Global Distributive Justice and Reparations: a Means to an End or an End in Itself?

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By Joost J. M. Thuis

S1571729

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for a Masters of Arts in International Relations with a Specialisation

in Global Order in Historical Perspectives

GLOBAL DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

AND REPARATIONS:

A MEANS TO AN END OR

AN END IN ITSELF?

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Abstract:

The aims of this thesis are twofold. First, it provides an overview of accounts of global justice with regard to reparations for historical injustice, particularly slavery and colonialism.

Secondly, it offers critical reflection on the validity of the reasoning provided for those accounts of justice. I will argue that many scholars of global distributive justice view reparations as a means to an end, rather than a moral necessity. Others believe that distributive justice would never be possible without levelling the playing field through

reparations and dealing with a racialized history of slavery and colonialism. However, despite global distributive justice scholars’ neglect of serious engagement with the topic of

reparations, there are still some serious flaws within the field of reparative justice that need to be resolved.

Keywords:

Global justice, Global distributive justice, International Relations, reparations, reparative justice, colonialism, slavery, non-identity,

Acknowledgements:

I would like to thank Dr. Vineet Thakur for helping me in getting a far more concise topic than I originally had and his patient help throughout the process. I would like to thank my parents and family for encouraging me to continue in trying times. A special thanks also goes to my good friends Brandon Marry, Tanguy Babled and James King, for helping me get through this year with yet another thesis.

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Ta-Nehisi Coates recently rekindled the debate on reparations in the US by publishing a history of injustices suffered by African Americans in order to illustrate the long lasting impact and the embeddedness of racism to this day and, therefore, why reparations payments are still highly topical. (Coates, 2014) The reparations debate was not always geared towards paying the victims. Initially, after the abolition of slaverya lot of early discussions on reparations for slavery were focussed on compensating slave owners for the (imminent) loss of “property”. However, there were soon after those who argued for a way for the former slaves to be compensated. Thaddeus Stevens posited a compensation of forty acres and a mule. (Boxill, 2016) James Foreman once famously requested 500 million dollars from white churches and Jewish synagogues for aiding in slavery and discrimination. 15 dollars for every black person. (Boxill, 2016) In recent history there are numerous examples of class action lawsuits against corporations in the US as a means of reparations payment. Lawsuits for colonial crimes are not limited to the US, in 2011 a Dutch court ruled that the Dutch government has to pay reparations for atrocities it committed in 1947. (Van Den Herik, 2012) Similarly, there are Somali groups that intend to sue the Italian state for crimes it committed. (Bufalini, 2017) South Africa also provides for some interesting cases. Communities who were “victims of Apartheid sued multinationals alleged to have profited from investments in pre-1994 South Africa” (Swart, 2015, p.353)

Often these claims are inspired by reparations for the Holocaust that Germany and some German companies had to pay to victims. In fact, in the section of Coates’ argument on reparations specifically, he discusses the Holocaust reparations as well. Although Coates makes a compelling argument for why reparations ought to be paid, he leaves the specifics of these reparations somewhat unclear. Instead, Coates claims that it is almost impossible to quantify

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the harm that was done unto African-Americans. However, he believes “that wrestling publicly with these questions matters as much as—if not more than—the specific answers that might be produced.” (Coates, 2014)

Coates’ symbolic reparations are mirrored in a 2015 debate at the Oxford Union. An Indian MP, Shashi Tharoor, made an impassioned speech in favour of reparations that the UK would have to pay for colonialism in India. The video currently has almost 5 million views. He believes that even 1 pound a year to India would suffice, as long as the British acknowledge their colonial history properly. He claims “the principle is what matters”. Tharoor claims reparations would be “a tool for [the UK] to atone”. (OxfordUnion, 2015) Like Coates, Tharoor believes an admission of wrongdoing and soul-searching among the perpetrating group would already go a long way in reconciling both groups.

Reparations in South Africa during the Truth and Reconciliation process were equally meant to be symbolic reparations and a process of memorialisation. (Naidu, 2012) Although the symbolic reparations are well received when they are done in consultation with the affected, “[f]or many survivors”, Ereshnee Naidu claims, “their survivor status is linked to social and economic marginalization. For survivors, therefore, coming to terms with the past is as much about social reintegration as it is about social justice and poverty alleviation.” (Naidu, 2012, p.271) Thus reparations for some are not only “about the principle”. Rather, due to the severity of the crimes, they have to be accompanied with material reparations.

In the US some claim that affirmative action functions as a form of material reparations. However, affirmative action is understood as diversity policy, not reparations. “In its 1978 ruling in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Court rejected “societal discrimination” as “an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past.”” Believing instead that affirmative action is intended to help institutions reflect the diversity of American society. (Coates, 2014) In fact, the US seems explicitly opposed to

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material reparations for slavery. In recent years many US states and the federal government have signed into law resolutions that express regret for their roles in slavery and Jim Crow. Angelique Davis argues that these symbolic reparations in fact serve to maintain white supremacy. (Davis, 2012) Many of the resolutions by individual states in the US explicitly mention that no rights can be derived from the resolutions to sue for reparations. In fact, “whether or not the word "apology" should be used was debated due to the concern by many lawmakers that these apologies could be used as the basis for reparations claims … Thus, the terminology of "profound regret," "atonement," and other synonyms for apology are found throughout these resolutions.” The federal resolution features a disclaimer to the same effect:

“DISCLAIMER. – Nothing in this resolution – (A) authorizes or supports any claim against the United States; or (B) serves as a settlement of any claim against the United States.” (US Congress, 2009)

Not only could no litigation rights be derived from the resolutions, there were no “concrete remedial measures” implemented after the passing of these documents. (Davis, 2012, p.39) Davis believes that the apologies actually “serve to covertly thwart reparations or other racial justice for black Americans while providing the illusion of substantive racial progress.” (p.43) This problematizes the symbolic reparations significantly and reveals that material reparations are a long way from having been implemented.

