• No results found

Conflict framing is not to blame : the influence of conflict framing on dimensions of EU attitudes

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "Conflict framing is not to blame : the influence of conflict framing on dimensions of EU attitudes"

Copied!
37
0
0

Bezig met laden.... (Bekijk nu de volledige tekst)

Hele tekst

(1)

Conflict Framing is not to Blame

The influence of conflict framing on dimensions of EU attitudes

Felicitas van Alphen (10408673) Master’s Thesis

Graduate School of Communication

Master’s programme Communication Science Supervisor: dr. Mark Boukes

(2)

Abstract

The goal of this study was to formulate an answer to the question whether conflict framing has an influence on the growing euroscepticism in the Netherlands. This study directed its attention at three underlying EU attitude dimensions, namely performance, negative affection, and utilitarianism, because this provides more insight than focusing on the one-dimensional umbrella term euroscepticism. Political sophistication and conflict avoidance were taken into account as potential moderators of conflict framing effects. An experiment has been

conducted with 130 Dutch participants between the age of 18 and 33, who all read an article of the news website NU.nl with either no frame or a conflict frame. The results indicated that conflict framing does not influence the various EU attitude dimensions. Furthermore, political sophistication and conflict avoidance did not act as moderators. It does not matter whether citizens are politically sophisticated or have a conflict-avoiding personality for the degree in which they are influenced by conflict framing.

KEYWORDS: conflict framing, euroscepticism, EU attitude dimensions, performance, negative affection, utilitarianism, political sophistication, conflict avoidance

(3)

Introduction

In October 2014, Brussels announced that the Netherlands was obliged to pay a surcharge of 642 million Euros, which caused discontent among both Dutch citizens and politicians. One may assume that this measure imposed by the European Union did not contribute to a positive portrayal of this institution. In point of fact, on the 31st of March 2014 the headline of the front page of De Volkskrant, a Dutch national newspaper, already proclaimed “Faith in the European Union is declining” (Volkskrant, 2014, p. 1). Indeed, several studies have shown this (e.g. Harmsen, 2004; Lubbers & Jaspers, 2010; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010). As integration efforts are dependent on the support of citizens of the European Union (Hobolt, 2009, as cited in Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, & De Vreese, 2011), such a growing euroscepticism could pose a threat for the continued existence of the European Union and therewith for those benefits that this institution offers, which are not available on a national level, such as greater international influence and political stability within Europe (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000).

The manner in which the media cover European issues influences the opinions of citizens regarding the European Union (De Vreese, 2007; Vliegenthart, Schuck,

Boomgaarden, & De Vreese, 2008). Conflict-driven news is one of the most common forms the media employ to cover political stories (e.g. De Vreese, 2012; De Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001; Schuck et al., 2013). One could consequently wonder whether this type of news reporting plays a part in the increasing euroscepticism. This study will therefore address the question whether conflict framing in news about the European Union has an effect on euroscepticism. The focus will be on three underlying EU attitude dimensions, namely performance, negative affection, and utilitarianism.

Little is known concerning the effects of conflict-driven news on political attitudes, notably with regard to the aforementioned dimensions. This inquiry attempts to fill this gap in

(4)

the literature. In addition, if it turns out that euroscepticism among citizens is indeed fuelled due to exposure to conflict framing, one might wonder whether the news media should use this frame as often as they currently do.

Below, a theoretical background will be provided, in which the accessory hypotheses and research questions will be amplified. Next, the methods will be discussed, followed by the presentation of the results. Lastly, a conclusion and discussion will be given.

Theoretical Framework Framing

According to Entman (1993) framing entails “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment

recommendation” (p. 52). As becomes evident by virtue of this definition, four possible functions can be attributed to framing. That is, a frame may define a problem, diagnose causes, make a moral judgment, and propose solutions (Entman, 1993; Entman, 2007). A frame is accordingly “an emphasis in salience of different aspects of a topic” (De Vreese, 2005, p. 53).

By making particular aspects salient, a frame offers the recipient interpretive shortcuts via which a judgment is likely to be made. This judgment will thus be based on the frame provided (Entman, 2007; Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004; Kim, Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002). For example, when the media present a political issue in terms of losses, the public will be prone to view the concerning issue in that manner: They will even perceive it as less acceptable as compared to the exact same issue presented in terms of gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). A frame does, however, not necessarily contain all four of the

(5)

In recent years an abundant amount of research has addressed framing and its various forms (e.g. Entman, 1993; Scheufele & Iyengar, 2014; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). It has become clear that a distinction can be made between issue-specific and generic frames. The former relates to frames that are merely applicable to certain issues, whereas generic frames are pertinent to various topics and, thus, transcend thematic boundaries (De Vreese, 2005; Matthes, 2009). Examples of the latter are the human interest frame, the economic

consequences frame, the morality frame, the attribution of responsibility frame, and the conflict frame (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).

The conflict frame is commonly used by the news media (De Vreese, 2012), especially with regard to political news (e.g. De Vreese, 2012; De Vreese et al., 2001; Schuck et al., 2013). This frame puts an emphasis on “conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 95). The omnipresence of conflict framing can be attributed to prevailing news values, as the use of conflict represents balanced reporting and it is able to capture the interest of the audience (Schuck, Vliegenthart, & De Vreese, 2014; Vliegenthart et al., 2008). In addition, conflict is a basic component of political reasoning as well as of the decision-making process in democratic systems, making it inherent to politics (De Vries & Steenbergen, 2013; Vliegenthart et al., 2008).

Conflict in political news may mobilize the citizenry (De Vreese & Tobiasen, 2007): In the case of disagreement across political parties, citizens may feel that there is something at risk and consequently feel the need to cast their vote (Schuck et al., 2014). Indeed, previous research has shown that this is a possible outcome of conflict framing (De Vreese &

Tobiasen, 2007; Schuck et al., 2014). Nevertheless, as the attention of conflict-driven news is directed at disagreement in the political arena, it does not portray an image of a competent and well-functioning entity (Botan, 2013; Vliegenthart et al., 2008). Here, it does not matter if

(6)

a citizen is pro or con a particular issue; it is solely the presence of conflict that paints a negative image.

