Social responsibility in post-conflict reconstruction : a case study of a Dutch public-private partnership in Afghanistan

Social Responsibility in Post-Conflict Reconstruction:

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Social Responsibility in Post-Conflict Reconstruction:

A Case Study of a Dutch Public-Private Partnership in Afghanistan.

Master Thesis: Ben Gans (10416633)

University of Amsterdam Business School, Faculty of Economics and Business

Supervisor: Dr. A.E. Kourula 2nd Reader: Dr. C.K. Buengeler

Venray, August 30, 2015

Statement of Originality

This document is written by Ben Gans who declares to take full responsibility for the contents of this document. I declare that the text and the work presented in this document is original and that no sources other than those mentioned in the text

and its references have been used in creating it.

The Faculty of Economics and Business is responsible solely for the supervision of completion of the work, not for the contents. Signature:

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Acknowledgements

This master thesis concludes the Executive Programme in Management Studies (EPMS). The EPMS is a Master’s of Science (MSc) program at the University of Amsterdam Business School. During the last five months I conducted a research to explore the role of Social Responsibility (SR) within Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) during Post-Conflict Reconstruction missions. Before delving into the specifics I would like to thank the following people who helped with conducting the research and reviewing the thesis.

In the first place I would like to thank Dr. Arno Kourula and Dr. Claudia Buengeler for their time, advice and support. Furthermore, I would like to thank Colonel Drs. Jan Swillens for providing his network. Without their support this thesis could not have reached the level where it is now. Additionally, I would like to thank all the interviewees for their time and resources. Without their openness and rich colorful stories it would have been impossible to fully understand the role of SR within Post-Conflict Reconstruction missions in practice.

I also would like to thank the University of Amsterdam Business School for their educational program. Without this program I would not have accumulated the academic foundation and life experience I have today. Especially I would like to thank Drs. Charlotte Spanjaard and Drs. Laura Keessen from the program management.

Finally, I am grateful to my family for the many ways in which they encouraged and supported me, also in matters beyond the writing of this thesis. The thesis symbolizes the end of a two year journey at the University of Amsterdam Business School. It has been a great experience, highly educational and most importantly I enjoyed it to the full!

Ben Gans

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Table of Contents

2.2 A Comprehensive Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction………..…..……13

2.3 Corporate Social Responsibility: definitions……….…...…………...…...….17

2.4 Theoretical framework………...19

3 Methodology……….…21

3.1 Research strategy……….………21

3.2 Data collection………...………..22

3.3 Unit of analysis………22

3.4 Validity and reliability………...25

4 Empirical findings………...………..……...……27

4.1 Case description………..….………27

4.2 Participants………...…………28

4.3 Results and discussion……….………...………..29

5 Conclusions, limitations and agenda for future research……….……38

References……….42

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Abstract

This study explores the complexities Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) are facing during Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The study discusses the added-value of Social Responsibility (SR) in the context of the Comprehensive Approach. The Comprehensive Approach is a conceptual framework intended to address the need for actors in a stabilization mission to work together, from planning to implementation, involving collaboration amongst Defense, Diplomacy and Development (Williams, 2011). To better understand the role of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in enabling SR activities I conducted a single case study. The main aim of this study is to explore the role of SR within the context of Post-Conflict Reconstruction, as part of the strategic management from a governmental perspective. This study will be a multidisciplinary research, which is going to empirically test how governmental actors motives at different levels interact to predict increased SR and consequently, positive social change. Next to its theoretical contribution, the study will be source to policy debates, decisions and new insights for practitioners in the military and similarly High Reliability Organizations (HRO).

The results of the content analysis of 16 semi-structured interviews with senior diplomats, senior military commanders, and civilian entrepreneurs support the discussion over the added-value of SR in the context of the Comprehensive Approach. Particular attention is paid to the existing variety in norms relevant to the involvement of the private sector, SR, and the potential role of PPPs in enabling stabilization as well as reconstruction in Post-Conflict Zones.

This study shows that engaging in SR activities toward reconstruction is a joint goal for the governmental stakeholders engaged in the Comprehensive Approach. These governmental stakeholders (Defense, Diplomacy and Development) demonstrated a sense of SR in their decision-making and approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction. In that respect the Comprehensive Approach meets the expectation of our society that organizations adapt proper responsible social values in their legal, ethical, and discretionary activities (Carroll, 1995; Sethi, 1975). Moreover, the three stakeholders perceived the role of PPPs to be potential enablers of stabilization and reconstruction in Post-Conflict Zones.

Keywords

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1

Introduction

As early as 1932 Dodd argued that companies like individuals, should strive to be good corporate citizens by contributing to the community to a greater extent as is generally required. Since this first impetus, the maximization for private firm of corporate social activities has been studied. It is recognized as key in improving the value of the firm (Fombrun, 2005). Such initiatives and activities promote societal peace and stability and range from protection of human rights to education and public health (Fort & Schipani, 2002; Kruk et al., 2009; Melandri, 2011;Quaynor, 2012). Such activities require investing in infrastructures such as school buildings, community clinic, and Information Technology (IT).

Most definitions of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) relate directly to the concept of Social Responsibility (SR). “Social Responsibility (…) implies a public posture toward society’s economic and human resources and a willingness to see that those resources are used for broad social ends and not simply for the narrowly circumscribed interests of private persons and firms” (Frederick, 1960). The CSR debate focuses on the entanglement of maximizing shareholder wealth with the requirements of involving a range of stakeholders in the decision-making process. CSR initiatives lead to a better reputation for private firm loyalty and customer identification (Klein & Leffler, 1980; Keh & Xie, 2009) and increased human and capital resources (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986). However, other multinational engagements have contributed to public mistrust. For example, Shell’s joint venture with the Nigerian government in 1995 is an illustration of corporate failure to protect and enable civil rights.1 Furthermore, CSR has failed as a peacebuilding tool in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This likely because the post conflict equation lacked numerous governance prerequisites. Enabling such CSR activities requires the ability to make sense of the environment and to maintain an ongoing dialogue amongst stakeholders. Improvements in corporate governance, accountability, and transparency are key to ensuring successful CSR initiatives.

1 _{In this case, Saro-Wiwa, a Nigerian environmental activist, was found guilty and sentenced to death by a special tribunal, convened specifically} for this occasion, for the brutal murder of four Ogoni chiefs. Some of the defendants' lawyers resigned in protest against the alleged rigging of the trial by the Abacha regime. At least two witnesses who testified that Saro-Wiwa was involved in the murders of the Ogoni elders later recanted, stating that they had been bribed with money and offers of jobs with Shell to give false testimony – in the presence of Shell's lawyer (Entine, 2009).

