The interaction process of the private sector-led urban area development of the Lammenschansdriehoek : an actor-centred institutionalist analysis

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Julian Neerincx August 2016

Master thesis Urban and Regional Planning

The Interaction Process of the Private Sector-led Urban Area

Development of the Lammenschansdriehoek:

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Background

This research has been carried out against a background in which established practices in urban area development are being questioned. Recent trends within Dutch society such as

privatization, decentralisation, and municipal financial losses on active land policy, have pushed private actors into a more central role in urban area development (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014). In this light local authorities and property developers are exploring new ways of collaboration in urban area development projects. This not an easy task. Problems arise when so many different stakeholders with deviating or even contrasting interests have to interact and work together in order to arrive at coordinated action. For decades, such difficulties in the Netherlands have been addressed by national and local authorities taking on a leading role in urban area development. However, the abovementioned recent trends within Dutch society have pushed private actors into a more central role in urban area development (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014).

Some private sector-led urban development projects have already been implemented in the Netherlands and preliminary evaluations point out that difficulties arise in reaching

agreements between the different actors. In light of this observation, a case study is proposed that tries to understand how the interaction process between different stakeholders eventually leads to a decision develop an urban area. This aim leads to the formulation of the following research question:

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How do the interaction processes between stakeholders in the private sector-led urban area development of the Lammenschansdriehoek lead to a decision to develop?”

The subject of the case study is the interaction processes of the private sector-led urban area development of Lammenschansdriehoek. The Lammenschansdriehoek, an area located in Leiden, is currently being redeveloped. Several projects have been initiated, each with its own specific interaction process consisting of numerous stakeholders. Two of these projects are of a central concern in this research: project Yours Leiden and Project Kanaalpark.

1.2 Relevance

Private sector-led urban area development is a relatively new phenomenon in the Netherlands. So far, not much scientific research has been done on this this topic. This is unfortunate, since in a context of progressive neoliberal practices in society at large, the occurrence of private sector-led urban area development projects will increase. Therefore, it is desirable to have more knowledge on how the interaction processes that consist of various stakeholders result in decision to develop. This research tries to fill this gap by the analysis of two interaction processes concerning two private sector-led urban area developments.

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1.3 Outline

This study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 consists of a theoretical framework in which the concept of private sector-led urban area development will be elaborated upon. Chapter 3 will subsequently give insight in the analytical framework that guides the empirical research. Chapter 4 will thereafter elaborate on the methodology of research, after which chapter 5 will introduce the case of this research. In the chapters 6 and 7 the actual analysis of the projects Yours Leiden and Kanaalpark is performed. Chapter 8 provides a conclusion on the research.

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Chapter 2 Private sector-led urban area development

2.1 Introduction

The central concern of this research is the interaction process within the private sector-led urban area development of the Lammenschansdriehoek. To understand this process, first a clear conceptualization of what constitutes private sector-led urban area development is needed. The aim of this chapter is to provide this conceptualization. The discussion will structurally narrow its scope from general processes of urban area development toward the specifics of urban area development led by private parties. In doing so it will also give a first indication of the

interaction process within urban area development.

The chapter will be structured as follows. First section 2.2 will give a general

introduction to the field of urban area development. Section 2.3 will subsequently narrow the focus by introducing the various types of parties and their individual motivations involved in urban area development schemes. Section 2.4 will define what constitutes private sector-led urban area development by reference to the structured collaborations between the involved public and private actors. Section 2.5 will conclude the chapter and once more summarize its contribution to the subject of this research.

2.2 Urban area development

Urban area development is concerned with the transformation of existing urban areas (Franzen et al., 2011: 19). Ambrose (1994: 37) refers to urban area development as part of a system that produces additions to and renewals of the built environment. He identifies the following five consecutive stages of the production and subsequent life of an element in the built environment:

 Promotion: associated with the decisions that are to be made to initiate the production of a built structure on a specific site and its subsequent implementation;

 Investment: the commitment of financial resources to a scheme;

 Construction: the production of a built structure by combining land, labour and capital;

 Allocation: the process of assigning the built structure to a user;

 Management: maintaining the built structure until the end of its usable life. Of the five consecutive stages of development, this research is most concerned with the promotion stage. The purpose of the research is to understand the interaction processes that result in decisions to develop urban areas. Such decisions will, if understood in terms of the system of Ambrose (1994), be made in the promotion stage. Since this research is not merely focused on the actual decision to development, but also on the interaction process that causes it, the scope of the research should, in addition to the promotion stage, also include the period of time preceding it.

Ambrose’s elucidation on the development process also provides a first indication of potential stakeholders in urban area development. In his scheme developers as well as authorities with statutory responsibilities are initiators of urban area development. They are also expected as potentially having influence in the subsequent development stages, due to their early involvement. Their involvement in the promotion stage labels them as stakeholders, but Ambrose (1994) also states that there is no necessary one-to-one relationship between the type

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7 of actors and the stage of development.

Urban area development is often described in relation to capital accumulation. In fact, starting points for the scientific understanding of urban area development in general have been provided by Marxist scholars, who referred to its relation with the capitalist system of for-profit production (Gotham, 2001: 2). According to Harvey (1973: 280) investment in land and

property is an important means for accumulating wealth and crucial for the specific ways in which cities develop. Harvey (1973: 145) elaborates on urban renewal (and also on the opposite process of urban disinvestment) as part of the continuous reshaping of the built environment to create more efficient stages for capital accumulation. Urban area development is thus,

considering a Marxist perspective, inescapably intertwined with the aim for capital accumulation.

Building on this line of thought, urban area development is understood as concerned with particular processes of capital accumulation (Ambrose, 1994: 37). In essence, it is concerned with changing -producing- the built environment at a particular site (Buitelaar, 2004). For this to occur, first an initial capital sum (M) is required that is committed to the purchase of several production commodities (C): labour, building materials and a site. These are then combined in the production process (P) to produce a finished commodity (C’) such as a building or other built structure. The value of the finished commodity (M’) is subsequently realized through the market by either the sale of the commodity and receiving a lump sum payment, or by retaining ownership and benefiting from future rent payments (Ambrose, 1994: 38).