A more concrete proposal for reparations to Africa for slavery and colonialism was offered through a document released after the first Abuja Pan-African Conference on Reparations state that debt relief could potentially serve as reparations payment. (Howard-Hassmann, 2004) Wilfred Onyekachi Aniago, similarly, makes the case for reparations through debt cancellation in Nigeria. (Aniago, 2006) There have been previous attempts to promote reparations internationally. The Durban Conference on Racism in 2001 provided an impetus for the issue of reparations. Tom Lantos, a former US Democratic congressman, described the Durban Conference as a failure. Primarily because Islamic states used the conference as a political stage to denounce Israel’s policies as racist. This is turn lead to the US pulling out of

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the conference. (Lantos, 2002) However, others saw it as an interesting start to a conversation about reparations. Inspired by the Durban conference, Ryan Spitzer discusses the possibility for African Reparations through the precedent of Holocaust reparations payments. He illustrates how they took place and provides possibilities for litigating reparations for slavery. However, most of the possible suits he proposes would take place at a US court. (Spitzer, 2002) Michelle Lyons believes that the Durban Conference against Racism showed a renewal in attention to the reparations debate. (Lyons, 2002) The many articles it spawned in the field of International Law seem to strengthen that belief. She, too, focusses on the legal aspect of reparations payments. She sees a great obstacle to litigating reparations payments in that “the defendants frequently "blamed" for slavery – namely the U.S. federal and state governments – are protected by sovereign immunity and the statute of limitations.” (p.1265) Similarly, the Italian state has a legal immunity from human rights abuse claims. (Bufalini, 2017, p.27-28) This brings us to a wider issue in approaching the issue of reparations through an international law lens. Larissa van den Herik claims that “[t]he main historical claims of injustice, intensely debated at the [Durban Conference], in 2001, concern colonialism, slavery, and the slave trade. But these claims concern general practices rather than concrete acts. They are governed by principles of morality but are less easy to frame in legal terms.” (Van Den Herik, 2012, p.697) It thus seems difficult to tackle these broader injustices in the field of International law.

1.2: Research Question

From the few cases and articles I have discusses above, a few shortcomings become clear: A lot of the literature has a heavy legal focus. Focussing on the implications and how best to avoid issues like: statutes of limitations, sovereign immunity and culpability. (Van Den Herik, 2012; Bufalini, 2017; Swart, 2015; Spitzer, 2002) Legal scholars will no doubt debate these issues for decades to come. However, this will not be the focus of this thesis. There are various

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state actions that could be undertaken in recognition of past crimes without international litigation. I will thus avoid the quagmire of international law. However, there are other noticeable trends in the literature. The difficulty to define culpability and victimhood. Another important issue is present in what form reparations should take? Symbolic reparations or a more material approach, some, like Davis, are sceptical of symbolic reparations.

This thesis will compare and contrast the positions on reparations in the field of global justice. The aims of this thesis are twofold. First, it provides an overview of accounts of global justice with regard to reparations for historical injustice, particularly slavery and colonialism. Secondly, it offers critical reflection on the validity of the reasoning provided for those accounts of justice. I will argue that many scholars of global distributive justice view reparations as a means to an end, rather than a moral necessity. While, others believe that distributive justice would never be possible without levelling the playing field through reparations and dealing with a racialized history of slavery and colonialism. I will argue that global distributive justice is difficult to achieve without serious consideration of the second position.

1.3: Chapter scheme

In order to answer the main questions of this thesis I will limit my study of reparations to slavery and colonialism. Although I will sometimes mention the holocaust, this is mostly because of its frequent mention in the literature on reparations. At times the domestic element of slavery in the US and the international element of colonialism will problematize my ability to generalise claims about reparations to both of them. I will discuss this in chapter four.

I will begin this thesis by explaining what global distributive justice is and how it differs from distributive justice. Once this basis has been established we can move into reparative justice more specifically. In this second part of the second chapter I will outline some of the

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main theories of reparations in global distributive justice. Third, I will add a cautionary chapter on Mills’ racial contract and exclusionary universalism. This chapter will serve as a reminder that some of the categories used have not always been, and perhaps still are not, truly universal. The fourth chapter will go deeper into reparative justice and the distinction between backward and forward looking theories of justice. The second last part of this chapter will discuss two important issues for reparative claims to overcome, the non-identity problem and the problem of continuous communities. The penultimate chapter will evaluate all the preceding reparative justice literature and will tentatively show how particular theories of justice will lead to different preference in what form reparations should take. The final chapter will conclude the thesis and offer some suggestions for further research.

Chapter 2: Global Distributive Justice and Reparative Justice

2.1: Distributive Justice

Before addressing the theories of reparative justice it is prudent to first define and explain what the overarching theory entails. Global distributive justice is a derivative of an earlier political theory advanced by John Rawls. He proposed a theory of distributive justice. In order to understand global distributive justice I will first give a brief explanation of Rawls’ distributive justice. (Rawls, 1971) Rawls has two principles of justice that underlie his entire theory:

“(1) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

(2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and

(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”

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These principles are reached by Rawls’ method. He proposes that self-interested, rational individuals should place themselves behind a “veil of ignorance”. This veil makes the individual unaware of what race, gender, class, etc. one would be once the veil was lifted. When designing a just society behind this veil Rawls argues that individuals would, through reason, arrive at the principles outlined above and that would be what he calls the “original position”. These principles would allow for a society wherein everyone would have an equal opportunity to flourish. There would still be different outcomes for individuals, based on their talents. Rawls, believes there should still be incentives for greater achievement, however, the boons of this greater achievement should not impede the equality of opportunity of the next generation. This is why the redistribution element exists.

His theory of justice limits itself to the domestic. However, he has also produced a theory of international justice in a work titled The law of Peoples. In this work he addresses a criticism that was often levelled at his theory: why does an individual’s ethical responsibility end at the border of one’s state, especially when his theory is inspired by principles of individualism and liberalism. Rawls advances a theory for why one has a responsibility towards one’s compatriots, but also a (significantly reduced one) towards individuals outside national borders. Charles Beitz claims that Rawls’ use of international political theory fails to account for one of its fundamental problems: “the norms of international conduct arising from these various political cultures may not coincide.” (Beitz, 2000, p.672) In order to circumvent this issue Rawls devised the following eight principles to produce more peaceful interactions between peoples:

“1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples. 2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.

3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.

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5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense.

6. Peoples are to honor human rights.

7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.

8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just

or decent political and social regime.”

