Home-grown Terrorism: Structural Causes of Differences in
Radicalization Processes in The Netherlands and Belgium
Master Thesis
MSc Crisis and Security Management
Student name: Daphne Koster Student number: S1676318 Supervisor: Bart Schuurman Word count: 17 590 words Date of submission: 07-06-2019
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Content
1. Introduction 4
1.1 Belgium as a breeding ground for radicalization 4
1.2 Defining radicalization 5 1.3 Research design 7 1.3.1 Research methods 8 1.3.2 Limitations 9 2. Literature review 10 2.1 Causes of terrorism 10
2.2 Structural-level causes of terrorism 11
2.2.1 Structural-level causes of terrorism in Europe 12
2.3 Analysis 13
2.3.1 Poverty and social inequality 14
2.3.2 Presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks 15
2.3.3 Ineffective counter-terrorism measures 16
3. Structural causes of radicalization in Belgium and the Netherlands 18
3.1 Poverty and social inequality 18
3.1.1 Poverty and social inequality in Belgium 19
3.1.2 Poverty and social inequality in the Netherlands 21
3.1.3 Differences and similarities 22
3.1.4 The influence of poverty and social inequality on terrorism 23
3.2 Presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks 24
3.2.1 Presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks in Belgium 25
3.2.2 Presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks in the Netherlands 26
3.2.3 Differences and similarities 28
3.2.4 The influence of the presence of radical mosques and jihadist
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3.3 Non-existing or ineffective counter-terrorism measures 30 3.3.1 Ineffective counter-terrorism measures 30
3.3.2 Counter-terrorism measures in Belgium 32 3.3.3 Counter-terrorism measures in the Netherlands 34
3.3.4 Analysis 36
3.3.5 Influence of counter-terrorism measures on foreign fighter numbers 38
4. Case study: Molenbeek and the Schilderswijk 41
4.1 Poverty and social inequality in Molenbeek and the Schilderswijk 41 4.2 Presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks in Molenbeek and the
Schilderswijk 42
4.3 Ineffective counter-terrorism measures in Molenbeek and the Schilderswijk 44
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1. Introduction
Since the start of the Syrian Civil war in 2011, increasing amounts of people have travelled to the Middle East in order to join the conflict (Boutin, et al. 2016, 9). These so-called foreign fighters are often driven by radical beliefs about Islam and the idea of the holy Jihad.
Although on the first hand this might not look like a threat for Europe itself, several scholars argue it is. Many of these foreign fighters are namely believed to be from Europe. Although exact numbers on the number of foreign fighters from Europe are unknown, estimations have been made. For instance, according to Boutin and colleagues, 3922 to 4294 of the foreign fighters are from different European countries (Boutin, et al. 2016, 3; Scherrer, et al. 2018, 5). According to Europol, in 2017 already more than 5000 individuals from Europe have
travelled to either Syria or Iraq (Europol 2017, 12). These European foreign fighters could pose a threat to Europe when they possibly return. During their stay abroad they acquire knowledge on and experience in combat. This raises fear that these returnees bring the terrorist threat from the Middle East to Europe (Scherrer, et al. 2018, 5). A well-known example of a terrorist attack carried out by a returnee are the attacks on Brussels on the 22nd of March 2016 (Boutin, et al. 2016, 9).
1.1 Belgium as a breeding ground for radicalization
Out of the approximately 3922-4294 (Boutin, et al. 2016, 3) to 5000 (Europol 2017, 12) foreign fighters from Europe, around 420 to 516 are believed to be from Belgium (Boutin, et al. 2016, 25). Although it remains an estimation, this is believed to be around 10 to 12 percent of all the foreign fighters from the European Union. Belgium therefore belongs to one of the countries with the highest number of foreign fighters (Scherrer, et al. 2018, 5). When
connecting this to the relatively small population of Belgium, the country has the highest per capita foreign fighter number in the EU, roughly 45,5 foreign fighters per million inhabitants (Boutin, et al. 2016, 25; Teich 2016, 37). Compared to the EU average is 8,1 foreign fighters per million inhabitants (Boutin, et al. 2016, 4), the Belgian numbers are extremely high. What can account for this high number of foreign fighters from Belgium in both absolute and relative terms?
