Utilitarian moral decisions as a reflection of a utilitarian outlook

Utilitarian moral decisions as a reflection of a utilitarian

outlook

Michelle Rasch

10724613

Department of Clinical Psychology, Universiteit van Amsterdam Bachelor thesis

Responsible researcher: J. W. B. Elsey, MSc.

Collaborators: Izabella Engelmoer, Broeno Rijnders, Byron Valkenburg Number of words: 5431

Number of words in the abstract: 131

Index

Appendix I: Moral dilemmas in English 25

Abstract

In this experiment it was researched whether the utilitarian decisions in sacrificial moral dilemmas are a good reflection of a utilitarian outlook with a correlational design. The roles of psychopathic traits and religious convictions were researched as well. 286 participants answered sacrificial moral dilemmas to measure their utilitarian decision-making in the dilemmas. A modified dictator game was used to measure a utilitarian outlook. The SRP-SF measured psychopathic traits. No correlation between utilitarian decision-making in moral dilemmas and in the monetary tasks was found. Psychopathic traits correlate with utilitarian decision-making in sacrificial moral dilemmas, but not with utilitarian decisions in the monetary tasks. Religious convictions had no effect. The results were in accordance with the main hypothesis. Utilitarian decisions in sacrificial moral dilemmas are not a good reflection of a utilitarian outlook.

Utilitarianism

Morality has been a subject of philosophy and religion since the beginning of

humanity (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2014). The words ethics and morality are interchangeable more or less. Morality is a set of habits and ideas that determine the way we think people should live. This set of habits differs from person to person. However, it is generally classified into few possible approaches.

For contemporary psychological research on moral decision-making, mostly sacrificial moral dilemmas are used. These dilemmas are considered to be a good way to separate people with a utilitarian outlook from people with a deontological outlook. In sacrificial moral dilemmas a person has to make the decision whether they would sacrifice a person’s life to save the lives of others, or not. The difference between personal and impersonal sacrificial

moral dilemmas is that in the personal dilemmas the person has to perform the action of killing someone themselves, where in the impersonal dilemmas they get to do it in an indirect matter, by pushing a button or hitting a switch, for example (Green, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). More people would think the sacrifice is acceptable in the impersonal dilemmas than they would in the personal dilemmas (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). People with a deontological outlook make moral decisions based on whether an action itself is acceptable or not. People with a utilitarian outlook make a decision based on whether the consequences of that action are considered good (Conway & Gawronski, 2012). Utilitarianism is widely believed to be the normative ethical standard (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). A utilitarian decision would focus on impartially maximizing welfare. In this study the focus lies on utilitarian decision-making and the utilitarian outlook, because a utilitarian decision could just as well be made as a result of reduced concern about causing harm. Sacrificial moral dilemmas are based on the assumption that people either make utilitarian or deontological moral decisions, with no in between or other options. Therefore, the decision made in these dilemmas is either considered deontological or utilitarian. In moral dilemmas utilitarianism is considered as rejecting many deontological rules for the greater good. Rejecting deontological rules is a feature that it shares with other views such as egoism, which is likely to be a view of point for psychopaths (Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015). Therefore, the question that arises is whether personal sacrificial moral dilemmas are a good method of research for the question whether people actually have a utilitarian outlook and mean well for others.

Psychopathy is a personality disorder generally considered to consist of two factors. Factor 1 is about the interpersonal and the affective facets of this disorder. The interpersonal facet is about how people interact. Psychopaths might manipulate other people, lie to people, act superficially charming, and have a grandiose sense of self-worth. The affective facet is

about emotions. Psychopaths might show a lack of remorse, experience lack of empathy and shallow affect, and fail to accept responsibility for their actions. Factor 2 is about social deviance; it includes the facet of lifestyle and the facet of antisocial behaviour. Psychopaths might be prone to boredom, use other people in their advantage, lack of realistic long-term goals, be impulsive and irresponsible, have poor behavioural controls and early behavioural problems, which may lead to a versatility of juvenile delinquency and criminal recidivism (Ogloff, 2006). Research has suggested that decision-making in personal sacrificial moral dilemmas is based more on social-emotional response (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). Psychopaths are expected to make immoral decisions (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). It would be surprising if psychopaths exhibit an unusually strong concern for the greater good. However, it would not be surprising if they would exhibit an unusually strong concern for their own good. Even though psychopaths can make the same moral distinctions as non-psychopaths when they judge whether an action in a moral dilemma is acceptable or not, they do often make the immoral decision (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010). This study focuses on factor 1 of psychopathy, because that is more relevant for making moral decisions. Psychopathy might show whether people who make the utilitarian decision in personal

sacrificial moral dilemmas actually have a utilitarian outlook on life. Previous research has suggested that psychopaths may be more willing to hurt or sacrifice a person in order to save others, and hereby make the utilitarian decision in moral dilemmas (Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, 2012) From previous research, it was found that there is no correlation between utilitarian judgement and concern for impartially maximizing welfare (Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015). This could mean that people who make utilitarian judgements do not necessarily have a utilitarian outlook on life. Judgements that are generally considered to be utilitarian, do not exhibit the key features of a genuine utilitarian outlook (Kahane, 2015).