(Beitz, 2000, p.672)

He distinguishes between liberal peoples and decent peoples. Decent peoples are those who do not necessarily adhere to liberal ideals domestically, but who do respect Rawls’ eight principles. These states “[do] not have aggressive aims in foreign policy and respects the independence of other societies. Second, the society has a ‘‘common good conception of justice,’’ in which each person’s interests are taken into account” as well as a respect for Human Rights. (p.674-675) Clearly, Rawls holds that an individual’s ethical duties are decidedly less pressing towards the inhabitants of other states or other “peoples” than they are for fellow nationals. Some, like David Miller, concur with Rawls’ primary obligations to fellow nationals. Miller believes that nationality is an important pillar of personal identity and that it therefore can trump one’s obligations to people farther away. (Miller, 1995) Others like Jeff McMahan argue that, because individuals are in a tighter network of social cooperation with those of the same nation than with others, one has a special obligation towards them. (McMahan, 1997)

2.2: Global Distributive Justice and Cosmopolitanism:

Peter Singer published an article a year after Rawls’. This article can be seen as the genesis of cosmopolitan distributive justice. The article features his famous drowning child thought experiment. Singer’s argument is based on several core assumptions. His first assumption is that “suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.” Secondly, he claims that if one can do something to prevent the aforementioned harm with little or negligible

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harm to themselves, one has a duty to do so. He then claims that proximity should be no issue, as his primary object of concern is not a state or another collective, but rather the individual. He claims that a person being in closer proximity to us makes it more likely that we “shall assist him”, but not that we “ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away.” Lastly, he claims that other people not helping does no reduce our personal moral responsibility. If no one else jumps into the pond to save the child, that does not reduce the personal responsibility to do so oneself. (Singer, 1972, p.231-233) Based on these principles he claims that more affluent individuals should spend as much of their wealth as they can, without harming themselves, in order to help those suffering from the aforementioned conditions.

Singer’s is a utilitarian approach to this issue. However, other cosmopolitan’s try to use Rawls’ own social contractarian theory of distributive justice and its parameters to extend it beyond the nation state in varying degrees. The resulting theory is global distributive justice. As mentioned earlier, there are those who wonder why the ethical responsibility should stop at the national border. This criticism is mostly brought up by Cosmopolitans. Prime examples are Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz and Kok-Chor Tan.

Beitz claims that it is logical for utilitarians to extend individual responsibility beyond state borders. Social contractarians have to provide an account of international duties of justice. (Beitz, 1999, p.127) Beitz and Pogge argue that due to growing global economic interdependence it becomes less and less relevant to discuss economic justice principles merely at the level of “Peoples” or states. One also has a responsibility to others in the international basic structure. Pogge claims “it would seem difficult in a context of tight global interdependence to maintain the sharp distinction between national and international institutions.” (Pogge, 1989, p.257) He claims that “Nationality is just one further deep contingency … one more potential basis of institutional inequalities that are inescapable and

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present from birth.” (p.247) So much like gender, race, class and other identity markers present in Rawls’ social contract theory, nationality ought not, morally, to be determining in one’s wellbeing. Álvaro de Vita similarly holds that there exists and international basic structure. His “case for taking inequality as an issue on the international level already relied on that supposition, that is, there is such a thing as a society's basic structure (in a Rawlsian sense) on the international level and that the distributive effects of such structure need to be addressed by a conception of justice.” (de Vita, 2007, p.121-122)

Thus, much like the original position in Rawls’ domestic ideal would exclude the former factors, so should, internationally, nationality be excluded from preventing one to reach their full individual potential, because the international economic system is so tightly interwoven and co-constitutive. Therefore, the Cosmopolitan original position differs substantially from Rawls’. Kok-Chor Tan defines Cosmopolitanism as follows:

“Cosmopolitanism, as a normative idea, takes the individual to be the ultimate unit of moral concern and to be entitled to equal consideration regardless of nationality and citizenship. From the cosmopolitan perspective,

principles of justice ought to transcend nationality and citizenship, and ought to apply equally to all individuals

of the world as a whole. In short, cosmopolitan justice is justice without borders.”

(Tan, 2004, p.1)

After Pogge and Beitz’s assertions of cosmopolitanism, Tan hopes to deal with the issue of group attachment as expressed, for instance, through nationalism. He noticed that a substantial part of the criticisms on cosmopolitanism focussed on this element. He claims that cosmopolitans have been criticised for “failing to take seriously the ties and commitments of nationalism and patriotism.” (Tan, 2004, p.198) Rawls and Miller’s theory puts more primacy on peoples (or nations/communities/ societies). Tan holds that the choice is not between an unequal world of nations and a cosmopolitan world without national boundaries. The more

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salient choice is between the unfair status quo that allows “only individuals in rich developed nations have the means to exercise self-determination, often at the expense of other nations, and a cosmopolitan order in which members of all nations are able to participate as equals in a global society of nations” (p.199) The real difficulty Tan sees is the actual implementation of this cosmopolitan responsibility of wealthy citizens towards those in worse conditions. Tan believes that extant global institutions can be sufficiently reformed to act as the organisers of global redistributive justice.

Martha Nussbaum, similarly, wants to address global inequalities and the ethical obligations deriving from it. She points to global inequalities expressed in GDP per capita. Despite, this not accounting for the purchasing power in these states, her basic point remains incontrovertible, great Global inequalities exist and this has been growing. (Nussbaum, 2006, p.225) The question then becomes, what to do with that information? Accept it as a fact of life and the mere tragedy of historical forces, or decide that inequalities of this level between the same species are unacceptable. Many global justice scholars argue the latter. Pogge offers a potential solution through his Global Resources Dividend (GRD). This would essentially be a small tax on the sale of resources that would be able to provide a fund for alleviating the harm that the use of these same resources inflicts on the global poor. (Pogge, 2002, p.203-207) This is partially inspired by Beitz’s notion that resources are placed morally arbitrarily around the globe and that no one state should have complete ownership of that. (Beitz, 1999, p.140-142) Thus the main differences between Rawls’ nationalist and the other Cosmopolitan approach to Global Distributive Justice are that Rawls holds that certain states are burdened states and are not well ordered enough for the well-ordered societies to have any parity with. The latter states have a “duty of assistance”, but a limited one. Burdened states need only be helped with the preventing of human rights abuses, but it is not incumbent on the wealthier states to help the burdened states reach a particular economic position, because they would

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require the right political culture first before any effective redistribution could take place. (Rawls, 1999, p.108) The Cosmopolitans argue that the global basic structure and increasing globalisation and interdependence problematize the assumption of autonomous, isolated states in an International system. Thus, Rawls’ claim that different societies do not have the same responsibilities to non-citizens as they do to fellow citizens is not uncontroversial. (Goodwin et al, 2007, p.221)

Simon Caney perhaps summarises the different approaches the best. He introduces three accounts of duties: the nationalist, institutional and interactional account. The first essentially holds that one has the duty to uphold the human rights of conationals, the Miller approach. The second believes that one has the duty to those that one is involved in an “institutional scheme” with. The interactional “maintains that the duty to ensure that a person's human right not to suffer from poverty is met falls on all other persons who can help”. (Caney, 2007, p.278) The last one is clearly more in line with what Singer proposes, the combination of the second and the last fits Beitz and Pogge’s account. In summary, while Rawls operates in a framework of international justice, cosmopolitans are better described as working on global justice, unconstrained – or at least less constrained – by national borders and states than Rawls is.