Given its distinct process of capital accumulation, the development of urban areas deviates from that of general commodities in numerous ways (Ambrose, 1994: 38). Firstly, land is needed to be able to construct the commodity and will for this reason form a large part of the value of the building. Land is owned by a legal someone who, as a result of his ownership, is entitled to a set of rights that may freely be put to use (Burns, 2005: 19). The right of development and extraction of profit are those rights considered most importantly in the context of urban area development. Secondly, after a building or structure has been constructed or renovated, it will remain where it was built and will not be moved to a market. Consequently, its value will be influenced by local events (Dubben & Williams, 2009: 47). Third and lastly, buildings or built structures have, in contrast to most commodities, a semi-permanent life (Ambrose, 1994: 38; Dubben & Williams, 2009: 39).

2.3 Actors and their interests in urban area development

Urban area development as a process, is engaged by a variety of parties with their own individual interests for involvement in each of its five consecutive development stages

(Ambrose, 1994: 37; Franzen et al., 2011: 18). To understand urban area development insight is needed in the parties that shape the process by their involvement in, for example, the stages of promotion, investment and construction. This section will therefore aim to provide a clear overview of the main parties involved in urban area development and their underlying interests. It is not possible within the scope of this research to provide a comprehensive overview of all types of actors and their motivations for involvement, since possible combinations seem to be endless. For example, a construction company might be involved in activities generally associated with a developer, but at the same time also act like an investor and design

architectural plans. Or instead participate in some of these activities and not in others. In the face of practicality, parties in this section are therefore as much as possible combined on the basis of their motivations for involvement in urban area development processes. A distinction of

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8 parties into three different groups will be applied on the basis of three distinct overarching interests (Ambrose, 1994: 41).

2.3.1 The profit-seeking private sector

According to Ambrose (1994: 37), the main interest of the profit-seeking investor in urban area development is, as the name suggests, to accumulate capital. A profit-seeking investor acts in the interests of his shareholders. His ultimate aim is to make a profit, which will be served if the market value of the constructed or renovated building is higher than the initial capital used to purchase building materials, labour and a site (Ambrose, 1994: 38). Whilst Ambrose identifies an uniform private sector that is characterized by its aim for capital accumulation, other scholars apply additional subdivisions.

Both Dubben and Williams (2009: 183) and Franzen et al. (2011: 27) identify property developers as essential actors in urban area development. Property developers undertake projects at the their own expense and risk. In general they are largely engaged in the

construction of buildings. Their financial risk-taking tends to be short-termed (Franzen et al., 2011: 27), since after the completion of a project developers transfer their interests in the project to an investor. Franzen et al. (2011: 27) note that within a Dutch context developers are increasingly involved in large-scale urban area development, and thus also involved in longer termed risk-taking. Within the category of property developers different combinations exist with builders, investors, architects and banks. In addition, developers tend to specialize in certain segments such as residential housing or retail.

Investors in urban area development are financial institutions that invest money on a long-term basis as a necessary part of their primary task in the management of pension or insurance funds (Van Gool et al., 2007: 88; Franzen et al., 2011: 27). Their aim is to have a sound return on their large terms investments. Dubben & Williams (2009: 15) differentiate between long-term investors, who resemble the description above, and term funders. The short-term funder provides the funds needed to purchase the site and the payment of fees and contractors (Dubben & Williams, 2009: 15). He or she is ultimately interested in loan repayments including accrued interest, in order to achieve certain investment yields.

Builders are the private parties that actually construct the buildings and infrastructure. Within a Dutch context traditional builders have increasingly become involved in more

integrated urban area development in which multiple parties have to cooperate (Franzen et al., 2011: 27).

Architects are involved in the design of the individual parts and the totality of an urban area development (Franzen et al., 2011: 28). Formally, they work under contract in urban development projects commissioned by actors such as developers and investors.

Estate agents play roles in different stages of an area development. Their knowledge on markets is valuable in regard to the estimation of market potential in the initiation stage, and in regard to the realization stage for the sale of buildings and individual units such as houses or commercial spaces (Van Gool., 2007: 89; Franzen et al., 2011: 28).

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2.3.2 Public authorities

Legally defined public authorities differ from profit-seeking private sector in their involvement in the built environment and their underlying motivations. In general, motivations of councillors and public managers involved in activities that shape the built environment are different, and sometimes even opposed, to those of the managers of profit-seeking private investors. The main rationale behind government intervention in the built environment is stated as to be the public interest, and not capital accumulation (Ambrose, 1994: 39). It is something that planners and governments use to legitimize their spatial interventions (Alexander, 2002; Campbell & Marshall, 2002; Sager, 2012). The conceptual meaning of the public interest within a spatial domain however, is controversial (Moroni, 2004; Lewis, 2006).

An often heard argument amongst these critical scholars is that a single public interest simply does not exist. Contemporary society is viewed as fragmented, and there is no such thing as ‘the public’ or ‘a common interest’. Instead, it is assumed in line with a notion of a pluralistic society, that there are many publics with diverging, competing, little overlapping or even incommensurable interests and values (Burton & Murphy, 1980; Kekes, 1993; Moroni, 2004). Within this abundance of values it remains challenging to determine what constitutes the public interest. Situations can occur in which conceptions of the public interest in fact represent the interests of the powerful and privileged (Nozick, 1974: 32; Campbell & Fainstein, 1996: 13).

Alternative views state that a public interest is identifiable. In the utilitarian perspective the public interest is understood as the collective sum of individual utilities (where an individual utility is the satisfaction of interest, desires and preferences) (Bentham, 1960: 126; Alexander, 2002; Moroni, 2004; Sager, 2012). Often, the utility measures happiness and pleasure are used in this regard (Alexander, 2002). In the example of happiness, public intervention is regarded as to serve the public interest when it aims to increase the total sum of happiness of a collective (e.g a city). Distributional consequences such as significant individual losses are basically ignored and justified in the name of the greater good of the collective (Bentham, 1960: 127; Alexander, 2002).

So far the public interest has been presented as a justification for public intervention in the built environment from a more general planning theoretical perspective. In regards to the Dutch context, the protection of the public interest within the built environment has been inextricably linked to its understanding as a public task. Illustrative of this idea is the following definition provided by The Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (‘Wetenschappelijke

Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid’):

“a public interest exists once a government believes it crucial to secure a civil interest as this interest otherwise would not be secured” (WRR, 2000: 20; Heurkens, 2012: 370)

In more concrete terms this conception of the public interest has led to the public involvement in the built environment through the coordination of individual decisions regarding land and land use, the correction of market failures such as environmental pollution or inefficient spatial developments, and the protection of individual rights and interests (Voogd et al., 2012: 12). In regards to the specific field of urban development, there is a recurrent use of cost-benefit analysis by public authorities in the evaluation of the desirability of urban area development projects (Ecorys/Ministery of VROM, 2009; Rijksoverheid, 2012). This essentially reveals a Dutch public tendency to an utilitarian conception of the public interest (Alexander, 2002), and thus a possible justification of individual losses for the greater good of the collective.

