Governing Water Resources and Hydropower Development: Contested Imaginaries of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

(1)

Governing Water Resources and

Hydropower Development:

Contested Imaginaries of the

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

Student name: Jakob Pallinger Student number: 12360171 Supervisor: Dr. Robin Pistorius

Master thesis Political Science specialisation Political Economy

University of Amsterdam 20 May 2020

(2)

1

1. Introduction

Climate change, environmental degradation, the scarcity and eventual depletion of fossil fuels and the drive for a diversification of energy supplies all make the implementation of renewable energies a major goal for countries throughout the world (Matsumoto et al. 2018). Hydropower is currently the world’s largest source of renewable electricity and is expected to grow further over the next decades (IEA 2019b). More than 3700 major dams are either planned or under construction mostly in countries with emerging economies in order to fulfil increasing electricity demands (Zarfl et al. 2015).

These dams come with various costs and benefits, affecting the economic, political, environmental, and socio-cultural level (Yihdego et al. 2016). Since large dams are often built on transboundary rivers, competition over water access can become highly political and complex. When external pressures from climate change, population growth and water scarcity become more severe, the potential for conflict between parties can increase (Petersen-Perlman et al. 2017). At the same time, how actors frame water-related affairs defines how a problem is perceived in the first place, thereby limiting or enabling choices for policy and governance outcomes (Gerlak & Mukhtarov 2016; Stetter et al. 2011).

By looking at the case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and using a social constructivist perspective, this thesis aims to further our understanding of the factors influencing cooperation, conflict and sustainability around large infrastructure projects and transboundary resources. Specifically, it looks at how various actor coalitions imagine mega-hydraulic projects and water governance in order to stabilize or challenge existing relations of social power. This question seems particularly important, considering that large infrastructure projects often lack democratic participation and deliberation (Abdelhady et al. 2015: 77). I argue that including a variety of stakeholders, specifically on a local and regional level and facilitating an exchange of values and ideas through an active deliberation process can enhance the sustainability of a project and cooperation around water resources.

The thesis uses the concept of hydro-social territories to analyse the imaginaries of various actor coalitions around the GERD. Document analysis and qualitative interviews were used within a discourse analysis to study three interlinked analytical levels of stakeholders: 1) the international level with the Nile Basin Initiative, 2) the national level with national ministries of the riparian countries of Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt and 3) the regional level with the civil

(5)

4 society organization Nile Basin Discourse. An analysis like that not only illuminates the power these actors have in influencing policy discourse around the GERD, but can also enhance our understanding of the possibilities for cooperation and deliberation between various stakeholders. By going beyond management and technical efficiency accounts of water and infrastructure governance, the thesis offers a politically sensitive approach of active struggles over dominant imaginaries of mega-hydraulic projects that aim to reconfigure the dam politically, socio-economically, and ecologically.

The thesis begins by providing an overview of the GERD project. It then discusses previous theoretical contributions to the topic, the research question and outline of the study. Subsequently, the theoretical section will look at the constructivist approach to the study of water, cooperation and conflict, as well as the concepts of hydro-social territories and water governance. The research design will then make the connection to the empirical part of the study and deal with methods and data used. I will use a discourse analysis to assess the framings of different stakeholders. The thesis concludes by discussing the results and methods, answering the research question and recommending possibilities for future research.

1.1. Overview of the topic

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) will soon become Africa’s largest hydroelectric power plant, expected to generate around 5000 to 6000 megawatts annually. Ethiopia started construction in 2011 on the Blue Nile River, approximately 20 kilometres east from the Sudanese border. The GERD is set to be 145 meters tall and 1800 meters long (Water Technology 2020). For the production of the power plant, a water reservoir with a capacity of holding 74 billion cubic meters of water will be created, which amounts to more than twice the size of the country’s largest natural lake, Lake Tana (ibid.). The GERD is projected to cost more than five billion US dollars, which is mostly financed by Ethiopia itself. In 2019, construction stood at 66% completion, and the dam is expected to be completed in 2022 (CR 2019; GCR 2018).

Several factors make the GERD an important strategic site for struggle and cooperation. First, its construction on the Blue Nile River places the dam at the heart of water supply in the region. The Blue Nile, which originates at Lake Tana in Ethiopia, is one of the major tributaries of the Nile, supplying about 80 percent of its waters. The Nile, in turn, is often cited as the

(6)

5 longest river in the world, flowing for more than 6600 kilometres through eleven states in Eastern Africa. About 250 million people in these countries depend on the Nile as a source of freshwater, food and water for irrigation, with population expected to exceed 300 million over the next three to four decades (Salman 2016: 512).

Second, next to population growth and growing demand, climate change will put additional pressure on already prevalent water scarcity in the region. Due to warmer climate and lower precipitation rates, the Nile is expected to decrease in water size over the next decades (Beyene et al. 2010). Additionally, Ethiopia and Sudan have already experienced high levels of poverty related to undernourishment, lack of energy access and water supply, which could be affected by the construction of a large dam on the Blue Nile (Handiso 2018).

The GERD represents both challenges and opportunities in this regard. These relate to the environmental, social, political and economic implications and perceptions of the dam. Dams can affect the quantity, quality and timing of water flows, thereby increasing environmental and social burdens for downstream communities and adversely affecting ecosystems dependent on the river (Richter et al. 2010). Their construction is also often related to the internal displacement of people (Jaichand & Sampaio 2013). On the other hand, dams can generate renewable electricity, help alleviate poverty, provide water for agriculture and mitigate the adverse impacts of water variability (CGIAR 2017).

A major concern which has emerged around the GERD relates to Ethiopia’s plans for filling the reservoir. The country has originally planned to fill the dam in three years (ICG 2019: 10). This has raised strong concerns in Egypt, which fears that this could drastically diminish the Nile inflow into the country. As a downstream country, Egypt is highly dependent on the Nile for its freshwater supply and irrigation. The Nile sustains the lives of about 90 percent of its population who live within twelve miles of the river (Abebe 2014). Egypt has therefore routinely called for an extension of the GERD’s reservoir filling (Mutahi 2020). Responses to the dam have ranged from scepticism, to open hostility and threats of military action (Stack 6 June 2013; Yahia 2013).

At the same time, the GERD provides opportunities for regional cooperation and a sharing of benefits between the countries and various communities. Sudan already sees the benefit of better water management in Ethiopia, which could mitigate recurrent floods in the country. Through a more regulated water flow, the country could improve its agriculture and

(7)

6 significantly increase crop yields (ICG 2019: 19). Additionally, the electricity production by the dam could increase energy security not only in Ethiopia, but also in Sudan and Egypt, who could then buy its electricity (EDF & Scott Wilson 2007). The GERD could also improve regional and economic cooperation and integration through the sharing of information, adaption of national plans for mutual benefits and a stronger collaboration in regional institutions such as the Nile Basin Initiative (Tawfik 2016).

