The Revolving Door in The Hague: The Movement of Ministerial Advisers into the Public Affairs Industry

(1)

The Revolving Door in The Hague:

The Movement of Ministerial Advisers into

the Public Affairs Industry

Thesis submitted by Lamiya Hujdur, 369734

Leiden University

Public Administration: International and European Governance

Dr. B. Fraussen

(2)

Abstract

Ministerial advisers are an odd phenomenon in the traditional Dutch political-administrative landscape. They operate in the shadowland and have remained a black box for many years. In general, scholars do not know much about ministerial advisers and their career paths in the Netherlands. In order to create an understanding of what kind of ministerial advisers specifically move to the public affairs industry, this study assesses what circumstances could have an effect on the movement to the public affairs industry. The revolving door phenomenon is relevant for this profession. Twenty percent of ministerial advisers move to a function in the public affairs industry after their appointment. The implications for practice have to be considered by the public sector. Finally, this study presents opportunities for further future research on this matter.

(3)

Introduction

“Ministerial advisers can always become a lobbyist for a large private corporation or non-governmental organization. Plenty of contacts in The Hague” (Volkskrant, 2012).

Jack de Vries was the long-time ministerial adviser of Prime Minister Balkenende of the Christian-democratic party CDA. He was known as one of the most important and successful spin doctors in The Hague. His connections with the media were so close, that his nickname became “Jack the Leak”. De Vries was particularly involved with the branding of the CDA-party in many ways. He was the architect of multiple campaigns of the CDA CDA-party. Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende was a financial expert, but he did not have enough experience in The Hague. He understood that he would need a ministerial adviser who knows how to strategically approach the media. Jack de Vries tended to hover around the Prime Minister. A ministerial adviser is expected to advise his or her minister in political critical situations and to maintain connections with his party in the Parliament. He is the gatekeeper for members of the CDA party who want to connect with the Minister. A ministerial adviser should not be proactively involved with the media. When the parliament asked questions regarding the rise of ministerial advisers in 2003, Prime Minister Balkenende explicitly stated that ministerial adviser should not be spokesmen. However, De Vries stayed involved in campaigning activities in his role as ministerial adviser. He continued his career in 2007 as State Secretary for Defence. However, De Vries resigned in 2010 after admitting to an extra-marital affair with his personal assistant a few days earlier. When he left politics, he made a remarkable move to the public affairs industry. He became a lobbyist for Hill & Knowlton. The lobby bureau represented the case of the JSF planes of Defence. Therefore, the switch in his career path is controversial. The Ministry of Defence does not speak with ex government leaders who work for a private corporation for two years after their resignation. Due to financial and strategic interests that are concerned with matters on Defence, De Vries was not allowed to lobby with the Ministry of Defence. The reaction of De Vries was: “I am just there to show the way, whether I will be the person that will call the Ministry of Defence is something that I do not know. However, I do not see any obstacles or problems”. Hill & Knowlton added: “For us it is not such an issue as it is for journalists. We have recruited Jack for his qualities and not because of our clients” (NRC, 2011). The case of Jack de Vries is an example of a former ministerial adviser that continued his career path in the public affairs sector. The

(5)

movement of political staffers from roles in the government to lucrative jobs in the public affairs industry is often described as a ‘revolving door’. This is a metaphor for the movement of political staffers between roles as legislators and regulators and the industries affected by this legislation and regulation. Corporations hire professionals from the public sector for different reasons. Hill & Knowlton stated that they hired Jack de Vries for his qualities, but they do not specifically mention what these qualities would be.

In general, scholars do not know much about ministerial advisers and their career paths in the Netherlands. This field of scholarship remains heavily under-theorized. The profession of ministerial advisers has remained a black box for many years. Current scholarship has shed light on this group of advisers and described their background and how their function looks like. The first wave of single-country studies in the Netherlands is still very little. Only in the last couple of years research has been conducted on ministerial advisers in the Netherlands. The complex nature of ministerial advisers makes it more difficult to establish comprehensive research in this field. This study aims at shedding light on ministerial advisers, their role in the consensus-driven landscape in The Hague, and their later career paths. Specifically, their movement to the public affairs sector appears to be an interesting phenomenon. In general, politicians and government leaders move to the public affairs industry more often than civil servants (Vidal et al., 2011). There are no studies that address whether ministerial advisers would also move more often to the public affairs. The public debate on the revolving door phenomenon in general can be dynamic. Ethical questions will rise as well. In order to get an understanding of ministerial advisers as a profession, we need to examine whether we can identify certain patterns in their later career path. This study is the first to assess the movement of ministerial advisers into the public affairs industry. Scholars are still in a very early and exploring stage when it comes to both the literature on ministerial advisers and the public affairs industry in the Netherlands. Both the profession of ministerial advisers and the public affairs industry have not been researched thoroughly in the Netherlands. Therefore, this thesis will have to be an exploratory research. The nature and characteristics of the population and data is too small to find explanatory patterns. However, this thesis will be the first to explore the relationship between ministerial advisers and the public affairs sector in the political-administrative context. This research aims to shed light on the phenomenon by providing a descriptive analysis and furthermore to examine whether there is an indication for a predictive relationship between variables. The goal of this research is to provide theoretically grounded hypotheses that can be tested when the population of ministerial

(6)

advisers has grown, and a large N study can be conducted. The research question that will be addressed in this study is: Under what circumstances are ministerial advisers more or less likely to continue their career path in the public affairs sector in the Netherlands from 1994 to 2016? In order to provide an assessment, factors such as the length of appointment as ministerial adviser, the role of the adviser, the political party and the ministerial department of their Minister or Secretary of State will be examined. This research question will be answered by following a quantitative logic, using survey data and desktop research.

