I hereby declare that this thesis, “Divide and Rule? Group Comparison and Group

i

DECLERATION BY CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this thesis, “Divide and Rule? Group Comparison and Group

Entitlement in Mandate Syria 1920-1946”, is my own work and my own effort and that it is has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Philip Gajos

August 18, 2015

ii

Divide and Rule?

Group Comparison and Group Entitlement in Mandate Syria 1920-1946

By Filip Gajos

Chopina 11, m.27

Kielce, 25-356

Poland

s2276887

+995 597 968 814

Doctor Sami Faltas

iii

Dedication

Dedykowane pamięci Dziadka Bogdana –

Ogrom Twej zasługi bije z każdego słowa tej pracy.

iv

Abstract

This study evaluates the effect of French colonial rule on ethno-religious relations between Syrian communities during the Mandate period. Ethnic conflict theory is used to explain the dynamics which defined group interactions in Syria between 1920 and 1945 in relation to the preceding Ottoman Tanzimat period. The primary question defining this study is whether drastic changes in inter-group dynamics may be observed between the two

periods, resulting from an interaction of local social and ideological trends and implicit colonial policy.

Donald Horowitz’s ethnic conflict theory on entitlement and invidious comparison between groups serves as the theoretical backdrop to the investigation into French rule, as he applies these two theoretical elements to the appropriate context of post-colonial societies.

An analysis of group relations is also done for the preceding late Ottoman period for comparative purposes. Here, Paul Collier, Jonathan Fox, and Marc Howard Ross offer theories on economic, religious, and social factors which aid in determining the extent to which conflict appears in a given society.

The Ottoman period of rule in Syria marks a time of dynamic social change which

stood to alter relations between religious and ethnic groups. The lack of violence and

unifying ideological trends however does not suggest that ethnic tensions where widely

embedded or primordial at the moment when Syria passed into French hands. The period of

colonial rule similarly does not offer conclusive evidence that the French greatly altered

inter-group dynamics. Social trends which had governed ethnic relations continued, but

within a new political reality. Instead, a weak institutional environment was left over as a

legacy in Syria, largely contributing to the problems facing the region today.

v

Acknowledgements

Foremost, I am grateful to my supervisor Doctor Sami Faltas for guidance in defining and honing the theoretical queries which gave rise to this thesis.

I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to the friends and family who surrounded me throughout the course of my writing, keeping me on track and generally sane. My thanks also go out to Aaron Raymond and Leo Zalischiker for their invaluable support and assistance in the editing process of this paper.

Filip Gajos

vi

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION ... 1

CHAPTER 1. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD ... 6

1.1 Theoretical Framework ... 6

1.2 Methodology ... 12

1.3 Groups in Conflict: Definitions ... 15

1.4 Ethnic Conflict and International Relations ... 18

1.5 Literature Review ... 20

CHAPTER 2. LATE OTTOMAN SYRIA ... 32

2.1 Rebellion and Predation ... 34

2.2 The Religious Nexus ... 49

2.3 Cultural Dramas ... 53

CHAPTER 3. GROUP DYNAMICS IN MANDATE SYRIA ... 58

3.1 Syria’s Communities on the Eve of the Mandate ... 59

3.2 Colonial Distribution of Opportunity ... 63

3.3 Group Evaluation ... 68

3.4 Group Entitlement and Symbolic Mitigation ... 73

CONCLUSION ... 81

LIST OF LITERATURE ... 86

vii

List of Tables

Table 1. Time Periods of Ottoman Syria during the Tanzimat 33

Table 2. Claims to Legitimacy among Syrian Communities 74

1

INTRODUCTION

“Yemen produces coffee, Egypt cotton, Iraq dates, Palestine oranges, and Syria trouble”,

quipped American journalist John Gunther, just a few years before the Mandate of Syria was granted official independence from France in 1945. This tongue- in-cheek observation provides a curious insight into coeval perceptions of this young land-locked country. Following the First World War, Syria, along with her immediate neighbours, was carved out of former Ottoman territories and allocated to France and Britain as a United Nations mandate. These European powers were charged with the task of guiding these territories towards modernization and eventual independence.

Labelling them as mandates, the British and French in effect created colonies to add to their existing global empires. Through the post-war settlements dictated by the Allied victors, the region that had been known throughout the Ottoman era as “Greater Syria”

was divided into territories which would later become four independent states: Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel (out of British Palestine).

As was the case in many post-colonial geopolitical cartographic endeavours, the partitions imposed on Greater Syria did not reflect local realities on a number of levels.

Politically, it created state entities that had never been rooted in any territorial tradition.

Over the course of four centuries, Greater Syria had been ruled from Istanbul by the Ottoman Turks, who themselves had conquered the region from its previous Egyptian Mamluk rulers in 1516. Their reign was only temporarily broken by an Egyptian reoccupation under the great reformer Muhammad Ali Paşa from 1833 to 1840.

European imperialism divided populations regardless of local loyalties, splitting variously heterodox groups across new territorial boundaries. Economically, it created separate nations out of provinces which had always been tightly linked to other parts of the Ottoman Empire in terms of regional trade. For the first time, the people of Greater Syria found themselves dealing across new and largely artificial borders with foreign import tariffs and alien economic regimes. For groups like the Bedouin, this new reality was unfeasible for their traditional society. At the same time, it imposed radical social and economic changes in order to modernize the mandate territories in line with early 20

century Europe. Culturally, and perhaps most significantly, it imposed restrictive

1

John Gunther, Inside Asia, (New York: Harper & Bros, 1939), 546.

2

Though it did not possess a set border, the territorial concept of Greater Syria roughly corresponded to

the modern-day Levantine countries, parts of south-eastern Turkey, and occasionally the Sinai Peninsula.

2

social and spatial barriers in a region which had always displayed a fluid character of tribal networks, ethnic affiliation, and self-identification. The net result would be the creation of small rump states with inherent problems embedded within their

institutional structures.