Associative duties beyond the borders:

Even if one does not subscribe to the cosmopolitan accounts of global distributive justice or the utilitarian one, there are still arguments one can make for distributive duties of colonial powers to their former colonies. Lea Ypi, Robert Goodin and Barry Christian produced such an argument. They claim that, considering these colonies were (unwillingly) associated with their mother states, do not the inhabitants of those states have distributive obligations towards their new (unwilling) compatriots? And when they have not fulfilled these distributive duties,

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do they not owe them these still? Those workers in the colonies have laboured for the wealth of the collective and are in some sense part of the same basic structure. They argue that the colonisers have new associative duties towards these people. (Ypi et al, 2009, p.104-105) Associative duties were usually used by nationalists as an argument against cosmopolitans, claiming that one has a duty only to those who one shares a basic structure with. However, if one extends this basic structure to the rest of the empire, these associative duties extend along with this new basic structure, to include the colonies.

Thus the imperial project forces former colonisers “to accept that special associative duties of robust distributive justice extend far more widely than they previously supposed: to everyone in one's colonies, ex-colonies, and, indeed, fellow colonies and fellow ex-colonies.” Ypi continues: “That does not give robust distributive justice quite the global scope that cosmopolitans would wish, but it extends its scope well beyond current state borders within which anticosmopolitan advocates of associative duties had hoped to confine it.” (p.135) Ypi claims that this will not quite cover the globe like cosmopolitans would hope, but if one considers the globalising forces of international trade and finance, perhaps our global associative duties become truly incontrovertible. It is clear that Rawls’ distributive justice can be extended beyond state borders in a number of ways: The simple moral claim that we owe to our fellow human beings at least a basic fulfilment of human rights; the claim that the global community is economically very tightly interwoven and that this creates a global basic structure. Which imposes similar, if less powerful, duties that a national basic structure would; and the colonial associative duties account listed above.

2.3: Reparative Justice

Now that we have established the basics of global distributive justice it is prudent to clarify the specific literature on reparations in the same field. This chapter will discuss the different types

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of reparative justice that exist in the literature and, at the end of the chapter, to what extent these overlap and differ. The problem with many of these theories is that the scholars who use them tend to term their theories almost interchangeably. Only rectificatory justice seems somewhat free of arbitrariness in terminology. All these theories fall under – what I shall term for ease – the wider field of reparative justice. De Vita offers a reason why some global distributive justice scholars prefer distributive justice over reparative justice. He claims the latter theory “loses its strength as time passes – as those people directly involved in the circumstances of exploitation, or their immediate descendants, have disappeared long ago.”(de Vita, 2007, p.122) Let’s discuss reparative justice to see whether or not this is true.

Rectificatory Justice:

Göran Collste argues for a rectificatory global justice (Collste, 2010) Rectificatory justice is not unrelated to global distributive justice. In fact, Collste believes the theory “is complementary to a theory of global distributive justice and enables us to develop a fuller understanding of the meaning of global justice.” (p.85) However, rectificatory justice does differ from global distributive justice. Mainly, because the grounds upon which Collste’s theory of justice is based are different to the ones presented by global distributive justice. Rectificatory justice asserts a historical basis for distributive justice and in this case colonialism. Historical injustice serves as the reason for redistribution, rather than one’s distributive duties due to a global social contract.

Scholars in rectificatory justice usually cite Aristotle and Nozick to support their theory. As both of these philosophers have a theory of rectifying injustice. Sometimes they also include Locke, but considering Nozick expands on Locke they primarily focus on Nozick. (Aniago, 2006, p.38-39; Sigurthorsson, 2006, p.31-38; Collste, 2010, p.86) They apply these accounts of redress to historical injustice, colonialism especially. Wilfred Aniago takes the specific case

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of debt cancellation in Nigeria, David Sigurthorsson and Collste argue for the wider use of rectificatory justice.

Nozick’s entitlement theory’s third principle is a principle of rectification of injustice in either transfer or acquisition of a holding or property. In an ideal World this third principle would not be necessary, because there would be no unjust acquisition or transfer of property and thus no need to rectify the situation.

Collste and Sigurthorsson both hold that the reparation claims can be trans-generational, because one can clearly identify beneficiaries and victims. (Collste, 2010, p.85; Sigurthorsson, 2006, p.36-37) They implicitly use the beneficiary pays principle to identify those who owe and those who are owed reparations. (Huseby, 2016) This implicitly challenges de Vita’s reason to avoid reparative justice, as rectificatory justice allows for trans-generational identifying of those who benefitted and suffered from colonialism and subsequently pay or receive.

Sigurthorsson’s conception of rectificatory justice is distinctly material. He argues that ““Rectification”, in the ensuing discussion, shall therefore be understood as referring to monetary compensation and, to the extent applicable, restoration of property rights.” (Sigurthorsson, 2006, p.28) He is somewhat sceptical of how some commentators prefer healing of the relationship between communities, claiming: “[o]ne cannot, for example, eat “sacred bonds”.” (p.28) Much like Naidu and Davis claimed earlier, Collste also believes that “reconciliation without rectification is empty.” (Collste, 2010, p.97)

Corrective and Compensatory Justice:

Corrective and compensatory justice are quite similar to rectificatory justice. However, the style of argument is slightly different. A prominent member of this approach is Daniel Butt. He uses James Nickel’s maxim for compensatory justice as guiding in his argument:

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“Compensatory justice requires that counter-balancing benefits be provided to those individuals who have been wrongfully injured which will serve to bring them up to the level of wealth and welfare that they would now have if they had not been disadvantaged.” (Nickel, 1975, p.537)

This principle leads to Butt’s counterfactual argument. Butt acknowledges in an article that in order for corrective justice to work, one needs to create a counterfactual with reference to which one could compensate those who suffered from colonialism. (Butt, 2007) Butt’s counterfactual is raised in opposition to the “status quo ante”. The status quo ante would leave victims of colonialism essentially in a worse state than they are in now, as there has been significant technological progress that people world-wide have benefited from to varying extents that was absent during colonialism. Butt claims that his counterfactual is a more just ideal to compare to. Thus he applies compensatory justice to this ideal. In this way the compensation should not be made with reference to a historical point, but with reference to his counterfactual’s outcome. He presents a counterfactual World where “relations between different communities took place in a context characterized by an absence of domination and exploitation.” (Butt, 2012, p.227)

He asserts that in order for reparations to be justified one must compare it to an ideal context where the injustice would not have occurred. Only then can one impose “rectificatory obligations” on the perpetrator. (p.239) Butt admits it is difficult to prescribe what that obligation looks like, but he claims that the advantaged party has a duty to a long-term commitment to rectify both the initial wrongdoing and the injustice of their disinclination to solve their debt earlier. The latter of the two is an important element in the reparations debate. I will discuss this counterfactual further in the chapter on forward and backward looking accounts of justice.

