The influence of domestic politics on
Israel’s foreign policy
A case study on the changing stance of Netanyahu’s Likud party towards the
two-state solution
Bachelor Thesis Political Science
Roel Bruinsma
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Bachelor Thesis Political Science
The influence of domestic politics on Israel’s foreign policy
A case study on the changing stance of Netanyahu’s Likud party towards the two-state solution Supervisor Dr. Said Rezaeiejan Word count 9011 (excluding footnotes) Student Roel Bruinsma Roelbruinsma@gmail.com UVA ID 10786368 Date January 2018
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“ Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic policy”
Henry Kissinger (American political scientist, former secretary of state, diplomat and national security advisor)
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Table of Contents
Introduction 5
Literature Review & Theoretical Framework 9
Methodology 16
Analysis 18
Conclusion 30
Bibliography 32
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Introduction
The Middle East has always been – and remains to be – a highly tense region where interstate wars, civil wars, terrorism and civil unrest cause turmoil decade after decade. Many countries in the region see their political environment change at a relatively high pace. The Israeli-Palestine conflict, on the other hand, still dominates the geopolitical setting of the Middle East. Although attempts have been made to solve the dispute, the conflict has not come any closer to a solution that is acceptable to both parties involved. Attacks on Israeli soldiers by Palestinians occur on a regular basis and significant acts of violence were committed by both Israel and Hamas during ‘Operation Protective Edge’ in 2014, following the kidnapping of three Israeli students in the West Bank (Shkolnik 2017: 186). Throughout the same operation, 2139 Palestinians were killed and 20.000 homes destroyed (Dearden 2014).
Conflict, civilian casualties and aggression have been taking place since the proclamation of the Israeli independence in 1948. Despite numerous attempts by various actors such as Norway, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) – the most famous being the Oslo accords signed by Rabin and Arafat in 1993 – “Israelis and Palestinians seem as
far as ever from a final status agreement” (Hallward 2011: 185). The Obama
administration made it seem as if they were pushing hard for a two-state solution, according to which a sovereign Palestinian state should exist side by side with the state of Israel (Rumley & Tibon 2015: 79). According to the former president of the U.S., the realization of an independent Palestinian state is the only way to ensure the continuing security and prosperity of Israel (Wootliff 2016). The Israeli newspaper Haaretz (2016) claims that “the two-state solution is a cornerstone of international diplomacy on the
Israeli-Palestinian issue”. The feasibility of such a two-state solution is subject to a lot of
discussion but many authors agree on the fact that it is still possible to implement, although not easy, and above all that it is desirable and necessary (Arieli 2014, Miller 2016).
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It may remain clear that the ‘international community1’ would like to see the conflict
resolved and that in order to achieve this the only viable option would be the two-state solution.
This is a highly relevant and controversial case in Israeli politics that causes fundamental dividing lines in both politics and society. Territory and security are highly politicized in Israel as the country has been involved in numerous armed conflicts since its independence in 1948, fighting for the survival of the nation in the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War (Oron 2012: 1931). Therefore, security has always played a fundamental role in Israeli politics (Falke 2012: 229). The political arena in Israel was, until 1977, dominated by the Labor party, a political force on the left side of the spectrum. However, the elections for the Israeli parliament (Knesset) in 1977 drastically changed the political landscape of the nation as the right wing party Likud achieved victory (Tessler 1986: 13). This marked the beginning of the rise of the political right, which would continue to grow and cause an increase “ in the complexity of political life
and the Jewish state [...]” (Tessler 1986: 52). In contemporary Israeli politics, a tendency
towards the extreme right can be observed. After the elections for the Knesset in 2009, almost a third of the seats in the Knesset were won by extreme right parties, making them a dominant power in Israeli politics (Mustafa & Ghanem 2010: 28).
While different political parties may differ on the peace process between Israel and Palestine and the possible execution of the two-state solution, the latter also causes division within political parties. Netanyahu, the leader of the right wing party Likud2,
stated in his speech at the Bar Ilan University in 2009 that “ [...] we are ready to agree to
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The notion of an ‘international community’ is subject to a lot of debate. Former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan (1999), stated that it is regarded by some as fiction and by some as a work in progress, succeeding and failing in solving problems around the world. According to Buchan (2010: 414), an international community emerged after the Cold War, consisting of Western, liberal states that created a new framework of statehood legitimization. In contemporary political discourse, however, the international community is not monopolized by Western states as both Russia and China incorporate the concept into their discourse. A basic definition is thus provided: “[...] a unified society of states adhering to generally the same norms, rules, identities and views
of moral conduct.” (Ellis 2009: 4).
2 Likud (meaning consolidation) was established in 1973. It was an alliance between several parties on the right,
but is also regarded as the consolidation of “centre-right circles into a single party”(Goldstein 2017: 915-916). Therefore, it remains somewhat ambiguous how to exactly define the Likud on the right side of the political spectrum. However, a political party may seem to belong more to the right wing of the political spectrum than the center right, depending on their list of candidates and viewpoints. In 2012, Likud decided to run on the same ticket as Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home), a political party known to be on the far end of the political right (Gerstenfeld: 2015: 178). Due to their liberal economic viewpoints and their willingness to cooperate with small extreme right parties, Likud is in this paper considered to be a right wing political party.
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a real peace agreement, a demilitarized Palestinian state side by side with the Jewish state”
(Netanyahu, 2009). However, in the following years, ambiguous statements regarding the two-state solution were made and in 2015, just before the elections for the Knesset, Netanyahu made it clear that there would be no Palestinian state if he were to be elected again (Ravid 2015). Keeping the changing Israeli political climate in mind, the definitive refusal of a Palestinian state by Netanyahu was seen by some as a measure of last resort to divert votes on the extreme right to his party Likud. In a time span of less than a decade, the foreign policy of Likud regarding the two-state solution changed multiple times. Given this context, the following research question will be examined in this research paper:
To what extent do domestic politics have an influence on Likud’s foreign policy with respect to the two-state solution?