Though its effects would not be felt for centuries to come, the French

occupation of Greater Syria marked the beginning of a period which brought significant reconfigurations of ethnic and religious representation within Syria’s fledgling

institutions. For the past few decades, stretching from the 1950s and 60s into the 21

century, historical scholarship has paid much attention to the developments surrounding the rise and fortunes of Syria’s Ba’athist party under the Assads, and how this family, hailing from a small, reclusive Shi’a sect, would ultimately come to dominate an extremely heterogeneous country after a series of military coups. Under the auspices of such Middle-East scholars as Abdul-Karim Rafeq, a more detailed picture of Syrian society dating from the Ottoman era has been cultivated and expanded upon in recent decades. This scholarly development has led to a refocusing of historiographical research into a more holistic bottom-up approach, where concerns with the social and economic development of the Syrian region and its people have gained momentum alongside the traditionally political scope.

The approach of this thesis will be to continue in line with this tradition, while applying a framework grounded in ethnic conflict theory in order to provide a synthesis of the themes prevalent in the existing literature. These themes, placed in the context of conflict theory, will address the primary research question: were sectarian relations between Syria’s ethnic groups structurally changed during the French Mandate? To explore the correlation between colonial administrative policy and local group relations, additional sub-questions will be explored. Firstly, it is important to consider the effects of the Tanzimat reforms specifically in Syria, and to what extent they were successful in mitigating nationalist tensions while establishing a culture of pluralism in this diverse Ottoman province. Conversely, how did budding notions of Arab nationalism impact local group relationships in the same period? Secondly, did later colonial policy create rifts in inter-group relationships between the most rigidly juxtaposed

communities, i.e. Muslims and Christians, and did it create a new reality in power

diffusion among Syria’s groups. Lastly, my analysis should provide insight into the

nature of French colonial rule in Syria, whether it laid the ground-work for future

3

conflicts, exacerbating already existent underlying tensions, or had little to no impact at all.

The first chapter of this thesis will constitute the theoretical and methodological underpinnings to the research question. It will provide an overview and evaluation of a number of relevant theories which deal with core processes and sources of ethnic conflict, and offer theoretical insight into phenomena bearing relevance to this particular study. Furthermore, it will delineate some definitions which will be widely referred to in this thesis, inherent in the themes central to the primary discussion. As some of these terms are contested or have broader meanings, it is imperative to clearly narrow their definitions to fit the relevant discourse. Lastly, a comprehensive review of the literature will attempt to assess the academic trends and understandings that

structure the historical valuation of the Ottoman and subsequent French presence in Syria.

Chapter Two will proceed with the first part of the analysis, starting with an overview and examination of the Ottoman period of rule in Syria. The aforementioned sub-questions relating to the primary research problem will be explored here, drawing from the established theoretical framework. This chapter will aim to establish the particulars relating to the research discussion in light of pre-colonial Syria,

contextualizing the country’s social and cultural state-of-affairs leading up to the First World War. The chapter will demonstrate that by and large, inter-group violence during this period need not be construed as ethnic, having other factors at play such as

predation-motivated rebellion. Furthermore, it will extrapolate on ideological currents which were actually able to bring together segments of the population around unifying principles, rather than reinforcing age-long hatreds.

Chapter Three will continue this examination, moving ahead to the beginning of de jure French rule in Syria in 1920 and the establishment of the Mandate. This chapter will analyse the developments of structural changes in the time period of primary focus.

Following a categorical assessment of Syrian ethno-religious groups, the subsequent

discussion will show that, despite the opportunities for social cleavage in the colonial

setting, counter-mechanisms embedded in the social fabric provided a counter-balance

to forces which could promote intense group conflicts. Drawing from psychological

guidelines of group evaluation, legitimacy, and symbolism, it will serve to dispel

certain modern evaluations of colonial rule and its effects on fostering hatreds in

heterogeneous societies.

4

The conclusion will bring together these two periods and extrapolate on the initial questions stemming from the research problem. It will aim to shed light on the ultimate effects that colonial rule had on ethnic group relations in the Republic of Syria, with its pre-colonial past serving as the backdrop, bringing the two eras together in synthesis. Lastly, the conclusion will reiterate the intents and purposes of this study, re- evaluating the main ideas developed in the research question. Ultimately, it should offer a fresh insight into the general themes of Syria’s colonial history, and place it in the context of ethnic conflict within a specific case study, with its own distinct framing relevant to the wider debate revolving around current events in the Middle East.

At the time of writing, there were 15 ongoing wars across the world. The four largest of these, namely the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nigeria, could be described as being of a sectarian nature to varying degrees. Syria in particular has received much media attention due to the activity of the Islamic State of Iraq and

Levant (ISIS), a Sunni Wahhabist terrorist organization which has committed numerous human rights violations, often targeting various Syrian and Iraqi minorities, in effect conducting ethnic cleansing operations and committing genocide. Whether it is Sunni ISIS members attacking non-Sunni religious communities, or the ongoing battle between the Alawi-based Assad regime and the mainly Sunni opposition over control of Syria, these conflicts continue to be labelled as sectarian, and the word is used in popular and political discourse time and time again.

And yet, a deeper scrutiny of this term merits some important considerations. When we speak of sectarian conflict, what popular conceptualizations are being applied to understanding ethnic-based violence and the sentiments it stems from? The myth of sectarianism has been a scapegoat for much larger problems at hand, while at the same time failing to offer some conclusive way out of the quagmire which is the current socio-political reality in the Middle East.

Whether it is a discussion in the media, between academics, policy makers, or politicians, a syncretic approach to these complex issues should be a priority. A thorough understanding of the fundamental driving factors behind ethnic conflict combined with a holistic perspective on historical trends would offer a more promising path towards future developments.

3

Sami Ramadi, “The Sectarian Myth of Iraq,” The Guardian, June 16, 2014, accessed July 9, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/16/sectarian-myth-of-iraq; Abigail Hauslohner,

“Sectarian Attacks in Iraq stoked by Spillover from Syrian War,” The Guardian, May 21, 2013, accessed

July 9, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/21/iraq-sectarianism-syrian-war-sunni.

5

The last one hundred and fifty years of general Middle Eastern history provide the researcher with a complex and inexhaustible source of material to consider. As such, this thesis will limit the scope of research to what may be considered the start of the “modern era” in Syria’s history, beginning in 1839 with the initial years of the Tanzimat, and ending in 1945 when Syria was granted independence by the French.

Although the changes that the Syrian land underwent within this span of nearly a

century were complex and varied, this study will focus only on the distinctions

governing ethnic relations and how they played into (or out of) the establishment of a

Republic of Syria. Hopefully, this focus will give us a greater ability to evaluate

Gunther’s impression of this Levantine country as a regional wholesaler of troubles.