I expect that various stakeholders view the GERD in different ways and strategically frame the project according to their own perceived interests. Next to the three riparian states, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, two main transboundary organisations in the Nile Basin are able to produce and influence policy discourse related to the GERD. On an intergovernmental level, the Nile Basin Initiative assembles scientific data on the Nile and works as a discursive platform for its ten member states. Its aim is to enhance trust and confidence between the various parties for a sustainable use of the Nile waters (NBI 2020). On a regional level, the Nile Basin Discourse works as a civil society network with more than 600 member organizations throughout the Nile Basin (NBD 2020). The network functions as a platform for discussion between local organizations and aims to emanate issues from the local level to the governmental and regional level (ibid.).

In the next section, I provide an overview of previous analyses of the GERD and studies on discourses around water resources. This helps inform the subsequent analysis and discover existing gaps in the literature. It also paves the way for an informed research question of this thesis.

1.2. Literature review

Due to the perceived social, political, environmental and economic importance of the GERD, many scholars have studied the dam from various angles. These studies can be classified according to their theoretical perspective, level of analysis and methods employed. The GERD and the Nile River Basin have been studied from a state-centric geopolitical/security perspective (Abdulrahman 2019; Gebreluel 2014; ICG 2019), a related game-theoretical perspective (Aljefri et al. 2019; Dinar & Nigatu 2013; Hagen 2011; Motlagh et al. 2017; Wu & Whittington 2006), a sustainability perspective (Batisha 2015; Handiso 2018), a historical perspective (Salman 2016), a technical/natural science perspective (Berhanu et al. 2014; Fenta et al. 2014; Moges & Gebremichael 2014; Mohamed et al. 2005; Zhang et al. 2016), an

(8)

impact-7 assessment perspective (Ahmed 2019; Basheer et al. 2018; El-Nashar & Elyamany 2018; Jeuland et al. 2017; Mulat et al. 2014; Wheeler et al. 2016;), an economic perspective (Block & Strzepek 2010; Jeuland 2010; Nigatu & Dinar 2016) and an institutionalist/legal perspective (Deneke 2014; Morbach 2012; Nanni 2016; Stoa 2014; Yihdego 2017).

Many studies of the GERD have used computer-based models to simulate long-term developments of the Nile River Basin and evaluate the impact of the dam (Blackmore & Wittington 2008; Block & Strzepek 2010; McCartney & Girma 2012). From these hydrological models, many have concluded that the water development of Ethiopia need not significantly affect water supply in downstream countries (Block & Strzepek 2010; Jeuland et al. 2017; McCartney & Girma 2012). However, the impacts depend on a number of factors, including climatic uncertainty, Ethiopian decision-making and the extent and manner of multilateral and institutional cooperation. For example, Jeuland et al. (2017) find significant economic benefits for Ethiopia after construction of the dam, without significantly affecting irrigation and hydropower production in downstream countries. However, high costs for all parties could result when the GERD’s water storage is increased in times of droughts (ibid.). By applying the concept of benefit sharing, Tawfik (2016) finds that the dam could bring benefits to all parties involved, such as economic growth for Ethiopia, electricity to Egypt and Sudan and better flow management to Sudan. However, impacts will depend on dam filling and operating strategies in Ethiopia. The author argues for stronger cooperation, for example through better trade relations between the countries, as well as through more transparent and open negotiation processes.

Game theorists and security analysists have emphasized the role of trust-building within negotiations and among different stakeholders. For example, Hagen (2011) finds that strengthening relationships among various stakeholders increases mutual trust and empathy and improves understandings of complex issues, thereby raising the chances for cooperation. Motlagh et al. (2017), using laboratory game experiments, find that a ‘win for all’ situation can be reached for the GERD, requiring a stable, integrative and cooperative framework. Cooperation among riparian states builds on sufficient transparency, knowledge and shared data, confidence and trust, as well as options for compensation (ibid.).

Scholars building on these insights have focused on the role of institutions and the legal order in the Nile River Basin for building trust and cooperation. Morbach et al. (2014) analyse the

(9)

8 Nile Basin Initiative as an intergovernmental organization and stress the need for a more binding River Basin Organization. According to the authors, several factors inhibit the establishment of stronger cooperation in the region: 1) environmental/geological factors relating to the imbalanced spatial and temporal distribution of resources, 2) socio-economic factors relating to ethnic, religious and cultural heterogeneity, population growth and poverty and 3) political factors relating to poor governance, national and international conflicts and divergences in federal versus centralized administrative structures between countries. While many studies have focused on the relations of the riparian states Ethiopia and Egypt - often employing a state-security perspective - or the physical and material impacts of the GERD, less attention has been paid on the perceptions and social constructions of stakeholders and the discursive frames they employ when speaking about the dam. This is despite the fact that identity and social norms shape the way individuals view their connections to natural resources and river waters, the likelihood that they will partake in collective action and the concepts and understandings they employ for water sharing (Anand 2007). These identities are also likely to matter on a national context, where they shape state policies and the interaction with other states, their recognition and chances for compromise and cooperation (ibid.). It has been shown that socio-cultural factors can be important reasons why large hydro-dam projects fail (Hess & Fenrich 2017). Nevertheless, they are often overlooked in dam studies (WCD 2000). Additionally, actors strategically frame water-related affairs in order to serve their interests and limit the discourse to certain perspectives and views (Gerlak & Mukhtarov 2016; Hajer 1995: 49).

A number of scholars have studied global environmental discourses (Adger et al. 2001), the securitization of water resources (Gerlak & Mukhtarov 2016; Lankford et al. 2013; Stetter et al. 2011) and discourses on water resource management in the Nile River Basin (Hissen et al. 2017). Building on political ecology approaches to water governance, Swyngedouw (2009) has discussed the concept of the hydro-social cycle. This concept views hydraulic environments as “socio-physical constructions that are actively and historically produced, both in terms of social content and physical-environmental qualities” (idem: 56). This process is characterized by tensions and conflict between actors who are trying to mobilize water for their own advantage. An analysis of discourse can reveal the social power relations between actors and the arguments which are used to legitimize particular actions over others (idem: 57).