A lot of research that is done on the foreign policy analysis of Israel is focused on the external factors and threats that Israel faces. Many use a realist and rationalist approach as to measure the power of both Israel and its adversaries because the precarious balance of power in the Middle East is shifting in Israel’s disadvantage (Inbar 2012: 62). The nuclear program of Iran and of other Middle-Eastern countries in the past has encouraged scientists to examine levels of deterrence3. This type of research, however,
regularly excludes domestic factors from the analysis of foreign policy. While this may provide a straightforward scientific framework, it does not contribute to a comprehensive understanding. Shlaim and Yavin (1980: 247) state that Israeli foreign policy is usually explained by the constraints of its external environment. Domestic factors and constraints, nonetheless, are “a decisive factor in the making of Israeli foreign
policy and [...] many of the most salient features of Israeli foreign policy can only be understood when seen against the backdrop of domestic politics.” (ibid).
In order to formulate an answer to the research question, it is firstly needed to discuss the theoretical debate concerning the making of foreign policy in a broad manner. Consequently, the construction of Israeli foreign policy is examined after which the most important indicators are selected that will be used in this research. The methodology section will elaborate on how to make these indicators measurable and which data will
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be used to that end. After the analysis, an answer to the main research question is given in the conclusion.
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Literature review and theoretical framework
A broad range of theories exist that try to explain international relations (IR) and each emphasizes different aspects of those relations. Grand IR theories such as realism and liberalism are inherently different and using either leads to different research methods, analyses and results. Foreign policy, a crucial tool of international relations, is a concept that has been the subject of discussion of many authors within the international relations discipline. For some, foreign policy is simply the direct result of domestic politics4 while others argue that domestic politics do not contribute in any way to
explain or understand foreign policy decisions (Fearon 1998: 290). Some of the main authors on foreign policy will be shortly discussed here in order to show the core argumentation of on the one hand the neorealist and on the other hand the post-positivist and constructivist approach with respect to foreign policy, why the former is deemed as incomplete and why the latter are thus chosen for this research paper. Then, some of the mechanisms through which domestic politics are believed to affect foreign policy are discussed, to show their relevance in regard to answering the main research question.
Over the last decades, one of the most influential writers on international relations and neorealism (also named structural realism) has been Kenneth Waltz. In his book ‘Theory of international politics’ (1979) Waltz uses a rationalist approach to explain why states compete for power in an international system where no higher authority is present that would be able to prevent conflict. Waltz (1979: 72) argues that a general theory of international politics does not need a foreign policy theory and that in order to explain the behaviour of states, one must regard all states the same. Why states behave the way they do does not have anything to do with internal characteristics but rather with the way they are placed in the international system. The nature of the international system and its international politics are, according to Waltz (1979: 122), explanations of foreign policy.
Key concepts and elements that influence the behaviour of a state in the international system (and thus its foreign policy) are based on power. States’ power is measured by
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their resources, military strength and economic capabilities (Waltz 1979: 131). When one of the states in the international system becomes too powerful, other states intervene to restore the ‘balance of power’ (Waltz 1979: 128). The neorealist approach hence emphasizes the rationalist behaviour of states, examining their power and placement within the international system because “[i]t is not possible to understand
world politics simply by looking inside of states” (Waltz 1979: 65).
While the rationalist approach of neorealism may offer some logical explanations for interstate relations, certain aspects of the theory are often criticized. In his article ‘the poverty of neorealism’, Richard Ashley (1984) elaborates on the flaws of neorealist theory and its assumptions. One of the main faults of neorealist theory is, according to Ashley (1984: 238), its state-centric model. This model implicates that the state is treated as an unproblematic entity, “whose existence, boundaries, identifying structures,
constituencies, legitimations, interests, and capacities to make self-regarding decisions can be treated as given, independent of transnational class and human interests, and undisputed” (ibid).
The second flaw is based on the state-centrism described above. The rational actions by states form the international system, in which power is distributed among states to use and which is objectively measurable (Ashley 1984: 244-245). Morale, power over opinion and leadership are deemed as irrelevant ‘psychological factors’ (Gilpin 1981: 13-14). The consolidation of these aspects of neorealism are largely due to the fact that neorealism adheres a positivist vision. Without the given role and definition of states and the international system, neorealists fear that the system will seem a meaningless space of actors and power for which they have no scientific approach (Ashley 1984: 254). While this thesis is not simply a critique on neorealism nor on rationalism and positivism, it is necessary to understand which theoretical voids exist in order to understand how a post-positivist and constructivist approach are better able to answer the main research question. Involving constructed sentiments and policies both domestic and international5 or the influence of non-state actors6 in the framework of
foreign policy and its analysis, may provide a more detailed and comprehensive understanding.
5 For example Shlaim, A. (2014). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World 6
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In her article ‘Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency In the Philippines’, Roxanne Doty applies a post-positivist approach to U.S. foreign policy. Doty (1993: 298) states that the analysis of foreign policy is mostly concerned with answering the question of why certain actions were taken or policies implemented. This means, however, that the background against which this happens is presupposed. She therefore advocates a new type of approach that focuses on the ‘how’ question rather than ‘why’. In this approach, “[w]hat is explained is not why a particular
outcome obtained, but rather how the subjects, objects, and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made possible” (ibid). In other
words, Doty (1993: 303) tries to broaden the scope of the foreign policy analysis using a discursive practices approach. Not just the decision makers have an influence on foreign policy: the information on which they base their decisions is gathered and written by a wide range of individuals, using a certain type of discourse that produces a meaning and constructs a ‘reality’ (ibid).