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However, this is a challenge because stakeholders’ motives are diverse, depending on the antecedents and consequences of engaging in these activities (Aguilera et al., 2007; Basu & Pallazo, 2008) proposed focusing on sensemaking to better understand the institutional factors that led to CSR activities.

Various CSR-principles, standards, frameworks and indices have grown significantly as researchers expanded the concept in business and academic worlds. Little is known on the way to organize CSR in the core activities of organizations in developing countries. It is only in the past decades that the idea that Western concepts of management cannot simply be applied in developing countries has taken its roots. Researchers and practices have identified significant differences between the development, implementation and practice of CSR in developed and developing countries (Tyagi, 2012; Tilakasiri, 2012). The findings revealed differences – of culture, management perspectives, geographical and natural business systems. They concluded that existing CSR in the developed world cannot be employed in developing countries (Ringov & Zollo, 2007; Pedersen & Neergaard, 2008; Sweeney, 2009). This is particularly the case during Post-Conflict Reconstruction which requires the close cooperation of (non)governmental and private organizations (van Marrewijk & Were, 2003; Reuther, 2011).

Since the end of World War II Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU) have been involved in the stabilization and reconstruction of Post-Conflict Zones. Governments and organizations perceive these zones as highly complex environments. Reconstruction includes programs for disarmament, destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, demining, training of police and other security personnel, election monitoring, human rights promotion, and ‘reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation’ (Weinberger, 2002; Manning, 2003). Effective reconstruction of Conflict Zones requires collaboration, coherence, and coordination amongst stakeholders. In Post-Conflict Zones, there is an absence of war, but not essentially real peace.

According to Brahimi (2000) the end of fighting does propose an opportunity to work towards lasting peace, but that requires the establishment of sustainable institutions, capable of ensuring long-term security. Examples of Post-Conflict Zones in recent history are the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Post-Conflict Reconstruction, building peace, and bringing stability in these zones has always been a high priority for IGOs. Boutros-Ghali (1997) defined Post-Conflict Reconstruction as the “comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people” (p.12). Post-Conflict Zones are characterized by a lack of cohesion and high levels of inequality amongst citizens, resulting in environmental and social instability (Bjarnegård & Melander, 2011; Wallensteen, 2011). A main challenge is that each stakeholder has its own agenda, jurisdiction, and approaches. This including solutions from a military, civil society and organizational perspectives. It is a challenge to align these various approaches. The Comprehensive Approach is an interesting intent in doing so. Williams (2011) defines the Comprehensive Approach as “a conceptual framework intended to address the need for actors in a stabilization mission to work together, from planning to implementation” (p.66). The Comprehensive Approach recognizes the military as part of the solution in reconstruction, however the approach carefully notes that the military is only one stakeholder in the entire reconstruction collaboration (Williams, 2011). The Comprehensive Approach represents the relevant stakeholders involved in the decision-making process. It’s usually implemented in failing or failed states aiming at Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Sustainable Peacebuilding. Governance in the Comprehensive Approach context is operationalized as collaboration, covering lasting and well-structured relationships, resources flow and other interactions between specific organizations seeking to attain both common as well as separate goals (de Coning & Friis, 2011; Damanpour & Schneider, 2006; Kratzer et al., 2004; Bullinger et al., 2010). Besides the participation of IGOs such as NATO and the UN, there is an increasing number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and private firms who play an important role in the reconstruction process. These stakeholders deploy organizational resources and activities to the benefit of the society, government, and environment. Establishing joint goals in PPPs (Eden & Ackermann, 2013), especially in an unstable context (Bjarnegård & Melander, 2011; Wallensteen, 2011) requires a high level of SR. Side effects of business-NGO partnerships are dwindling citizen trust and confidence in public authorities, which will hinder state efforts or intentions to levy taxes, which, in turn, makes fragile states even more dependent on external donors (Kolk & Lenfant, 2013).

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While the literature reports extensively on the benefits of engaging in CSR from a business-NGO partnership, little is known about the added-value of SR in PPPs from a governmental perspective. To better understand the vision of the government on the role of SR within the context of Post-Conflict Reconstruction I conducted a single case study in a unique context: the reconstruction mission of the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) in Afghanistan that ran from 2006 to 2010.

1.2 Research question

The goal of the study is to first explore the role of SR within the context of Post-Conflict Reconstruction, as part of the strategic management from a governmental perspective. Second, this exploratory research aims at mapping the decision-making process when considering SR engagement. Additionally, we investigated the stakeholders’ perceptions on the role of private firms and SR as enabler of reconstruction in Post-Conflict Zones. The reconstruction mission of the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) in Afghanistan is used as an illustration of the context that surrounds SR in Post-Conflict Reconstruction.

The central research question of this thesis is:

How is Social Responsibility practiced by Inter-Governmental Organizations during Post-Conflict Reconstruction?

Next to its theoretical contribution, this study intents to be a source to policy debates, decisions and new insights for practitioners in the military and similarly High Reliability Organizations (HRO) operating in Post-Conflict Zones. This research will be a multidisciplinary research, which is going to empirically test how actors motives at different levels interact to predict increased SR and consequently, positive social change.

1.3 Thesis outline

This thesis follows a linear-analytic approach in the thesis structure; the linear-analytic approach for reporting is best suited when a thesis committee comprise the main audience for a case study (Yin, 2014). This thesis is divided in two parts; a theoretical part and an empirical part. Chapter two covers the theoretical part of this thesis by describing the results of an extensive literature review. It describes the concepts of Post-Conflict, the Comprehensive Approach and SR. The purpose of the literature review is to explore current literature about the previously mentioned concepts.

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Consequently, Chapter two explains and elaborates on each of the concepts as defined in the literature. The results of the literature study are bundled in a theoretical framework which can be used as a sound foundation for the empirical part of this thesis.

The empirical part starts in Chapter three by describing the design of the overall research. The Chapter elaborates on the research strategy, the choice of the data collection, method and the validity.

Chapter four describes the selected case, selection of participants and how the research was conducted. Moreover, the Chapter describes the empirical part of this thesis by reporting the findings of the empirical study.

