Masterthesis:
‘How The New York Times covers the war
against Islamic State (ISIL)’
MA Journalism and Media
Supervisor: Dr. Peter Vasterman Student: Mathieu Peulen (6134688) Uiterwaardenstraat 85-3
1079 BT Amsterdam
mpeulen@hotmail.com
Introduction
‘The first casualty when war comes, is truth’, wrote American senator Hiram Johnson in 1917, commenting on the widespread censorship used by western media on their coverage of WW1.1 He did not know however, that, 100 years later, his words would still contain
undeniable truth. Throughout the decades, journalism during wartime has been a problematic phenomenon. Journalistic ethics often seem to evaporate and deeply rooted patriotic sentiments suddenly come to the fore.
When one flicks through a western newspaper, and reaches the international affairs section, there is a fair chance it will be dominated by a terrorist group called ISIL, or ISIS. Its militants are a hot topic nowadays. Or even hotter: the war against ISIL to ‘degrade and destroy’ the group, to use the words of American President Obama. It’s easy to find reports on the cruelty of ISIL, but much harder to find reports of the dark side effects of the war, like the ever expanding civilian casualties.
Our current knowledge of war coverage of ISIL though, is based on impressions and assumptions. There is an urgent need of an academic study of this hypermodern phenomenon, and I would like to commit myself to take up this challenge. In my
Masterthesis I will focus on the coverage of the war against ISIL, no research of western media in general, but a very specific study of one major news outlet, in order to be able to closely examine the dynamics, practices, framing technics and developments of one particular news media. I have chosen for one of the world’s most leading and prominent newspapers, The New York Times.
One of the main reasons why this could be a very interesting study is the major trauma suffered from the last war in Iraq (2003-2011). It compelled and even horrified many American journalists. Although initial support seemed overwhelming, as the war plodded on, many reporters felt betrayed by their leaders. No weapons of mass destruction had been found, casualties were going through the roof and there was no real prospect of victory or stability in the Middle East. Many renowned journalists even expressed remorse for their complete lack of courage to challenge Bush’ disputable war motives and regretted their jingoistic coverage, among them many renowned Times reporters, like Judith Miller.
The hypothesis of my study is that Times reporters, considering the huge Iraq trauma, will be very wary and skeptical of any new military involvement in Iraq. At a certain point though, I assume, their attitude transformed into pro-interventionist. I expect this turning point to be the decapitations of two American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, in the summer of 2014, as the outrage in American society surrounding these events was tremendous. I will elaborate on this societal turmoil later on.
But first, I will examine how journalism during and prior to major wars has evolved, in a period stretching over a century, to explore parallels in framing technics, changing attitudes, societal dynamics, journalistic dynamics, changing ethics and patriotic sentiments etc. Considering I will analyze The New York Times in my case-study, there wil be a strong emphasis on media coverage in the United States. The wars featured in my theoretical framework are: First World War (1914-1918), Second World War (1939-1945), Vietnam War (1964-1973) Gulf War (1990-1991) ,until the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (2001-2011). Consecutively, I will explore to what extent the findings of my theoretical framework apply to my case study. In the Methodology section (22-23) I will further elaborate on this practice. Also my research strategy, focus points etc. can be found in this section.
Theoretical Framework
Not only in the heat of warfare, well before the first shots being fired, dissimulation settles in. War is no un-forecasted hurricane, it is a well planned horror. War starts in the minds of men. Organized violence requires planning: mobilizing civilians psychologically. This is the phase when political leaders urgently need media organizations. Never would leaders attempt to mobilize the masses by stating their wars are driven by greed, land grabbing, imperial pride or expropriating resources. Instead they will frame their ‘cause’ as defensive, just or even inevitable. In essence, in their eyes every war is just and victory therefore is certain. 2
History teaches us that journalists often become fervent, ardent advocates of military invasions, rather than peaceful solutions to conflicts, writes Carruthers. Moreover, they often support the justifications for armed conflict offered by political leaders. In retrospect, there are very few examples of prominent newspapers, radio or television companies endorsing fierce anti-war positions during wartime. Instead of continuously questioning the war-motives of the aggressor, media organizations have always played an important role in the process of rallying opinion for war. 3
Considering the fact that in western democracies the ethos of the press is to function as a watchdog of the truth and to check and reveal abuses of power, this is a painful reality. However, if we look at reporting prior to the war, we see a more balanced image. As political scientist William Dorman’s words illustrate: ‘the only meaningful time to debate the need for war is before one begins’.4
The First World War (1914-1918) ‘The ‘Hunt the Huns’ War’
In July 1914, just a month before the outbreak of WW1, there was little enthusiasm for a military conflict on mainland Europe, quite the contrary. In Germany for instance, most newspapers even gave voice to fierce anti war sentiment. In Britain no media-outlet neither wanted nor expected a large scale war on the ‘Continent’. Instead, British journalists were too preoccupied writing about strikes, uprisings and fighting nationalist militias on, what they referred to as their ‘backyard’: Ireland.5
Besides, prospect of a world war did not appeal to the ordinary people of France, Russia, Germany and Britain either. Instead of imperial rivalries, colonial disputes, looming war crises and arms race, they were rather worried about workplace conditions, wages, food, housing, women’s emancipation and popular representation. And also as early as the 1910’s, newspapers dealt with what ‘was on people’s minds’. 6
2 Idem 16-17 3 Ibidem 17
4. William Dorman, ‘A Debate Delayed Is A Debate Denied’ in: Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global Media Debate. (New York 2006) 11 5. Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 44-46
What really was on people’s minds? In the early 1910’s socialist movements were on the rise all across Europe, scaring European elites and threatening the very existence of the semi-democratic capitalist nation states. Strikes, labour unrest, armed uprisings and riots rocked Europe to its foundation.7
Mayhem of a different category gripped Europe after the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist in June 1914. As earlier alliance commitments clicked into place, binding Britain, France and Russia to war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, manpower was needed, writes Knightley. 8 Over 70 million
European men were finally drafted to fight in this inter-imperial showdown. A new unprecedented horror reality came to the fore, that of Total War.