Two hypothesises are tested regarding religion/spirituality and moral decision-making. The first hypothesis is that people who consider themselves to be religious tend to make moral decisions more based on deontological rules than a utilitarian outlook. This might be because in many religions there are deontological rules regarding hurting others. The second hypothesis is that people who believe in destiny or karma might think that if someone is going to die, that person should die. This could be either because it is the will of a higher power that should not be intervened, or because this person has done bad things and therefore deserves death. On the other hand, it could just as well be that people who believe in karma want to save as many people as possible so they can receive good karma. Research has already

suggested that religious or spiritual people might behave more pro-socially (Saroglou, Pichon, Trompette, Verschueren, & Dernelle, 2005). It could be that there is a correlation between religion of spirituality and utilitarianism as well.

In this experiment it will be investigated whether the utilitarian decisions in personal sacrificial moral dilemmas are a good reflection of a utilitarian outlook. This is a correlational research with 286 participants. There will be checked for interpersonal differences in moral decision-making based on demographic data. The participants will be asked about six

different sacrificial moral dilemmas how acceptable they find it to sacrifice a person in order to save the lives of more people. This will measure whether they make utilitarian decisions in sacrificial moral dilemmas. They will also be asked to divide money between themselves and another participant, where the money they donate will be doubled and the money they take will be halved. This will measure whether they make utilitarian decisions in a more realistic situation, since the participants think they could actually receive the money. They will also be measured for psychopathic traits and for religious beliefs and whether this is of influence on the decisions made. The main hypothesis is that utilitarian decisions in personal sacrificial moral dilemmas are not a good reflection of a utilitarian outlook. Moral dilemmas are not a

good method to measure whether people actually make utilitarian decisions in real life. The expectation is that there is no correlation between the utilitarian decisions in the moral dilemmas and in the monetary tasks.

Methods

Participants

Experiment 1:

27 participants were excluded for failing the attention check question or for not answering the questions seriously. That leaves 256 participants in the test week research. These participants were all first-year psychology students at the University of Amsterdam who participated as a part of their courses. Most of the participants considered Dutch to be their native language.

Experiment 2:

There were 30 participants who participated in the experiments individually in the in person research. In this research the participants were coupled with an actor-participant. This was one of the researchers who pretended to be another participant. Most of the participants were of Dutch descent (63,3%), others either had one or two parents who were born in another country (36,7%). These participants have all been recruited through an advert on the website of www.lab.uva.nl or by flyers handed out on campus. They were eligible if they spoke Dutch fluently and if they had not participated in the other part of this research1. All subjects gave informed consent and the study was approved by the faculty ethics review board

1

The research was in Dutch and it was important that the participants completely understood all questions. If they had participated in the part of the research we tested in test week that could have influenced their answers in this research.

(FMG-UvA). They could choose between receiving 10 euros upon participating in this research and receiving 1 participant point2. There was only one condition.

All participants:

All participants were between the ages of 17 and 37, the mean age was 20,3. Almost all participants were psychology students (97,9%) and most were in their first year of their bachelor (94,4%). There were more women (68,2%) than men (31,8%).

There were questions about the income of the parents of the participants. These questions were there because in the monetary task the participants got to divide 50 euros. To people with very poor or very rich parents this amount could have a different meaning. Most parents had an annual income that was above modal3 (44,6%), some had a modal annual income (15,7%) or a below modal income (13,9%). Others did not provide an answer (25,8%).

The participants indicated on a scale from 0-100 how strongly they identified as religious or spiritual. Most of the participants indicated that they considered themselves to be not very religious or spiritual. Half of the participants indicated that they did not believe in karma very much. More than half of the participants indicated that they did not believe in destiny or fate strongly.

2 _{every psychology student in their first year at the University of Amsterdam has to make 20 participant points in total to}

paspass.

Table 1

The Percentage of the Participants who Score between 0-25. 25-50, 50-75, and 75-100 on a Scale of 0-100 of how much the Participants Considered Themselves to be Religious or Spiritual and how strongly They Believe in Karma and Destiny or Fate.

Scale from 0-100 Religious/spiritual Belief in karma Belief in destiny/fate

0-25 66,7% 43,3% 53,3%

25-50 6,7% 6,7% 6,7%

50-75 20% 36,7% 30%

75-100 6,7% 13,3% 10%

Materials

All participants answered the questions on a computer of the university of Amsterdam in a quiet environment. The website www.qualtrics.com was used for the questionnaires. All questions were presented in random order.

