members are either direct individuals or various national societies.2
NGOs have an impact on world politics, although in general they perform rather low-level, specifically functional tasks.3 Sometimes NGOs function as pressure groups, affecting national governments or international organizations. Examples of these are the International Red Cross, mobilizing world concern and aid for starving people in Africa, or Amnesty International, ‘forcing’ states into stopping human rights abuses.
Reviewing the IGOs as international actors, one can see that they have a significant and continuing impact on international relations. The role of many IGOs is clearly institutionalized in both international law and practice. International law prohibits the use of force by states unless it is authorised by the UN Security Council.4 States and individuals simply expect IGOs to act in certain areas.5 They expect the UN, for example, to help calm areas of conflict like it did in Liberia in 2003. The European Union (EU) and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) attempted to resolve the violence in former Yugoslavia starting in 1991. When states find them themselves in severe economic difficulties, they almost automatically turn to the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for some kind of assistance. Both NGOs and IGOs play an important role in the international society.
Where the interfering of one specific state in an international crisis is often considered ‘meddling’ or ‘playing cop’ by other states, international organizations (IOs) can play a large role in international crisis management. This role may take the form of an impartial ‘third’
1
Union of International Associations (UIA), Yearbook of International Organizations (2009), www.uia.be/yearbook.
2
Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr and David Kinsella, World politics, the menu for choice (Belmont 2006) 67.
3
Ibidem 69.
4
Art. 2.4 Charter of the United Nations, this article is considered ius cogens and is therefore binding for all international legal personalities. (See for definition of ‘aggression’ UN General Assembly resolution 3314, and for direct or indirect ‘use of force’ the case Nicaragua v. United States of America, International Court of Justice, 27 June 1986). The Charter of the United Nations can be accessed at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
5
party acting as a peace keeper or negotiator, or just a forum where states can meet and communicate on neutral territory.
The position of IOs in international crisis management is however also fragile. Especially IGOs are as effective as their (most powerful) member states want them to be. One can easily come up with cases where IGOs failed to act because of lack of interest or opposition of member states. One of the most shocking examples is the inaction of the UN during the Rwandan genocide.6 Another example forms the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the so-called coalition of the willing without explicit UN-permission.7 The coalition hereby seems to have violated international law, but there was no IO who could do anything to stop this invasion.
On the one hand IOs are among the most important actors in international crisis management, on the other hand their power is limited by the (un)willingness of the member states. During a crisis IOs have to manoeuvre between responding effectively and maintaining a good relation with their member states in order to be able to solve the crisis. Language and symbolic acts are tools of crisis management that can help IOs in their difficult position, because of their effect on the public, which in the case of IOs may also consist of national governments. Language can be used to influence the publics’ perception of the crisis. This defining of a certain situation is called framing.8 It is a useful tool for policy makers as the one who can tell what the crisis is all about, is usually also the one who can tell how the crisis should be resolved. Language can also be used for ‘masking’: covering up conflicts and vulnerabilities of the established order when a crisis is threatening to expose them. The use of symbolic acts, or rituals, is also a powerful tool for influencing public opinion. An act like visiting the scene of a disaster or meeting the victims will arouse feelings of sympathy (or perhaps the opposite!) for the policy maker.
In this paper research will be conducted to find out what exactly the role of international organizations in international crisis management is, and what the effect of the use of symbolic crisis management devices by IOs is. According to Paul ‘t Hart symbolic acts and symbolic language ‘(…) serve crucial political functions for power holders’.9 He calls these the ‘lost dimensions of crisis management’, an addition to the already existing managerial,
6
An insightful read on this topic is Romeo Dallaire, Shake hands with the devil (London 2005).
7
David M. Malone, The international struggle over Iraq. Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005 (New York 2006) gives a lot of information on how this war came to be from a UN-perspective.
8
Paul ’t Hart, ‘Symbols, rituals and power: the lost dimensions of crisis management’, Journal of contingencies
and crisis management 1 (1993) 36-50.
9
functionalist dimensions.10 These ‘lost dimensions’ consist of the three types of symbolic crises handling devices mentioned before: framing, ritualization and masking. Together they make up a power-critical approach to the analysis of crisis management. This theory provides a unique combination of crisis management theory and analysis of the use of symbols during crises; in this paper it will therefore be used to conduct the research into the use of symbolic crisis handling devices by IOs. ‘t Hart focuses in his article only on the management of crises on a national level, yet he gives examples of all kinds of actors using the ‘lost dimensions’. In this paper the theory will be operationalized for application on an international level and for IOs as specific actors.
In order to answer the main question of this paper, first the role of IOs in international crisis management will be thoroughly investigated and described. In the second chapter of the paper the theory of ‘t Hart and its semantics will be described and explained. After that the question has to be answered whether it is theoretically possible to apply ‘t Harts theory to international organizations and what the implications of this application are for the operationalization of the theory. By this research a comprehensive theoretical framework will be constructed which will be used in the second part of the paper.
To answer the analytical part of the main question and to examine whether the proposed operationalization is useful to be applied in practice, a large-scale case study will be conducted in chapters three to seven by applying the theory on several crises, and several IOs. Each of these chapters begins with a short description of the crisis. In the second part of the chapter the case study will be conducted by making a comparison between the use of traditional and ‘lost’ dimensions of crisis management by the actor. This will show the effect of symbolic crisis handling devices on the outcome of a crisis. It will also show whether ‘t Harts theory still serves its goal when applied on an international level. This goal is seen as providing useful and additional insights into the study of the particular crisis. In the concluding chapter the findings will be analysed and the research question answered.