The thesis is concluded in Chapter five. In which, the research questions are answered and conclusions are drawn using the findings of both the empirical and the theoretical part. Subsequently, recommendations are made for applying the concept of SR within the Comprehensive Approach based on the conclusions. Apart from the conclusions the Chapter elaborates on recommendations the limitations of this study and provides future research directions.

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2

Literature review

As described in the research design this thesis is divided in two parts; this chapter covers the theoretical part. Within this chapter the objective is to identify and describe the currently available theoretical concepts in literature on the research subjects. To achieve this goal, an extensive literature review was made. The chapter starts by defining Post-Conflict in order to fully understand the context of the Comprehensive Approach. Next the concept of the Comprehensive Approach itself is described in Paragraph 2.2. The literature review is concluded in Paragraph 2.3 which describes the concept of CSR. The entire Chapter is than finalized by Paragraph 2.4 which provides a theoretical framework based on the literature review.

2.1 Defining Post-Conflict

According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) there have been 33 armed conflicts with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths in 2013 (Themner & Wallensteen, 2014). Seven of these where recorded as wars by the UCDP. In order to categorize an armed conflict as war a minimum of 1.000 battle-related deaths per year is required (Strand et al., 2004; Themner & Wallensteen, 2014). Six peace agreements were signed in the year 2013. These and other numbers show us the rise of Post-Conflict Zones in numerous countries around the world (Williams, 2011; Themner & Wallensteen, 2014). The most prominent examples of Post-Conflict Zones include: Afghanistan, Iraq and Yugoslavia. These Post-Conflict Zones arise due to numerous interventions orchestrated by the international community.

One well recognized contributor to the outbreak of war is state failure (Brinkerhoff, 2005). State failure, or failed states as literature describes them, are states which no longer perform the basic functions of a state. A situation arises where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart (Di John, 2011). Brinkerhoff (2005) provides a set of characteristics to assess whether a state can be considered a failed state; (a) breakdown of law and order where state institutions lose their power on the usage of force in protecting their citizens, or the institutions use their power to oppress and terrorize citizens, (b) weak or disintegrated capacity to fulfill citizens’ needs, provide basic public services and assure citizens’ welfare or support normal economic activity, (c) lack of credible entity representation of a state beyond its borders. The degree to which a given state exhibits these characteristics is a key issue.

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Extreme cases arise when civil and social authority have disintegrated and anarchic clashes of all against all prevails (Brinkerhoff, 2005). However, less extreme countries have less drastic situations and vary in the extend in which they can support the welfare, basic needs and security of their citizens (Brinkerhoff, 2005). Despite the wide usage of the label failed state literature provides remarks whether the label failed state is objectively used in practice (Bøås & Jennings, 2007). The remarks question the value of the label for objective policy planning and thoughtful analysis.

Post-Conflict Zones arise once the fog of war has cleared and opposing groups lay down their weapons. If peace agreements hold and military violence subsides the focus shifts from emergency relief aid to long-term social and economic reconstruction (Anderlini, 2004; Collier, 2008). Peace in Post-Conflict Zones is relative; in practice the conflict has subsided to a greater or lesser degree, but strife might still be ongoing in parts of the country (Brinkerhoff, 2005). The international community is increasingly playing a strong role in Post-Conflict Zones, mainly through the actions of peace support operations (Brzoska, 2006). Peace support operations initially focus on providing short term needs such as humanitarian assistance, emergency relief and other forms of post-conflict assistance (Anderlini & E;-Bushra, 2004). Apart from a lack of security conflict undermines trust and cooperation within formal and informal social organizations (Vervisch et al., 2013). Thus Conflict Zones are fragile; according to a study by Collier et al. (2008) the average risk a Post-Conflict Zone reverts back to conflict is 40%. Both operations (emergency relief and long-term development) require a different set of capabilities from peace support operations. Emergency relief provides basic humanitarian needs such as food, medical care, housing an security (Anderlini & El-Bushra, 2004). Whereas long-term development aims at rebuilding the entire Post-Conflict Zones in all its dimensions (e.g. governance, economic, security, social) (Anderlini & E;-Bushra, 2004). Long-term development requires peace support operations to integrate their efforts in a holistic approach which combines security forces with other governmental, non-governmental and the rest of society to form a whole-of-society approach (Manning, 2003; Stavridis, 2011).

One organization which has experienced difficulties in adjusting to the holistic approach is NATO (Williams, 2011). During the Cold War NATO was well prepared to provide security for Western Europe but their capabilities where mainly limited to providing security and emergency response aid (Williams, 2011). However, security cannot be provided by military means alone.

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Security requires good governance, justice, reconstruction and development (Williams, 2011). Thus when NATO was responsible for security in Afghanistan 2006 it was indirectly dependent on the long-term development and reconstruction of the country (Williams, 2011). After initial struggles NATO and its allies united their efforts in reconstruction and development in what is now known as the Comprehensive Approach.

This study will focus on Post-Conflict Zones, where there was an armed conflict, finished by the signature of a peace agreement (or other kind of ending) but where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. These situations are often characterized by a lack of social cohesion and stability, and high levels of inequality (Bjarnegård & Melander, 2011; Wallensteen, 2011).

2.2 A Comprehensive Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The NATO alliance began development of their own crisis management and state-building framework due to a lack of coordination and collaboration with civilian organizations outside of NATO (Williams, 2011). The goal was to create coherence between military, development and reconstruction (Petersen & Binnendijk, 2007). The Comprehensive Approach originated out of the Concentrated Planning and Action initiative (CPA) proposed by Denmark to the NATO alliance in 2004 (Petersen & Binnendijk, 2007; Williams, 2011). The CPA initiative was a result of various interventions in the 1990s and 2000s where members of the alliance realized that a shared understanding of the collaboration necessary to rebuild complex Post-Conflict Zones was lacking at the tactical level (Williams, 2011). The international community realized that military actions alone were no longer sufficient in rebuilding countries. In order for these issues to be solved the coordination at an operational and strategic level had to improve. The Comprehensive Approach was formally discussed at the NATO summit in Riga 2006, after which the relevant NATO bodies were instructed to propose action plans to implement the approach in their practices(Petersen & Binnendijk, 2007; Williams, 2011). Between the NATO summits the Comprehensive Approach was subject of substantial internal discussion. Within these discussions it was stressed that NATO remained a military body and thus only could be seen as one of the stakeholders in the Comprehensive Approach (Petersen & Binnendijk, 2007; de Coning & Friis, 2011).

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As a result the Bucharest 2008 summit concluded that NATO can solely be regarded as one contributor to the Comprehensive Approach of a wider international inter-organizational community (de Coning & Friis, 2011).