One could, therefore, expect that exposure to political conflict frames may also have a negative outcome, for example with regard to political attitudes. In fact, previous research has confirmed this exact expectation. For instance, support for the European Union decreased due to exposure to conflict frames (Vliegenthart et al., 2008). However, support for the European Union (or euroscepticism – the other side of the same coin) is quite a generic term. In this study the focus will be on more specific attitudes towards the European Union, which will be amplified below.

EU Attitude Dimensions

Most public opinion studies concerning the European Union apply a one-dimensional approach of operationalizing attitudes. However, such an approach, focusing on generic attitudes such as “euroscepticism” and “support for the European Union,” does not provide a proper view of the various attitudes that exist regarding the European Union (Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Hobolt & Brouard, 2011). Boomgaarden et al. (2011) actually found five

dimensions of EU attitudes, namely: performance, utilitarianism, strengthening, negative affection, and identity. The first three dimensions are grounded in utilitarian support whereas the latter two dimensions are based on affective support. Utilitarian support refers to “support based on interest in the costs and benefits of membership in the EU” (Boomgaarden et al., 2011, p. 244). Affective support refers to “diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some vague ideals embodied in the notion of European unity” (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970, as cited in Boomgaarden et al., 2011, p. 244).

Above it is argued that conflict-driven news may evoke the impression that the

(7)

belonging to utilitarian support, performance, is based on cognitive responses and refers to “the democratic and financial functioning and the performance of European institutions” (Boomgaarden et al., 2011, p. 247). As the features of a dependent variable should be taken into consideration when the expected effects of the independent variable are formulated (Boomgaarden et al., 2011), this EU attitude dimension seems the most appropriate for the purpose of this study. Based on the above-mentioned argument, it is expected that conflict framing will have a negative influence on performance. The hypothesis is as follows:

H1. Exposure to conflict framing negatively influences the EU attitude dimension performance.

Aside from potentially influencing cognitive responses, it can be argued that frames are able to influence the emotions of recipients (Gross, 2008). If these are indeed affected, it could have quite some implications, as Marcus (2000) states: “Evaluations arising from emotional processes, independent of prior or concurrent cognitive processes, can influence not only emotional expression but also thoughts, decisions, and political behaviour” (p. 224). Emotions thus play an important role in politics. However, previous research regarding the effects of political framing has mainly focused on cognitive responses (Druckman & McDermott, 2008; Gross, 2008; Gross & Brewer, 2007).

This study will take emotional responses into account to uncover whether these responses are influenced in a different manner as compared to cognitive responses. Negative affection, referring to “feelings of fear of and threat by the EU” (Boomgaarden et al., 2011, p. 258), is based on emotional responses (Boomgaarden et al., 2011) and will therefore be

(8)

news on this EU attitude dimension. Therefore, the accompanying research question is as follows:

RQ1. To what extent does exposure to conflict framing influence the EU attitude dimension negative affection?

Apart from performance and negative affection, the EU attitude dimension

utilitarianism is included in this study. Based on cognitive responses, it refers to “general support and benefit evaluations as well as more post-materialist utilitarian considerations with regard to the EU” (Boomgaarden et al., 2011, p. 250). Since this dimension is most

comparable to the items used in other public opinion research regarding the European Union (Boomgaarden et al., 2011), and especially as utilitarianism and performance do not strongly correlate with each other (Boomgaarden at al., 2011), it is worthwhile to see whether these two EU attitude dimensions are affected similarly.

As mentioned earlier, little is known regarding the effects of conflict framing on political attitudes. It is, however, clear that conflict-driven news is able to negatively influence support for the European Union (Vliegenthart et al., 2008). This is due to the fact that “conflict news accentuates disagreement and the potential inability of the EU to operate efficiently” (Vliegenthart et al., 2008, p. 434). Though this explanation may more reflect the EU attitude dimension performance, support for the European Union was measured in a (partially) similar manner as the utilitarianism dimension. It is therefore expected that exposure to a conflict frame will have a negative effect on the EU attitude dimension utilitarianism. Consequently, the accompanying hypothesis is as follows:

(9)

H2. Exposure to conflict framing negatively influences the EU attitude dimension utilitarianism.

Political Sophistication

A frame often does not have a universal impact (De Vreese, Boomgaarden, & Semetko, 2011): Individual differences moderate media effects on public opinion (Valentino,

Beckmann, & Buhr, 2001). Political sophistication, defined as “an individual’s intellectual or cognitive engagement with public affairs” (Zaller, 1992, as cited in De Vreese et al., 2011, p. 183), is one of these individual differences and is “an influential factor in frame analyses” (Schuck & De Vreese, 2006, p. 7).

If political sophistication would prove to be a moderator in the investigated relationship, it is critical to note whether the less politically sophisticated are influenced stronger as compared to their counterparts. If the attitudes of these individuals would be more negatively influenced, an attitudinal gap between the two groups could emerge due to conflict framing, on top of the knowledge gap that is already present.

Previous studies that took political sophistication as a moderator into account have found contradictory results. Some scholars state that politically sophisticated citizens are more susceptible to the effects of framing (e.g. De Vreese et al., 2011; Slothuus, 2008), while other studies yielded opposite results (e.g. Lecheler & De Vreese, 2010; Schuck & De Vreese, 2006; Valentino et al., 2001). Interestingly, both sides provide similar explanations to support their findings, but interpret it in a different manner. The scholars that contend that politically sophisticated individuals are more susceptible attribute this to the fact that these citizens deliberate more on political issues, are more often exposed to political frames, and are capable of understanding and incorporating these frames into their judgment (e.g. De Vreese et al., 2011). The studies that found contradictory results attribute this to the notion that less

(10)

politically sophisticated individuals do not possess strong “long-term internal motivations for their political attitudes and behavior” (Valentino et al., 2001, p. 353) or do not have enough knowledge to reject framed information (e.g. Lecheler & De Vreese, 2010), and are thus more easily influenced. This lack of unambiguity has led to the following research question:

RQ2. To what extent does political sophistication moderate the effect of exposure to conflict

framing on the EU attitude dimensions performance, negative affection, and utilitarianism?