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Cohen argues for a semi-independent theory of corrective justice. He holds that corrective justice can operate independently of distributive justice in the field of apologies. He claims that in this area distributive justice cannot fully account for reparations, as it is too preoccupied with material distribution and its justification in global distribution rather than a historical moral obligation of setting relations right again. (Cohen, 2016) Corrective justice can transcend the distributive element, exactly because it is defined with regards to historical injustice. Cohen claims “[c]orrective justice sometimes picks out a domain of justice that is not distributive.” (p.676)

Restorative Justice:

Restorative justice is focussed more on post-conflict transitional justice, but does have relevant insights to older injustices. Margaret Walker proposes “that we understand “restoration” in all contexts as normative: “restoration” refers to repairs that move relationships in the direction of becoming morally adequate, without assuming a morally adequate status quo ante.” (Walker, 2006, p.384) To some extent this is in line with Butt’s counterfactual. He also proposes to compare the current situation with one which would have exhibited moral relations between states and not the status quo before colonialism. However, Walker claims she goes beyond corrective justice when she proposes that certain extreme injustice are not compensable materially. These include: “the murder of a loved one or the expropriation of a people’s land and destruction of their language and culture due to genocidal practices of colonization”. (p.384) Furthermore, she explicitly hopes to avoid counterfactuals. She claims that the “obscurity” of the counterfactual renders them ineffective and they tend to focus too much on material reparations. Walker believes that besides the material compensation reparations should also take the form of reconciliation through dialogue and a verbal confrontation between

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victim and perpetrator. This is perhaps where we can notice the problem when applying this to an injustice like slavery or colonialism.

Restorative justice is also less concerned with identifying perpetrators than repairing relations between the affected communities. It proposes “fostering a full exploration of the nature and impact of the wrong and of the rupture in relationship that explains it or results from it.” (p.386) This way people will be able to air their grievances and try to heal the divide that way. She seems to agree somewhat with Coates who claimed “that wrestling publicly with these questions matters as much as—if not more than—the specific answers that might be produced.” (Coates, 2014) Walker also claims that restorative justice is more open to the community aspect of injustice this way. Walker seems to anticipate a later development in reparative justice, epistemic justice. Miranda Fricker distinguishes between distributive epistemic justice and discriminatory epistemic injustice. The latter she further subdivides into testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. The former “happens when a speaker receives a deficit of credibility owing to the operation of prejudice in the hearer’s judgement.” The latter “occurs at a stage prior to communicative activity, though it will only surface in a certain kind of failed or semi-failed attempt to render an experience intelligible, either to oneself or communicatively to another.” (Fricker, 2013, p.1318-1320) I shall discuss epistemic justice in greater detail in chapter five and will mention it in relation to the racial contract in the next chapter.

Differences and similarities:

Corrective justice and Rectificatory Justice seem rather similar. Although Cohen focusses on apologies and Aniago and Sigurthorsson are more explicitly engaging in a debate on material reparations. Compensatory justice differs from the former two as it uses a counterfactual rather than a Nozickean, Lockean or Aristotelian notion of rectification. This counterfactual then serves as a reference point. Although this difference is not as pronounced, considering that the

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counterfactual merely serves as a device to illustrate the injustice. The rectificatory argument is rather similar. Both Rectificatory and compensatory justice rely on the beneficiary pays principle in assigning the roles of beneficiary and victim of colonialism.

A noticeable issue in Butt’s work is that he uses compensatory and corrective justice interchangeably, making it difficult to discern whether or not these are distinct theories of reparative justice. However, he is not the only one who muddies the terminology. Collste, on numerous occasions seems to imply that rectificatory justice is a part of corrective justice. Which begs the question whether the introduction of his own term is necessary.

Cohen and Walker seem to share the commitment to moving beyond material reparations. Cohen seems to argue that corrective justice can transcend mere distributive justice, because it can factor in immaterial reparations like apologies. (Cohen, 2016, p.676) However, Walker accuses corrective justice of the same deficiency. Walker claims: “A corrective justice framework tends to make compensation—making good a victim’s loss— central, with pressures toward defining a metric of loss and, ideally, compensation in some proportion to loss.” (Walker, 2006, p.384) It seems they both agree that, for reparations to work, reparations beyond the material ought to be considered and utilised. We will get to the discussion of what reparations should look like in chapter five, however, this does show that the field suffers from its own lack of terminological clarity.

Walker’s emphasis on immaterial restoration through dialogue is in stark contrast with Sigurthorsson’s material conception of reparations. He echoes Naidu’s claim that it is not merely about the principle. This is understandable considering that what is at stake is not always an animosity between communities, but also the ability to fulfil the primary functions of life: nutrition, housing and health. It would be unfair to say that Walker is not concerned with that, however, there is a discernible difference in focus between the two.

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Restorative justice is most distinct from the other theories with a focus on repairing beyond material reparations. Walker does not merely state that it should go beyond material compensation, but actually proposes viable paths forward in engaging victim and perpetrator communities in dialogue. However, there are some serious questions to what extent this is feasible with larger and older injustices such as colonialism and slavery. She falls within forward looking accounts of reparations, whereas the other theories are backwards looking accounts of justice. We will discuss this difference at length in the fourth chapter.

I want to add one note on the use of Nozick’s entitlement theory. Nozick is often invoked in terms of restitution, etc. He might be useful in getting reparations, but he is fundamentally opposed to redistributive efforts, so it is a somewhat selective use of his theory. Which, when applied elsewhere, would render one unable to advocate for global distributive justice. The theorists often base their claims for rectification on his entitlement theory. (Nozick, 1974, p.151) However, this entitlement theory also serves as his attack on taxation, as this is an involuntary transfer of property. Thus, one should be careful in selectively using Nozick’s theory, when simultaneously proposing large scale taxation programmes for helping the global poor. In the case of rectification, compensation and correction this theory might hold. Yet, if one also holds those to be part of global distributive justice it would be prudent to use a different authority for rectifying an injustice. Nevertheless, Sigurthorsson does provide a powerful libertarian justification for reparations, which certainly strengthens the case for reparations overall.