The goal of the Comprehensive Approach is not to create new capabilities for peace support operations but rather to combine and coordinate efforts of multiple stakeholders in a single integrated approach of rebuilding failed states (Williams, 2011). The scope of a crisis faced by a peace support operation is so immense that no single governmental or private organization could manage it alone (Friis & Jarmyr, 2008). Therefore military, diplomacy and humanitarian organizations arise and develop their own set of competences to manage one specific aspect of the larger crisis (Friis & Jarmyr, 2008).

Figure 1: Strategic framework for reconstruction and development (IIP, 2009).

Unfortunately the lack of coherence between these different organizations and local organizations causes friction such as: inter-organizational conflicts, competition for funding, working at cross-purposes and sub-optimal economies of scale (Coning & Friis, 2011; Williams, 2011). In other words there is no coherence between the different organizations operating within a peace support operation. Comprehensive Approach Safe and secure environment Sustainable economy Stable governance Social well-being Rule of Law

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In literature there appears to be consensus that peace support operations can be more efficient and effective if coherence between organizations improves, that is if there is a common strategy, a detailed understanding of the situation, a common change theory and a plan for implementation and evaluation of such a strategy (Friis & Jarmyr, 2008; Coning & Friis, 2011; Stavridis, 2011). The authors Coning and Friis (2011) have developed a model of coherence, the model defines six types of relationships and four levels of coherence between actors (Coning & Friis, 2011).

Table 1: Collaboration matrix (De Coning & Friis, 2011).

Intra-agency

Whole-of-government

Inter-agency Internal-external

Unity Various sections of

the Swedish Foreign Ministry Various Canadian government agencies Members of the coalition Operation Desert Storm, 1991 Gulf War International agencies and national IEC work together to organize elections in DRC in 2006 Integration Various components of a UN Peacekeeping mission UK Stabilization Unit, or Canadian Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) UN Peacekeeping mission and UN Country Team in, e.g. Liberia, 2009

Liberia 2009: International agencies and local actors agree to use PRS as common framework and action plan

Cooperation DPKO and OCHA

(both UN Secretariat) work together on UN Protection of Civilians guidelines Civilian and military pillars of USA PRT in Afghanistan, 2009 Afghanistan Bonn-process 2003; UN-EU cooperation in Chad, 2008

EULEX and the Kosovo

government, 2009

Coordination DPKO and OCHA

in the field Civilian and military pillars of Norwegian PRT in Afghanistan, 2009 Humanitarian cluster approach to coordination; Kosovo UNMIK pillars; Bosnia Peace Implementation Council (PIC) UN and Sudanese Independent Electoral Commission in April 2010 elections

Coexistence Various parts of EU in Chad in 2008

DFID and MOD fail to agree on common evaluation criteria for UK PRT in Afghanistan, 2008 Humanitarian community and MONUC in Eastern DRC, 2009 UNAMID and Government of Sudan in Darfur, 2008

Competition Various sections of a ministry compete for funding

US State Department, US Department of Defense and CIA in Afghanistan, 2007 Humanitarian agencies and UNMIL disagree on movement of IDPs from Monrovia, 2005 Taliban and ISAF/UNAMA; Government of Chad and MINURCAT, 2010

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The relationship types can be presented on a scale from unity to competition. When actors are in unity they undertake joint action under a unified command structure (Coning & Friis, 2011; van der Lijn, 2014). Whereas when actors are competitors they have complete opposing values, visions and strategies (Coning & Friis, 2011; van der Lijn, 2014). The total matrix (see table 1) of six relationship types consists of: Actors are United, Actors are Integrated, Actors Cooperate, Actors Coordinate, Actors Coexist, Actors Compete (Coning & Friis, 2011). Most collaborations between stakeholders will move between the different relationship types during the lifetime of a collaboration. These relationship types are active between actors at four coherence levels in peace support operations. The inter-agency coherence level describes the coherence within an organizations (e.g. within the UN) (Coning & Friis, 2011; van der Lijn, 2014). Coherence on the Whole-of-Government level describes coherence between agencies and different ministries of the same national government (van der Lijn, 2014). Inter-agency coherence aims to describe the coherence between different international actors ranging from national governments to NGOs (van der Lijn, 2014). Lastly, the international-local level describes the amount of coherence between international actors and local actors (Coning & Friis, 2011; van der Lijn, 2014).

Consequently the goal of the Comprehensive Approach is realizing an optimal coherence on all levels for successful post-conflict reconstruction of a failed country (Petersen & Binnendijk, 2007). Williams (2011) provided a sound definition of the Comprehensive Approach: “The Comprehensive Approach is a conceptual framework intended to address the need for actors in a stabilization mission to work together, from planning to implementation” (p.66). The Comprehensive Approach recognizes the military as part of the solution in reconstruction, however the approach carefully notes that the military is only one stakeholder in the entire reconstruction collaboration (Williams, 2011).

Rather the term ‘3D’ (Diplomacy, Development and Defense), developed by the Canadian government, is used to describe the different governmental stakeholders of the Comprehensive Approach (Friis & Jarmyr, 2008; Coning & Friis, 2011). Defense and Diplomacy are self-explanatory terms but the Development element needs clarification, development refers to stakeholders directly responsible for development projects (e.g. building schools, hospitals). In practice this role is fulfilled mainly by NGOs, government agencies and the private sector.

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The different stakeholders operating in a peace support operation aim to assist reconstruction in a certain aspect of the overall crisis. Therefore each of the stakeholders has different strategies, mandates, believes, resources and practices (Rietjens et al., 2013). These differences in strategies, mandates and believes can be grounded in different ideologies, identities, theories of change or politics and simply cannot be overcome by new coordinating bodies, business measures or improved communication (Coning & Friis, 2011). For example an NGO which is committed to non-violence and an international military force which has a mandate for violence will not collaborate nor coordinate, the coherence between these actors will likely be low to zero (Rietjens et al., 2013). Thus, in certain situations coherence between actors is simply not possible. While in other situations coherence can be greatly improved and contribute to the faster rebuilding of a failed state (Coning & Friis, 2011). Coherence and thus indirectly the Comprehensive Approach is dependent on the context in which it operates. Contextual elements such as the type of stakeholders, number of stakeholders, level of security, identities and ideologies all effect the coherence within the comprehensive approach. The article of Coning et al. (2011) posits that maximum coherence is not always desirable, a context dependent optimum should be sought. Rather than seeking maximum coherence literature advises to focus on processes which can facilitate the collaboration (e.g. knowledge sharing processes, priority setting processes) between actors in the Comprehensive Approach (Petersen & Binnendijk, 2007; Coning & Friis, 2011; Lijn, 2011). Collaboration processes can structure and support collaboration, coordination and integration between actors and thus influence the coherence between them. In that respect the Comprehensive Approach meets the expectation of our society that organizations adapt proper responsible social values in their legal, ethical, and discretionary activities (Carroll, 1995; Sethi, 1975).