6

CHAPTER 1. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD

1.1 Theoretical Framework

The central questions revolving around this paper’s research problem aim to draw from the relatively young academic field of conflict theory, and more specifically from one of its subfields which particularly looks at the nature of ethnic conflicts. As an academic practice, Conflict Studies have been a relatively new addition to the scholarly trends of the last one hundred years. Similar to International Relations, the beginnings of this field are rooted in the end of the First World War, as uncovering underlying causes and exploring mitigation methods for human conflict gained resonance. As a sub-discipline of Conflict Studies, ethnicity-based conflict theories and their

corresponding corpus of literature began to surface well into the Cold War era, and the larger body of it has mostly been elaborated upon by scholars only after the fall of communism in Europe.

Today, conflict theories draw from three larger fields of hermeneutic traditions;

primordialism, constructivism, and instrumentalism, each one with its own central view on the social roots of ethnic conflicts. Primordialist theory may be understood as

grounded in the notion that ethnicity and nationality represent objects, traditionalized within the context of humans’ natural biological existence based on kinship and geographical position.

The unavoidable tie to family then becomes expressed on a higher level. Instrumentalist theory came to explain the involvement of community leaders in mobilizing their ethnic constituencies “in their competition for power and resources, because they found them more effective than social classes.”

In this

account, ethnicity becomes a tool to reach particular goals. Constructivism draws upon the idea of “imagined communities” proposed by Benedict Anderson, whereby national communities are imagined because most members never know their co-nationals.

Imagined ethnicity becomes the locus point from which to then analyze ethnic conflicts.

These three separate approaches take a varied and oft times conflicting starting point in

4

Grosby, Steven. "Debate: The Verdict of History: The Inexpungeable Tie of Primordiality ‐ a Response to Eller and Coughlan." Ethnic and Racial Studies (2014), 168, accessed November 3, 2014,

doi:10.1080/01419870.1994.9993817.

5

Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 54-55.

6

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism

(London, New York: Verso, 2006), 6-7.

7

their theoretical approach to ethnic violence, but their individual contributions to understanding it as a whole should not be ignored.

Horowitz’s Ethnic Groups in Conflict will provide the theoretical benchmark for this thesis, drawing from a largely psychological approach to ethnic conflict studies grounded in the constructivist school. Because the mandate period in Syria’s history brought an interruption to older socio-political patterns, the constructivist school’s approach is particularly relevant. As this paper represents a case study of a country with a colonial past, Horowitz’s theory bears a number of suitable characteristics that are most adequate for constructing a fitting blueprint for analysis. He explicitly limits his own case studies primarily to Asia and Africa, stating that, “With few exceptions, these countries share a common experience of colonialism, and, in the post-colonial period, have had to cope with similar problems of building new institutions and relating component ethnic groups to them… Not least importantly, the problems of post- colonial politics have been treated in a large and still-growing literature on the new states, a literature with a common vocabulary and one that can be readily tapped when necessary”.

The subsequent analytical chapters of this thesis, starting in the Ottoman Tanzimat era and moving chronologically into the French Mandate period, will draw upon the schematic outlined by Horowitz. Following his first two chapters dealing with an examination of ethnic conflict in a wider academic context, he divides his work into five major parts consisting of elaborative subchapters to develop his own theoretical structure, the first of which will be focused upon specifically in this paper. This first section covers structural theories examining group comparison, group entitlement, and secessionism and irredentism as conflict motives. The subsequent sections, detailing militarization of ethnic conflict and the colonial impact on army composition, ethnic configuration in electoral system, and party politics along with conflict prevention methods, will not be considered as their relevance goes beyond the scope and

timeframe of this thesis topic. A more detailed synthesis of the pertinent subchapters will now be explored.

A benchmark for ethnic group analysis is introduced early on in the dichotomy of advanced and backward groups. Horowitz posits that on one hand, an advanced group may be disproportionally educated, overrepresented in the civil service and

7

Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 18.

8

independent professions, wealthy and domineering in business. On the other, backward groups may be disproportionately rural, working in the subsistence economy, poor, and uneducated.

He does point out that these categories are in essence very general, and all groups may exhibit internal cleavages along other lines such as social class or local integration. In essence, advantages and disadvantages are relative to the given case.

Horowitz’s chapter on group comparison ultimately attempts to answer how this particular aspect of collective group importance vis-à-vis other groups plays into

conflict. Here he notes some early psychological studies which provided clues to group psychology and differentiation. Most notably, these test subjects, once divided into groups, aimed for positive in-group evaluation, discriminated against out-groups, similarities were not pertinent to categories of membership, and when faced with the task of wealth distribution, maximizing the relative profit difference between groups was preferred over maximizing one’s group’s total profit.

The underlying assumption here is that such a micro-example of group behaviour can shed some light on the macro-level, and from this Horowitz extrapolates his larger analytical model of group worth. Consequently, group worth and evaluation, once placed in a colonial context, provided new conceptualizations by competing groups of their place within the political entity. It introduced factors which “sharpened group juxtapositions”

through general colonial policies like centralization, differential group modernization, group patronage, and European evaluation of their colonial subjects. Moreover, it created a specific colonial experience and a new environment of comparison,

one that fell onto the backdrop provided by the configuration of groups into the backward-advanced dichotomy.

Horowitz goes on to explore two other constituent parts of his psychology-based nexus of conflict motives, namely group entitlement and the politics of symbolism. In the first case, he introduces the concept of politics of entitlement within divided societies, where groups struggle over self-esteem within their society by using the political system as a medium in attaining social recognition of their standing.

This bears weight in the analysis of any colonial nation, given the fact that historical evidence supports the assumption that control of the state is central to many conflict

8

Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, 148.

9

Ibid., 144-146.

10

Ibid., 149.

11

Ibid., 148.

12

Ibid., 185.

9

painted as ethnic.

The example of Syria not excluded, the position of groups within their societies, and how they manifest their power in relation to other groups, cannot have resonance without the capability to exert power on the political stage.