And for that, total conviction was needed. Thus, civilian morale of the soon-to-be drafted men and the home front became of unprecedented importance. Officials dedicated
themselves to shatter fighting spirit on the enemy side while enhancing it at home. In a matter of weeks, all fighting nations set up state-supported channels of propaganda: newspapers, posters and pamphlets. Authorities put enormous pressure on existing newspapers to wholeheartedly support the war, and censor if necessary.9
High ranked officials, as prominent as Prime Minister Lloyd George himself, personally visited the editorial boards of newspapers in Great Britain to discuss the possibilities of censoring war-reports. To C.P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, he said: ‘If people really knew, the war would be stopped tomorrow. But of course they don’t know and can’t know. The correspondents don’t write and the censorship would not pass the truth.’10
One should understand that in the early 20th century, leaders had more powers to confine
freedom of speech. In general, before the war Germany and Britain both executed tight control over the press anyway. With the declaration of war, leaders put far greater emphasis on prohibition of speech than before. More importantly, mass media were seen as important tools to rally support for warfare. In Germany, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg issued the press with a list of 26 prohibitions to confine ‘the right to express opinion freely by word, print or picture.’ 11
In France, censorship was so dramatic, that one American reporter in Paris noted: ‘the news does not arrive, or maybe it does not exist’. In Great Britain, BBC suspended news programs on radio, to replace it with hours of repetitive organ music, suggesting the tens of thousands men perishing in the trenches did not fit in the news category. 12
In the United States Woodrow Wilson got re-elected in 1916 using the slogan ‘I Kept America Out Of The War’, reflecting popular sentiment of the American people: maximum economic growth through isolationism. No costly wars, no interference in European disputes. This only changed when horror, fiction-like, stories of the war reached urban America in 1917, largely copied by the press. America’s public sphere was horrified with published stories of despicable atrocities, committed by ‘the Huns’, as the Germans were sarcastically nicknamed. German troops were said to brutally rape, pillage, even slice of breasts of Belgian nurses and beat babies to death with rifles. 13
7Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 44
8 P Knightley, The first casualty: The war correspondents as hero and myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore 2004) 116 9 Idem 116-118
10 Ibidem 116-118 11 Ibidem 116-118
12 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 69 13 Idem 23
The most notorious story featured a German corpse factory, melting down German soldiers’ bodies for glycerin. Tales like these were fabricated by British officials to rally support for the war-effort in the US. ‘The Hun’ was dehumanized, depicted as a blood thirsty beast. Newspapers produced headline stories about these Hun horror stories, causing a steady wave of anti-Germanism sweeping urban America and isolationism therefore was rapidly abandoned. 14
Thus, in the case of the First World War, British authorities had successfully framed the German enemy as a bloodthirsty savage, who had to be stopped. In fact, the ‘Great War’ was nothing more than an inter-imperial showdown, but was framed by authorities and
journalists as a ‘Hunt the Huns’ war, a struggle to stop savagery, and bring Anglo-Saxon enlightenment and civilization to mainland Europe. Journalists played a crucial role in convincing the American people the US had to wage war against these barbaric Huns. After WW1, ending in an allied victory, predominantly because of fresh American troops joined the fight in 1917, it became clear that many of these horror stories the press had adopted were false. Unreliable audi alteram partem, no supported witness testimony, et cetera.15 Even if we take into consideration that in the 1910’s reliable journalism about a war
fought on the other side of the Atlantic was a wee bit more challenging, dehumanizing nicknames as ‘The Huns’, and the above mentioned horror tales, were adopted by almost all newspapers. Reporters had indeed bought sheer lies.
‘We were lied to’, has become a common complaint of journalists whose stories have been criticized of biased- or false reporting during wartime. Indeed, it’s a fact that throughout the centuries, reporters have been manipulated by policy-makers, pro-war lobbies, spin doctors and by foreign states and their agents.16 Only in the 1920’s, American scholars and
journalists discovered that British agents had successfully sold American authorities and journalists the tales about ‘the Hun’. More lies were told than in any other period of history, writes Knightley, calling WW1 a ‘discreditable period’ in the history of journalism.17
Second World War (1939-1945) ‘The Good War’
In the late 1930’s, when Nazi troops were Blitzkrieg-ing their way through eastern Europe, committing mass murder and ethnic cleansing, American journalists were extremely cautious to take these reports of atrocity serious, fearing that they might make the same mistakes as during the late First World War years. They assumed these reports would not be more reliable than the fiction they bought in WW118 Even in 1941, when the Germans had
occupied almost all of Western, Central and Eastern Europe, atrocities were far less visible in the press than in 1917, whereas this time reported German horrors weren’t fiction. Opinion polls, this time not being encouraged by the press in favor of war, showed that the American people almost unanimously opposed taking up arms.19
American journalists were extremely skeptical about engaging in another European military mission. In the late thirties, American newspapers even gave voice to pro-German sentiments. When Hitler expelled French soldiers from the occupied Rhineland, American journalists wrote that this step was justified, as the Rhineland was Germany’s ‘backyard’ and crucial industrial heartland.20 Some even argued that Hitler had successfully ended post
WW1-chaos and replaced it with order and stability.
14 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 23-24 15 Idem 23-24
16 P Knightley, The first casualty: The war correspondents as hero and myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore 2004) 100-104 17 Idem 103
18 Ibidem 103
20 J.R. Gritz, ‘Interview Andrew Nagorski: Early warnings: How American Journalist reported the Rise of Hitler’ The Atlantic (13-2-2012)
Andrew Nagorski, author of Hitlerland, did extensive research on the coverage of American correspondents in Germany during the late 30’s. He discovered that although some
journalists warned the home-front of Hitler’s dangers, most of them were very cautious. Most striking is the story of Hans Kaltenborn, a famous radio Berlin-based correspondent of German descent. He refused to believe reports that SA-militants attacked American visitors for not bringing the Hitler salute.21 Even when his own son was severely beat up, he
remained reluctant to write about it. The Nazis apologized: ‘I hope you won’t write about this.’ Kaltenborn replied: ‘No, I don’t insert anything personal in my stories.’
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the soon-to-follow American declaration of war, dramatically changed the attitude of American journalists. Many quickly became ardent supporters of the war and gave voice to anti-German sentiments, predominantly because of the framing used by the authorities.22
Roosevelt and Churchill sold the war as the ultimate struggle for Liberty, because Freedom was what made the allies superior over the Nazis. They framed it as the cause of freedom vs. fascism, or, the ‘Good War’. Who on earth would be against this war against evil? Journalists were ‘free’ to write what they wanted, leaders declared.23 Mainly because Freedom of speech
was one of the ‘Four Freedoms’ for which the allies fought the war, Roosevelt and Churchill established in 1941’s Atlantic Charter. Also at home, they meant to staunchly defend this freedom. It was what made them ‘morally superior’ over those ‘savage’ Germans with their lying propaganda machine, they told American citizens in –ironically - their own pro-war propaganda series called Why We Fight.