Rather than focussing on the foreign fighter phenomenon itself, this research will focus on the preceding processes of foreign fighters and terrorism, namely the structural-level causes and drivers of radicalization and terrorism. It aims to understand and identify the reasons behind these significant differences in foreign fighter numbers within European countries. It will do so by comparing Belgium with The Netherlands. By comparing these two
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similar countries, this comparison will hopefully yield insights into why one of them experienced much higher numbers of foreign fighters per number of inhabitants.
The following research question will therefore guide this study: What structural-level
causes of radicalization in Belgium and the Netherlands account for the much higher per capita number of foreign fighters from Belgium? By addressing this research question, the
study will specifically focus on structural-level causes of radicalization and terrorism. It will do so for the sake of the cross-national comparison, for which nation-wide structural
economic and social factors seem most relevant. Once having identified the relevant factors which help us understand the differences between the two countries regarding foreign fighters and radicalization, they will be applied to two key neighbourhoods which are believed to be at the core of the radicalization problem in both countries. The neighbourhoods which will be compared are the Schilderswijk in The Hague, Netherlands (de Wijk 2007, 56), with the neighbourhood of Molenbeek in Brussels, Belgium (Kroet 2017).
Several scholars have already focused on the high number of foreign fighters from Belgium before. Teich, for example, has conducted demographic research in order to find a cause for the idea that Belgium has become a breeding ground of radicalization (Teich 2016, 37). Devrou and Ponsaers, furthermore, have looked into what is done in order to prevent radicalization in Belgium (Ponsaers and Devrou 2016, 1). None of these scholars, however, have made a comparison with another country in order to identify factors which are unique to Belgium, for the purpose of finding the causes of this difference in foreign fighter numbers. This research will therefore contribute to the academic debate on the high numbers of foreign fighters from Belgium, but also to the debate on the causes of radicalization and foreign fighters in general, by comparing Belgium with the Netherlands.
This thesis will not try to solve the problem of terrorism, nor will it propose an
explanation for the existence of terrorism. Rather, it will focus on identifying possible causes of the difference in number of foreign fighters from Belgium and the Netherlands. In the next section the concept of radicalization will be defined where after academic literature on the causes of radicalization and terrorism will be reviewed.
1.2. Defining Radicalization
In order to fully understand the topic of radicalization and its causes, it is of importance to elucidate frequently used concepts. This section will try to summarize and discuss the most important works and viewpoints existing in the academic debate on the concept of
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radicalization and radicalization processes so far. It will start off with discussing several attempts on defining radicalization, where after a working definition of the concept will be established.
As a consequence of the fact that there is no one generally accepted definition of terrorism, the same goes for the concept of radicalization (Teich 2016, 30). Several attempts, however, have been made. According to Alex Schmid, the term radicalization has become politicized in the past few years. He argues that the term is often used within ‘the political
game of labelling’ (Schmid 2013, 17). Furthermore, he argues that many of the definitions
given by academics are not accurate (Ibid., 17). Most of the posed definitions make the link between radicalization and violence.
Sedgwick, for example, simply describes radicalization as ‘’What goes on before the
bomb goes off’’ (Sedgwick 2010, 479). By doing so, Sedgwick implies that radicalization and
violence are two intertwined concepts, one always being the cause of the other. However, it is important to note that this is not the case. Radicalization does not always directly lead to violence. According to Schuurman and Taylor the majority of radicals never become involved in either violence or terrorism (Schuurman and Taylor 2018, 3). Dalgaard-Nielsen does distinguish between violent and non-violent radicalization. She defines a radical as a person who demands, in his or her eyes fundamental, social-political change. Radicalization
therefore, is defined as the willingness to pursue changes in the society, which are not in line with the existing order (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, 798). Although radicalization could conflict with the law, it does not always turn out to be violent (Noppe, Verhage and Easton 2012, 97). Even though radicalization and terrorism are not equal, they are connected. Although radicalization does not always lead to terrorism, terrorism is always preceded by
radicalization (Mandel 2008, 101). However, it is not necessary for radicalization to lead to terrorism in order to become a threat to society. Radicalization can also cause social
polarization, which can cause tensions among groups or individuals in society (Noppe, Verhage and Easton 2012, 98).