(7)

Scientific Relevance

The scientific relevance of this study is based on the assessment of ministerial advisers in the Netherlands. Narrowing down the task, this research will provide an answer to the question under what circumstances ministerial advisers are more or less likely to continue their career path in the public affairs sector in the Netherlands. This thesis aims to contribute to current scholarship by particularly looking into the movement of ministerial advisers to the public affairs sector after their appointment. The relevance of this study lies in multiple aspects. First, it can be an indicator of what resources and competences they have acquired during their appointment as a ministerial adviser. Different factors can contribute to this, such as the contacts with stakeholders that one has acquired. Secondly, ministerial advisers are an odd phenomenon in the traditional Dutch political-administrative landscape. The profession of ministerial advisers in the Netherlands is an issue that is not covered well enough in scholarly work. Only in the last couple of years research has been conducted on ministerial advisers in the Netherlands. More empirical work on this phenomenon is required in order to gain understanding on this profession. Moreover, most studies that have been conducted are for a Dutch-language audience only. There is a lack of English studies on ministerial advisers in The Netherlands. Politically appointed ministerial advisers are a relatively recent phenomenon. Therefore, it is difficult to conduct comprehensive research as the number of ministerial advisers is still small and they have only been appointed since the nineties. The first wave of research into ministerial advisers is mainly focused on biographical profiles, descriptive data and numbers. Moreover, we lack information on how this profession has evolved over the years. In order to create an understanding of what kind of ministerial advisers specifically move to the public affairs industry, we need to assess what circumstances could have an effect on this movement. If there are any circumstances that contribute to this movement, then it becomes possible to gain insights on how specific assets that they have acquired during their appointment can affect the later career path of ministerial advisers. By formulating hypotheses that have been drawn from current theories on ministerial advisers and testing whether there is a predictive relationship, future research will be able to conduct explanatory research in this field when the population has grown.

This study can also help to better understand the revolving door phenomenon in the Netherlands. On the one hand it addresses the unexplored phenomenon of ministerial advisers. On the other hand, it tries to shed a light on the revolving door phenomenon and the

(8)

public affairs industry in general. There is a knowledge gap when it comes to the public affairs industry. Scholars do not uniformly agree whether public affairs is a profession. The key elements of a profession are: a set of common values; membership in strong representative organizations; adherence to professional norms; an intellectual tradition and body of knowledge; and technical skills acquired through profession training (Grunig and Hunt, 1984). The public affairs industry especially lacks an intellectual tradition and body of knowledge (McGrath, 2015). The phenomenon has not been addressed on a large scale in the Netherlands. Scholars do not even agree on terminology at this point in time. They use different terms for the same phenomenon such as: ‘public affairs’, ‘lobbying’, ‘public policy advocacy’ and ‘communication affairs’. Studies are still in a very early stage. The public affairs industry can only enhance public legitimacy by achieving greater professionalization. In order to establish the professionalization of the public affairs industry in the Netherlands, more empirical research is required. Therefore, it is crucial to enhance scholarly work on this topic and particularly in the Netherlands.

This thesis will contribute to the body of knowledge by looking specifically at ministerial advisers who continue their career path in the public affairs industry. I expect this research to be feasible as it will do a thorough exploratory analysis. Further research on both ministerial advisers and on the revolving door phenomenon in the Netherlands is highly recommended. In order to get a better understanding of this ‘shadowland’, scholars need to conduct more research in the future. In order to help guide attempts to regulate the revolving door in the Netherlands, scholars can for example evaluate the extent to which ex-government officials convert their political contacts into lobbying revenue. Vidal, Draca and Rosen (2011) have found the first quantitative evidence in the United States of how former congressional staffers benefit from Washington’s revolving door. A similar research conducted in The Netherlands would be helpful in order to create a better understanding of the phenomenon. The key aim is to lay the groundwork for future scientific research on ministerial advisers in the Netherlands.

(9)

Social Relevance

The social relevance of this study is mainly in creating more awareness and fuel for the public debate regarding both ministerial advisers and the public affairs industry. These areas are often a black box for society. Ministerial advisers have been relatively unknown to the public. Media call this function ‘a new route to power’ (NRC, 2017). Due to the fact that they have a close position to the minister, they can be important actors in the political and administrative landscape. The social relevance of this study is in the fact that this thesis will make visible who these people are and what their role was during their appointment. Moreover, it sheds a light on how their position can lead to a role in the public affairs industry due to certain factors. The public affairs industry is also an unknown world to the public. In 2015, Parliament Members of the Dutch Labour Party initiated the proposal ‘Lobby: open and transparent’. The importance of regulation for the public affairs industry is the focusing point of this proposal. This proposal has not been the first discussion regarding the public affairs industry in The Netherlands. The influence of non-governmental actors in policy making should be transparent. The lobby industry needs more ‘daylight’ instead of operating in the ‘shadowlands’. There has been a call for more transparency in the public debate for several years. However, up until this point there still has not been any policy reform on regulation for the public affairs industry. Mostly journalists report on the severe impact and influence of lobbyists in The Hague. Policy makers seem to demand a more open lobby industry and clear directives initiated by the government. The public debate mainly focuses on regulation mechanisms in order to control the legislative footprint that large corporations have. However, the societal relevance of this study is the attempt to assess the presence of the revolving door phenomenon in The Hague. If we know who lobbyist are and how they operate, regulation can be re-evaluated. This study can contribute to get a better understanding of what lobbying in the Netherlands is and help guide attempts to regulate the revolving door phenomenon. Greater regulation of the profession has been demanded from different sides. At this point in time, there is a minimum of regulation. There is a lack in transparency when it comes to the relationship between the public affairs industry and public officials. In other countries such as the United States more attention has been generated for this issue. On the European Union level, lobbying registers have been discussed many times for example. The EU is an important playing field for lobbyists. Business interests are represented in many lobby campaigns targeting EU institutions. The demand for more regulation at the EU level is increasing.

(10)

“The European commission has called for tighter checks on lobbying after revelations about the business activities of two of its former leaders, which have highlighted the revolving doors in EU institutions. Under the proposals from the EU’s executive arm, lobbyists would be obliged to join a public register if they want to meet MEPs, senior officials at the European council or senior diplomats from countries holding the EU’s six-month rotating presidency. The protracted debate about the role of lobbyists in EU law-making has come under renewed scrutiny since the former commission president José Manuel Barroso joined the investment bank Goldman Sachs. It emerged last week that the former commissioner Neelie Kroes had failed to declare a directorship in an offshore company while she was in office.” (Guardian, 2016).

(11)

Research Question

Considering the objectives of this research and the societal and academic relevance, the following research question has been developed for this thesis:

Under what circumstances are ministerial advisers more or less likely to continue their career path in the public affairs sector in the Netherlands from 1994 to 2016?

In order to answer this research, question several sub questions have been developed additionally:

Sub questions

● How do we define ministerial advisers and lobbyists?