Furthermore, Horowitz’s model provides an understanding of how “backward”

groups, those perhaps with less opportunity in their society, may reinforce their claim to political inclusion through other means. Here, Horowitz offers a metaphor pertaining to ownership and how it plays out on the state level, outlining three major concepts that may be used in a group’s claims. Groups may structure a claim on the grounds of indigenousness (real or perceived), a special mission to perform on a given territory (often religious aiming at exclusivity within a particular area), a tradition of rule (possibly through previous conquests), and the “right” to succeed the colonial power (which may stem from favouritism entrusted upon a group during the colonial period).

How effectively groups are able to enforce these claims will depend on the moral weight behind their appeal positioned against other appeals. These two trajectories provide us with what Horowitz calls a “raw” conflict situation, where very detractive group comparisons combined with a large contest area for legitimacy claims are conducive to intense conflict,

excluding moderation from institutional factors like party systems. As Syria did not become a constitutional republic until the post-Mandate period, this raw model offers a competent tool in identifying what changes occurred in inter-group social structures between the span of late Ottoman rule to Syria’s

independence in 1945.

Lastly, Horowitz ties another issue into the aforementioned factors as the space where “group psychology and group status meet in a struggle over symbols of prestige and dominance”.

Within this space, notions of a symbolic character, i.e. ones that cannot be quantified, including language or religious rights, or alternatively ones that can be, such as group representation within the civil service, add an additional element to compete over in the domestic sphere. The manifestation of this provides an answer to why lower classes follow, as shared group prestige is ultimately derived from their respective educated elites, and they therefore align with the latter’s careerist ambitions within the divided polity.

Symbols put a material face to otherwise ambiguous issues,

13

Ibid., 187.

14

Ibid., 202-205.

15

Ibid., 215.

16

Ibid., 219.

17

Ibid., 226.

10

making them pertinent in a society resembling that of Syria in the 1920s, 30s, and 40, where groups mostly speaking one universal language could only find cleavage on the basis of other, visual categories. How the competition for symbolism manifested itself among the heterogeneous groups of Mandate Syria will be explored in later sections.

To this day, Horowitz’s work stands out as a fundamental study into the

symbolic and psychological processes which he identifies as key in ethnic conflict, and as a central introductory text to the subject. Other notable works which considered low- level actors in the earlier literature, that is to say, non-state and non-international ones, were Gurr’s exploration into relative deprivation theory in Why Men Rebel and

Rapoport’s The Origins of Violence; Approaches to the Study of Conflict.

Horowitz expands into what he considers are areas which earlier conflict theories had neglected to take into account in explaining conflict behaviour, namely those which focus on the procedural effects of modernization, competition over materialist interests and between classes, or ethnic pluralism within societies. As he points out, these theories do not account for, respectively, relative group capacities to utilize opportunities in a

modernizing state, why non-elites choose to follow elites at unfavourable cost, and why institutions and common beliefs may mitigate conflict in the most pluralistic societies.

In this regard, Horowitz stresses the need for a more inclusive theory, one that takes into account symbolic issues, collective (ethnic) group anxiety, and how elites are connected to the concerns of the wider group through psychological factors.

Though Horowitz’s work may adequately explain the trends impacting conflict causes in Mandate Syria, a number of more recent studies exist which may additionally serve as a point of reference for analyzing the period of Ottoman occupation of the Syrian land. Of these, the present paper will draw from the works of political economist Paul Collier, as well as political scientists Jonathan Fox and Marc Howard Ross.

Collier’s piece in particular juxtaposes Horowitz’s, suggesting economic motivation for violence. Specifically, it focuses on the duality of greed and grievance as cause for ethnic rebellion. Where, on the one hand, popular perceptions of ethnic discrimination may seem to warrant a rebellious response to vocalized grievances, another motivating element, that of greed, may justify viewing such action as “large-scale predation of

18

Alex Austin, Martina Fischer, Norbert Ropers, eds, Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook, Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict, pgs. 111-127 (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für

Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), accessed November 3, 2014, doi:10.1007/978-3-663-05642-3.

19

Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, 102.

20

Ibid., 140.

11

productive economic activities”.

The specific forces at play in Collier’s analysis are rebel organizations, determined by existing conditions in a state which make predation more or less cost-beneficial.

Fox explicitly examines the dual manifestation of religion and ethnicity, and how these two merging elements tie into on another in the arena of ethnic conflict. Fox notes that while religion is most often not the leading cause in ethnic violence, it is however prevalent in the majority of cases where such violence occurs,

and that combined, these two factors may provoke the highest levels of violence. Importantly, Fox’s discussion of the role of religious institutions deserves due consideration in the context of this study. Whereas Horowitz discusses post-colonial political institutions within independent states, the timeframe of this thesis permits only a focus on the religious bodies which existed as local and home-grown actors, operating in Syria’s political environment before and up to 1945.

Lastly, and bearing some parallels to Horowitz’s terminology and operational models, Ross utilizes what he refers to as psychocultural interpretations and

psychocultural dramas as conducive elements in identity constructs within ethnic conflict scenarios. He describes these as, respectively, “the shared, deeply rooted worldviews that help groups make sense of daily life,” and “the conflicts between groups over competing, and apparently irresolvable, claims that engage the central elements of each group’s historical experience and identity and invoke suspicions and fears of the opponent.”

Ross’ theory is useful in that it focuses on the role of

symbolism and identity-based rituals in a psychological interpretation of ethnic violence. It also elaborates on the various mechanisms which play out once a conflict arises,

which may shed light on such examples in the historical record.

Ross’ theoretical model, along with those of the previous two authors, shares some important common factors making them useful to an analysis of Ottoman Syria.

They cover four major factors that shaped this period of Syrian history: the recurrent ebb-and-flow of rebellion in this highly decentralized and “fringe” province of the

21

Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,” (paper prepared for the World Bank Development Research Group, Washington, DC, June 15, 2000). 3.

22

Jonathan Fox, “The Ethnic-religious Nexus: The Impact of Religion on Ethnic Conflict,” Civil Wars 3 (2007): 1, accessed November 3, 2015, doi:10.1080/13698240008402444.

23

Marc Howard Ross, “Psychocultural Interpretations and Dramas: Identity Dynamics in Ethnic Conflict,” Political Psychology (2014): 159, accessed November 3, 2014, doi: 10.1111/0162- 895X.00231.

24

Ross, “Psychocultural Interpretations,” 167-168.