Conclusion:

A significant issue in this literature is the lack of a common nomenclature, which makes it difficult to understand when scholars are discussing similar issues. Subtle differences are important, of course, a complicated issue like reparations deserves detailed and nuanced

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language. However, it seems that many of these scholars share a goal that becomes further and further obscured by meta discussions on the justifications for those reparations. The differences between these schools of reparative justice are relatively minor and they seem to accuse one another of lacking the same elements. In chapter 4 I will discuss more powerful differences.

Chapter 3: Exclusionary Universalism

As explored in the literature review, global distributive justice relies on a universalism that undergirds its claim that there is an ethical obligation among the wealthy (or wealthy states) towards the poor (or poor states). However, this universalism has, historically, not been truly universal. This chapter will discuss the historically false neutrality and the exclusionary nature of universalism. It will survey some of the literature on philosophy’s, and especially social contract theorists’, role in legitimising past injustices. This chapter is intended to remind scholars on justice that we ought to be trying to include those who have traditionally not been included in universality. The chapter will first discuss Charles Mills’ ‘Racial Contract’ as a theoretical framework through which to counter the social contract. Secondly, I will discuss the role of social contract theory in IR and how the exclusionary universality in the former manifests itself in the latter. This chapter will finish with a brief discussion of the field of global distributive justice and the ignorance on race as a category.

Any discussion on reparations for colonialism and slavery would be incomplete without acknowledging the strong racial element of colonialism and slavery and how this came to be a factor, in part, due to the philosophical underpinnings of modernity/enlightenment thought. Perhaps one of the most powerful accounts of how race came to be a prominent feature in the World is Charles Mills’ Racial Contract. Considering this thesis mainly focuses on reparations for slavery and colonialism, which occurred and was legitimised heavily on racial lines, Mills’

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Racial contract is an indispensable part of the discussion. Mills wrote the ‘Racial Contract’ in 1997. It has since informed a lot of critical reflection on race in the social sciences and political philosophy.1 In this book he posits that, rather than modern Western society being based on a social contract, it is in fact based on a racial contract. He was inspired by Carole Pateman’s ‘the Sexual Contract’, which criticised Rawls’ and other social contractarians for ignoring gender as an important factor society. (Pateman, 1988; Mills, 2013, p.71) Distributive justice and global distributive justice is heavily influenced by social contract theory, in fact Rawls’ original work aimed to create a whole new liberal social contract. (Rawls, 1971) Thus, I would be remiss not to mention Mills’ theory in a discussion of reparations for slavery and distributive justice.

3.1: Mills “The Racial Contract”

Charles Mills held that, in contrast to the central concept in political philosophy, the social contract, there actually existed a ‘racial contract’. He claims that social contract theory has long given up the pretence that it is a historical fact. The Racial Contract, however, is a descriptive account of history. (Mills, 1999, p.19) Mills’ homonymous book rests on three central claims: “the existential claim - white supremacy, both local and global, exists and has existed for many years; the conceptual claim - white supremacy should be thought of as itself a political system; the methodological claim - as a political system, white supremacy can illuminatingly be theorized as based on a "contract" between whites, a Racial Contract.” (, p.7) I will attempt to explain what he means with his racial contract and, afterward, how we should best understand his message when looking at literature in IR and Global Distributive Justice.

1_{Although, Mills, himself, has expressed frustration over the lack of influence his theory has had in political}

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The first claim impresses on the reader the reality of the racial contract as opposed to the social contract. In the first part of his book he focuses on proving the existence of the racial contract. He does this through a historical exploration of race and colonialism. During the Spanish colonisation of America religion served as a basis for exploitation. However, Mills claims that instead of religion, race became the marker of differentiation and the legitimation of subpersonhood and thus exploitation. The obvious benefit of race over religion being that religion could easily “be overcome through conversion”. (p.23)

Mills describes the racial contract as essentially ensuring that “nonwhite subpersonhood

is enshrined simultaneously with white personhood.” (p.56, emphasis in original) Thus,

whiteness is defined in the absence of whiteness in others, which in turn confers unto some “personhood” and unto others “subpersonhood”. Part of his existential claim is not only explaining what the racial contract is, but also that it has historically existed and been created. According to the racial contract only those with personhood were rational and human. The founding documents of the US follow this logic, as they are explicitly racist. For example, the US constitution initially bestowed blacks with “three fifths” of personhood and Native Americans were characterised in the declaration of independence as “merciless Indian Savages,” (p.28) After Bacon’s rebellion in 1676, constitutions and legal documents explicitly differentiated between races and set them against each other in order to prevent future worker revolts. (Pithouse, 2016) (Tatum, 2017) This lends credence to Mills’ notion of the imposed nature of race as an identity marker and its creation of a “Herrenvolk” and “Untermenschen”. The conceptual claim essentially is that the racial contract should be conceived of as “itself a political system.” The social contract is inherently political and moral, however also economic. Locke maintains that entering into a state is mainly for protecting property rights and thus ensuring man’s industry. Human equality is “supposed to carry over into the economy

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of the created sociopolitical order”. The Racial Contract is explicitly economic in nature, its main purpose being the exploitation of nonwhites. (Mills, 1999, p.31-32) The methodological Mills’ last claim is the methodological claim. He believes that “we live in a world which has

been foundationally shaped for the past five hundred years by the realities of European domination and the gradual consolidation of global white supremacy. Thus not only is the

Racial Contract "real," but … the Racial Contract is global, involving a tectonic shift of the ethicojuridical basis of the planet as a whole, the division of the world, as Jean-Paul Sartre put it long ago, between "men" and "natives, "” (p.20, emphasis in original) Mills shows that the racial contract is a global understanding among whites as opposed to the conventional social contract, which limits itself to the formation of a nation state. Mills claims that the “Racial Contract is thus the truth of the social contract.” (p.64) The social contract provides a fiction of how states came into being through a covenant between consenting individuals. Whereas the racial contract provides a more accurate account of white societies being built on the exploitation of non-whites and that this has historically been legally codified.

3.2: Epistemology of ignorance

Another important element of the racial contract is “”an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made.” (p.18) This can clearly be seen in the social contract theories devised by Europeans, as these offer a deracialised view of society. Thereby whitewashing their own history of exploitation. This carries through to into modern social contract theories. Mills claims that it is obvious that the world is built on the Racial Contract. However, “whites don't think about it or don't think about it as the outcome of a history of political oppression but rather as just "the way things are."” (p.30) Many political

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theorists will denounce past historical oppression, but do not acknowledge how elements of that oppression might still exist in political theory.

