University of Groningen Cooperation and social control Bakker, Dieko Marnix

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University of Groningen

Cooperation and social control

Bakker, Dieko Marnix

DOI:

10.33612/diss.98552819

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Publication date:

2019

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Bakker, D. M. (2019). Cooperation and social control: effects of preferences, institutions, and social

structure. Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.98552819

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