1
Progresses and Limits of the Normative Power
Europe through the European Neighborhood
Policy: The Cases of Georgia-Abkhazia and
Nagorno-Karabakh
By
Guglielmo Pascarelli
Student Number: 1951653
Master of Arts: International Relations and International Organizations
Supervisor:
Prof. Paula Hevia Pacheco
2
Table of Contents
Abbreviation List ... 3
Maps ... 4
General Introduction ... 6
1. Normative Power Europe ... 10
1.1. Introduction
... 10
1.2. The European Normative Power. The Debate.
... 11
1.3. The Use of the EU Conditionality and Socialization Mechanisms in the 2004
and 2007 Enlargement Processes
... 17
1.4. Conclusions
... 21
2. The European Neighborhood Policy ... 23
2.1. Introduction
... 23
2.2. European Neighborhood Policy. Historical Context and Innovations
... 25
2.3. Conditionality beyond the EU’s Border
... 28
2.4. ENP, Conditionality and Conflict Management
... 32
2.5. Conclusions
... 38
3. The case studies and the analysis ... 40
3.1. Introduction
... 40
3.2. The de Facto States
... 41
3.3. The Georgia-Abkhazia conflict
... 42
3.4. Georgia and the EU
... 45
3.5. Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
... 51
3.6. The EU, Armenia and Azerbaijan
... 53
3.7. Conclusions
... 60
General Conclusion ... 62
3
Abbreviation List
AP Action Plan
CEECs Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CR Country Report
EU European Union
ENP European Neighborhood Policy
ENPI European Neighborhood Policy Instrument
ESDP European Security and Defense Policy
EUMM European Monitoring Mission in Georgia
EUSR European Union Special Representative
IDP Internal Displaced People
MEDA Euro - Mediterranean Partnership
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs Non Governmental Organizations
NK Nagorno-Karabakh
NPE Normative Power Europe
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PR Progress Report
TSFSR Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
UN United Nations
US United States
4
Maps
5
Source:
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/large-map.php
6
General Introduction
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has been launched in 2004 by the European Commission with the scope of improving the relationship between the EU and its neighbors in the absence of a future membership perspective. This policy aimed at creating a “ring of friends” around the EU by ensuring participation in the internal market and financial support in return for the achievement of democratic standards.
The implementation, developments and possible future scenarios of the ENP are particularly interesting especially after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements that brought the EU in a more direct contact with some of the most unstable geopolitical areas in the world such as the Caucasus, the Middle East, North Africa and the Russian Federation.
The scope of the thesis is to understand whether the normative power of the EU, which consists in the capacity of the EU to influence other international actors without using military force but just political, diplomatic and economic incentives, has found a valid success through the implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). In particular I want to investigate if the ENP has been consistent in acting as a normative power tool in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia-Georgia conflicts since 2004. Therefore, the final objective is to assess the capacity of the EU to act as a normative power beyond its borders and, in particular, to verify whether the EU has been able to represent a trustable and solid international actor capable of bringing a general improvement of the relations between the actors involved in the Nagorno-Kharabakh and Georgia-Abkhazia wars.
I have chosen these two specific cases studies since the states involved fit particularly well in the analysis for the following reasons: Georgia, Abkhazia and Azerbaijan are members of the European Neighborhood Policy and they have no perspective of become members in the short and medium run. This is the perfect situation to verify the NPE outside the EU’s borders. Moreover, the conflicts take place in the same geographical area, with the involvement of the same international actors (Russia, OSCE and the EU itself) and characterized by the same ethnic origin. This makes possible a more effective study because it enables to confront the overall evolution of the conflicts, limiting the complexity of the variables at stake.
7
undertaken in its history. In this positive discourse, however, there is always been an element of weakness: the foreign policy. The EU so far has been very unsuccessful to create a solid, coherent and cohesive European foreign policy; rather, depending on the contingent situation, the various and different states’ national interests have dominated the EU’s foreign policy agenda.
The European Neighborhood Policy represents the last attempt to give a solid basis to a satisfactory and efficient EU foreign policy. What is really interesting for me, is to verify whether the EU will be able to replicate the results it has obtained domestically by influencing external states to comply and adapt to its values and norms. In particular, whether the EU will be able to inaugurate a new way of standing in the international arena. Since it is the first experiment of supranational state, it might be also the case that the EU will represent the first entity able to favor a change in another state without using its military capabilities but only its international status.
This is also the reason why the main theoretical framework I will rely upon in order to get to my conclusions will be the Normative Power debate, which aims at understanding why and how the EU is considered a ‘sui generis’ actor. In particular it is important to shed a light on this sometimes confusing debate over the definition of what a normative power is and the characteristics the EU has to entail in order to be considered a special international actor.
In order to pursue this goal, I will rely mostly on secondary sources to outline the main positions of the debate about the normative power of the European Union. This, however, does not exclude the use of different kind of sources. Especially in the third chapter dedicated to the analysis, I will also use primary sources since, through the study of the EU official documents, I will try to analyze whether the EU has been able to develop a normative power beyond its borders and to bring an improvement in the conflicts under observation.
This thesis is divided into three main chapters. The chapters are also divided into several paragraphs or sections.
8
The first section describes the main positions within the debate and tries to clarify the concept of normative power. Then, the discussion moves on the debate about the role and the identity of the EU. In the third section, the focus will be on the possibility for the EU to act as a normative power while strengthening of its military capabilities. The chapter ends by sketching a normative power model, underlying the main characteristics and the main objectives the EU has to pursue in order to be considered a ‘sui generis’ international actor.
The second chapter analyzes to what extent the European Neighborhood Policy through the Partnership Agreements and the Action Plans has been able to adhere to the normative power model and to what extent these instruments can contribute to strengthen the role of the EU in conflict management issues.
In fact, the main theoretical issue in relation to the effectiveness of the normative power in the region has been the impossibility to use the main reward applied in the domestic enlargement process: the membership perspective. Consequently, the doubt is that the EU might appear politically weak, not being able to ‘force’ the neighboring countries to comply with the European principles and wills. The European Neighborhood Policy introduces important innovations to fill this gap.