However, this emphasis on liberty to express oneself was not only designed as a framing-tactic. A degree of righteousness and honesty would encourage civilians to feel that leaders trusted them to accept even the worst possible news, writes Hynes. A report, in 1939 issued to the British government, illustrates this picture: ‘distrust breeds fear much more than knowledge of reverses. The all-important thing for publicity to achieve is the conviction that the worst is known’. 24
Journalists voluntarily became their own censors. They even encouraged each other to practice censorship and reminded each other there was a ‘war going on’. State officials barely needed to interfere, since editors simply disciplined each other and many even adopted a hawk-like attitude. 25
For instance, when the Nazis officially surrendered on May 7, 1945, one correspondent, Edward Kennedy of the Associated Press, talked about this event in the press before the US PR committee had officially published it. Colleagues heavily criticized him for doing so and some even lamented that he endangered the lives of American troops, writes Hynes.24 Not
only newspaper editors, also their readers were unpleased with Kennedy’s ‘shenanigan’. A poll showed that only 35% of newspaper readers approved of it. Overall, national polls showed that Americans were largely supportive of the war anyway.26
21 J.Rothenburg Gritz, ‘Interview Andrew Nagorski: Early warnings: How American Journalist reported the Rise of Hitler’ The Atlantic (13-2-2012) 22 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 78
23 Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front and the Ministry of Information in World War II (Crows Nest 1979) 28 24 Idem 28
25 Ibidem 28
Not surprising, considering allied leaders did everything they could to sell their ‘Good War’. For instance, American and British State PR officials released official statements declaring that allied airplanes were bombing ‘strategic’ military targets in Germany. The press copied and published these reports as the truth.27 Not knowing, or just denying, they were lied to:
Allied planes were deliberately destroying civilian residential areas to shatter German morale, using fuel air-bombs, making sure everything would burn down to the ground. Even more striking, after two atomic bombs were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in August 1945, state officials knew all about the horrendous radiation and atrocious burns suffered by thousands of Japanese citizens in the nuclear firestorms, but silenced these horror-stories. Months later, correspondents were still prohibited to inspect these cities. Quite surprising acts for leaders who told ‘the truth, nothing but the truth and, as near as possible, the whole truth’, as American officials put it.28
But did journalists mind? Not really. As we have seen, WWII journalists harmoniously cooperated with allied leaders to achieve victory, and even reminded each other their country was at war and should act accordingly. Because above all, the ‘Good War’, the just cause for freedom against evil, had to be won. Quite striking, considering this ‘evil’ had been rampaging through Europe and Asia well before America’s involvement in the war. During these years, journalists had been fervent advocates of non-interventionist politics and even gave voice to pro-German sentiment. This shows how powerful the ‘Liberty’ and ‘Good War’ frame were and also how easily journalists adopted it.
Then the question remains: How ‘Good’ was this war? Hynes points out that there was nothing ‘good’ about it. The cause might have been just, the war itself was hell, like every other war. American journalists liked to portray their servicemen as heroic, brave and well-mannered. The truth is many American marines looted, pillaged, murdered POW’s and raped tens of thousands of women they encountered from Normandy, Germany to the islands in the Pacific.29
27 Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front and the Ministry of Information in World War II (Crows Nest 1979) 137 28 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 82
Vietnam War. (1964-1973) ‘The ‘Stop the Communists’ War’
‘Blood, looks very red on the television screen’, wrote British broadcaster Robin Day in Encounter magazine in 1970.29 With almost 90% of American households possessing a
television set in the mid-sixties, the Vietnam War was quickly coined the TV- or living room war. For most Americans, blood, however, unlike the words of Mr. Day might suggest,
remained a shade of black-grey, since most people had black-white TV’s until the mid 1970’s, writes Daniel Hallin, author of ‘The Uncensored War’.31
Television caused such an enormous revolution that C.L. Sulzberger, a renowned foreign policy commentator for The New York Times even complained: ‘few Americans actually seem to remember how to read’.32 With television on the rise, newspapers lost their role as main
supplier of the news and as the major journalist platform, which still even was the case during the Korea War in the 1950’s.
Liebes states that the introduction of television radically changed the way audiences interpreted news coverage. Written text cannot be perceived as an authentic depiction of reality, whereas the iconic nature of television made people believe that what we see is real, uncensored. Of course, quite the opposite is true.33
Months before the invasion in Vietnam, media-outlets were divided over the matter if the US should wage war against Communist forces in Vietnam, who were beleaguering pro-Democratic forces in the south. The New York Times for instance, warned that a land war in Asia might provoke a Soviet or Chinese response, like during the Korean War in 1953.34
Once the US invaded Vietnam, media outlets seemed to have become unanimous advocates of the war. Daniel Hallin’s work shows that television news programs and
newspapers rarely showed and wrote about atrocities committed by American troops. Until 1968, only 22% of Vietnam War-coverage featured combat scenes. A similar picture as in WWII emerged. ‘Free’ media harmoniously cooperated with leaders, in conveying the importance of ‘the defense of democracy’. In the case of the Vietnam War, ‘containing global communism’ was added to that paradigm.35 The authorities framed the invasion of Vietnam
as a necessary struggle during the ‘Cold War’, to contain global Communism and defend pro-Democratic forces in Vietnam. In this case the ‘Cold War’, is used as a meta-frame: it entails the general struggle of the ‘free’ Capitalist western world against Soviet Russia and
Communist China.
Journalists quickly adopted this frame. Journalists, politicians and citizens alike, condemned every report or article that could be interpreted as not fully supportive of the war.36 A good example is the case of CBS reporter Morley Safer. When Safer witnessed how
American troops were burning down Vietnamese houses with flamethrowers, he said on camera: ‘Today’s operation is the frustration of Vietnam in miniature. There is little doubt that American fire power can bring a military victory here. But to a Vietnamese peasant whose home is built within a lifetime of back-breaking labor, it will take more than presidential promises to convince him that we are on his side’37 But what had Safer really
said? By no means, anything anti-American or anti-war.
30 Daniel C Hallin, The Uncensored War: The media and Vietnam (Los Angeles 1989) 3 31 Idem 105-106
32 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 102
34 Daniel C Hallin, The Uncensored War: The media and Vietnam (Los Angeles 1989) 108-110 35 Idem 90
36 Idem 108-110
37 Shooting with a camera: The Modern American War’, JP Keenan. (2009)
President Lyndon B. Johnson personally called the director of CBS news to tell him that Safer had ‘shat on the American flag’. CBS fired him on the spot and he was prohibited to enter any site of American military action afterwards.38
During the Vietnamese lunar New Year, or ‘TET’, in 1968, Communist forces had launched a surprise offensive on American and South Vietnamese bases. Initially losing control over several cities, American troops responded with a ruthless counterattack, killing over
110.000 Vietcong guerrillas, North Vietnamese soldiers and many more innocent civilians, in just a matter of days.39
Before the TET offensive, clashes between Communist and American forces had been brief operations in desolated areas, almost impossible for film crews to capture. In their attempt to pursue the virtues of objective journalism, during the TET offensive, they finally had the chance to shoot enormous amounts of footage directly witnessing these clashes. In the heat of action, journalists captured pictures of napalmed kids, crying peasant women, piles of killed VC and bleeding marines, compelling lots of Americans.40
Even though, ending in a landslide victory for the Americans, the TET offensive made many Americans, even the country’s elites, wonder whether the Vietnam war could be won. They never expected Communist forces to be able to wage such an enormous offensive as far south as Saigon. As political debate changed, so did the media. They were simply affected by it, states Hallin: ‘As the parameters of political debate changed, so did the behavior of the media: stories that previously had been reported within a consensus framework came to be reported as controversies; subjects and points of view that had been beyond the pale in the early years came to be treated as legitimate news stories’41
Before TET, stories of atrocities committed by American marines, rarely appeared in newspapers. Even more ‘objective’ newspapers such as The New York Times were
consciously filtering out such reports. The most striking example of this practice is the story of a brutal assault launched by American troops on the village of My Lai, in march 1968. They raped, murdered and mutilated over 300 Vietnamese villagers.42 Although there was
plenty of evidence, editors of all newspapers consciously blocked the story, fearing it could damage the image of America’s intentions during the Vietnam war.