Political culture
The post-positivist framework and its focus on discourse and language prove useful when examining the cultural approach as described by Aronoff and Aronoff (1996). In their article, Aronoff and Aronoff (1996) argue that the radical shift in policy under the Labor party regarding the negotiation with and recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization, can only be explained by including a cultural approach. This approach incorporates the political culture that defines the collective identity and perceived destiny of society, through which it legitimates the society and system itself (Aronoff and Aronoff (1996: 85). The dominant political culture in Israel has been Zionism, that portrays the Israeli people as isolated and prone to danger from the outside world. This discourse – used by Likud – changed under the labor government when prime minister Rabin declared that “no longer it is true that the whole world is against us.” (Rabin 1992). The perception of danger is thus an important construct that is used as a tool by different political parties. Aronoff and Aronoff (1996: 87) stress, however, that threat perception is not objective: events, albeit they are the same, are perceived differently because they are examined through a cultural or ideological framework. Campbell (1992: 1-2) states that everything can be a risk, depending on how the danger is analyzed. This has important implications for international relations and foreign policy,
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because the interpretative nature of risk decides whether something is a risk and whether a risk is a danger (ibid). As the perception of threat by the Labor party reduced, they were willing to be more flexible in peace talks (Aronoff and Aronoff 1996: 88). Risk and danger perception thus play an important role in culture and ideology which affect foreign policy.
But while the Labor faction saw threat reduction as a moment of opportunity that required fast decision making, Likud had a more conservative cultural approach. Likud was certain that the settlements in occupied land on the West Bank would create a irreversible situation and their claim over that land prevented any possibility of an autonomous Palestinian state (Aronoff and Aronoff 1996: 88-92). The acceptance of a new cultural reality is not achieved solely through political elites; the population and society must share the same ideas and perceptions (Aronoff and Aronoff 1996: 96-97). This relates to the fact that foreign policy can extend beyond government institutions because, as Doty puts it, “The reception as meaningful of statements revolving around
policy situations depends on how well they fit into the general system of representation in a given society.” (Doty 1993: 303). However, the main argument of Aronoff and Aronoff
(1996: 97-98) revolves around the cultural and ideological differences between Israeli society, their political parties and its leaders based on how they perceive threats and security. The dominant ideology and political culture thus influence the policy making process within foreign policy.
While post-positivism does provide a broader scope of examination of foreign policy, its focus on discourse and language would limit this thesis mostly to critique, as it completely ignores ‘hard’ data such as polls, and employment rates. Because using a post-positivist approach for every mechanism – except for the culture mechanism – makes the measurement of those indicators less feasible, a constructivist framework will be applied to the two remaining indicators. Constructivism maintains the importance of culture and ideas while also focusing on power and resources (Hill 2016: 12). According to Epstein (2013: 500-501), both constructivism and post-positivism originate in their common concern for the constructed-ness of the world in international relations theory. However, where constructivism is now seen a middle ground and mainstream theory, post-positivism is deemed more radical, albeit it has strong links with constructivism.
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One of the ‘founding fathers’ of constructivist theory is Alexander Wendt. In his article ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it’, Wendt (1992) argues against the rationalist ideas of neorealism and neoliberalism. Post-positivism and constructivism have a number of viewpoints in common. Where Doty (1993) disagrees with the existence of a presupposed background, Wendt (1992: 395-399) states that the ‘self help system’ and ‘power politics’ – both at the core of neorealist thinking – are institutions rather than presupposed features of anarchy. States, people and other actors direct their actions towards each other based on the meaning that this other has for them; institutions are thus constructed by the ideas of the actors regarding the way the world works (ibid). Constructivism seeks to explain interests, norms and aims to incorporate those into the study of international relations (Ruggie 1998: 884). The world of international politics is a world of our making because, as Wendt (1992: 410) states: “Far from being
exogenously given, the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes competitive identities and interests is constructed every day by processes of "social will formation.””. This has
two important implications: first of all, identities and interests of actors are defined by an inseparable constructed context of norms. Secondly, this means that structures do not just constrain, as in the neorealist view, but also constitute identities and interests. Popular perception & leader competence
That the interests of actors are influenced by a context of norms, values and the ideas of other people manifests itself in this second approach. According to Bueno de Mesquita (2012: 170-171), foreign policy is sometimes used as a diversion from domestic political problems and that choices on ‘war and peace’ are strongly influenced by the chances of re-election for the political leader as well as the stage of his election cycle. When domestic political pressure on the government or leader increases due to rising unemployment, social injustice or other policy failures, foreign policy disputes can be used to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect and show competence (ibid). Morrow (1991) argues that diversionary wars cannot be fully understood without taking into account the political approval that could be gained by resolving an important international dispute. According to Morrow (1991: 264), domestic politics limit the options politicians have with respect to pursuing their own interests. This does not mean, however, that domestic politics are considered to be an obstacle for foreign policy. On the contrary, they are an essential part of the latter (ibid). Leader competence
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and political approval may thus prove to be useful when examining the role of domestic politics in foreign policy making.
Domestic political structure
A third approach to analyzing foreign policy focuses on the nature of the domestic political structure. Shlaim and Yaniv (1980: 247-248) argue that Israeli foreign policy and the peace process can only be understood when domestic politics are included in the framework of analysis. The core element of their argument is that the deadlock of the Israeli stance towards the peace process with both Palestine and other nations, can be traced back to the emergence of deep divisions within the major political parties (ibid). Both secular and orthodox, ‘Eastern European’ and ‘Oriental’ Jews came together in Israel and thus political divisions existed before an organized society was realised (ibid). This has a number of implications. First of all, closing the ranks within the governing parties is relatively difficult as hawks will oppose any dovish7 stance from the
government and Knesset members may turn against their own party’s policy (Shlaim and Yaniv 1980: 255). The Israeli political landscape is very fragmented; it is therefore challenging to formulate a comprehensive and consistent national policy because
“[s]pecific areas of policy tend to be controlled and managed by individual parties or groups with little regard for the collective responsibility of the Cabinet” (Shlaim and Yaniv
1980: 257). Some policy areas, mainly those that concern national security, are limited to only a few top officials (Aronoff and Aronoff 1996: 94).