● How does the role of a ministerial adviser during his appointment affect his later career path?

● In what way does the political party involvement of a ministerial adviser affect his later career path?

● Is there an effect of the stature of the government leader of a ministerial adviser on his later career path?

● Does the length of the appointment of a ministerial adviser affect his later career path?

The objective of this research is twofold. First, this thesis aims to examine what the role and function of ministerial advisers in the Netherlands is. This is a topic that has not received enough detailed attention in this context. In many countries the basic groundwork in terms of mapping and description has already been done. In the Netherlands, a start at first base is necessary (Van Den Berg, 2018). This research is therefore necessary in order to contribute to the mapping of ministerial advisers in the Netherlands. Secondly, this thesis will look into ministerial advisers that continued their career path in the public affairs sector. The career paths of political advisers vary substantially. This study aims to enhance the body of knowledge on the public affairs sector and on ministerial advisers in the Netherlands by formulating hypotheses that have been drawn from the theory and that are empirically

(12)

grounded. The yield of this research will be in these empirically grounded hypotheses, that can be tested in future research when the N becomes larger and regression analysis can be executed on the dataset. This study will be exploring rather than testing due to the nature of the data and population. Hereby, this thesis contributes to the body of knowledge on public affairs as a profession in the Netherlands.

(13)

Theoretical Framework

In this chapter current scholarly work on ministerial advisers and the public affairs sector in general will be reviewed. For the current theory on ministerial advisers, this section particularly looks into international literature. Only a handful of articles from the Netherlands has been included, as it is rather scarce now. In order to examine where the literature is at this point, this section will provide an overview. Moreover, this section will place this current study in the body of knowledge on ministerial advisers.

Ministerial advisers

Ministerial advisers in the Netherlands have been in the shadowland of the political landscape. This is particularly due to the fact that this phenomenon has only emerged since 1994 in the Netherlands. Moreover, the traditional Dutch political-administrative landscape is based on the notion that politics and administration have to be separated and ministers are served by impartial civil servants (Van Den Berg, 2017). However, nowadays this group has been institutionalized in the executive governments of most Western democracies (Hustedt et al., 2017). Ministerial advisers have been part of the political environment in the Netherlands for nearly twenty years. Nowadays, the ministerial adviser supports Ministers and Secretaries of State.

Hustedt et al. (2017) have reviewed literature on ministerial advisers and have proposed a definition for this function. The one fact that all ministerial advisers have in common is that they are close confidants to their political masters, operating in the shadowland of politics and bureaucracy (Hustedt et al., 2017). They suggest defining ministerial advisers as: “a person appointed to serve an individual minister, recruited on political criteria in a position that is temporary” (Hustedt et al., 2017: p. 300). Scholarly work on ministerial advisers covers in general one theme: in what way the ministerial advisers fit within the political system. Other countries have a longer tradition of ministerial advisers in general. In order to understand who this group of people is, scholars are mainly dependent upon international studies. Especially countries of Westminster nations have done detailed research on ministerial advisers. In Anglo-Saxon administrations, the ministerial advisers have been present for a longer time. Research on ministerial advisers has been focused mainly on Westminster system such as the

(14)

UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada (Hustedt et al., 2017). The Westminster bias is mainly due to the fact that ministerial advisers can be perceived as a break with the core fundamentals of Westminster (Hustedt et al., 2017). Westminster systems are characterized by the neutral bureaucracy, providing free, frank, and fearless advice. Therefore, this phenomenon has particularly gained scientific interest. There is much we do not know regarding the procedural and substantive dimensions of public policy making (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2015). In the Netherlands, there is only a limited amount of academic publications that tell us something about ministerial advisers (Van Der Steen et al., 2009; Nieuwenkamp, 2001). There are barriers in cross country comparative research as the characteristics of advisers are diverse in different countries (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2017). In many countries ministers increasingly rely on advisers for support and advice. Labels for this group of advisers differ, but they all serve close to their ministers and operate in the grey area between politics and bureaucracy (Hustedt, Kolltveit and Salomonsen, 2017). Researchers are in general focused on the rise of the ministerial advisers, the consequences of this development on the bureaucracy, and their influence in policy processes. Studies have brought the role and power of ministerial advisers to greater prominence. However, the role and function of ministerial advisers is still developing. Scholarly work continues on exploring in what way advisers can support their political leader. Some scholars have attempted to make a classification of the roles of ministerial advisers (Connaughton, 2010). It is clear that these advisers are an important factor for the ministers. Certain issues concerning this profession are relatively well covered, but many are still not addressed. One of the most dominant ongoing debates is to what extent ministerial advisors are accountable for their performances and whether this should be improved (Keating, 2003). Other issues that are being raised in scholarly work are for example politicization. The literature is mixed concerning the politicization of ministerial advisors (Christensen, 2006). Studies draw different conclusions regarding who this group of people is and why ministers and other political leaders need ministerial advisers.

Motivation to adopt a ministerial adviser depend upon different influences such as the media, electoral, desire for coordination and control (Connaughton, 2015). Requirements vary from responsiveness, expertise, loyalty, and personalization commitment to ideals (Connaughton, Sootla & Peters, 2008). Van Der Steen et al. (2009) state that ministerial advisors can be perceived as special civil servants that are appointed and closely tied to a political leader. This is a substantially different position compared to ordinary civil servants, as political advisors

(15)

have to make political decision. Civil servants are recruited based on their expertise in a specific policy field. Ministerial advisers seem to be appointed on multiple criteria, such as trust for example. The first wave of research into ministerial advisers is mainly focused on biographical profiles, descriptive data and numbers. A few researchers have addressed these kinds of studies in the Netherlands (Maijenburg, 2007; De Vries, 2008; Van Der Steen et al. 2009). De Vries (2008) has conducted a Dutch thesis concerning the liaison-role of ministerial advisers. De Vries (2008) addresses multiple questions such as the position of ministerial advisers in The Hague, what kind of relationships ministerial advisers start, how ministerial advisers use information inside these relationships, and what motives ministerial advisers have for the way they interpret their liaison-role. The liaison-role reflects mainly in maintaining relationships within their own organisation and outside their organisation. The ministerial adviser executes this task by maintaining relationships in the various worlds in the context of political The Hague. They provide information, in order to get other information in return. The ministerial adviser is allowed to have direct contact with Members of Parliament. Van Der Steen et al. (2009) add more insights on the phenomenon. They state that ministerial advisers operate in between different domains. Ministerial advisers give substance to the daily processes that a Minister is concerned with. They are an important actor in the strategic capacity of the organization.