2.3 Corporate Social Responsibility: Definitions

Definitions of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) have proliferated in the literature. These vary as a function of the diversity of the stakeholders involved, their values, and therefore associated goals. CSR has been developed up to the point that it became almost “universally sanctioned and promoted by all constituents in society from governmental organizations [to] individual consumers” (Lee, 2008).

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The definition of Carroll (1991) is one of the most commonly used: “Corporate Social Responsibility involves the conduct of a business so that it is economically profitable, law abiding, ethical and socially supportive.

To be socially responsible… then means that profitability and obedience to the law are foremost conditions to discussing the firm’s ethics and the extent to which it supports the society in which it exists with contributions of money, time and talent. Thus, CSR is composed of four parts: economic, legal, ethical and voluntary or philanthropic” (p. 604). Epstein (1987) also related CSR to organizational decision-making activities. He stated that the normative correctness of the outcome of corporate action relating to a specific problem, i.e. to be socially responsible, should have beneficial rather than adverse effects on stakeholders. That is to be socially responsible. Steiner stated that taking up “social responsibilities is more of an attitude, of the way a manager approaches his decision-making task, than a great shift in the economics of decision making. It is a philosophy that looks at the social interest and the enlightened self-interest of business over the long run as compared with the old, narrow, unrestrained short-run self-interest” (Steiner, 1972). For a further review of CSR definitions see Carroll (1979) or Joyner and Payne (2002).

CSR has a long history in both research and practice, since centuries (Carroll, 1999). The concept addresses categories of economic, legal, ethical and discretionary activities. Organizations should adapt their activities to the value and expectations of the society (Andrews, 1987; Carroll, 1979; Sethi, 1975). It is around the late 70’s when businesses and government started paying attention to the concept. The next twenty years, CSR had been developed up to a point when it became almost “universally sanctioned and promoted by all constituents in society from governmental organizations and individual consumers” (Lee, 2008, p.53). This indicates that on a wide range of issues corporations are encouraged to behave socially responsibly (Dahlsrud, 2006).

Various CSR-principles, standards, frameworks and indices have grown significantly as researchers expanded the concept in business and academic worlds. Little is known on the way to organize CSR in the core activities of organizations in developing countries. It is only in the past decades that the idea that Western concepts of management cannot simply be applied in developing countries has taken its roots. Researchers and practices have identified significant differences between the development, implementation and practice of CSR in developed and developing countries (Tyagi, 2012; Tilakasiri, 2012).

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The findings revealed differences – of culture, management perspectives, geographical and natural business systems. They concluded that existing CSR in the developed world cannot be employed in developing countries (Ringov & Zollo, 2007; Pedersen & Neergaard, 2008; Sweeney, 2009). This is particularly the case during Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Such situations have a highly multidisciplinary (public-private cooperation) and ethical character. Furthermore, actions are generally planned and organized in Western countries, but conducted in Post-Conflict Zones, mostly developing countries. Kolk & Lenfant (2013) highlighted that “MNEs and NGOs take innovative approaches by engaging in dialogue with a large number of actors, including government representatives, taking steps to improve understanding of and compliance with standards and regulations, and undertaking concrete activities to further reconciliation, reconstruction and development more broadly” (p. 13).

Aguilera et al. (2007) combined four organizational levels individual, organizational, national, and transnational and their associated motives. They identified three types of associated motives. The first motive is instrumental. It posits that humans are searching for control. The second associated motive is relational. It concerns the quality of the relationships between individuals and groups in linkage to the psychological need for belongingness. The last associated motive is the type of relation. This third motive is moral and it is related to the need for meaningful existence. This need is based on the common idea that most human beings are sharing basic respect and human dignity with each other. Different types of pressure are placed on the firm to engage in CSR as function of the interaction between organizational levels and motives.

2.4 Theoretical framework

Figure 2 gives a schematic overview of the theoretical framework for this study. IGOs, NGOs and the private sector are visible as the three main actors in the Comprehensive Approach. They interact under different form and want to deploy their organizational resources and activities in order to contribute to sustainable peacebuilding and development. Therefore, this study views the Comprehensive Approach as a form of PPP organized according to the concept of Social Responsibility.

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3

Methodology

3.1 Introduction

As described in the introduction, this thesis consists of a theoretical part and an empirical part. This chapter describes the design of this empirical part. The main goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the methodologies and design considerations. By describing the research design readers can assess the soundness of the research and potentially recreate the research. Aside from the pure research design this chapter also describes the methodological justification of the research methodologies used.

3.2 Research strategy

The explorative objective of the research is best supported by a qualitative research direction. Qualitative research can offer insights into how behavior, systems and relationships emerge and evolve (Teijlingen, 2014). As such qualitative research aims at analyzing phenomena which are descriptive in nature and not easily quantifiable (Hove & Anda, 2005; Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Furthermore qualitative research can help to understand contextual and detailed data (van de Kuyt, 2013). Detailed data and contextual understanding are crucial capabilities to study the complexity of the Comprehensive Approach in practice (van de Kuyt, 2013). Complexity within the Comprehensive Approach arises from the multitude of heterogeneous organizations and their ideologies. Together these arguments all sup-port the notion that a qualitative research approach suits this specific research objective best.

Following the research approach a research method has to be developed. The starting point of any research method should be the type of the research question (Yin, 2014). Within this research the research question can be categorized as a “how” question. According to Yin (2014) ‘how’ questions can be answered using experiments, historical analysis and cases studies (Yin, 2014). Further analyzing the research topic learns that the research focuses on a set of contemporary events that do not require the researcher to control the environment. That is, the research can be done in a current non-contrived setting. After combining these observations and consulting the Yin (2014) framework a case study research is the most logical and sound option for this research. The following section will delve deeper in the unit of analysis of this study.