10
Chapter 1. The role of IOs in international crisis
management
International crisis management has already been called the security paradigm of the 21st century, encompassing conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, post-conflict peace building and humanitarian operations.11 Yet international crisis management consists of more than just military tasks; a crisis may also be political or financial in scope. Whatever the nature of a crisis may be, in every kind of international crisis IOs are prominent actors. When the United States wanted to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it did not act unilaterally but turned to the UN Security Council. When the international community wanted to maintain the suspension of combat in Bosnia, it sent in peacekeeping troops under the aegis of the UN and NATO. In fighting humanitarian crises, IOs like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Food Program play a leading role. When a trade dispute between different countries arises, the World Trade Organization (WTO) offers a dispute settlement mechanism.
In this chapter the role of IOs in international crisis management will be analysed. What is their role and how should it be studied? The first paragraph of the chapter contains an analysis of the position of IOs as independent actors in the international community. The second paragraph examines the functions that IOs have, the tasks they perform and the properties that enable them to perform these tasks. The final paragraph deduces out of the previous two the answer to the main question of this chapter: what is the role of IOs in international crisis management?
IOs as actors on the international stage
Up until the 70’s, when Realism was the leading paradigm in International Relations (IR), IOs were not considered of any importance as actors in the international arena.12 International society was regarded an anarchical society, consisting of sovereign states with clearly defined (and mainly military) interests. IOs like the UN or NATO did not have independent standing, as they were composed of autonomous states that determined what these IOs would do. There was no place for IOs in the mind of theorists, as it was believed that cooperation between
11
Lieutenant General Günter Höfler, commander of the Austrian armed forces, introduced the term as such on a United Nations Information Service-conference. www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2006/unisinf178.html.
12
states was not a real possibility. Realists saw international relations as a zero-sum game, in which the one states loss was the other ones gain.13
In the second part of the 70s, theorists like Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye grew more and more unsatisfied with the existing realist assumptions. They saw that ‘the world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations.’14 Realism was no longer sufficient for explaining the international relations of the time. Yet Keohane and Nye did not want to replace traditional by modernist thinking ‘(…) because our era is marked by both continuity and change, this would be fruitless.’ Instead they wanted to ‘(…) blend the wisdom in both positions.’15 In their theory of complex interdependence they portray the realist worldview as one archetypical situation and complex interdependence as the opposite. Both situations are models, and reality will most of the time lie somewhere in the middle. But, so they state, ‘frequently complex interdependence will provide a better portrayal of reality.’16
In the field of International Relations, complex interdependence provides IOs with their début as independent actors on the international stage. Keohane and Nye use the examples of the UN special session on proposals for a New International Economic Order and the activities of the IMF and GATT to show how IOs, by bringing officials together, help to activate coalitions in world politics.17 According to Keohane and Nye IOs are important actors that can set agendas, induce coalition-formation, and act as arenas for politically weak states.18
The increasing complexity of the world kept challenging the positivist scientific ambitions of IR theories. Keohane and Nye’s description of the role of IOs is no longer sufficient. Complex interdependence could have never predicted for example the fact that an IO (the EU) would become a supranational legislative power. In IR-theory the focus has shifted from positivist, materialist theories to a wide range of positivist, idealist theories like post-modernism, constructivism and critical theory.19 This shift also includes a shift from rationalism to reflectivism, which claims that political actors are deeply social and that their identities are socially constructed. Their interests are the result of social interaction, and do
13
Paul R.Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International relations theory. Realism, pluralism, globalism and beyond (Boston etc. 1999, 3rd edition) 55, Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater et al., Theories of international relations (New York 2005, 3rd edition) 33.
14
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and interdependence. World politics in transition (Boston 1977) 3. 15 Ibidem 4. 16 Ibidem 24. 17 Ibidem 35-36. 18 Ibidem 37. 19
not exist prior to this interaction. This view makes way for all kinds of actors interacting on the international stage, together shaping each others interests and producing a shared picture of reality.
Nowadays IOs are accepted as full-fledged actors in the international scene by most theorists. On an ongoing basis IOs help manage many areas of international life, from postal policies (by the Universal Postal Union) to human rights (Amnesty International, ICRC) to European security (OSCE, NATO), but IOs are also prominent actors in many critical episodes in international politics.
Realists keep finding this treating of IOs as serious political entities naive. They believe that states are merely using IOs to reduce transaction costs, and that states would never grant IOs enforcement capacities that are strong enough to overcome international anarchy. Consequently, realists consider IOs of little influence on international relations.20 In this paper a synthesis of this rationalist and the constructivist approach is used. It is true that states use IOs to cut down on transaction costs, and the invasion of Iraq has proven that a powerful state will not always let itself be constrained by an IO. Yet IOs are also entities that create and shape information, ideas, norms, beliefs and understanding of reality. 21 As the next paragraph will show, the functions of IOs do affect states interests, and provide IOs with a power well beyond their material power. This does make IOs into influential actors on the international stage.
The functions of IOs in international society
In their article ‘Why states act through formal international organizations’ Duncan Snidal and Kenneth Abbott give an extensive overview of the functions of IOs.22 They identify centralization and independence as the key properties of international organizations. Centralization refers to the fact that through IOs collective state activities can take place in a concrete and stable organizational structure. Independence is an organizations ability to act
20
See for example John Mearsheimer, ‘The false promise of international institutions’, International Security 19 (1994-95) 5-49.
21
Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Why states act through formal international organizations’, Journal of
conflict resolution 48 (1998) 3-32, there 8.
22
with a degree of autonomy within a certain sphere. Although many IOs incorporate both characteristics, each of the two features creates specific possibilities for an IO.
Centralization
The increasing issue complexity of the world today, combined with the growing number of states, calls for a centralization of state activities. This centralization can be achieved through IOs. IOs with a centralizing function provide states with support for state interaction. They provide for example stable negotiating forums, like the UN Security Council. Other organizations create neutral, depolitized, specialized forums, like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the IAEA the superpowers could discuss technical nuclear issues without political intrusion, even at the height of the Cold War.