Ministerial advisers are concerned with a multitude of tasks, in order to support their Minister as good as possible. Van Der Steen et al. (2009) point out that the position of ministerial advisers is not being reflected. They execute different tasks, but there is no learning and reflection process. Ministerial advisers are somewhat supervised by their party, and in some cases, there is support from the administration. Another concern is the political-administrative relations in the Netherlands. A number of government leaders needs more political support. This could lead to a situation where the tasks that a ministerial adviser executes could be divided amongst different individual experts. These experts would form a political team together, who support their minister in different ways. The team would consist of coordinators, media experts, spokespersons and policy experts. The idea of a political team has not been positively received in the Netherlands so far. This form of extra support is not being perceived as a qualitative addition at this point. A Minister who is dependent upon a political team could be seen as a weak government leader. The Netherlands have an impartial and merit-based government. Political cabinets function properly in countries such as New

(16)

Zealand and Australia. Whether this kind of culture is a future scenario for the Netherlands is doubtful.

Van Der Steen et al. (2009) predict that ministerial advisers will not disappear in the near future. Their value has become indispensable for Ministers and Secretaries of State. Both political and administrative actors benefit from the valuable work ministerial advisers do. The study of Van Der Steen et al. (2009) shows to some extent that the appointment of a ministerial adviser has proven not only to be a perk, but a vital and essential element in the system. They are bridging, connecting and bringing different worlds together. Ministerial advisers seem to function most properly if they are out of the public eye and can continue their work as hidden connectors. Another document that is helpful in order to determine the position of ministerial advisers is the Handbook for Incoming Ministers. It mentions that each Minister and Secretary of State has to inform the Prime Minister about the appointment, tasks, and remuneration of the ministerial adviser. The Prime Minister is obliged to inform the parliament. Salary is based on the salary scale in the public service. The duties of a ministerial adviser determine in which scale they will be placed, the bandwidth ranges from scale 11 to 14. When a government leader resigns, the ministerial adviser is allowed to stay in the service of his department for six more months and perform duties for the ministry. Ministerial advisers differ across individual properties such as educational and professional backgrounds, their role and the work they do (Hustedt et al., 2017). This makes it more difficult to find common ground for the systematic analysis of ministerial advisers (Hustedt et al., 2017). The government of the Netherlands formalized the profession of ministerial advisers in 1994 and this was the first time it was mentioned in any official government documentation (Van Den Berg, 2018). In the early years, only the Dutch prime minister and the vice-prime minister were allowed to have a ministerial adviser as a privilege. Nowadays, every Minister and Secretary of State appoints a ministerial adviser. Despite of this development, the rise of the ministerial adviser in the Netherlands is remarkable. Ministries employ thousands of civil servants, who are loyal to their minister by law. The administration in the Netherlands has traditionally been populated by impartial, anonymous, expert bureaucrats who are recruited, selected and promoted based on merit criteria (Van Der Meer & Roborgh, 1988). The Weberian notion of a separation between politics and administration has always been dominant in the Netherlands. There is a strong tradition of political neutrality in public service. The rise of the ministerial advisers is thus an odd development in this political-administrative context. They were regarded as a threat to the traditional governance order,

(17)

especially by civil servants (Van Den Berg, 2017). Maijenburg (2007) has provided general insights on the phenomenon ministerial advisers in The Netherlands. Maijenburg (2007) states that there is not much information about the function of ministerial advisers. Therefore, he proposes a description of what ministerial advisers are: “A civil servant who is temporarily appointed. His appointment is tied to the appointment of his political leader, who he supports with party political activities” (Maijenburg, 2007: p. 5). The profession of ministerial adviser has only been formalized since the Paars I cabinet in 1994. However, ministerial advisers have been informally active before this cabinet. During the government formation in 1994, the coalition parties agreed that the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers could appoint one ministerial adviser. In this first phase, the role and position of ministerial advisers was not clear. Ministerial advisers did not even exist in the organograms. The tasks that ministerial advisers executed, such as maintaining the relationship with the political party, took place in the ‘shadow land’. There was no clear job description until 2003 when Prime Minister Balkenende formalized the profession. The rise of the ministerial advisers in the Netherlands could finalize in these years. The most important aspects that the cabinet discussed were that the ministerial adviser has to be appointed for the duration of their political superior’s term in office; that the ministerial adviser has to organizationally resort directly under the Secretary General; and that the job explicitly excludes any press-communication tasks. After Prime Minister Balkenende formalized the job description, the number of Ministers and Secretaries of State that were allowed to appoint a ministerial adviser grew steadily. In 2007, it was agreed that every Minister and Secretary of State was allowed to appoint one ministerial adviser.

(18)

The function of ministerial advisers

Ministerial advisers are occupying a position in the borderlines of politics and administration (Connaughton, 2015). Political leaders have relied on ministerial advisers for support and counsel. The description of the profession is vague, because the “unofficial status of many advisers and the greater variety of their roles as compared with political officers whose powers have been well defined by law or custom” (Goldhamer, 1978: p. 8). Van Den Berg (2018) points out that the function of ministerial advisers can be pursued as threefold. First, they provide politically responsive input for policy making. Second, they are a buffer between the political sphere and the civil service who were traditionally always separated. Ministerial advisers have an uncomfortable fit in the traditional Dutch government. The ministerial advisers assist the minister in political tasks, while the impartial civil service cannot be involved in the political sphere. The Dutch civil service is traditionally impartial and merit-based (Lijphart, 1975; Wunder, 1995). Civil servants are neutral, but the ministerial adviser is close to the minister. He / she is a person who they can trust. The advisers tend to hover around their ministers. They advise their ministers prior to debates in the Parliament. They talk to their own political party, or to coalition partners in the Parliament. Besides that, they also serve as a spokesperson towards journalists. Ministerial advisers provide their minister with useful advice and help in deciding what issues should be brought to their attention. However, there is no clear job description that delineates their power and functions as distinct from those of senior public servants.

