Paul van der Sande - 10715460 Master Thesis
European Policy & External Relations University of Amsterdam
Supervisor: dhr. dr. C.W.C. (Carlos) Reijnen 01-07-2020
EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta:
Serving EU interests through modern foreign politics in the Horn of Africa
‘Atalanta and Meleager Hunt the Calydonian Boar’, by Jan Fyt and Pieter Thijs (1648) at Ringling Museum of Art, Sarasota, Florida.
Table of Contents Introduction - Introduction __________________________________________________________3 - Academic context________________ _____________________________________ 4 - Policy documents______________________________________________________ 6 - Interviews____________________________________________________________7 - Method and Layout_____________________________________________________7
1. Operation Atalanta
- The first years: 2008-2010_______________________________________________8 - Mission organisation_________________________________________________ _12 - Rough waters: 2010-2014_______________________________________________14 - EUTM, EUCAP and the Comprehensive Approach_____________________ _____16 - Piracy supressed, but not eradicated: 2014-2020_____________________________19
2. Theoretical Framework
- Normative Power Europe_______________________________________________22 - Militarization and Securitization____________________________________ _____25
3. Serving EU Interests
- Towards a security actor in the Horn______________________________________29 - Eurafrique and port politics_____________________________________________ 34 - The dangers of the integrated approach ____________________________________43 - Letting go of the last utopia_____________________________________________ 47
Conclusion
Abbreviations
AIP - Africa Investment Platform AO - Area of Operations
BMP - Best Management Practices CA - Comprehensive Approach CMF - Combined Maritime Forces
CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy CTF - Combined Task Force
ECDPM - European Centre for Development Policy Management EDF - European Defence Fund
EEAS - European External Action Service ESS - European Security Strategy EU - European Union
EU NAVFOR - European Union Naval Force EU-AITF - EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund
EUCAP Somalia - European Union Capacity Building Somalia EUGS - European Union Global Strategy
EUTM Somalia - European Union Training Mission Somalia HoA - Horn of Africa
HQ - Headquarter
HRW - Human Rights Watch IA - Integrated Approach
MCRA - Maritime Control and Reconnaissance Aircraft MEP - Member of European Parliament
MS - Member State
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NPE - Normative Power Europe
OBP - Oceans Beyond Piracy OHQ - Operational Headquarter
SHADE - Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
TFG - Transnational Federal Government of Somalia UN - United Nations
UNSC - United Nations Security Council USD - United States Dollars
VPD - Vessel Protection Detachment WTF - World Food Programme
Introduction
Eleven years ago, on December 8th, 2008, Operation Atalanta was initiated. The operation of
the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) was launched within the framework of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and is a military operation aimed towards countering piracy of the coast of Somalia. The main reason for the launch of this first ever EU naval operation in 2008 was to protect vessels from Somalian piracy around the Horn of Africa and the West Indian Seas. The operation has been very successful during the first years. At the height of Somalian piracy in 2011, 736 hostages and 32 ships were being held by pirates. By October 2016, these numbers have dropped to zero.1 Even though piracy has successfully been supressed and the threat of piracy is no longer evident, the operation has been prolonged several times since then, and will run at least until the 31st of December 2020.2
Over the course of the twelve years the operation has been running, the aims and purposes of the mission have broadened. The raison d’être does not solely lie in the countering of piracy in the region anymore but now concerns multiple aspects, like monitoring illegal fishing activities and helping provide stability for Somalia. A total of six times the mandate for Operation Atalanta has been prolonged, some of those prolongments also included changes to the mandate on mission objectives and competences. Besides this, due to multiple EU foreign policy strategy changes, Operation Atalanta and EU engagement in the region has changed in character over the years.
The more than a decade long steady and reliable naval military presence of the European Union in the region has enabled the EU to get involved in more than just the protection of commercial vessels. As said by an EU official, Operation Atalanta can be used as a diplomatic tool for serving EU interests in the region.3 Alongside Operation Atalanta, two more EU CSDP missions are currently active in Somalia: European Union Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia) and European Union Capacity Building Mission Somalia (EUCAP Somalia). All three are seen by the EU as a part of the comprehensive and later integrated approach of the EU in the Horn of Africa.
1 https://eunavfor.eu/mission/.
2 COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/564f3a90-2931-11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search.
In my thesis I research Operation Atalanta and the way it has grown to be part of the comprehensive and integrated EU approach towards Somalia and the Horn of Africa, and how EU foreign policy in the region has changed over the years. My research question will be: What is the role of Operation Atalanta in the EU’s changing engagement with the Horn of Africa in the light of the comprehensive and integrated approach? I will answer this question by investigating a multitude of sources. First of all, I will use official EU policy documents and communication on not only Operation Atalanta, but also larger EU engagement in the Horn of Africa and EU foreign policy as a whole. Strategies, intentions and discourse are the main focus points in looking at these policy documents. Secondary literature will also be important sources for my research, on the topic of Operation Atalanta and EU engagement in the region itself, but also on EU foreign policy theory, to sketch a theoretical framework.
I will be looking at the operation through a combination of the framework of both Normative Power Europe theory (the power of the European Union to shape norms and values globally) and militarisation and securitization theory (the increasing use of EU military power and presence in foreign territory, and the increasing security actorness of the EU) I will argue that through this multifaceted hybrid approach the EU has become an important actor and gained influence in the Horn of Africa and can serve its own geo-specific interests in the region in an effective way. Furthermore, I argue that the hybrid approach of normative and military power has changed over the years to an approach in which security and other interest have become more dominant. Operation Atalanta can be seen as a symbol of this development.
Academic context
In the academic context not a lot of extensive research is done into Operation Atalanta. The articles that have been written on the subject are very strong and prove to be helpful. The articles that I will be using as a starting point will be the ones containing the more practical and factual information about the operation. To understand the tactics and ins and outs of maritime security and anti-piracy I will use amongst others Irregular Warfare and Tactical Changes: The case of Somali piracy 4 by Karl Sörenson and J. J. Widen, and In Search of Lost Deterrence 5, also by
4 Sörenson, Karl, and Widen, J. J. “Irregular Warfare and Tactical Changes: The Case of Somali Piracy.” Terrorism
and Political Violence 26, no. 3 (July 1, 2014): 399–418.