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3.3 Unit of analysis

Doing sound case study research requires a clear definition of the unit of analysis of the case (Yin, 2014). Knowing the case also requires a clear understanding of the case boundaries. Within case study research the case is the primary source of research data and thus the case cannot be a mere abstraction of a theoretical concept, a hypothesis or an idea (Yin, 2014). A theoretical concept, a hypothesis or an idea can support a certain research direction or proposition but cannot provide new research data for a case study research. Rather the case should be a concrete real-world manifestation of the theoretical concept (Yin, 2014), a manifestation which can be analyzed by the researcher in its natural context. Consequently the case of this research is not the Comprehensive Approach as a concept, but rather the focus is on organizations who have been involved within a real-world Comprehensive Approach. Or in other words, organizations who have a task-related relationship within an actual Comprehensive Approach collaboration. To further narrow down this case the research focuses on Dutch organizations who have a task-related relationship with a Comprehensive Approach. Using these criteria in practice the case is defined by recent peace support operations were the Netherlands have played an active role. Examples of these operations are the NATO ISAF peace support operation in Afghanistan and the UN police mission MINUSMA in Mali.

3.4 Data collection

After defining the unit of analysis, or in this thesis the case, logically the next step is how to collect data from the defined case. Unfortunately due to time, resource and safety restrictions there was no opportunity to retrieve research-data using a field study within an active peace support operation. Therefore, as a substitute, the research focuses on primary research data derived from organizations through interviews. Corresponding with the case definition the organizations selected for the interviews have been or are still active within a Comprehensive Approach. Interviews are being used as a common data gathering method for case study research (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013; Yin, 2014). Interviews are guided conversations between the interviewer and the interviewee. The goal of the interviews is to hear stories, opinions and actions of individuals. Thus the interview can be a source of rich qualitative research data (Hove & Anda, 2005). Furthermore interviews can be used to study historical events. That is, events can be recalled by interviewees while in an interview.

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Important to notice is that the information gathered from an interview is always a mere interpretation of the interviewees view of the original facts (Yin, 2014), consequently a certain response bias can enter the research data. For example; an interviewee can be impacted by the specific wording or pronunciation of the interview questions. Triangulation can be used to minimize this bias in the research data. The specific triangulation practices used in this thesis are described in section 3.5 Validity and reliability.

From the different types of interview techniques, semi-structured interviews are interviews were only a few of the interview questions are specific while the other questions are open-ended (Hove & Anda, 2005). Although the questions are designed to give a direction to the interview, the main goal is to hear the stories and experiences of the interviewees on top of the specific answers to the questions. This is the main reason for this research to use structured interviews. The semi-structured interviews used in this research are designed for individual face-to-face interviews. Individual face-to-face interviews are interviews where both the interviewer and the interviewee are solely present in one physical location. Face-to-face interviews are favorable for this research because the interviewees can use a wider range of verbal and non-verbal signals than distance interviews (Clark & Schober, 1992; Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). For example interviewees can use gestures and eye gazes to let the interviewer know that they are still thinking about a question. Using these qualifiers a total of sixteen interviews of approximately 60 minutes each were held. The interviews were held in English.

An interview protocol was developed for the interviews with employees of the Ministry of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Private Sector. The interview protocol contained instructions for the interviewer how to introduce him-self and the research. Additionally the protocols contain specific instructions on how to ask for consent in audio-recording the interview. The main part of the protocols contain the interview questions.

The interview questions were developed upon the theory found in the literature exploration, the research questions and the established propositions. The initial version of the interview protocol was reviewed by two experts in the field of academic research whose recommendation for improvements were incorporated. The resulting final version of the interview protocol can be found in Appendix B.

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Finally, it is important to notice that the author tries to keep the interviewees of the interviews as anonymous as possible. Consequently this means that every reference made to statements of interviewees is solely linked to an organization and not to an individual. The anonymity is further integrated in the process of data analysis. Instead of using the name of the interviewee each of the interviews is given a job description after the interview; this description is than used as the primary identification factor in the data analysis process.

After the interviews are held the resulting interview data has to be transcribed and analyzed. To transcribe means to transform (Kvale, 2008), in this thesis specifically to transform from oral speech to written text. Unfortunately there are no standard forms or codes to transcribe but rather some standard choices which have to be made in the transcription process (Kvale, 2008). Within this thesis the interviews are transcribed by the author himself in a verbatim style. The advantage for the author to transcribe the data himself is that he reads the raw data and gets already familiar with the data (Kvale, 2008). Transcribing the interview in the verbatim style ensures that the vital information of the interview is stored. However, it should be noticed that using the verbatim style some data such as the ‘mh’-s and the ‘uhh’-s or the dialect is lost (Kvale, 2008) (Gibbs, 2012). Once the interview data has been transcribed the process of the data analysis starts. Data analysis is about examining the collected data so that empirical based findings can be produced (Yin, 2014). According to Yin (2014) there are four general strategies in analyzing case study research data; relying on theoretical propositions, working with data from the ground up, developing a case description and examining plausible rival explanations. For this thesis the general strategy of working with the data from the ground up is used. This strategy provides an inductive approach in analyzing the interview data. Due to the explorative nature of this thesis such a strategy is best suited for this thesis. One of the data analysis methods which implements this strategy is content analysis. Content analysis first breaks-down the transcripts in smaller manageable categories such as words, sentences or themes.

Following the break-down the smaller categories are analyzed using conceptual analysis. Conceptual analysis looks at the occurrence of concepts within a text; these concepts can either be explicit or implicit. Consequently within this study the original transcripts first will be broken down into themes, each question and answer pair representing a theme.

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After the data is divided into themes, each individual theme is analyzed using conceptual analysis for concepts which correspond with the respective interview questions. Apart from aggregated coding data derived from the content analysis also individual responses in the form of quotes are used in the findings section of this thesis to underpin important results in the research data. 3.5 Validity and reliability

To increase the validity of this research triangulation is used in the data-gathering phase. The concept of triangulation involves the usage of multiple sources, methods, researchers and theory to increase the reliability of the research findings (Mathison, 1988; Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Within this research one of the more common streams of triangulation will be used; data triangulation. Data triangulation involves the collecting of data from multiple sources and/or at different time periods (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). In practice this means different employees of the same organization will be interviewed to reduce the bias and increase the reliability of the research data. Data triangulation in this research will be used in a broader holistic approach of understanding the phenomena. That is, as empirical data from the interviews might be inconsistent or even contradict, the research tries to make sense of these differences by combining the empirical data with a holistic understanding of the situation and general background information of the phenomena (Mathison, 1988).