Conflict Avoidance

Personality traits, defined as “dimensions of individual differences in tendencies to show consistent patterns of thought, feelings and actions” (McCrae & Costa, 1990, as cited in Blais & Labbé St-Vincent, 2011, p. 400), are other individual differences that could act as

moderators in the relationship between exposure to conflict framing and EU attitude dimensions. A personality trait that especially seems interesting with regard to this study is conflict avoidance; one is prone to expect that those citizens that rather avoid conflict are negatively affected when they are confronted with situations in which conflict is present. Indeed, Mutz and Reeves (2005) have shown that political trust among individuals who are conflict-avoidant decreases when being confronted with uncivil discourse, that is, conflict. In addition, another study has found that individuals, who are conflict-avoidant, will be less likely to participate in political activities during which conflict may arise, such as political protest, providing support during campaigns, and interpersonal discussion of political matters (Ulbig & Funk, 1999). Consequently, it is expected that negative effects will

especially arise among citizens that rather avoid conflict when exposed to conflict-driven news. The accompanying hypothesis is as follows:

(11)

H3. The EU attitude dimensions performance, negative affection, and utilitarianism are more

negatively influenced by exposure to conflict framing among citizens who have a conflict-avoiding personality as compared to citizens who do not have a conflict-conflict-avoiding personality.

Online Media and the Millennial Generation

In recent years, scholars often have chosen traditional media, such as newspapers and

television, as the subject of their investigation. The use of the Internet, however, has increased significantly over the years (Eurostat, 2013; Pew Research Center, 2014a). To illustrate, 83 percent of Dutch citizens used the Internet (nearly) daily in 2013 (Eurostat, 2013). Moreover, utilizing the Internet as a news source is becoming more common, which is at the expense of traditional media such as newspapers (Hoksbergen, 2009; Van Cauwenberge, d’Haenens, & Beentjes, 2010). Especially online only news websites, thus not belonging to a print

newspaper, are perceived as the most valuable manner to find political news online (De Waal & Schoenbach, 2010). These websites will, therefore, be the medium that is focused upon in this study.

Related to this is the fact that the millennial generation, those citizens in the age of 18 until 33 (Pew Research Center, 2014b),1 is the part of the population that is most active online (Zickuhr, 2010). In 2010, 70 to 79 percent of this generation went online to find news

(Zickuhr, 2010). Moreover, this generation is of the utmost importance for the future of the European Union, as it should be supportive of this institution to ensure its continuation. This could prove to be quite difficult, since millennials did not experience periods in their life during which the European Union was essential; for example, due to conflict or war between countries. These individuals may therefore not regard this institution as paramount.

Collectively, it is of importance to know in what manner this generation is influenced by the                                                                                                                

1 The youngest citizens belonging to the millennial generation are currently in their teens. This study, however,

(12)

media, and will thus be used as participants in an experiment during this study.

Method

To test the hypotheses and provide answers to the research questions, this study has employed an online experiment with a 2 (conflict vs. no conflict) x 2 (topic “new European

Commission” vs. topic “universal mobile phone charger”) factorial design. The aim was to gather at least thirty participants per condition, all in the age of 18-33 years. Participants have been recruited via social media (such as the Facebook page of the study Communication Science of the University of Amsterdam) and, subsequently, via a snowball sample.

Eventually a total of 144 participants commenced to partake in the experiment, of which 130 finished it entirely, resulting in a completion rate of 90 percent. 71.5 percent of these

participants were female (N = 93) and 28.5 percent male (N = 37). Overall there were

considerably many participants that completed higher education (at least HBO), namely 89.2 percent of the participants.

The online only news website that was used during the experiment is NU.nl, as this is the news website with the highest number of readers in the Netherlands (Mediamonitor, 2013). On average, 34 percent of Dutch citizens older than twelve years used this website in 2012. Individuals that access the website via a mobile phone or tablet are not taken into account in this number; thus, the reach will presumably be higher in reality (Mediamonitor, 2013). Two articles, with diverse topics, were selected. The article called “new European Commission” touched upon the composition of the new European Commission and the approval hereof by the European Parliament. The second article, “universal mobile phone charger,” discusses a bill regarding a universal mobile phone charger for the entire European Union, which has been approved by the European Parliament.

(13)

The use of two articles with different topics enabled controlling whether the topic of an article plays a role in the relationship between conflict framing and EU attitude

dimensions. All other aspects of the articles were similar, such as the length of the article,2 commercials at the sides, and the presence of photos. See Appendix A for a display of the articles. In each no-frame condition, the original version of an article was shown, which did not contain conflict elements. For the purpose of this study, sentences in both articles of the experimental conditions have been manipulated to create conflict-framed articles.

During the experiment, 32 participants were randomly exposed to the no-frame

version of the article “universal mobile phone charger” and 33 participants to the manipulated version, which contained a conflict frame. In addition, 32 participants were exposed to the manipulated conflict frame version of the article “new European Commission” and 33 participants to the no-frame version of this article.

Procedure

Individuals who indicated that they were willing to participate were provided with a link of the website that contained the experiment. First, a text was displayed that contained general information, such as the purpose of the experiment, that the participant would remain anonymous, and that the participant could stop with the experiment at any time. After obtaining informed consent, several questions were posed with regard to demographic variables, such as age, gender, and educational level. Several questions were consequently asked regarding the political sophistication and personality of the participant.