Centralizing IOs are also managers of operational activities, meaning that states use these IOs to carry out certain tasks. IOs often are a vehicle for pooling. States can pool activities, assets or risks in an IO, which reduces individual costs and risks. Pooling of capital provides the World Bank with the capability to make credible financial commitments. The pooling of technical resources, capital and expertise has enabled the WHO to eradicate small pox.
States can also use IOs for joint production, like scientific research. Abbott and Snidal even depict NATO as an example of joint production, producing ‘common war plans, specialization of military tasks, joint exercises, common equipment and interchangeable parts (…).’23 The third state activity that IOs manage is the elaboration and coordination of norms. States need norms, standards and regulations to achieve cooperative relationships. They use IOs to establish and elaborate these norms. Although individual member states often retain the power to reject, or opt out, a norm that is accepted by the majority of the member states often becomes a custom relied upon in the international community. This gives IOs power to affect international norms and thus state behaviour.24
Independence
The IO characteristic ‘independence’ even more clearly demonstrates the importance of the combination of realism and constructivism in the study of international organizations. IOs need independence to achieve the long-term collective goals they were designed for. States
23
Abott and Snidal, ‘Why states act’, 15.
24
will not enter an organization they can not influence, yet undermining the independence of the organization will reduce its effectiveness and the states own ability to achieve the valued goal. Independent IOs also provide support for state interaction, but on a more active level than IOs that only have a centralizing function. The UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General for example both have the right to initiate negotiations and they can also set the agenda for these negotiations. IO officials are also often members of epistemic communities that can shape the political, normative and intellectual context in which states interact. These officials propagate the ideals and interests of their organizations. An example of this is how the officials of the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization contributed to the development of scientific programs in several nations.25
All of the tasks mentioned above that are carried out by IOs, could also be carried out by a powerful state. Yet this would probably not be accepted by other states, because of a suspicion of bias. An IO is however acceptable because it is expected to be neutral. It is this property of neutrality, which adds impartiality to independence, that enables IOs to perform a lot of tasks.
IOs can function as neutral information providers, a task that is getting more and more important as the world wide information flow increases. IOs can also function as trustees. Trusteeship arrangements in the traditional sense are not common in the international society anymore, but one can think for example of the ‘common heritage’ principle of UNCLOS III. The convention declares that the right to the seabed and its resources are ‘vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act’.26 IOs function as allocators, think of the World Bank for example, and as arbiters. In this last function there are few IOs that are really designed to restrain state power. IOs more often operate as ‘honest brokers’. Examples of these are the functions of the UN Secretary General under chapter VI of the UN Charter; good offices, mediation, conciliation and fact finding. There are however also IOs that can make binding decisions as arbiter, after agreement by both conflicting parties. In that case one has to think of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights.
The most important function IOs can fulfil because of their neutrality is laundering. The word ‘laundering’ has a very negative connotation, from the association with money laundering, but when IOs are used for laundering it only means that activities that may be
25
Martha Finnemore, ‘International organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization and science policy’, International organization 52 (1998) 4, 887-917.
26
unacceptable in a state-to-state form become acceptable when carried out by an independent IO. Examples of this laundering include development aid and peace operations. Because of laundering, developing nations can create a debt with an independent IO instead of another state, which would jeopardize their national independence. Laundering allows powerful states to support peace operations without being drawn into relatively small, regional, conflicts. Laundering can become dirty laundering when powerful states try to influence the IO which carries out the task at stake. The United States have tried this for example when they linked support for World Bank lending to human rights. Powerful states face a permanent tension between the immediate gains by dirty laundering and the long-term gains by IO independence.
IOs as community representatives
A more controversial function of IOs is the function of community representative. IOs can function as the representative of a community of states. As representative of the community the most important task of the IO is the expression and development of community norms and values. The expression of shared norms and values creates a sense of unity within the community and legitimizes and delegitimizes state conduct. The most striking example of this is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights issued by the UN. Although the Declaration can not be enforced, it has influenced state behaviour in a tremendous way. Norms of the Declaration have been put into binding treaties; the declaration itself has been incorporated in national constitutions. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights demonstrates the way in which realism and constructivism interact in the everyday practice of international relations: IOs affect the interests and values of states, but the process is initiated and shaped by states.
The fact that IOs have very little material power is demonstrated when one looks at the track record of IOs as (coercive) enforcers. Chapter VII of the UN Charter was originally designed to give the UN the possibility to enforce its decisions, but has never really been used. The only way an IO can enforce its decisions is by withholding IO support from a state or the so-called mobilization of shame, where a states reputation in the international community is damaged.
IOs in international crisis management
IOs can fulfil a lot of the above mentioned functions in a role as international crisis manager. When centralization is the main characteristic of an IO, the IO is just the instrument states use to carry out a certain policy. This is often the case for IOs providing technical or humanitarian aid, like the World Food Program bringing food to starving people in conflict areas. It can however also be the case for an IO functioning as an alliance, providing the possibility of joint production of war plans. NATO can be seen as such an IO.
The more independent IOs are, the more ‘personality’ they have in crisis situations. Consider the UN Security Council, or the Secretary General, focussing the world’s attention on a certain crisis. Dag Hammarskjöld for example, the second UN Secretary General, personally called together the Security Council to bring the Congo crisis to the fore, on July 14th 1960. One day later the first UN-troops landed in the Congo to help restore order, in a mission that would last for four years.27
In modern international society, a very important function of IOs during a crisis is that of neutral information provider. IOs like specialized UN agencies, Amnesty International or the ICRC provide the world with information on the situation of civilians during a crisis, information which influences the policies of third countries. An example of this is the Dutch government, asking the UN and the ICRC for information during the recent Gaza-conflict. The government used the supplied information to formulate policy propositions for the EU.28
The role of arbiter is one obviously played in conflict situations, and the example of peace operations, encompassing conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peace building, has already been mentioned. Peace operations are almost always carried out by an IO because if it would be carried out by an independent nation, this would not be acceptable for probably neither the conflicting parties nor the international community.