Not until November 1969, 18 months after the atrocities took place, the local Texan paper St. Louis Post-Dispatch, published an elaborate report about the events, conducted by investigative journalist Seymour Hersch.43 Later on, several interviews with My Lai veterans
were shown on national TV, revealing marines were ordered to shoot little kids because ‘when they would grow up, they would become Vietcong anyway’ and how hey would ‘cut them with knives, scalp ‘em like Indians, anything. Some guys really enjoyed cutting their throats also’, among other quotes, shocked millions of Americans, fuelling a rising anti-war movement.44 .
Huge demonstrations broke out in cities and campuses everywhere in America. Protestors appeared more in the news than ever before. Hallin states however, that this did not mean journalists were endorsing their views. On the contrary, often reporters depicted them as ‘disruptive hippies’ protesting only for the sake of rebellion.45
38 Shooting with a camera: The Modern American War’, JP Keenan. (2009) 39 Daniel C Hallin, The Uncensored War: The media and Vietnam (San Diego 1989) 40 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 107
41 Daniel C. Hallin ‘Images of War: The Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars in American Television’, in: Viewing War: How the Media
42 Daniel C Hallin, The Uncensored War: The media and Vietnam (San Diego 1989) 189-191
43 Idem 189-191
44 Joseph Strick, ‘interviews with My Lai veterans’ (Laser film corp. 1970) 45 Daniel C Hallin, The Uncensored War: The media and Vietnam (San Diego 1989) 196-201
This should not come as a surprise, said MIT sociologist Gans in 1970. Journalists simply represent the ‘middle-class culture that dominates America’. They ‘accept most of the economic and social values of that culture, and often judge other societies by these values. Thus, they generally see what goes wrong in Socialist countries more easily than what goes right, and are more aware of propaganda in Russian pronouncements than American ones, consider protestors more militant than insistent lobbyists, and deem marijuana-smoking more of a social problem than alcohol consumption.’46 The Cold War frame and
anti-Communist frame, used by American authorities to sell the Vietnam war, were therefore quickly adopted by these predominant middle class journalists, argues Gans. The Vietnam war had become the ‘Stop the Communists’ war.
Ironically, newspapers and channels were torpedoed with criticism from both leftist activists and staunch conservatives. Leftists stated a newspaper like The New York Times was part of an ‘imperialist war machine’, representing America’s ruling class. On the right,
conservatives fiercely blamed the ‘liberal press’ for rallying public opinion against the war. Undisputedly, the latter is what mostly resonates in the minds of Americans when thinking about ‘media’ and ‘Vietnam’: the media made America lose the Vietnam-war.47
46 Herbert J. Gans, ‘Since Spiro Agnew Brought Up The Subject, How Well Does TV Present the News?’, The New York Times (Januari 11 1970) 33 47 Shooting with a camera: The Modern American War’, JP Keenan. (2009)
Gulf War (1990-1991) ‘The Incubator War’
During the aftermath of the war in Vietnam, America’s elites continuously reminded reporters that they indeed made America lose the war in Vietnam. Officials, as high ranked as Secretary of State Dean Rusk, repeatedly stated it wasn’t the ‘tenacity of the North-Vietnamese’, that gave American troops the final blow, the press did, he told journalists.48
Never again were journalists supposed to undermine America’s victory on the battlefield, elites warned.
When the USA got entangled in a diplomatic crisis with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, who threatened to invade Kuwait, journalists gave voice to both pro- and anti-invasion
sentiments, especially during periods of congressional debate, writes Kalb.49 Many scholars
argue that both journalist’ and public opinion in favor of the war grew significantly after the speech of a 15-year old Kuwaiti girl named ‘Nayirah’, in front of a congressional meeting, October 10 1990.50 In tears, she said: ‘When I was there I saw Iraqi soldiers coming to the
hospital with guns. They took the babies out of the incubators, and left them to die on the cold floor. Well after the war, in 1992, journalists revealed that this ostensibly ‘random’ girl, turned out to be the Kuwaiti ambassador’s daughter. Moreover, it turned out that the incubator kills were sheer lies, manufactured by a Pentagon aligned PR-company, determined to ‘sell’ the war to Americans. And they did so, effectively.51
When America took up arms in 1991 to halt Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, president Bush warned that this time US troops would not be asked to ‘fight with one hand behind their back’, like the media allegedly forced them to during the Vietnam war.
Personally, he swore to ‘kick the Vietnam syndrom’ and curb critical journalists.52 Also
general Colin Powell got on television and personally urged journalists to ‘trust’ him during the war.53
Virtually every journalist did, abandoning the more objective approach they had before the war.54 According to Kalb, a renowned journalist himself, reporters resorted to the ‘most
dangerous of professional practices’: patriotic journalism. Kalb even accuses journalists to have been ‘wrapped in the flag no less proudly than the troops themselves’. Even Sam Donaldson, one of television’s most renowned hawks, said he was surprised and
disappointed, by the ‘jingoist tone of some of my colleagues’. Tom Shales, of the Washington Post, also expressed his concern: ‘I’m worried. The networks are whooping up war fever’.55
48 Marvin Kalb, ‘A View from the Press’, in: Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the gulf war. (Chicago 1994) 3 49 Idem 3
50 Yasemin Inceoglu, ‘Continuity in Disinformation: With some examples from the War on Iraq’ in (Istanbul 2014) 7 51 Idem 7-8
52 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 131
53 Marvin Kalb, ‘A View from the Press’, in: Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the gulf war. (Chicago 1994) 3,4 54 Idem 5
55 Ibidem 5
Not just the networks, newspapers and tabloids, were equally conveying a patriotic message: The New York Post headlined: ‘Up Yours!’. Even a more objective and ponderous newspaper as The New York Times published a photo of cheering marines, captioned: ‘New York Celebrates, Operation Welcome Home, Monday, June 9, 1991’ 56 Saddam Hussein was often
portrayed as ‘The Hitler of our Time’, which is not only a historically false parallel, it is also a strong exaggeration. Journalists did little to criticize this comparison, instead, they helped emphasizing it.57 Patriotic journalism denies people crucial facts, information and prevents
them from shaping a well formed opinion of the war, states Kalb.58
After the Vietnam controversy, the military did whatever they could to prevent American camera crews from gaining access to sites where ‘real war’ was fought. Crews shot artillery-fire, aviation, moving tanks, but never combat, blood or dead marines.59 One journalist
complained: ‘Pester though we might, they wouldn’t put anybody up to talk to us about it, nor arrange visits to field hospitals’. Authorities imposed an unprecedented censorship and restrictions on all press-institutions. But complaints such as the above were scarce.60
Ironically, during operation ‘Desert Storm’ an unprecedented huge number of journalists gathered in Kuwait and Iraq to cover the war: over 1600. In retrospect, back in 1968, at its peak, 637 reporters were covering the Vietnam war. But still, their liberties were extremely limited.61 For instance, BBC’s Martin Bell lamented that frontline footage shot by his crew
was not approved by the military press committee, for it featured images of dead Iraqi’s. However, Bell wasn’t violating any rules, only showing pictures of American casualties was prohibited.62
Because, in the early 1990’s, virtually every American household possessed a color-TV, which meant that blood would now indeed be very red on the television screen, instead of a shade of black-grey, which it had been during the Vietnam war. And if blood was very red, the war must be made to appear without bloodshed.63
The story of journalist Molly Moore, a Washington Post correspondent in Iraq during the war, illustrates this picture. In 1993 she published the book ‘A Woman at War’. In an
interview with C-SPAN she talks about her findings: ‘We had a leash around our neck. There was nothing they didn’t check.’ The result of this large scale censorship on the awareness of the American people, she says, was vast.64 ‘When I came back from the war, and it seemed to
me that Americans believed that this had been a very easy war, it was antiseptic, surgical’ This is was exactly what leaders tried to convey, and was all over the media, but not based on the truth, says Moore. ‘The war I saw was nothing like that. The ground war that I saw, was chaotic, there were miscalculations and mistakes. (..) There were so many friendly fire incidents.’ 65
56 Marvin Kalb, ‘A View from the Press’, in: Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the gulf war. (Chicago 1994) 5-6 57 Lance W. Bennet, ‘The News about Foreign Policy’ in: Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the gulf war. (Chicago 1994) 25 58 Marvin Kalb, ‘A View from the Press’, in: Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the gulf war. (Chicago 1994) 6
59 Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester 1998) 237 60 Idem 237
61 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 136 62 Idem 136-137
63 Ibidem 136-137
65 Idem
‘During the ground war many of my colleagues had horrendous experiences. A USA Today reporter, for instance, spent weeks living with his unit in the desert. In the 4-5 days of the ground war he was continuously writing. At the end of the war he went to the army
headquarters and they handed him back all his work.’ 66 None had been sent to the states for
publishing; weeks of work down the drain.