Public authorities are not by any means an uniform entity. In regards to Dutch urban development various authoritative levels exist in the form of the municipality, the province, the national government, and the European Union. In addition, within each level there are various departments such as the those of spatial planning, economic affairs, transport and real estate.

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10 Depending on the particular site and policy priorities all of these departments and levels of government may have their own particular interests to be involved and serve the public interest in specific urban development projects.

Since municipalities are entitled to make decisions regarding the territory on which an area development is planned, most public intervention in urban development projects originates from this local level (Franzen et al., 2011: 26). The role of municipalities in public law in

combination with their ability to use private law, provides them with the opportunity to play the role of director in urban area development projects (Franzen et al., 2011: 26).

Higher authorities such as the province or central government can be incentivised to be involved in local urban area development as well. Again under the umbrella of serving the public interest and through the establishment of policy principles that have to be taken into account at lower authoritative levels, or the granting of financial subsidies (Franzen et al., 2011: 26). Examples of such activities are found in the development of the so-called key projects

(‘sleutelprojecten’), in which the Dutch national government invested in the strengthening of the social-economic structure and redevelopment of various cities (VROM, 2003).

2.3.3 Civic Societies

Franzen et al. (2011: 28) position the users of areas under development such as citizens and entrepreneurs under one heading. The motivations of these users vary. Local residents may have for example very different orientations toward roads and parking garages as part of a planned development than entrepreneurs. In addition to the local users, there is often also involvement of organized civic societies known as voluntary interest groups (Franzen et al., 2011: 29). Their motivations vary greatly. Some civic societies are in fact organizations consisting of local residents or entrepreneurs that guard the interests of their constituents. Whilst others operate on (inter)national levels in their aim for, for example, environmental preservation.

In general civic societies operate on a non-profit basis (Ambrose, 1994: 39). They resemble local public authorities in the sense that they also try to achieve maximal quality within a cost-effective way. They, however, differ from the abovementioned local authorities in the sense that their existence and the activities they undertake are not statutorily required, nor are they as an actor democratically accountable (Ambrose, 1994: 40).

In a Dutch context, housing associations have traditionally played an important role in urban area development as well. Originally, housing associations are non-profit organisations tasked with the social objective to provide affordable housing for middle and higher income groups (Van Gool et al., 2007: 88). In previous years however, a shift in national government strategy to the provision of market-oriented housing has resulted in housing associations increasingly acting like private parties (Franzen et al., 2011: 28).

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2.4 Private sector-led urban area development

The research is concerned with private sector-led urban area development practices in a Dutch context. So far, urban area development has been conceptualized as a multi-staged urban process shaped by the interests of various actors. The aim of this section is to clarify what is meant by an urban area development that is private sector-led.

An explanation of private sector-led urban area development is provided by Heurkens & Hobma (2014) who state that it is based on a public-private organizational arrangement for the managing of an urban area development, in which property developers take on a leading role and local authorities facilitate. In order to understand what such an arrangement encompasses, the following section will elaborate on the various ways in which public and private parties structure their relations in urban area development in the Netherlands.

2.4.1 Dutch approaches to urban area development

Land use planning and real estate development are closely related. Public intervention in land use patterns influences private investment in real estate, while at the same time the

achievement of public sector planning goals is often dependent on the willingness and ability of private actors to act in accordance with these goals (Van der Krabben, 2014). In urban area development these interdependencies induce particular ways in which public and private actors structure their interaction. Decisions have to be made on which actor is responsible for land development activities such as the acquisition of land, the preparation of the site, the sale of the serviced building plots, and the actual construction of property. This section will predominantly be concerned within the land development stage of urban area development, since it is at this stage that private sector-led development differs from other approaches to urban development.

Scholars that study Dutch development practices refer to the structured interactions between public and private actors with various denominations. Interchangeably, terms are used such as organizational arrangements and development models (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014; Van der Krabben, 2014), cooperation models (Heurkens, 2012: 148), land management strategies (Van der Krabben, 2014) and municipal strategies for land and property development (Ary et al., 2010).

Notwithstanding their different denominations, all deal with the structuration of relationships between public and private actors. Within the specific model of public-private partnerships - a model in which there is organisational and contractual cooperation between public and private actors - actors must make arrangements on the financial, organizational and legal aspects (together so-called institutional aspects) of an urban area development project in order to achieve its successful realization (Franzen et al., 2011: 108; Heurkens, 2012: 97)(see figures 1 and 2). In concrete terms an urban development project’s legal aspects are the publicly defined rules and requirements that must be taken into account, the financial aspects are its revenues and risks, and the organizational aspects are its tasks and responsibilities. Hence, these three aspects will reoccur in the discussions on private sector-led development and other Dutch approaches to urban development to the extent that they are helpful in the characterization of the former.

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12 In the Netherlands the following five ‘ideal’ or conventional development models can be

identified: the public and private development models, the building claim model, the joint venture model and the concession model. All are currently applied in Dutch urban development practices, but have changed in popularity throughout the past decades. In addition to these five models, the discussion will also elaborate on two alternative models that have only recently been introduced in a Dutch context: the piecemeal, incremental development model and the urban land readjustment model. Both fall under the heading of private development, but nonetheless are dissimilar to conventional private development. Since the aim of this section is to characterize private sector-led development within the spectrum of Dutch approaches, the discussion will be limited to the prime characteristics of the different development models.

Figure 3 provides an overview of how the different development models, including those viewed as private sector-led, compare to one another if measured on two characteristic

variables. The variables are the distribution of financial risks and responsibilities amongst public and private actors; the relationship for each of the seven development models is shown in figure 3. Figure 3 specifically shows that private sector-led development is not limited to one development model, but consists of several. In addition, it is also reveals that the more a

development becomes private sector-led, the more risks and responsibilities associated with the development are carried by the private sector and less by the public sector. As such, figure 3 visualizes two distinctive characteristics of private sector-led development.

Risks & Revenues

Legal Organizational Rules & Requirements Tasks & Responsibilities Financial Institutional aspects Interorganizational arrangements

Figure 1: the institutional aspects of partnerships in urban area development projects.