Furthermore, ministers – unlike the prime minister – are elected by their parties which suggests that opinions carried by the different political parties are transmitted to the government to act as the official policy (Shlaim and Yaniv 1980: 256). Some parties, especially the ultra orthodox parties, seek certain government positions to secure financial resources to maintain their separate education system and allowances (Krebs 2011: 10). Ministers thus seek to retain autonomy for the policy areas they are responsible for, causing friction between them and the executive leader that desires to lead and coordinate (Williams 2004: 912). This shows that understanding the nature of the political landscape is crucial to researching foreign policy in Israel.
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According to Liebes (1992), Israeli society has increasingly dichotomized into ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’. In her research on political discourse of hawks and doves, the former consisted of right wing hardliners who are not willing to give up any territory in exchange for peace. The doves, on the other hand, are more inclined to seek compromise (ibid).
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When taking the above mechanisms into account, it remains clear that domestic politics factors have the ability to influence foreign policy making. Focusing solely on the role of states in international relations would provide a theoretical framework that is too narrow and limited, neglecting non-state actors, perceptions and state-society. This thesis tries to analyze how foreign policy is affected by domestic politics instead of only examining why a certain policy is implemented.
This will be done by examining three different frameworks that, according to the theory, have influence on the foreign policy of Likud. The first approach revolves around the perception of the national identity that exists in Israel, which discourse is used in relation to that culture and what effects that has on the perception of threats and danger. Secondly, an approach is used that focuses on the election cycle and the role that domestic political factors play, in relation to the perceived status of the prime minister. The third approach will encompass the nature of Israel’s political system, focusing on how ethnic, cultural and religious factors cause political fragmentation in a multi-party system and how this affects foreign policy.
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Methodology
This thesis will use the case study of Likud’s stance towards a two-state solution to examine the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy. A case study focuses on the complexity and nature of one case, emphasizing an intensive examination of the setting of the case (Bryman 2012: 66-67). While case studies are frequently used in both quantitative and qualitative research, this thesis will adopt a purely qualitative approach (Bryman 2012: 68). Although quantitative research is able to provide data concerning for example approval ratings, military power or the number of seats that political parties gain, this thesis aims to firstly understand how these factors are constructed and secondly which effects they have on the construction of foreign policy. Qualitative research is therefore more suitable to realise these goals because it achieves understanding through interpreting and sees phenomena as constructions rather than unchangeable and ‘out there’ (Bryman 2012: 380). Quantitative data is used on a small scale to understand the constructed context, rather than to extract direct conclusions out of that data. The indicators that are used are chosen because of their general applicability as well as their specific connection to Israeli politics. While most case studies aim to provide understanding on a certain case in order to extrapolate this knowledge to other studies, this thesis has no such objectives.
The first paragraph of the analysis revolves around the dominant political culture in Israeli society. With the post-positivist approach in mind, political culture was measured by focusing on the discourse used by the political party in power; Likud. Because of the importance of language, only primary sources in the form of speeches and remarks made by Likud’s leader, Netanyahu, have been used. These statements were retrieved from two government-owned websites, namely that of the prime minister’s office8 and
the ministry of foreign affairs9 as well as those published by the two main Israeli
newspapers, Haaretz and The Jerusalem Post. The time period used in this research ranges from 2009 until late 2017 as the elections of 2009 marked the beginning of the Netanyahu administration, which is still in place at the time of writing of this paper.
8 http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/default.aspx. consulted on January 24th 2018. 9
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The second paragraph analyzes popular perception and leader competence by looking at the 2009, 2013 and 2015 elections. The election context was constructed by using data from polls10 and specific academic articles on the run up to the Israeli elections found
through the online library of the University of Amsterdam11.
The third and final paragraph examines the role of the domestic political landscape in Israel. In order to do so, the coalition forming process as a consequence of the peculiar multi-party system was used as an indicator for the political structure. First, an overview of the formed coalition was given based on the data of the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI)12. A selection was then made of academic articles conducting analyses of
the Knesset election results of 2009, 2013 and 2015 to determine possible political leverage of parties. Party standpoints were retrieved from their platforms through the IDI and statements published in the Israeli newspapers Haaretz and Times of Israel during the election period.
Limitations
When analyzing discourse, language plays a key role. It is important to realise that some of the speeches of Netanyahu that were used in this paper were in Hebrew and subsequently translated to English. Subtle changes may be applied for a certain goal; the operation conducted by the Israeli army in the Gaza strip in 2014 was named ‘resolute cliff’ in Hebrew but was translated to English as ‘protective edge’, stressing the defensive aspect13.
Furthermore, only a small amount of speeches and official statements were used. During the 2009-2017 period, Netanyahu has made many remarks at numerous occasion. Given the limited length of this paper it is not feasible to analyze every one of them. Therefore the choice has been made to select speeches from different years and circumstances.
10http://www.bhirot2009.co.il/home.yecms/index , http://www.bhirot2013.co.il/ and
http://www.kas.de/israel/en/publications/16792/ consulted on January 27th 2018.
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http://lib.uva.nl/primo_library/libweb/action/search.do?vid=UVA consulted on January 27th 2018.