(10)

9 Applying these insights for their analysis, Hommes et al. (2016) have used the concept of hydro-social territories to study Turkey’s Ilisu Dam, focussing on interpretations and imaginaries of different actor coalitions involved or affected by the project. Similar to the hydro-social cycle, this concept “views water flows and management as physical, social, political and symbolic matters, entwining these domains in particular configurations, actively constructing and producing territoriality in techno-political and socioecological interactions” (Boelens et al. 2016; cited in Hommes et al. 2016: 11). Spaces and territories are actively imagined within a time- and place-specific context, where they produce contested meanings and discourses. Dams and other infrastructure projects are then used as means to reconfigure the political order, worldviews and social-political norms of people (ibid.).

In relation to the GERD, Abdelhady et al. (2015) have analysed nationalist and hydrosolidaric discourses among various actors in the region. However, their analysis lacks a more comprehensive empirical analysis of discourses and processes. Menga (2017) studied discursive practices of the Ethiopian ruling class. He showed that these elites have constructed the GERD as a geopolitical object and foreign policy issue, thereby moving attention away from national environmental and social issues (ibid.).

Despite some preliminary attempts, there is still a need for analysing the struggles over values, meanings and ideas between the various stakeholders of the GERD on a regional, national and international level. How do various stakeholders frame the GERD in order to serve their own perceived interests? How do these framings in turn affect the cooperative, conflictual and sustainable potential of the project? By employing the concept of hydro-social territories, this study aims to illuminate the discursive strategies of various actor coalitions around the dam. An analysis like that moves beyond management, technical or rational-choice approaches and shows the inherent political and social tensions around large infrastructure projects, as well as possibilities for cooperation between stakeholders. This approach is specifically important when taking into account that large dam projects often lack participatory processes and democratic procedures, thereby curtailing the expression of diverging values and interpretations (Abdelhady et al. 2015: 77).

1.3. Relevance of the study

This research aims to fill the gap, which has emerged for the study of hydro-social territories and framings of large dams in the Nile River Basin. The GERD provides an ideal case for analysis

(11)

10 in this regard, due to its special size, location and wide-ranging influence domestically and on transboundary relations of riparian states and other actors. Given the enormous potential for conflict, cooperation and development related to the project, a thorough study of the subject becomes critical. Specifically, the GERD provides a good case to study the discourses, power dynamics and governance structures around large hydro-dam projects.

The two aims of the study are: to analyse 1) how different actor coalition around the GERD have actively imagined and framed the project, and 2) how these framings have affected the conflictive, cooperative and sustainable potential of the dam. This analysis can not only help for a better understanding of interests and political power struggles between stakeholders around the GERD, but can also potentially enhance our understanding of sustainability, cooperation and public participation in large hydro-dam projects in other parts of the world. By gaining a better understanding of how various stakeholders perceive and frame problems and opportunities related to large dam projects, changing power struggles become visible that might ultimately reconfigure politics in the Nile River Basin on a local and regional scale. An analysis like this also seems vital in an age where hydro-dams could maintain their important role as renewable energy and substitute for fossil fuels. Finally, the study might also help further our theoretical knowledge about the connections between social constructions, conflict and cooperation between various stakeholders of transboundary water resources and hydro-dams.

1.4. Research questions

The research questions of this study are the following:

RQ1: How do different actor coalitions imagine and frame the GERD?

RQ2: How are these frames shaping the possibilities for cooperation or conflict in the region and the sustainability of the project?

In order to answer these questions, the study will proceed in three steps. First, it will provide a context analysis of the GERD, focusing on the political, socio-economic and environmental challenges and opportunities that have been linked to the dam’s construction and operation. Second, it will analyse the discourse of selected stakeholders in the region, namely from the riparian states of the Nile, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, the intergovernmental Nile Basin Initiative and the regional Nile Basin Discourse. Using the concept of hydro-social territories

(12)

11 will illuminate how different actor coalitions around the dam imagine the project and which ideas, beliefs and framings they employ when speaking about it. The discourse analysis will focus on how risks and benefits of the project are framed, which governance scale is deemed appropriate and what ideas of social justice, fairness and development are present. By going beyond traditional state-centric accounts of the topic, this study helps highlight voices that are marginalized from the decision-making process and stresses the need for inclusive participation. In the third step, insights gained from steps one and two will be used to construct an interactive account of the dynamics, ideas and relations that influence the cooperative, conflictive and sustainable potential of the GERD.

The thesis uses three levels of analysis: regional, national and international politics. Regional politics relate to the experiences and framings of local civil society organizations around the GERD, subsumed under the Nile Basin Discourse. Their experiences and interests will likely be shaped by the perceived benefits and burdens of the dam, as well as existing historical, cultural, political and institutional processes. National politics looks at the state governments of the three main riparian states Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, discourses of nationalism and development and the role of symbols and identities during the negotiations and agreements. Finally, the international level relates to the discourse of the Nile Basin Initiative. These three levels of analysis are not treated as isolated from each other. Instead, specific emphasis is placed on showing the interconnections and contradictions between them.

2. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I will look at theories, which are relevant for the study of transboundary rivers and the governance of large hydro-dam projects. Specifically, I will draw on the constructivist contribution to studying water affairs. I will then analyse the related theory of hydro-social territories. Finally, I will conclude by discussing the constructed concept of water governance.

2.1. Water issues are what actors make of them: A social constructivist approach

Both neo-realist (e.g. Gleick 1993; Homer-Dixon 1994) and neo-liberal approaches (e.g. Wolf et al. 2003) have provided valuable insights into the governance and management of transboundary water resources. However, they face inherent limitations because of their focus on materialist-rationalist logic. Scholars employing these approaches generally ignore or downplay the role of ideas, norms and values in the national and international system and see actors as purely self-interested, who follow the principles of instrumental rationality

(13)

12 (Reus-Smit & Snidal 2008). According to these theories, the material nature of a transboundary river has itself a direct effect on the actions of stakeholders and possibilities for conflict and cooperation (Hurd 2008). Since these theories are generally removed from time- and place-specific meaning, they cannot plausibly explain change of conflictive or cooperative behaviour over time.

Constructivism in turn has managed to draw attention to the role of ideas, norms, identities and collective cognitions for the conduct of politics, where meanings arise out of interactions (Wendt 1992: 398-403). Human reality is conceived as a socially constructed reality, rather than naturally given and objective, as in positivist approaches. Societies and policymakers rarely interpret the world in purely materialistic terms, but instead rely on these social constructions for their interpretations. Consequently, international norms define the choices that are available to society and set the boundaries for legitimate behaviour (Abdelal et al. 2010: 9).