Following these questions, the participants were randomly exposed to one of the four articles and asked to read it thoroughly. A timer forced them to stay at least fifteen seconds on the page with the experimental treatment. A participant could be exposed to an article with a                                                                                                                

2 No-frame version “universal mobile phone charger”: 160 words. Conflict frame version “universal mobile

phone charger”: 190 words. No-frame version “new European Commission”: 157 words. Conflict frame version “new European Commission”: 165 words.

(14)

conflict frame or to a no-frame article, which was either about the topic “new European Commission” or the topic “universal mobile phone charger.”

After reading the article, the EU attitude dimensions performance, negative affection, and utilitarianism were measured.3 Hereafter, the experiment was finished and submitted. On average, participants spent 20.98 minutes on the experiment.4

Dependent Variables

To measure the EU attitude dimensions performance, negative affection, and utilitarianism, participants have been presented with several statements in a random order, to which they could respond by means of a Likert-scale ranging from one (“strongly disagree”) to seven (“strongly agree”). These dimensions and the accompanying statements are adopted from the study of Boomgaarden et al. (2011), which is based on existing public opinion survey data. The statements are displayed in the table below.

<< PLACE TABLE 1 HERE >>

Performance and utilitarianism in fact both have a fifth item in the study of

Boomgaarden et al. (2011). These are, respectively, “I trust the European Parliament” and “I personally benefit from the Netherlands’ EU membership.” However, both these items have low factor loadings and deviate from the other items on the basis of their content. Therefore, the decision was made to not include these items in the questionnaire of this experiment.

A principal component analysis with VARIMAX rotation has been conducted to check whether the same factors would come forward as have been found in the study of

Boomgaarden et al. (2011). Indeed, three factors were distinguished (eigenvalue > 1),                                                                                                                

3 The likelihood of voting during the next European Parliament election and the motivation to read news about

the European Union in the future were also measured. However, this is not reported in this study, as it is not relevant for the hypotheses and research questions.

4 Some participants started with the experiment and did not complete it immediately. They proceeded some

(15)

consisting of the same items as “performance,” “utilitarianism,” and “negative affection.” However, the item “The European Union poses a threat to Dutch identity and culture” has a considerable lower factor loading (.55) as compared to the other items (respectively .78, .77, .78, and .74) belonging to the EU attitude dimension negative affection. As this was also the case in the study of Boomgaarden et al. (2011) and the item deviates slightly from the other items based on its content, the decision has been made to delete this item from the dimension negative affection.5 A new factor analysis, without the deleted item, showed that the three factors explain 62.14 percent of the variance.

Next, mean scales were made of all three EU attitude dimensions. The item “The European Union is wasting a lot of tax money” of the EU attitude dimension performance was recoded. The reliability of the scale is acceptable (Cronbachs α = .66, M = 3.97, SD = 0.83) and could not be improved. Also, the scale of the EU attitude dimension negative affection is reliable (Cronbachs α = .82, M = 1.97, SD = 0.89). Lastly, the EU attitude dimension utilitarianism is a reliable scale (Cronbachs α = .78, M = 5.08, SD = 0.86).6 The distribution of all three variables is normal: performance (skewness = 0.00, kurtosis = 0.89), negative affection (skewness = 0.98, kurtosis = 0.27), and utilitarianism (skewness = -0.05, kurtosis = -0.60).

Moderators

Political sophistication, a theorized moderator in this study, was measured in the pretest. This variable was composed of political interest and political knowledge. First, two questions were posed regarding the interest of the participant, namely regarding politics in general and regarding politics concerning the European Union specifically. Participants could respond to                                                                                                                

5 In addition, two items belonging to performance score slightly lower than the two other items. However, as the

difference is smaller and the items fit with the dimension due to their content, it was chosen to keep these items.

6 The reliability could be improved by removing the item “The European Union fosters the preservation of the

environment,” but as this was merely an improvement of .03 and as it belongs to the dimension according to the

(16)

those questions on a seven-point Likert-scale. Hereafter, seven knowledge questions were asked, such has “How many seats does the Dutch House of Representatives have?” and “Who is the current President of the European Commission?” All questions provided five possible answers, including an “I don’t know”-answer. In Appendix B, all questions regarding political sophistication can be found. Participants could receive a number of points, ranging from zero until seven, depending on the amount of knowledge questions they answered correctly. Correct answers were summed up and led to a seven-point scale indicating political knowledge (M = 4.45, SD = 1.80).

For the purpose of analyses, a mean scale was made of political sophistication, ranging from one to seven. This scale existed out of the three above-mentioned items, namely the two interest questions and the scale political knowledge. A principal component analysis with VARIMAX rotation has been conducted, which brought forward one factor (eigenvalue > 1). This factor explained 72.49 percent of the variance. The scale was reliable (Cronbachs α = .79, M = 4.34, SD = 1.35) and normally distributed (skewness = -0.26, kurtosis = -0.54). To make the variable more easy to use in the analyses, the scale was then subdivided into two categories, namely low political sophistication (N = 62) and high political sophistication (N = 68). The cut-off point was 4 (47.7 percent).

The second hypothesized moderator, conflict avoidance, was measured by means of five statements, as proposed by Mutz and Reeves (2005) based on a study of Goldstein (1999). Participants could respond via a seven-point scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The presented statements were the following: “I hate arguments,” “I find conflicts exciting,” “I enjoy challenging the opinions of others,” “Arguments don’t bother me,” and “I feel upset after an argument” (Mutz & Reeves, 2005, p. 14).

A mean scale was created for this moderator. First, the items “I hate arguments” and “I feel upset after an argument” were recoded. Hereafter, a principal component analysis with

(17)

VARIMAX rotation has been employed. The results showed that two factors could be distinguished (eigenvalue > 1). This was not in line with what was expected, that is, one conflict avoidance factor. It was, however, decided to proceed with these two factors, as there was a clear content-based distinction.