I briefly discussed epistemology of ignorance earlier in my explanation of reparative justice. Margaret Urban Walker used the epistemology of ignorance in her account of restorative justice. She claims that one of the reasons why there needs to be a dialogue between victims and perpetrators in the US case is exactly because white people are inculcated with an ignorance of their own role in prolonging racial injustice. Only by getting these two communities into contact and sharing experiences can this ignorance be overcome. (Walker, 2006, p.388) This thesis will also discuss epistemic justice. The “epistemology of ignorance” on the part of whites with regard to issues of race is exactly one of the factors for the need for epistemic justice. The fifth chapter will discuss this issue further, at which point I will bring up “epistemology of ignorance” again. Mills has since expanded on the Racial Contract, but for the purposes of this thesis his challenge to the supposed universality of social contract theory has been sufficiently established.2

3.3: The Social Contract and International Relations

A good way to illustrate Mills’ racial contract at work in academia is to explore Errol Henderson’s article on social contract theory concepts used in IR. IR uses concepts from social contract theory to explain relations between states. Errol Henderson argues that social contract theory is deeply embedded in the field of International Relations and that the flaws inherent in the theory are expressed in IR theorising. He argues that the “conceptualization of anarchy in IR theory derives from the insights of social contract theorists such as Hobbes, Locke,

2_{In 2013 Mills proposed a domination contract. This contract includes gender and class alongside} race in the understanding of the social contract. Like the racial contract it is a non-ideal theory and serves as a framework through which to interpret the constitution of current society. (Mills, 2013)

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Rousseau and Kant”. (Henderson, 2013, p.79) Anarchy and the state of nature are indispensable parts of social contract theory, as they provide the opposite to organised society. If the state of nature, or anarchy, is preferable to a current government then people have a right to resist that government and step back into the state of nature. Henderson argues that these fundamental elements to mainstream IR theory are racist and continue white supremacist notions in IR.

Henderson employs Mills’ work to systematically voice his objections to this fundamental element to IR theory and the way it functioned to exclude peoples from the society of states and put them under the tutelage of ‘civilised states’. He explains that Hobbes seems to indicate that native Americans are currently living in a state of nature, but that it is doubtful whether Europeans ever did. Thus, the state of nature is “hypothetical” for whites, but for non-whites the state of nature is “literal”. Henderson claims that “[h]erein lays the dualism that Mills argues inheres in social contract theses: there is one set of assumptions for whites and another for nonwhites.” (Henderson, 2013, p.80) Like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant also present the state of nature in ways that make whites into humans and non-whites subhuman. Locke does so by presenting “the new world” as an uninhabited space ripe for European exploitation, Rousseau by creating an image of “the noble savage”. (Henderson, 2013) Kant is even more explicit in his racist categorisation.

With regard to Kant, Mills claims: “But the embarrassing fact for the White West (which doubtless explains its concealment) is that their most important moral theorist of the past three hundred years is also the foundational theorist in the modem period of the division between Herrenvolk and Untermenschen, persons and subpersons, upon which Nazi theory would later draw.” (Mills, 1999, p.72) Mills claims that Kant is one of the most important European moral theorists. Mvuselelo Ngcoya, similarly, holds that Kant’s influence in IR is significant. Cosmopolitan and Liberal IR derive many of their concepts from him. Perpetual

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peace, for instance, manifests itself as democratic peace theory in liberal IR today. (Ngcoya, 2015, p.249-250) Mills also claims that Kant inspired race theory “upon which Nazi theory would later draw” Stella Sandford argues that Kantian natural history delineates distinct races. She is apprehensive of claiming that this has a significant impact on Kant’s theories, but Sandford does point to several areas in which Kant’s claims to universality become problematic. (Sandford, 2018) Naomi Zack also explains that Kant believed there were 4 distinct races. Zack observes a circular argument present in Kant’s concept of race. Kant’s evidence for the existence of race is contingent on the phenomenon of “hybridity” between races. However, the concept of hybridity is dependent on the existence of race in the first place. Thus, how can hybridity be evidence of a category that sustains the notion of hybridity in the first place? (Zack, 2006, p.243-244)

Mills recognises a similar cyclical argument in race theory: “You are what you are in part because you originate from a certain kind of space, and that space has those properties in part because it is inhabited by creatures like yourself.” (Mills, 1999, p.42) Thus, “savages” inhabit a wilderness which reinforces their uncivilised state, which in turn maintains an enduring wilderness. This explains the reasoning among certain European enlightenment scholars that an outside force should break this cycle. Perhaps a good example of how this thought permeated into the social sciences can be perceived in Henderson’s article. He claims that the use of these philosophies and racist categorisations – derived from colonialist anthropology – ultimately do translate into International Relations. Henderson uses Samson’s work on Waltz and Wendt. He “notes that, ‘[a]t first glance, one might find it ironic that a theory “necessarily based on the great powers” and “states that make the most difference” owes its existence to anthropological fieldwork in Africa’” (Henderson, 2013, p.86) He continues: “Beyond irony, ‘Waltz’s appropriation of a theory originally intended to help colonial administrators control primitive African societies produces an image of international politics

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that privileges power over progress, equilibrium over change, and preventative measures over curative ones’” (p.87)

Henderson claims that this colonial administrator approach to international relations, revived by Neorealists in IR, is subsequently taken over by other main theories of IR like liberalism and Wendt’s constructivism. Liberalists do not dispute anarchy, but rather present a more cooperative version of it, much like Locke’s state of nature. Wendt, with his famous claim “anarchy is what states make of it”, leaves this notion of anarchy intact, but allows for more agency on the part of states in determining the outlines of it. (p.88) As Ngcoya argued already, Kant is one of the main inspirations for Cosmopolitanism, to what extent is universalism influenced by his race theory? He claims that for cosmopolitan theory to be redeemed from this history of exclusionary universality it needs to re-evaluate itself. He believes “Cosmopolitan thought needs to similarly give a brick-by-brick account of the origins of its building blocks. It is difficult to see how the cosmopolitan construction of global justice, equality, and perpetual peace can possibly take place without “clearing up the encumbrances of the past”” (Ngcoya, 2015, p.252) We can clearly see that racist elements of social contract theory continue to impede IR. Let us now discuss to what extent this still inheres the field of Global Distributive Justice.