Source: Heurkens (2012).

Figure 2: the interorganizational arrangements of partnerships in urban development projects.

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2.4.2 Traditional approaches: public and private development models

For decades the dominant land development strategy of Dutch municipalities has been an active land development policy. Municipalities were directly involved in the land development process through the purchase, ownership, servicing and readjustment of the land into building plots, before their release to the private sector for actual development (Van der Krabben & Needham, 2008; Van der Krabben, 2014). The private sector consisting of predominantly builders, private developers or users, was free to purchase the ready-to-build-on parcels and develop their schemes for housing, commercial buildings or any other desired development. In recent years however, this active land development policy, often also referred to as the public development model, and its dominant role of public authorities has lost ground to more market-based development practices and a more facilitating role of public authorities (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014).

The popularity of the public development model from a municipal point of view is based on the opportunity to develop the land according to public policies, cover the costs of public works (e.g. public space, infrastructure) through the sale of building plots and retrieve some of the surplus value of the land after a change of land use (Van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013). Additionally, private actors welcome the model because it minimizes their exposure to financial

PPP Building Right Public development PPP Joint Venture PPP Concession Private development:  Self-realization

 Urban land readjustment

 Piecemeal, incremental development

Low priv at e risk s H igh p riv at e risk s H igh p ubl ic risk s L ow pu bl ic risk s

Low private responsibilities High private responsibilities High public responsibilities Low public responsibilities Figure 3: responsibilities and exposure to financial risk in Dutch

development models.

Source: modification of Heurkens (2012), also based on Van der Krabben (2014).

Private sector- led

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14 risk, since the financial costs of land development are borne by the municipality and not the developer, while it also enables a focus on their prime aim, namely the development of property and not land (Franzen et al., 2011; Van der Krabben, 2014).

The public development model has become less popular due to various reasons. Firstly, the ongoing process of ‘neoliberalization’ in Dutch society and its translation in successive waves of privatization, deregulation and decentralization has pushed urban development toward more market-based practices, and thus away from the conventional public development model (Heurkens and Hobma, 2014; Van der Krabben, 2014). In addition, European legislation that opts for a strict division between public and private roles opposes the former hybrid form of Dutch municipalities, in which on one hand it regulated land use, while on the other it applied an active land development policy driven by profit-based incentives (Heurkens, 2012; Heurkens & Hobma, 2014). Lastly, loss in support for the public land development model is also caused by severe financial losses experienced by municipalities, and the support this has rendered

amongst scholars and government for alternative approaches (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014; Van der Krabben, 2014).

The public development model is one of two traditional approaches to land development that have been dominant in the Netherlands from the post-war period stretching to 1980s (Oudman, n.d.). The other is private development in which private land owners such as

developers, invoke the so-called self-realization right (‘het zelfrealisatierecht’) that allows them to develop their land in accordance with the publicly defined requirements (Kenniscentrum PPS/Ministry of Finance, 2006). In this model the municipality merely provides the planning framework, most clearly reflected in the adoption of a land use plan, that has to be taken into account by the developing land owner. The latter subsequently undertakes all other activities required for the intended development and bears the risks associated with these, which range from the design of a development plan (‘stedebouwkundige visie’) to the actual construction of the site.

2.4.3 Public private partnerships (PPPs)

The 1990s in the Netherlands witnessed the introduction of models of public private

partnerships (PPP’s) in urban area development. Klijn and Teisman (2003) broadly define these public-private partnerships as co-operation between public and private actors with a durable character in which actors develop mutual products and/or services and in which risks, benefits and risks are shared. They are based on the idea that co-operation is able to create mutual added value that otherwise would be unattainable. Three kinds of PPPs exist in Dutch land

development practices: the building right model, the joint venture model and the concession model (Heurkens, 2012: 148). The first two will be elaborated in this section on PPPs, the third in the subsequent section that discusses private sector-led development models.

The building rights model is applicable in situations in which private developers have acquired land in an area of planned development and want to invoke their right for self-realization (Oudman, n.d.). Within the building rights model private developers are willing to sell their unserviced land to the municipality without making any profit, and thus often below a market conform price (Franzen et al., 2011: 107). In return they obtain building rights that for example guarantee them the first right to buy serviced building plots at certain predefined prices, locations and sizes and develop within certain permitted functions (Van Dijk et al., 2007; Ary et al., 2010; Heurkens, 2012: 150). A private developer will demand such conditions in order to maximize the potential value of the real estate it plans to develop. Since the municipality is responsible for the actual land development and carries all its underlying risks, it will demand influence as well. The extent to which both public and private actors will be able to influence the

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15 development, is therefore ultimately dependent on the conditions of the building rights grant, and the negotiations that precede these (Kenniscentrum PPS/Ministry of Finance, 2006). In the negotiation, private actors will have a relative strong position as the initial owners of the land. Automatically, this will translate in less municipal influence on the actual development than in for example a public development model. However, since the municipality at one point will own and sell the land, it will be able to share in any increases in its value (Kenniscentrum

PPS/Ministry of Finance, 2006). A developer in the building rights model is less exposed to the financial risks of land development and prone to less influence than in the private development model.

In a joint venture model public and private actors mutually establish a special purpose vehicle (SPV ), in a Dutch context often in the form of a ‘gemeenschappelijke

grondexploitatiemaatschappij’ (GEM), through which risks, activities and responsibilities for the

land development are shared (Kenniscentrum PPS/Ministry of Finance, 2006; Franzen et al., 2011: 108). This makes the model an attractive option for public and private actors that for example wish to share financial burdens and expertise in development projects (Ary et al., 2010; Heurkens, 2012). Actors are exposed to the risks of the land development in proportion to their individual participation in the GEM. Often, this will equal a fifty-fifty share divide between public and private actors.

2.4.3.1 Private sector-led urban area development: the concession model; the incremental, piecemeal development model; and the land readjustment model

A third and last public private partnership is a model viewed by Heurkens and Hobma (2014) as the Dutch concrete manifestation of private-sector led development: the concession model. Gijzen (2009) defines a concession as:

“A form of contract in which clear financial arrangements are made beforehand between public and private actors involving a deliberate choice by the public actor to transfer to the private actor the risks, revenues and responsibility of the plan development, preparation, implementation and eventual management and operation of the entire project area, within a beforehand publicly defined set of conditions, as to achieve the goal of efficient and effective roles and tasks and a clear separation between public and private responsibilities. Steering by the public authority is limited to the monitoring of the recorded arrangements.”