When one looks at the role of IOs in international crisis management, one can see that this role is quite comprehensive. IOs act as forums or as instrument for pooling or joint production, but also as initiator of negotiations, as information provider, arbiter or as the actor that carries out peace operations. Although it may seem that a lot of IOs are just instruments
27
The course of the Congo crisis has been described in detail in several works, see for example Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, a United Nations Force in action (Washington 1965) or Alan James, Britain and
the Congo crisis 1960-63 (London etc. 1996). Hammarskjölds actions, which provide a clear example of the power of an independent IO executive in international relations, are described in: Richard I. Miller, Dag
Hammarskjöld and crisis diplomacy (New York 1961) 266-316.
28
used by states, through the tasks they perform they can have a profound effect on the outcome of a crisis. Also, through their capability of creating and shaping information, ideas, norms, beliefs and understanding of reality, IOs affect states interests and behaviour.
Chapter 2. Theoretical framework
In this chapter the theoretical framework for the research on the use of symbolic crisis handling devices by IOs will be set out. When it comes to studying the use of symbolic language and rituals in crisis management, the theory of Paul ‘t Hart – referred to in the introduction – is seemingly the only theory capable of providing a framework for analysis. This theory effectively combines realism and constructivism in that it appreciates the value of assertive decision-making and exploiting opportunities, but in the meantime also underlines the power of words and rituals to shape reality. In the following section of the thesis the theory of ‘t Hart and its semantics will be described and explained. Secondly, research will be conducted to see whether it is theoretically possible to apply ‘t Harts theory to international organizations, and what problems arise during the application of the theory. In the last paragraph of the chapter the theoretical problems and opportunities of the application of the theory will be formed into a practical framework for the case studies.
Describing ‘t Harts theory and explaining its semantics
Defining crisis and crisis management
In his article ‘Symbols, rituals and power: the lost dimensions of crisis management’ Paul ‘t Hart implicitly builds on the stream model of John Kingdon.29 ‘t Hart assumes that crises form policy windows, or ‘opportunity spaces’, and in order to exploit these, ‘it is important for decision elites to influence collective definitions of the situation in such a way as to highlight preferred courses of action and to selectively obscure others’.30 For this goal the policy maker has three symbolic crisis handling devices at hand: framing, ritualization and masking. ‘t Hart calls these symbolic crisis handling devices the ‘lost dimensions of crisis management’.
‘t Hart wants to communicate, by means of his essay, a two-fold message. Firstly, he wants to present an addition to the already existing managerial, functionalist approach of the study of crisis management. He claims that both this traditional dimension and his new, more power-critical, ‘lost’, dimension should be taken into account. His constructivist approach does not want to replace the positivism and functionalism of the already existing methods of crisis analysis.31 Secondly, he wants to expose the way powerful language and other symbolic
29
Ibidem and John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (New York 1984).
30
’t Hart, ‘Symbols’, 36.
31
tools affect the conceptualization of crises. This is where he claims that ‘analysis will indicate how symbolic instruments of crisis management serve crucial political functions for power holders’.32
‘t Hart uses a constructivist definition of crisis. Here, he explicitly builds on James Rosenau, who described politics as ‘institutionalized drama’.33 Political life is structured, according to ‘t Hart, by all kinds of symbols and dramatic acts. These convey important, reassuring messages to the ones who do not participate and even legitimize the existing political order. When a crisis occurs, this existing order is threatened by a certain event that has disrupted the normal pattern of symbols and dramatic acts that legitimize the order. So crisis is hereby defined as ‘a breakdown of familiar symbolic frameworks legitimizing the pre-existing socio-political order’.34
This new definition of crisis gives rise to five goals of the management of a crisis: -perceptual control: managing the collective perception of the crisis.
-conflict reduction: re-aligning different and possibly contradictory definitions of the situation.
-affective control: managing emotions generated by the breakdown of familiar patterns. -de- and re-legitimation: finding a new equilibrium of ‘more of less predictable and commonly supported patterns of social and political interaction’.
-opportunity recognition and exploitation: bringing the opportunities for certain stake-holders that are created by the crisis effectively to the fore.35
According to ‘t Harts article, the last two are the most important goals of crisis management. Later publications however, show that ‘t Hart has not fully made up his mind about the matter. In his article ‘Public leadership in times of crisis’ he concludes that opportunities in times of crisis are often smaller than thought, and that they are very hard to exploit as the requisites of crisis management are very different than that of effective reform.36 The first three goals are considered more instrumental. In Governing after crisis; the
politics of investigation, accountability and learning ‘t Hart and other authors conduct a more
32
Ibidem.
33
Ibidem 38 and James N. Rosenau, The dramas of politics : an introduction to the joys of inquiry (Boston 1973). 34 ’t Hart, ‘Symbols’, 38-39. 35 Ibidem 41. 36
Arjen Boin and Paul ‘t Hart, ‘Public leadership in times of crisis: mission impossible?’, Public Administration
thorough research into opportunity recognition and exploitation and they stress its importance in present-day governance again.37
Strategies of crisis management
Framing, ritualization and masking are the broad classes of strategies that can be pursued to achieve the five above mentioned goals.38 Framing is about defining what the crisis is all about. The one who is able to define the crisis can also tell how the crisis should be resolved. For policy makers it may be necessary to aggravate the conception of crisis to create a climate in which non-incremental change is possible, in order to achieve opportunity exploitation. On the other hand it may be necessary to lessen the sense of ‘being in crisis’, in order to remain in control. All of this is done by shaping the definition, the perception, of the crisis. Calling a situation a ‘crisis’ is in itself a major rhetorical act; one could also call a certain event for example an ‘incident’, an ‘accident’ or a ‘tragedy’. During crises as ‘t Hart depicts them, the authorities have by definition lost control of the events. Now it is important that the
conception of the events remains in their hands and is not taken over by, most probably, the mass media. In this strategy language is the most powerful tool of crisis management.