The boundaries that ministerial advisers cannot overstep are not defined. As mentioned before, Prime Minister Balkenende stated that ministerial advisers should not proactively approach media. The pressure from the media on ministers has only increased with the rise of social media. A part of the ministerial advisers is primarily responsible for media assistance. In a survey of the OECD (2011) amongst ministerial advisers in member states, 67% of the respondents answered that the most commonly function that they perform is media assistance. In the Netherlands, it is not clear what the different tasks of ministerial advisers are. The job description is not specified: “Some ministers use their advisers just for certain issues, some for all areas of the portfolio; some take a coordination role, others are elbow deep in policy development; some work closely with officials, others independently. [It] depends on the relationship between ministers and advisers” (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2005: p. 23).

Ministerial advisers can also be perceived as a link between the ministers and the departments: “Ministerial advisers are important in ensuring departments understand

(19)

ministers’ expectations and views. They provide clarity and a degree of transparency which is important to achieving good communication between departments and ministers. They also provide a mechanism to reinforce the distinction between departmental and political advice if ministers so choose” (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2005: p. 23). Connaughton stated that ministerial advisers ‘help with their considerable workload, to contest ideas, deal with coalition relations or electoral considerations and critically drive the machinery of government to secure policy outputs’ (Connaughton, 2015: p. 38). There is much room for the interpretation of the tasks that ministerial advisers have to execute. Hustedt et al. (2017) argue that recent scholarly work reveals that ministerial advisers often perform crucial roles, beyond direct advisory functions. Most of these functions involve brokering, networking, or coordinating policy. The distinctive policy roles of ministerial advisers are examined in multiple international studies that will be assessed. Ministerial advisors have different roles and tasks in different countries. The roles and function of ministerial advisers across countries have similarities and differences. There is a lack of studies concerning the function and the assigned tasks of the political adviser in the Netherlands. Maijenburg (2007) makes a comparison and points out that the function of ministerial advisers in England is most similar to the situation in the Netherlands. However, Dutch ministerial advisers have more tasks compared to their English colleagues. The diversity of the tasks that a ministerial adviser has to execute depends upon the personality of his political leader, the work experience of the ministerial adviser and the kind of political leader (Prime Minister, Minister or Secretary of State). Ministerial advisers in Australia help their political masters to generate policy ideas and formulate policy (Maley, 2000). Maley (2000) argues in her paper that ministerial advisers in Australia could have five distinctive policy roles: agenda-setting; linking ideas, interests and opportunities; mobilising; bargaining; and ‘delivering’. Ministerial advisers have access to both political and technical information and maintain relationships with stakeholders inside and outside government (Maley, 2000). In a more recent research, Maley (2015) goes more in depth on the policy work of Australian ministerial advisers and political staff. Ministerial advisers in New Zealand read, interpret, and forward policy advice from civil servants, attend meetings with them, and participate in meetings with other ministers (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2014). Silva (2017) found that ministerial advisers are appointed to ministers’ private offices as a strategy to legitimize policy choices and instruments, by injecting partisanship, responsiveness and loyalty in the policy-making process. In Greece, ministerial advisers best fit the role of a coordinator and policy manager who vertically steers policy and networks with other political

(20)

staff across a fragmented executive core government. They belong to ministerial cabinets, which is characterized by prime minister centrism, independent ministers, and a passive bureaucracy. Hustedt and Salomonsen (2017) examined the roles of ministerial advisers in government coordination in Denmark and Sweden. The roles of advisers are different in coordination. In Sweden, ministerial advisers control government coordination through hierarchical authority. However, in Denmark advisers play a more indirect role in coordination. They serve to reproduce the functional politicization of the permanent bureaucracy in government coordination. Askim, Karlsen and Kolltveit (2017) did a study on distinct roles among ministerial advisers in Norway. Norway has had a long tradition of political appointees. They find three distinct roles among political appointees in Norway: ‘stand in’, ‘media adviser’ and ‘political coordinator’. The stand in role assists the minister by having responsibility for parts of the ministry, faces front issues in the media, gives policy-substance advice on single issues and advises the minister on various issues in the ministry (Askim et al., 2017). The media adviser coordinates with the communications department in the ministry, prepares the minister’s speeches and newspaper op-eds, advices in handling of urgent media issues and keeps contact with parliamentary group and party organization (Askim et al., 2017). Finally, the political coordinator role gives long-term political advice, political-tactical advice on single issues, and participates in coordination processes in the government apparatus (Askim et al., 2017). The study shows that appointees’ roles within the executive government depend on their personal experience (Askim et al., 2017). Some tasks are performed by all ministerial advisers in the study.

Scholars approach the function of the ministerial advisers quite differently. Early studies distinguish two general groups of ministerial advisers. One group of advisors is mainly concerned with assisting and advising the minister as a ‘spin doctor’ (Hustedt & Salomonsen, 2013). Advisers are the spokesman of the political leader in media and political communication affairs. The other group of ministerial advisers is also concerned with providing political advice on many different topics and areas. These advisers are more involved with political advice policy process and policy formulation activities. Another classification regarding the roles of ministerial advisers distinguishes four different types of advisers; expert, partisan, coordinator and minder (Connaughton, 2010). The growing number of ministerial advisers can be explained by the “reality that Ministers need assistance in government as the scope of a minister’s responsibilities far exceeds the capacities of any one individual” (Connaughton, 2010: p. 352). There is no clear job description for ministerial

(21)

advisers. However, empirical cases show that over the years the demand for ministerial advisers is growing. Ministerial advisers are appointed by Ministers based on two criteria. The first reason to appoint an adviser is that they contribute to improve the responsiveness of governments (OECD, 2010). The government is confronted with an increase of communication technologies and modern information. Stakeholders and the public expect that the government should be responsive. Therefore, Ministers need this group of advisers to guide them. The second reason is that ministerial advisers have an important strategic role in designing policies and proposing reforms. The government operates in a complex environment, where a market of ideas, policies and actors puts pressure on the minister. Public servants and ministerial advisers support the minister in doing so. Other reasons for the appointment of ministerial advisers are based on their relations with parliament and interest groups, to handle relations with the minister’s party.