12

Ottoman state, the tumultuous effect of economic changes sweeping the Middle East as European economic ascendancy spread to its peripheries, the religious aspect of local identities and its primary importance in group loyalties (as opposed to language or race), and the changing narrative that shaped pan-Syrian identities among sundered groups. Ultimately, they provide comparative depth for the period of Ottoman rule, alongside Horowitz’s overarching models for diagnosis of the French Mandate.

The drawback of these frameworks may primarily stem from their emphasis on the identity factor in ethnic conflict and its functionality in post-colonial spaces.

Another limitation presents itself simply in the complex nature of the topic at hand, and the limited space for theorizing within a single dissertation. Though it is certain identity and its related phenomena, such as religious belonging, kinship-based ritualization of particular symbols or group self-worth offer a powerful tool in harmonizing key elements which drive violence between separate communities, the individual-based approach to such issues leaves open questions relating to wider events. How do the interactions between the masses and social, political, and economic institutions

influence subsequent issues? Given the scholarly focus on conflicts in the post-colonial world, what may be said in terms of a meta-theory addressing core trends within the phenomenon itself? Can these theories even provide adequate answers within broader contexts? The essential strength of individual theories does not lie in their ability to provide end-all answers, but should be sought in their capacity to interact with other approaches within the larger puzzle. This ties into the issue of synthesis between these four theories. Though their approach is in essence quite varied, their application to the current subject within specific contexts and thematic categories may illuminate the issue as a whole.

1.2 Methodology

This thesis aims to approach the body of relevant literature through an

interpretive, qualitative analysis. Through chronological review of the literature, a

thorough picture should present itself out of the events which shaped Syria’s history in

the eighty-odd years discussed throughout this paper. Such a method should provide a

clear analytical synthesis between academic interpretations of events, placing it within

13

the framework of ethnic conflict theory.

Given the nature of our research question, the pertinent answers to be devolved from it will have to be able to make sense of the events present in the literature, and provide holistic explanations to how these events were shaped by the pre-established theoretical processes, why they occurred, how the contemporary context may serve to explain them, and ultimately act as a bridge between the separate historical narratives of Syria’s Ottoman and colonial histories.

Most of the primary sources relevant to this study are contained in former Ottoman and modern Arab state archives or in the memoirs and diplomatic attaches corresponded between 19

- and 20

-century European diplomats and their home governments. Consequently, the research involved in this paper will focus on the existent history-based literature of scholars, who have individually analyzed and presented a summation and evaluation of foreign-language archives. Therefore, this paper’s discussion and inquiry will stem from the current English body of subject literature, which includes Western as well as Middle Eastern authors concerned with the history of the Ottoman Empire and the Levant. More importantly, this study aims to reinterpret the themes within the literature through its specific research parameters outlined in the theoretical framework.

From among the rich body of literature on Ottoman and Middle Eastern history, we have chosen first and foremost to focus on those authors who have gone beyond the political-chronological documentation of past events, and have expanded their discourse into the social stratum of historical evidence. Among these stands out a collection of essays under the self-explanatory name Syria and Bilad Al-Sham under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeq, compiled and edited by Peter Sluglett and Stefan Weber. Other authors, including Benjamin Thomas White, Bruce Alan Masters, and Kais Firro, have been chosen for their contribution to the discussion of identity formation within Arab and former Ottoman territories, as identity holds a critical role in the contributive causes to ethnic conflict, and is a primary factor in the chosen theoretical discussions. A more thorough summation of the available sources will be discussed in the literature review.

As with any research that reaches deeper into the annals of history, the availability of first-hand accounts constitutes a significant element in the limitations of

2525

Such an approach on the topic of Syria was advocated in: Oded Haklai, “A Minority Rule over a

Hostile Majority: The Case of Syria,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 6 (2007): 19, accessed February 2,

2015, doi:10.1080/13537110008428602.

14

this study. Particularly, when taking into account the application of ethnic conflict theory, the traditional and common-place methods for data-collection are no longer available. The discrepancy between an academic conducting research into the underlying causes of the Yugoslav Wars and one piecing together the information on violent events in isolated areas of the Ottoman domain becomes immediately evident.

The Ottoman Empire was undergoing a gradual process of modernization in the 19

century, and its Arab provinces by no means developed parallel to the center. In many ways, Greater Syria for its entire time under Ottoman suzerainty was a periphery region,

and many of the edifices of centralized control only came to exist and develop under the French Mandate. Therefore, research into much of this time-frame does not possess the benefits accorded by mass media or thorough journalistic investigation and reporting. Moreover, much of the theoretical literature on ethnic conflict and civil war came about late in the Cold War, expanding after the 1990s as scholars began to face new questions resulting from the reconfiguration of the global state order, echoed by such works as Samuel P. Huntington’s famous The Clash of Civilizations. As a result, this study will be forced to provide an explanation to events outside the traditional context of contemporary ethnic conflict studies, which have largely focused on developments in decolonizing states of the 1950s and onwards.

Most significantly, the voices of those in lower rungs of society are often muffled or non-existent in the time-frame between the Tanzimat era of the Ottoman state and French occupation of ash-Sham. First-hand accounts have been concentrated to the writings of such people as consular employees of the European empires, European travellers with personal or economic interests in the Ottoman territories, Turkish governors, local Ottoman administrators, and local Arabic-speaking administrative and religious officials. Not until the 20

century does the dearth of lower-level accounts narrow. The development of printed media allowed for sources like local newspapers vocalizing social trends or concerns to arise, and eventually French administrators lay the groundwork for organizational tools such as a national census, making it possible to procure more accurate (albeit far from perfect) statistical data on local populations.

Nonetheless, even up to the 1920s and 30s the voice of the common people, the workers of the cities as well as the peasants of the Syrian hinterlands, remains largely

26

Moshe Mo’az, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861: The Impact of the Tanzimat on

Politics and Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 4-5.

15

undocumented or requiring more research. Primary sources relating to such actors would aid in contextualizing their place within societies which have seen more historiographical attention paid to the political and ideological battles fought within them. Recording their personal responses to these societal factors would greatly benefit any psychologically-oriented study into ethnic violence. All the factors above pose significant issues to be kept in mind within this paper’s particular historical narrative.

In light of this problem, the current study will attempt to parse what is available, fitting it into broader patterns established in other case studies, and employ those same methodological tools in its own analysis.