The participants were presented with monetary tasks where they could choose to divide 50 euros. In the test week they could choose between dividing the money between themselves and either another randomly selected participant or a charity of their choice. In the in person testing, the participants divided the money between themselves and another

participant. It was a modified dictator game, therefore they could make all the decisions and there was no approval required from the other participant. There were two sliders on which

they could divide the money. On the first slider the distributions starts out with 25 euros for themselves and 25 euros for the other participant. If they would move the slider to the left, they donated money to the other participant. The money they donated would get doubled for the recipient. If they would move the slider to the right, they received money. The money they took from the other participant was halved upon receiving it. On the second slider the

distribution starts out with 50 euros for themselves and 0 euros for the other participant. If they would move the slider to the left, they donated money to the other participant. The money they donated would get doubled for the recipient. Donating money on both sliders would maximise the overall money received. Therefore, donating money was the utilitarian decision and keeping or taking money was not.

In the in person testing the participants were asked to rate how likeable they found the actor-participant. This was included because this could possibly have played a role in the sum of money they would give to or take from the actor-participant. Social attraction was

measured with eight questions that could be answered on a five-point scale that went from ‘completely disagree to ‘’completely agree’. These questions have a good validity and reliability (McCroskey, McCroskey, & Richmond, 2006).

All participants were presented with six sacrificial moral dilemmas, three of which were personal and three of which were impersonal. The moral dilemmas that were used are included in appendix I. They were translated from English to Dutch and a translator approved the translation3, the translations are included in Appendix II. There were some adaptations made to existing moral dilemmas so they could fit the criteria, these criteria were based on the idea that the participants had to choose between a utilitarian and a non-utilitarian option. These are that the person being sacrificed should not be going to die anyway, the dilemma should not include saving yourself, the person being killed ought not to have bad intent, and

3

that there were not personal and impersonal versions of the same dilemma used. Additionally, the numbers were edited so that there is one personal and one impersonal moral dilemma with four people dying, with five people dying, and with six people dying. For every moral

dilemma, the participants were asked how acceptable they thought it was to perform a certain action that would sacrifice one person to save four/five/six people. They could choose from a 6-point scale that went from completely acceptable to completely unacceptable without a neutral option.

Psychopathic traits were measured by the Self-Report Psychopathy checklist short form (SRP-SF). The third version of the SRP (SRP-III) was used because this is the most recent version. The short form was used because the participants should stay focused and not be tired with too many questions. The short form has proven to be of good validity, as well as the full version (Gordts, Uzieblo, Neumann, Bussche van den, & Rossi, 2017). This was examined in a community sample, since psychopathy was tested on a non-clinical level this is relevant. The test contained 29 questions. The questions were all statements regarding

showing psychopathic traits specifically for the separate facets of psychopathy. This made it easy to measure the factors separately. Every question could be answered with a score between 1 and 5, where 1 meant completely disagree and 5 meant completely agree. In total, the participants could score between 29 and 145, the higher the score, the more psychopathy traits someone appeared to have.

Procedure

Experiment 1:

In the test week research, the participants answered the questions about the moral dilemmas on the computer as well as the monetary tasks and the SRP-SF. This was done in randomized

order. Afterwards they answered questions on demographic information. This took 30 minutes.

Experiment 2:

In the in person research a participant and an actor-participant were sat together after entering the waiting room. They were left in the room together for two minutes, so they had the opportunity to engage. After they both had read and signed the informed consent, they were brought into separate rooms with a computer. The participants were asked to draw lots to decide whether they would participate in an extra assignment or not. All participants were told they were chosen to participate in the extra assignment, which was the monetary task. The participants answered to the moral dilemmas, the monetary tasks and they filled out the SRP-SF. This was done in randomized order. Finally, they answered questions about how they felt about the other participant (the actor-participant) and the experiment and about demographic information. This took between 30 minutes and an hour.

Results

The alpha level used in this experiment is 0,05. Only the participants who passed the attention-check were included in this research.

Experiment 1:

The influence of the income of the parents on the total sum of money in the monetary task was measured with a correlation test. The income of the parents was measured with a question that categorized the income into one of nine categories. The assumptions that should not be violated for a correlation test are normality, homogeneity of variances and that there should not be any outliers. This was tested with a Shapiro-Wilk test and a Levene’s test. These

assumptions have not been violated. In accordance with the hypothesis, there was no

significant effect found, F(1, 87) = 1,280, p = ,261. This means that there was no significant influence of the income of the parents on how utilitarian the participants divided the money.

The correlation between the utilitarian decisions in moral dilemmas and the utilitarian decision in the monetary tasks was measured with a correlation test. The utilitarian decision in moral dilemmas was measured by calculating the average score of how acceptable they found it to sacrifice a person in order to save others in a moral dilemma, per participant. The

utilitarian decision in the monetary tasks was measured by calculating the total sum of money from both monetary tasks. The higher this sum was, the more utilitarian the decisions of the participants were. The assumptions have not been violated. In accordance with the hypothesis, there was no significant correlation found, F(1, 87) = 0,536, p = ,466. No significant

correlation was found between the utilitarian decision in the personal moral dilemmas and the total sum of money, F(1, 87) = 0,654, p = ,421. No significant correlation was found between the utilitarian decision in the impersonal dilemmas and the total sum of money either, F(1, 87) = 0,285, p = ,595. This means that people who made utilitarian decisions in the moral

dilemmas, did not necessarily make them as well in the monetary tasks.