One strategy that may serve as an example within the class of framing is the use of historical analogies to influence the public opinion.39 In this case policy makers draw on the collective memory of their audience to influence the perception of a current event, in order to legitimate a certain action.40 Policy makers can even first influence the collective memory of the audience before using these coloured memories as an historical analogy.41
Another strategy of crisis management is the use of rituals. Rituals are defined as ‘symbolic behaviour that is socially standardised and repetitive’.42 Rituals are often enacted in places or times that have themselves a symbolic meaning. Crisis-related rituals can take many forms and have many functions. ‘t Hart mentions three: rituals of solidarity (like visiting the scene of a disaster), rituals of reassurance and purification (let the people see that the
37
Arjen Boin, Paul ’t Hart and Allan McConnell, ‘Conclusions: the politics of crisis exploitation’, in: ibidem eds. Governing after crisis; the politics of investigation, accountability and learning (Cambridge 2008) 285-314, there 312-314.
38
‘t Hart, ‘Symbols’, 41-42.
39
Annika Brändström, Fredrik Bynander and Paul ‘t Hart, ‘Governing by looking back: historical analogies and crisis management’, Public Administration 82 (2004) 191-210.
40
An example Brändström, Bynander and ’t Hart use is the legitimation of sanctions against Austria by the European Union by comparing Jörg Haider with Adolf Hitler.
41
This memory alteration is described by Edgar Wolfrum, Geschichte als Waffe. Vom Kaiserreich bis zur
Wiedervereinigung (Göttingen 2001).
42
government is still in control by for example showing the search for the perpetrators) and rituals of animosity (one extreme example is the burning of enemy portraits and flags).43 The last class of strategy ‘t Hart mentions is masking. Masking is a specific form of perception management, meant to cover up deep-rooted conflicts and vulnerabilities of the established order, when a crisis is threatening to expose them. Some types of masking that ‘t Hart mentions are: communicating a ‘business as usual’-image, displacing crisis perceptions and obscuring details of crisis management operations.44 What remains is the special case of counter-symbolism. This is the exposing of the use of symbols and rituals by the opponent, thereby making him look manipulative and untrustworthy.45
The applicability of ‘t Hart to international organizations
In his article, ‘t Hart uses a lot of examples to illustrate the different strategies of crisis management. Most of them refer to national crises handled by national governments, but ‘t Hart emphasises that his theory is not only to be used for the analysis of national government behaviour. He also gives examples of individual behaviour and the behaviour of a corporation.46 In every crisis, be it small or large scale, there are power holders who must somehow manage the crisis, so the theory is not restricted to government behaviour only. Still, the theory is applied on inner state crises only, and in this paper the jump to interstate crises-analysis will be made.
‘t Hart does not provide his readers with a reason why he only considers national crises. It is likely that international crises are too multi-faceted to serve as a (clear-cut) example in his article, which is theoretical in scope. In the international society, just like in a national society, a framework of symbols and dramatic acts that structure political life exists, so crises according to ‘t Harts definition can, at least theoretically, occur. And just like in a national society, the international society has power holders who have to manage a crisis when it occurs, although the jurisdiction on a certain event may not be as clear as it is on a national level.
cooperate with the UN. These organizations face the complex task of remaining neutral though all (national) stakeholders in a crisis are members of the organization.
‘t Hart treats all actors as unitary actors, be it governments, government agencies or corporations like CNN.47 This approach has been out of vogue in International Relations theory since the decline of Realism, and the rise of liberalism and other theories as most important paradigm, because it can not obscure the complex reality of different interest groups that act within all kinds of actors.48 The unitary actor approach can most certainly not obscure the complex reality of organizations like the UN and the AU, where so obviously different interests are at stake. The UN can, when managing an international crisis, simply not be seen as a unitary actor, as every stakeholder in such a crisis is also part of the UN.
Although ‘t Hart treats actors as unitary actors, he also talks about ‘power holders’, foremost when he claims that ‘analysis will indicate how symbolic instruments of crisis management serve crucial political functions for power holders’49 These power holders may well be individuals, like the presidents ‘t Hart mentions.50 The solution for studying international organizations that can not be treated as unitary actors therefore lies in studying individual power holders that represent the organization.
For organizations like the UN or NATO this is fairly simple, as these organizations have specific neutral organs, like a secretariat. The secretariat is headed by a Secretary General. These Secretaries General are, as individuals, the most unitary power holder within the organization. They preside the organization, what makes them the main power holders. At the same time they are the face of the organization and the main spokesperson. These characteristics make them the most plausible actors to use the lost dimensions. Also, within their organizations, they are one of the few people that (should) only serve the organization and its goals, without a ‘hidden’ agenda serving their home country. The Secretary General may assign specific tasks to specific people who then act on his behalf, like special representatives for example. These subordinates can also be in the position to make use of the lost dimensions of crisis management.
For other organizations the situation is more complicated. The European Union (EU) and the AU for example, that is modelled after its European counterpart, do have chairpersons but these are the heads of the state that presides the organization at the present time. Surely they should act and speak on behalf of the organization, but it is evident they also have national
47
’t Hart, ‘Symbols’, 38, 40, 41.
48
Viotti and Kauppi, International relations theory, 55 and 199-200.
49
‘t Hart, ‘Symbols’, 37, emphasis added.
50
interests to look after and in some cases these latter may prevail. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may function as unitary actors, but they often don’t have single representatives that can issue strong international speech acts and rituals.