Thus, a private sector-led development based on a concession model, implies a facilitating role of the municipality and a leading role of the developer in the management of an urban area

development (Heurkens, 2012: 22; Heurkens & Hobma, 2014). The public authority stipulates beforehand a set of public requirements regarding the infrastructure, public space and building program. The private developer is subsequently free to plan and develop his schemes in

compliance with these requirements (Franzen et al., 2011: 108). Since developers perform the land and property development, and consequently bear all the costs and risks associated with plan development, site preparation, and also the construction of infrastructure and public space, they will demand considerable influence in the development (Oudman, n.d.).

In a situation in which the public authority is also the owner of the land, the adoption of a concession model provides it with additional benefits. A municipality is able to organize a tender process, in which private developers will compete for the right to acquire and develop the land (Bijsterveld, 2009). This competition possibly increases the quality of sent in

development plans, and the possibility of attractive price offerings for the land.

The concession model is closely related to the model of private development, since in both models there is a facilitative public authority that provides the planning framework within

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16 which a private actor performs the land and property development (Oudman, n.d.). A difference is that a concession often entails the construction of infrastructure and public space by the developers, while in a private development this is viewed as a public task. In addition to the concession model Van der Krabben (2014) identifies two alternative

development models he considers private sector-led. Similar to the concession model, the incremental, piecemeal development model and the urban land readjustment model, both imply a facilitating role of the municipality and a proactive role of the private actors within the

development.

Incremental, piecemeal development implies that a municipality presents a broad vision on the (re)development of a location, and private actors are subsequently invited to develop plans that comply to this vision (PBL, 2012; Van der Krabben, 2014). Initiatives that are compatible with the vision will consequently be legally facilitated by the municipality through for example the adoption of new land-use plans. The incremental, piecemeal strategy contrast with other development models, such as those part of PPP, in that the realization of the

municipality’s vision on an area is not guaranteed. The municipality is dependent on individual initiatives, instead of agreement(s) struck beforehand that guarantee the implementation of a certain building program and public infrastructure. These private initiatives might cover small sections, and not the whole area.

In addition, cost recovery of public works is more challenging in incremental

development (Van der Krabben, 2014). While for example in a public development model costs associated with the construction of public works could be covered through the sale of building plots, this is not an option in an incremental model. Certain costs such as those associated with the so-called indirect overarching public works (e.g. motorway access or additional public transport services etc.), may be difficult to cover, since developers can only be forced to contribute in the face of profitable schemes. Incremental development by ways of many small, less profitable projects will hinder the identification of these indirect overarching public works and make their subsequent cost recovery in broad municipal visions more difficult (PBL, 2012; Van der Krabben, 2014).

In the strategy of land readjustment, also known as land pooling, the initiative for development lies with the owners of land and property that are already present in the

development location (Van der Krabben, 2014). Land readjustment implies that the structure and boundaries of an area are transformed to allow for development, while the original owners will keep the land (Larsson, 1997)(see figure 4). Urban land readjustment is considered an attractive development model in a context of fragmented landownership and when no individual owner or developer is willing to take the risk of acquiring all land and properties and redevelop the area (Van der Krabben, 2014). In the Netherlands, land readjustment has traditionally been widely applied in rural areas to increase a farmer’s efficiency in the use of the land (Needham, 2007; Van der Krabben, 2014). Since 2014, however, the Dutch government has started a national program to experiment with the practice of land readjustment in urban settings (Muskee, 2014).

Land readjustment can be implemented on a voluntarily as well as compulsory basis. In both situations, the owners of scattered plots and property in a given area transfer their land and property rights to a self-established special purpose vehicle or a third party such as a property developer, who will then on behalf of the collective redevelop the area. The land is reparcelled to make room for the development of public infrastructure such as roads and public space and to create additional value for the original owners. (Larsson, 1997). After the

completion of the area development, the original owners are again assigned property rights, which will equal the size and/or value of the individual land inputs (Larsson, 1997; Van der Krabben & Needham, 2008; Van der Krabben, 2014). The costs of the development of public infrastructure are subsequently covered through the individual contributions of the original

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17 land owners who will have benefited from land value increases, and/or through the sale of reserved parcels of land (Van der Krabben & Needham, 2008; Van der Krabben, 2014).

For a private landowner urban land readjustment might be attractive since the integrative development, including the construction of public infrastructure, can lead to substantial increases in value of individual landholdings, even when the newly obtained rights entitles one to land parcels and property smaller in size than the original input (Sorenson, 1999). For a municipality it is an attractive model, because it allows for development in the context of fragmented landownership, while also limiting the municipal exposure to financial risks, since the municipality is not involved in the large-scale acquisition of land or property. Instead, the financial risks of development is largely borne by the original land and property owners.

While voluntary land readjustment is induced by the development intentions of the original owners, who will privately arrange the necessary exchange of land ownership rights (Larsson, 1997), mandatory land readjustment refers to its implementation on the basis of a legal instrument. This instrument employed by a public authority would enforce development in situations in which a majority of all land owners is in favour of development that also takes into account publicly defined goals. A minority of opposing land owners is then overruled by

majority vote and they have to cooperate or are expropriated (Van der Krabben, 2014). Urban land readjustment as a legal instrument does not yet exist in the Netherlands, contrary to countries such as Germany and Japan. However, there is currently a national discussion on the

Before development:

The owners of land parcels and property (owners A, B, C etc.) intent to redevelop the area, and therefore transfer individual land and property rights to a redevelopment company responsible for the redevelopment scheme

After development:

Land has been reparcelled to allow for redevelopment of the area and the original owners are assigned property rights equal in size or value to their original input. The costs of new public infrastructure (public space and new infrastructure) is covered by contributions of the owners and/or through the sale of reserved land

Urban land readjustment model

Figure 4: urban development on the basis of an urban land readjustment model. Source: own creation.

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18 adoption of a planning law that would provide public authorities with the legal means to enforce this private model of land readjustment.

2.5 Conclusion

The aim of this theoretical section has been to conceptualize private sector-led urban area development. Urban area development in general is understood as a process consisting of five consecutive stages (e.g. promotion; investment; construction; allocation; and maintenance) in which various parties with their own specific set of interests are involved. Since the research is concerned with the interaction process that precedes and results in decisions of development, both the promotion stage as well as the period of time that precedes it will be investigated in the empirical section of this research.