Collective action involves the interactions between social actors and non-human resources, such as common pool resources (CPRs), technologies or money. These interactions will be influenced by: 1) the networks of social relations and sociotechnical networks, 2) the attributed meanings to the collective governance system, 3) perceptions of the external context which surrounds the collective action process and 4) previous social experience and interactions (Steins & Edwards 1999: 544). A social constructivist approach does not predefine categories of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ but aims to stay open for the social constructions of the users of the resource (ibid.).

On an international level, Wendt (1994) has argued that collective action is shaped by the collective identity among states and that likewise, interaction at the systemic level shapes state identities and interests and can redefine the problem of collective action altogether. State identities and interests are largely constructed by intersubjective social structures, such as shared understandings and expectations, which are embedded in international institutions. These identities and interests are always changing during interactions. Collective action problems can partly be overcome when actors identify with the fate of the other to achieve some form of collective identity. In this sense, conflicts are also intersubjective phenomena, in the sense of shared perceptions of issues and threats among various parties. Rising

(14)

13 interdependence and the diffusion of norms, ideas and cultural understandings can encourage collective identity formation (idem: 389).

Thus, social constructivism is very sensitive to cognition and time- and place-specific meaning-making. ‘Constructivist’ institutionalism (Hay 2006) also provides greater insights into institutional change by looking at preferences, strategies and norms of various actors. It shows how discourses can redefine interests, reshape structures and rules and create new norms (Schmidt 2010). Actors are actively engaged in interpreting and constructing reality (Ruggie 1998).

In relation to transboundary rivers, relations between actors will be influenced by “discursive framings of the environment and social construction of goals of river basin development and cooperative arrangements for such” (Menga & Mirumachi 2016: 375). Actors actively construct social and political narratives around river basins in order to pursue (geo-)political objectives (Sneddon & Fox 2016).

Three core assumptions about the conflictive or cooperative nature of transboundary river issues and large hydro-dams can be derived from the literature:

1. Whether water-related affairs and hydro-dam projects will be conflictual or cooperative depends on the changing meanings various actors attach to the subject. 2. Changes in the relations among actors depend on how these actors understand the

transboundary resource and their role in it.

3. There is an interdependent relationship between actors’ identities, the meanings they attach to a subject and their social interactions.

A constructivist approach fits well for answering the research questions that were stated earlier, namely how different actor coalitions imagine and frame the GERD (RQ1) and how these frames are shaping the possibilities for cooperation or conflict in the region and the sustainability of the project (RQ2). Specifically, the three assumptions from above provide a promising framework for answering RQ2. RQ1 postulates a link between various actors and a subject (in this case the GERD). The concept of hydro-social territories, to which the next section turns to, helps provide this link by theorizing the connections between actors’ imaginaries and spaces and objects. Finally, since the GERD arguably impacts the local, regional and transnational scale, one question relates to how different actors imagine the

(15)

14 scale of the dam. This question is contained in RQ1. Thus, the last section looks at how actors (strategically) frame an appropriate governance scale of the dam. Since the concept of governance has been used in assessing the sustainability of large dam projects (Pahl-Wostl 2015), this section might also help answer the question of sustainability contained in RQ2. All sections in the theory part are connected through their focus on ideas, imaginaries and discourses, thus complementing the overall social constructivist approach in the thesis.

2.2. Hydro-social territories and contested imaginaries

Baletti (2012) and Hommes et al. (2016) argue that the concept of hydro-social territories views territories not just as geographical spaces with a direct effect on the actions and behaviour of individuals, but rather as actively imagined spaces. These imaginaries are time- and place-specific and actors struggle over the precise meanings, discourses and ideas attached to these spaces (Hommes et al. 2016: 11). Hydro-social territories can be defined as “spatial configurations of people, institutions, water flows, hydraulic technology and the biophysical environment that revolve around the control of water” (Boelens et al. 2016: 1). These territories in turn “have contested functions, values and meanings, as they define processes of inclusion and exclusion, development and marginalization, and the distribution of benefits and burdens that affect different groups of people in distinct ways” (idem: 2). Human society and nature are intrinsically linked and reproduce each other in multiple ways (Baletti 2012; Swyngedouw 2007). Human beings are actively shaping their biophysical environment by building on ideologies, knowledge and socio-economic and political power (Boelens et al. 2016: 3). Since these understandings are embedded into an existing political, cultural, and historical context, analysis of hydro-social territories needs to take these contextual factors into account (ibid.). Water, society, technologies and nature are strongly interrelated and together form hydro-social networks. These networks essentially regulate and define how water is distributed and used. They are continuously shaped and reconfigured by actors with the power to create new imaginaries and knowledge systems (ibid.).

The concept of hydro-social territories is very closely related to the concept of socio-technical imaginaries, as developed by Jasanoff & Kim (2009). They define socio-technical imaginaries as “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the design and fulfilment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects” (idem: 120). Thus, as is the case with hydro-social territories, the focus is on different ideas and visions which

(16)

15 influence values, world views and reference frames, and legitimize certain developmental approaches over others (Jasanoff & Kim 2009, 2015).

Hydro-social and socio-technical imaginaries are never stable, but are continuously renegotiated and reimagined among various actors (Delina & Janetos 2018: 3). Narratives can coexist and overlap with each other (Lovell et al. 2009) or can become highly contested (Delina 2018). Inherent in this perspective is the focus on how various actors try to influence national, regional and local imaginaries. These actors compete and align their views on how to manage and distribute water resources, thereby reconfiguring political-economic and socio-cultural relationships (Boelens et al. 2016: 1). Thus, some imaginaries clearly dominate over others, specifically, when actors haver greater access to financial resources, political networks and national discourse (Delina 2018). In most cases, national-level governments and private sector networks can wield much greater influence on imaginaries than local or regional actors (Jasanoff & Kim 2015).

For example, scholars have used the concept of governmentality to describe the process by which national level governments subjugate local groups not only through legal, military or economic means, but also through top-down discursive practices which generally reconfirm and stabilize the current political order (Foucault 2008; Menga 2016). The aim is to make subjects adopt the dominant discourse and adapt their worldviews, beliefs, needs and ideas to the hydro-territorial imaginaries of the ruling elite (Swyngedouw & Williams 2016).

In reality, many different territorial and socio-technical imaginaries co-exist within the same geographical space (Hoogesteger et al. 2016). Counter-imaginaries can challenge existing and dominant imaginaries by creating new frames for meanings, problems and solutions. Alliances that build around these counter-narratives use networks which connect the local to the national and global level (Boelens et al. 2015). Actors involved in these networks need not be directly or materially connected, but rather are interlinked through constructed territories and imaginaries which extend across scales (Warner 2012).