The first section defines the context in which the ENP has developed and then describes its main tools: Action Plans, Progress Reports and National Indicative Programs. The focus will be on the progress of the ENP which will be analyzed through the official documents of the EU on several issues related to conflict management. I am referring to consolidation of democratic institutions, human and minority rights.
However, the new policy of the ENP has to be linked to the debate about the Normative Power Europe (NPE). In fact, even in the new context, this theoretical framework remains valid. The mechanisms of conditionality and socialization have to undertake a partial redefinition in order to be adapted in the ENP framework. In the third section this adaptation process will lead to a redefinition of the normative power model. At this point the concept of Anchoring is introduced. The Anchoring mechanism is a theoretical concept introduced by Elena Baracani in 2003 which studies and defines the mechanisms at work in a relationship in which a bigger actor tries to influence smaller actors through economic and political incentives. Therefore, this model is perfect to illustrate the relationship between the EU and the countries involved in the conflicts, in the absence of a membership perspective.
The third chapter focuses on the application and verification of the theoretical model of the
Anchoring through the analysis of two case studies. The first one is the interethnic conflict between
9
phase between 1991 and 1994. The conflict still presents elements of tension between the counterparts. The second case study is the long-lasting issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave which has sparkled in 1988 with the declaration of independence by the Nagorno-Karabakh region under the influence of the Armenian authorities. The most violent period of the war has ended in 1994 but there are still thousands of refugees and displaced people and the tension remains high. Both cases involve states which are part of the European Neighborhood Policy and have signed agreements with the EU. Therefore, through the analysis of the Action Plans and the Progress Reports issued by the EU on an annual basis, the capacity of the ENP to reduce the distance between the fighting parts and the overall capacity of the EU to act as a normative power will be tested.
The first part of the chapter will delineate the general context in which these conflicts had evolved. First of all, it is important to define the peculiarity of the situations I’m going to deal with by pointing out the concept of the “de facto” states. In fact, both the region of Abkhazia and the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave present characteristics common to a nation-state such as population and a defined territory but they lack the most important element which is the external sovereignty. This implies that those entities have not been recognized by the international community even if they felt entitled to be regarded as full-fledged states. This situation of ambiguity has exacerbated ethnic tensions and has contributed to raise the animosity of the conflicts.
The second and third sections are linked together since the former provides a brief history of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict and the latter analyzes and describes the progress in the relationship between the EU and Georgia from the period before the entry of the ENP (2004) on the scene until the last Progress Report (2010). The capacity of the EU of being a normative power will be analyzed through the verification of the presence and of the three basic elements of the Anchoring mechanism: economic assistance, conditionality process and institutional links.
The same scheme remains valid for the second case study as well. In fact, the description and the history of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is followed by the study of the EU’s commitment especially after 2004.
From the study of the official ENP documents and from their analysis through the Anchoring theory, the EU has been capable of maintaining and improving its involvements into the conflicts. However, this engagement is only limited to general statements contained in the official documents but the EU is still marginal e linked only to support initiatives taken and led by other actors such as OSCE and the Russia Federation. In the general conclusions I will delineate my own idea to strengthen the role of the EU and to make it more effective.
10
and strategic interests at stake that have conditioned the actions of the actors involved. However, my main objective is to verify the progresses and constraints of the NPE, thus there will be no analysis of geopolitical nature.
1. Normative Power Europe
1.1. Introduction
The aim of the first chapter, through the analysis of the current debate about the EU Normative Power, is to shed light on the international role of the European Union. In the first part, it aims at highlighting the main positions within the debate and gives a clear definition of the term normative power. In this sometimes confusing context assumes a pivotal role the understanding of what is civilian and what is normative and the characteristics they have.
Then, the discussion moves on the distinctiveness of the EU in the international system. First of all this distinction is based upon the debate about the role and identity of the European Union. Then, the focus shifted on the possibility for the EU to act as a normative/civilian power also in the case of a deepening of its military capabilities. Is it possible to act in a normative way also in the case of a military advancement?
Moreover, based on some authors` analyses, I will try to delineate my own definition of normative power, underlying the main characteristics and the main objectives it has to pursue in order to be considered a ‘sui generis’ international actor. What are the main characteristics of the Normative Power Europe?
This uniqueness will also be the main element of the second section, when I will focus on the description of the external governance model and the social learning model. 1 In this way I will delineate how the EU has been able to operate normatively at the domestic level. In the last part of the chapter, I will briefly explain the democratic governance model which describes how the EU is projecting its image also beyond its borders through the European Neighborhood Policy. 2 How has the EU been able to convince future member states to adapt their legislations to the European one?
1
Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004), “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe ’’, Journal of European Public Policy, p. 660.
2
11
The chapter shows how the mechanisms of conditionality and socialization are at the basis of the decision of the future member states to come closer and to respect the EU standards. In addition it demonstrates that this mechanism is also able to work beyond the EU’s borders.
1.2. The European Normative Power. The Debate.
The debate about the EU’s normative power has sparkled in 2002 when Ian Manners published his seminal work on the argument: “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”. In this work Manners argues that the European Union can be seen as a normative power because it has been able to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics. The question is of a great importance since it aims at understanding the possibility that the EU is acting through imitation rather than imposition in International Relations.3
According to Manners, the origins and development of the European Community as a normative power are situated in the post Second World War.4 The atrocities of the world conflict led to the necessity of building different relations among states in Europe whose economic and spiritual life have been destroyed by the conflict. According to others such as Adrian Hyde-Price, the origins of the normative power and the shift in the European international standing from a military one to a position related to diplomacy and bound by the international law, was not due to a specific decision taken by the European states.5 Instead, it was a compulsory arrangement in the post war era. The European states found themselves too weak and poor to place their attention to something but the moral and physical reconstruction. The presence of NATO and the U.S. represented a military guarantee and a prevention from the risk (especially the spread of Communism from the Soviet Union) of external influence.6 Kagan as well uses the same line of reasoning, arguing that the Europe’s pacifism was not due to a specific choice but was related to military weakness.7
3
Ian Manners (2002), “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 239.