5 Sörenson, Karl. “In Search of Lost Deterrence – Two Essays on Deterrence and the Models Employed to Study
Karl Sörenson. In the first article the tactics and strategy of the operating naval forces in the Somali area are being analysed in terms of command, intelligence, mobility etc. The article shows tactical adaptation of strategies over time and the way piracy is being countered. The second article shows how deterrence is central in strategic thinking for military operations. Operation Atalanta is used as a case study to show how deterrence, (in this case discouraging Somali pirates) can be most useful.
To gain insight in the framework in which Operation Atalanta can be seen I will use Ian Manners ‘Normative Power Europe’ theory with a focus on the way military security and defence fits into this framework. Useful articles on this will be Normative Power Europe Reconsidered 6, by Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe: a Realist Critique 7 by Adrian Hyde-Price, and Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation 8 by Thomas Dietz and Michelle Pace. In these articles the normative power Europe theory is put to the test and expanded on through combing normative power with cases of conflict, realism and militarization of EU external policies.
The core of this thesis will revolve around researching the ways in which Operation Atalanta enables the European Union to use its presence in the region for other geo-specific purposes. The articles that will help me most with that will be Pirates and Power Politics 9 by Lee Willet, The European Union at the Horn of Africa: The Contribution of Critical Geopolitics to Piracy Studies10 by Basil Germond and Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU’s Anti-Piracy Operation11 by Basil Germond and Michael E. Smith.
These articles revolve around the ways piracy and anti-piracy can be intertwined with international politics, in ways of cooperation and international relations, but also in the legitimization of military force.
What is missing in the literature is a thorough comprehensive analysis of Operation Atalanta, combining the normative framework, the military (normalised) reality and
6 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads.” Journal of European Public
Policy 13, no. 2 (March 1, 2006): 182–199.
7 Adrian Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe: a Realist Critique.” Journal of European Public Policy 13, no.
2 (March 1, 2006): 217–234.
8 Thomas Dietz and Michelle Pace, ‘’Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation.’’ In: Whitman R.G.
(eds) Normative Power Europe. (Palgrave Macmillan London, 2011) 210-244.
9 Lee Willett, “Pirates and Power Politics: Naval Presence and Grand Strategy in the Horn of Africa.” The RUSI
Journal 156, no. 6 (December 1, 2011): 20–25.
10 Basil Germond, “The European Union at the Horn of Africa: The Contribution of Critical Geopolitics to Piracy
Studies.” Global Policy 4, no. 1 (February 2013): 80–85.
11 Basil Germond and Smith, Michael E. “Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the
securitization of EU foreign politics. The value of this approach lies in the hybrid nature of theorizing. The success in initiating and running Operation Atalanta can be seen as an effect and as a contribution to the European Union as a normative power. At the same time, the military character of the Operation is an effect and a contribution to the militarization and securitization of European external polices. In Operation Atalanta we see the two approaches intertwined and working successfully. Understanding this will help us see how Operation Atalanta is not only successful in fighting piracy, it has grown into a bigger force serving EU interests in the region. The research into Operation Atalanta specifically can also give insight in broader themes about EU normative power, militarization, securitization and the development of modern European Union foreign politics.
Policy documents
Besides academic literature I will base my research on official European Union policy documents directly or indirectly aimed at operation Atalanta. In these official documents and policy papers about maritime security, the Horn of Africa and Operation Atalanta, two main subjects keep coming back: Objectives and strategy. This points out the pragmatic way the EU, and the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) in particular, approach the issues in the region. The communications on maritime security, Operation Atalanta and anti-piracy are very clear in their objectives. The strategy however can sometimes be vague. Especially strategy set out towards objectives such as development and stability, is described more in general terms opposed to concrete action plans. It is only in the strategic framework for the Horn of Africa that geopolitical interests in the region are being mentioned as important for the EU and its Member States. The other documents and policy papers stick to their own objectives and do not refer to this bigger interest. To link these bigger interests to the pragmatic Atalanta Operation will be an important part of my research.
The main trend in all the documents is the comprehensive, and later the integrated approach. This is named explicitly in the maritime security strategy and the strategic framework. In documents on Operation Atalanta or anti-piracy in general this is not explicitly stated but can be noticed by the fact the documents speak of action, cooperation and development on multiple areas at once. Looking back at the academic sources this can be seen as a normalization of militarism as the EU combines a normative development approach with hard military force. This policy pragmatism and military approach fits into the trend that the
European Union is becoming a more realist masculine player in the wider world, which in practice means more and quicker use of military force in foreign policy.
Interviews
The academic literature and official EU policy documents will form the base of my research into Operation Atalanta. To gain more perspective and get a better understanding about the mission and the EU presence in the region I spoke to three EU officials working on the subject. These are: European External Action Service Political Officer Somalia Mr. Charles Andrew Stuart, European External Action Service crisis response planning and current operations officer Mr. Jan Karlsson and Liaison Officer to the EU Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Colino. These interviews proved to be very helpful and I will incorporate the knowledge and insights the interviews produced into my thesis.
Method and Layout
The way in which I will do research in order to answer the questions set out is a mix of different methods. Leading will be the analyses of the policy documents and what they say about the operation. This will however not be a discourse analyses per se. The discourse used and the lines set out in the policy documents will be analysed, but also will be compared and held up against the actual operational activities and the way the policies work out on the ground. Furthermore, will I try to examine what goes beyond the official documents. By this I mean the trends that can be detected in the development of the mission and EU engagement with the Horn of Africa region. Furthermore, I will analyse the development of EU foreign policy strategies.
My thesis will be ordered in the following structure; firstly, I will give an overview of the rise of piracy in Somalia and the international efforts made to counter this. The initial mandates, amendments, mission objectives and legal basis of Operation Atalanta will be discussed in this part. Within this chapter the two other EU missions currently deployed in Somalia and the way the three missions together form a bigger and comprehensive approach will be discussed. This first part will be the groundwork and lay the basis on which further research can be done.
At the start of the second part I will introduce the theoretical framework that will be used as a lens through which my thesis will be written, and the findings can be understood. This
theoretical framework will be Normative Power Europe combined with militarization and securitization theory. Following the theoretical framework will come the core part of this thesis. In this part I will analyse how Operation Atalanta enables the European Union to serve other interests. These interests include gaining international security actorness and political and economic influence in the region especially with respect to other powers active in the Horn of Africa. Besides this I will use Operation Atalanta to analyse the development of EU strategy and approaches to foreign policy along the lines of the integrated approach and the internal-external nexus. Lastly, I will try to broaden the perspective to show what this case can tell us about modern EU foreign politics and why this may not be desirable.