The correlation between the total score on the SRP-SF and the utilitarian decisions in the moral dilemmas was measured with a correlation test. The assumptions have not been violated. In accordance with the hypothesis, there was a positive and significant correlation found between the total score on the SRP-SF and the utilitarian decisions in all moral dilemmas, F(1, 255) = 8,934, p = ,003. The correlation between the separate factors of the SRP-SF and the utilitarian decisions in the moral dilemmas was measured as well. The correlation between factor 1 and utilitarian decisions in all moral dilemmas was positive and significant as well, F(1, 255) = 10,892, p = ,001. There was a positive and significant correlation found between factor 1 and personal moral dilemmas, F(1, 255) = 10,541, p =

,001 . However, no significant correlation was found between factor 1 and impersonal moral dilemmas, F(1, 255) = 7,704, p = ,006. There was no significant correlation between factor 2 and utilitarian decisions in all moral dilemmas, F(1,255) = 4,810, p = ,029. No significant correlation was found between factor 2 and personal moral dilemmas either, F(1, 255) = 4,515, p = ,035. Neither was a significant correlation found between factor 2 and impersonal moral dilemmas, F(1, 2255) = 3,549, p = ,061. There was a positive and significant

correlation found between the total SRP-SF score and personal moral dilemmas, F(1, 255) = 8,626, p = ,004. However, no significant correlation was found between the total SRP-SF score and impersonal moral dilemmas, F(1, 255) = 6,352, p = ,012. This means that people with more psychopathic traits were more likely to make the utilitarian decision in the moral dilemmas then people with less psychopathic traits. This was especially for factor 1 of psychopathy and for the personal moral dilemmas.

The correlation between the total score on the SRP-SF and the utilitarian decision in the monetary tasks was measured with a correlation test. The assumptions have not been violated. In contrast to the hypothesis, there was no significant correlation found between the total SRP-SF score and the total sum of money, F(1,87) = 0,004, p = ,951. There was no effect found between factor 1 and the total sum of money, F(1, 87) = 0,343, p = 0,559. No significant correlation between factor 2 and the total sum of money was found either, F(1, 87) = 0,431, p = ,513. This means that there was no significant difference in the degree of

utilitarianism people expressed in their division of the money between people with more and less psychopathic traits.

Experiment 2:

In the in person testing, no participants knew the actor-participant. Therefore, the

actor-participant. To check whether how much they liked them had an effect on the total sum of money they divided between themselves and the actor-participant, a correlation test was executed. The assumptions have not been violated. The average scores were all between -1 and 1, this had no significant effect on the total sum of money in the monetary tasks, F(1, 28) = 0,012, p = ,913. This means that how much the participants liked the actor-participant, did not significantly influence the sum of money they were willing to give them.

The influence of the income of the parents and the money the participants divided was measured with a correlation test. The assumptions have not been violated. In accordance with the hypothesis, there was no significant effect found, F(1, 28) = 0,095, p = ,761. This means that there was no significant influence found of the income of the parents on the money the participants donated.

The correlations between the utilitarian decisions in moral dilemmas and the utilitarian decisions in the monetary tasks were measured with correlation tests. The assumptions have not been violated. In accordance with the hypothesis, there was no significant correlation found between the utilitarian decision in all moral dilemmas and the total sum of money, F(1, 28) = 0,112, p = ,740. No significant effect was found between the utilitarian decision in the personal moral dilemmas and the total sum of money, F(1, 28) = 0,005, p = ,946. There was no significant effect found between the utilitarian decision in the impersonal moral dilemmas and the total sum of money either, F(1, 28) = 0,124, p = ,727. This means that people who made utilitarian decisions in the moral dilemmas, did not necessarily make them as well in the monetary tasks.

The correlation between the score on psychopathic traits of the SRP-SF and the utilitarian decisions in the moral dilemmas was measured with correlation tests. The

correlation found between the total score on the SRP-SF and the utilitarian decisions in all moral dilemmas, F(1, 28) = 1,293, p = ,265. The correlation between the separate factors and the utilitarian decisions in moral dilemmas was measured as well. The correlation between factor 1 and utilitarian decisions in the moral dilemmas was not significant either, F(1, 28) = 1,293, p = ,265. There was no significant correlation found between factor 1 and personal moral dilemmas, F(1, 28) = 2,079, p = ,160 . Nor was there a significant correlation found between factor 1 and impersonal moral dilemmas, F(1, 28) = 1,701, p = ,203. The correlation between factor 2 and utilitarian decisions in all moral dilemmas was not found to be

significant, F(1,28) = 0,781, p = ,384. There was no significant correlation found between factor 2 and personal moral dilemmas as well, F(1, 28) = 1,583, p = ,219. No significant correlation was found between factor 2 and impersonal moral dilemmas, F(1, 28) = 0,239, p = ,629. There was no significant correlation found between the SRP-SF score in total and personal moral dilemmas, F(1, 28) = 2,293, p = ,141. No significant correlation was found between the SRP-SF score and impersonal moral dilemmas, F(1, 28) = 1,083, p = ,307. This means that how many psychopathic traits people expressed, did not make a significant difference in how utilitarian their decisions in the moral dilemmas were.