Apart from the usage of triangulation other measures were used to increase the validity of this thesis. The thesis will be reviewed by supervisors from the University of Amsterdam (UvA) and the Dutch Ministry of Defense, both supervisors having excellent knowledge in the field of academic research. Additionally the supervisors provided a face validity check on the semi-structured inter-view questions. After the reviews improvements were made which leads to an increased validity of this thesis (Yin, 2014). Apart from the reviews a case study protocol was developed which exactly describes the measuring instruments, procedures and general rules which have to be followed in the data collection phase.

The protocol is a guide for the researcher to perform the data-collection of a single case, such a protocol is a way of increasing the reliability of this thesis (Yin, 2014). Apart from the advantages for this thesis the protocol is also an ideal starting point for a replication of this study or a follow-up study. The complete case study protocol can be found in Appendix C.

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In order to ensure the reliability of this thesis, a case study database is realized and a chain of evidence approach is followed during the data analyses. The case study database is realized by a qualitative data analysis tool named NVivo which stores for each interview: all the notes taken during an interview, the transcriptions, the coding, the audio recording and a full report of the interview. The chain of evidence is a concept whereby the findings of a research can directly be traced back to data collected in the data-gathering phase (Yin, 2014). This means that the conclusions made by this thesis can be directly linked back to statements of interviewees.

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4

Empirical findings

4.1 Case study

The Dutch government started the mission of the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) in Afghanistan in 2006 with a plan consisting of three main lines of operation. Each line had its own set of goals, but the interdependence between the lines symbolized the effective collaboration required to reach effective reconstruction. The TFU served as a single case study to explore the role of SR within the context of Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Sixteen members of the core components of the TFU (see appendix B), senior military personnel, senior diplomats, as well as civilian entrepreneurs, each representing each a unit of analysis of the Comprehensive Approach took part in this research: The TFU’s Headquarters (HQ), the Battle Group (BG), and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). Yin (1994) argued that “the essence of a case study (…) is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken how they were implemented, and with what results (Schramm, 1971). This exploratory study undertook part of this challenge.

4.2 Case description

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission was established in 2002 by NATO as part of a broader international strategy. The meta-goal of ISAF is to enable the Afghan government to guarantee security and stability within its own borders facilitating post-conflict reconstruction. The mission statement presented the reconstruction goal clearly: “ISAF, in support of GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan], conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and the will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socioeconomic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population” (ISAF Mission Statement, 2001).

After the Dutch government contributed to the reconstruction of Baghlan Province (2002 – 2006) they shifted their focus to the southern Afghanistan. The Dutch government agreed on contributing to the reconstruction of Uruzgan province as of 2006 by establishing the TFU. Beyond deploying their forces, they explicitly included requirements for governance and economic reconstruction in their planning.

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In accordance with the ISAF mandate, the Dutch government focused on increasing the support of the local population to take support away from the Taliban and other insurgency groups. Although offensive military actions were needed in particular situations, the core task of the mission was to improve the efficiency of the Afghan government, stimulate good governance, uphold rule of law, and implement projects and reconstruction activities. From the start of the mission, all three ministries defense, diplomacy and development, were actively engaged in the mission. Its core components were the Battle Group (BG) and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The main responsibility of the BG was to maintain security in the Province. The PRT was responsible for reconstruction efforts and maintaining contact with civilians. It also advised and supported activities of reconstruction.

Figure 3: Organigram of the core components of the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU).

4.3 Participants

To collect the data I conducted sixteen semi-structured interviews with members of the core components of the TFU (see appendix B), each represent a unit of analysis of the CA: TFU Headquarters (HQ), the Battle Group (BG) and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The participants were selected on the basis of their seniority and the nature of their responsibilities in the decision-making process. Three out of four senior diplomats with the role of Civilian Representative (CivRep) and four out of four senior military commanders with the role of Commander Task Force Uruzgan (C-TFU) were selected from the HQ.

TFU HQ

Command & Control

BG

PRT

TFU Staff

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Furthermore, six out of eight senior military commanders involved in the TFU with the role of respectively Commander Battle Group (C-BG) and Commander PRT (C-PRT) participated in this research. Finally, three civilian entrepreneurs from the PRT with the role of private sector

developer were interviewed.

4.4 Results and discussion

The answers provided during the interview support the analysis. I will first address how the participants made sense of the decision-making process during the time they were involved in the TFU mission. I found elements addressing goal-setting, decision-making, organizational culture, motives for collaboration, stakeholder relationships, and CSR perception.

Goal-setting

The Dutch government deployed troops in Uruzgan province with a master plan: support the local Afghan government in stabilizing and reconstructing Uruzgan province. A military commander stated that: “the meta-goal of the mission was to kick start the local economy in a self-sustainable

system with local means that will not require external financing or NGO involvement”. A diplomat

perceived the goal as: “an overall effort of stabilization, province return to prosperity, political

transition, opening up the province, private sector to locally develop”. Indeed, shaping the

conditions for the reconstruction activities was one of the core aims according to another military commander: “we needed to integrate and coordinate the non-military effects into the mission”. After one year the TFU learned an important lesson as a military commander stated: “we learned

the importance of having a global campaign plan. So no short-term vision but mid-term vision and also hopefully a long-term vision where all three stakeholders of defense, diplomacy and development of the Comprehensive Approach were addressed”.

Interestingly, a civilian entrepreneur was more critical regarding the alignment of the goals. He emphasized that “the meta-goal was of course ISAF as a Stabilization Force. All the things that

ISAF wanted to achieve were in line with the Dutch International Security Strategy (IVS). They matched. The problem although was that the goals NL and ISAF had were not made SMART”.

The strategic direction of an organization requires a clear definition of its purpose. Still, this does not imply an agreement on so-called SMART goals.

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The Dutch government accepted a certain level of fuzziness in the strategy and therefore failed in describing its goals in detail, which has been recognized as key to better outcome. A military commander recognized the need for precise goals: “being only there four 4 or 5 months makes it

really important to have a broader structure in which your operations are tied into. If you do not have a far-stretching campaign plan for more than only your term of deployment, it is always opportunistic and short-term”.