1. Operation Atalanta
The first years: 2008-2010
Piracy of the coast of Somalia has been a problem for many years. The first rise of modern piracy can be detected in the early 90s. Due to civil war in Somalia, the central government under Mohamed Siad Barre collapsed in 1991. This led the Somali Navy to be disbanded.12 As no authority was in place to control the seas, illegal fishing and waste dumping became a problem in the area. The seas of Somalia started to get polluted and the local fish stock eroded. This understandably led to anger with the local fishing communities. With an ongoing civil war in the country and no naval protection, the fisherman had to protect their own resources. The situation escalated over the years as local militias were formed in order to hijack foreign fishing vessels and protect their waters. Eventually noticing the profitability of hijacking foreign ships and the demanding of ransom payments, piracy quickly grew out to be an industry on its own.13 As concluded by a BBC investigation in 2008, when piracy was at one of its peaks, most of the pirates were young men coming from southern Somalian conflict zones. Groups of pirates could roughly be divided into three categories: local fisherman, ex-military men who used to fight under the Barre regime and some technical experts who could operate GPS equipment.14 The Somali pirates would refer to themselves as badaadinta badah, which means ‘saviours of the
12 Nina J. Fitzgerald, Somalia: issues, history, and bibliography, (Nova Publishers, New York: 2002) 19. 13 Jay Bahadur, ‘The Pirates of Somalia: Inside their hidden world’, (Vintage, New York: 2011).
14 Robyn Hunter, ‘Somali Pirates Living the High Life,’ BBC News, 28-10-2008,
sea’.15 From roughly 2000 and onwards, pirate activities expanded in the seas around the Horn
of Africa. International concerns grew as shipping in the area became more dangerous and costly. The first action to counter piracy in the region was taken by Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150). CTF-150 is a part of Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a multinational naval partnership to promote stability, security and prosperity on international waters.16 Since 2002, CTF-150 has been designated to patrol the waters around the Horn of Africa. Although naval military forces were present in the area, piracy continued to grow. Social and political turmoil in Somalia combined with the lucratively of pirate activities caused for criminal organizations to expand the piracy industry. Piracy became more professional and the pirates better equipped. From 2005 to 2010 there is a significant growth in attempts and capability noticeable, as not only more successful attacks took place, also the reach of the pirates expanded. (see figure 1.)
Figure 1. Somalian Piracy threat map 2005-2010.17
15 Jay Bahadur, ‘Somali Pirate: ‘We are not Murderers, we just attack ships’’, The Guardian, 24-05-2011,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/24/a-pioneer-of-somali-piracy.
16 Official information about CMF: https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/.
The Somali pirates extended their reach and capability in such a way that every commercial vessel sailing in the Gulf of Aden, an essential piece of maritime infrastructure, was now a potential target. As a great number of European ships were under threat of the piracy and the CTF-150 initiative did not prove to be effective enough, the EU stepped in. On November 10th 2008, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on ‘a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast’.18 The
initiation of the mission was possible due to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 181419 and 181620. The Transnational Federal Government of Somalia (TFG), recognised the severity of the piracy problem and asked the UNSC for international help. To make this possible, resolutions 1814 and 1816 were made in the summer of 2008 to authorize military vessels of foreign states to enter Somali territorial waters in order to counter piracy.21
In accordance with these UN resolutions and in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Operation Atalanta commenced on December 8th, 2008.22
The mission as deployed in 2008 consisted of two main objectives: (1) The protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WTF) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UNSC Resolution 1814 (2008). (2) The protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008).23
The way Operation Atalanta came into existence shows us that it was the government of Somalia who initially insisted on international help from the UN to counter acts of piracy executed by their own people in their own territory. It was only after the UNSC concluded the resolutions which made it possible to take action, the EU deployed their mission. Although the problems of piracy in relation to international maritime trade had been evident for multiple
18 COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/564f3a90-2931-11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search.
19 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1814(2008), S/RES/1814
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%201814.pdf.
20 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816(2008), S/RES/1816
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%201816.pdf.
21 N.A., ‘Navies to Tackle Somali Pirates,’ BBC News, 02-06-2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7432612.stm.
22 COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/851/CFSP. 23 COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/851/CFSP.
years, the mission deployment can still be seen as a very decisive course of action from the EEAS. Resolution 1816 was concluded on June 2nd, 2008, the decision to initiate Atalanta was made on November 10th of the same year. Especially when keeping in mind this was the first ever military naval mission of the EU in foreign territory, the EU acted fairly quickly. Would it have been a conflict of any other kind, the EU would probably be less eager to step in. One of the explanations of the speed and decisiveness behind Atalanta is that this particular issue touched upon the core of EU values. The criminal obstruction of international trade in a key infrastructural sea route, directly affected the EU economy and goes directly against what the EU stands for on the international stage.
Initially Operation Atalanta was supposed to run for the course of twelve months. After the first year, Council decision 2009/907/CFSP was taken to prolong the Operation with another twelve months.24 In that same council decision, two amendments to the mandate were made.
First of all, a third objective was set out: (3) ‘In addition, Atalanta shall contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.’25 This extra objective contributes to
the line the EU set out in objective number 1, the protection of WFP ships. Atalanta is in place to counter piracy, but at the same time is helping towards development of Somalia. This can be seen as a part of the more comprehensive approach the EU is moving towards, which shall be discussed later. The second amendment that was made stated: ‘The EU will liaise and cooperate with organizations and entities, as well as States, working in the region to combat acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, in particular the “Combined Task Force 150” maritime force which operates within the framework of “Operation Enduring Freedom”.’26 This means
that Atalanta will start to cooperate more in the region and no longer works on its own. This expansion of the mandate in the two amendments concerning international coordination and services in the region hint towards a longer presence of the EU in the area.
In December 2010, the mission again was prolonged. This time not by twelve months, but for the course of two years. Besides this, international cooperation related to arresting, detaining, persecuting and data sharing of pirates was also strengthened in the council decision. Agreements were made with Interpol as well as between operating Member States and third countries in the region under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the
24 COUNCIL DESCISION 2009/907/CFSP of 8 December 2009, amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a
European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and
armed robbery off the Somali
coast.https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009D0907&from=EN.