The use of the ‘lost dimensions’ of crisis management on an international level bears in itself the specific problem of intercultural communication. International organizations themselves are often multicultural, and they address a multicultural audience. The ‘lost dimensions’ from Paul ‘t Harts theory consist of the use of rituals and several speech acts. Geert and Gert Jan Hofstede show in their book Cultures and organizations that symbols and rituals (which also contain words and discourse) are important levels on which cultural differences manifest themselves.51 Rituals and discourse that are common in one culture may be frowned upon in another culture. For international organizations cultural differences may hamper the successful use of the ‘lost dimensions’. The research conducted in this paper will also show to what extent international organizations are capable of overcoming this obstacle in order to make successful use of framing, masking and ritualization.
Framework for the case studies
In this paper four cases of crisis management by international organizations will be investigated. ‘t Hart uses a constructivist definition of the word ‘crisis’, describing it as ‘a breakdown of familiar symbolic frameworks legitimizing the pre-existing socio-political order’.52 In selecting case studies for this paper, this definition was a leading factor. What frameworks legitimize the existing international socio-political order, and in what cases can one see a breakdown of (one of) these frameworks?
The most important framework is the international state system. Every territory in the world is governed by a state. The definition of a state is laid down in the Montevideo convention (1933).53 All states are sovereign and equal.54
51
Geert Hofstede and Gert Jan Hofstede, Cultures and organizations. Software of the mind (New York etc. 2005) 6-8.
52
‘t Hart, ‘Symbols’, 39.
53
“The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” Art. 1 Montevideo Convention. Furthermore, the first sentence of article 3 explicitly states that "The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states."
In practice these criteria are used quite flexible (art 3 and 4 Charter of the United Nations). India for example was a member of the UN before its independence, and Israel already became a member before its borders were set. Recognition by other states and the UN is de facto the most important criterion.
54
The relations between states are regulated through international law. Every nation should abide by international law. This in itself forms the major framework legitimizing the existing international socio-political order. Although of course not every breach of international law can be seen as a crisis according to ‘t Harts theory, breaches of the most important laws and general principles can be seen as such. International law consists of treaty law, international customs and general principles of law and ‘judicial decisions (…) of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations’.55 The principle of pacta sunt servanda is probably the most important unwritten rule in international relations; it means that every state should keep its treaties.56 This principle can also be seen as a condition for art. 2.2 of the UN Charter, which states that ‘All members (…) shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present charter’.57
The prohibition of the use of force, as mentioned in the introduction, is also a framework legitimizing the existing order. The use of force, as well as the threat of use of force, is prohibited under international law.58 This more or less guarantees the safety of the existing states.
The list of events or situations where one of these frameworks broke down is extensive. In this thesis four cases of crisis management by international organizations are studied. Four would be the minimum number of cases required to cover the wide array of crises and organizations that exist. Western organizations as well as a non-western organization and a global organization with a non-western representative are investigated. I would have liked to investigate more different IOs like NGOs, and more different kind of crises like for example a financial crisis. In order to make a successful literature study possible however, quite large crises had to be chosen. In order to study the communication about the crisis from the crisis managing organization it was necessary to select quite large organizations as well. The possibility to access speeches, communiqués, news articles etc. in which the (representatives of the) organizations had the chance to use symbolic language was crucial for carrying out the case studies.
The crisis surrounding the invasion of Iraq by the ‘coalition of the willing’ in 2003 is a situation that definitely fits ‘t Harts definition of a crisis. A very clear-cut breach of
55
Art. 38.1 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
56
The meaning of the word ‘treaty’ is defined in art 2.1(a) and art 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
57
Art. 2.2 Charter of the United Nations
58
international peace was pursued without the UN’s permission or involvement. The United States (US), leading the coalition, hereby violated both international law and the pacta sunt
servanda-principle (as they violated the UN charter). In the first case study the management of the UN of this crisis will be studied. 59
The second investigates the way the UN responded to the crisis in Somalia after 1991, where internal war led to the disintegration of the Somali government and a state of anarchy throughout the country. This crisis also fits ‘t Harts definition: the disintegration of the Somali government was a breakdown of a framework legitimizing the existing order. Somalia was still considered a state, yet there was no sovereign authority present anymore.60 This also had consequences for the legal basis of any possible intervention.
The third case study concerns the intervention by the AU in the Sudanese region of Darfur from 2004 up to 2007. In this region war crimes and crimes against humanity were, and are, taking place; the international community is compelled to act but is very reluctant to do so.61 The AU tried to help resolve the conflict through intervention and negotiation.
The last case study focuses on the war of NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo-crisis in 1999. NATO insisted on an intervention in this region because ethnic cleansing would be taking place. The UN did not support the operation, yet NATO engaged in an air war, dubbing it a ‘humanitarian intervention’. This was unprecedented in international society, and responses differed greatly.
Of the IOs studied, the UN has a strong single representative; the Secretary General. He is the spokesperson of the organization, and in the study of the use of the ‘lost dimensions’, the focus will be on what the Secretary General communicated to the public. Speeches of his subordinates are only used in the analysis if they provide a valuable addition to the image of the crisis management by the UN as a whole. The AU has a chairman, but he is also president of a member state, which makes him less of a neutral representative.62 In the case of the AU also general communiqués from the organization have to be analysed. NATO, as an alliance, will be considered a unitary actor. It will show however that most use of symbolic crisis management in this case is done by Javier Solana, the Secretary General.
59
Malone, International struggle over Iraq gives an insightful overview of what happened in Iraq, from a UN point of view.
60
Peter Biles, ‘Somalia: anarchy rules’, Africa Report 37, 4 (1992) 30-33.
61
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf , Art. 3 Geneva conventions, art. 7 Rome Statute of the ICJ.
62
The question that will be answered in each case study is: What was the effect of the use of the above mentioned symbolic crisis handling devices – framing, masking and ritualization – by the acting IO? Both the effects on the crisis and on the IO itself will be taken into account. This way the practical applicability of the theory is tested along the way, as an answer to this question will provide insight into the question whether ‘t Harts theory still serves its goal of providing additional insights when applied on an international level.