1.3 Groups in Conflict: Definitions

A discussion focusing on groups in conflict merits a definition of said groups appropriately placed in the context of the present case study. The two notions at question here follow firstly from the presupposition that group A or B embodies a determinately ethnic character, and secondly from the presupposition that the conflict is of a practical ethnic nature. Both these concepts cannot be detached from the specific historical context within which they existed and unfolded. That being said, our aim in this section will be to define ethnicity, given its significance as the qualitative marker characterizing the test subjects of the present study. To establish the aforementioned presuppositions as valid, the qualities of group conflicts in Syria must be delineated as fitting this principle. This requires demarcating them as an issue pertinent to ethnic groups. The constituent parts to such a definition however may vary between examples and are determined by the context of the geographical area in question.

The defining characteristic of heterogonous groups in Syria is primarily

religion. Other possibilities for group cleavage such as race or language simply do not

bear the same weight, and in fact offer Syria a degree of homogeneity. It can be

established that the majority of groups native to Ottoman Syria represent a common

Levantine type stemming from the Semitic population’s genetic ancestry dating back to

classical antiquity, resulting from an admixture of an earlier Aramean population and

16

more recent Arabic settlers.

In terms of language, Arabic and its various local dialects provided a binding element among the region’s peoples, and more recently settled groups, such as Circassians and Armenians, were quick to assimilate into the general population, occasionally adopting Arabic as their primary language of use and only later developing native-language education in their communities.

Similarly, even Syrian Jews used Hebrew primarily as a liturgical language, while speaking local Arabic or some form of Judeo-Arabic in day-to-day situations. One exception may be the Kurds, speaking an Indo-European language related to Farsi, but even this group had undergone substantial assimilation into the Arabic communities surrounding it.

This leaves religious and sectarian affiliation as the primary determining marker for group identification within the context of the Levant, at least among Arab speakers.

The changes these group configurations would eventually undergo in Ottoman Syria’s transitional period into a European mandate territory will be discussed in later sections.

Conversely, one issue that has received much attention in the existing literature has been the development of nationalism in the Arabic world. It is safe to say that local- level linkages, determined by tribal, familial, and communal identification, constituted the norm by which individuals recognised their personal loyalties. Moreover, we may say that, at best, it is not until the early to mid-20

century that any sort of national consciousness in the form of Pan-Syrianism developed among the general population.

Therefore, the application of the term solely as “ethnic conflict” to conflicts between Syrian groups may construe a misleading treatment of the subject.

As Horowitz points out, “comparison is facilitated by an inclusive conception of ethnicity that embraces differences in color, language, religion, or some other attribute of common origin.”

When considering the case of Ottoman and Mandate Syria, we may establish that the notion of ethnicity is formed by arriving at the nexus between religious identification and ethnic conceptualization translating from the perceived commonality between members of thusly demarcated groups. Here, perceived

27

Mirvat El-Sibai et al., “Geographical Structure of the Y-chromosomal Genetic Landscape of the Levant: A coastal-inland contrast,” Annals of Human Genetics 73 (2009): 577-578, accessed July 17, 2015, doi:10.1111/j.1469-1809.2009.00538.x.

28

Avedis K. Sanjian, The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1965), 68.

29

Philip S. Khoury, “Syrian Urban Politics in Transition: The Quarters of Damascus during the French Mandate,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 16 (1984): 526, accessed February 2, 2015, doi:10.1017/S0020743800028543.

30

Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 36-37.

31

Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, 41.

17

commonalities would be grounded in the tribal links mentioned earlier. In this sense, sectarian affiliation takes on the role of an “ethnic” identity. For practical purposes, the term “ethnic conflict” will still be used in this study to encompass cleavages between groups differing in religion and clan, as well as those with more visible ethnic markers, like the Kurds or Circassians. Because the conflict theory is evidenced by group differentiation, the sources for it, mentioned in the quote above, do not alter the underpinnings of the method itself.

In their discussion of ethnic violence, Brubaker and Laitin point out that classifying ethnic violence is by no means obvious, while posing some serious difficulties.

In order to best summate the issue, they outline some main points of significance. Firstly, they note that the coding or labelling of a violent event entails important consequences. Secondly, they stipulate that today’s interpretive frames are blinded by ethnicity, resulting in an ethnically biased coding of events. Thirdly, the resulting definition of ethnic violence determines that “at least one party is not a state (or a representative of a state), and in which the putative ethnic difference is coded - by perpetrators, targets, and influential third parties, or analysts - as having been integral rather than incidental to the violence…”

It is correct to assume that the paradigms which characterize ethnically-charged conflict and violence are many, and cannot be easily defined in a sweeping manner. Genocide, riots, terrorism, slavery, forced assimilation, or resettlement can all constitute some form of ethnic violence, or be inherent in an ethnic conflict. Nonetheless, this basic definition proposed by Brubaker and Laitin offers some analytical margins. It allows us to isolate the constructive analysis of ethnic conflict’s contributive factors, while ensuring the term’s application in the appropriate context. Thusly, tension or violence between Alawi and Sunni, Druze and Maronite, or Greek Orthodox and Jew can be referred to as ethnic so far as it is a result of, to wit, coded through group differentiation hinged on ethno-religious self- identification.

32

Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 427, accessed November 3, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/223488.

33

Brubaker and Laitin, “Ethnic Violence,” 428.

18

1.4 Ethnic Conflict and International Relations

Issues relating to peace and war have spawned a vast array of new fields in the last century as a response to the dilemmas such concerns posed. Traditionally, these schools of thought have been Euro- and military-centric, a result of the preoccupation with the two global wars sparked by European conflicts in the first half of the 20

century, and later from the looming threat of nuclear annihilation throughout the Cold War. Moreover, the traditional theoretical views which characterized the field in its earlier days were concerned with the state as the primary agent within the power configurations they sought to explore and understand. This configuration of the early International Relations (IR) field has manifested itself more broadly into the subsequent strands of theory which have spawned from it. One prominent sub-field of IR has become Security Studies, a branch which traces its origins to the same questions which gave rise to its mother-field. More precisely, this discipline, having taken off in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, was structured within the context of strategic studies, nuclear deterrence, and Great Power politics.

These approaches would come to shape the initial configurations of the field, putting in place its operational and analytical boundaries.