The first factor was composed of the following three statements: “I hate arguments” (recoded), “I feel upset after an argument” (recoded), and “Arguments don’t bother me.” As these statements all refer to arguments, this factor was named argument avoidance. This factor explains 44.87 percent of the variance and the scale is reliable (Cronbachs α = .70, M = 2.71, SD = 1.21) as well as normally distributed (skewness = 0.65, kurtosis = 0.08). Higher scores indicated that individuals were less afraid of arguments. This is also the case respecting the second factor. This factor was named contention avoidance and consisted of the

statements “I enjoy challenging the opinions of others” and “I find conflicts exciting.” This factor explains 22.68 percent of the variance and again the scale is reliable (Cronbachs α = .63, M = 3.81, SD = 1.33) as well as normally distributed (skewness = -0.20, kurtosis = -0.74). This factor is most in line with the theory regarding conflict framing. Both scales were

divided into two groups, namely low argument avoidance (N = 80) versus high argument avoidance (N = 50) and low contention avoidance (N = 70) versus high contention avoidance (N = 60). The cut-off points were respectively 2.33 (48.5 percent) and 3.50 (46.2 percent), on scales ranging from one until seven.

Results

The statistical program SPSS (version 20) has been employed for the purpose of the analyses. First of all, participants that did not complete the entire experiment were excluded from the analyses. Hereafter, two-way and three-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) have been utilized to test the hypotheses and provide answers to the research questions. Two

(18)

dichotomous variables, named frame and topic, which represent the four conditions

concerning the article a participant had read, have been used in the analyses as independent variables. Below, the results will be discussed per EU attitude dimension, after which sections are attributed to the moderating influence of political sophistication and conflict avoidance.

Performance

The first hypothesis, which regarded performance, was formulated as follows: “Exposure to conflict framing negatively influences the EU attitude dimension performance.” The above-mentioned variables frame and topic were used as the independent variables and the scale performance as the dependent variable.

The two-way ANOVA showed that there is no significant effect of frame on

performance, F (1, 126) = 0.00, p = .979, and of topic on performance, F (1, 126) = 0.00, p = .979, just as the interaction effect of both, F (1, 126) = 0.06, p = .810. In other words, it did not matter whether an article was written in terms of conflict or not. This was the case for both articles with different topics, namely “universal mobile phone charger” and “new European Commission.” Thus, Hypothesis 1 was rejected.

Negative Affection

“To what extent does exposure to conflict framing influence the EU attitude dimension negative affection?” was the first research question. Again, the independent variables were frame and topic.

According to the two-way ANOVA, conflict framing does not have a significant influence on the EU attitude dimension negative affection, F (1, 126) = 0.21, p = .646. However, in this case the topic of the article did matter, F (1, 126) = 7.02, p = .009, η2 = .05. Participants who read the article about the new European Commission (M = 2.18, SD = 0.90)

(19)

had more negative feelings towards the European Union than those who read the article concerning the universal mobile phone charger (M = 1.77, SD = 0.84). It must be noted though, that the difference was quite small, and that there was no interaction effect with the frame of the articles, F (1, 126) = 0.01, p = .925. Below, a figure displays the effect.

<< PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE >>

Utilitarianism

The second hypothesis was the following: “Exposure to conflict framing negatively influences the EU attitude dimension utilitarianism.” To test this hypothesis a two-way ANOVA was utilized, with the variables frame and topic as independent variables and utilitarianism as dependent variable.

The output of the two-way ANOVA showed that conflict-driven news did not have a significant effect on the EU attitude dimension utilitarianism, F (1, 126) = 0.09, p = .766. The lack of a significant effect also applied to the relationship between the topic of an article and utilitarianism, F (1, 126) = 0.12, p = .727, as well as to the interaction effect of frame and topic, F (1, 126) = 0.01, p = .946. Hypothesis 2 was therefore rejected.

Political Sophistication

“To what extent does political sophistication moderate the effect of exposure to conflict framing on the EU attitude dimensions performance, negative affection, and utilitarianism?” was the second research question. Again frame and topic were the independent variables and political sophistication was added as a third independent variable. The three EU attitude dimensions were the dependent variables.

(20)

The three-way ANOVA showed that the interaction effect between framing and

political sophistication was insignificant in all cases: performance, F (1, 122) = 0.18, p = .676, negative affection, F (1, 122) = 0.01, p = .915, and utilitarianism, F (1, 122) = 0.10, p = .758.7 This was equal for all articles, thus independent of the topic of an article, as the insignificant three-way interactions showed; for performance, F (1, 122) = 1.88, p = .173, for negative affection, F = (1, 122) = 0.00, p = .991, and for utilitarianism, F (1, 122) = 0.07, p = .796.

However, it did become clear that political sophistication was directly related to the EU attitude dimensions negative affection, F (1, 122) = 8.59, p = .004, η2 = .07, and

utilitarianism F (1, 122) = 23.41, p < .001, η2 = .16. Less politically sophisticated citizens (M = 2.25, SD = 0.92) had more negative feelings towards the European Union than their

counterparts (M = 1.72, SD = 0.79). In addition, utilitarianism was lower, and thus more negative, among the less politically sophisticated (M = 4.75, SD = 0.60) as compared to politically sophisticated individuals (M = 5.39, SD = 0.94).

Conflict Avoidance

The hypothesis with regard to the moderator conflict avoidance was the following: “The EU attitude dimensions performance, negative affection, and utilitarianism are more negatively influenced by exposure to conflict framing among citizens who have a conflict-avoiding personality as compared to citizens who do not have a conflict-avoiding personality.” As stated in the method section, the initial moderator conflict avoidance was subdivided into two moderators, namely argument avoidance and contention avoidance. For both moderators three-way ANOVA’s were conducted.8 The independent variables were frame and topic, and,

                                                                                                               

7 It was also tested whether the political knowledge (existing out of the seven knowledge questions, excluding

the two interest questions) of the participants was a significant moderator. This was, however, not the case.