In order to achieve a clear conclusion on whether symbolic instruments really help policy makers influence the outcome of a crisis, it will be important to make a clear division between traditional and ‘lost’ dimensions of crisis management. This is difficult since ‘t Hart does not give a clear definition of what he sees as traditional crisis management. In the book The
politics of crisis management, of which ‘t Hart is co-author, a rather complete picture of crisis management is drawn.63 As ‘t Hart is co-author of the book it also includes his ‘lost dimensions’. The book gives a good overview of what the study of crisis management encompasses besides the ‘lost dimensions’, and what place the ‘lost dimensions’ take within the whole of crisis management. The authors of the book define crisis leadership in five critical tasks:
- sense making: recognizing a dawning crisis as such, and recognizing how threatening it is. - decision making: responding to the events in an effective way, remaining in control. - meaning making: this is basically the use of the lost dimensions.
-terminating: returning from a state of crisis to normalcy
- learning: drawing political and organizational lessons from the crisis once it is over.64 To keep the focus on the crisis itself, and for the sake of simplicity, the task of learning will not be investigated in this thesis. So in order to make a division between lost and traditional dimensions, this division of tasks will be copied, except the task ‘learning’.
In every case study first the crisis will be described shortly. After this overview of the facts, the IOs actions within the traditional and lost dimensions of crisis management will be analysed, and the results of the use of both dimensions will be compared.
63
Arjen Boin et al., The politics of crisis management. Public leadership under pressure (Cambridge 2005).
64
Chapter 3. The UN and the invasion of Iraq 2003
In this chapter the first case study, about the UN and the invasion in Iraq, will be conducted. First of all a short overview of the events that form the crisis will be given. In this case study both the period before and after the actual invasion will be studied, but the main focus will be on the period before the invasion. During this time the UN was most active, especially through the work of its main representative, Kofi Annan, who was using his power in trying to prevent the war. After the decision had been made to invade Iraq unilaterally the UN became more of a commentator, who could condemn the war but not really do much anymore.65
Following the overview of the facts, the UNs actions within the traditional and lost dimensions of crisis management will be analysed. The focus will lie on the actions of Kofi Annan, who represents the organization as a unitary actor. The results of the use of both dimensions will be compared in order to determine whether the use of symbolic crisis handling devices had an effect on the outcome of the crisis for the UN.
A factual overview of the invasion of Iraq
The first time United States president George Bush made his case for an invasion of Iraq was when he addressed the General Assembly of the UN on 12 September 2002.66 In this speech he mentioned four main reasons for a war against Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), his link to the al-Qaeda network, his oppression of the Iraqi people and the ‘fact’ that peace in the Middle East would only be possible when Hussein was gone. Some of the US key allies were very critical of the plan, including France and Germany. They argued for continued diplomacy and weapon inspections. After intense diplomacy Security Council resolution 1441 was accepted, a resolution offering Iraq a last chance to comply with its disarmament obligations, and a new team of UN weapon inspectors was sent to Iraq.67
The UN weapon inspectors could not find evidence of the existence of any WMDs.68 On 5 February 2003, Colin Powell presented the US’s own findings on the topic to the UN, where
65
Stanley Meisler, Kofi Annan: a man of peace in world of war (New York 2006) 245.
66
George W. Bush, President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, 12 September 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html.
67
Meisler, Kofi Annan, 238-245 and Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II. The inside story of
the invasion and occupation of Iraq (Toronto 2006) 70-72. More information on the weapon inspections following resolution 1441 can be found in Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (London 2004) and Jean E. Krasno and James S. Sutterlin The United Nations and Iraq. Defanging the viper (Westport 2003).
68
he stated that Iraq did have WMDs.69 Little over a year later it was proven that this was wrong, and he had to admit that nothing he had said was true.70 As a follow-up to Powell’s presentation of 5 February, a coalition of states proposed a resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq. They knew it would not pass the Security Council because France was still strongly opposing the war, but still they hoped to get at least nine out of fifteen votes so they could claim at least a moral victory for their proposal.71
When the coalition states found out that even nine votes would not be possible they withdrew the proposal, and the US decided to start a war unilaterally. On 17 March 2003 George Bush issued a 48-hour ultimatum for Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq.72 They did not comply and so the invasion started 20 March 2003. After 21 days the Iraqi government was overthrown and the country was occupied.
The UN got a role in the reconstruction and restoration of the country when Security Council resolution 1483 was adopted, 22 May. But it soon became clear that the UN would hardly get a chance to work on its own: the US controlled everything and the UN role was only technical.73 As the occupation continued, things did not go as planned by the coalition forces: insurgencies kept rising and the American Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance proved almost completely ineffective.74 Furthermore, the first two and most important reasons to go to war were proven false. In August 2003 the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was deployed, but the role of this mission was also largely technical. The control over the country remained firmly in the hands of the US and its allies, while the security situation for both Iraqi’s and coalition- and UN-personnel degraded, which eventually even led to a devastating terrorist attack on the UNAMI-headquarters on 19 August 2003.75
69
Meisler, Kofi Annan, 249 and Colin L. Powell, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, 5 February 2003, http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.htm.
70
The Iraq Survey Group (installed by the US after the invasion) meticulously combed the country and finally reported that Iraq must have destroyed all their WMD’s unilaterally in 1991. The report can be found at:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/.
71
Meisler, Kofi Annan, 251.
72
George W. Bush, Iraq. Denial and Deception. Global Message, 17 March 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/news/20030317-10.html.
73
Malone, International struggle, 205-206.
74
Ibidem 202-203.
75
The UN and traditional crisis management
In this paragraph the UNs actions that fall within the traditional dimensions of crisis management, ‘sense making’, ‘decision making’ and ‘terminating’, will be examined, to see what their results were.