But, not unlike the larger field of International Studies, International Security Studies (ISS) has itself undergone drastic changes over the past few decades, and it is these changes which constitute the relevant considerations which link the study of ethnic conflict to International Relations as a whole. Strategy Studies, as a particular perspective of ISS with a classical and traditionalist standpoint, paved the way for early theorising on the subject. The analytical lens through which this was done assumed broadly that the referent object was the state, the forces shaping it were external, and framed security politics in Realist terms.

This rigid implementation of a theoretical and analytical model had obvious draw backs, and as a result, the branching of this field into traditional approaches and peace research occurred.

As the discipline evolved and expanded in the 1960s and 70s, it garnered scholarly input from Marxist, feminist, and poststructuralist theorists. This academic widening and deepening has only continued exponentially into the post-Cold War

34

See Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2009).

35

Buzan and Hansen, Evolution of Security Studies, 38.

19

period, with new theories like constructivism, post-colonialism, critical security, or those of the Copenhagen school joining the discourse. One major common feature which binds these widening trends is the refocus of analytical concerns away from the state and towards concepts of structural violence, bringing emphasis to human, gendered, and individual security.

For this reason, it is pertinent to examining ethnic conflict. Moreover, this transformation in theoretical tone constitutes a three-way bridge between the theoretical methods becoming embedded in recent security studies, the increasingly holistic approach to conflict studies, and the shift towards bottom-up analysis in research on Middle Eastern history.

The aim of the present thesis is to provide a synthesis of these three analytical and methodological approaches. The consistency of this type of approach in regards to the wider developments within the IR community, namely the broadening and deepening of the field, is already self-apparent. In his textbook on Contemporary Security Studies, Alan Collins provides a thorough overview of the current concerns and referent objects, namely sub-state and intra-national actors, which shape this field.

One of these, relating to the various security studies foci arising from the recent theoretical diffusion, is societal security. The broader concerns of this sub-field provide us with the platform to springboard into the other theoretical models being used here.

Writing on the topic of societal security, Paul Roe ties it into issues of identity, and how the ethnic (or religious) group comes to be shaped as the referent object, constituting a

‘society’, which operates within the international system.

Furthermore, he postulates that there are five dimensions through which a society may be endangered: societal, military, political, economic, and environmental.

How these threats are created is less important than by what means the response to this threat is unpacked, as the defence of a societal identity is the key marker which binds this IR sub-field with the academic preoccupations of theorists such as Horowitz.

Roe outlines these possible means of defence as military (whereby a group may form a militia or own defence force), or non-military (whereby groups seek out cultural autonomy or political nationalism).

Ultimately these factors may escalate and manifest themselves in a societal security dilemma. Explicitly, this may refer to an ethnic conflict, given that the causal source for the dilemma may either be cultural

36

Ibid., 191.

37

Alan Collins, ed., Contemporary Security Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 179.

38

Collins, Security Studies, 183-184.

20

(positive) nationalism, or ethnic (negative) nationalism, which then brings to question issues such as self-expression or marginalization respectively within a given society.

It is in the inter-play of these conducive elements where the IR or ISS student may turn to the analytical tools provided by theorists like Horowitz.

So far, few studies have applied wider IR frameworks to the Ottoman context.

One example of such a study may be Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power, edited by Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski. In his theoretical framework, Karateke observes the role of political legitimacy in the cementing of state authority in the Ottoman Empire. This line of reasoning holds with the IR field’s observance of state and sub-state actors and the interplay between them at the societal level. Conversely, an extensive literature deals with the Ba’athist era of Syria’s history, but moving back in time, it narrows and eventually ends on a number of academic intrusions into the French Mandate of Syria, with focus on the social changes it ushered into Syria’s 20

century history. The reasons for such a limited approach are not entirely unjustified, and it has been stated earlier that many limitations result from the fact that researchers are left with a smaller cache of primary sources from the period in question, curbing the extent of their analysis. Nonetheless, over the last few decades all of the three aforementioned fields have made ardent strides towards broadening and deepening their analytical approaches. This has greatly expanded their existing respective literatures, and is constantly providing new material for the inquisitive researcher. The present thesis will aim to provide some input into this less-trodden approach, and open the door for further IR-oriented studies into the older and neglected recesses of the historical record.

1.5 Literature Review

There has been much scholarly attention paid to the social and political history of the Ottoman Empire, but much less of it has dealt directly with a narrowed focus on its various regions. For one, the European provinces of the Empire have been well- attended to by modern studies, but provinces such as Greater Syria, North Africa, or even Anatolia had not been the targets of such scrupulous academic research until

39

Ibid., 185.

21

recent decades. To summarize the existing scholarly work on Syria’s Ottoman and mandate history, the literature review portion of this paper will follow an outline corresponding to the chronological framework of the paper. The review of the literature will first assess the development of works after 1950 on subjects pertaining to the former Ottoman province of Syria, focusing on its development as a distinct field within broader Ottoman studies, and secondly, it will move on to assess changes and trends over the last few decades in literature relating to the French Mandate of Syria.

Travelling across Egypt and Syria in in early 1860s, S.S. Hill referred to Levantine minorities as “resigned and patient victims of a bad system of government, and laws which have been seldom administered with justice towards Christians and Israelites.”

Scholars have long been countering some of these popular notions about the Ottoman Empire in its last few centuries of existence, harkening back to European perceptions of the Orient developed in the 19

and early 20

centuries. Works by various authors ranging from Roderic Davison to Justin McCarthy have challenged the view that the Sublime Porte was the so called “Sick Man of Europe”.

This popular image, of an empire stagnating and heaving under the brunt weight of its own heterogeneous population, comprising rebellious Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks, disgruntled or secessionist Arabs, and supressed Christian minorities in the Levant, has not stood up to a more detailed assessment of Ottoman history and the complexities which characterized this extremely diverse state. Within this larger trend emerged a specific body of literature which gradually shifted its focus from larger developments within the Ottoman Empire and afforded more attention to one of its most important regions: Greater Syria.

Some of the first authors challenging older historical notions, appearing in the late 1950s and 1960s, provided the groundwork for a specialized field concerned with Ottoman Syrian studies. Published in 1958, Hassan Saab’s The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire paid very close attention to the development of Arab consciousness within the Ottoman state, tracing its heritage back to 7

century Arabic tribal configurations consisting of complex and varied genealogical relationships. As Saab points out, these loose political bonds allowed for a fluid character of loyalty and submission within a centralized state polity, a trend which carried on from the

40

S.S. Hill, Travels in Egypt and Syria (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1866), 416.