These imaginaries and frames also relate to the question of how actors frame an appropriate way of governing the GERD. Governance can broadly be perceived as a “form of collective decision-making to steer the society” (Peters 2011: 994). Many studies have shown the important role of governance for the sustainable use of resources and the prevention of conflict (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007; Wolf et al. 2003), and have linked a failure of governance

(17)

16 systems to adverse impacts on water use, water quality, water distribution and the efficiency of water-service deliverance (Rogers & Hall 2003). A constructivist perspective points to the ideas related to the concept of governance and the strategic construction of the term. Analysing the concept of governance through a constructivist perspective thus directs attention to the way actors frame decision-making processes around the GERD, the scale on which the project should be dealt with and the power various actors have to influence the debate. The following section will deal in more detail with these points.

2.3. Constructed concepts of governance and scale

Castro (2007) argues that contrary to technical and management approaches, an analysis of governance needs to include identities, ideas, values and power of different actors. The notion of governance entails different understandings of the type of development to be achieved, the role of democracy in decision-making and the overall values to be pursued by society (ibid.). These often dissimilar understandings lead to a “confrontation of rival political projects grounded on different values and principles” (idem: 102). Thus, governance is essentially a “political process involving the exercise of political power by political actors who seek to define the ends and values that must inform social development” (idem: 106). An analysis of the process involves the study of both the values and ideas that inform water policy, as well as the actors who are involved in decision-making and who determine how decisions are made and what ends and values are pursued (idem: 107).

Zwarteveen et al. (2017) build on this debate by highlighting the concepts of voice and authority in decisions about water allocation. Actors involved in decision-making “do not only have widely differing perspectives and interests, but are also drawing on different resources, norms and legal repertoires to articulate, frame, and defend their positions” (idem: 6). Entrenched powers within institutional and technological path dependencies can make changes to resource allocation difficult. Better organizational capacity, higher financial means and political resources frequently allow actors to form powerful alliances around large water infrastructures and to actively frame the agenda to their advantage (idem: 6).

Different groups with various interests also struggle to define and influence the precise scale on which water resources should be governed (Swyngedouw 2004: 32). Traditionally, four scales can be differentiated: local, national, basin and global. The local view stresses local stakeholders, rights, needs and perceptions for an effective governance of water issues.

(18)

17 According to this perspective, problems such as water-related diseases, access to water or the distribution of resources are best addressed by local stakeholders who have knowledge of the specific place, are directly affected by the problem and can come up with more innovative and adaptive institutions and solutions (Pahl-Wostl 2015: 100).

National level governance of water resources relates to formal legislation in the form of national water and resource laws. Legitimation rests on elected politicians or other legitimized actors on a national level. Proponents of this approach emphasize the need to overcome local interest biases and create public goods for the benefit of the overall society and economy (Pahl-Wostl 2015). However, national governance might also overrule individual human rights, or might be perceived as illegitimate when many stakeholders question the welfare-enhancing intentions of the state (Lemos & Agrawal 2006).

In the context of transboundary rivers, the basin level perspective has gained increased attention over the last decades. Scholars and policymakers emphasizing this perspective take the scientifically defined natural basin or catchment of a river as a basis for analysis (e.g. Hooper 2005; Kitaw & Yitayew 2014; Molle 2009;). In order to manage water issues in the region, specific institutions, which are adapted to the size and spatial distribution of the resource, should be created. This should then lead to a more integrated approach for resource management and a better distribution of costs and benefits among upstream and downstream countries (Vogel 2012). The Nile River Basin Initiative provides a good example in this context (e.g. Morbach et al. 2014). However, the approach can suffer from challenges in adequately defining hydrological boundaries in light of scientific uncertainty, accountability and public participation (Cohen & Davidson 2011). Many basin-wide institutions still lack adequate public participation and put greater emphasis on technocratic expertise than on political processes (Jeffrey & Gearey 2006).

Finally, the only recently developed global perspective on water governance emphasizes the solving of water issues on a global level. In light of climate change and wide-reaching effects of environmental pollution and degradation, this view stresses global approaches over local, national, or basin ones. Actors and frameworks include regional and multilateral institutions, intergovernmental organisations such as the EU, international laws such as the UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and other initiatives such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Pahl-Wostl 2015: 102).

(19)

18 Political decision-makers might choose a certain governance level in order to prevent free-riding, create a level-playing field, increase their own power vis-à-vis other players, share information and experiences or increase state sovereignty and national wealth (Pahl-Wostl 2015: 102). Who has a voice in decision-making and problem-assessment shapes the way a problem is perceived in the first place (Lebel 2006; Mostert et al. 2007). Up-scaling or down-scaling of environmental problems and governance issues can lead to shifts in responsibility and accountability, the power of stakeholders and access to resources (Gupta 2008).

In general, no optimal governance scale of water issues exists. Instead, approaches are politically and socially constructed, reflective of institutional and political settings and include the interaction of multiple scales in time and space (Pahl-Wostl 2015). The concept of multi-level water governance highlights this insight and emphasises the need to involve relevant actors from the local to the global level, such as states, institutions, civil society organizations and business. It also requires the coordination and cooperation between these different scales (Young 2002).

Transparent, equitable, accountable, inclusive and efficient institutions and negotiations can further a sustainable governance of water resources (Kitaw & Yitayew 2014; Pahl-Wostl 2015: 107-108). Additionally, sufficient access and distribution of information, public participation and flexibility and openness for experimentation enable institutions to be more adaptive to complexity, uncertainty and newly arising challenges (Huitema et al. 2009). Participatory mechanisms accustomed to the realities, needs and wishes of the region can support social learning among stakeholders, increase cooperation and help come up with new mechanisms for adaptation (Kitaw & Yitayew 2014).

To sum up, it can be argued that the insights from the constructivist approach to the concepts of hydro-social territories and water governance are well suited as a framework to explore the two research questions and the three core assumptions about the relationship and behaviour of actors (see Section 2.1). Both of the concepts enable an analysis of ideas, imaginaries and discourses that link to the subject of the GERD. Inherent in the chosen concepts is a focus on power relationships, specifically the power to influence the debate and thereby define the values and goals to be pursued. While the concept of hydro-social territories has much to say about domination and the conflictive potential arising from divergent imaginaries, the concept of water governance also includes the notion of sustainability within large water infrastructure

(20)

19 projects. Thus, taken together, the theoretical framework provides a promising framework for answering RQ1 and RQ2.