12 https://en.idi.org.il/ consulted on January 24th 2018. 13
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Analysis
Chapter 1 – Political culture
In this chapter the dominant political culture in Israel and its effects on Likud’s contemporary foreign policy are analyzed. According to the post-positivist interpretation of Doty (1993), it is quintessential to examine how a certain political culture is constructed that is able to define society, its identities and interests rather than why. Perceptions and culture are not static but change over time, affected by differing political, social and historical experiences and landscapes. It is thus impossible to analyze the dominant political culture and discourse during the contemporary reign of Likud without mentioning the origin of Likud’s ideological inspiration and its contextual framework when Likud first gained power in 1977.
Ze’ev Jabotinsky was the founding father of Revisionist Zionism, which formed the ideological cornerstone of Etzel, an underground right wing movement in the years before the independence of Israel (Galanti et al. 2001: 263). This movement was the predecessor of the Herut (Freedom) party, from which the Likud emerged in 1973. Jabotinsky was part of the Zionist Executive, a branch of the World Zionist Organisation, but he resigned in 1923 because of a territorial dispute regarding ‘Eretz Israel’ which translates to ‘The Land of Israel’ (Galanti et al. 2001: 264). According to Jabotinsky, the Jewish national home should consist of the region both east and west of the river Jordan, a claim abandoned by the Zionist Executive.
The Likud party that won the elections in 1977 was fiercely ideology driven and stressed in particular the concept of Eretz Israel (Shlaim 2014: 359-360). The Labor party, on the other hand, strived towards a more pragmatic driven interpretation and execution of foreign policy. Following their ideological leader’s ideals, Likud declared ‘shlemut
hamoledet’ (integrity of the homeland) as one of their basic principles in its 1977
election party platform: “The right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is eternal and
is an integral part of its right to security and peace. [...] [T]here will be Jewish sovereignty alone. Any plan that involves surrendering parts of Western Eretz Israel militates against our right to the Land, would inevitably lead to the establishment of a “Palestinian State,”
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threaten the security of the civilian population, endanger the existence of the State of Israel [.]” (Shindler 1995: 85).
What becomes clear is that the relationship between security and resigning territory for a possible Palestinian state is not something that has become important during the last decade; especially Jabotinsky was already in the 1920’s constantly thinking about the future problems for Israeli-Arab relations (Galanti et al. 2001: 264). There was, however, one major difference between Jabotinsky and the 1977 Likud leader Menachem Begin that had a big impact on their perception of the world. While Jabotinsky died in 1940, before the Holocaust, Begin lost both his parents and brother during the systematic persecution of Jews during the Second World War. This caused him to view the world as a dangerous place, one that was very hostile towards Israel and above all anti-Semitic (Shlaim 2014: 360).
The Zionist discourse used by Begin for his political ends revolved around everything that the Holocaust stood for. In an effort to gain votes from the Mizrahim (non-European Jews), Begin talked about a united Jewish people that together had survived the Holocaust, but were “[...] forever isolated and exposed to slaughter in an intrinsically
antisemitic, gentile world.” (Lustick 2017: 158). In doing so, Begin created a discourse
that portrayed the Jewish state as David, struggling against an evil world that was Goliath. The PLO was compared by Begin to the German SS and attacking the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 protected the Israeli people from another holocaust (Lustick 2017: 159). The advantage of this political culture of an ‘isolated people’ was that Israeli offensive and defensive actions were in that way legitimized.
Understanding the early ideological core of Likud and the construction of a Zionist discourse used by Begin is relevant when analyzing the Likud of today lead by Netanyahu for a number of reasons. When Likud won the decisive elections in 1977, Begin was its leader, playing an important role in defining Likud’s ideals and strategy. According to Lustick 2017: 160), Netanyahu has followed in the footsteps of Begin, comparing Iran’s nuclear program to the German mobilization prior to the Second World War and Holocaust. Always comparing ‘outside dangers’ to the Holocaust and using this type of discourse leads to the Israeli people getting accustomed to such ideas: they then expect their leaders to act accordingly.
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Just as Begin’s perception of the world and its dangers changed due to the loss of his family during the holocaust, Netanyahu (2016) stated that losing his brother during the famous hostage-rescue in Entebbe changed the course of his life. In addition, it showed once more that the Jewish people continue to be the target of violence: “The hijacking of
the Air France plane to Entebbe touched a raw nerve with the people of Israel. Thirty-one years after the Holocaust, Jews again had to undergo a separation of Jews and non-Jews by those who wanted to kill us.” (Netanyahu 2016).
In his speech at the Bar Ilan University in 2009, Netanyahu stated for the first time that Israel was ready for a peace agreement that included the existence of a Palestinian state. However, the threat of terrorism for Israel was once more underlined: “The Palestinians
cannot make military treaties. Without this, sooner or later, we will have another Hamastan. We can't agree to this. Israel must govern its own fate and security.”
(Netanyahu 2009).
During the years following his 2009 speech, Netanyahu became less explicit on Israeli willingness towards the creation of an independent Palestinian state. He did, however, continue to use a discourse that suggested that a Palestinian state in the West Bank would cause an imminent threat to the Jewish state. In an address before the AIPAC in 2013, Netanyahu remarked that “Israel seeks a peace with our Palestinian neighbors – a
peace that will end our conflict once and for all. That peace must be grounded in reality; and it must be grounded in security. Israel withdrew from Lebanon; We withdrew from Gaza; We gave up territory. We got terror. We cannot allow that to happen a third time.”