The correlation between the score on the SRP-SF and the utilitarian decisions in the monetary tasks was measured with a correlation test. The assumptions have not been violated. In contrast to the hypothesis, there was no significant effect found, F(1, 28) = 0,199, p = 0,659. There was no significant correlation found between factor 1 and the total sum of money, F(1, 28) = 0,201, p = ,657. Neither was a significant correlation found between factor 2 and the total sum of money, F(1,28) = 0,119, p = ,732. This means that there was no

significant difference found in the degree of utilitarianism people expressed in their division of the money between people with more and less psychopathic traits.

The correlation between the religious convictions of the participants and the utilitarian decisions in moral dilemmas was measured with correlation tests. The assumptions have not been violated. In contrast to the hypothesis, there was no significant effect found between how religious people were and how utilitarian their decisions in the moral dilemmas were, F(1, 28) = 0,138, p = ,713. No significant correlation was found between how strongly the participants believe inn karma and the utilitarian decisions, F(1, 28) = 0,124, p = ,728. No significant correlation was found between how strongly the participants believed in destiny or fate and the utilitarian decisions in the moral dilemmas either, F(1, 28) = 0,032, p = ,859. This means that there was no difference found between how utilitarian people with different

religious convictions responded to the moral dilemmas.

Discussion

In experiment 1 no correlation between the income of the parents of the participants and the division of the money they made was found. Therefore, it can not be concluded that the income of the parents of the participants played a role in how utilitarian the participants divided the money. This was in accordance with the hypothesis. No correlation was found between the utilitarian decision in the sacrificial moral dilemmas and the utilitarian decision in the monetary tasks, neither for the personal and impersonal dilemmas separately. This means that it can not be concluded that there is a correlation. This is in accordance with the hypothesis that stated that utilitarian decisions in sacrificial moral dilemmas are not a good reflection of a utilitarian outlook. A positive correlation between psychopathic traits and utilitarian decision-making in sacrificial moral dilemmas was found. This was for psychopathic traits in general and for factor 1 of psychopathy, yet not for factor 2. The

From this can be concluded that people with many psychopathic traits, in general or in factor 1, were more likely to make a utilitarian decision in sacrificial moral dilemmas, especially in the personal dilemmas. This was in accordance with the hypothesis. Finally, In contrast to the hypothesis no correlation between psychopathic traits and a utilitarian decision in the

monetary tasks was found. This means that it can not be concluded that there is a difference between how utilitarian the monetary tasks would be answered by people who express many psychopathic traits and people who express little psychopathic traits. The hypothesis was that people who express more psychopathic traits, are less likely to make a utilitarian decision in the monetary tasks than people who express less psychopathic traits.

In experiment 2 no participants knew the actor-participant and no correlation was found between how much the participants liked the actor-participant and how much money they would donate to them. From this can not be concluded that how likeable the actor-participants were perceived at by the actor-participants played a role in the outcome of the

monetary tasks. No correlation was found between the income of the parents and the division of money they made either. This means that it can not be concluded that the income of the parents played a role in the outcome of the monetary tasks. These results were in accordance with the hypothesis. Like in experiment 1, there was no correlation found between the outcome in sacrificial moral dilemmas and the outcome in the monetary tasks, this is in accordance with the hypothesis. This means that it can not be concluded that there is a correlation between the utilitarian decisions in sacrificial moral dilemmas and the utilitarian decision in the monetary tasks. However, in contrast to the hypothesises no correlations were found between psychopathic traits and the utilitarian decisions in the sacrificial moral

dilemmas and the monetary tasks. This means that it can not be concluded that there is a difference in how utilitarian the participants responded to the dilemmas and monetary tasks between people who express many psychopathic traits and people who express little

psychopathic traits. No correlation was found between utilitarian decision making in the moral dilemmas and religion, belief in karma, and belief in destiny or fate. Therefore, it can not be concluded that religious convictions play a role in utilitarian decision making in sacrificial moral dilemmas. This was in contrast to the hypothesises.

The reason that in the second experiment no significant results were found, could be the small sample size. Because of the small sample size, the power of the analyses were rather low. When the power is low, the chances of finding significant results are smaller. Not much could be concluded from this experiment for this reason. In further research a bigger sample size could be researched. A reason that the data in both experiments did not match all hypothesises could be that not all participants actually believed they would receive the money. Therefore, the monetary tasks may have seemed unbelievable or unrealistic. They might have replied differently if they were sure they could receive the money, this might be a good idea for further research. The monetary task might have not appeared realistic and a good method to measure a utilitarian outlook. The monetary task was also based on the idea of there only being two possible approaches to moral decisions; deontology and utilitarianism. This means that if someone does not make a moral decision based on deontological rules, than they automatically make a utilitarian decision based on these assumptions. However, there are more approaches to moral dilemmas than just these two. People might also have more than one approach to morality. There was no space for other approaches than utilitarian and deontological. The reality is more complicated than this. This could cause missing out on or misinterpreting information. In further research, more possible approaches could be taken in account or the participants could be asked to motivate their replies. These motivations could be categorized into possible approaches. Another possible explanation could be that there were no participants who were very high on psychopathic traits. However, there were many participants who expressed little psychopathic traits. This could possibly be because mostly