The fact that Moore’s revelations came two years after the war, is illustrative for the hawk-like atmosphere during the war. ‘We just couldn’t get the information out there’, Moore explains. Not only were they stopped from doing so, no reporter wanted to be called
unpatriotic either.67 Moreover, Carruthers emphasizes, that even though journalists regularly
lamented about lack of access, they only very rarely criticized the war itself. As journalist John MacArthur (also two years later) put it in 1993: ‘it was difficult to find anyone who didn’t, at least officially, count Desert Storm as a devastating and immoral victory for military censorship and a crushing defeat for the First Amendment.’ 68
The vast majority of news organizations had been fully condoning America’s offensive in Iraq during the war. But the examples mentioned above illustrate a striking pattern: two years after the war ended, the time finally seemed ripe to reflect on the widespread self-censorship and the almost dictatorship-like approach on the media. How ‘American’ were these practices? Because journalists had so easily swallowed the restrictions and censorship they faced, critics nicknamed television during Desert Storm ‘Pentavision’ (reference to Pentagon). However, polls consistently found that an overwhelming majority of Americans approved of the way the press covered the war. Polls even showed that many thought the Pentagon should have had greater influence on press coverage.69
The President proudly claimed that he ‘finally kicked the Vietnam syndrom’. And most Americans, even journalists, seemed to agree with him. In times of war, journalists simply hate to be called ‘unpatriotic’, seems to be a painful reality.70
66 Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines – Gulf War Journalism. Molly Moore (C SPAN 18-7-1993) 67 Idem
68 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 139-140 69 Idem 139
The Afghanistan and Iraq War (2001-2008) ‘The War on Terror’
On September 11, 2001, allegedly Al Qaeda-linked terrorists flew two passenger planes into the World Trade Center in New York. Thousands perished. The next day, President George W. Bush, called the attacks ‘acts of war’ and announced a ‘monumental struggle of good versus evil’71 Eight days later he held a speech during a meeting with Congress: ‘Our war on terror
begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there.’
‘The War on Terror’ was born. This ‘war’ didn’t have a clear enemy or battlefield; it was a moral superior mission, an ultimate fight between good and evil. The mainstream media quickly picked up the War on Terror frame, without debating its built-in neoconservative worldview, nor questioning what it exactly entailed, writes Lewis.72 A day after the
President’s speech, the ‘War on Terror’ was featured into tens of thousands news reports, to explain the ‘logic’ for both armed invasions abroad, and radical soon-to-be-imposed interior policies. No major newspaper or news network argued against military action.
Lewis and Reese state that there should be little surprise about the journalist’ acceptance of the War on Terror frame, since major political figures quickly endorsed it, both
Republicans and Democrats.73 Especially the latter shows how effective the Bush
Administration framed the ‘War on Terror’: Even liberal democrats sided with Bush. Not even that surprising. The president gave them little choice: ‘you are either with us, or with the terrorists’, he repeatedly stated. Journalists found it very hard to ride against the wave of fierce nationalism, swallowing the United States after 9/11.74
In her book ‘Shock Doctrine’, journalist Naomi Klein states that reporters were paralyzed, shocked, by the unprecedented wave of fierce nationalism and administration pressure to be ‘with us or with the terrorists’ after 9/11. In her chapter ‘Erasing Iraq’, Klein states that many journalists simply thought waging wars, even in Iraq, was justified after 9/11. Like Richard Cohen, a prominent Washington Post columnist, explained his support of the Iraq war as following: ‘In a post-Sept. 11 world, I thought the prudent use of violence could be therapeutic’.75
She also describes how, on the eve of the invasion of Bagdad, the Pentagon effectively put pressure on American media outlets to ‘fear up’ Iraq. As an example, she mentions a CBS News report, two months before the invasion: ‘They’re calling it A-day. A’ as in airstrikes so devastating they would leave Saddam’s soldiers unable or unwilling to fight.’76 The
news-anchor, Dan Rather, ended the report with a message to his viewers: ‘We assure you this report contains no information that the Defense Department thinks could help the Iraqi military’. Especially the latter typically illustrates how fearful journalists were to undermine the authorities’ war plans and how consciously they avoided anything that could question their own patriotic intentions as ‘good’ American citizens.77
71 Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009) 86 72 Idem 86
74 Ibidem 87
75 Naomi Klein, Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (New York 2007) 325 76 Idem 334
77 Ibidem 334
Just like the ‘Cold War’, ‘The War on Terror’ is a metaframe, entailing a ‘lager world of meaning’, with a strong distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’.78 Once frames are endorsed or
naturalized by the media, they gain organizing power. A striking example of this phenomenon is the framing of the Abu Graihb prison scandal, in which countless Iraqi prisoners were brutally tortured. Journalists simply adopted the administration’s ‘isolated abuse’ frame, downplaying the more appalling ‘policy of torture’ frame, endorsed by critics.79
Why then, would journalists simply internalize administration rhetoric?
The words spoken out by MIT professor Gans in 1970, once again, prove to be a plausible explanation. Journalists, wrote Gans, are members of the ‘middle class that rules America’, and are thus more skeptical and aware of propaganda used by dissidents than the culture and political order they represent. The latter they take for granted.80 Thus, journalists saw
the Vietnam War as a ‘necessary’ struggle, seen the geo-political circumstances during the ‘Cold War’ (adopted metaframe), just as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were crucial for the ‘War on Terror’ (equally, a metaframe).