Sense making
The same day George Bush first made his case about intervening in Iraq, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also delivered a speech at the General Assembly. He too addressed the issue of Iraq and said that if the Iraqi government would not comply with its obligations, the Security Council should take ‘it’s responsibility’. Annan also stressed the importance of multilateral action, he repeatedly stated that states should only act multilateral and that ‘choosing to follow or reject the multilateral path must not be a simple matter of political convenience’, whereas Bush certainly did not rule out the possibility of unilateral action.76 So from the very beginning the positions of both the UN and the US on that matter were very clear.
With the starting positions set out so clearly, a crisis was dawning. Kofi Annan had proven with his speech that the UN knew about the plans the US was making and they interpreted them correctly, so on the task of ‘sense making’ they did a good job. Annan had the feeling that a war was coming, but he also still had faith that it could be prevented if the UN would do everything in its power.77 He thought that the UN could end the crisis by fulfilling the tasks ‘decision making’ and ‘terminating’ in a good way.
Decision making
In the following days Annan negotiated with Naji Sabri, the Iraqi minister of foreign affairs, about the return of the weapon inspectors. 16 September Annan got a letter from Sabri saying that Iraq would allow the weapon inspectors back without conditions.78 The letter was met with great scepticism by the US and Great Britain, a Downing Street spokesman said the Iraqi government was ‘playing games’ while the White House claimed the offer was ‘a tactical step by Iraq in hopes of avoiding strong UN Security Council action.’79 The letter also proved the fears of the pro-war lobby in Washington, that taking the road via the UN might not lead to
76
Kofi Annan, Press Release SG/SM/8378 or GA/10045, 12 September 2002. George Bush, President's Remarks, 12 September 2002.
77
Meisler, Kofi Annan, 240.
78
Sabri, Naji, Annex to Security Council Release S/2002/1034: Letter from the minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General, 16 September 2002,
http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/s-2002-1034.pdf.
79
war, which this lobby saw as the only way to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The lobby consisted of high-ranked people like Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice; they were angry with the UN for asking Sabri for this letter and they were not about to let Saddam ‘wriggle of the hook’.80 From this point on, the relationship between the US government and the UN, and Kofi Annan in particular, became increasingly difficult.
Now that a resolution about the return of the weapon inspectors had to be formulated, the negotiating task for Annan grew more intense. He wanted the resolution to be accepted unanimously by the Security Council. Dick Cheney wanted a resolution containing a ‘hidden trigger’, demanding Saddam Hussein to give a detailed overview of his weaponry. If he denied the possession of WMDs he would be lying, giving the coalition a causus belli. But if he admitted having WMDs he would do the same: the proposed resolution would automatically lead to war.81 This kind of resolution would never pass the Security Council though, and it was up to the member states and Annan to find a middle way. Annan’s campaign for unanimous acceptance strengthened the position of the countries that did not want a resolution ‘American style’.
At last Security Council resolution 1441 was accepted unanimously. Annan had put a lot of diplomatic effort in it, and even convinced Syria – a traditional ally to Iraq – to accept it.82 It did not contain a direct cause of war; if Iraq would not comply with the resolution the Security Council would consider the matter again.83 After the resolution was accepted the UNs active role in the crisis became much smaller, there was not much they could do anymore. Within the task of ‘decision making’ they did everything they could. They succeeded in the goals they had set: getting Iraq to accept the weapon inspectors without conditions, and making a strong case against an invasion by unanimous acceptance of resolution 1441. Only the coalition forces did not react the way the UN had hoped.
In speeches Annan kept declaring that he was against an invasion of Iraq, and after Powell gave his presentation on the US ‘findings’ of Iraqi weapons he understood that for some the presentation would be convincing, although he himself did not believe Powell.84 When the coalition tried to attain a moral victory for a new resolution the US put economic pressure on
80
Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 72.
81
Malone, International struggle, 194 and Meisler, Kofi Annan, 242.
82
Meisler, Kofi Annan, 244.
83
UN Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002.
84
Meisler, Kofi Annan, 249 and James Traub, The best intentions. Kofi Annan and the UN in the era of American
the South American members of the Security Council to vote in favor of the resolution. Annan traveled to these countries and encouraged them to stand their ground, and they did.85
Terminating
When the invasion and occupation finally began, there was not much the UN could do anymore. Annan was overwhelmed by a feeling of failure, even despair. By the end of April he collapsed into a kind of depression combined with physical illness, which made him quite inactive.86 After a while however he regained his strength and he helped form UNAMI and selected Sergio Vieira de Mello to lead the mission. Although it was not the result of crisis termination – the territory of Iraq was still occupied by foreign armies without UN consent, so the original crisis situation still existed – the installment of a humanitarian mission can be regarded as returning to normalcy for the UN.
The attack on the UNAMI-headquarters was a huge blow for the entire UN, which lost in De Mello the man who was often mentioned as the next Secretary General. After this event the organization withdrew to an even smaller level of involvement, and the crisis episode for the UN had come to an end.87
The UN and the lost dimensions of crisis management
In this paragraph the UNs actions that fall within the ‘lost’ dimensions of crisis management, so framing, masking and ritualization, will be examined, to see what their results were. The focus will be on Kofi Annan, as representative of the UN.
It was for Kofi Annan standard protocol to address the General Assembly on its opening, 12 September 2002. It was however not standard protocol that Annan’s speech was already issued to the press the day before. This was done to draw extra attention to the speech. George Bush would address the Assembly directly after Annan, and the attention for his speech could easily overshadow the attention for that of Annan.88 When looking at the content of the speech it is understandable why it was important for the UN that special attention would be paid to it. The UN had recognized a dawning crisis (‘sense making’) and now they wanted to influence the public’s perception of the crisis (‘meaning making’) by means of framing.
85
Meisler, Kofi Annan, 250-251.
86
Traub, The best intentions, 185-186 and Meisler, Kofi Annan, 257-261.
87
Ibidem, respectively 193-199 and 260-268.
88