3. Research Design

In this chapter I will describe the methods that I used, the data and sources, and I will discuss possible limitations and ethical issues of the study.

3.1. Research Methods

The thesis employed a qualitative case study analysis of the GERD. A case study can be defined as an in-depth study of a defined topic, including relevant contextual factors and conditions (Pahl-Wostl 2015: 181). Case studies can be carried out using both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Within positivist approaches, a case study is often used to generalize to “a larger class of similar phenomena” (Gerring 2004: 341). By contrast, interpretivist approaches (which this study takes) focus more on intensive, context-specific descriptions, which provide insights into real-life situations and thereby can improve understandings of processes and issues at stake (Merriam 2009). Sufficiently rich descriptions can then be transferred to similar situations (ibid.).

I employed several methods for the analysis of the GERD. First, a context analysis drew on primary and secondary sources to analyse the main challenges and opportunities that have previously been cited for the construction and operation of the GERD. This analysis helps better understand the justifications onto which actions of various parties are built and which subsequently shape their understandings and beliefs. Second, I conducted a document analysis of both official and non-official documents, which represent speech acts about the GERD by the various stakeholders analysed in the study. I paid specific attention on how meanings and frames, which appear in these texts, have changed over time.

Third, I conducted semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders of the GERD, in order to illuminate the understandings these actors have when speaking about the dam. Questions were mainly focused on two overall topics: 1) What the GERD means for them (e.g. Is the project viewed and framed as beneficial or detrimental? At what scale should the project be governed?), and 2) what their role in the decision-making process is and how they interact with other stakeholders during the stages of implementation of the project (see also Appendix in Section 9, for the more detailed Interview Guide).

(21)

20 I used a discourse analysis to make sense of the discursive frames stakeholders employ in the study. Discursive frames can be defined as “ever-changing ‘scripts’ for organising and understanding the social and political world” (Dayton, 2000: 72–73). They “are transmitted via language and are constructed through social interaction, reaction, and adjustment” (idem: 72–73).

For the discourse analysis, I drew on insights from Michel Foucault (1979), who defines discourse as “tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations” (101-102). A discourse analysis looks at how language helps to create meaning. It is not defined by truth content, but rather by a statement’s ability to gain acceptance and prominence (Foucault 1972: 120). On the one hand, the discourse analysis helps illuminate the power relations, which are manifested in the narrative and construction of the GERD and which work to include or exclude particular voices from participation in decision-making. On the other hand, it helps understand different stakeholder perspectives, values and beliefs, which can then facilitate dialogue and collaboration (Raadgever et al. 2008). For example, perceptions of fairness or scale of an issue can have an influence on the governance system and the ability with which benefits are created and shared between the various parties (Gross 2007).

Drawing on Potter and Wetherell (1994), the discourse analysis encompassed the following steps:

- Content and form of the document/speech

- The various meanings and constructions actors attribute to the subject

- How the argument and rhetoric are structured, which frames are used and which are not used

Frames were mainly gathered using an inductive approach. However, some frames have been defined preliminary as a guiding tool, based on previous literature on the topic (Atkins 2017; Hissen et al. 2017; Menga 2017). Analysing the discourse around large water projects, Islar and Boda (2014) have discovered a number of discursive frames aimed at legitimizing the project, such as politicians’ focus on economic growth and development or granting access to electricity.

However, since this study takes a more transnational approach contrary to a national elite focus, frames were not solely analysed according to their effect on the domestic populations

(22)

21 and politics, but on wider transboundary relations. Abdelhady et al. (2015) provide the framework for an analysis like that by considering both nationalist and hydrosolidaric discourses. While nationalism refers mainly to a top-down national-scale ideology and issues of national development and unity, hydrosolidarity is a bottom-up approach that transcends national boundaries and aims to share access to water in an equitable way (idem: 74-75). Moreover, the approach states that water infrastructure projects should be “socially and environmentally sustainable, promote economic development and ensure community cohesion within a decision-making process that makes the necessary local compromises transparent” (Bjornlund and McKay 2003: 87).

This literature refers to a few frames, which are relevant for the study of the discourse around the GERD:

- Nationalistic frame: The GERD is a symbol of modernity and way towards economic growth and poverty reduction.

- Risk frame: The GERD increases the risks of water insecurity, means a loss of control and constitutes a threat.

- Cooperative frame: The GERD provides opportunities for cooperation, sharing of resources and increasing interdependencies among stakeholders.

Governance Frames

- Local Stakeholder Participation: Participation of local communities is framed as positive for the success and sustainability of water management and the GERD. - Institutional Involvement: Transnational institutions are necessary in order to manage

the GERD and the Nile Basin effectively. 3.2. Data and Sources

The thesis used a variety of sources for the analysis of the GERD. For the context analysis, it drew on secondary sources such as scholarly publications on the issue, as well as primary sources such as legal documents on international water law and official agreements on the GERD.

For the document analysis, I gathered documents spanning the period from 2011 – the year of construction of the GERD – until today. I chose documents that directly or indirectly dealt with the GERD and actively mentioned the project in the text. Official documents included official statements, speeches, and declarations by high-level political decision-makers of

(23)

22 Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt at national and international summits. These documents and speech-acts were gathered through the official websites of the countries’ prime ministers, the respective ministries of Water Resources and Irrigation and the official Facebook pages thereof. On the other hand, non-official documents were news reports published by tightly controlled national media outlets in the respective countries. For Ethiopia, I used reports by the English and Amharic written newspaper The Reporter, the Ethiopian Herald and Ethiopia Insight, for Sudan, the Sudanese Online newspaper and the Sudan Tribune, for Egypt, the government-owned Ahram online English news, Egypt Today, Egypt Independent and the pan-Arab media outlet The New pan-Arab. Since most of these newspapers are very close to official government sources and subject to political censorship, they can be considered as mouthpieces of the respective governments.

I also conducted four semi-structured interviews between February and April 2020 with a government representative from Ethiopia, a representative from the Water Ministry of Sudan, a member from the Nile Basin Discourse and a representative from the Nile Basin Initiative. The interviews aimed to provide a closer understanding of personal interpretations and framings of the GERD. They also gave insights into everyday policy issues and experiences on a more local and practical level, thus expanding the abstract and higher-level discourse within official documents and news sources. The interviewees were contacted via email through the official websites of their organizations and selected according to their direct experiences in the field of the GERD development. Arranging the interviews proved hard throughout the research, with many potential interviewees not replying to interview requests or formally rejecting an interview, often stating the politically ‘hot’ character of the issue and the ongoing negotiations around the dam project. I was also not able to arrange an interview with an Egyptian official, mainly due to these reasons.