8 It was also attempted to proceed with the one factor that was expected beforehand, as it was adopted from an

earlier study (Mutz & Reeves, 2005). This did not yield significant results regarding conflict framing. It did, however, become clear that the initial variable conflict avoidance is a moderator in the relationship between the topic of an article and the EU attitude dimension utilitarianism, F (1, 122) = 5.84, p = .017, η2 = .05.

(21)

as a third independent variable, argument avoidance or contention avoidance. The dependent variables were performance, negative affection, and utilitarianism.

The results of the first three-way ANOVA indicated that argument avoidance did not play a significant moderating role in the relationship between conflict framing and the EU attitude dimension performance, F (1, 122) = 1.96, p = .164. This was also the case for the EU attitude dimensions negative affection, F (1, 122) = 0.07, p = .794, and utilitarianism, F (1, 122) = 0.32, p = .570. The three-way interactions were also not significant: performance, F (1, 122) = 0.49, p = .486, negative affection, F (1, 122) = 0.41, p = .522, and utilitarianism, F (1, 122) = 1.33, p = .251.

The three-way ANOVA that took the second moderator into account, namely contention avoidance, showed that this variable neither had a moderating effect. This is the case for all three EU attitude dimensions, that is, performance, F (1, 122) = 0.02, p = .901, negative affection, F (1, 122) = 1.26, p = .265, as well as utilitarianism, F (1, 122) = 1.39, p = .241. Here too, no significant three-way interactions occurred: performance, F (1, 122) = 0.68, p = .412, negative affection, F (1, 122) = 0.06, p = .813, and utilitarianism, F (1, 122) = 0.01, p = .943.

Thus, the interaction effects turned out to be insignificant in all cases. Consequently, Hypothesis 3 has been rejected.

Conclusion and Discussion

The goal of this study was to formulate an answer to the question whether the media have an influence on the growing euroscepticism in the Netherlands. The focus was put on conflict-driven news and the EU attitude dimensions performance, negative affection, and

utilitarianism, as these dimensions offer deeper insight than the umbrella term euroscepticism (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). An experiment has been conducted that included 130 Dutch

(22)

participants between the age of 18 and 33, who all read an article of the news website NU.nl with either no frame or a conflict frame. The analyses made clear that conflict framing does not influence the various EU attitude dimensions. Moreover, political sophistication and conflict avoidance did not act as moderators. It does not matter whether a citizen is politically sophisticated or has a conflict-avoiding personality for the effect of conflict framing. Hence, all three hypotheses have been rejected. In addition, negative answers were formulated respecting the two research questions.

These findings imply that conflict framing, a popular way of political news reporting by the media (De Vreese, 2012), does not have implications for the continued existence of the European Union. At least, not when it comes to the three EU attitude dimensions

performance, negative affection, and utilitarianism. Not all EU attitude dimensions as found by Boomgaarden et al. (2011) have been included in this study, as not all of them related to relevant literature. Apart from the three above-mentioned dimensions, two other dimensions have been distinguished, that are, identity and strengthening. The former beholds

identification with the European Union and the latter relates to “the future of European integration and to a process of further deepening and widening of the EU” (Boomgaarden et al., 2011, p. 250). Although unlikely according to the literature, it might be that these dimensions are influenced by conflict-driven news. Moreover, Boomgaarden et al. (2011) themselves state that the items used in their study stem from a list that is not exhaustive. This means that other excluded items possibly could form alternative EU attitude dimensions. Indeed, other scholars have found such dimensions (e.g. Hobolt & Brouard, 2011). The accompanying items partly overlap with those of Boomgaarden et al. (2011), but some items differ. In sum, other EU attitude dimensions – already found or yet to be discovered – may be negatively influenced by conflict framing.

(23)

It must be noted though, that contrary to the angle of this study, it is also conceivable that conflict framing has a positive effect. As already stated in the theoretical section, it has been shown by previous studies that conflict framing may lead to a mobilized citizenry (De Vreese & Tobiasen, 2007; Schuck et al., 2014). When political parties are in disagreement, citizens might sense that something is at risk and therefore want to cast their vote. This mobilization effect could be understood as good news for the future of democracy and, in particular, the continuation of the European Union.

The question why no significant results were found during this study remains, however. Or in other words, why did the results of this study bring forward the conclusion that a conflict frame in a news report does not influence the three investigated EU attitude dimensions? Besides the conclusion that there simply is no effect, three reasons can be mentioned to explain why a potential effect has not been found. First of all, previous research containing the definition and operationalization of EU attitudes is ambiguous. Often, the definition of a certain EU attitude corresponds between studies, but the manner in which it is measured differs. For example, Vliegenthart et al. (2008) speak of support for the European Union and relate this to the ability of the European Union to operate in an effective manner. This definition corresponds with the one belonging to the EU attitude dimension

“performance” of Boomgaarden et al. (2011). However, when looking at the items that were used to measure support for the European Union, they overlap with the items used to measure the EU attitude dimension “utilitarianism” as proposed by Boomgaarden et al. (2011). This lack of equivocality complicates setting up a proper theoretical background in which

expectations can be grounded. During this study, it was attempted to unravel these entangled definitions and measures, but future research may try to do this more thoroughly.

(24)

Secondly, the manipulations of the articles in this study were rather detailed and subtle. Perhaps other results would have come forward when more extreme examples of conflict were used.

Lastly, a particular limitation of this study is the sample size. Eventually 130

participants took part in the experiment with four conditions. This relative small sample size decreased the statistical power to find significant results. This leads to the recommendation that in future research a larger sample size or fewer conditions should be considered.

A larger amount of participants would also have fended off another limitation of this study. Even though the research method allows generalization of the results, one could wonder if 130 individuals are a fair representation of the Dutch population, in particular of citizens between 18 and 33 years old. This small sample size was, however, inevitable, as the available period for this study was rather short and a budget was virtually nonexistent.

Furthermore, a vast majority of the participants completed higher education and was female, which is not representative for the Dutch population. In future research it must be attempted to avoid this skewed representation of the population.