The concept of private sector-led urban area development is conceptualized as an urban area development project in which private actors have a leading role and public authorities facilitate. Three specific development models can be labelled as private sector-led: the concession model; the piecemeal, incremental development model; and the urban land

readjustment model. In these models private parties are increasingly engaged in activities such as land acquisition, site preparation, plan development and the construction of public

infrastructure. Thus, more risks and responsibilities associated with the development are carried by the private sector and less by the public sector.

Chapter 2 has conceptualized the term private sector-led urban area development. In the next chapter attention will be paid to the conceptualization of the interaction processes in private sector-led urban area developments

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19

Chapter 3 Analytical Framework

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has clarified what is meant with private sector-led urban area

development. This chapter will aim to provide an understanding of the interaction processes within urban area development as games in which various parties have specific individual interests that intersect. This conceptualization will be provided as part of discussion in which the analytical framework of this research is introduced.

Section 3.2 will introduce the framework of ACI, Game Theory and rational-choice institutionalism. Section 3.3 will elaborate more on game theory and its value for this research. In section 3.4 the main concepts of the ACI framework will be discussed in detail. Followed by section 3.5 in which ACI and its applicability to the subject of this research is outlined. Section 3.6 will elaborate on the stakeholder theory applied in this research. The chapter will conclude with a summary in section 3.7.

3.2 ACI, Game theory and rational-choice institutionalism

The main theoretical background of this research is provided by conceptualizations derived

from actor-centred institutionalism (ACI) and its origins in game theory and rational-choice institutionalism. Their analytical value in regards to the purpose of this research, lies in their explanation of social (and political and economic) phenomena as the outcomes of strategic interactions shaped by institutions. Consequently, these theories provide meaningful conceptualizations to understand the interaction processes of private sector-led urban area development. This section will outline the fundamental concepts of game theory and actor-centred institutionalism, and elaborate on their shared foundation in rational-choice institutionalism.

3.3 Game theory

Game theory, in essence, is a bag of analytical tools designed to help understand the phenomena observed when decision-makers interact (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994: 1). It proceeds from the assumption that phenomena are to be explained as the outcomes of strategic interaction amongst interdependent rational decision-makers. Consequently, the analytical tools of game theory can be applied to any situation in which actors or decision-makers are assumed to pursue well-defined exogenous objectives (they are rational) and his or her behaviour is based on knowledge and expectations of what the other actor(s) involved in the situation will do (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994: 1).

3.3.1 Fundamental concepts of game theory

The fundamental concept of game theory is strategic interaction. Strategic interaction, according to adherents of rational choice institutionalism, implies that an actor’s behaviour is likely to be

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20 driven by strategic calculus and, second, that this calculus will be affected by the actor’s

expectations about how others are likely to behave as well (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Individuals are assumed to seek to maximize the attainment of a set of goals given by a specific preference function and, in doing so, behave strategically, which is to say that they canvass all possible options to select those conferring maximum benefit. Thus, actors or decision-makers are assumed to be rational in the sense that they are exclusively motivated by self-interest; each decision-maker’s objective is to maximize the expected value of his own payoff (Scharpf, 1997: 69). In terms of cognitive capacity, this inherent self-interested motivation of actors is

accompanied by an ability to select those courses of action that in fact maximize their self-interest (Scharpf, 1997: 20).

Game theory uses several concepts to conceptualize strategic interaction: actors; strategies; and payoffs. Actors are supposed to reason and act only in their own self-interest, under conditions of complete information and unlimited cognitive capacities (Scharpf, 1997: 6). An actor participating in a game is characterized by his capacity to make purposeful choices among a selection of alternative courses that optimizes his self-interest. The strategies of the individual players are the courses of action available to each player. They are the options a player has in a given situation. If the strategies of the different actors are interdependent, and thus the ultimate outcome of the interaction will be affected by the players involved, a game exists (Scharpf, 1997: 7). Ultimately, a payoff represents a player’s preference for certain possible outcomes. It is an individual valuation of a possible outcome of the game according to the preferences of the actor involved.

The interaction process of a private sector-led urban area development can be

conceptualized according to game theoretical conceptions. The interaction process of urban area development in general is a process in which various parties participate, each party having its own specific set of interests. A profit-seeking investor for example aims, as their name suggest, to accumulate capital. Considering game theory, this self-interest would be the main interest guiding its actions. A game exists, if in a given urban area development the interests of the profit-seeking investor intersect with the interests of other parties such as local residents. Residents might be opposed to the intentions of a profit-seeking investor who wants to initiate a

development due to its aim to accumulate capital. Each party guided by its self-interest will thereafter act strategically, which means that they will take into account the courses of actions available to the other party, and use this knowledge to maximize the benefits for its own self-interest.

3.3.2 Applicability of game theory to real-life settings

Game theoretical reasoning is very abstract. In their study of explanations of phenomena, game theorists have tried to understand conflict and cooperation by studying quantitative models and hypothetical examples (Myerson, 1997). In the use of these analytical tools lies its appeal to social researchers. The design of models to abstract complicated real-life situations, is beneficial to the understanding of interactions in real-world choice situations. Simplification renders clearer insights. However, this simplification also makes many game theorists unwilling to claim explanatory validity for their models (Scharpf, 1997: 6). An often heard argument is that game theory presupposes extreme unrealistic assumptions. Game theory starts by assuming that all actors are perfectly rational in their behaviour; actors are supposed to reason and act only in their own self-interest under conditions of complete information and unlimited cognitive capacities. These unrealistic demands have led game theorists to be sceptical or reject empirical applications of game theory. A reason to apply ACI, instead of conventional game theory in the

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21 empirical research, is that it offers a more realistic view on actors and the motivation behind their actions. This will elaborated in greater detail in the following section.

3.4 Actor-centred institutionalism

This research applies game theoretical reasoning to real-life situations, namely the interaction process of the urban area development of the Lammenschansdriehoek. This does not come without challenges, since game theory presupposes certain extreme demands, such as perfectly rational actors, that are not met in real-life situations. In order to still benefit from the

conceptualizations provided by game theory, a framework called Actor-Centred Institutionalism (ACI) is applied to the empirical research.

ACI is of particular importance in regards to the purpose of this research, since it systematically applies the concept strategic interaction in combination with theory that is, in contrast to classic game theory, empirically grounded. Hence, ACI provides a helpful bridge between the abstract concepts of game theory and the need for empirically observable variables; it makes a combination of game theory and empiricism workable. This does not mean that only conceptualizations provided by ACI will guide the empirical research. Stakeholder theory will also be employed.