psychology students were tested. Psychology students are too much of a homogenous population and that is not representative of the general population. Another thing was that more women than men participated in this experiment. In previous research it has been suggested that men were more likely to express psychopathic traits than women (Coid, Yang, Ullrich, Roberts & Hare, 2009) In further research, a different sample could be used and gender differences could be measured. Another factor that could play a part is the moods of the participants when answering the questions on moral decisions. Someone’s mood could affect the way a person makes a moral decision (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). This could be because experiments showed patterns of activation in emotionally relevant areas in decision-making in moral dilemmas (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). The

participants in the test week had to answer questions of different researches for two hours, this might have had an influence on their mood. There was not checked for the moods of the participants. In further research, the participants could be controlled for their mood during the experiments.

The results of the both experiments support the theory that utilitarian decisions in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect utilitarian decisions in other situations. According to the theory, this is because sacrificial moral dilemmas do not measure real utilitarianism. In experiment 1 psychopathic traits play a role in the utilitarian decisions in the sacrificial moral dilemmas, yet they do not in the utilitarian outcome of the monetary task. This was not according to the hypothesis that stated that people with many psychopathic traits were more likely to make utilitarian decisions in the sacrificial moral dilemmas, but less likely in the monetary tasks. However, these results do show that the sacrificial moral dilemmas measure something else than the monetary tasks if psychopathic traits are only of influence on the dilemmas. No evidence was found that religious convictions play a part in decision-making in sacrificial moral dilemmas. The results suggest that utilitarian decisions in sacrificial moral

dilemmas are not a good reflection of a utilitarian outlook. Research to alternative methods of measurement could be proven to be useful.

References

Bartels, D. M., & Pizarro, D. A. (2011). The mismeasure of morals: Antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas. Cognition, 121, 154-161. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.05.010

Bauman, C. W., McGraw, A. P., Bartels, D. M., & Warren, C. (2014). Revisiting external validity: Concerns about trolley problems and other sacrificial dilemmas in moral psychology. Social and Personality Psychology, 8, 536-554. doi:10.1111/spc3.12131

Cima, M., Tonnaer, F., & Hauser, M. D. (2010). Psychopaths know right from wrong but don’t care. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 5, 59-67. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsp051

Coid, J., Yang, M., Ullrich, S., Roberts, A., & Hare, R. D. (2009). Prevalence and correlates of psychopathic traits in the household population of Great Brittain. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 32, 65-73. doi: 10.1016/j.ijlp.2009.01.002

Conway, P., & Gawronski, B. (2012). Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision-making: A process dissociation approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104, 216-235. doi: 10.1037/a0031021

Glenn, A. L., Raine, A., & Schug, R. A. (2009). The neural correlates of moral decision-making in psychopathy. Molecular Psychiatry, 14, 5-6. doi: 10.1038/mp.2008.104

Gordts, S., Uzieblo, K., Neumann, C., Bussche van den, E. & Rossi, G. (2017) Validity of the self-report psychopathy scales (SRP-III full and short versions) in a community sample. Assessment, 24, 308-325. doi: 10.1177/1073191115606205

Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44, 389-400. doi:

10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027

Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R., B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001) An fMRI investigation in moral judgement. Science, 293, 2105-2107. doi:

10.1126/science.1062872

Hare, J. (2014). Religion and morality. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy

Kahane, G. (2015). Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment. Social Neuroscience, 10, 551-560. doi:

Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Farias, M., & Savulescu, J. (2015). ‘Utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good. Cognition, 134, 193-209. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.10.005

Koenigs, M., Kruepke, M., Zeier, J., & Newman, J. P. (2012). Utilitarian moral judgment in psychopathy. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 708-714. doi:

10.1093/scan/nsr048

McCroskey, L. L., McCroskey, J. C., & Richmond, V. P. (2006). Analysis and improvement of the measurement of interpersonal attraction and homophily. Communication Quaterly, 54, 1-31. doi: 10.1080/01463370500270322

Ogloff, J. R. P. (2006) Psychopathy/antisocial personality disorder conundrum. The Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, 6, 519-528. doi: 10.1080/j.1440-1614.2006.01834.x

Saroglou, V., Pichon, I., Trompette, L., Versueren, M., & Dernelle, R. (2005). Prosocial behavior and religion: New evidence based on projective measures and peer ratings. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 44, 323-348. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5906.2005.00289.x

Valdesolo, P. & DeSteno, D. (2006). Manipulations of emotional context shape moral judgement. Psychological Science, 17, 476-477. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01731.x

Appendix I: moral dilemmas in English

Impersonal

1. Fumes

You are the late-night watchman in a hospital. Due to an accident in the building next door, there are deadly fumes rising up through the hospital’s ventilation system. In a certain room of the hospital are four patients. In another room there is a single patient. If you do nothing the fumes will rise up into the room containing the four patients and cause their deaths.