But not to forget: A few significant results were found during this study, even though they do not relate to the main research question. In the first place, some effects were found with regard to the topic of an article, meaning that it does matter what kind of article one is reading. When taking the EU attitude dimension negative affection into account, the article concerning the new European Commission lead to more negative feelings among the citizenry as compared to the article with the topic “universal mobile phone charger.” This could

potentially be attributed to the fact that the latter concerned quite a concrete and practical topic and did not name individual politicians, whereas the former article regarded a generic, somewhat bureaucratic, topic and mentioned Jean-Claude Juncker, a politician towards which individuals may have certain – in this case negative - feelings. It might be worthwhile to

(25)

examine what kind of topics exist regarding the European Union and to uncover what type of topics have a negative (or positive) influence on EU attitude dimensions.

Additionally, it was interesting to see, even though not related to the media, that political sophistication related to negative affection and utilitarianism. Those citizens that were politically sophisticated had fewer negative emotions, were generally more supportive and made more positive benefit evaluations of the European Union as compared to less politically sophisticated citizens. Thus, political sophistication seemingly plays an important role with regard to the EU attitude dimensions. Though experimental evidence is lacking, politically sophisticated citizens seem more favorable towards the European Union, both with regard to their emotions as to their opinions.

Anyhow, it is recommended to abandon the one-dimensional umbrella terms such as support for the European Union and euroscepticism: They do not cover the various sentiments and opinions a citizen may have towards the European Union. Scholars should be more precise about the exact attitudes they are investigating. As a result, in times to come it may become clearer whether, and in what manner, the media influence the European citizenry. It consequently might be possible to counteract the current prevailing eurosceptic attitudes. Then hopefully in the future, we will not be confronted anymore with newspaper headlines proclaiming that faith in the European Union is declining. At least for now it seems that conflict framing does not play a part in the increasing euroscepticism and is, thus, not to blame.

(26)

References

Bakker, T. P. & De Vreese, C. H. (2011). Good news for the future? Young people, Internet use, and political participation. Communication research, 38(4), 451-470.

Blais, A. & Labbé St-Vincent, S. (2011). Personality traits, political attitudes and the propensity to vote. European Journal of Political Research, 50(3), 395-417.

Boomgaarden, H. G., Schuck, A. R. T., Elenbaas, M., & De Vreese, C. H. (2011). Mapping EU attitudes: Conceptual and empirical dimensions of euroscepticism and EU support. European Union Politics, 12(2), 241-266.

Botan, M. (2013). Different types of conflict in the news and their impact on political trust: The cumulated effect of incivility and intrusiveness. Romanian Journal of

Communication and Public Relations, 2, 49-57.

De Vreese, C. H. (2005). News framing: Theory and typology. Information Design Journal + Document Design, 13(1), 51-62.

De Vreese, C. H. (2007). A spiral of euroscepticism: The media’s fault? Acta Politica, 42, 271-286.

De Vreese, C. H. (2012). New avenues for framing research. American Behavioral Scientist, 56(3), 365-375.

De Vreese, C. H., Boomgaarden, H. G., & Semetko, H. A. (2011). (In)direct framing effects: The effects of news media framing on public support for Turkish membership in the European Union. Communication Research, 38(2), 179-205.

De Vreese, C. H., Peter, J., Semetko, H. A. (2001). Framing politics at the launch of the Euro: A cross-national comparative study of frames in the news. Political Communication, 18(2), 107-122.

De Vreese, C. H. & Tobiasen, M. (2007). Conflict and identity: Explaining turnout and anti-integrationist voting in the Danish 2004 elections for the European Parliament.

(27)

Scandinavian Political Studies, 30(1), 87-114.

De Vries, C. & Steenbergen, M. (2013). Variable opinions: The predictability of support for unification in European mass publics. Journal of Political Marketing, 12(1), 121-141. De Waal, E. & Schoenbach, K. (2010). News sites’ position in the mediascape: uses,

evaluations and media displacement effects over time. New Media & Society, 12(3), 477-496.

Druckman, J. N. & McDermott, R. (2008). Emotion and the framing of risky choice. Political behavior, 30(3), 297-321.

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51-58.

Entman, R. M. (2007). Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 163-173.

Eurostat (2013). Internet access and use in 2013. Retrieved on November 26, 2014 from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/4-18122013-BP/EN/4-18122013-BP-EN.PDF

Goldstein, S. B. (1999). Construction and validation of a conflict communication scale. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 29(9), 1803-1832.

Gross, K. (2008). Framing persuasive appeals: Episodic and thematic framing, emotional response, and policy opinion. Political Psychology, 29(2), 169-192.

Gross, K. & Brewer, P. R. (2007). Sore losers: News frames, policy debates, and emotions. The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 12(1), 122-133.

Gross, K. & D’Ambrosio, L. (2004). Framing emotional response. Political Psychology, 25(1), 1-29.

Harmsen, R. (2004). Euroscepticism in the Netherlands: Stirrings of dissent. European Studies, 20, 99-126.

(28)

Hobolt, S. B. & Brouard, S. (2011). Contesting the European Union? Why the Dutch and the French rejected the European constitution. Political Research Quarterly, 64(2), 309-322.

Hoksbergen, M. (2009). Internet verdringt traditionele mediaproducten. Retrieved on November 26, 2014 from http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/vrije-tijd-cultuur/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2009/2009-2789-wm.htm

Kim, S., Scheufele, D. A., & Shanahan, J. (2002). Think about it this way: Attribute agenda- setting function of the press and the public’s evaluation of a local issue. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 79(1), 7-25.

Lecheler, S. & De Vreese C. H. (2010). Framing Serbia: The effects of news framing on public support for EU enlargement. European Political Science Review, 2(1), 73-93. Lubbers, M. & Jaspers, E. (2010). A longitudinal study of euroscepticism in the Netherlands:

2008 versus 1990. European Union Politics, 12(1), 21-40.