4
Ian Manners (2002), p. 240.
5 Adrian Hyde-Price (2006), “Normative Power Europe: a Realist Critique”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.
13, No. 2, p. 225.
6
Adrian Hyde-Price (2006), p. 240.
7
12
The origins of the debate can be traced back to the 1972 when François Duchêne described the European Community as a Civilian Power, an actor able to operate in the International context in a new way:
“The European Community in particular would have a chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political co-operative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power” 8
The principal aim of this new actor would be to ‘civilized’ the international community by spreading those values to which it is attached to. It is a power over ideas and a power over opinions. The academic community has for long time debated around the definition and the characteristics of both concepts of normative and civilian power, but nobody has really managed to get to a solid and shared definition. In fact, according to Johansson-Nogues: “the NPEU concept becomes almost indistinguishable from Duchêne’s civilian power notion”9 while for Sjursen: “it is difficult to find a single consistent definition of ‘normative’, ‘civilian’, ‘ethical’, ‘civilizing’ power Europe.”10
However, for Manners, normative is different from both civilian and military. It is related to particular means through which norms achieve what otherwise would be achieved through military means.11 According to him, the concept of civilian power is strictly related to an old idea of the European Union, which is the necessity to evaluate any element of the Community in the light of a nation-state building process. He wants to shift the attention from the analyses of the EU’s institutions and policy in a nation state analytical framework to the focus on how and through which elements the EU is building its own identity internationally.12 “The most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is”13. On this basis Hedley Bull criticized the idea of civilian power. He argued that the EU could not be considered a central actor in the International System due to the lack of military resources.14
Throughout this thesis I will refer to the term normative power EU as intended as follows: an international actor capable of favoring compliance and change in other actors without using
4F. Duchêne, (1973) ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’. In Kolistamm, M. and
Hager, W. (eds) Nation Writ Large: Foreign Policy Problems Before the European Communities (London: Macmillan), p. 19.
9 Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués (2007), “ The (Non-)Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An
Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor? ”, European Political Economy Review, No. 7, p. 188
10 Helene Sjursen (2006), “The EU as a ‘normative’ power: how can this be?”,Journal of European Public Policy,
13(2), March, p. 236
11 Ian Manners (2002), “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies,
Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 252. 12 Ian Manners (2002), p. 252. 13 Ian Manners (2002), p. 252. 14
13
military power. The EU is situated outside of the nation-state paradigm as commonly understood until the end of the Cold War. For this reason it is a normative rather than a civilian power.
On the other hand, nevertheless, the normative power cannot be described in total opposition to the idea of civilian and military power. This opposition is not clear cut especially because other states have shown normative power throughout their history. A clear example is the case of the United States under the Woodrow Wilson’s presidency. In this period the U.S. acted as a normative power, trying to indicate the norms which had to regulate the international system after the Second World War (the constitution of the League of Nations).15 Nonetheless, also the Soviet Union and the spread of the Communist ideals can be seen as an expression of normative power. What was intended to be “normal” under the Warsaw Pact were the rules set up by the Communist Party. Thus, why does the EU should be considered in a different way? An element which highly differentiates the EU from the other two actors is the fact that U.S. and the Soviet Union did not feel bound by the International Law; sometimes they acted as they were above it, regardless of it, while the EU has always tried to enforce International Laws.16
But how is it possible to recognize the EU as a `sui generis` organization? What elements have to be considered in order to support such an assessment? One interesting side of the debate focuses on identity and role arguing that the EU represents a new way of constructing relations between states and a new mode of standing as a modern power in International Relations. Nicolaidis and Howse claim that the construction of the European identity is built around the dichotomy and the contradiction between the self and the others. The EU is trying to construct its own identity by projecting its own image in opposition to the one of other countries, such as the U.S. It has tried to do it so far by refining new forms of solidarity beyond the nation state framework.17
According to Sicurelli and Scheipers, the EU constructs its identity along the
vanguard/laggard distinction.18 It stresses equality before the law and solidarity towards developing
countries. In the case of the institutionalization of the International Criminal Court, for example, the different normative power of the EU emerged clearly in opposition to the U.S. The American unilateralism was opposed to the European multilateralism. Markedly different was also the
15
The League of Nations was an intergovernmental organization set up after the First World War with the objective of preventing war through negotiation and diplomacy.
16
Thomas Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering `Normative Power Europe' ”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2005; 33, p.621
17 Nicolaidis and Howse (2002), “‘This is my EUtopia …’: Narrative as Power”, Journal of Common Market Studies,
Vol.40, No. 4, p. 773.
18
14
consideration the two actors hold about International Law; the EU feels bounded while the US positions itself above it.19
Another example can be also the endless Turkish accession process. Even if the Turkish institutions have been very keen in following the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria (the abolition of death penalty in 2000 just to cite one), the EU’s institutions have been reluctant in acknowledging those progresses. Thomas Diez argues that this particular behavior represents nothing but the will to construct the other (in this case, Turkey) in order to have a more specific image of the self.20
The debate about the normative/civilian power Europe is particularly interesting in relation to the notion of military/non military power. Military power, especially in the Cold War period has been used as the major element to induce compliance from a third state. According to Hedley Bull, war, at the level of the international society, is needed to enforce international law and to promote “[…]changes in the law generally regarded as just.”21 This is why, while researching for new methods of forcing compliance, it is important to understand whether the notion of the normative power is downplayed by the emergence of a EU military power.
The EU in the last decades has developed a strategy towards a more direct and efficient use of the military force through the strengthening of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the improvement of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).22 Thus, the main question for the future would be whether the EU will readjust itself in to a power as commonly understood (an Hobbesian rather than Kantian one) or it would be able to be always a normative power even if potentially able to deploy its military force in international crises. Manners argues that the military-building process might be negative for the EU.23 In fact, also due to recent and catastrophic events, such as the 09/11 terrorist attacks or the Iraqi war, the EU has shifted its strategy from the pursuit of a ‘sustainable peace’. The concept of sustainable peace, which consists in using civilian means such as the strengthening of economic, social and political development in order to achieve peace in unstable areas, was an integral part of the EU normative power. The risk of this change, according to Manners, is that the growing of the EU as a `normal` great power will lead to the maintenance of the status quo. Thus, Europe has to find the way to go back to its original proposition in the field of foreign policy since only through a `sui generis policy` it can expect to provide a meaningful help to the shaping of a new international system.24
19 Sybille Scheipers, Daniela Sicurelli, (2007), p. 440. 20
Thomas Diez (2005), p. 633.
21 Hedley Bull (1977), The Anarchical Society, London, MacMillan Press, p.180.
22 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is part of the Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP) and
deals with defence and military aspects.
23
Ian Manners (2006) ‘’Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads’’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13: 2, p. 190.
15
On this issue, Karen E. Smith has argued that a civilian power is a power which rests upon diplomatic, economic and normative means to achieve its objectives.25 Thus, it is completely different from a military power. Smiths points out also that peacekeeping operations represents a kind of actions which are proper to a common-intended power rather than a civilian one.26 Nevertheless, the possibility to witness an ideal civilian power, namely an actor which bases its foreign policy on civilian objectives to pursue through persuasion rather than force, and subject to democratic control and transparency, is a fancy one.27
However, according to Stavridis, the growing military importance of the European Union, the fact that the EU is trying to make up a force of intervention (an Army able to respond quickly to crises around Europe) does not mean that the concept of normative power is marginalized or downplayed. It may contribute to strengthen the idea of a normative power as shown by cases in which military force has been deployed to enforce principles of International Law, Human Rights regime or democratic institutions.28 Nonetheless, a more effective military power can improve the role of the EU internationally as in the case of the United States who has been able of upholding new international institutions through the League of Nations also because of its military power and the recognition of it by the whole international community. Therefore, military and normative power cannot be considered mutually exclusive even if they represent different ways of acting in the international system.
At this point our definition of normative power has to be narrowed down in order to get to a more precise and workable theoretical tool. In order to do so, the works of Hans Maull, Christopher Hill and Richard Withman are particularly useful since they underline different characteristics in relation to the role of the EU.
In his article on Germany and Japan, Hans Maull argues that the new environment of the post Cold War allowed these two actors to develop as civilian powers.29 This concept implies three characteristics: a) multilateralism in the pursuit of international objectives; b) primacy of non-military means to pursue those objectives even if the non-military element is still present; c) development on international shared institutions.30
Christopher Hill, in his 1993 article about the expectations-capabilities gap, which was intended to catch the international role of the European Union, highlights six functions which can
25 Karen E.. Smith (2005), “Still ‘civilian power EU?’ ”, European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper, p. 1. 26
K. Smith (2005), p. 2.
27 K. Smith (2005), p. 5.
28 Stelios Stavridis, (2001) '“Militarising” the EU: The concept of civilian power Europe revisited', The International
Spectator, p. 47.
29
Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers ”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 5 (Winter, 1990), p. 95.
16
be considered relevant to identify the civilian power`s functions.31 Among others, particularly important are those which refer to the EU as a: global pacifier, mediator of conflicts, bridge between rich and poor and joint supervisor of the world economy.32
According to Whitman, in order to capture the international role of the EU and in order to understand whether the EU is still a civilian power, we have to consider its structural power, its identity and also its processes.33 Drawing on the work of Christopher Hill, we can stress that the EU, in its relations with states geographically close to the European borders uses four different methods: informational, procedural, transference and overt. Regarding the informational method, in relation to the development of a CFSP, the EU has made its position clear through the use of Joint Action and Common Positions. The aim of this instruments is to make third parties aware of what the position of the EU is. Joint Actions and Common Positions can also be strengthen by the use of specific agreement with single states or groups of states in specific region (as, for example the one with Russia, or the one with the Mediterranean states, MEDA). Procedural dimension refers to the creation of a standing institutionalized relationship with a third country as in the case of future members. This can be pursued through the sharing of institutional links. The concept of
transference is related to the financial and technical assistance the Community uses in order to
pursue its policies. This includes both the use of positive transference, as in the case of funds that states will use to implement their own policies and, on the other hand, negative sanctions towards third states. The overt refers to the physical presence of the EU personnel outside of the EU borders.34
The elements above mentioned represent a general kaleidoscope of what the features of any ideal civilian power are. We need to isolate some of them in order to get to a convincing and workable definition of what I intend to be a normative power and which characteristics it has to entail. First of all, an important characteristic is the use of multilateralism. Is the EU able to involve the main international actors such as the UN, the United States, the Russian federation as well as international NGOs and agencies (OSCE) to the table? Second, primacy should be granted to diplomatic and economic means. Is the EU able to play a major role in situation of conflict? What kind of economic ties is the EU able to offer to the counterparts in order to narrow the distance between the parts in conflict? However, as I highlighted above, the military element cannot be downplayed as such, but any case has to be considered separately by analyzing how this power has
31 C. Hill, 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe's International Role' Journal of Common
Market Studies 31, 3 (September 1993). Pp.312-315
32
C. Hill (1993), pp. 310-311.
33
Richard Whitman (2002), ‘’ The Fall, and Rise, of Civilian Power Europe?’’, National Europe Centre Paper No. 16, p. 17-18.
17
been used and in which particular context. Third, the creation of common institutions with third parties must be considered pivotal in conflict prevention policies. Fourth, `physical` presence of the EU (diplomatic, political or even military) in the zones in which the EU wants to intervene represents the beginning and the stabilization of an institutional relationship between the EU and the target states, thus having a central role in the building of an external normative power.
Only if the EU will be able to pursue these objectives, its normative capacity can be judged.
1.3. The Use of the EU Conditionality and Socialization Mechanisms in the 2004 and 2007 Enlargement Processes
The EU has been able to act as a normative power especially, but not exclusively, in relation to new member states. The process that has led to the enlargement of 2004 is particularly helpful to shed light on what we really mean by Normative Power Europe. In fact, in the accession process, the normative weight of the EU is appeared in a very clear way. Moreover, studying the accession process makes also easier to understand how the mechanisms of conditionality and socialization work, thus rendering our description more concrete. The EU, on the other hand, has been able to use different strategies in order to generate compliance from the new members. The new membership process has been developed especially through the use of sticks and carrots, socialization and conditionality.
The Normative Power of the EU is not only limited to theoretical considerations, but it is strictly related to the normative acts produced by the European institutional bodies. This power can be seen at work in the process of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and it is characterized by the use of rewards or punishments (the famous stick and carrots) in order to generate compliance to the EU’s main objectives: rule of law, respect for minorities and human rights, democratic principles.35
Scholars refer to this process as external governance which differs from the internal conditionality since the former is related to the creation of new norms in order to conform to the EU standards, while the second pertains to the transfer of norms (and to the mode through which this norms are transferred) from the EU to the newcomers.36
There are two overlapping dimensions of this framework: the kind of norms or systems of norms which have been transferred and, most importantly for our purposes, the way through which these norms have been transferred. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have developed an `external
35
Michelle Pace (2007), “The Construction of the EU Normative Power”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5, p.
36
18
incentives model` in contrast with two alternatives, the `social learning` model and the `lessons-drawing` model.37 In the external incentives model the actors involved in the process are thought to be utility maximizers. The process is a bargaining one involving a logic of conditionality. In particular the EU sets the rules the other actors have to respect in order to get rewards. Rewards can vary from simple cooperation, through financial and political aid, to association agreements and, finally, membership.38
This bargaining process is particularly interesting when analyzing the external relations of the EU. In fact cooperation and financial aid are considered important part of the external incentives model, also in the absence of an official accession of the third party.
The main element in relation to the link between this model and the normative power is that
conditionality applies without the use of force or coercion but only through rewards. It can directly
influence the domestic government by intergovernmental talks or indirectly by empowering powerful actors domestically. Of course the potential member has to find a balance between the requests from the EU and the domestic demands. The conditionality mechanism will work only if the benefits for the target society will be more relevant than the costs it has to pay in order to conform its policies.39
A very central element for this model to work is an asymmetrical relationship between the counterparts. In the case of the 2004 enlargement, the EU had little reason to get involved into the enlargement process since the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) were marginal for the EU economy, while the CEECs were highly interested and conditioned and influenced by the possibility of getting a stake in the EU market. However, at the same time, the bigger actor (in this case, the EU) has to make sure that it is capable to give the rewards (and the punishments as well) in a reasonable period in order not to lose credibility before the target countries.
Moreover, the credibility of the promises has to be really high especially in the case of enlargement. In fact, in this case, in contrast with the case of simple association agreement, the costs for the EU (to enlarge) are higher and it implies also a restructuring of the EU institutions. The behavior of the EU is of a great importance in this process. The rewards have to be credible but also consistent. If the EU is perceived by the future members to be just acting in order to get other objectives (political, diplomatic, economic) they could try to exploit the situation. Then, the EU should not show internal conflict which can downplay the rewards. In this case, the other actor would try to take advantage on the weak position of the EU, thus undermining the conditionality
37
Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004), p. 663.
38
Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004), p. 663.
39
19
process. Also important is the role played by ‘veto players’, which are thought to be of little importance in the CEECs countries but whose role can vary depending on the policy at stake. The role of the veto players can influence the way through which the target government will internalize EU`s norms.40
In contrast to the external governance model, there is also an alternative model who tries to shine a light on the process behind the enlargement. The so called social learning model derives directly from the social constructivist`s approach. According to it, the actors involved are motivated by norms, values, identities and interests. The process of rule transfer and rule adoption is characterized by a logic of appropriateness and through a mutual process of exchange, recognition and shared values between the two parts. The target government will adopt EU rules if it regards those rules as appropriate in relation to its norms, identity and values.41
This final outcome is the result of a three-stage process. 1) the first step of the relationship between two counterparts (the EU and the future members) is still characterized by a logic of conditionality. The actors follow strategic calculations. They decide to uphold EU rules (or not) because the benefits outnumber the costs (as explained above). 2) However, in the course of this process the two parts exchange information, start working together for longer time and get to know each other. Through this element the process reaches the second stage, namely the `role playing` stage: agents adopt certain rules because they are appropriate in that particular setting. They feel them to be appropriate. 3) But the process is not concluded yet. It is concluded when the actors try to influence each other, when there is a mutual exchange which can be more profound than a single and specific law, when actors are aware of the fact that these rules are felt as appropriate.42
The model delineated by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier focuses on two different sources of conditionality: democratic conditionality and ‘acquis’ conditionality. Democratic conditionality refers to the core principles that rest at the heart of the EU: these are democratic institutions and human rights. On the other hand, ‘acquis conditionality’ focuses on the transfer of the EU norms from the EU into the domestic legislations of the future member states.43 For my purposes I will only focus on the former one which concerns the fundamental values of the EU, namely democracy, rule of law and respect and enforcement of human rights. The latter category focuses on a more broad and technical area which leads specifically to future member countries.
40 Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004), p. 666.
41 Jeffrey T. Checkel, (2005), “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework ”,
International Organization 59, pp. 811-12-13.
42
Alastair Iain Johnston ( 2001), “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”, International Studies Quarterly ,45 (4), p.488.
20
The role of the EU conditionality on third countries depends on the single country`s domestic situation. In the cases of Poland and Hungary, for example, the role of conditionality was minimum due to the existence of a consolidated path to democracy. In more authoritarian countries, as in the case of Slovakia, the process proved to be much more difficult due to the unwillingness of the regime to adapt to the European standard and loose consequently part of the power. However, even in the case of authoritarian states, the research conducted by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier demonstrates that the EU conditionality, in some cases, has been able to influence positively electoral campaigns and to help liberal democratic government to emerge, thus creating a kind of lock-in democratic effect.44
This emphasis on the EU conditionality and socialization process is of a great importance in order to understand how the EU can act globally and not only domestically as a normative power. In this respect the role of the EU is also important as a global actor. According to Marise Cremona, the EU so far has been able to act as a normative power (a `magnet`) because of its capacity of spreading its values such as democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.45 More important, however, is the possibility for a future strengthening of the EU`s role internationally. Cremona argues that the EU should be able to act as a model in order to solve conflicts peacefully without recurring to military means. It also has to promote International Law and multilateral solutions to crises. These are the characteristics we have highlighted above when we have tried to describe how a normative power looks like.
Both the social learning and the external governance models have shown how he EU has been able to operate domestically. Through its political, economic and diplomatic weight the EU has managed to promote its policies to the new members. At this point, the question is whether the same mechanism can be applied also beyond its borders, when accession conditionality cannot work. In this respect, Tyna Freyburg and others have developed the so called democratic
governance model in order to show how the EU is able to promote democratization beyond its borders through the European Neighborhood Policy. The main focus of the model is on the possibility to democratize laws and practices of specific sectors rather than institutions in general.46 By doing so, the model wants to point out that democratization can take place in the conduct of policies even in the presence of non-democratic institutional arrangements.
Democratic governance focuses on three dimensions: transparency, participation and
accountability. The focus is on the democratization of practices rather than institutions. The EU`s
44 Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004), p. 671. 45
Marise Cremona (2004), “ The Union as a Global Actor: Roles, Models and Identity”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 553-573.
46
21
influence is driven by transgovernmental networks and it is not the outcome of a bargaining process between the EU and the target state. The authors apply the model to three ENP countries, namely Moldova, Ukraine and Morocco. Their research is based on three different fields: environmental, state aid and asylum policies. Their findings are of great importance since they show that the EU has been able to influence rules’ adoption in these states.47
However, the implementation process presents several problems. In this respect, the difference with the domestic implementation risks to represent a very hard obstacle. In fact, while internally the Commission is responsible for rules’ adoption, in the neighborhood its powers are limited. The target states have to create ‘ad hoc’ agencies which are not likely to work in a short period of time.48
Their research concludes that, although in the case studies under observation the transfer of rule adoption has been observed, however this does not lead to conclude that the same result will be witnessed in a different ENP country. This different result might be due to different domestic conditions such as less liberalized economy and society in general but also it might derive from a weaker interest in entering into the EU area of interest.
1.4. Conclusions
In conclusion we have seen in this chapter how the debate around the normative power is structured and, in particular, I have sketched why the EU can be considered a different actor in the international scene. First of all, the chapter has shown that there is not a shared definition of what the terms civilian and normative power imply. However, while the term civilian reminds of an international actor still embedded into a nation-state paradigm, the term normative defines the EU as a modern international actor which spreads its norms and values without recurring to military means. This difference might appear really weak but I think that moving away from a stable concept of the nation-state can be useful in understanding the peculiarity of the EU. This is the reason why I believe that the term normative is more appropriate to indicate the European Union in comparison to the term civilian.
Then, the EU has projected an image of itself which differs from the one of other actors such as the U.S. on the basis of a peculiar identity. In particular, the EU has always shown the will of acting in the international arena in a different way which is in a normative way. In terms of relationship with the International Law, for example, the EU has always acted accordingly to the
47
T. Freyburg et al. (2009), p. 918.
22
international norms while the rest of the International community has been mainly driven by particular interests. Thus, the EU has created its own identity in opposition to the others, in the sense that while the states continue to operate by paying attention to security and economic considerations, the EU acts in order to spread its norms and values.
Therefore, the EU has a peculiar international identity that consists in its normative power; but how can this be related to the ongoing building of an European Army? This element is not sufficient to downplay the concept of normative power as such. In fact, notwithstanding the political will shown in the last decades towards the strengthening of a European foreign policy through the institutionalization of a Common Defense and Security Policy, the concept of normative power still represents a valuable theoretical concept. In fact, the establishment of a more coherent foreign policy and even the birth of an European army is not in conflict with the concept of normative power as delineated in the chapter. It is also possible that this advancement might represent a way through which the EU will be able to present itself in a more coherent and strong way thus giving more reliability to its normative mission.
Consequently, there are four main characteristics that the EU has to show in order to be considered a normative power: 1) multilateralism in the International arena. It is central for a normative power to call the main actors to join the table in the case of a conflict or in the resolution of international crisis; 2) the use of diplomatic and economic means. This two have to be prior in comparison to military means. However, we have already demonstrated how the military element can’t be downplayed as such but has to be studied from case to case and it is important to considered how it is used; 3) the institutionalization of common institutions is of great importance since it aims at sharing also experiences and transfer of competences, thus rendering the two states (or entities) close to each other; 4) physical presence of the EU personnel on the field. This might be considered as the first step of the creation of common institutions and testifies the vicinity and the interest of the EU.
Clear expression of the normative power of the EU has been given by the European institutions in the 2004 and 2007 enlargement processes. In these occasions the EU has been able to influence the future members in changing their legislations and adapting to EU norms and principles. This process has been explained through two theoretical models: the external
governance and the social learning. The former one assumes that the EU and the future members
23
decide to adapt to the EU norms after a process characterized by a mutual exchange of interests, information and capabilities. When they feel these norms as appropriate, as part of their internal and international identity, therefore when the socialization process is concluded, they are willing to join the EU.
However, this description would be incomplete without a reference to the functioning of these mechanisms in the external dimension of the EU through the Neighborhood Policy. The EU, now, has to find a way to be a “magnet” also in its neighborhood. The starting point is, above all, an instrument, a policy that can act to connect the EU with external countries. In 2004 the European Commission have set up the European Neighborhood Policy in order to pursue this specific goal.
The democratic governance model has showed that the ENP has been able to operate in the absence beyond the EU’s borders and to be significant in the policies of Moldova, Ukraine and Morocco. This has been possible by influencing specific sectors, in particular asylum policies and rule adoption rather than the institutional sphere. However, this mechanism risks not to be working in cases of very strict and authoritarian regimes or simply when the interests of the ruling elite to enter into closer relations with the European politic are less strong.
The second chapter will deepen the discussion and the analysis over this themes by pointing out the European Neighborhood Policy, its instruments and the re-contextualization of the models described.
2. The European Neighborhood Policy
2.1. Introduction
The EU, as a sui generis actor in the international arena, aims at defining what is 'normal' through the use of persuasion rather than force. In this sense, it can be defined as a 'force for the good', a force able to provide justice and fair opportunities for everyone by promoting positive and good values such as democracy, rule of law, respect for human and minority rights.49
The aim of this second chapter is to understand to what extent the EU has been able to operate beyond its borders as a normative power. In fact, the main problem regarding the effectiveness of the normative power in the neighborhood has been the impossibility to use the leverage of the membership perspective. In the first chapter, we have seen how conditionality and socialization have been able to operate in the enlargement processes. In that occasion, however, the membership perspective has represented the main tool the EU has used in order to generate
49
24
compliance from the potential future member states to adapt their legislations to EU norms and principles.
Consequently, there could be the risk that the conditionality and socialization mechanisms do not properly work because the potential ENP country feels less prone to adapt its legislation since the reward is not as strong as in the case of the accession process. However, the European Neighborhood Policy seems to fit perfectly in this situation to fill this gap. Therefore, it is important to define the context in which the ENP has been first set up, pointing out both domestic and external pressures that pushed the Commission towards the inauguration of the policy. Then, a brief description of the tools that characterize the policy will be introduced. What kind of innovations does the ENP bring to create a stronger foreign policy in the neighborhood?
The second section will aim at linking the ENP to the debate about the normative power made in the first chapter. In this way I will show that the normative power framework and, along with it, both conditionality and socialization mechanisms, can still represent a valuable term of comparison and a good theoretical tool of analysis. This will be demonstrated through a partial redefinition of the conditionality mechanism and the introduction of the horizontal governance model.
The third section will provide an analysis of the role of the EU in conflict resolution issue. The EU has to intervene in situations of conflict in order to prevent negative spill-over from unstable areas. My interest will be more on conflict management capacities which will be evaluated by looking at the consolidation of democratic institutions, human and minority rights since is also on these elements that a peace process could be set in motion; thus, is not just the simple advancement of peace talks but also the general environment surrounding it that must be improved. After that I will describe the history and the growing commitment to a conflict resolution role of the EU in the last decades.
25
2.2. European Neighborhood Policy. Historical Context and Innovations
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has been set up in 2004 after the biggest enlargement process in the history of the EU was completed.50
The main reason for the EU to launch the ENP has been the lack of a coherent foreign policy, which became extremely clear during the 2003 Iraqi War when the EU members showed fragility and incapacity to get to a common position. In the same year the Commission approved the European Security Strategy with the objective of identifying the main threats to the EU. In the words of Commissioner Romano Prodi (future President of the Commission), “Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations”.51
This renewed commitment has been also confirmed by the establishment of the ENP Task Force with the supervision of Commissioner Verheugen.52
In order to understand why the ENP was needed in that specific historical context, we need to point out both constraints and concerns that pushed the Commission towards the launch of the ENP. At the domestic level, particularly important was the rejection of the EU Constitutional Draft by France and The Netherlands (2005). In this occasion, in parallel with the enlargement to the CEECs countries, the accession process of Romania and Bulgaria had already started and, in the back of the scene, Turkey and Croatia were rapidly adapting their institutional arrangement to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria.53 This combination of events was probably seen as a potential source of weakness of the EU. Including problematic countries represented a very important challenge and probably the core of the EU did not feel safe in approving such a step forward, since the new EU’s shape would have meant the exposition to unstable and unsecure geopolitical areas such as the Middle East and the Caucasus.54
The central element of this discourse is the lack of membership perspective. The EU might not be able to act as a normative power in the absence of the main ‘carrot’ (membership). The context in which the ENP was able to grow was characterized by the necessity of establishing one single and coherent umbrella for all the agreements in the field of external relationships. The former
50 The 2004 Enlargement refers to the process that led to access of ten new EU members on the 1st May, 2004. The
new members are: Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary
51
European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, EU Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 9.
52
Romano Prodi, Speech to the Sixth ECSA World Conference, Brussels, 5 – 6 December 2002.
53 The Copenhagen Criteria are the rules that have been set up in order to assess the capacity of a country to be eligible
to become a EU member. The criteria have been established in the June 1993 by the European Council that took place in Copenhagen, Denmark.
54
26
agreements signed with the Mediterranean Countries (the so called MEDA55) or the Partnership Agreements concluded with the Eastern countries could have been reallocated under one single policy.56 In this way the EU has been able to manage in a better and easier way its relations with the neighborhood, since it’s easier to have one single and structured European policy that sets the rules and the norms that regulate the relationships between the EU and the countries surrounding it, instead of having several different policies for many different areas, thus creating confusion. In this sense, the ENP represents a new attempt to strengthen and deepen former external policies.
In addition, through this policy the EU could have strengthen its role as a powerful regional actor, since the stabilization of the neighborhood is considered, in terms of importance, the most significant foreign policy initiative after the enlargement. The new environment created after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements have expanded the borders of the EU. In this new position, the EU can no longer rely on the NATO and the US to support its foreign policy. Its international role has to be strengthen and the regional policies represent the most important step in this sense.57
In this new context, the Action Plans (AP) which contain the basic elements of the relation between the EU and the countries subjected to the ENP, introduce the great innovation of being issued on the basis of differentiation. This means that the plan has to be improved and reinforced on the basis of a single state's political, social and economic situation.58 By doing so, the ENP can be assumed to be more effective in using a sort of conditionality mechanism. In fact, even in the absence of the membership perspective, other elements can be employed by the EU in order to influence other states. These instruments can be represented by economic and political offers (development) and they can also be linked to punishment and rewards, as in the case of the external
governance model. The punishment would be the withdrawal of the cooperation, while the rewards would be represented by the continuation of the relationship.59
On the other hand, the external factor that favored the setting of the ENP was related to considerations of security. The new and bigger Europe was now facing directly some of the most unstable geopolitical areas in the world. Russia, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Leaving aside the specific case of Russia, which decided not to be part of the ENP and signed a specific strategic agreement with the EU, the Caucasus represents a very difficult challenge to face for the European
55
The MEDA regulation is the principal instrument that regulates the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. It enables the EU to provide financial, economic and political assistance to the countries that belong to this area. This tool has been first introduced in 1996 and then renewed in 2000.
56
The PA (Partnership Agreements) have been signed by the EU with several countries from 1995. The PA had represented (until the introduction of the European Neighborhood Policy) the main instrument for financial and economic relation between the EU and external countries.
57
Rosa Balfour , Alessandro Rotta, (2005) “ 'Beyond Enlargement. The European Neighbourhood Policy and its Tools'”, The International Spectator, 40: 1, p. 10.
58
Sharon Pardo, (2004) 'Europe of Many Circles: European Neighbourhood Policy', Geopolitics, 9: 3, pp. 733-734.
27
States. Here, the presence of long-lasting conflicts, the failure of the UN and the OSCE to tackle them, the fragile and authoritarian natures of the regimes involved, do not present easy solutions for the EU. Nevertheless, the ENP can represent the right key to bring stability outside and, consequently, security inside the EU.60
In this new environment, the EU had to find a way to secure its borders and to prevent negative spill-over to influence its peaceful realm. Therefore, the ENP was a tool to get the EU and its neighbors closer. In the words of Benita Ferrero Waldner, former member of the EU Commission: “The EU’s neighbors are particularly important to the EU: by bolstering their stability, prosperity and security, we also bolster ours”.61
According to Dannreuther, the ENP provides three different kinds of innovation. First, even in the absence of a membership perspective, the EU offers bigger incentives than in the past, such as a stake in the EU`s market and the transfer of competence and technical assistance.62
The second innovation lies in the approach the EU has developed towards third parties. In the previous attempts, the EU used a 'one-policy-fits-all' without taking into account the specific characteristics of the state it was dealing with. With the ENP the approach is changing towards a more direct and specific relation with the state in consideration, the environment and the context in which this relation has to take place. A great advantage of this new method is that the measures contained in the Action Plans are not just decided by the Commission and then transferred to the third states.63 Every single aspect of the relationship between the EU and the ENP members has to be agreed and participated by the government that has to sign the agreements. In this way the chances for the policy to proceed positively are higher because the path through which achieving a specific result could be established and reinforced by both parties.
A third element is the will to build a more coherent and effective policy. The past programs targeting specific regions (for example, the MEDA program for the Mediterranean countries, the program for the Balkans and the one for the NIS, New Independent States) all evolved independently from each other. They used different instruments, financial programs and actors. This, combined with a rather confusing European domestic bureaucracy undermined the cohesiveness of the policies.64
60
Dov Lynch (2005), “ The Security Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy ”, The International Spectator, Vol.1, p. 42.
61 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “European Neighbourhood Policy ”, Baltic Rim Economies, Expert article 148, 21.12.2007,
p. 11. 62 Roland Dannreuther (2006), p. 191. 63 Roland Dannreuther (2006), p. 191. 64
28
The EU and the partner countries reach different agreements on certain objectives to be pursued in different areas such as environmental issues, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, mobility, economy and trade. The first step is the definition of Country Reports in which the EU has evaluated the state of affairs for any single state in order to be able to define a future plan of development and agreement. The next step is the setting of Action Plans for each country which is negotiated between the EU and the countries. They set the objectives that have to be realized and also the timing. Moreover, every year the EU monitors and evaluates the state of the implementation of the ENP objectives for every single state through the Progress Reports. Consequently, every year, on the basis of the results acknowledged by the Country Reports, the objectives and the instruments are readapted to the current situation.
For my purpose I will only focus on those elements which I consider relevant to assess the progress of those countries on issues which have an impact of conflict resolution/management. In particular, I will concentrate on the capacity of the EU to become central in the negotiation between the counterparts. The direct consequence of this renewed effort would result, first of all, in the improvement of the relations between the parties in conflict, but also through the enhancement of the democratic institutions of both states and the improvement of the refugees (or displaced people as they have been officially called) situation. Therefore, is not just the resolution of the conflicts itself but the advancement of the general conditions in the broader context that will be considered to assess the conflict management role of the EU.65
2.3. Conditionality beyond the EU’s Border
Sjursen, in his article of 2006, “The EU as a ‘normative’ power: how can this be?” argue that:
“[a] number of empirical observations regarding issues such as the EU’ s policy of democracy promotion, its introduction of human rights clauses in
trade agreements, the emphasis on encouraging regional co-operation and its focus on strengthening international institutions could very well indicate
that there is something distinctive about the EU’ s foreign policy[...]”66
This means that the distinctiveness of the EU in its foreign policy strengthens the idea of a ‘sui generis’ international actor: a normative power also beyond its borders.
However, according to Johansson-Nogues, the concept of normative power contrasts sharply with the reality we have witnessed lately.67 First of all, if we just focus on the substantive (political
65
www.europa.eu, accessed on 03/07/2010.
66 Helene Sjursen (2006), “The EU as a ‘normative’ power: how can this be?”,Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2)