25 COUNCIL DESCISION 2009/907/CFSP. 26 COUNCIL DESCISION 2009/907/CFSP.
transference of suspects and property of suspects.27
Slowly but surely Operation Atalanta grew bigger and bigger, but the piracy problem continued to worsen. Extra efforts were made after 2010, as the CMF deployed an additional task force: Combined Task Force 151, specifically directed on countering piracy instead of just patrolling the region as was the case with CTF-150. The UN also stepped in with a mission called ‘Operation Ocean Shield’ working towards the same cause. To coordinate the various efforts the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism was brought to life. SHADE served, and still serves, as a platform to coordinate naval actions on countering piracy. Currently SHADE is also used to coordinate actions on the Mediterranean Sea in handling the refugee crisis.28 Mission organization
Contribution to, or participation in EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta can be done in multiple ways:
- Deployment of a surface vessel; either combat (incl. Helicopter) or auxiliary. - Deployment of Maritime Control and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MCRA). - Deployment of Vessel Protection Detachment units (VPD’s).
- Provision of military or civilian staff to work on HQ’s or on board.
Due to frequent rotations of units the composition of EU NAVFOR changes constantly. The mission usually compromises approximately 600 working personnel, 1-3 combat vessels and 1-2 MCRA’s. Participation is done by individual EU Member States with occasional contribution of a non-EU Member State. 29 The currently (June 2020) deployed units are:
27 COUNCIL DECISION 2010/766/CFSP of 7 December 2010, amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a
European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010D0766&from=EN
28 EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL FORCE MEDITERRANEAN Press release on First Shared Awareness and
De-confliction (SHADE) meeting for the Mediterranean Sea, 26-11-2015, http://statewatch.org/news/2015/dec/eu-navformed-pr-shade-meeting.pdf
29 EU NAVFOR official website:
https://eunavfor.eu/mission/
- Combat vessel Numancia (ESP) - Combat vessel Carlo Bergamini (IT) - MPRA P-C3 Orion (GER)
- MPRA P-3M Orion (ESP)
Member States can decide for themselves if they want to participate in any CSDP mission. Usually countries of military magnitude take the lead. The biggest contributors to Operation Atalanta have been Spain, Italy, France, Germany, The UK and The Netherlands. First of all, these are countries who have the resources, staff and knowledge to do so. Secondly, these countries are heavily invested in maritime trade and have significant interest in stopping piracy. According to EU Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Colino, who works on the operation, joining the operation also brings a certain status, both in EU circles and in the deployment region.30 An example of this might be the placement of the Operational Headquarter (OHQ) of the mission. When the mission started in 2008, the OHQ was located in Northwood, UK. Due to Brexit the UK was forced to give up the OHQ in 2018. After this, the country most invested in Atalanta, Spain, was ‘rewarded’ with the Operational Headquarter in Rota, Spain.31
The construction of individual Member States working on EU missions as opposed to a much disputed ‘European army’ of sorts is common for any mission or initiative coming from the EEAS. This can sometimes lead to difficulties and ambiguity about who is in charge. This is what is called the leadership paradox of EU foreign policy. In their work Lisbeth Aggestam and Markus Johansson argue that formal EU leadership of foreign policy does not correlate with the executive leadership of the Member States. Because of this, the legitimacy of the EU as a foreign actor is affected.32 When we look at the case of Atalanta, we see certain Member States taking the lead in the operation. Although formally they are not leading the operation, effectively they are. This paradox has multiple implications. Apart from the status Member States can gain within the EU from participating and effectively leading an operation, this also applies on the international level. Vessels sailing the seas around the Horn of Africa are both under EU flag and State flag. When engaging in talks, negotiations, the making of agreements etc, this can cause for what is called diplomatic hybridism. The diplomacy that accompanies a mission like Operation Atalanta is performed both by the EU and the invested Member States. challenges that arise because of this can be that certain Member States have different interest
30 Interview EU Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Colino.
31 N.A. ‘EU Piracy Task Force to leave UK post-Brexit’, BBC News, 30-07-18.
32 Lisbeth Aggestam and Markus Johansson, ‘The Leadership Paradox in EU Foreign Policy’, JCMS 2017 Volume
than other Member States or the EU as a whole. In the case of potential extension or expansion of the mission or mandate, these interests can play a role. Diplomatic hybridism can also work negatively for Member States as their bilateral relations with third countries can be overshadowed or be made obsolete by EU diplomacy.33
Rough waters: 2010-2014
Despite efforts from the EU, CMF and the UN, piracy reached its height in 2011. In January of 2011, 736 hostages and 32 ships were being held by pirates.34 Although the numbers of hostages and ships held were high, financial gain for the pirates themselves from these attacks was relatively low. Reports show that the income from ransom is estimated around 58 million US Dollars (USD) over 2009, rising to 238 million US Dollars over 2010 and then dropping again to 160 million US Dollars in 2011.35 Ransom for a single ship could get as high as 5 million
USD in cash, usually delivered by helicopter to the ships in question.36 The ransom payments
go to the bosses and funders on land, who regulate their investments through buying shares in certain attacking plans on the trading bourse of Harardhere, a small coastal town in Somalia.37 The ransom payments are but a small fraction of the costs the piracy problem brings. According to a rapport from Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP), the indirect costs can be estimated around 6.9 billion US Dollars over 2012. This includes taking alternative routes, insurance costs, private protection, legal proceedings and also the costs of the international anti-piracy operations.38
In the period 2007-2011, over 3500 sailors were captured with the hijacking of ships, 62 of them did not survive. ‘Hundreds of these seafarers have been subjected to horrific torture including being hung by the ankles over the side of the ship, being shut in the ship’s freezer room, having cable ties tightened round the genitals, being beaten, punched and kicked…..62 seafarers have died in the past four years as a direct result of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and
33 David Spence, ‘The EEAS and its epistemic communities: The challenges of Diplomatic Hybridism’, in: Spence
D., Bátora J. (eds) The European External Action Service. The European Union in Iternational Affairs series (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015).
34 EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta Mission Information, https://eunavfor.eu/mission/.
35 Venetia Archer & Robert Young Pelton, ‘Can We Ever Asses the True Cost of Piracy?,’ Somalia Report,
24-
02-2012,https://web.archive.org/web/20120602064556/http:/www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2867/Can_We _Ever_Assess_the_True_Cost_of_Piracy_.