OECD distinguishes three main types of advisers across OECD countries. The generalist or strategic advisers, media advisers and experts. Educational and professional backgrounds are good indicators for the kind of tasks that ministerial advisers are responsible for. Media advisers have backgrounds in journalism or media. Experts have a background in specific areas such as legal affairs. They are recruited based on their academic specialization and/or knowledge or experience of a particular area that is relevant for the minister. However, it is not entirely clear what the roles of ministerial advisers are. Many countries do not set forth in legislation or policy what ministerial advisers do. There are four functions that ministerial advisors regard as their most important tasks: giving strategic advice, coordinating relations with stakeholders, advising on political considerations and providing media and communication advice (OECD, 2011). Many ministerial advisers consider giving strategic advice as their most important function. They inform the political leader and advise them on political issues. Government leaders need ministerial advisers to keep in touch with a variety of stakeholders. The coordinating function can help ministers to include the views of stakeholders in the policy-making process. Stakeholders can be influential party supporters, think tanks, business leaders, interest groups, trade unionists, and political parties in other countries. Politically sensitive issues can be coordinated with other ministers, when inter-party negotiations are required. Only ministerial advisers are allowed to negotiate with other ministers on behalf of their own minister. Ministerial advisers find their coordinating task very important, and they devote much time to this role. The provision of media and communication advice is mainly focused on the increasingly professional nature of ministerial

(22)

communication. Tasks such as tailoring messages for specific target groups are important. Ministerial advisers can act as some sort of spokesmen, or they can write speeches for their ministers when they speak before their party or other target groups. By advising on political considerations, ministerial advisers can support their Minister by drumming up political support for reforms and ensuring that they are in line with the plans of the government and interests. These and other tasks determine the type of role of a ministerial adviser during his appointment.

Connaughton (2010) developed a classification of roles of ministerial advisers into four different types. In order to understand what kinds of ministerial advisers there are, we can use the classification of Connaughton (2010). The study shows that multiple characteristics determine the type of ministerial adviser. The concrete tasks they carry out within and outside the government department are indicators for specific type of roles.

Role Profile Political Communicat e

Policy-making role

Impact Expert Specialist Passive Technical Knowledge Expert

Partisan Responsive Active Political Politics Political dominance

Coordinator Generalist Variable Both Fixer Managem ent

Minder Generalist/ responsive

Active Political Politics / passive

Mutuality

TABLE 1. Characteristics of advisers’ roles. Source: Connaughton (2010: p. 352).

Type I: Expert

The expert embodies the role of adviser as an individual working in isolation or as part of the government machine. They are highly qualified political outsiders. The experts contest and promote policy advice in their specific sector, which can be linked to the department of the minister (Connaughton, 2010). Experts mainly have technical solutions for problems. They are expected to initiate policy and ideas, contest and promote policy advise. This type of ministerial advisers injects more specialist expertise to government work. Their main

(23)

contribution is through their special in-depth knowledge and expertise. This type of adviser has no need to be an active political participant.

Type II: Partisan

The partisan type is appointed for political associations with the minister. The partisan is predominantly appointed for political association with the minister. Partisans have a highly political role, they keep politics in policy. They operate in instances where there is distrust between politicians and the civil service. The ministerial adviser can anticipate and has a keen political-strategic eye. The ministerial adviser is responsive to the ministers and highly political. Therefore, they are closely connected to their political party and other relevant political actors. Ministerial advisers with a partisan function are thus very much focused on the political process. Partisan advisers must represent their minister in political negotiations for example.

Type III: Coordinator

The coordinator has a liaison-role, who helps to monitor relevant actors in the department and rest of the government. They monitor the programme for government, liaising with various groups and offices to facilitate an oversight of the minister’s agenda. They mainly maintain vertical and horizontal relationships. Ministerial advisers mainly aid in media relations and communication.

Type IV: Minder

Minders look out for issues that can be potentially harmful to their minister, both politically and in terms of reputation management. Their most important recruitment criteria are their loyalty to the department. They are chosen based on personal trust and affinity. The adviser is closely linked to the minister and does not possess prior specialist expertise or experience on the minister’s policy portfolio.

(24)

Impact on the public sector

The relationship between ministerial advisers and civil servants seemed to be problematic at first in most European Union and OECD member states (OECD, 2007). There is some overlap between the roles of civil servants and ministerial advisers. Both actors have to be loyal to the Minister. The advisers are highly dependent upon their political leader. Ministers rely on the expertise and skills from their ministerial advisers, to make informed strategic decision (OECD, 2007). Moreover, ministerial advisers assist the minister in political tasks and roles while it would be damaging to the impartial civil service if civil servants get politically involved (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2008). Ministerial advisers are part of a ministerial department. However, unlike civil servants they are not politically neutral (Van Der Steen, Van Twist, Peeters & De Vries, 2009).

Many countries are raising questions and have concerns due to the growing number and influence of ministerial advisers (OECD, 2010). Issues vary from transparency to integrity and accountability for ministerial advisers. During the past few decades, the general pattern in administrative changes was to move political and administrative controls away from the political centre of government (Peters and Pierre, 2004; Peters, Rhodes and Wright, 2000). The public service is mostly concerned with advising and supporting the minister, while ministerial advisers provide separate political advice. The relationship between civil servants and ministers could be impacted by the introduction of ministerial advisers. Mainly in terms of politicization, ministerial advisers could have an impact on the work of civil servants in relation to the minister.

Van Den Berg and Carroll (2015) examined the role of ministerial advisers and their impact on the senior civil service in the Netherlands. The working relationship was strained as senior civil servants perceived ministerial advisers as a clash with traditional civil service values. However, Van Den Berg and Carroll (2015) found that the senior civil service successfully adapted as ministerial advisers have become institutionalized and the relationship has improved. Working relationships between senior civil servants and ministerial advisers are closer in ministerial departments than they are in executive agencies and regulatory bodies. However, later in time senior civil servants got at the same level of closeness of the relationship as their colleagues in ministerial departments. Eichbaum and Shaw (2007) suggest that ministerial adviser can act as filters between ministers and their civil servants. This implies that the free and frank advice of civil servants is first being filtered by the

(25)

ministerial adviser before it either passes to the minister or it is being ignored. This is the concept of administrative politicization, it restricts ministers’ access to the civil servants and colours their advice. However, there is little empirical evidence that ministerial advisers have an effect on administrative politicization. However, some evidence has been found in Belgium and Denmark (De Visscher and Salomsen, 2013). De Visscher and Salomsen (2013) mainly focus on Public Service Bargains (PBS) between different politico-administrative systems. The study confirms that it is important to spell out the terms of bargain applying to political advisers for ministers, special advisers and senior civil servants (Visscher and Salomsen, 2013). Shaw and Eichbaum (2016) also apply the PBS lens to minister/political relationships.