Reese and Lewis interviewed 13 USA Today journalists about this ostensibly easy
acceptation of The War on Terror frame. All lamented about the press’ usage of the term and all had difficulties defining what the War on Terror exactly entailed. These reporters
acknowledged that American media organizations did not only become advocates of Bush’s phraseology, they also naturalized the policy, making it almost incontestable.81
When the USA Today reporters were asked the question: ‘When you think of the War on Terror, what issues and ideas tend to fall under that label?’, their answers reveal a striking pattern. Many reporters mentioned a series of policies and events, mostly calling it the ‘general basket of activities’ of the government since 9/11, but rarely specifically mentioned the role of the Bush administration during the War on Terror, forgetting the latter had created the frame in the first place.82 This is illustrative of how powerful and effective the use
of the War on Terror frame was: it wasn’t ‘Bush’s war on terror’ but ‘America’s war on terror’. The hawkish vibe during Bush’s speech in Congress on September 20th 2001, when the
President officially declared the War on Terror, illustrates this. Often not even being able to finish his sentence, Congress rose up, Republicans and Democrats alike, to applaud their commander in chief. 83 What American journalist, watching this ostensibly unanimous
nationalist uprising, would even question the War on Terror when there was such an overwhelming political consensus for this cause? The country clearly was in shock, paralyzed. ‘The war on terror will not stop, until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated’, Bush concluded, only to hear the cheering intensify. Democrats and republicans represent America as a nation.84 If they agree, the nation agrees.
What journalist would even question the motives of an entire nation?
78 Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009) 88 79 Idem 88
80 Herbert J. Gans, ‘Since Spiro Agnew Brought Up The Subject, How Well Does TV Present the News?’, The New York Times (Januari 11 1970) 33 81 Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009) 89
82 Idem 90
83 George W. Bush addresses Congress. Live. CNN (20-9-2001) 84 Idem
Liebes argues that journalists have a certain responsibility when a terror attack has just occurred, for in the immediate aftermath, audiences are the most vulnerable and anxious.85
The often sensational, shocking and hawkish reports easily shaped the American opinion in favor of warfare. Liebes also states that the War on Terror caused the rise of ‘performer’ journalists: reporters moving from the studio to the field, in search of sensation, drama and action. The journalist presents himself as the ‘hero’, risking his life.86 Correspondents in Iraq
even mobilized to the war effort, Liebes explains.
Equipped with an American army helmet and life-vest, hard to distinguish from a real marine, the war-reporter has become the image of patriotic, mobilized journalism. Often he would even sneak into enemy territory, risking his life to show audiences who ‘these
terrorists’ really are.87 Often these reporters would even achieve more than the military. For
instance, when the US army was trying to track down the notorious terrorist group ‘Muhammad Army’, it wasn’t the marines, but Newsweek’s Scott Johnson who managed to discover the secret hideaway of these Baghdadi terrorists. He was not met with hostility; on the contrary, he gained access and interviewed the jihadists.88
The word ‘amorphous’ was pretty popular among USA Today reporters trying to describe the term War on Terror. ‘I don’t think it’s a particularly useful term. It’s too.. amorphous. I don’t think it has any meaning anymore.89 You listen to me struggle to define it,’ said
‘journalist E’. ‘The war on terror has come to be a catch-all phrase. It’s so amorphous. Not sure anyone knows what it means anymore’, explained ‘journalist B’. It was also coined as a ‘handy catchphrase.’ Others also denied it was their responsibility using the term, simply because they were ‘quoting’ the President. Although claiming they wouldn’t use the term independent from the Bush administration, they did, shows the research Reese and Lewis conducted.90
Many USA Today reporters also admitted they used the phrase for convenience sake. As one journalist put it: ‘When you’re writing a big story about a big event and you have 10 inches to write it in, are you going to reach for a phrase that is less nuanced than another? Yeah, you bet. So often these decisions have so little to do with politics and everything to do with space constraints and deadlines.’ Another explained, ‘Perhaps if we had more time, we could write more nuanced reports.’ 91
And when talking about how they had adopted the term, one journalist simply said: ‘There wasn’t really another phrase being used at that time. That was the one put out there. That was the crawl on all the TV screens. That was what the CNN talked about. So, I imagine everyone in the press picked it up as a shorthand’.92
85 Tamar Liebes, ‘Performance Journalism: The Case of Media’s Coverage of War and Terror’ in: The Communication Review (Jerusalem 2009) 240 86 Idem 243-244
87 Ibidem 244 88 Ibidem 245
89 Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009) 90 90 Idem 91
91 Ibidem 92 92 Ibidem 92
In short, the fact that these USA Today reporters explained their adoption of the term as ‘a shorthand’ or ‘catch-all phrase’, shows a certain indifference. It also shows a degree of ignorance: these journalists failed to see the political power embedded in word choice.93 By
using ‘the War on Terror’ as a taken-for-granted term, and thus policy, journalists shaped the political debate in favor of Bush’s neo-cons. Even though many journalists were critical of Bush’s policies, especially concerning the war in Iraq, their criticism still seemed to be executed within the framework of the War on Terror, contesting not the frame, but only the execution of the war itself.94
A striking parallel with the Gulf War-days of the early 90’s becomes visible. Two, three years after the invasion of Iraq, a number of high-profile journalists and news networks started to publicly self-scrutinize coverage of the War on Terror. Bob Woodward for instance, a prominent Washington Post-reporter, admitted that he should have encouraged his editor-in-chief to make a cover-story on the weakness of Bush’s claim of weapons of mass
destruction on the eve of the invasion in Iraq. A top editor for The New York Times also blamed herself for not having had the guts to question Bush’s actions.95
According to Liebes, in times of unrest or war, dilemmas such as the above, are legion. Should journalists value the public’s right to know or avoiding the risk of causing damage to national interest or security?96 In times of war, though, the nation, including journalists, are
in such a state of shock that they almost always choose the latter, writes Liebes.
Consequently, aided by an ‘echoing press’, the Bush administration effectively framed the invasion of Iraq as the ‘sequel’, or extension, of the War on Terror. Many journalists later showed regret for not having been more sceptical.97 ‘I wish we were tougher minded in the
build-up to Iraq, but it took time for the traditional adversarial relationship to reassert itself because of the shock of 9/11.’ Another reporter explained: ‘You run the danger that it can become propaganda. If you allow a government to put everything and anything under the rubric of ‘it’s part of the war on terror’… it’s an effort to convince people that, well, you have to go along with this, it’s part of the war on terror, or else we’ll all be terrorized and killed.’ 98
93 Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009) 92 94 Idem 93
95 Ibidem 87
96 Tamar Liebes, ‘Performance Journalism: The Case of Media’s Coverage of War and Terror’ in: The Communication Review (Jerusalem 2009) 241 97 Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009) 94
98 Idem 94-9
Conclusion
As the self-reflecting words of the last reporter illustrate, during war-time, journalists generally have a very hard time riding against the popular wave of pro-war sentiment. Before wars have been declared though, we see a dramatically different pattern. Months prior to wars, journalists tend to adhere to their core-journalistic principles: function as a watchdog of truth, critically examine both sides of the story and not to take a narrative or frame for granted. On the eve of WWII for instance, journalists even gave voice to
pro-German sentiment. Just before the war in Vietnam erupted, reporters warned for a powerful Soviet or Chinese response. As soon as leaders have declared war, my study shows that journalists generally turn into patriots.