36 David Gardner, ‘Five Somali Pirates drown as they squabble over 3Million ransom,’ Daily Mail, 12-01-2009,
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1110585/Five-Somali-pirates-drown-squabble-3million-ransom.html.
37 Bruce Sterling, ‘The Pirate Stock Exchange,’ Wired.com, 03-12-2009,
https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2009/12/the-pirate-stock-exchange/
Indian Ocean, through deliberate murder by pirates, or suicide during the period of captivity.’
39 As said by Save Our Seafarers organisation chairman Giles Heimann.
Understandably and very necessary, the EU decided they would not retract out of the area but instead continue Operation Atalanta. The decisions on continuations of Operation Atalanta in 2009 and 2010 were made at the very last in December of the year. This time, the decision to continue was made a lot earlier, in March 2012, 10 months before the termination date. Determination to continue the fight and to eradicate piracy was shown by this. Just like in 2010, the prolonging of the mandate was two years, scheduled to end December 12, 2014. The prosecution procedure of detainees was once again sharpened in this 2012 Council Decision.40 In earlier stages of the mission, units deployed by the EU NAVFOR could already arrest, detain and transfer suspects of act of piracy in the Area of Operations (AO). From 2012 onwards, suspects could also be prosecuted by EU Member States, Regional States or any Third State with which the EU has agreements and has jurisdiction in accordance with resolution 1814 and 1816 UNSC.41
Operation Atalanta can tell us a lot about EU foreign policy development. The maritime military character, the decisiveness and extent of legal agreements all outside of EU territory are quite extraordinary for the EU up to this point. One should note that was it not for this immediate necessity of the piracy crisis, this way of foreign policy shaping would not have been realised so quickly. It is often said that in the field of international relations, the EU is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm. This statement seems to get challenged more and more over time. Since 2002 the EU has intervened over thirty times by means of a Common Security and Defence Policy military or civilian mission outside of EU territory. When looking at the missions and the reasons behind each individual mission the incentive is never solely military. Operation Atalanta is a prime example of this; the economic interest is the first and foremost incentive; piracy is damaging EU trade. Secondly there is a political incentive, relations between the EU and countries in the region will strengthen due to this mission, as well as relations with other countries benefitting from EU protection on the seas. The military aspect is merely a tool towards getting these results.
The development that can be noted is that the EU is not becoming more of a military
39 N.A. ‘Deaths of Seafarers in Somali Pirate Attacks Soar,’ Reuters.com, 20-06-2011,
https://www.reuters.com/article/somalia-piracy-seafarers/deaths-of-seafarers-in-somali-pirate-attacks-soar-idUSLDE75J1KA20110620.
40 COUNCIL DECISCION 2012/174/CFSP of 23 March 2012 amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a
European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2012/174/oj/eng.
power, it is that in EU foreign policy, military is more often used to contribute to other purposes. So, the statement about the giant, dwarf and worm is not necessarily challenged because of the fact the ratio between the three is changing, it is challenged because of the fact that in foreign policy missions like Atalanta, the three cannot simply be considered apart from each other, they are often intertwined.
EUTM, EUCAP and the Comprehensive Approach
After the rough years of 2011 and 2012, piracy activities finally started to slow down. Over the course of 2013, only nine attempts of hijacking were reported in the area, with a success rate of zero. Compared with 2012, this was a 90 percent drop in piracy activities.42 According to
specialist risk consulting firm Control Risks, this decline could be attributed to the almost universal adoption of the Best Management Practices (BMP) by the vessels sailing the area.43
The BMP’s, created in a joint effort by the maritime industry, governments, military and private protection services, are booklets published regularly since 2009 on how to handle piracy. Some examples from BMP4 (2011) include:
Increasing the speed of the ship, learning escape and avoidance manoeuvres; elevation of freeboard; use of barbed and electric wire over hanging on the outboard of the ships, water cannons or projected nets ; use of debilitating loudspeakers and flares; development of “strongholds” (safe areas for the crew), use of radars and cameras, keeping sailors constantly alert, Reporting entries in risk areas and sending daily reports to authorities.44
The latest version, published in 2018 is ‘BMP 5: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in The Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea’.45 The most important update in this BMP with respect to Operation Atalanta can be found
in the coordinative aspect. Because Atalanta is the operation that has been focussing on the issue and active in the area for a decade in 2018, they slowly have become a coordinative force.
42 Steven Perlberg, ‘Somali Piracy is down 90 per cent from last year’, thejournal.ie, 15-12-2003.
43 Cormac McGarry & Sebastian Boe, ‘The return of Somali Piracy: Myth or Reality?’, Control Risks report, 2017. 44 https://unosat.web.cern.ch/unosat/unitar/publications/UNITAR_UNOSAT_Piracy_1995-2013.pdf.
45 BMP 5: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in The Red Sea, Gulf of
Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, 05-06-2018,
Alongside with SHADE, through which strategies are being set out, Atalanta coordinates the operational reality in cases of threat or attack.
According to the Control Risk report, another significant factor that contributed to the decline in attempts by pirates in 2013, is the establishment of security and development forces on the Somalian mainland. This leads us to the comprehensive approach touched upon earlier. When operation Atalanta was launched in 2008, it was purely aimed at protecting merchant vessels from piracy, not at addressing the roots of the piracy problem itself. After a few years however, these root causes did get attention from the EU. One of the causes of the growing piracy problem was the fact that the Somali military force had largely been dismantled after the collapse of the central government in the early 90s. To try and help Somalia regain strength in this field, the EU launched the European Union Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia).
EUTM Somalia was initiated April 10th, 2010 and was directed at the training of Somali
Armed Forces to help them support the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia as well as strengthen military institutions.46 Just like Operation Atalanta, EUTM has been prolonged
several times and the mandate has been expanded over the years. Currently the mission is in its sixth mandate and is scheduled to continue at least till December 31, 2020.47 From the missions third mandate in 2013, the EU started to engage more with the Somali government. The headquarters moved to the capital Mogadishu, and next to the training of armed forces, the mission was also directed at strategic advisory and mentoring of activities of the Ministry of Defence and the Somali National Army.48
In July of 2012 the EU launched a third mission in the region. This mission was called the European Union Capacity Building Mission in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor). The initial mission was focused on the building of maritime security forces capacity in the Horn of Africa region, including countries such as Kenya and Djibouti. After restructuring of the mission in 2016, it was decided the mission was to focus solely on Somalia. Due to this refocus the name changed to EUCAP Somalia.
Capacity building is broader than just helping develop maritime forces. Other aspects of the mission include: ’Supporting federal and regional authorities in developing legislation, strengthening the criminal justice chain in the maritime domain and providing advice on policy
46EUTM Somalia Mission Statement, https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/.
47 Council of the EU Press Release, ‘Somalia: EU training mission extended, budget agreed and mandate
amended’, 19-11-2018, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/11/19/somalia-eu-training-mission-extended-budget-agreed-and-mandate-amended/.
to the Somali ministry of internal security and the Somali Police Force.’ 49
EUCAP Somalia will also run until at least December 31st, 2020.50 Again, just like the other two missions, EUCAP Somalia has been prolonged multiple times and the mandate has changed on several occasions. A slight difference with these mandate changes in comparison with the other two missions is that in this mission, the mandate first had to be ‘narrowed’ in 2016 in geographical sense, before the mandate could become ‘broader’ in institutional sense. This ‘deepening’ of the mission, the increasing investment of the EU in the region, is in accordance with the trend we have seen in the development of the other two missions.
Over the course of a couple years, the EU gets heavily invested in the Somalian case. The three missions all have their own aims and objectives, but they all contribute to the so-called comprehensive approach (CA) in Somalia. The first time this comprehensive approach towards the region is formally mentioned is in the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa in 2011. In this strategic framework the context and the challenges in the region are being discussed as well as the way the EU should engage with these challenges. In the strategic framework five key objectives are set out: (1) Building robust and accountable political structures, (2) contributing to conflict resolution and prevention, (3) mitigating security threats emanating from the region, (4) promoting economic growth and (5) supporting regional economic cooperation. To achieve these objectives ‘the EU aims to become both more visible and more effective through a comprehensive approach towards the Horn that will bring together all EU policy strands.’51
The bringing together of all EU policy strands is vital in the comprehensive approach. It means next to the fact that different missions work together in a cooperative way to achieve a common goal of stability and prosperity, the missions also make sure different EU policy strands are being connected. This connects to the intertwined economic, political and military aspects and interest served by Operation Atalanta discussed earlier. Scholars Diego Borrajo and José Luis de Castro have analysed this comprehensive approach as a way of foreign engagement. They see the comprehensive approach as tool for providing security is a strong alternative to the more military-focused approaches used by the classical big powers such as the United States of America or Russia. With the comprehensive approach the EU brings broader policy and tool potentialities, this in contrast with the often narrower approach of
49 EUCAP Somalia Fact Sheet, https://www.eucap-som.eu/fact-sheet/. 50 EUCAP Somalia Fact Sheet, https://www.eucap-som.eu/fact-sheet/.
51 Council of the European Union, ‘Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa.’
classical military intervention.52 This gives the EU a better chance of being a transformative power in complex crisis environments. However, an overemphasis on the military and security dimension could harm the social effectiveness of the approach.53
When specifically looking at the effectiveness of the approach in stabilizing Somalia, Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Kerstin Petretto see the comprehensive approach only works to a limited extent. The stabilization of the country through securitization on the one hand and institution building and training on the other, is only effective in the first phase. When it comes to actual state building processes and the inclusion of society, problems emerge. Due to heterarchy problems, i.e. the balance of powers, there is lack of legitimacy of EU efforts. For the state building process to fully work, it must come from Somalia itself, including bottom-up input and societal willingness and cooperation.54
Piracy suppressed, but not eradicated: 2014-2020
The next prolonging of Operation Atalanta was in 2014, when Operation Atalanta was extended to 2016. During this period, the number of pirate activities remained low. This however does not prove the piracy problem could be considered gone. In the tactical analysis of threat of piracy there is a big gap between the supressing of piracy activities and the eradication of piracy. A way of measuring the threat of piracy is done by looking at three key factors: opportunity, capability and intent. When all three are up, the threat is high, and the number of attacks will be high. When all three are down, the threat is low, and eradication can be considered close.55
What we have seen is that opportunity has been brought down by Operation Atalanta, CMF 151, the BMP’s, and all initiatives making it extremely difficult for pirates to successful perform an act of hijacking. The capability however, has only risen. The trend depicted in figure 1., where you see the reach of pirates growing from 2005 to 2010, has continued over the years. Also, through the means of better weaponry and technological improvements coming with the industrialising of the piracy industry, the capability is ever growing. The intent can be considered quite stable. What is common for the last few years is that once every so often, an attempt of hijacking is done by pirates. In operational jargon this is called ‘testing the waters’,
52 Diego Borrajo & José Luis de Castro, ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach as an alternative strategic framework
for a security provider: the case of EU NAVFOR Somalia, Global Affairs, 2:2, (2016) 177-186.
53 ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach as an alternative strategic framework for a security provider’, 184. 54 Hans-Georg Ehrhart & Kerstin Petretto, ‘Stabilizing Somalia: can the EU's comprehensive approach work?’,
European Security, 23:2, (2016) 179-194.
pirates will test if security forces are still out there and alert, to see whether or not it is a good time to plan further activities.56 This is made visible in figure 2. Since the successful suppression of piracy after 2013, each year there are a few cases of suspicious events and attacks.
With slight fluctuations taken into account, the opportunity is down, the capability is up, and the intent remains the same since the successful suppressing in 2013. The security system in place however does not prove to be flawless. As we can see in figure 2, there is an uprising in 2017. An interesting attack occurred in March of 2017, when a large commercial ship, oil tanker Aris 13, was hijacked by a group of Somali pirates. The crew was held hostage and after a reported gunfight, negotiations began. But after learning the oil tanker and crew were hired by a Somali businessman to bring oil to Mogadishu, the ship and crew were released without any demands. According to a Reuters journalist in Bossaso ‘Pirates have traditionally been wary of tangling with Somalia’s powerful businessmen.’57
Figure 2. Monitored piracy activities in the EU NAVFOR Area of Operations 2008-2019.58
Over the last couple of years there have been no significant changes in piracy activities off the coast of Somalia. With Atalanta and other systems like SHADE and the BPM5 in place, there is an adequate line of defence. The pirates however are not limited to piracy alone. As said earlier, piracy is a part of a bigger criminal system grown out of the failing of the Somalian
56 Interview Manuel Colino.
57 N.A., ‘Somali pirates release oil tanker and crew after first hijack for five years’, The Guardian, 16-03-2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/somali-pirates-release-oil-tanker-and-crew-after-first-hijack-for-five-years.
state. Other activities such as human trafficking and drug trade are also part of this criminal system. In recent years another worrisome development has been noted; the links between Somali piracy and the terrorist groups al Shabaab and in lessor form Isis.
According to journalists in the area, these links have been in place since piracy started to become a profitable business in the early years. At the time, pirates would occasionally be threatened and forced to give up their ransom money to terrorist organisations. It also occurred that terrorist organisations bought shares in certain piracy operations at the bourse.59 With opportunity down, and pirates out of a ‘job’, independent militant groups and young men who used to be active in piracy were recruited by terrorist groups such as al Shabaab to perform illegal activities. The terrorist groups are acting as employers and give the young men who no longer can make money off of piracy, new ways to make money. These activities do not directly threaten EU interests but do form a danger for peace and stability in the region.
No significant changes have been made in the last years with respect to Operation Atalanta. The operation is successful in countering and supressing piracy, but danger of uprising stays present. According to insiders the chance of prolonging after 2020 is very high, as there is no adequate alternative for maritime protecting in the region available. The two other missions in Somalia, EUCAP and EUTM, also are very likely to continue after 2020.60
On the one hand, it is true that there is no adequate alternative to Operation Atalanta as a security force and as a coordinative tool in the region. On the other hand, no efforts were made by the EU to transfer their tasks to other authorities such as NATO. It seems the EU is perfectly content with their presence in the region. To a lesser extend this can also be said for EUCAP and EUTM. These two missions are about development and are working towards the goals of stabilizing and rebuilding Somalia. As these goals are not yet achieved, they will keep on working. At the same time, no end goal has been marked and EU involvement with Somalia and the rest of the Horn of Africa Region is planned to increase in following years. Security, development, trade relations and geo-strategic interests are all coming together in the region. This will be discussed in chapter three.
59 Richard Lough, ‘Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants’, Reuters Press, 06-07-2011. 60 Stated by all three interviewees.
2. Theoretical framework
Normative Power Europe
The European Union is an exceptional entity, as is the EU way of dealing with foreign policy. In general, foreign relations to the EU mostly mean trade agreements and commercial partnerships. However, over the last two decades, the EU has been more active in the militarized field of external relations. Because the EU is such an exceptional entity, there are many ways to describe the EU as a foreign power. A commonly used dichotomy between the EU and classical strong nations on the world stage, is soft power versus hard power. The theory is formulated by Joseph Nye. He states the concept of soft power can be seen as an alternative to coercion by direct military force or threat. He defines soft power as the ability to influence or shape one’s behaviour to get the desired outcome. This can be done in several different ways but is mainly done on the bases of attraction and co-optation. Tools of soft power include foreign policies, international agreements and political values.61 Opposed to the concept of soft power is hard power. This kind of power is also used to influence the behaviour of others, usually to protect own interests. The difference with soft power is that the effects usually can be seen almost immediately, especially when used by big entities such as Russia or the US. Hard power does not always have to be military intervention, it can also exist of economic sanctions or the threat of sanctions.62
The EU in general can be seen more as a soft than as a hard power. However, in the case of the EU the dichotomy between hard and soft power is more nuanced. For instance, economic sanctions are often incorporated in agreements by the EU, which makes them a combination of soft and hard power. Also, the ways in which EU military forces act on foreign soil, is often not in an offensive or coercive way. Most missions have objectives aimed at stability and development. A term that better defines EU engagement with foreign countries or regions is the EU as a civilian power. Civilian power is the power built through political and economic cooperation (which can be both agreements and sanctions). This cooperation and the desire of
61 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990). 62 Daryl Copeland, ‘Hard Power vs. Soft Power’, The Mark 26-04-2012.
others to cooperate with the EU is a form of power that serves EU interests. Within civilian power, military force is optional to protect these interests, although it is rarely used.63
The soft versus hard power dichotomy and the civilian power form, give names to the form of power used but does not tell us much about the reasons behind it. To analyse the motives behind EU actions and foreign policy we can use Ian Manners’ theory of Normative Power Europe (NPE). Manners states that the EU tries to shape the norm of what is desirable in the world. Through leading by example, the EU has the ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’. These norms include stable democracies, free trade, rule of law and the protection of human rights.64
In her paper European Union in the eyes of others: filling the gap in literature Sonia Lucarelli analysed the images of the EU as an international actor in large countries all over the world.65 She finds that although the EU is not considered very much as a distinctive
international actor, the EU often is presented as an ‘external supporter of the domestic democratization process’.66 This goes especially for less developed countries or conflict areas.
In India for example, the EU is often mentioned as an important player in the democratization process after the Nepalese crisis in 2006 as well as an actor in creating peace in Sri-Lanka and Jammu-Kashmir.67
In these cases, the EU not only uses its soft power to gain direct influence in border regions, the EU also uses its soft normative power to help countries and civilizations outside of their own region. Besides preaching democracy and EU ideology, these projects help the EU get a more global influence and status. In the analysis of Lucarelli it is also stated that the EU is seen more and more as a counterbalance to the US in the international power framework.68 The more the EU is seen as a normative power by the rest of the world, the more the EU will be allowed to come and intervene in conflicts or areas where this EU norm is under threat. In this sense, it is profitable for the EU to be seen not as a distinctive international actor but merely as a peacekeeper and protector of standards.
The status of a normative power allows the EU to intervene, while at the same time it can strengthen the EU status as a normative power. However, the status of normative power
63 Karen E. Smith, ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?’, The International
Spectator Vol 35, No. 2, April-June 2000, 12.
64 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe, a contradiction in terms?’ JCMS 2002 40(2), 235-258.
65 S. Lucarelli, ‘European Union in the eyes of others: filling the gap in literature’, European Foreign Affairs
Review, 12(3), 249-270, 265.
66 Lucarelli, European Union in the eyes of others, 266.
67 L. Fioramonti, ‘The External Image of the European Union: Country Report on India’, Working Paper Series
GARNET, 2007.