All of the final interviewees had an academic background and were experts in the fields of water governance, water management, dam building or community development, respectively. The interviews were carried out via skype or phone. Questions were structured according to the position of the actor and his or her expertise, which relates to the expectations, involvement and understandings of the issue (see Appendix in Section 9 for the overall Interview Guide).

(24)

23 3.3. Limitations

Due to the limited scope, time and financial resources of the research, I had to limit the number of methods and sources used for analysis. Therefore, the analysis focuses on only three stakeholders on the international level, namely Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, despite the fact that other riparian states of the Nile could also be affected by the GERD. Nevertheless, these three countries have been studied as the main stakeholders within the GERD-related affairs. When analysing the discourse on this level, the study necessarily takes a more state-centric approach, thereby ignoring to some extent intra-elite competitions and differences between national-level ministries. The strict focus on state actors was overcome by also including two non-state actors into the analysis. I am aware that although the Nile Basin Discourse and the Nile Basin Initiative constitute important actors within the Nile Basin, many more actors and NGOs are present in the region. However, increasing the number of respondents was not feasible within the boundaries of this research. Additionally, it is important to note that civil society organizations can hardly claim to speak directly for the local population. Therefore, frames used by these organizations have to be understood as representations of a part of the organization itself and not as representations of the wider local population.

When it comes to the data, I had to make constraints in the number of sources selected for the discourse analysis. Considering the fact that the study aimed to cover the discourse within a broad geographical area spanning across three countries, the sources selected within each country necessarily had to be restricted. Despite paying attention on creating an overall account of national discourse, more nuanced understandings and differences on a national level and across different sources might be missed. However, since the study takes a more cross-boundary and relational approach, these shortcomings might be compensated by future studies looking specifically at the national discourse around the GERD.

3.4. Ethical Issues

Ethical concerns can emerge in qualitative studies due to the interaction between the researcher and the participants and the personal involvement of the researcher in the study (Sanjari et al. 2014). Challenges relate to anonymity, confidentiality, informed consent and the researcher’s potential impact on the participants and of participants on the researcher (ibid.).

(25)

24 Since the thesis involved no field trip, the only personal connection I had with participants was through the phone and skype interviews. Before the interview, interviewees were informed about the identity of the researcher, the nature and objective of the research, their contribution in it, as well as how the results will be published and used. Interviewees’ identities were concealed by generalising to the term ‘representative’ of the specific organisation or institution they were working for. This was also communicated to interviewees during the interview. Personal information was further protected by removing personal details from the interview transcript. The topics discussed were familiar for all interviewees in the study, as they directly related to their daily work in the field. It can also be assumed that most of the interviewees were familiar with the ‘interview setting’, due to their role as public figures.

A detailed interview transcript helped create a close representation of understandings of respondents in the interviews and the final study. Additionally, elaborative questions were asked during the interview to adequately capture interviewees’ understandings of the topic. Finally, implications of the research on participants can only thought of preliminarily. However, due to the limited publication format of the research, the chances of stakeholders hearing about the results arguably remain low.

4. The GERD: Framing the challenges and opportunities

No large infrastructure projects such as dams are able to satisfy the needs and concerns of all stakeholders affected by the project. Due to dams’ wide-reaching (but often unclear or under-researched) consequences on different people dependent on the water resource, their cultural traditions, economic circumstances, political relationships and the environment, clear-cut cost-benefit analysis seems highly difficult - if not impossible - to conduct. Quite contrary to standard management approaches or generalized impact assessments, hydro-dams need to be viewed as inherently political processes, with actors fighting over voice, authority and suitable framings and imaginaries connected to the dam (Zwarteveen et al. 2015: 5-6).

Since hydro-dams always create winners and losers (Hommes et al. 2016: 18), different people have different stakes and interests in the project. At the same time, they have divergent possibilities in influencing the discourse around the dam, its developments and subsequent distribution of benefits and costs (ibid.). It is expected that national-level governments and

(26)

25 private actors wield greater power over the discourse surrounding the GERD than civil-society actors such as NGOs or local activist groups (Delina 2018). Comparing national-level governments involved in transboundary water issues usually leads to the assumption that upstream riparians have considerable power advantages over downstream countries (Kuenzer et al. 2013: 566). However, downstream riparians should not be viewed as powerless actors which naturally lose out, but instead often have significant gains to make from upstream dam development, such as flood control or electricity supply (ICG 2019: 19).

Therefore, instead of assuming a clear-cut impact of dams on power relations and political relations between upstream and downstream riparians, careful analysis points to the context- and time-specific circumstances that shape specific viewpoints and approaches to dam development. Additionally, analysis should go beyond treating riparians as black-boxes and unitary actors. It is typically not riparians per se which benefit or lose from dam development, but rather different parts of the population within these countries (Kuenzer et al. 2013). For example, while a few urban elites and influential private actors might significantly benefit from dam development by gaining increased access to electricity or diverting financial resources devoted to building the project into their own hands, the larger rural and poor population might ultimately suffer from construction impacts, resettlement issues or long term consequences and changes to the ecosystems on which their livelihood depend (ibid.). The following sections will deal in more detail with the challenges and opportunities, which have been associated with the construction and operation of the GERD. This analysis will help better judge the various frames and imaginaries actors use in legitimizing or opposing the development of the GERD. Additionally, it will help sketch possible points of contestation and cooperation between stakeholders.

4.1. Political challenges and opportunities

The Blue Nile, on which the GERD is being built, originates at Lake Tana in Ethiopia, descends and converges with the White Nile in Sudan and then flows as the combined Nile through Egypt to the Mediterranean (see Figure 1). Until today, water remains the most vital and shared resource between these three countries, with millions of people relying on the resource for their livelihood (Mendler de Suarez 2011). At the same time, population growth, economic growth and climate change put pressure on the adequate sharing of this resources,

(27)

26 while additional infrastructural investments such as hydro-dams have created potential for both cooperation and conflict between the riparian states (ibid.).

Figure 1: The Nile River Basin (from Aljefri et al. 2019).

Historically, claims made by governmental actors of Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt about dam projects on the Nile and its tributaries have been shaped by uneven demands and rights to the waters of the river. A 1929 agreement signed between Egypt and Britain granted Egypt the right to an annual flow of 48 billion cubic meters of Nile waters, the right to construct hydro-dams without notifying upstream riparian states and the veto power over dams in other Nile states, if these would cause harm to Egypt (Aljefri et al. 2019: 309). In 1959, three years after Sudan gained its independence, the country signed an agreement with Egypt, in which both countries increased their annual water allotments. Sudan gained the permittance to construct hydro-dams on the Nile, while upstream countries were prohibited from building hydraulic infrastructure on the river and its tributaries (Salman 2013; Swain 1997).