3.4.1 Explaining the ACI framework

ACI uses conceptualizations provided by game theory and rational-choice institutionalism. In correspondence with these theories, ACI proceeds from the assumption that social phenomena could be explained as the outcomes of structured interactions among rationally acting actors, and that these outcomes are shaped by the characteristics of the institutional settings in which they take place (Scharpf, 1997). Thus, both the institutional setting as well as the interactions between actors are seen as causal factors of the decision-making process (see figure 5). Yet, there is a hierarchy in causalities. Institutional settings are understood as the remote causes of certain outcomes or decisions, while actors and their courses of action are the proximate causes (Reus, 2014).

So far, ACI does not defer from either game theory or rational-choice institutionalism. Differences become evident in the conceptualization of the capacity of actors to act rationally and strategically. ACI does not adhere to the notion of perfectly rational actors. Instead Scharpf (1997: 19) takes on the assumption that people and actors do not act exclusively on the basis of self-interest, but also on the basis of their subjectively defined interests and normative

convictions of how it is right or appropriate to behave under certain circumstances. This cultural approach to human behaviour, as opposed to a more calculus approach, implies that the

motivation and preferences of the actors involved are constrained by social norms and

institutional rules (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Scharpf, 1997: 21). Furthermore, in real-life people are limited in their capacity to act strategically. Strategic behaviour in a game theoretical sense, as mentioned before, implies that actors are assumed to have knowledge on the rational responses of each actor to the expected behaviour of each of them. This is however unrealistic since humans do not have the computational capacity to process this, and thus subsequently act on it.

In an attempt to be more realistic in regards to actors and their capacity to act rationally and strategically, Scharf introduces the concept of bounded rationality. Rationality is still viewed as the basic driving force of social interaction, but human knowledge is assumed limited and human rationality bounded by culturally shaped and socially constructed beliefs about the real world (Scharpf, 1997: 21; Boessen, 2008). In this conceptualization of actors bounded in their rationality, one which will be used in the course of this thesis, actors do whatever they can to maximize their interests, but within a more realistic view of complete information and utility maximization (Scott, 2001).

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22 The ACI framework conceptualizes an interaction as a game in which actors act strategically. It uses the concepts actors, actor constellations and modes of interaction to describe strategic interaction. Actors are assumed to have certain preferences for interaction outcomes and manipulate those of others, in order to steer the interaction outcome toward their own

preferences. To facilitate the achievement of goals and to control conflicts within the interaction process, actors apply modes of interaction such as negotiated agreement, hierarchical direction, majority vote and unilateral action. Conceptually this all implies that within this research, a model is drawn up in which the outcome of an interaction process (e.g. urban area development) will be understood as the dependent variable, and actors, actor constellations, modes of

interaction and the institutional setting as the independent variables (see figure 5). The urban area development environment constitutes, in combination with the institutional setting, also the context of the interaction process. All these fundamental concepts of ACI will be elaborated in greater detail below.

3.4.1.1 Actors and their characteristics

ACI conceptualizes actors as the participants in decision-making processes (Reus, 2014). They

can be individuals, but also larger entities such as political parties, unions and firms that consist of a plurality of individuals. Ostensibly, such a conceptualization poses a problem in the context of game theory. Game theory assumes actors to behave rationally and strategically. Individuals, that is, individual human beings, are assumed to be capable of this. They have preferences for certain interaction outcomes, and try to satisfy these. Even they, however, may struggle to act on their multiple selves. They are held individually accountable for their actions. An actor in this thesis is, following the definition of ACI, defined as being capable to act rationally and

strategically, but in a realistic assumption of human motivations and cognitive capacities. This is Figure 5: the framework of actor-centred institutionalism as

applied in this research.

Source: own creation based on Scharpf, 1997.

Institutional setting

Urban area development environment (physical, economic, social-cultural, ecological)

Actors Orientations Capabilities Modes of interaction Actor constellations Urban area development

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23 the main assumption that defines as actor.

However, what if an actor consists of many different individuals with different

perceptions of the situations and different preferences to outcomes, and thus possible courses of actions. How are the orientations of these larger units subsequently represented? What, in the course of this research, are for example the preferences of a real estate developer or a

municipality that consist of many different individuals. Scharpf (1997) deals with this problem by treating these actors that consist of several or a great many individuals as a unit with unitary interests. Thus the numerous individuals that constitute a property developer are understood as having the same interests when acting on behalf of their organization.

3.4.1.2. The orientations and capabilities of an actor

Individuals or organizations are capable of strategic action, that is, to choose strategies that maximize their expected utility (Scharpf, 1997: 58). The capacity of an actor to act strategically depends on his or her orientations and capabilities. Orientations signify the individual rationales on why and how to act; an actor’s motivation for his or her actions. Actor orientations are

shaped by the specific institutional setting in which they are present (see figure 5) and can be stable or change in the course of the interaction process. They consist of perceptions and preferences. Perceptions are viewed as the subjective perceptions of reality (Scharpf. 1997: 60; Boessen, 2008). Scharpf (1997: 40) disaggregates this concept into four different components: basic self-interest; normative role orientations; identity; and interaction orientations. It is expected that this subdivision will make it easier to obtain empirical evidence of the more complex concept preferences. Also, through the inclusion of three other preferences than basic-self-interest, it is once more propagated that actors are not believed to be purely driven by rationality.

Basic self-interest of actors refers to their preference for autonomy, self-preservation and growth (Scharpf, 1997: 64). It is important to emphasize that these, just like all other actor orientations, are shaped by the institutional environment within which individuals or

organizations are situated (see figure 5). The preference component called normative role orientations shapes the individual actions of an actor in regards to social expectations. Organizations are often created to serve particular purposes; they have certain normatively specified organizational goals and assignments. Lack of attainment to these goals will potentially result in social disapproval.

Normative role orientations are potentially similar to the preference basic self-interest. Sometimes the distinctive lines between different preferences becomes blurred; motivations of actors can be categorized as belonging to more than one category. This is not a problem, since the purpose of the subdivision, namely to identify arguments in the decision premises of actors, is still served.

The preference identity is used to categorize those intermediate motivations of actor behaviour in which neither generally held normative social expectations, nor basic self-interest are of much help (Scharpf, 1997: 65). Actors may selectively emphasize certain normative organizational rules or aspects of basic self-interest that go further than those that generally apply to actors of their type. These preferences of self-characterization are referred to as

identity. Actors that have defined a distinctive identity reduce the uncertainty surrounding their own behaviour for themselves and other actors. In this way they increase the efficiency of interactions (Scharpf, 1997: 65).

A fourth and last preference is interaction orientations. These refer to the relational dimension of actor orientations. The assumption that actors are bounded in their rationality, results within the concept of actor orientations, in a notion of actors as not exclusively occupied

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24 with maximizing their own self-interest, but also, positively or negatively, concerned with the payoffs the other actors receive. Decisions of actors are influenced by the nature of their mutual relationships. These can for example be hostile or competitive in nature or be based on altruism or solidarity (Scharpf, 1997: 86).

Whereas the orientations of actors represent what they want to achieve, their

capabilities determine the probability of realising this. Together, orientations and capabilities make certain strategy options possible, and others nonviable (Boessen, 2008). The capabilities of actors are the action resources actors can utilize in order to influence the outcome of a decision-making process. These can be both material (e.g. financial resources) and immaterial (e.g. human and social capital).

3.4.1.3 Actor constellations and modes of interactions

Decision-making processes are rarely controlled and modified according to the orientations and capabilities of one actor. In reality, combinations of actors, within ACI called actor constellations, will determine what decision will be made. According to Scharpf (1997: 31) an actor

constellation represents a static picture of actors, their orientations and capabilities, the evaluation of the individual payoffs and the degree to which these payoff aspirations are compatible. Therefore, an actor constellation describes in fact the level of potential conflict within an interaction.

The mode of interaction, which is the way actors are assumed to interact with one another, subsequently specifies how the conflict is going to be resolved and is concerned with the dynamics of the actual actor interaction. As such, they are concerned with the transition of game constellations into interaction outcomes. Scharpf (1997: 15) distinguishes four different modes of interaction to resolve potential conflict: unilateral action, negotiated agreement, majority vote and hierarchical coordination.

Unilateral action refers to actions taken by an individual actor that are one-sidedly and based on their objective to maximize their own payoff. No agreements or other kinds of

coordination takes place with the other actors. An actor simply takes action based on his orientations and capabilities, within the constraining conditions shaped by the institutional setting.

The mode negotiated agreement occurs if the courses of actions of actors are interdependent and actors try to jointly decide (Reus, 2014). This mode’s effectiveness in

achieving agreements increases in institutional settings in which for example property rights are protected and agreements have legal binding force. Its potential to create agreements

diminishes however with any increase in actors involved, since this will be accompanied with higher transaction costs. Furthermore, agreements that are struck will include concerns about the increase of overall welfare and the distribution of this amongst the actors involved. (Scharpf, 1997: 120).

Hierarchical direction implies an actor controlling the decision-making process by marginalization of the influence of the other actors. Often it is based on a superior capacity of and actor to threaten or reward the other actors involved, or on a legitimate hierarchical authority.

Majority vote occurs if a decision is reached based on the majority rule. In constellations with many actor involves, with different and potentially opposing interests and goals,

cooperation can still be reached through collectively binding decisions. This compliance of the actors involved needs legitimacy of some kind. Positive rewards and negative sanctions are means to achieve compliance of all actors involved, but in order to have a durable character they have to be based on rules that are accepted as legitimate by the actors involved (Scharpf, 1997: 152).

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25 other encapsulates the strategic interaction that lies at the heart of game theory in general, and ACI in particular. The distinction between these concepts are merely for analytical purposes, in reality they are very much intertwined (Boessen, 2008).

3.4.1.4 The institutional setting

An institutional setting in an influential component within ACI. Within this framework it is defined as a system of rules that structures the courses of action that a set of actors may choose (Scharpf, 1997: 38). It does so by influencing the different elements (e.g. actors; actor

constellations; and modes of interaction) individually. In the framework of Scharpf (1997) the institutional setting constitutes of legal rules and social norms (Scharpf, 1997: 38). In this research policy is also included as part of the institutional setting, because policy influences the courses of actions available to actors, and thus how they will behave in the interaction process. Thus, both conventional municipal regulation in the spatial planning such as land use plans, and policy such as structure visions are understood as part of one legal framework.

The conceptualization of an institutional setting and institutions belongs to the tradition of rational-choice institutionalism. One issue fundamental to any rational-choice institutional analysis will be discussed briefly, since it is believed that this will provide an argumentative basis for the use of conceptualizations of institutions provided by ACI. Rational-choice

institutionalism assumes a specific view on how institutions affect the behaviour of individual actors, and how institutions originate or change (Hall & Taylor, 1996). In line with the calculus approach, institutions provide actors with certainty about the present and future behaviour of other actors. Institutions provide information on the behaviour of actors by for example enabling the enforcement of agreements and penalties for defection. Institutions within the tradition of rational-choice institutionalism, thus, are in fact sanction rules. They exist because they facilitate a more smooth interaction between actors; they lower the transaction costs of an interaction.

3.4.1.5 The urban area development environment

The urban area development environment in this research is understood as the physical, economic, social-cultural and ecological facets of an area in which a development takes place (Franzen et al., 2011: 81). It provides, together with the institutional setting, the context in which the interaction process is situated. The physical facet refers to the tangible manifestations in the area and the economic facet to its the economic activities. The socio-cultural facet is used as a term to refer to the identity of an area, whilst the ecological facet deals with the local environmental quality (Franzen et al., 2011: 81).

3.5 Application of ACI to private sector-led urban area development

The ACI framework will be applied to make sense of the interaction process within private sector-led urban area development. Since ACI is originally used as a framework to explain public policy, its application within the setting of this research will be accompanied by certain

alterations. These will be discussed in this section. Scharpf (1997) used the ACI framework to investigate public policy at the (inter)national level. This already poses differences between how ACI has originally been used, and how it is going to be used in the course of this research. This research is not interested in the explanation of public policy. Within the interaction process of privately-led urban renewal projects, public actors are present, but most of the time this is

The interaction process of the private sector-led urban area development of the Lammenschansdriehoek : an actor-centred institutionalist analysis

The Interaction Process of the Private Sector-led Urban Area

Development of the Lammenschansdriehoek:

Table of contents

Chapter 1

Introduction

“

Chapter 2

Private sector-led urban area development

Chapter 3

Analytical Framework