Eichbaum and Shaw (2010) analysed the impact of ministerial advisers on the relationship between politicians and the bureaucracy. Ministerial advisers are in general very close to their minister. Therefore, they can make an imprint on the policy process themselves (Connaughton, 2010). Maijenburg (2007) addresses the question to what extent ministerial advisers can have influence on their political leader. They aid and advice to a certain extent. This could imply that ministerial advisers have some sort of influence on their minister. However, this depends on the relationship with their political leader, the extent to which a ministerial adviser can make decisions on their own, and in what way the ministerial adviser uses the information that he receives. They are a desirable second opinion for minister. However, as the ministerial advisers are not politically neutral they can also undertake work of a politically partisan nature (Keating, 2003). It is hard to measure the influence of a political advisor on policy processes. Nevertheless, some scholars have tried to make their influence in the policy process visible. A Dutch parliamentary member raised parliamentary question regarding the ministerial adviser of the Prime Minister in 2008 (Rijksoverheid, 2016). Members of the parliament are concerned about how the ministerial adviser of the Prime Minister is being appointed. A ministerial adviser does not have a mandate from the electorate, they are dependent upon their Minister. The political position, the recruitment process and background are issues that parliamentary members have raised in the past. Ministerial advisers are actors serving democratically appointed ministers. In a survey from the OECD, 73% of the respondent countries stated that ministerial advisers are mainly appointed based on personal trust to help Ministers who have full discretionary power (OECD, 2010). The length of the appointment is therefore also linked to the Ministers’ term of office.

(26)

Career trajectories

One of the main questions regarding ministerial advisers is how their function as a ministerial adviser looks like and how it might affect their later career path. Ministers and State Secretaries have the possibility to appoint only one ministerial adviser. If the minister resigns, the ministerial adviser will leave the department as well. Their term of office is tied to term of office of the Minister or Secretary of State who appointed them. There are multiple motivations to appoint a specific adviser. They can be appointed for their policy expertise, political involvement or media experience (OECD, 2011). However, they are primarily appointed on the basis of personal trust. Who ministers will choose as their ministerial adviser depends on many different factors. Ministerial advisers have an important role in the political field. There is no single definition of what ministerial advisers constitute. However, there are some common characteristics in their appointment procedures and the range of functions that they carry out (OECD, 2011).

Scholars give several explanations for the reason why certain people are being appointed as a ministerial adviser. Experts on policy fields of the minister are mostly appointed by Ministers who do not have in-depth knowledge on certain issues. Prime Minister Balkenende needed a ministerial adviser who knows how to assist in media. The case of Jack de Vries illustrates how he executed a specific role during his appointment, and how he continued his career path in the public affairs industry. It is not clear whether there is a pattern between certain types of ministerial advisers and their later career path. There is not one single definition of a ministerial adviser. There are five main reasons to appoint a ministerial adviser. The first reason is the political party of the Minister. Even if Ministers are the executive power, they are still tied to their political party. A ministerial adviser can facilitate the contact between the Minister and the political party of the Minister. Civil servants cannot serve as a link between the political leaders and their political parties. Another reason to appoint ministerial advisers is the complexity of the function of the political leader, ‘loneliness at the top’ and the quality of the organization in the ministerial department.

The tasks that ministerial advisers have to perform can be categorized in five different relationships. Ministerial advisers have to maintain relationships with their political party, with the society, members of the parliament, the ministerial department, and the media. Maijenburg (2007) explicitly emphasizes that political leaders should be more transparent towards civil servants when it comes to the motivation to appoint a ministerial adviser and

(27)

what he expects. This will lead to an improved relationship between civil servants and ministerial advisers. Maley and Van Den Berg (2018) did a comparative analysis on educational and professional background and career trajectories of ministerial staff in the Netherlands and Australia. The Netherlands and Australia have a very different political-administrative tradition. However, both countries are late adopters of the figure of the ministerial advisers. Australia is a majoritarian federal Westminster system and the Netherlands is a more fragmented and consensus-driven political system with a Germanic administrative tradition (Maley and Van Den Berg, 2018). They conclude that the cadres of Dutch and Australian ministerial advisers are quite similar, despite the different contexts. It is remarkable that there is no overall trend as to the ministerial advisers’ career paths after their appointment comes to an end (OECD, 2011). There are several options when their appointment has ended, such as to resume their previous profession, stay in the same position with a new minister, or follow the minister into his/her new position (OECD, 2011). When a minister resigns, the ministerial adviser is allowed to stay in service of the department for six months and perform duties for the ministry (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2013). Experience as a ministerial adviser can be an advantage in securing a higher position than previously held. This is mainly because they had held an influential position, developed networks, and built first-hand knowledge of policies (OECD, 2011). Well-connected individuals are at a significant advantage in professional labour markets (Oyer and Schaeffer, 2010; Singh et al., 2010). Several factors are considered, in order to identify whether there are mechanisms behind ministerial advisers who choose to continue their career path in the public affairs industry. Particularly in the public affairs industry it is highly beneficial if one has acquired a broad network in a specific field.

A plethora of studies has been conducted in the United States when it comes to the public affairs industry. Therefore, the context of the theory is based on the United States and lobbyists in Washington. A number of studies has shown in what way ex-government officials benefit from the personal connections acquired during public service (Vidal et al., 2011). Scholars have not addressed to what extent the public affairs industry in the Netherlands is dominated by the revolving door phenomenon. Some studies illustrate this aspect as the movement of public employees into the lobbying industry. When we look at the United States lobbyist in Washington, a ranking of the top 50 lobbyist is dominated by former members of the federal government (Eisler, 2007). The trend that lobbyist are often former public servants seems to be relatively similar in the Netherlands and the United States.

(28)

The most important question regarding the recruitment of lobbyists is whether issue expertise as an asset is more valuable or whether the connections in the field are the most important aspect in this matter. It is hard for researchers to separate the ‘what you know’ from ‘who you know’. Lobbyists often claim that it is ‘what you know’ not ‘who you know’ that matters. Who you know and what you know can both be crucial factors for private actors to hire a lobbyist. Earlier research has analysed surveys of lobbyists, and it argued that policy and process knowledge is more important than personal connections (Salisbury et al., 1989). However, more recent research shows that lobbyist rely more on personal connections than on policy expertise. Evidence from the USA emphasizes the role of personal connections. The uses of government experience in the public affairs sector is very common (Salisbury et al., 1989). Ex-government officials benefit highly from the personal connections that they have acquired during their public service. In the United States this phenomenon is called the revolving door hypothesis; the ranks of lobbyist are filled by people who have moved to the private sector from positions in government (Salisbury et al., 1989). In a ranking of the 50-top lobbyist in Washington, 34 are identified with federal government experience (Eisler, 2007). Knowing the right people in the administration has proved to be the crucial factor for personnel in the government to move their career towards the public affairs sector in multiple studies. Some scholars even state that ‘Washington is all about connections’ (Vidal et al., 2011). Experience in government allows appointed government officials to develop a network of friends and colleagues during their appointment, which they can later exploit on behalf of their clients. However, lobbyists themselves often put forward that the importance of individuals with prior government experience is due to higher innate ability and human capital accumulation. This would imply that government officials used their natural networking skills during their appointment as a public servant as well. They mainly argue that their earnings reflect their expertise on certain policy issues and the inner workings of government in general. This standard claim of lobbyists themselves does not stand up to formal scrutiny according to Vidal et al. (2011). Vidal et al. (2011) have presented evidence that connections to powerful, serving politicians are key determinants of the revenue that lobbyists in the United States generate. They evaluate the extent to which ex-government officials convert their political contacts into lobbying revenue. The main finding of the study is that connections to powerful, serving politicians are key determinants of the revenue that lobbyist generate. Researchers have problems with separating the effects of ability on lobbyist earnings from those of acquired political connections. Earnings and revenue show the effects of those both factors combined. They address the issue of separating what you know from

(29)

who you know, by looking at the impact of a serving politician’s exit on the lobbying revenues of his or her former staffers. If lobbyist have experience in the office of a US senator and the senator leaves the office, the lobbyist will suffer a 24% drop in generated revenue (Vidal et al., 2011). Personal connections as an asset has a value independent of other attributes such as experience, human capital or general knowledge of how government operates. Another remarkable statement is that being connected to an individual holding political power allows a lobbyist to generate higher revenue. This would imply that individuals who are connected to more powerful politicians are more valuable to lobby offices. These findings tell us that ministerial advisers that have had a chance to expand their network during their appointment, would have better chances of continuing their career path in the public affairs sector. Key determinants of the revenue that lobbyists generate are mainly related to their network in the political field. Experience as a ministerial adviser can be an advantage in securing a higher position than previously held. This is mainly because they had held an influential position, developed networks, and built first-hand knowledge of policies (OECD, 2011).

Bombardini et al. (2011) present evidence that lobbyists often follow politicians they were initially connected to. The political power or rank of the connected government leader matters in terms of access and revenue. Bombardini et al. (2011) argue that the connections of lobbyists matter for their professional activities and particularly for their average revenue. The findings of Vidal et al. (2011) suggest that access to serving officials is a scarce asset that command a premium in the market for lobbying services. One could argue that the higher the stature of the government leader, the more likely it will be that ministerial advisers will continue their career path in the public affairs sector. Relationships and who you know are important factors in continuing a career path in the public affairs industry. Membership of a political party could be a factor. A quid-pro-quo argument would justify connections to a higher number of ministerial advisers who move to the public affairs industry and who are from the same political party. Bombardini et al. (2011) argue that connected lobbyists are paid more on average and it is a scarcer resource than their expertise. Moreover, when the political party of the ministerial adviser is in a position of power there is a so called “political cycle”. There is an increase in returns to lobbyists associated to a party who is in a position of power (Bombardini et al., 2011). Therefore, this thesis will also consider the membership of a political party as a factor that could affect the movement to the public affairs industry. Ministerial advisers have an employment status that differentiates them from public servants.

(30)

A ministerial adviser’s term of employment ends when the minister or the head of government leaves his/her position. After their career as ministerial adviser end, there are several subsequent career paths. They may resume their previous profession, stay in the same position with a new minister, or follow the minister in his / her new position (OECD, 2011). There is no overall trend as to the ministerial advisers’ career paths after their appointment ends. Vidal et al. (2011) have presented evidence that connections to powerful, serving politicians are key determinants of the revenue that lobbyists in the United States generate. Experience as a ministerial adviser may be an advantage to secure a higher position than previously held. 47 percent of responses from ministerial advisers in OECD countries indicate that their experience has helped them in their later career as they had held an influential position, developed networks, and built first-hand knowledge of policies. The length of appointment of a ministerial adviser can have consequences for the network that he/she establishes. They have more time to develop a lucrative network and gain more connections to powerful politicians. The ‘what you know’ can mainly be perceived as the expertise that ministerial advisers have, that is relevant for their ministerial department. The length of appointment will not affect the ‘what you know’. These kinds of ministerial advisers are being hired for their policy expertise. Ministerial advisers that are hired for their coordinative role, generate valuable skills during their appointment. The key determinants of the revenue that lobbyist generate are connected to their network. If ministerial advisers that have been appointed for a longer time than their colleagues might be an indicator for public affairs offices that they have established a large network over the years. If ‘who you know’ is more important than ‘what you know’, the coordinative role that ministerial advisers have becomes more valuable if they are being appointed for a longer time. However, it must be remarked that ministerial advisers might have worked in the public sector prior to their appointment as ministerial adviser. They might have gained personal connections during this time as well. This factor is beyond the scope of the present study. Further research should clarify what kind of professions generate the most beneficial connections.

In general, organizations used to have a rigid hierarchical structure, and operated within a stable environment (Baruch, 2006). However, there has been a transition to dynamic organizations that are in a mode of change. This means that careers have become less predictable, more vulnerable, and multidirectional. Veit et al. (2016) conducted a research on how administrative career patterns can be linked with politicization in Germany. They particularly looked at the careers of top civil servants in Germany. The study showed that

The Revolving Door in The Hague: The Movement of Ministerial Advisers into the Public Affairs Industry