(Netanyahu 2013). According to the ideology of Likud, the West Bank is part of Eretz Israel. Giving that up only leads to terror and a deteriorating security situation in Israel. In speeches at the UN, on memorial days and at institutions, Netanyahu and Likud keep reminding the Israeli people and the world who the real ‘enemy’ is. In 2012, prime minister Netanyahu (2012) said about the Palestinians that “[t]heir unwillingness to
accept a Jewish state in any borders whatsoever is the root of the conflict. […]They are raising the younger generation to hate. They are educating for the destruction of Israel. I do not see here any discourse for peace; there is no discourse that prepares the way for coexistence. The discourse is one of hatred and the destruction of the State of Israel.”.
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A discourse is created that is dominated by a political culture of danger to the Jewish people. Unlike Rabin (1992), who stated that Israel is no longer on its own in this world, Netanyahu and Likud are actively promoting a discourse that pictures Israel as a bastion of Western values under siege by terrorism and anti-Semitism. This discourse originates from the perception of having an ‘historical’ right to Eretz Israel, which is needed to provide a safe haven for the Jewish people who are under a constant threat. The continuous referencing to the Holocaust, the danger of Palestinian terrorism and the fight for survival of Israel all work towards creating a social identity in which a Palestinian state is deemed dangerous and undesirable. For Likud this is necessary if it wants its cultural reality to be accepted by the population: the threat perception of the population is made the same as that of the government.
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Chapter 2 – Popular perception & leader competence
This chapter aims to examine the role of Netanyahu and Likud their political approval and competence in relation to their stance towards a two-state solution. As mentioned in the literature review and theoretical framework, choices on war and peace are influenced by the political leader’s chances of re-election (Bueno de Mesquita 2012: 170-171). In the Israeli context, an analogy can be made between the tense contemporary status quo (war) and the creation of a Palestinian state (peace). It is not the intention of this thesis to state that an autonomous Palestine coexisting with Israel means that peace will be the result. However, a two-state solution is regarded by the international community to be the only way to enduring peace (Guterres 2017). This would imply that the implementation of the two-state solution is partly dependent on the election context.
To get (re)elected, a political leader needs to gain popular support. Because interests and preferences of both the electorate and the politician are not given but shaped by “a
range of personal, intra-state and international factors” (Hill 2016: 116), this chapter
analyzes the elections of 2009, 2013 and 2015 by looking at on the one hand polls and salient issues and on the other hand Netanyahu’s standpoints at that time.
2009 Knesset elections
The elections for the 18th Knesset were originally scheduled for 2010, but prime
minister Olmert resigned after corruption allegations and a deteriorating security situation following the 2006 Lebanon war. Thus, elections for the 18th Knesset were held
on February 10th 2009. Initially, Likud lead by Netanyahu adopted a relatively centrist
position compared to right wing Yisrael Beitenu (Hazan and Diskin 2009: 655). During his campaign, Netanyahu refused to rule out the possible creation of a Palestinian state and proclaimed that he would not be building new settlements (Rynhold 2010: 151). This is in line with his speech at the Bar Ilan University later that year, where Netanyahu stated that a Palestinian state would be realistic if its security were to be under Israeli control. Furthermore, 59% of the Israeli population supported a two-state solution14,
14
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compared to 55% in 2005 and 47% in 200315. This increase in support may have
induced Netanyahu to become more tolerant on the subject16. However, Yisrael Beitenu
was gaining momentum in the polls climbing from 11 seats at the end of December 200817 to 16 seats two weeks before the elections18. According to Rynhold (2010: 154),
this swift rise caused Netanyahu to move his comments and discourse more towards the political right.
A second important aspect of these elections is how the electorate interpreted the main theme of the 2009 elections. Shamir et al. (2015: 1001) explain in their article that there are multiple frames for understanding elections and the most obvious frame relates to leadership determination and policymaking. The elections were preceded by an Israeli ground offensive in Gaza and this shifted the focus towards security instead of possible peace talks, paving the way for Netanyahu to claim victory (Marcus 2009: 55). The policy of Likud and Yisrael Beitenu was more security orientated and “[p]ublic
perceptions of the credibility of the candidates to take charge of Israel’s foreign and security policy also played a role in reinforcing the preference for Likud.” (Rynhold 2010:
156). Because peace talks were not the main issue of the elections, Likud was able to take a moderate stance to attract centrist votes while maintaining a more aggressive approach towards Iran and Lebanon.
2013 Knesset elections
In 2012, Netanyahu stated that he was not able to obtain a majority in the Knesset for the budget and the parliament voted to dissolve (Gerstenfeld 2015: 177). According to Perliger and Zaidise (2015: 206), the resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians was ignored by almost all of the political parties during the following campaign. The combined list of Likud and Yisrael Beitenu was relatively certain of becoming the biggest block at the end of the elections (Gerstenfeld 2015: 186). With the expected results of the elections, Netanyahu would be able to continue governing with his right-wing block,
15
http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/january-2005-poll-majority-of-israelis-and-palestinians-support-geneva-initiative-content Consulted on January 8th 2018.
16
It is important to realise that objective polls are non-existent and time specific. There is a big difference in the opinions of Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs. A topic as salient as the two-state solution causes opinions to be highly volatile and prone to outside factors, such as rocket attacks or other security threats. Nonetheless, it does provide insight in a more general trend.
17 http://www.bhirot2009.co.il/home.yecms/poll/20 Consulted on January 9th 2018. 18
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but in his search for legitimacy from the middle-class he was to incorporate center party Yesh Atid (Lewin 2015: 297). While Netanyahu openly expressed to be in favour of a two-state solution, some of his party members did the opposite and Likud members stated that Netanyahu was only doing this to please voters (Gerstenfeld 2015: 184). 2015 Knesset elections
After Netanyahu fired two ministers because he claimed they were conspiring against him, the 19th Knesset dissolved itself on December 3rd 2014 (Gerstenfeld 2016: 578).