The only way to avoid the deaths of these patients is to hit a switch, which will cause the fumes to bypass the room containing the four patients. As a result of doing this the fumes will enter the room containing the single patient, causing his death.

How acceptable is it to hit the switch in order to save the four patients?

Completely unacceptable Unacceptable Slightly unacceptable Slightly acceptable Acceptable Completely acceptable 2. Mineworkers

You are working in the control room of a mine. An accident has occurred and the mine is flooding. Five mineworkers are mining in a passage that is in the path of the flooding water and there is no way for them to escape: they will drown when the water reaches them. One mineworker is in a separate passage that is closed off by a watertight door and therefore safe from the water.

The only way to save the five mineworkers is to open the watertight door from your control-room. If you do so, the water will be diverted from the passage containing the five miners. The one mineworker in that room will drown, but the water won’t flow into the passage with the five mineworkers and they will live.

How acceptable is it to press open the door in order to save the five mineworkers?

Completely unacceptable Unacceptable Slightly unacceptable Slightly acceptable Acceptable Completely acceptable 3. Trolley

You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of six railway workmen. On the tracks extending to the

right is a single railway workman. If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the deaths of the five workmen.

The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to press a button on your dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman.

How acceptable is it to press the button in order to save the six workmen?

Completely unacceptable Unacceptable Slightly unacceptable Slightly acceptable Acceptable Completely acceptable Personal 1. Motorboat

You are the driver of a motorboat. You notice four swimmers in severe trouble in the distance. If you do not drive towards them at top speed then you will not arrive on time, and all four will certainly die. You have a passenger on the boat, making the boat too heavy to drive at top speed.

The only way to save the swimmers is to quickly push the passenger off the boat. The

passenger cannot swim and will drown, but the boat will be light enough to drive at top speed and save all four of the drowning swimmers.

How acceptable is it to push the passenger off the boat in order to save the four swimmers? Completely unacceptable Unacceptable Slightly unacceptable Slightly acceptable Acceptable Completely acceptable 2. Vitamins

You are a doctor flying with a group on a travel expedition. Your group has had to do an emergency landing in the desert. You are several days away from any means of help. The group includes you (the only person with medical knowledge and abilities), the pilot, and a party of five people with a rare genetic disease: they have a vital vitamin deficiency and must receive the vitamin through supplements to their diet or they will die. There is plenty of water for everyone to survive, but without the vitamin the party of five will die before you can reach help. Normal human kidneys contain large amounts of the vitamin they need. You cannot remove your own kidney or teach the others to do it to you, and the kidneys of the people with the disease do not contain the vitamin.

The only way to save the lives of the five people is to remove one of the pilot’s kidneys and use it as a source of the vitamin. He will die if you do this, but the other five people will be saved.

How acceptable is it remove the pilot’s kidney in order to save the five people? Completely unacceptable Unacceptable Slightly unacceptable Slightly acceptable Acceptable Completely acceptable 3. Earthquake

You are a doctor in the intensive care unit of a hospital. An earthquake strikes, and you are trapped in a room with seven critically ill patients. One patient is on a life-support machine and can live for several days. The other six patients will die without immediate care from rescue crews.

The only way for to signal for immediate help from rescue crews is to kill the patient on the life support machine, which will trigger an alarm system into “code red.” A “code red” alarm will attract the rescue teams immediately, and the other six patients will be able to live. If you do not kill the patient, the one patient on the life-support machine will live, but rescue crews will not arrive in time and the other six patients will die.

How acceptable is it to take the life of the patient on life support in order to save the other six patients?

Unacceptable

Slightly unacceptable

Slightly acceptable

Acceptable

Appendix II: moral dilemmas in Dutch

Onpersoonlijk:

1. Gassen

Je bent de nachtportier in een ziekenhuis. Vanwege een ongeluk in het gebouw hiernaast zijn er dodelijke gassen aan het stijgen door het ventilatiesysteem van het ziekenhuis. In een bepaalde kamer van het ziekenhuis zijn vier patiënten. In een andere kamer is een enkele patiënt. Als je niks doet, zullen de gassen stijgen naar de kamer waar vier patiënten liggen en hun dood veroorzaken.

De enige manier om de dood van deze patiënten te voorkomen, is door een hendel over te halen waardoor de gassen langs de kamer met vier patiënten gaan. Als gevolg hiervan, zullen de gassen de kamer binnengaan waar de enkele patiënt zich bevindt en zijn dood veroorzaken.

Hoe acceptabel is het om de hendel over te halen om de vier patiënten te redden?

Compleet onacceptabel

Onacceptabel

Een beetje onacceptabel

Een beetje acceptabel

Acceptabel

Compleet acceptabel

Je bent aan het werken in de controlekamer van een mijn. Er is een ongeluk gebeurd en de mijn is aan het overstromen. Vijf mijnwerkers zijn aan het werk in een gang dat op het pad ligt van het stromende water en er is geen mogelijkheid voor hen om te ontsnappen: ze zullen verdrinken als het water bij ze aankomt. Eén mijnwerker is in een aparte gang die afgesloten is door een waterdichte deur en daarom veilig van het water.