Europe can also be weakened when military intervention takes the overhand in relation to for instance humanitarian intervention. In his article European Union ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge, Ian Manners takes his own theory and applies it to the way the EU engages with world security. With the security challenge, Manners refers to the way the EU engages in the global war on terror in the early 2000’s. Manners sees that this war on terror is shaping EU foreign policy. Strategic objectives and security are becoming more predominant concerns while development aid is being left behind. ‘Normative principles such as democracy, human rights, social justice and good governance are not just the niceties of a Kantian paradise; they are the means and the ends of sustainable peace.’69 In other words; the EU should stick with their normative principles as a basis for foreign policy and should not be tempted into excessive militarized policies. This is not desirable for two reasons: one, it will not result in sustainable peace and development. Two, it will demise the normative power of the EU.
Thomas Diez and Michelle Pace see Normative Power Europe not merely as a theory or a given, they see Normative Power Europe as a discursive self-construction. In their work they argue the EU likes to portray themselves as a ‘force of good’ on the international stage. This image reinforces itself when the EU takes action externally because this action is always in line with their own norms, which are considered good. When this constructed image is shared by others, the EU gains power and legitimacy to act externally.70
Operation Atalanta can also be seen as an exertion of normative power. The mere fact that the operation could be initiated, can be seen as an effect of the status of Europe as a normative power and a doer of good. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia asked for international help and allowed the EU to have authority in their territorial waters by UNSC resolutions 1814 and 1816. They agreed and welcomed the EU NAVFOR operation not only because there was a piracy problem that needed to be solved, but also because of the status the EU has with foreign interventions. Somalia clearly shares the image of Normative Power Europe. It is not likely Somalia and also the UNSC, would be as welcoming to other powers such as Russia or China to conduct such an operation. Of course, this line of thought also goes for the initiation of EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia. For these missions maybe even more so, as they do not use direct military force, and the NPE status had grown at this point due to Atalanta.
69 Ian Manners, ‘European Union ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge’, European Security, 15:4
(2006), 405-421.
70 Thomas Dietz & Michelle Pace. ’Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation.’’ In: Whitman R.G.
From a European perspective, the initiation of the mission also fits into the NPE image. Crucial norms and values of the EU; free trade and rule of law, are under threat. This is a legit cause to fight for. Also, Operation Atalanta provides security for all commercial vessels from any country worldwide. This contributes to the image of the EU as a doer of good in the world. The other two mission can be seen in the same light. Training and capacity building are in essence development operations, they help Somalia and the region by providing stability and working toward prosperity.
Militarization and Securitization
The idea behind Operation Atalanta clearly fits into the framework of Normative Power Europe. However, the fact that its execution is based on military force makes this complicated. As described by both Lucarelli and Manners, militarization of external action of the European Union could weaken the Normative Power Europe image and therefore the power of normative Europe. At the same time, the European Union has been increasingly military active in the last two decades. To understand this development, we can look at the militarization of EU foreign policy.
Traditional militarization theory argues that when the presence and or use of military armed forces are deemed more important by a government, they will increase in capacity. Consequently, the state becomes more likely to adopt aggressive (military intervention filled) foreign policies, and military force will be used more and more.71 This can be seen as a cycle that reinforces itself. When applied to the European Union, militarization is the notion that EU foreign policy is more and more focused on strategic objectives and security, which allows for an increase of military operations and the use of armed force.
The start of the militarization process in the EU is typically pinpointed with the publication of the first European Security Strategy in 2003.72 This document emphasizes the need for a renewed focus of European External Action. Main policy implication of this document is that the EU should be:
71 J. Schofield, ‘Contending Views: Militarism, Militarization and War’, In: Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues
and Policies, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007).
72 European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels, 12 December 2003)
https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/10/11/1df262f2-260c-486f-b414-dbf8dc112b6b/publishable_en.pdf.
More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.73
This of course is only a small part of the document and a great deal is also written about development, humanitarian aid, cooperation, agreements and the like. However, the explicit statements about strategic objectives and robust intervention are a significant change compared to earlier EU discourse and action on foreign policy. By some scholars at the time this was seen as a ‘sharp turn away from the normative path of sustainable peace’74 and ‘an important first
step along the road to an EU strategic culture’.75
Since the first Common Security and Defence Policy mission in 2002, there have been 36 CSDP missions, 19 of them completed and 17 of them still active (see figure 3).76 On March
31st, 2020 it was decided to launch yet another mission, called EUNAVFOR MED IRINI.
Operation Irini (named after the Greek goddess of peace) is a naval operation in the Mediterranean area with ‘the key aim to contribute to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya and to promoting peace in our neighbourhood.’77
This means on average, two new missions are initiated each year by the European Union to ensure security outside of EU territory. Besides this, the CSDP has become more dominant in the institutional sense. An example is the establishing of a European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2016 in order to increase and coordinate national investments in research, development and acquisitions of military instruments. The budget is set out to be 1 billion euros annually from 2020 onwards.78
73 European Security Strategy 2003, 6.
74 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads.’ Journal of European Public
Policy 13, no. 2 (March 1, 2006): 192.
75 G. Quille, ‘The European security strategy: a framework for EU security interests?’, International Peacekeeping,
(2004) 11(3): 437.
76 European Union CSDP Missions and Operations 2020
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en.
77 EEAS, ‘A new EU military operation in the Mediterranean: Irini is born to enforce Libya arms embargo’,
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/76869/new-eu-military-operation-mediterranean-irini-born-enforce-libya-arms-embargo_en.
Figure 3. European Union CSDP Missions and Operations 2020.79
In their work ‘The European Union as a Masculine Military Power: European Union Security and Defence Policy in ‘Times of Crisis’ Marijn Hoijtink and Hanna Muehlenhoff argue that the developments of the CSDP and therefore the EU do not so much indicate classic militarization but a ‘normalization of militarism’.80 They see this normalisation is strengthened
by what they call the ‘crisis narrative’. Conflicts or issues in the European Neighbourhood and further away are depicted in terms of crisis and threat to EU safety, thus legitimizing military action. Repetition of this cycle causes for normalisation of European militarism in each ‘crisis’ situation.
The normalisation of militarism in discourse strongly relates to securitization. Securitization is the use of discourse towards shaping a particular issue or conflict into an existential threat. Experts in this field define it as discourse or a speech act ‘through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional
79 European External Action Service: Military and civilian missions and operations,
https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en.
80 Hoijtink, M., and Muehlenhoff, H.L. “The European Union as a Masculine Military Power: European Union