Decision-making

The collaboration within TFU was based on hierarchical institutionalized structures i.e. asymmetrical influence. It included centralized planning and decision-making, while execution was decentralized. From 2006 until 2009 the decisions were taken by the military commander of the TFU (C-TFU). The Political Advisor (PolAd) of the ministry of foreign affairs functioned as a personal advisor to the C-TFU. According to a diplomat this part of the mission’s operational design was identified as inefficient. Consequently, as of 2009 the mission came under dual-headed command. One of the diplomats described the leadership and decision-making process as follows: “the TFU was set up in an integrated way. Two people were put at the head of the TFU; Defense

and Diplomacy. The two had very different responsibilities, dual-lead in all decisions were taken by both. They together always discussed from both perspectives, the elements, i.e., situational context and resources, compared those and used an integrated approach to take the decision“. A

military commander underlined the importance of “deconfliction” particularly when NGOs entered into the picture. He stated that: “NGOs and foreign affairs were not often on the same

page. There was a need to deconflict and sometimes to synchronize them. The local government was busy reconstructing the Province. It was not really easy to have them all on the same sheet of paper. In the best case we could prevent conflict of interest. At the same time I had to deliver my part in the military operation, not always easy to operationalize because we strongly differ in perspective”.

The joint decision-making process was perceived as effective since they could easily consult each other. They converge in planning the actions core to the mission and agreed allocating the scarce resources.

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One of the mission’s diplomats describes the dual-headed mission command as: “creating an

organizational climate in which both military and civilian personnel could collaborate efficiently”. The mode of coordination was based on a strong instructional hierarchy and conveyed

authoritative decision-making. A diplomat explained that in practice there was room for TFU personnel to engage in a form of mixed governance with space left to negotiate under the supportive shadow of hierarchy: “the TFU was civilian-military led by both a CivRep and a

military commander. Each had very different responsibilities. Needless to say it was not my task to lead the military operations but yet all decisions were taken by the two persons together. Whenever a decision had to be made it was discussed from both a military and a civilian perspective. The different perspectives were compared and then on the basis of that integrated approach a decision was taken”. According to the framework of de Coning and Friis (2011) I

conclude that collaboration at the operational level – between civilians and the military – was a cooperative relational type before 2009 and an integrated relational type after 2009.

Organizational culture

Organizational culture surely plays an important role in such dual-headed situations. One military commander describes the collaboration as having: “mutual understanding for each other’s

organizational cultures”. Interestingly, the CivRep was not directly part of the ISAF structure. A

diplomat reported that regarding the local command and control: “it was not problematic for the

diplomats”. Overall, he insisted that: “the military had really good awareness of the civilian contribution. We were trying to create synergistic effects by collaborating intensively”. Synergy

between the different organizational cultures started from the home country prior to the deployment: The diplomat emphasized that: “we come from different organizations, we have

different working cultures. It is important to learn from each other, that we basically can get used to each other, and we plan together from the out-set, and not only when in the theater”.

The collaborative process generated tension. A military commander reported that: “there was

always tension, it never became smooth. It is not bad because if we have development and military going hand in hand in an operation and there is no struggle something is wrong. Our ultimate goals are maybe the same, but the ways we achieve them are fundamentally different.

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In the military it is about employing the force, we are willing employing the force in order to “subjugate” our opponent, the development people try to get the people engage in their economy, so they do not fight anymore, so that is a different mechanic. We need each other. You cannot create stability without security, you cannot create security without stability so it goes hand in hands”. Coming from different organizations means that integration needs to take place at an early

stage as one of the diplomats emphasized: “if you start collaborating when in theater you only

have six months, which is already a very limited amount of time. In other words, if you lose one or two months there in getting used to each other and understand what each other’s’ plans are, then that is a time lost”.

Motives for collaboration

Humans are searching for control (Tyler, 1987). This sense of control can maximize the favorability of the outcomes (Aguilera et al., 2007). Organizations have several instrumental motives for collaborating with other organizations. Time played an important role in the collaboration and decision-making process. The mandate of the mission was signed two years ago and there was a sense of urgency to collaborate. The Dutch government did not have endless time to participate in the reconstruction of Uruzgan province. Time has always been a critical factor. Especially in relation to the level of progress that have been made. Nowadays the sense of urgency for Western organizations is heightened by the financial recession they are facing in their home countries. The initial two-year mandate was perceived as a real limitation for credible goal-setting. A military commander stated that during his deployment he did not know whether the missions mandate was going to be extended: “the question was if we still had to plan for long-term

reconstruction or we had to shift to a possible re-deployment back to the Netherlands. Two important questions were ’when did the Netherlands want to hand over to the Afghan government and which of the NATO partners will be taking over our tasks?’ I could not get an answer at that time from the Netherlands”. A diplomat emphasized that “reconstruction efforts are generally a term activity. The uncertainty about TFU’s mandate made it really hard to plan for long-term development and allocate the necessary resources”.

Furthermore, TFU had to deal with scarce resources for its operations, making efficiency a key motive for collaboration as a diplomat stated: “we were operating with very scarce resources. We

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Whether an armored vehicle was used for a certain patrolling activity that day or for a visit to the governor. These type of choices were considered in terms of what was most necessary that day”.

Therefore, joining and coordinating deployment of resources were more efficient. Enhancing social cohesion is an important motive for collaboration. The OECD (2012) stated that a cohesive society works towards the well-being of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalization, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its members the opportunity of upward mobility. While the notion of social cohesion is often used with different meanings, its constituent elements include concerns about social inclusion, social capital and social mobility. Social cohesion is key to reconstructing a well-functioning society. A military commander provided a good illustration of social cohesion: “you basically need a social contract. If the economy is

working, people will pay taxes to the government and then it will provide safety, security, and a healthcare system. The government needs to be sustained by the economy itself, by the population paying taxes and receiving services in return. So you need to fight corruption and at the same time people need to see something coming back from the taxes. You need to build government functionalities”.

Stakeholder relationships and network governance

Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s purpose” (p.36). The TFU mission required collaboration with several other stakeholders; IOs, NGOs, and private firms. Effective collaboration is a key element to success within the CA, because actions are highly interdependent. Having mutual understanding of each other’s intentions is therefore important, as a military commander stated:

“if we deployed our forces into a certain area to provide security, it is very important to have a good understanding of what the other agencies, reconstruction teams or NGOs are doing during this military operation, but this also after securing part of the area. So the importance is not only of having a successful military operation, but also to stress the importance of the follow on”.

The U.S. military units deployed into Uruzgan province under the mandate of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The C-TFU had received orders from his leadership in the Netherlands not to collaborate, but to “only support in extremis”. There was neither functional relationship nor institutionalized structure between them. In practice this meant that both C-TFU and the leadership of the OEF units in the Province informed each other about their intentions.