De enige manier om de vijf mijnwerkers te redden is door de waterdichte deur vanaf jouw controlekamer te openen. Als je dit doet zal het water uit de gang die de vijf mijnwerkers inhoudt geleid worden. De ene mijnwerker in die kamer zal verdrinken, maar het water zal niet de gang met de vijf mijnwerkers in stromen en zij zullen leven.

Hoe acceptabel is het om op de knop drukken om de deur te openen om de vijf mijnwerkers te redden?

Compleet onacceptabel

Onacceptabel

Een beetje onacceptabel

Een beetje acceptabel

Acceptabel

Compleet acceptabel

3. Transportwagen

Je staat achter het stuur van een losgeslagen transportwagen die snel op een tweesprong in het spoor afrijdt. Op het spoor dat naar links uitstrekt is een groep van zes spoorwegwerkers. Op

het spoor dat naar rechts uitstrekt is een enkele spoorwegwerker. Als je niks doet zal de transportwagen verder op het linker spoor rijden, wat de dood van de zes spoorwegwerkers zal veroorzaken.

De enige manier om de dood van deze werkers te voorkomen is door op een knop te drukken op het instrumentenpaneel waardoor de transportwagen verder naar rechts zal rijden wat de dood van de enkele spoorwegwerker zal veroorzaken.

Hoe acceptabel is het om op de knop te drukken om de zes spoorwegwerkers te redden?

Compleet onacceptabel

Onacceptabel

Een beetje onacceptabel

Een beetje acceptabel

Acceptabel

Compleet acceptabel

Persoonlijk:

1. Motorboot

Je bestuurt een motorboot. Je merkt vier zwemmers op in ernstige problemen in de verte. Als je niet op topsnelheid naar ze toe vaart, zal je niet op tijd aankomen en zullen ze alle vier zeker sterven. Je hebt een passagier aan boord van de boot wat de boot te zwaar maakt om op topsnelheid te varen.

De enige manier om de zwemmers te redden is door snel de passagier van de boot af te duwen. De passagier kan niet zwemmen en zal verdrinken, maar de boot zal licht genoeg zijn om te varen op topsnelheid en alle vier verdrinkende zwemmers te redden.

Hoe acceptabel is het om de passagier van de boot te duwen om de vier zwemmers te redden?

Compleet onacceptabel

Onacceptabel

Een beetje onacceptabel

Een beetje acceptabel

Acceptabel

Compleet acceptabel

2. Vitaminen

Je bent een dokter die aan het vliegen is met een groep op een reis-expeditie. Jouw groep heeft een noodlanding moeten maken in de woestijn. Je bent enkele dagen weg van enige hulpmiddelen. De groep omvat jou (de enige persoon met medische kennis en vaardigheden), de piloot en een groep van vijf mensen met een zeldzame genetische ziekte: ze hebben een dodelijk vitaminetekort en moeten de vitamine ontvangen door supplementen bij hun dieet of ze zullen sterven. Er is genoeg water voor iedereen om te overleven, maar zonder vitamine zal de groep van vijf sterven voordat ze hulp kunnen bereiken. Normale menselijke nieren

bevatten grote hoeveelheden van de vitamine die ze nodig hebben. Je kan niet jouw eigen niet verwijderen of anderen leren om het bij jou te doen en de nieren van de mensen met de ziekte bevatten de vitamine niet.

De enige manier om de levens van de vijf mensen te redden is door één van de nieren van de piloot te verwijderen en te gebruiken als een bron van de vitamine. Hij zal sterven als je dit doet, maar de andere vijf mensen zullen gered zijn.

Hoe acceptabel is het om de nier van de piloot te verwijderen om de vijf mensen te redden?

Compleet onacceptabel

Onacceptabel

Een beetje onacceptabel

Een beetje acceptabel

Acceptabel

Compleet acceptabel

3. Aardbeving

Je bent een dokter op de intensive care unit van een ziekenhuis. Een aardbeving vindt plaats en je zit vast in een kamer met zeven ernstig zieke patiënten. Één patiënt zit aan de beademing en kan voor enkele dagen leven. De andere zes patiënten zullen sterven zonder onmiddellijke zorg van reddingsteams.

De enige manier voor jou om voor onmiddellijke hulp te signaleren van de reddingsteams, is door de patiënt aan de beademing te vermoorden, wat een alarmsysteem zal activeren tot ‘code rood’. Alleen een ‘code rood’ alarm zal de reddingsteams onmiddellijk aantrekken en de andere zes patiënten zullen leven. Als je de patiënt aan de beademing niet doodt, zullen de reddingsteams niet op tijd aankomen en de andere zes patiënten zullen doodgaan.

Hoe acceptabel is het om de patiënt aan de beademing vermoorden om de zes andere patiënten te redden?

Compleet onacceptabel

Onacceptabel

Een beetje onacceptabel

Een beetje acceptabel

Acceptabel