Why? Journalists are human beings, they’re flesh and blood, vulnerable to pressure from society, politicians, and colleagues, afraid to be called a dissident or unpatriotic. As Gans pointed out in 1970, journalists are middle-class citizens, ‘the soul’ of western nations, who are likely to take their own society and political order for granted, and are more inclined to emphasize the propaganda and wrongdoings of other cultures/enemy countries. This can be one explanation for the quick adoption of the whole set of pro-war rhetoric and frames used by authorities throughout the years.
Another striking pattern, visible from the First World War until the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, is the use of framing. As I mentioned earlier in the introduction, never will authorities frame their wars as imperial, oil-thirsty campaigns, but always portray their enemies as forces of evil, which inevitably have to be fought and beaten. From the days of the savage Huns during ‘the Great War’, the ‘Good War’ during which the fascists Nazis had to be defeated, the Vietnam War, which was a crucial ‘Cold War’ struggle to stop the Communist, to the War on Terror in the 21st century. These frames show a crucial pattern: they always
feature Good versus Evil. The latter could be called the ultimate metaframe, as it is dominant during all wars.
Another metaframe that has been used throughout the decades, is the frame of Inevitable and Just. As soon as a war has erupted, journalists frame a war as something necessary, as a phenomenon there is no way around of. As a just cause that will ultimately benefit the nation. An even stronger metaframe I have witnessed in all wars is the frame of Atrocities. As soon as this frame was applied by one journalists, others quickly followed. It helped to rally journalistic support for the war-effort. The real power of these frames is that, as soon as they are adopted, they gain organizing power.
And because journalists mainly are middle-class, norm-abiding citizens, they are the perfect agents to let these frames powerfully resonate throughout society. In doing so, authorities do not hesitate to consistently tell lies in order to sell their war. From fairytales about bloodthirsty Huns who sliced off nurses’ breasts, to fake stories about babies being thrown out of incubators to ‘die on the cold floor’ on the eve of the Gulf War. Even during the second war in Iraq, 12 years later, journalists again bought the lies of authorities: the
narrative about Weapons of Mass Destruction turned out to be a complete fabrication. Often journalists lament: ‘we are lied to’. This is undeniably true. Though one might wonder, why would journalists consistently believe these lies, time after time?
These lies are often made up of atrocious stories, meaning to shock journalists. They often do so, effectively. Often it even mobilizes journalists and public opinion in favor of war. The horror slicing-breasts tales appalled American journalists, who first were very skeptical of warfare. Newspapers published these fiction stories causing a steady wave of
anti-Germanism throughout the USA, ultimately resulting in a declaration of War. Similarly, months prior to the Gulf War, media outlets were very divided over whether an invasion was worth it. When the fabricated incubator stories came around, journalists responded in shock. Many now were in favor of invading Kuwait, the American people quickly followed. Atrocities -lies or truth- seem to be a factor which highly influences journalists. Like I stated earlier, journalists are ordinary human beings, like most other Americans they were
outraged by such stories. Equally, the horror stories about the Weapons of Mass Destruction, had a huge impact on many journalists.
Never again would journalists believe the horror tales they were told during the First World War, they declared some years later, when the breast slicing stories turned out to be lies. My study shows that this statement didn’t have any prophetic value. War after war, journalists started to self-scrutinize their lack of critical attitude and almost sheep-like pro-war coverage. Two years after the gulf pro-war, when the incubator-story turned out to be a fabrication, reporters felt like they betrayed their own profession. And in essence, they had. Equally, some years after the invasion of Iraq, journalists of all media outlets regretted they had so easily believed the Administration’s tale of Weapons of Mass Destruction. A
prominent Washington Post journalist even admitted he should have pushed his editor-in-chief for a front-page story on the weakness of evidence for these weapons on the eve of the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
My study shows, that during war-time, Jingoism almost always takes a grip on reporters. Paralyzed, petrified and scared to say anything that can undermine the war effort, or to be called ‘unpatriotic’.
Case study. ‘How the New York Times Cover the war on ISIL’
Factual framework: The Rise of ISILWhen President George W. Bush launched the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as an extension of his ‘War on Terror’, American forces rapidly defeated Saddam Hussein’s army. Victory was certain, Bush declared. But as soon as Bush’ troops occupied Iraq, real armed resistance would be met. Various militias rose up to arms. One of the fiercest was ‘Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad’, an extremist Sunni insurgent organization. In 2004 it pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda, to merge with other Sunni militias to form the Mujahedeen Shura Council in 2006. Due to the Al-Qaeda affiliation, foreign fighters flocked to Iraq to join the fight. Its
commanders proclaimed the ‘Islamic State in Iraq’.99 Although the Americans suffered severe
losses due to the guerilla tactics of this militant group, American forces would still largely dominate Iraq.
When the last American troops left Iraq in 2011, the group continued to grow as a consequence of the major shift of power in favor of the country’s Shia’s, comprising 62.5 percent of the population (Saddam Hussein was a Sunni). Under his authority Al-Maliki gave Shia militias a carte blanche to kill countless Sunni civilians, fueling support of the country’s moderate Sunnis for extremist organizations such as Islamic State in Iraq (ISI).100
Although America had provided Iraq’s army with top-notch military equipment when it withdrew its troops from the country, Al-Maliki’s soldiers were not capable to halt the insurgence of Al-Qaeda affiliates. That same year, the Syrian civil war broke out. ISI, under the leadership of radical Al-Baghdadi, started sending missions into Syrian territory to side with Syrian Al-Qaeda associates to fight the Shia dictator Bashar Al-Assad. On April 82013, they merged with ISI, and called themselves ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’, a name inundated with territorial ambitions. The ultra-orthodox Islamic Sunni state would not just comprise of Iraq and Syria, but also of Lebanon, Jordan and ultimately Israel.101 Also the
acronym ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) is widely used. During my case study I will use ISIL, as it describes the group’s territorial ambitions more accurately.