The new elections were scheduled for March 17th 2015 and quickly turned into a
campaign that was mainly targeting Netanyahu (Gerstenfeld 2016: 580). Slowing economic growth19 gave voters decreasing confidence in Netanyahu’s ability to manage
the economic situation while at the same time 41% of the Israeli’s blamed the prime minister for the severe housing crisis (Gerstenfeld 2016: 585-592).
Because of the constant attacks aimed at bringing down Netanyahu, Likud tried to shift the focus of the electoral debate from socio-economic issues to a more security related discourse (Rahat et al. 2016: 113). In his speech at the United States congress, Netanyahu addressed the Iranian nuclear threat and his domestic campaign underlined the internal threat posed by Israeli Arabs, depicting the political left as a danger to society (ibid). Demonstrating military power and an aggressive security policy, Israel allegedly conducted airstrikes in Syrian territory to destroy armament on its way to Hezbollah in Lebanon (Kershner 2014). As stated in the theoretical framework, foreign policy disputes can be used to show political strength and multiple parties accused Netanyahu of solely conducting the airstrikes with the purpose of influencing the elections (Gerstenfeld 2016: 582).
In a final attempt to move the debate away from socio-economic problems, Netanyahu introduced a more radical ‘us versus them’ discourse to mobilize the political right, warning of a “threat of Arab voters swarming to the polls in droves” (Moshe 2016: 767). At the last day before the election, Netanyahu – during a campaign stop in East-Jerusalem – proclaimed that there would be no Palestinian state if he were to be elected prime minister once more, resigning his support for a two-state solution (Peters and Pinfold 2015: 407).
19
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Over the years, Netanyahu’s stance on an independent state varied from being explicitly in favour in 2009 to becoming more ambiguous during the 2013 elections, while openly rejecting any such plan in 2015. This analysis makes the case that Netanyahu, in pursuing his interests – namely to win the elections – was constrained by the perceptions of his competence by the electorate. Therefore, Netanyahu had to act accordingly, changing his view on a Palestinian state over time.
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Chapter 3 – Domestic political structure
Where the previous two chapters focused on the construction of discourse and the perception of leader competence, this chapter will look at the role of the domestic political structure. As stated by Hill (2016: 238), the – as he names it – constitutional structure of a nation plays an important role in defining the composition and style of a country’s foreign policy. To understand pivoting opinions on foreign policy issues such as the two-state solution, it is necessary to analyze Israel’s intricate multi-party system and social undercurrents (Shlaim and Yaniv 1980: 248). First, a brief overview is given on the multi-party system, after which the coalitions of 2009, 2013 and 2015 are examined.
Israel’s electoral system is known to be based on the most extreme form of proportional representation. The whole country is regarded as one district, in which seats for the Knesset are awarded to a party in proportion to the number of votes it receives. Parties are only limited in participating by having to pass the qualifying threshold (Hazan and Diskin 2009: 655). According to the Knesset20, a large number of parties emerged
because of this system, as important changes were taking place in Israel and “it was important to enable maximal representation for various groups and opinions.”.
These various groups make Israel a very heterogenic nation. Early settlers that moved to Palestine before the emergence of the Jewish state of Israel were joined by religious and secular Zionists, Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews, ultra-Orthodox and immigrants from many countries such as Russia and Ethiopia. The bringing together of secular and religious Jews from all around the world caused ideological turmoil, especially when different ideas about the future of the territories that were gained in the 1967 war are taken into account. The division between secular and religious elements of society continues to be influential. Lijphart et al. (1999: 39) state that Israel’s plural society is predominantly based on its paramount secular-religious divide rather than the Israeli-Arab division.
20
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Before the 1977 elections, the Labor party could form relatively stable governments because it always gained a powerful number of seats in the Knesset. This lessened the need to find multiple strong coalition partners and ensured stability (Kenig 2005: 557). After Likud’s victory, however, the political landscape became more bipolar and thus additional coalition support was needed to form a government. This gave religious parties – in particular Shas – their ‘king making’ ability (ibid). Coalition forming dominates Israeli politics and in 1974 there had already been 17 different governing coalitions (Nachmias 1974: 316). According to Lardeyret (1991: 32), this creates a situation where relatively small political parties obtain a disproportionate share of power due to being the key to a majority. In an attempt to achieve more stable governments, a system was introduced in 1992 that enabled the direct election of the prime minister (Kenig 2005: 558). However, this increased political segregation because voters started using a ‘split-vote strategy’: “support a minor sectarian party without
damaging the chances of a major political bloc winning the election” (ibid). Therefore, the
system was abandoned in 2001, which slightly decreased party fragmentation but nevertheless remained at a high level. (Kenig 2005: 556).
The national unity government of 1984 is an example of political paralysis caused by structure of the coalition. Consisting of seven parties and 25 ministers, an additional inner cabinet was formed with members of the two biggest parties. This led to two significant problems. On the one hand, establishing a common foreign policy was impossible due to the wide variety of ideologies in the coalition. On the other hand, important decisions required unanimity in the inner cabinet giving those parties de facto veto power (Shlaim 2014: 438). Because the two major parties were the left orientated ‘Alignment’ and right wing Likud, the peace-process was slowed down once more. Coalitions and coalition forming are thus an integral part of Israeli politics. The nature of the coalition partly decides the direction of Israel’s foreign policy but is hindered by inter and intra party divisions (Hill 2016: 242). The next part of this chapter will therefore consist of a brief analysis of the three most recent coalitions headed by Netanyahu.