(28)

27 This colonial water agreement has helped Egypt construct hydro-dams over the last decades. For example, the Aswan High Dam, which was built in the 1960s, was designed to control the flow of the Nile, avoid the frequent occurrence of floods, expand cultivation and produce hydropower (Britannica 2019). Not without its criticism, the dam has nevertheless helped spur industrialization in the country and prevented a severe water shortage in 1984 to 1988 (ibid.). Sudan completed its Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile River in 1925 for the purpose of irrigation and the production of hydroelectric power (Britannica 2019). In addition, it built the Jebel Aulia Dam on the White Nile in 1937, the Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile in 1966 and the Merowe Dam on the Nile in Northern Sudan in 2004. All of these dams helped the country make use of its water allotments as granted during the 1959 agreement with Egypt (ibid.). The Ethiopian government has criticized the 1929 and 1959 agreements ever since their ratification and has denied their validity (Swain 1997). It has regarded these agreements as historical injustices during times of colonialism and as barriers for its effective utilization of Nile waters and hydro-dam construction for economic development (Tawfik 2016: 578). However, for a long time, Ethiopia was unable to challenge the status-quo of water allotment in the Nile River Basin, due to political instability, its poor economic situation and lack of financial means (Blackmore & Whittington 2008).

This situation has changed in recent years. Ethiopia appears to be relatively politically stable and has managed to channel assistance and funds from abroad and its own population for the construction of new hydraulic infrastructure such as the GERD (Chen & Swain 2014: 16). This has led to shifting power relations between the riparian states of the Nile. Whereas Egypt has frequently been cited as the hydro-hegemon in the Nile Basin region, due to its socio-economic and military strength (Zeitoun & Warner 2006), the aspiring vision of Ethiopia as producer of hydro-electricity and its rising economic power might increasingly challenge Egypt’s dominant position in the future (Chen & Swain 2014: 16).

The GERD is the first dam in Ethiopia which is located at the Blue Nile. Ethiopia unilaterally started construction of the dam in 2011, in the midst of the Arab Spring and the revolution that ultimately toppled President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Both the Egyptian and Sudanese government immediately reacted with criticism and opposition to the project (Salman 2016: 516). As water-scarce countries, both feared that the GERD will significantly reduce their respective water supply. They saw upstream water storage facilities as a national security

(29)

28 threat (Morbach et al. 2014). Egypt claimed that the GERD could turn a considerable part of its irrigated lands into desert and could reduce the power generation of its High Dam and Aswan Dam (Chen & Swain 2014: 15; Salman 2016: 516). Sudan feared for the security implications of the GERD in case of cracking or collapse of the hydraulic infrastructure (Salman 2016: 516).

The Sudanese government later changed its critical view of the GERD towards emphasising the benefits of the project (see Section 5.2.2). While this has helped foster cooperation between the Sudanese and Ethiopian government, it has broken the historical alliance between Sudan and Egypt and has resulted in a more hostile Egyptian attitude towards both Ethiopia and Sudan (Salman 2016: 518).

The Egyptian government has – with only some small variations – generally remained hostile to the GERD (see Section 5.2.1). It demanded that the Ethiopian government makes available all information about the GERD to Egypt and Sudan, notifies both countries in advance of any decision and allows enough time for their responses before construction continues (Salman 2016: 517). The situation seemed to nearly escalate in 2013, when Egyptian politicians discussed to take military action or use sabotage to stop further construction of the dam. The meeting was inadvertently broadcast live, poisoning relations with Ethiopia in subsequent periods (Stack 6 June 2013).

Two attempts to soften the apparent tensions between the three riparian countries were the report of the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) of 2013 and the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in 2015. The IPoE consisted of ten members, two from each of the three riparian states, and four experts outside the Nile Basin region. The panel should offer an unbiased account of potential impacts of the GERD on Sudan and Egypt and assess construction plans of the dam. It criticized that the Ethiopian government has not offered an economic justification to constructing a power capacity of 6000 MW, nor did it consider sediment accumulation over time, which could affect the lifespan of the project. According to the report, more emphasis was placed by the Ethiopian government on technical criteria than on the assessment of downstream impacts (IPoE 2013). Finally, it recommended carrying out more in-depth studies of the impacts of the GERD on downstream countries. While Egypt demanded the suspension of the GERD after the report was released, the Ethiopian

(30)

29 government contented that no suspension was required by the Panel and continued with construction (Salman 2016: 518).

The DoP was signed between the three riparian countries in 2015 and aimed at reintegrating established principles of international water law from the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention into the negotiations, establishing new cooperative mechanisms between the parties and setting up guidelines for the filling and operation of the dam (Yihdego et al. 2016: 505). It emphasized water law principles of causing no significant harm to downstream countries, measures to mitigate this harm in case it occurs and compensation mechanisms for inflicted harm (DoP 2015). Ethiopia was entitled to make changes to the guidelines of operation in case of ‘unforeseen or urgent circumstances’, while Egypt and Sudan gained priority in purchasing electricity generated by the dam (DoP 2015).

Despite some cooperative achievements, tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt continued. US mediation has so far not been able to bring the parties closer together, with Ethiopia recently withdrawing from negotiations with Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia has reinforced its commitment for completing the GERD by stating that its army is willing to protect the dam from possible aggressors (MEM 16 March 2020).

No unanimous agreement has yet been reached between the Nile countries regarding the involvement of regional institutions such as the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) for the negotiation of the GERD. The NBI focuses on enhancing cooperation and water sharing in the Nile Basin, while the extended Cooperate Framework Agreement (CFA) should establish binding principles of international water laws of causing no significant harm and an equitable sharing of water resources (see Section 5.3.1). However, differences between the Nile countries emerge over the conflict between these new laws and the old colonial water agreements, which particularly Egypt is not willing to surrender (Salman 2013).

Next to changes on the national and international level, the GERD can also be viewed through the changes it brings on a more local and regional scale. Large dams such as the GERD are expected to have major impacts on local populations in domestic and foreign countries who are directly or indirectly dependent on the river waters (Jaichand & Sampaio 2013). However, the Ethiopian government has so far not published a social or environmental impact assessment, while local stakeholder participation remains low (see Section 5.1).

Governing Water Resources and Hydropower Development: Contested Imaginaries of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam