A bridge over a dry river
an anthropological exploration of the water crisis in Iran
UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM
FACULTEIT DER MAATSCHAPPIJ- EN GEDRAGSWETENSCHAPPEN
BACHELOR CULTURELE ANTROPOLOGIE EN ONTWIKKELINGSSOCIOLOGIE DER NIET WESTERSE SAMENLEVINGEN
Bachelor Thesis Laura Muns Student number: 10910905 Email: Laura.muns@student.uva.nl
Supervisor: Dr. G. Nooteboom Second reviewer: Thijs Schut
Word count: 10.239 words Date: 18-05-2018
Introduction
In the summer of 2017 I sat in a taxi towards a famous and ancient bridge in Isfahan, the largest city in central Iran, 340 kilometers south of Tehran. Built on the fertile north-bank of the Zayandeh Rud river, the city is famous for its ancient architecture and lush green Persian gardens in a furthermore arid landscape. The city has eleven bridges, but if we approach the impressive Si-o-se Pol bridge in the scorching afternoon heat, the architectural wonder is overshadowed by a cork-dry riverbed. All that remains from the river is a sun-drenched stretch of cracked earth that winds through the city of Isfahan. Without water over which they were built, the 15th-century historic Savavid bridges that criss-cross through the city remain a painful reminder of how it is supposed to be.
The Zayandeh Rud (literally: ‘life-giving river’) fertilized the dry soils of central Iran for more than 1000 years. Flowing from the Zagros mountains and ending a hundred miles east in the Ghav Khouni wetland, the wide river that normally flows throughout the year unlike other rivers that are seasonal, has now given way to withered soil, stones, and dust. Being in Isfahan during the dry, hot summer months the absence of water seems like a natural occurrence. However, when I meet our Iranian friend Mohammed for dinner and tell him that we want to see the river filled with water, it becomes clear from his reaction that the situation comprises more than only a seasonal drought. As a sad expression appears on his face, he explains:
The river is dry. It has been this way for years. With some luck we have water for 3 months a year, and that period is getting shorter and shorter. The worst thing is that the water does flow, but is diverted towards Yazd province and its dry desert cities. That way it is just decided by the authorities who will get water and who will not and we cannot do anything about it. People are protesting since years, but nothing is changing. It's only getting worse.
As the Zayandeh Rud river remains empty for most of the year, due to water diversion for irrigation in the Yazd Province, the dry riverbed is one of the many symptoms of a looming water crisis that affects the whole Islamic Republic of Iran. In the province of Isfahan alone, 100,000 farmers lost their jobs due to crop-failure as a result of the persistent drought. In 2001 fifty villages in the southeastern region of Kerman were evacuated due to water shortage, displacing thousands of people and resulting in the loss of crops such as barley and wheat (Foltz, 2001: 358). The Baghtegan lake, regarded as Iran's second largest salt lake, has dried up and now turned into a salt-desert. The lake used to be a home for several migratory birds and large amounts of flamingos1 . Similarly, with its 5200 km2 once the largest salt lake on earth, the massive Lake Urmia is almost completely dried up due to anthropogenic effects of extensive upstream water use and uncoordinated dam building (Madani, 2014: 321; Khatami and Berndtsson 2013). The results are disastrous; the drying not only causes that the unique ecosystem of Lake Urmia is on the verge of dying, but also forces migration of thousands of people that were dependent on tourism that surrounded the lake. While these people lose their livelihood, salt storms cause extensive salination of farmlands and serious health implications. The drying of Lake Urmia is a visible consequence of Iran's water problems but the rapid developing water crisis does not remain limited to surface water. It is said that ‘a groundwater tragedy’ is another disaster waiting to happen as Iran has almost used all of its reserves (Madani, 2014: 314).
Water shortage causes increasing anger and despair among the population and often leads to protests, which were reported for the first time around 2001 in the city of Isfahan (Foltz, 2001: 371). When at least twenty-five people were killed by government violence in December 2017 during large-scale demonstrations, water shortage was also identified as one of the reasons behind the protests. In March 2018 again violent clashes with the authorities took place in Varzaneh, a small desert village just outside Isfahan. On BBC Persian a video shows hundreds of people gathered around local water transfer facilities
shouting ‘death to the authorities’ 2 . Dozens of security agents stationed against the protesters used tear gas to disperse them. An eyewitness reports: ‘[o]ne key demand of the protesters was to demolish a pipeline that transfers water from their region to neighboring Yazd Province’.3
As the water crisis grows larger the government finally recognized it as a national problem; on March 25, 2018, the Minister of the Environmental Organization stated: ‘We are facing a crisis when it comes to providing water rights for wetlands and the environment. We are under the influence of droughts as a result of climate change and the current year has been one of the worst years in the past 50 years in the country’. Shortly hereafter during a speech given for Norouz (the Iranian New Year) both the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Rouhani identified ‘drought as a problem that needs to be addressed’.
The government often blames the lack of water on persistent drought and climate change, making the water crisis appear like a seasonal and temporary phenomenon (Madani, 2014: 315). In the recent attempts to control the water crisis, more water is being diverted to the aridest regions such as Yazd and Kerman.. However, the situation does not appear to become less severe. Like Madani et al. (2016: 997) points out: ‘[F]requent droughts coupled with over-abstraction of surface and groundwater through a large network of hydraulic infrastructure and deep wells have escalated the nation’s water situation to a critical level’. The mismanagement of water resources is no longer a secret, and as people try to claim their right to water, protests against the government become increasingly violent. While the sovereign state tries to silence the protesters with violence, the question rises how water scarcity, which has been recognized in Iran since 1999, could have grown out into a water crisis of disastrous proportions. Before we come to an in-depth discussion regarding this question, it is helpful to briefly explore a crisis or disaster from an anthropological point of view.
2 Middle Eastern Institute - http://www.mei.edu/content/io/iranian-protesters-clash-police-over-water-dispute-isfahan - retrieved on 10 May, 2018
The ancient Si-o-se Pol bridge over a dry Zayandeh Rud river. Photo taken 01 august, 2017. Isfahan, Iran.
The situation in Iran is not a self-contained event; the shortage of water tops the list when it comes to the environmental problems humanity is challenged with in the future (Subramaniam, 2018). A growing number of countries are now faced with a scarcity of freshwater (see for example: Postel, 2014; du Plessis, 2017; Lonergan, 2018). With the world population growth estimated by 83 million every year4, finding a way to meet the water demand while maintaining important natural ecosystems will be a critical and difficult challenge for the 21st century (Postel, 2000: 941). Although overshadowed in the interdisciplinary field of environmental studies, a social science perspective can provide an important contribution in finding the answer on the increasingly pressing question how to live sustainable on our planet (Milton, 1997: 485). By studying how people think about nature and how they act accordingly we can gain a rich understanding of the interconnectedness between humans and their natural and socio-cultural environment 4 See: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW
(Milton 1997: 484). Oliver-Smith (1996: 304) has identified a (natural) disaster as a crise revelatrice or ‘revelatory crisis’ wherein ‘the fundamental features of society and culture are laid bare in stark relief by the reduction of priorities to basic social, cultural, and material necessities’. Thus, he argues, through the rupturing effect of disasters on society, we can gain a valuable understanding of the primary beliefs and ideals that shape actions and thereby begin to understand how ‘natural’ disasters - and its social consequences - are embedded in power-relations. In this thesis I’ll consider the Iranian water crisis and its management as a crise revelatrice. Through analyzing the disappearing of the Zayandeh Rud river and the drying of Lake Urmia, I'm providing an in-depth analysis of how the water crisis in Iran is dealt with, talked about and ‘known’ in a specific way
The global coverage of environmental hazards in relation to climate change and sustainability has increased in the mass media. According to Grand et al. (2015: 28), these reports focus to a large extent on how to deal with these challenges, often leaving out the root causes of the problems. I argue that approaching the water crisis in Iran simply as a consequence of a combination of climatological changes has profound limitations. Although drought and higher temperatures certainly do contribute to the development of water scarcity, with this one-sided approach attention is diverted from the human-made decisions and (unforeseen) consequences of large scale projects, which have contributed a great deal to the aforementioned catastrophic results (Barrios, 2017: 152).
I am inspired by anthropologist Roberto E. Barrios (2017: 153) as he states that the way in which a crisis is framed can be problematic when its definition ‘presents catastrophic outcomes as the effect of errors or accidents that are aberrations of the normal operation of things’. By asking the question ‘what went wrong?’ the attention is diverted away from the normative accepted practices and actions that cause or aggravate such events (ibid.). Understanding how a crisis is framed and understood also clarifies that many of the proposed solutions are directly connected to these interpretations and in turn are a result of the way we perceive the world around us (ibid.). Inspired by the insight of Barrios (2017) and Oliver-Smith’s (1996) crise revelatrice, the guiding question for this paper is as follows: what does the water crisis in Iran reveal about the socio-historical processes that
shape interpretations, (expert) knowledge and actions regarding environmental crises and disasters? As mentioned before, the water crisis in Iran is not an isolated event and many countries around the world will have to relate to ever-growing water scarcities in the future. Studying the Iranian water crisis also becomes relevant for understanding how, in general, water scarcity is identified and ‘resolved’ and why certain solutions to environmental problems are proposed and executed at the expense of other potential alternatives.
To find an answer to these questions I will first explain the way in which the water crisis in Iran is being spoken of in political and popular media sources, and how disaster narratives are social and culturally shaped. After that, I’ll illustrate that the way in which the water management by the Iranian state is implemented characterizes an anthropocentric (human-centered), approach because he interpretation of the water crisis is connected with how the natural environment is perceived and what means are available to control it. (Milton, 1997: 491). Scotts 'high-modernism’ (1998) gives valuable insights about the role of the modern state in implementing large-scale hydraulic projects. Furthermore the concept of ‘rendering technical’ by Tania Li (Li, 2007: 03) allows to investigate whether technology itself introduces a new water-regime and what part technology plays in the social construction of reality. Finally this perspective opens up the possibility to critically examine the role and the limitations of ‘expert knowledge’ in the particular context of Iranian society.
The social life of disaster narratives
As I walked along the dried up river bed of the Zayandeh Rud, I wondered how the landscaped parks of Isfahan remained so green and fertile in times of water shortages. Looking at the European-style grassy lawns, there was no indication that water had to be used sparingly. In the middle of the day, under the scorching midday sun, parks and lawns were provided with water from garden hoses and irrigation systems allowing plants and trees to grow alongside the dried up river. In most urban area’s I visited later this seemed to be the norm causing the presence of beautiful grass lawns, flowers and hedges in
desert-like areas appear desert-like a rather absurdist sight. Richard Foltz (2001: 386) already observed the same contrast and water spill in the summer of 2001. Sixteen years later apparently nothing had changed:
‘I saw unattended hoses and faucets running full force into the ground, sometimes every hundred yards or so. Once I even found a gardener using his watering hose as a spray to clear the lawn of fallen leaves, in lieu of raking. This was during a period when some neighborhoods were entirely without water for days at a time’.
Throughout my stay in Iran this seemed not to be an isolated phenomenon, as I kept being constantly surprised that the visible water use was not in any sense related to the actual severity of the water crisis. Everywhere, at mosques and public places there were small stalls that offered water. Clearly not only for the importance of washing the feet before prayer as this water was clean, cold and perfectly drinkable. In the city centre of Tehran I even saw public taps continuously flowing and liters of unused water disappearing into the drain. The hidden reality is that while there is water available everywhere and the city parks remain frequently irrigated, thousands of farmers are desperately losing their livelihood due to persisting drought. From observing these water diversion policies, it becomes painfully clear how a 'disaster' or a 'crisis' is experienced differently; power relations, socio-economic circumstances and means of subsistence are factors that can significantly influence the way people get to ‘know’ such events (Oliver-Smith & Hoffman, 1999: 309).
From this point of view a statement of the Minister of Energy, Sattar Mahmoudi, when he talked about the water shortage in Iran in 2016, becomes an interesting one: ‘This year’s rainfall has been about 40 percent of last year’s, and this puts the availability of water supplies from dams at risk’.5 According to the Middle Eastern Institute (MEI), in his 5See: http://www.mei.edu/content/is/iran-s-water-shortage-crisis-worsens - retrieved on 3 May 2017
speech he furthermore recognized the water crisis as an ‘catastrophic event’, something he had also done earlier that same year. As he made a clear distinction between the absence of rain and its unfortunate result for the dams that were specifically built for effective water management, the absence of rain becomes reduced to a ‘natural hazard’ and consequently, a resulting ‘catastrophe’ which occurred from without society (Barrios, 2017: 161). Such a discourse surrounding the water crisis is not uncommon in Iran. For example, a commercial on state-led television shows a man sitting in a desert saying ‘drought is closer than you think6’ which should encourage people to cut back on their water use.
As will become more clear throughout my thesis, hazards such as drought ceased to have an entirely ‘natural’ ontology (Barrios, 2017: 161). From a geographical point of view it is generally assumed that pure 'natural’ disasters do not exist. Preparedness, response and reconstruction are all inherent social aspects because of the simple fact that a disaster cannot take place without the merge of a hazard and a human population (Gaillard et al., 2007: 257; Smith, 2006, 1). The political ecology approach, with what is usually called ‘vulnerability theory', emphasizes the local context in which a catastrophe takes place and the associated social, political vulnerability of the victims, which are often poor and marginalized (Oliver-Smith & Hoffmann, Gaillard et al., 2007: 257). Through this perspective political and economical factors are recognized as an important part of how a disaster or crisis unfolds. When we entered the anthropocene, which Haraway (2016: 536) describes as an ‘age in which human industry has come to equal or even surpass the processes of geology’, the social life of natural disasters became extended. The significant human impact on the environment results in natural phenomena which are accelerated or enhanced by human influence such as rising ocean-level, flooding, hurricanes and forest fires (Barrios, 2017: 162). Yet despite these social aspects of a disaster still regular use is made of terms like 'natural hazards'. According to Grand et al. (2015: 29), there is a growing tendency to frame disasters as caused by climate change, in order to ‘reach an intended goal or to distract the discussion from the real problem'. The 'natural' side of
6 See: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-security-water-crisis/water-crisis-spurs-protests-in-iran-idUSKBN1H51A5 - retrieved on 13 May 2017
climate change is often used as a cover for the social, political and economic (and thus preventable) aspects of an environmental disaster (Smith, 2011: 1; Barrios, 2017: 161).
It is important to recognize that water scarcity has been increasing in Iran since 1999 but has only been (publicly) discussed in recent years by government agencies. This raises the question of who ‘owns’ a disaster, meaning who decides when to speak of a 'disaster' (Oliver-Smith & Hoffmann, 1999). The UNISDR (2009) describes a disaster as ‘a serious disruption to the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources’ (UNISDR as cited in Grand et al., 2015: 28). A vital point to ask is whois capable of identifying the start and end of a crisis or disaster in a society. When does one speak of material and economic losses? At what point is a farmer that loses his crops due to water scarcity part of something that can be called a crisis, or is it just a concurrence of unpleasant conditions? Who gets to declare that a persistent drought has grown into a crisis situation and eventually a full-blown disaster? And who is able to act on it, and in what way? Thus, in addition to the social and technological construction, disaster problematizations are also politically constructed and shape the ‘fundamental assumptions on which basis they [natural disasters] are identified as problems’ (Milton, 1997: 492).
To better understand the socio-political aspects of the water crisis in Iran, following Foucault in his understanding of discourse can provide a useful framework to identify disaster framing in a holistic manner and to understand its consequences. According to Foucault, discourse consists of more than just a coherent way of speaking about a specific topic. He defines it as an institutionalized way of talking about the world, which gives meaning to what can be understood as reasonable. A specific discourse consists not only of language but also of practice and goes hand-in-hand with the production of knowledge (Foucault, 1972, 1971; Hall, 2001: 73). Thus, the discourse in which is spoken about environmental issues also plays an integral part in how they are perceived and consequently acted upon (Barrios, 2017: 157.) It becomes clear that when a climate crisis is interpreted as being caused by the absence of rainfall, increasing drought and climate
change, other solutions are proposed than if the phenomenon is seen as a result of water mismanagement and human interventions. By following Foucault we can acknowledge that how the cause of water scarcity is framed has profound implications, because it ensures the production of specific knowledge and dismisses others (Leach & Mearns, 1996). As already has been argued by Tania Li (2007: 06) such problems are part of what Foucault termed ‘governmentality, referring to the importance of governing the well-being of the entire population by identifying problems and calculating them carefully before solving them through systematic and rational state-led interventions.The calculation of such problems happens through specific problematizations, which Ferguson described in his study of community development in Lesotho (1994) as being directly connected to the possible solutions that are presented which 'co emerge within a governmental assembly with certain sorts of diagnoses, prescriptions, and techniques' (Li, 2007: 06). Taking these factors into account, disaster problematizations become inherently socially constructed. They are built on specific convictions with regard to the cultural interpretation and contextual knowledge about the world. Furthermore such problematizations again provide a framework for how people interpret disaster risk reduction, shape what solutions are proposed, which are dismissed and on what grounds this is being done (Barrios, 2017: 155).
Foucault (1970, 1980) also argued that through examination of the way in which issues have been analyzed, reviewed and solved, the social construction of problematizations can be understood. Thus, if we look closely at projects that have been executed to manage the water resources in Iran, and more recently, the solutions that are being proposed to deal with the problem of water scarcity, we can gain a socio-historical understanding of how the availability of water has been defined in a particular way to serve political goals (Barrios, 2017: 157). In the following section, I will identify which large-scale water management projects already have been applied in Iran and which are being proposed for future management. This analysis will eventually enable me to answer the question of how these proposed solutions relate back to how a crisis is interpreted and culturally framed.
A boy washes his hands at a ancient mosque at the city of Isfahan. Photo taken on 02 August, 2017.
A gardener waters plants in the middle of the day in the city of Qazvin, north Iran. Photo taken on 4 August, 2017.
Iran’s hydraulic mission
In 1971, the natural flow of the Zayandeh Rud river became interrupted by the building of the Chadegan Dam. Its application at the time was primarily the prevention of flooding caused by severe rainfall, to improve water storage and to induce hydroelectricity (Ghohari et al., 2014: 394). The Chadegan Dam is one of the 316 large and small dams that are dotted all over Iran. Dam construction in Iran began in 1950, just after World War II, under the rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi. Together with the building of roads, railways and putting the country towards an American inspired ‘free world stance’ transformation, water management was part of the so-called ‘white revolution’ (Yazdanpanah et al., 2013: 1631). During a period in which modernization and industrialization were believed to be the means to achieve progress and economic growth, Iran, like many other countries, became part of the ‘hydraulic mission paradigm’ (ibid.). This paradigm is entirely built on the assumption that, through technological and modernistic schemes, it becomes possible to control water resources and exploit them for economic development (Molle et al., 2008: 1). The idea of 'scientific irrigation' was central, which Molle et al (2009: 330) describe as ‘the associated view of the domination of nature, a view that many would now regard as hubris, the fascination conveyed by the "let the desert bloom" utopia, the moral ideal of farming, and the biblical/messianic overtone of the call for creating new Edens in deserts or arid places’. Through new hydrological technologies and large-scale water projects, it indeed became possible to supply water to even the driest regions in Iran. and irrigation tunnels for water transfer ensured that the 'blooming of the desert' became a reality. (Yazdanpanah et al., 2013: 1631).