3.4: Global Distributive Justice

Many of the (cosmopolitan) authors on global distributive justice, whom I will discuss in this thesis, fail to mention or discuss the racial elements in Kant’s writing, while Kant himself is mentioned quite frequently. (Tan, 2006; Pogge, 2007; de Vita, 2007; Beitz, 1999; Nussbaum, 2006) Some scholar argue that, like in IR, there is a serious problem of omission in global distributive justice. Somewhat akin to what Mills called the “epistemology of ignorance”. There are global distributive justice scholars who already argue the danger of not

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acknowledging the root of, or at least a major factor contributing to global poverty. April Shaw argues that Pogge is an example of a theorist on global distributive justice who, through omission of gender and race, reinforces the false neutrality of the theory. (Shaw, 2010)

Shaw’s central claim is that Pogge’s work suffers from “descriptive inaccuracy”, which in turn “suggests an inaccurate analysis, namely, that global economic institutions are free of gender and race bias and that national factors are to blame for the fact women and people of color happen to be severely poor, even as global economic institutions are in part responsible for severe poverty.” (p.3) Like Carole Pateman’s critique of Rawls’ institution of the family and gender amnesia, Shaw criticises Pogge’s Global Resources Dividend. She holds that the GDR does not challenge the status quo on race and gender relations and will therefore, most likely, maintain them. (p.3) Shaw claims that Pogge does not take seriously issues of race and gender, because they are held to be included within his universality. As if by acknowledging these things as problems they are solved.

Even a scholar like Martha Nussbaum – who wants to expand issues of justice beyond humanity – does not use Mills’ racial contract in her considerations on justice and the social contract. (Nussbaum, 2006) Despite his book having been around for nine years before the publishing of her own book. Not only does she not discuss Mills’ Racial Contract, race, as a consideration in justice, is only ever mentioned in passing with other categories such as “inequalities of wealth, class, and status”. (p.92) At some points in Nussbaum’s book, she implies that oppression on the basis of race has already been widely disavowed, whereas discrimination on the basis of sex is regarded as merely “a legitimate expression of cultural difference.” (p.260) With regards to gender Mills claims that replacing the occasional ‘he’ and ‘him’ with ‘she’ and ‘her’, does not sufficiently deal with gender inequality. Similarly, naming race as just one of the identity markers of oppression while “continuing basically as before” does not adequately deal with race in global justice. (Mills, 2013, p.72) Thus, those scholars

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who seem to think they have adequately dealt with the issue of race if they simply claim that it is not a valid basis for discriminating between people, need to revaluate what impact their theories truly have on racial inequalities.

One explanation for the lack of consideration of race offered is the lack of black philosophers. Stephen Steinberg claims that “today only 1 per cent of American philosophers are black, and only about thirty of these are women.” (Steinberg, 2018, p.544) If a majority of white scholars do indeed suffer from an epistemology of ignorance, then the lack of voices discussing race in philosophy could be a contributing factor. Despite race no longer being a scientifically valid concept of categorising human beings, it continues to be employed explicitly and covertly as a means of categorising people socially. Race is viewed by many as a socially constructed category. In theorising on issues of race it is important not to reaffirm the concept, but rather to acknowledge that some consider it a valid factor in their considerations and that, however unscientific the category might be, it still affects the World socially.

Conclusion:

Race should not feature merely as an encore, but rather should be seriously considered as having had a significant role in the current global order. I have attempted to show in this chapter that Universalism has not always been truly universal. It is important to be wary of who is actually included in philosophers’ universalist theories. Oft cited philosophers, like Kant and Locke, had a very racialized vision of the world. It is important then to re-evaluate the concepts they propose that might further that worldview, like Anarchy and Democratic Peace Theory in IR. Especially with regard to reparations it is important to realise the basis of the injustice that needs to be rectified. Slavery and colonialism should not be considered “just the way things

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are”, but rather a historical injustice that philosophy needs to come to terms with their involvement with.

When discussing the role of reparations in global distributive justice later on in this thesis it is important to be knowledgeable of the history of universalism which undergirds the theory. This chapter, while slightly diverging from the topic of reparations, gives an insight into the logic that undergirded the crimes that the reparations I discuss are meant to correct. Abstract equality is not necessarily true equality and can in fact obscure inequalities. Angelique Davis’ article on official apologies for slavery showed how this functions. (Davis, 2012) However, Nussbaum posits that certain groups are still unjustly excluded from the universality of justice, animals and the disabled, for instance.

Chapter 4: Backward and Forward Looking Accounts of Justice

The aim of this thesis is to carefully consider the different positions on reparations in the field of global justice. The past few chapters have established global distributive justice as a field, but have also provided us with a cautionary tale of universality in the field of global justice that one should continue to heed while exploring the rest of this thesis. This chapter will outline backward and forward looking accounts of justice and reparations. Within these two approaches there are various strands that conflict with one another. Central to forward and backward looking accounts of justice are the role of a counterfactual and the non-identity issue. Leif Wenar issued a challenge, of sorts, to other scholars in 2006. He claimed that backward-looking accounts of justice, despite having an “intuitive plausibility” inherently could not provide adequate accounts of justice because of non-identity and other issues. (Wenar, 2006, p.396) The backward looking accounts of justice try to deflect this critique. Considering the

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centrality of this topic to reparations let us start with Wenar’s account of why only forward-looking accounts of justice can truly provide theoretical ground for reparations.

4.1: Forward looking:

Forward looking accounts of justice can perhaps best be summarised into a short question. This question is: ‘what is necessary?’ Forward looking accounts of justice do not use historical injustice as justification for reparations or distributive justice, but rather the same logic as global distributive justice. Most global distributive justice scholars would fit into this category or in neither. Wenar supports forward looking accounts of reparations. One of the main reasons Wenar prefers forward looking accounts of justice is because there are fundamental flaws in backward looking accounts of justice. He claims that due to the limited principle if former colonies were on average better off than the colonisers, would there still be a call for reparations? He believes the answer is no. Within a global distributive justice perspective it would not make sense to transfer wealth from those less well-off to those better-off. He claims that this shows that a more logical approach would be to look to the future. To look at what possible ways there are to diminish or eradicate inequity? (Wenar, 2006, p.402-403)

One of the examples Wenar names is Kok-Chor Tan. He claims that Tan uses reparations as an instrument to achieving distributive justice. Reparations for injustice are more powerful in motivating individuals to action than “positive duties of justice to assist strangers”, claims Tan. (p.402) Cohen, similarly, identifies Tan as using reparations as a rhetorical advantage in obtaining distributive justice, as opposed to an end in itself. (Cohen, 2016) Tan himself admits that reparations arguments can supplement or augment global distributive justice ones. (Tan, 2007) Thus reparations is a tool through which to achieve global distributive justice. Thus, reparations have no true organising potential on their own other than appealing to people’s “intuitive” morality. The true, overarching aim is always global distributive justice.