2009 coalition
This coalition (graph 1) is remarkable because of the inclusion of the Labor party. Visions on territorial agreements and the two-state solution of the political left (Labor)
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and the political right (Likud, Yisrael Beitenu and the religious parties) made the coalition susceptible for disagreement and instability (Kenig 2009). Netanyahu’s campaign prior to the election was focused on being a centre party and he subsequently wanted both Kadima and Labor to join his coalition. Ignoring the National Home party to avoid becoming seen as an extreme right coalition, Netanyahu offered Labor five ministerial posts. Likud thus preferred the costly support of Labor over the right wing nationalist National Home (Diskin 2010: 67). While this gave the dovish Labor party a strong bargaining position, its leader Barak was mainly interested in continuing holding the defence ministry post, ignoring the Palestinian issue for the most part (Diskin 2010: 66).
2013 coalition
The surge of Yesh Atid in the 2013 elections gave Lapid’s party the role as king maker in the coalition making process (graph 2). Netanyahu planned on making a broad centre right coalition to avoid relying on the support of The Jewish Home, but negotiations were not easy and took six weeks (Peters 2013: 321). Because Hatnuah was the first party to join the coalition, it was rewarded with – relatively seen – many ministries, as well as being placed in charge of the negotiations with the Palestinians (ibid). According to Ashkenas (2015) the persistence of Hatnuah in trying to renew the peace negotiations clashed with The Jewish Home and their policy on expanding settlements. However, the negotiations with the Palestinians were a negligible subject of coalition agreements and should initially not have had an important impact on Likud’s policy.
2015 coalition
Initially, the coalition forged in 2015 did not include Lieberman’s Yisrael Beitenu as he refused to join, leaving the governing parties at a marginal majority of 61 seats. This put The Jewish Home and Shas in a strong bargaining position with Likud, as their resignation from the coalition would mean losing the majority (Kenig 2015). Kulanu and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) were the first to join, and eventually Yisrael Beitenu agreed to join the coalition in 2016 (graph 3). Finding the lowest common denominator among these parties on a policy concerning a Palestinian state is difficult, given their proposals
29
on the subject in 2015. In their party platform21 The Jewish Home state that they are
against any type of Palestine state in the West-Bank. The religious parties mostly ignored the issue and Yisrael Beitenu proposed to annex settlement blocks in the West-Bank in exchange for Israeli territory inhabited by Arab citizens (Ahren 2015). Taking into account these different viewpoints, it is difficult for Netanyahu and Likud to formulate a policy that would be supported by a majority.
Apart from the inter-party divisions in the coalitions, several disputes have manifested themselves within Likud itself. In 2012, chairman of the coalition Ze’ev Elkin stated that the time of giving to the Palestinians was over and that Israeli sovereignty had to be applied over the entire area of Judea and Samaria (Ahren 2012). The next year, several members of Knesset for Likud advocated the annexation of the whole or parts of the West Bank, declaring that the two-state solution was dead (Ahren 2013). A poll conducted with cabinet members in 2016 showed that only four out of the twenty ministers openly supported a two-state solution, with six Likud ministers expressing their opposition to such a plan22.
Conducting a consistent foreign policy on the two-state solution is increasingly difficult when the coalition spans across the political spectrum. Even within the political right itself, opinions on crucial elements of the two-state solution such as Jerusalem and the settlements differ substantially. Taking into account the intra-party divisions as well, where party members turn against their own party’s policy, formulating a new policy on the two-state solution is virtually impossible and the issue is thus mostly ignored.
21
https://en.idi.org.il/media/6078/%D7%94%D7%91%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%94%D7%95%D7%93%D7%99-2015.pdf (Hebrew) Consulted on January 10th 2018.
22
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Conclusion
The Israeli-Palestinian issue remains to be one of the most discussed, controversial and above all unresolved conflicts in contemporary international politics. In the Middle-East, the stakes are always high and the complexity of every situation makes political analysis significantly more challenging. Traditional IR theories such as neo-realism and liberalism have proven to be inadequate and this thesis has therefore used a constructivist and partly post-positivist approach. Rejecting the state-centric view of neo-realism with its presupposed structure and given interests, this thesis tries to focus on the domestic factors for foreign policy to provide an answer to the research question ‘to what extent do domestic politics have an influence on Likud’s foreign policy with respect
to the two-state solution?’.
It is impossible to formulate an exact answer to this question; giving a certain figure or percentage regarding the influence that domestic politics has on foreign policy compared to extra-state factors would be wrong and incongruous with the theory. Nevertheless, this research has shown that domestic politics do have a significant effect on the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of Netanyahu and Likud regarding the two-state solution, through multiple mechanisms.
Zionism, the isolation of the nation and the danger for the Jewish people remain the dominant political culture in Israel. On the one hand, this culture is reinforced by the discourse used by Likud, proclaiming to be in a continuous fight for survival. On the other hand, a context is created in which every threat is perceived to be an imminent danger, causing the possible creation of a Palestinian state to be seen as dangerous. The second chapter showed that Netanyahu’s ideas on a possible Palestinian state were constrained and defined by the elections and the perception of the electorate. Salient issues during the elections and a hardening political climate that shifted towards the right forced Netanyahu to change the main themes of the campaign and his own viewpoints.
Lastly, the analysis of the domestic political structure in Israel has shown that coalition forming is the endgame of Israeli politics. During this process, that is practically
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unavoidable in the extremely fragmented politics and society, ideological views on territory are mostly put aside to achieve more immediate gains. Thus, a complicated and salient issue such as the two-state solution is mostly ignored, which can lead to an – ironically – very consistent policy of maintaining the status-quo.
What the exact outcome of the effects of the described mechanisms on Likud’s policy is, remains unclear. Answering that question is, however, not the goal of this thesis. Waltz’s view that foreign policy is purely decided by international factors has proven to be incorrect. The other extreme, phrased by Kissinger as ‘Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic policy’ is also to narrowly focused. Foreign policy is constituted through a complex mix of domestic and international factors that are individually important but nevertheless inevitably intertwined.
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