As a result of the international sanctions for the new regime after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the devastating war with Iraq, food safety became a major challenge for the Iranian government. The ambition to become self-sufficient led to large subsidies for the agricultural sector and consequently extensive water supply was needed (Madani et al., 2016: 1000). Driven by the desire to show independence to the rest of the world, in a country where most areas are considered arid or semi-arid and despite the limited availability of suitable soils for cultivation, agriculture became one of Iran's most
important industrial sectors (Madani, 2014: 316). By increasingly placing nature in the service of man, drilling deeper for groundwater and constructing dam after dam, water was also supplied to rapidly developing urban centers and even the most barren lands could be used for agriculture. Thus continuing the trend of modernization and the predominance of nature for human well-being, the separation between society and the natural environment became widened (ibid.: 1631).
From anthropological theory we learn that the way people perceive their environment shapes how they enact with it (see for example: Milton, 2007; Levi-Strauss, 1973; Meillassoux, 1967; Harris, 1966). When one regards nature as a tool for human development it is not surprising that it becomes dominated and exploited for this purpose. An example is the emergence of mono-crops and the way natural influences such as insects are excluded by using chemicals (Milton, 1997: 490.) Scott (1998: 11-22) points to the development of the scientific forest as an example of the increasing organization and control over the natural environment. This way of managing nature emerged in Germany around the late 18th century; because there was a growing shortage of timber, exploitation of forests became increasingly important. In an attempt to arrange sowing, planting and cutting in a more efficient way, the diversity of trees was reduced (often creating a monoculture) so that they could be planted systematically and in a straight line over longer distances. Scotts scientific forest is an example of nature organized by the state, driven by the belief that by means of scientific calculations, trees could be domesticated and put into service for the need of man.
When nature is approached as something that exists outside of human society, like a tool that can be used for (economic) progress, the separation between human development and the natural environment consequently becomes reinforced (Hjorth and Madani 2013). In other words; water that is seen as a controllable, manipulable resource is treated differently than water that is regarded as the vital source of life and whereof each drop is considered valuable. Through Berger & Luckmanns influential book The Social Construction of Reality (2007 [1966]), it is now widely known within social sciences that knowledge is never objective, but always influenced to a certain extent by the society in
which it is created. For most social constructionists, knowledge is seen as a combination of beliefs that are created through human interaction in a specific society, embedded in institutional organizations and therefore reproduced. (Lupton, 2000: 51). If we also consider world-views as constructs that are built from social interaction with the environment, the knowledge produced within this world view becomes only valid within a specific context (Milton, 1997: 487). Then, the 'western' perspective on ecology does not differ in ontological status than other - often called traditional - views of nature (ibid., 1997: 485). From this perspective, the hydraulic mission and its assumptions on which it is based cannot be seen as simply a period wherein technology was used to control a natural resource, but have to be regarded as a socio-cultural product (Bruffee, 1986: 775).
There are other important factors that determine how certain knowledge is created and therefore put into practice. Without the technological means to control the natural environment the Iranian landscape would look very different today. The role of technology in Iran's hydraulic mission gives a sense of 'technological determinism'. This concept affirms that technology influences society more than any other factor (Smith & Marx 1994, 1). In the extreme sense, it is seen as an independent entity and even an 'autonomous agent in change' (Smith & Marx, xi). Following this determinism, it seems that introducing a new technology into a society leads to unavoidable and irreversible results. Take for instance, the examples that Smith & Marx (1994: xi) give: 'the robots put the riveters out of work' or 'the automobile created suburbia' or even ‘the pill produced a sexual revolution’. The history of Iran's water management paradigm exemplifies that during a period wherein industrialization and modernization were considered the essential means for economic development, newly available hydraulic techniques ensured that the water could be domesticated and controlled. As a result, in a dry environment such as Iran, where water has always been of vital importance, this natural resource no longer became a precious resource for human survival; it now could be regarded as inexhaustible. Driven by a belief in science, modern hydraulic projects executed by the Iranian state ensured that water could be made available to everyone, everywhere. The question raises if it can it be said that Iran's water crisis is a product of technological determinism? In answering this
question it must not be forgotten that a central actor such as a sovereign state is needed to carry out such projects. Therefore, in the next section I will explore the role of the sovereign Iranian state in executing large-scale hydraulic projects.
The Iranian state as social-political actor
New challenges for the state rose when between 1961 and 2000 the population of Iran grew by 31.7 million. This population growth was accompanied by the rapid expansion of cities and the increased living standards and had a direct influence on the overall use of domestic water. Consequently, the Iranian state became an increasingly important actor with regard to the management of water resources. The most important being the provision of clean drinking water, water for the rapidly growing industry sector as well as the removal of waste water (Ardakanian, 2005: 19).
The building of dams and the belief in a more general, hydraulic paradigm started during the end of the Pahlavi Dynasty and after the revolution, the hydraulic mission has been continued by the new regime. A focus on ambitious and independent development took the form of large water infrastructures and management projects that were executed with a minimal account of their consequences. As has been agued by Madani (2014: 341), long-term development projects are mostly not associated with political popularity and direct economic gains and do not have a place in populist political agendas. Thus, the government of Iran placed emphasis on rapid development to achieve economic benefits. For example, the financing of projects that would stimulate the regional economy such as agriculture gives the population confidence in the leaders of the country and would therefore vote them to a second term in the elections (ibid.).
In his case study on Mexico’s irrigation movement Wester et al (2009: 395) similarly points out that ‘the rapid expansion of water infrastructure literally built the state and deepened its control over territory and people’. When looking at studies by Crow-Miller (2015) and Mukerji (2003) on the political motives for implementing large scale water transfer projects in China despite social and economic consequences, it can be argued that the availability of clean and sufficient water legitimizes political regimes and provides
sovereign states with power. The will to govern natural resources by the sovereign state can be explained by what Scott (1998: 4) conceptualized as high modernism: ‘a vast belief in scientific and technical progress driven by a focus on linear progress through industrialization and the increasing control over nature’. It is the attempt to organize society according to the laws of science, which is seen as the best way to achieve development through the expansion of production in agriculture and industry. An important factor is that these plans are often imposed by sovereign states and in order to apply them, a weak civil society is needed without capacity to repel or change these plans. It is, in other words, an authoritarian way of governing society manifested by the belief in scientific knowledge that has the ability to control, regulate and improve the human and natural environment (Scott, 1998). By means of a high-modernist ideology, water management projects have been applied and implemented by modern states all over the world (See: Molle et al. 2009, 334; Benedikter, 2014: 499; Wester et al, 2009). These projects are often accompanied by a simplification of reality to gain knowledge and control over land, nature or populations. Control requires a 'narrow-focus' on an otherwise far more complex and unmanageable reality which makes the natural environment more readable and therefore more susceptible to cautious adjustments and calculations (Scott, 1988). As Scott explains in his book Seeing like a state (1988); even though these projects are based on scientific knowledge, the process of simplification also ensures that important issues will become overlooked. According to Scott, this paradox serves as the main reason that ambitious projects to control the natural environment lead to unforeseen and often disastrous outcomes.