Lubbers, M. & Scheepers, P. (2010). Divergent trends of euroscepticism in countries and regions of the European Union. European Journal of Political Research, 49(6), 787- 817.

Marcus, G. E. (2000). Emotions in politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 221-250. Matthes, J. (2009). What’s in a frame? A content analysis of media framing studies in the

world’s leading communication journals, 1990-2005. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 86(2), 349-367.

Mediamonitor (2013). Mediabedrijven en mediamarkten 2012-2013. Retrieved on October 15, 2014 from

http://www.mediamonitor.nl/wp- content/uploads/2013/10/Mediamonitor-2013-Mediabedrijven-en-Mediamarkten-2012-2013.pdf

(29)

political trust. American Political Science Review, 99(1), 1-15.

Pew Research Center (2014a). Internet use over time. Retrieved on November 26, 2014 from http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/internet-use/internet-use-over-time/

Pew Research Center (2014b). Millennials in adulthood. Retrieved on November 18, 2014 from http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/03/07/millennials-in-adulthood/#fn-18663-1 Righton, N. (2014, March 31). Geloof in Europese Unie brokkelt af. De Volkskrant, p. 1. Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2000). The political basis of support for European Integration. European

Union Politics, 1(2), 147-171.

Scheufele, D. A. & Iyengar, S. (2014). The state of framing research: A call for new directions. Unpublished manuscript.

Schuck, A. R. T. & De Vreese, C. H. (2006). Between risk and opportunity: News framing and its effects on public support for EU enlargement. European Journal of

Communication, 21(1), 5-32.

Schuck, A. R. T., Vliegenthart, R., Boomgaarden, H. G., Elenbaas, M., Azrout, R., Van Spanje, J., & De Vreese, C. H. (2013). Explaining campaign news coverage: How medium, time, and context explain variation in the media framing of the 2009 European parliamentary elections, Journal of Political Marketing, 12(1), 8-28.

Schuck, A. R. T., Vliegenthart, R., & De Vreese, C. H. (2014). Who’s afraid of conflict? The mobilizing effect of conflict framing in campaign news. British Journal of Political Science, 1-18.

Semetko, H. A., & Valkenburg, P. M. (2000). Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news. Journal of Communication, 50(2), 93-109.

Slothuus, R. (2008). More than weighting cognitive importance: A dual-process model of issue framing effects. Political Psycology, 29(1), 1-28.

(30)

Science, 211(4481), 453-458.

Ulbig, S. G. & Funk, C. L. (1999). Conflict avoidance and political participation. Political Behavior, 21(3), 265-282.

Valentino, N. A., Beckmann, M. N., & Buhr, T. A. (2001). A spiral of cynicism for some: The contingent effects of campaign news frames on participation and confidence in government. Political Communication, 18(4), 347-367.

Van Cauwenberge, A., d’Haenens, L., & Beentjes, H. (2010). Emerging consumption patterns among young people of traditional and Internet news platforms in the Low Countries. Observatorio Journal, 4(3), 335-352.

Vliegenthart, R., Schuck, A. R. T., Boomgaarden, H. G., & De Vreese, C. H. (2008). News coverage and support for European integration, 1990-2006. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 20(4), 415-439.

Zickuhr, K. (2010). Generations 2010. Washington (D.C.): Pew Research Center. Retrieved on October 15, 2014 from http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-

(31)

Tables and Figures in Text Table 1

Measures of performance, negative affection, and utilitarianism (Boomgaarden et al., 2011).

EU attitude dimension Statements

Performance

The decision-making process in the European Union is transparent. The European Union functions well as it is.

The European Union is wasting a lot of tax money.

The European Union functions according to democratic principles.

Negative affection

I am afraid of the European Union. I feel threatened by the European Union. I am angry about the European Union. I am disgusted with the European Union.

The European Union poses a threat to Dutch identity and culture.

Utilitarianism

The European Union fosters peace and stability.

The European Union fosters the preservation of the environment. Dutch membership of the European Union is a good thing.

(32)
(33)

Appendix A

(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)

Appendix B

Interest Questions of the Moderator Political Sophistication

1. To what extent are you interested in politics? (On a scale from one to seven) 2. To what extent are you interested in politics regarding the European Union? (On a

scale from one to seven)

Knowledge Questions of the Moderator Political Sophistication 1. How many seats does the Dutch House of Representatives have? 2. Which political parties are currently in the coalition government? 3. Who is the current Deputy Prime Minister of the Netherlands?

4. Who is the current Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations of the Netherlands? 5. Who is the current President of the Dutch Senate?

6. Who is the European politician displayed on the picture below? (Note: A picture of Herman van Rompuy was displayed)

Referenties

GERELATEERDE DOCUMENTEN

Research aim: “The purpose of the current meta-analysis is to examine the impact of relationship, task, and process conflict on proximal group outcomes (i.e., emergent states, such

RE stip (4x)m grof, (2x), hele lichte krimpscheuren, veel kopscheuren (2x), watervlekken (2x), platte vruchten, dof, oortjes, rommel, slechte vorm RF te lang (5x),

Voor pluim- veebedrij ven in vervoersverboden zijn de extra kosten van vaccinatie en de schade als gevolg van het zogenaamde kruismerkvlees (voor toelichting zie laatste alinea

Woorden zoals ‘Kok maakt de verwachtingen niet waar’, ‘onze alternatieven liggen op tafel’ en ‘de fractie van GroenLinks heeft in dit debat oppositie

Sleuf 18 werd opnieuw verder in oostelijke richting uitgegraven in de niet-verharde berm tussen de IJzerlaan en de noordelijke ventweg en had tot doel om de locatie,

If the national values in the home country of the parent firm influence the behaviour of the subsidiary, it seems logical that subsidiaries from MNEs originating from a country

We here show that, given a linear network code (and its associated set of global coding vectors) that supports a specific rate tuple, we can in fact use the same global coding