41

Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire (London: Arnold, 2001), 3.

22

Umayyad period into the Ottoman era.

In later chapters, Saab accounts for this flexibility as being a good indicator of the solid bond which bound the Arabs to the Ottoman state, enforced by a common Islamic heritage, and cemented by the Turkish Sultan’s ultimate authority.

The result of this, according to the author, was the emergence of Arab federalists in the Ottoman Unionist movement of 1908 who, up to the watershed moment represented by the outbreak of the First World War, were committed to preserving a unified Arab-Turkish state.

Writing five years later, Davison paints a similar narrative to the one adopted by Saab, in his book entitled Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876. Davison’s work, which traces the implementation of the Tanzimat reforms in the first two decades following their proclamation by the Sultan, provides a general overview of the political changes which would come to shape the last years of the Sublime Porte’s ascendancy in the Balkans and the Middle East. Though he does not focus specifically on the Arab regions of the Empire, the conclusions he makes are still valid for our discussion. Here, Davison continues a more balance narrative, highlighting the strong desire from the Ottoman elites to achieve reforms and hold the state together, while not ignoring the major obstacles which they admittedly were not always able to overcome.

Moreover, he points out the class divisions which ultimately governed turbulences of the period, discrediting the traditional claims of religious tension as the all-to-do factor in the Ottoman narrative.

As mentioned earlier, conflicts in Syria most often did splinter along religious and sectarian lines, but this does not preclude that the underlying sources where of the same quality.

The 1960s saw a number of authors expand on Ottoman Syrian studies and continue to develop the overarching trends which defined them in this period. The work of Avedis Sanjian on the Armenian community in Syria looked at a specific group within the spectrum of Ottoman communities, and it highlighted the significant impact the Tanzimat reforms brought to this particular community, allowing for a substantial integration of local Armenians into many administrative rolls across the Syrian provinces.

Additionally, Moshe Mo’az’s Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine,

42

Hassan Saab, The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1958), 10.

43

Ibid., 79.

44

Ibid., 182.

45

Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 65-68.

46

Ibid., 115

47

Sanjian, Armenian Communities, 66-68.

23

1840-1861 appeared as the first concrete exposé on Tanzimat reform and its direct application and consequences in the Greater Syrian region. Mo’az delineates the most important tendencies characterizing this period: the fluid decentralized form of rule continued to be practiced by the Porte, the unsolved issues of demotic corruption which affected Ottoman subjects across all lines, and economic changes.

Mo’az’s narrative holds value within an ethnic conflict paradigm, as he focuses on some universal structural problems and their role in exacerbating existing tensions and prejudices.

Writing nearly a decade later in 1977, William Haddad and William Ochsenwald deepened the discussion of Ottoman history to examine issues of ethnicity and state co-authoring and editing a book entitled Nationalism in a Non-national State:

The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Focusing mainly on Arab nationalism, the authors of this collection did well to examine in greater detail the processes at play among the primarily Syrian intellectual elite in shaping Arabic consciousness among the upper strata of Ottoman Arab populations. Two of these authors, namely Caesar Farah and Rashid Khalidi, concentrated their research specifically to the lands later to become the Syrian Republic. They broadened the literature concerned with budding Arab nationalism, but most significantly, they paid greater attention to a nationalist phenomenon which uniquely sought to bridge sectarian gaps by using common linguistic heritage as a rallying point for national identity, a neglected aspect in previous literature.

In many ways, the works by the authors of the first three decades after 1950 display the changing attitude within the scholarly debate, one which began to look beyond the disastrous end the Ottoman Empire came to during the Great War, and rather sought to appreciate the unique context through which the government in Istanbul ruled over its diverse territories. However, the general trend of this period was a markedly upper-level focus on the issues at hand. Consistently, the narrative resulting from the assessment of events and historical developments exemplified the preoccupation with the larger forces pertinent to this period; imperial decrees, the emergence of new administrative practices, European meddling in Ottoman affairs, and commercial change all typified a narrative which largely focused on the upper classes in Ottoman Syrian society. From this, we may deduce the motives and interests behind

48

Mo’az, Ottoman Reform, 156-187.

49

William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald, eds., Nationalism in a Non-national State: The

Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 210.

24

the actions of sultans, consular agents, Arabic notables, or Islamic clerics, but the focus is inevitably drawn away from the socio-economic realities of the general population of illiterate peasants and urban workers. The beginning of the 1990s brings about a plethora of material on Syria’s Ottoman past, as older and newer authors begin filling the gaps in our understanding of the singular iotas making up the social forces which characterized Greater Syria in the 19

and early 20

centuries.

At the forefront of this trend is Thomas Philipp’s The Syrian Land in the 18

and 19

Century: The Common and the Specific in the Historical Experience, published in 1992. This collection of works by a number of authors, including other active Ottoman Syrian scholars such as Mo’az, Masters, and Rafeq, includes essays on what is termed the Syrian Land, encompassing Lebanon and Palestine in addition to the modern day Syrian Republic. The essays present in this volume capture a much broader thematic overview of Syria, focusing on elites and politics in one section, but also commercial and economic developments of the region in another. Furthermore, another group of authors tasked itself with analyzing the changing identities which came to shape the nature of Syria’s people, playing into the urban and social dynamics within which they lived their daily lives. Lastly, six essays were composed with rural issues in mind, examining themes in agrarian life ranging from matters of land ownership to demographic changes within the rural landscape.

For the first time, a collection of works aimed to provide a holistic account of Syrian history, moving beyond the established norms rooted in the study of Arab nationalism, Ottoman administrative politics, and European power plays within the Ottoman jurisdiction.

The collection compiled by Philipp would prove to be just one work within a growing new trend in Syrian studies, one that would continue dominating from the 1990s on to present day. That same year, a dissertation by James M. Quilty would trace the development of Syria’s urban classes over the course of the 18

and 19

centuries, as new factions and families grew in prominence out of the changing economic situation in the Levant at the dawn of the European industrial era. Quilty focused his attention to the lesser notables, but his research drew in other significant observations on local guilds, social changes in the country as well the cities, and the interplay of these elements within wider society.

50

Thomas Philipp, The Syrian Land in the 18

and 19

Century: The Common and the Specific in the

Historical Experience (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1992), 217-340.