Thus, instead of regarding the state as an entity separate from nature and society, it must be seen as a central political-ecological player (Ioro, 2014: 2). For this reason a political perspective on the water crisis in Iran is fundamental to understand the significant role of the state in environmental decision making. A vital point to note is that while the state has a growing capacity for mediation and intervention in the natural environment, the amount of environmental problems also seem to increase (Ibid.,: 4). The water crisis in Iran is a good example; the more the state interferes with the the natural environment, the more
the exploitation and control of nature becomes promoted and the gap between society and nature is widened (Ioro, 2014: viii). The notion of ‘environmental statehood’ introduced by the philosopher Antonio Ioro works enlightening. The concept generally refers to the ideological and material efforts of the state to deal with socio-ecological problems to solve or mediate them (ibid.,: 14-15). One aspect of such ecological state interventions becomes particularly important to take into consideration when looking at the water crisis in Iran. As Ioro (2014: 1) argues: ‘Through the advance of environmental statehood, the contemporary state has become both a mediator of socio-ecological conflicts and a driver of additional environmental change’. In the next part of my thesis, I will explore the notion of environmental statehood in more detail through the state-led inter-basin water transfer projects in the Zayandeh Rud river basin.
Inter basin water transfer in the Zayandeh Rud river basin.
The Zayandeh Rud river basin is one of the most important watersheds in Iran. Because of its central location, fertile land and many touristic, cultural and historical attractions, the basin is densely populated. It is also an important industrial zone with many steel factories, textile and cement companies. For these reasons the river basin has a high level of in-migration. The largest river in de basin, the Zayandeh Rud, starts in the Zagros mountains and eventually ends into the unique ecosystem of the Ghav Khooni wetland; internationally recognized in 1971 under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and home to many migratory birds such as pelicans and flamingos (Gohari et al, 2013: 24).
After the second world war, due to the growing population, water demand steadily increased and in order to provide enough water, several Inter Basin Water Transfer projects (hereafter: IBWT) have been constructed7. If the demand for water exceeds the limits of what a natural system can supply, IBWT is the most common solution to meet water demand in large urban centers, industry and agriculture (Gupta and van der Zaag 2007: 29). IBWT simply involves transporting water from a water-abundant region to an area with
7 National research council, 2005. Water Conservation, Reuse, and Recycling: Proceedings of an Iranian American Workshop. National Academies Press.
water shortage (ibid.). In Iran the first water transfer infrastructure was built in 1953. The Kuhrang Tunnel No 1 transported water from the Kuhrang river in the Zagros mountains to the Zayandeh Rud river. The second major development project was created in 1971, when the Chadegan - or Zayandeh Rud - Dam was built to supply water for agriculture and industrial purposes as well as to control flooding and to generate hydroelectricity. In the early 1980s, due to major agriculture and industrial development in the river basin, the demand for water had exceeded supply, causing serious water shortages (Gohari et al, 2013: 24). The third project was the Kuhrang tunnel No 2, which had the same task as the first tunnel and became operational in 1985.
Figure 1: map of the Zayandeh Rud river basin showing the IBWT tunnels starting in the Zagros mountains near the border with Iraq.
Because the tunnels kept suffering from persistent drought, the Cheshmeh-Langan tunnel was developed in 2005 to counter the water level decrease in the Chadegan reservoir; a 13,8 kilometer long water supply tunnel provided water from the rivers Cheshmeh-Langan, Sardab and Sibak in the Zagros mountains to the Chadegan reservoir (Dickmann, 2005: 03). Despite the recurring problems the reservoir has to meet the water demand in the Zayandeh Rud river basin, the Chadegan reservoir is now also a donor basin for six neighboring cities such as Yazd, Kashan and Ardestan. To meet the ever-growing water demand for both the Zayandeh Rud river basin and other recipient basins, two more water transfer projects have been developed in recent years: the Goukan Tunnel in 2015 and the Kuhrang Tunnel No. 3 in 2016 which are not fully operational yet (Gohari, 2013: 25).
As said, the Zayandeh Rud river basin is densely populated because of high-industrial and agricultural development and many people migrate to the basin from rural areas to find work. Due to extensive development and urban expansion, the demand for water in the river basin continues to increase. To meet this growing water demand, IBWT projects are developed, subsequently creating the illusion that water is abundant and does not need to be used sparingly. Both Gohari et al. (2013: 24) and Madani (2014: 316) argue that due to the IBWT projects, the demand for water keeps growing with the supply of water causing water scarcity to be a recurring phenomenon in the Zayandeh Rud river basin. Because of this infinite looping effect, such water management projects have been identified as belonging to ‘fixes that backfire’ as they consist of short-term solutions that only mask the symptoms of the problem (Gohari et al, 2013: 24). This is what Antonio Ioro (2014: 15) has identified as an aspect of environmental statehood and termed a ‘state-fix’. The concept refers to the state-led attempts to respond to environmental issues in society which are primarily shaped within the economic and political priorities of the state such as capitalist development and industrial expansion (Ioro, 2014: 16). Ioro’s observation is clearly derived from what Harvey (2001) has termed a 'spatial fix’. Embedded in Marxian theory, a 'spatial fix' refers to 'capitalism's insatiable drive to resolve its inner crisis by geographical expansion and geographical restructuring’ (Harvey, 2011: 24). According to Harvey, by using a ‘spatial fix’, problems are never really resolved but rather moved
around until another crisis develops and a new fix must be applied (ibid.). Hence, because of the inherent temporary nature of these 'fixes' they can create bigger problems in the future. Both Ioro’s ‘state fix’ and Harvey’s ‘spatial fix’ can be applied to the IBWT projects of the Zayandeh Rud. For its central location, important agriculture and industrial developments the river basin has become a very important area for the Iranian government (Madani et al, 2014: 310). To meet the growing water demand, water from other regions is diverted into the Chadegan reservoir causing dried up lakes and rivers in the less populated south and western provinces of Iran. After every water transfer project that was developed and became operative, water scarcity occurred again because of the ever-increasing in-migration and development driven by the false impression that enough water was available in the basin, unlike in the rest of Iran (See: Figure 1, Gohari et al, 2013: 38). Now that the Chadegan reservoir is fed by several IBWT tunnels, the basin also serves to provide water for other (desert) cities, causing increasing problems for the population, industry and agriculture in the Zayandeh rud river basin.
Figure 1 illustrates the looping effect of the IBWT-projects in the Zayandeh Rud river basin, identified as a ‘fixes that backfire archetype’, in which increasing water supply causes a rise in water demand, consequently resulting into recurring water scarcity (Gohari et al, 2013: 37)
Although these state-led ecological interventions have contributed to make barren land fertile and have made new areas livable suitable for human development, in a broader definition of ecological transformation they have led to unforeseen outcomes, leading to a need for endless expansion in the area of hydro-engineering (Benedikter, 2014 554-555).
The Zayandeh Rud river basin is a complex watershed where many factors are interconnected. Dismissing these factors together with a lack of knowledge of all the interacting systems has led to a failure when addressing the water-shortage in the basin (Madani & Marino, 2009 in Gohari et al: 2013: 26). Hydraulic projects such as dams, water tunnels and reservoirs become not only a way to control the natural environment, they are also demonstrable icons for a powerful state apparatus in solving water problems and taking the leading role in mediating ecological conflicts (Benedikter, 2014: 551; Molle et al. 2009: 334). Added to the power and control of the state, there is another factor that helps explain why the management of water resources continues to be implemented through large-scale projects that have a counterproductive effect, such as inter basin water transfer.
Expert knowledge
I have used the IBWT projects in the Zayandeh Rud river basin as an example for the seemingly infinite loop that such projects create, resulting in the need for an ever expanding water infrastructure. These projects are not isolated to Iranian water management; water transfer is recognized as a solution for water scarcity all over the world. Major projects have been implemented in China (Zhang, 2009, Shao et al, 2003), Australia (Wright, 1999; Ghassemi & White, 2007), USA (Ghassemi & White, 2007; Israel & Lund, 1995), Russia (Micklin et al., 1986) and India (Jain et al., 2007). It is estimated that 14 percent of all water use in the world comes from water which is part of an inter-basin water transfer project (Gohari et al, 2013: 29).
The overpowering of nature, so that it can serve and secure the livelihood for many people, requires a lot of economic resources and manpower. The implementation of complex hydraulic projects also requires rational scientific planning and thus a need for
specialized knowledge. In various parts of the world therefore, to manage, operate and centralize hydraulic development projects at national and regional scale as effectively as possible, in the early twentieth century technical and economically driven hydraulic engineers centrally formed a powerful body of water bureaucracies which Molle et al. (2009: 328) identified as ‘hydrocracies’. The knowledge of specialized engineers is derived from scientific disciplines such as hydrology and geography, providing a monopoly on so-called 'expert knowledge' and securing an elite role in society (Scott 1998, 96; Benedikter 551; Li, 2007). The engineers that carry out such hydrological projects are perceived as great ‘problem solvers’, as Karwat et al. (2014: 8) cited an environmental consultant: ‘Generally, engineers are focused on more straightforward solutions and don’t get distracted with some of the social, humanistic sensitivities that are associated with the problem. They are more direct for the [technical] solution.’ Engineers are not separate from the world in which they carry out their projects and thus their problem solving becomes inherently socially constructed (Karwat et al., 2014: 08). The challenges with which they engage are framed in a particular, mostly technical, way. Their work is incorporated within governmental, bureaucratic and political domains, which makes their projects also serving social and political goals (Molle et al., 2009: 336).
To understand how certain knowledge becomes dominant and for who specific knowledge is available, two other concepts are helpful to identify. Firstly what Ferguson (1990) has conceptualized as problematization, and secondly what Tania Li (2007: 7) has designated as 'rendering technical.' As explained earlier, problematization refers to identifying a problem according to a specific logic. A vital point to remember is that framing a problem in a certain way is connected with the solutions that are are presented and seen as fitting. Tania Li has argued that the concept of ‘rendering technical’ is directly connected to problematizations, as it refers to the way the problem and the solution become susceptible to specific measurements that are often based on technical knowledge and calculations (Li, 2007: 06).
Although the concepts of Li and Ferguson both are derived from studies that focus on community development projects in Lesotho and Indonesia, they become very applicable
for my thesis when it is argued that experts usually render the problem and the appropriate solution in a technical, simplified way (Li, 2007: 7). Both Li’s and Ferguson's studies agree that the intended effect of development projects is rarely achieved and that they generate unforeseen effects such as new local conflicts. While this seems an undesirable way of governing developments projects, it has become normatively accepted because it focuses on 'improvements' in the social and natural environment. Because this is done according to necessity identified by experts it subsequently results in the upholding of a successful 'development narrative' (Doucette & Muller, 2016: 32). The technical rendering of both the problematization and the proposed solution results in a limited framework wherein the project will be executed. This framework ensures that some of the intended results are achieved, but projects often backfire because of that what becomes invisible. As Scott has also argued: ‘[t]his potent but narrow perspective is troubled both by certain inevitable blind spots and by phenomena that lies outside of the restricted field of vision (Scott, 1998: 263)’.
However, the hegemonic position of expert knowledge goes beyond a simplification of a complex reality in order to make it subject to scientific adjustments and control. An important point is that the technical rendering of a problem and its solution automatically has depoliticizing effects, which means it is removed from the social, political and economic domain (Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2007: 6). According to Timothy Mitchells in his Rule of Experts (2002: 90) the authority of expert knowledge is also actively maintained to serve as a way to 'rearrange power over people as power over ideas'. Along a similar line, Shore et al. (2011: 62) observe that expert knowledge is often conceptually contradictory to the practical reality, because technocrats are driven by power structures. They argue that often not the best ideas are executed, but mostly those that also serve political and social goals of important actors such as the state or major development organizations. This makes expert knowledge part of a larger field of authoritarian policy making (ibid.,: 63). As Molle et al. (2009: 336) also state: ‘Hydraulic bureaucracies are, first and foremost, the creation of nation states and reflect a number of their concerns and objectives’. To put these theoretical explanations back into context and to understand the benefits of the
depoliticizing effects that technically rendered solutions have for the Iranian government, I will now briefly look a a project that is proposed for the future management of the water crises.
The drying of lake Urmia and Iran’s mission ‘to bring the water back’
Iran is the most advanced country in the Middle East with regard to water management, and paradoxically, the complex hydraulic infrastructure that constantly mediates water supply and demand is the main reason why the water crisis has become so severe (Madani et al, 2016: 997). Dams and complex inter-basin water transfer projects have been a popular tool for Iranian engineers to regulate and control the natural flow of water but have absolutely not been without consequences such as human displacement, irreparable damage to unique ecosystems and increased water scarcity. Despite these undesirable environmental and social effects, Iran's hydraulic mission is still in full swing; the desire for progress and technical development remains the main driver in environmental decision making (Madani et al, 2016: 997). Due to the water crisis, many dams remain empty for most of the year and have become hard to politically justify. Therefore, other complex hydrological projects are gaining interest such as inter-basin water transfer and water desalination (Madani et al, 2016: 997).
An illustrative example of the political goals that such large-scale hydraulic projects can serve is found when looking closely at the drying of lake Urmia. The lake is situated between the two cities of Tabriz and Urmia in the west Azerbaijan province, close to the borders of Turkey, Iraq and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Here, many dams have been built since 1970 in the eleven rivers that provide the lake with water. The area now has seventy-seven dams whereof forty-three are in use and mainly serve to supply water for regional agricultural irrigation (Ouria & Sevinc, 2016: 5). Together with water transfer tunnels towards the Zayandeh Rud river basin these dams prevent the rivers from reaching the once immense 5200 km2 water body of lake Urmia. As a result, the lake now only holds 5 percent of its capacity, turning the rest into a salt desert.
The wind carries the salt residue over an area of more than 500 kilometers and increases the salinity of the surrounding soils significantly, placing an enormous burden on local farmers. 8 Together with a lack of groundwater, farmers abandon their land in search of other, alternative forms of income. The salt storms also cause severe health problems in the region and the drying of Lake Urmia means that an unique ecosystem with endangered species such as the salt water shrimp will disappear completely (Madani, 2014: 320; Ouria & Sevinc, 2016: 5). In 2014 an environmental activist stated that ‘[w]hile Iran is shooting monkeys into space to advance its missile program, the Rouhani government, low on funds because of the impact of the international sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, has not made any money available for efforts to restore the lake.’
Those who, for example through social media, demand attention for the mismanagement of the water in the lake are soon silenced by the government. In January 2018 the director of the Persian Heritage Wildlife foundation was arrested along with six others. 9 In February, another three environmentalists were arrested. 10 According to a political analyst from Tehran, Saeeyd Leylaz, the reason for this is that ‘Public opinion has become sensitized to environmental issues. So the government may see the organizations and institutions who work on environmental issues as problematic’. 11
Because of increasing water scarcity, in 2014 President Rouhani visited the worst stricken areas and has identified Iran’s water crisis as a national security issue. Through public speeches he promised that the government of Iran will ‘bring the water back’ by taking water from alternative sources. 12 It has been suggested that water could be transported from the Caspian sea; the proposed route covers more than 300 kilometers and
8 See: https://www.azernews.az/region/126004.html - retrieved on 19 May 2018
9 See: Water crisis spurs protests in Iran. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-security-water-crisis/water-crisis-spurs-protests-in-iran-idUSKBN1H51A5 - retrieved on 16 May 2018.
10 ibid. 11 ibid.
12 See: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/world/middleeast/its-great-lake-shriveled-iran-confronts-crisis-of-water-supply.html - Retrieved on 14 May 2018.
the costs for the project are estimated at 5.5 billion dollars. Alternatively the Aras river and Zab river in Iraqi Kurdistan could serve as donor water bodies, as could Lake Van in Turkey. The execution of this massive project is said to be complicated by the fact that in order to realize water transfer of such large proportions, Iran remains dependent on international water sources. Hedayat Fahimi, the Minister of Energy stated that 'transferring water from other countries would act against our national interest' and that dependency on other countries would reinforce international tensions and obstruct Iran's independence. 13 However, many are also opposed against these water transfer projects for other reasons. For example Madani et al. (2016: 997 ) argue that Iran suffers from ‘water bankruptcy’ in which the ‘water demand exceeds the natural water supply’. Also, environmental experts believe that water transfer schemes are impossible, as ‘there is just not enough water in Iran to begin with 14.’
Many scholars have identified the Iranian water management as one where action is taken only when it has become something that can hinder development (Madani et al., 2014; Gohari et al., 2013; Yazdanpanah et al., 2013; Foltz, 2011). The announcement and implementation of hydraulic projects suggest that a solution is sought for water scarcity and that the state fulfills its obligation to manage and provide water. This mechanism is not exclusive for the Iranian state, as Mukerji (2003: 675) similarly argues: ‘resource management and infrastructural development remain backbones of political legitimacy’. Large water projects such as dams and impressive water transfer projects often serve as ‘physical displays’ of political legitimacy and are used for the maintenance of existing power structures (Crow-Miller, 2015: 177). In Iran these projects will provide temporary relief, as was evident at the IBWT in the Zayandeh river basin, making the crisis not resolved but equally aggravated.
Local initiatives are now working on applying more sustainable ways of irrigation in agriculture to cut back on water use in an effort to restore some of the water in the lake 13 See: Water transfer won’t revive Lake Urmia. http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/423519/Water-transfer-won-t-revive-Lake-Urmia-official - retrieved on 14 May 2018.
14 Prof. Dr. Parviz Kardavani: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/climate/water-iran.html - retrieved on 14 May 2018.
(See: Hussain, 2008; Yazdanpanah, 2014). To this day the Iranian government did not act on the environmental disaster that is lake Urmia. It has, however since a few years designated the water crisis as a national security issue and proposed multiple ambitious water transfer projects. Rahim Meidani, Irans deputy minister of Energy stated on Januari 2018 ‘we should tackle [the water crisis] it with all the scientific tools and expertise available to us’.15 Gee (2004: 9-10) argues that the discourse through which problems are discussed, written and framed is central to how the world is experienced. In addition it can also be used as a highly effective political instrument in which it is concealed who benefits and who is wrongly damaged, and in which the problem is framed in a certain way. Vital to point out is that the use of a particular discourse is not only a reflection of power, but also an instrument for strengthening and maintaining power relations (Crow-Miller, 2015: 173). Related to the discourse wherein is spoken about a the Iranian water crisis, Price (2012: 10) beautifully expresses: ‘a state is, in part, a collection of stories connected to power’. As these stories shape internal and external perceptions of the state, they serve as ‘narratives of legitimization’ for its actions (ibid.). The discourse in Iran with regard to the water crisis provides certain 'truths' by the government. We can thus say, in addition to being a revelatory crises, the water crisis in Iran is also an ‘arena’ in which hegemonic views on what a crisis entails can be seriously questioned by the experiences of those most affected (Barrios, 2017: 157).
Environmental mediation by the Iranian state suggests that hydraulic projects can solve the water scarcity and the implementation and announcement of such projects should gain the trust of people who are increasingly affected by the water crisis to prevent uprisings and stifle criticism to the government. Thus it becomes clear that in addition to an attempt to control and domesticate the natural environment, complex hydraulic projects can also be deployed as a flagship for the sovereign state.
15 See: Iranians Pray For Rain Amid Water Crisis: https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-drought-praying-forrain/ 28980941.html28 - retrieved on 18 May 2018.
New knowledge at the end of the world
A water crisis such as in Iran enters society with an all-embracing presence; it touches upon environmental, social-cultural, economic and political aspects. How a crisis is ‘known’ and acted upon depends on the socio-political and economic position of the person who is experiencing it. It has also consequences for the way in which the event is weakened or acknowledged. A crisis, as described by Barrios (2017: 152), is often seen as 'an individually or collectively experienced moment when the customary flow of everyday life is brought into question and when those states of affairs that have been credited as normative have come as no longer tenable'. Because the previous way of life is called into question, anthropologists Stein (2002) and Oliver-Smith (1996) the generation of new knowledge is inherent after a disaster or crises and a new way of looking at the world can emerge. Thus, the tragedy that is the Iranian water crisis can teach a valuable lesson as it offers an opening for a renewed view on sustainable development.
In the anthropocene, our natural environment can no longer be seen as purely ‘natural’ or be placed in opposition to human society. According to Haraway (2016: 536), the new era holds a promise of renewed scientific knowledge. Because humans now have such a profound influence on their natural environment, conventional science can no longer be separated in natural and social sciences; the idea of a nature-culture split has been replaced by a natural world that is inextricably bound to the human world. In some countries the internalization of this new way of looking at the natural environment already takes place, and nature is managed from a more sustainable ecological approach (see, for example: Disco, 2002; Yazdanpanah, 2012; Molle et al. 2008; Apitz et al, 2006) But, like Disco (2002: 207) argues, ecological consequences are often unintended effects of human actions, so before it is possible to act on them, first insight must be gained into what damage has been done and how this has happened. Only on the basis of these insights can a practical solution be constructed that mitigates or even solves these consequences. This is called the 'ecological turn' which is often described as ‘a political and cultural rather than technical and professional accomplishment’ (Disco, 2002: 206).
As I have shown, water management is mainly shaped by technological scientific knowledge, which aim to control and regulate natural resources for economic and political development (Molle et al. 2008: 4). Local initiatives in Iran are now placing increasing emphasis on the incorporation of sustainable ways of water management, such as the use of traditional groundwater extraction and the reuse of agriculture waste water (Zie: Hussain, 2018; Yazdanpanah, 2014; Reza Balali, 2009). Yet an state-led ecological approach for the water crisis in Iran remains to be developed. As an infinite loop, ‘fixes’ such as inter-basin water transfer continue to be applied, even when similar projects have backfired in the past. This is due to the fact that ecologically oriented water management projects can only be successful if they are in balance at some point with the authority that carries out these projects (Disco, 2002: 209).
Although in the dominant discourse technology is still seen as 'scientifically sterile' and as a neutral entity removed from culture and society (Karawat et al., 2014: 8), I have shown that technology has influenced the water crisis in Iran in many aspects. Technology also remains one of the pillars of modernism, which in a broader sense represents 'a struggle to find a stable ground of being within the promise and peril of science and technological development’ (Pfaffenberger, 1992: 495). Therefore, scientific renewal can be of enormous value. It is, however important to understand that this new knowledge will be naturally absorbed into the normative, dominant worldview of the ‘superiority of man over nature’, and the strong belief in the all-solving power of technology. And that above all, technology still serves as a subject of abuse by sovereign states for the legitimacy of political power.
Conclusion
In this thesis I started my argument by illustrating that during the twentieth century Iran's environmental approach was radically influenced by the development of new technological means. These new hydraulic technologies made it possible for man to overpower nature and to exploit it for economic and social development. As a result the separation of nature and society became widened. As illustrated by the multiple water transfer projects in the
Zayandeh Rud river basin, technological ‘fixes’ seemed to solve water problems and technology proved to be a dictating regime wherein problematizations and solutions are still being shaped.
My purpose was not to argue against the use of technological solutions when it comes to solving environmental challenges, but rather to the inability of recognizing essential knowledge beyond this narrow ontology. The blind spots that it generates leads to unforeseen and possibly disastrous outcomes (Scott, 1998). Technology is not ‘neutral’ and cannot be separated from the social, natural and political spheres of human society. Its possibilities shape our world view and therefore, our actions. The technical rendering of problems and their solutions ensures that certain knowledge is given an elite role in society, whereby, as a logical consequence, other knowledge becomes silenced. Moreover, it is used by modern nation states to serve populistic agendas and to obtain political legitimacy.
As the water crisis in Iran is not a self-contained event I have illustrated how it, as a
rupture in space and time, thus provides an entry for critical analysis of larger structures of society, especially as crises and disasters seriously challenges the governmental ability to adapt (Barrios, 2017; Oliver-Smith, 1999). Therefore, an anthropological perspective on the water crisis in Iran can provide valuable insights into the core values, axioms and power structures of Iranian society. It is important to understand and expose these processes, as the water crisis in Iran is not an self contained event and could also contribute to generating new knowledge about understanding the interconnectedness of people and their natural environment in general. As knowledge is continuously changing and we learn through experience, when a crises hits, other ways of looking at environmental management will emerge. However, the ways in which these newly acquired understandings are going to be incorporated into society depends on multiple factors including local organizations, politics, hierarchies, and power structures. Now is the time to think radically about what our relationship with nature instead of our relationship with technology can teach us, and not live by the ties that technology imposes but act within the frameworks and possibilities of ecology. This requires a revision of the conventional
separation of scientific disciplines in the execution of hydrological projects, and therein, a interdisciplinary collaboration is of vital importance for a sustainable future.
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