In the spring/summer of 2013 the group first gained international attention by rapidly expanding throughout northern Syria. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, coined it ‘the strongest rebel group’ of the region. Some weeks later, on May 11, ISIL carried out suicide attacks in Turkey, killing 51. 102
In late December, ISIL advanced throughout Northern Iraq and conquered large areas at expense of the Iraqi army in a crushing defeat. In early January, it had launched a siege on Falluja, a key Iraqi city, to fully control it at January 4th. A day earlier it had proclaimed Iraq
as an Islamic State. With Falluja being 20 miles from Baghdad, ISIL’s threat became real. 103
In February and March ISIL suffered several setbacks. After an intense power-struggle, Al-Qaeda broke all ties with ISIL on February 3, blaming the group for religious fallacies and calling it a band of ‘thugs’, referring to its pillaging, raping and indiscriminate decapitating of fellow Muslims. Al Nusra, an important Syrian ISIL affiliate, remained loyal to Al Qaeda. In Syria, they joined other rebel forces against ISIL. Consequently, the group was driven out of
several Syrian cities. Also in Iraq, ISIL lost the key city of Ramadi and most of Fallujah to Iraqi government forces. Also in April and May they continued to lose ground. 104
99 Michael Weiss, Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York 2015) 40-43 100 Idem 40-43
101 Ibidem 132-136
102 Danny Romero ‘ISIS timeline: A year under the so-called Islamic State’ The Independent (28 6 2015) 103 Idem
104 Ibidem
At June 9, after days of intense fighting, ISIL conquered Iraq’s second most populous city, Mosul. A day later ISIL carried out an execution of 670 Shia prisoners in Mosul. On the 11th
also Tikrit, the birthplace of the Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein, fell in the hands of ISIL. In the weeks to come ISIL would continue to conquer countless villages and cities across Iraq and Syria. ISIL’s leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, announced the establishment of a new ‘Caliphate’ on June 29th. A few days later, he would declare that IS’ ultimate goal was world
domination, calling for all Muslim worldwide to capture ‘Rome, in order to own the world’. June 2014 is one of the most turbulent months in ISIL’s offensive.105
In early August, ISIL launched an offensive in northern Iraq. In a relentless rampage, they killed countless men and women of the Yazidis-minority, adherents of a religion infused with elements from Islam, Christianity and Pagan beliefs. Around 50.000 Yazidis fled into the Sinjar mountains. The UN warned for ‘a humanitarian tragedy’: thousands would potentially perish of hunger, thirst and diseases. Many in fact did. The Yazidi-crisis gained huge
international attention. Barack Obama was exposed to tremendous international pressure, to which he yielded on August 7. 106
The president authorized targeted airstrikes, along with airdrops of aid. A day later he would justify his decision publicly as an essential step to ‘prevent genocide against the Yazidis’. In close coordination with Kurdish ground troops, the Americans managed to establish a humanitarian corridor, through which the starving Yazidis could finally escape to a safe haven. 107
While American airstrikes continued, hundreds more Yazidis were killed and decapitated by ISIL, thousands of Yazidi women were abducted and finally sold as sex slaves. Such stories outraged the West. The EU agreed to supply Kurdish troops with weaponry. Also Pope Francis, called on the international community to halt ISIL.
On August 20, Obama would reveal the decapitation of American journalist James Foley by ISIL. The terrorist group released a graphic video of the execution, featuring Foley, dressed in an orange prison outfit –an obvious reference to Guantanamo Bay-, and his executioner, incognito. With his knife pointing at the camera, he says: (…..). Foley’s death had an enormous impact on the West. Mainly because, many now felt ISIL’s war wasn’t simply confined to the Middle-East, but now also westerners were involved. A mere two weeks later, ISIL released a new decapitation video, this time featuring journalist Steven Sotloff, also an American national.108 Millions of western citizens watched both these videos on e.g. social
media, causing massive outrage.
A few days later, on September 10, Barack Obama announced a coalition, including many western nations, to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL’. Among other allies, were many Arab nations, including Saudi-Arabia. Obama’s declaration of war against ISIL will be another key event in my case-study. It followed quickly after the beheadings of Foley and Sotloff, which had caused massive turmoil in the West, especially in the US. Despite intense bombing of ISIL positions by coalition forces, the group would only enhance its terror. In a series of new decapitations of western citizens, suicide bombings and an unprecedented armed offensive, thousands were killed. ISIL kept expanding northwards in Syria, and besieged the symbolically important Kurdish city of Kobani.109
105 Graeme Wood ‘What ISIS Really Wants’ The Atlantic (March 2015)
106 Danny Romero ‘ISIS timeline: A year under the so-called Islamic State’ The Independent (28 6 2015) 107 Idem
108 ‘Timeline: ISIS hostage killings’ The Guardian (16 11 2014) 109 ‘Battle for Kobane: Key events’ BBC World News (25 6 2015)
It wasn’t until March 15th 2015, after a period of 6 months of fierce Kurdish resistance and
thousands of allied airstrikes, that ISIL was finally driven out of the city and neighboring villages. The everlasting fierce battle for Kobani, lead to a wave of pro-Kurdish sentiment in the West. Even more important: for citizens morale: allied airstrikes had made a vital difference in the battle. 110
In the months to come, Kurdish forces, assisted by allied air support, would continue to gain ground and drive ISIL forces increasingly southward. On the other hand, the terrorist group would retake Ramadi and the ancient Syrian town of Palmyra. In other words, despite thousands of allied airstrikes, Kurdish offensives and the rise of Shia militias in south and central Iraq, ISIL still is far from defeated. The summer of 2015 would be period of no significant breakthroughs. Even a partnership with foe Iran is possible at this point. The status quo is lingering. 111
110 ‘Battle for Kobane: Key events’ BBC World News (25 6 2015)
111 Graham Allison ‘Defeating ISIS: With Whose Boots on the Ground?’ The Atlantic (27 10 2014)
Methodology
In studying the coverage of The New York Times concerning the war against ISIL, I will conduct a qualitative content analysis, during which the emphasis will lie on my own interpretation, based on the concepts and findings of my theoretical framework. I believe this is an effective strategy to spot parallels, shifting tone, vocab and frames.
During my study, I will conduct a thorough content analysis of articles written around the dates of several dramatic ISIL-related events, such as the fall of Mosul and the beheadings of Foley and Sotloff, based on the ‘ISIL-explainer’. I have composed an overview of these dates, and will explain below why I have chosen these particular ones as the key moments my case study evolves around.
In order to answer my hypothesis, I will particularly focus my analysis on the months and especially weeks prior to the week declaration, to be able to closely spot developments and sudden changes. Therefore, focus points are the Yazidi-crisis, the beheadings and war declaration, as these events are crucial to my case study. In essence, the aim of my case study is to reveal the stance of Times journalists about the war on ISIL, and the aspects that clarify their vision, such as word choice, framing, selective information and explicit standpoints in opinion pieces and Editorials.
At what specific date/event can we see a striking development of the above-mentioned features in the Times? I will study as many articles around my selected dates as possible, but analyze the most relevant and striking ones.
1. Rise (Summer of 2013)
The first time period that I will discuss in my case study is the summer of 2013, when ISIL first gained international attention. As I mentioned earlier, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights even coined it ‘the strongest rebel group’ of the region. It also slowly gained ground in Iraq.
2. Takeover of Falluja (January 2014)
When ISIL-forces took Falluja, billions of American dollars worth of military equipment, including tanks, anti-aircraft technology and other weaponry granted to the Iraqi Army by the U.S., fell in the hands of ISIL affiliates. The militants were now only 30 miles from
Baghdad. Considering Iraq’s security and stability now really at stake, I will use this dramatic date as a key moment in my case study: did Times journalist frame the takeover as American interests under siege?
3. Fall of Mosul (June 2014)
Months later, the occupation of Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, in June 2014, confirmed earlier assumptions that ISIL had transformed from a Sunni insurgency to an established power, even calling for world domination and announcing a march on Rome. ISIL now, had completely disrupted Iraq. I will use the fall of Mosul as important milestone in my study. Did Times journalists envision a role of the U.S. to halt ISIL? Or did they frame it as a region the USA shouldn’t ever get involved in again, considering the tremendous Iraq-trauma?