According to Sedgwick, the Oxford English Dictionary defines the word ‘radical’ as ‘’representing or supporting a section of an extreme party’’ through which is automatically implied that radicalization is a synonym of extremism (Sedgwick 2010, 481). However, the Oxford Dictionary itself does differentiate between the concepts of radicalization and extremism. Radicalization is defined as ‘The action or process of causing someone to adopt
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radical positions on political or social issues’. Extremism is defined as ‘The holding of extreme political or religious views’. While extremism is rather seen as a point of view,
radicalization is defined as being a process. Therefore, although extremism and radicalization are connected, they cannot be considered synonyms. Noppe, Verhage and Easton, however, consider extremism as being a part of the radicalization process. Preceded by the radicalism phase and prior to the violent terrorism phase, they positioned extremism (Noppe, Verhage and Easton 2012, 99-100). They argue the extremism phase contains people who justify and support violent actions, but have not carried violent actions out themselves (Noppe, Verhage and Easton 2012, 101).
In short, it is important to realize that radicalism is not by definition violent.
Extremism and terrorism, however, are. This study will make use of the dynamic model of radicalization as proposed by Noppe, Verhage and Easton which was developed in the framework of the study on prevention of radicalization in Belgium (Noppe, Verhage and Easton 2012, 99). As mentioned above, they distinguish three phases in the process of
radicalization. Within this model, the radicalization phase is followed by phases of extremism and terrorism which eventually leads to violence (Noppe, Verhage and Easton 2012, 99). Furthermore, this study will adhere to the definition of radicalization by the Dutch
intelligence services, the AIVD, who define radicalization as “the pursuit of and/or support to
far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim) which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect)” (Schmid 2013, 12)
1.3 Research Design
This research has chosen to make use of a comparative case study design, because case studies are necessary in order to find an answer to the research question. Baxter and Jack discuss several examples of researches in which case studies could be very interesting for the outcome of the study. Firstly, this is the case when trying to answer why questions. Although the current research question it is not a why question, it can easily be transformed into a why question which will get the same results: Why do more people radicalize in Belgium than in the Netherlands? Secondly, should case studies be done when it is impossible to manipulate the behaviour of the people studied. Thirdly, case studies are necessary when the context in which the phenomenon emerges are important for the outcome. Finally, when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clear (Baxter and Jack 2008, 545). All four examples fit this research. As the contextual conditions are of major importance in the
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radicalization process, and the behaviour of the radicalized people cannot be manipulated or influenced.
The case studies selected, Belgium and the quarter Molenbeek in Brussels, and the Netherlands and the quarter Schilderswijk in the Hague, are chosen because of the fact that they are very similar in most aspects, but also have a major difference. The percentage of people radicalizing. As explained in the introduction Belgium was chosen because of the extraordinary numbers of radicalized people compared to the size of their population. The Netherlands has been chosen firstly because of its similarities with Belgium, and secondly because it is the country from which this study is done. The latter will therefore increase the accessibility on data. Once the relevant factors for understanding the differences on country-level are clear, they will be applied to the two neighbourhoods. The two neighbourhoods, the Schilderswijk and Molenbeek, were chosen because they are believed to be at the core of the radicalization problem in both countries (de Wijk 2007, 56; Kroet 2017).
1.3.1 Research methods
In order to be able to give an answer to the research question ‘What structural-level causes
and drivers of radicalization in Belgium and the Netherlands account for the much higher per capita number of foreign fighters from Belgium?’, data has been gathered through the
following methods.
Firstly, extensive research of existing literature on radicalization processes and the causes of radicalization and terrorism has been done. Through this existing academic literature, a list of common structural causes of radicalization and terrorism has been established. Thereafter, this thesis has selected three structural-level causes which are
believed to be most relevant in the comparative case study design. Do these perceived causes of radicalization and terrorism apply in the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands? Through these structural factors and the possible presence of them in Belgium and the Netherlands, the researched tries to identify one or more factors which might have contributed to the difference in percentages of people radicalizing between Belgium and the Netherlands.
Secondly, this research has looked into data and demographics of both Belgium and the Netherlands, and the Schilderswijk and Molenbeek. By doing so it aimed to not only identify differences between the two countries and neighbourhoods, but also the similarities. The more similar the two countries, or the two neighbourhoods, are, the more interesting it is to find out the cause behind the different outcomes when talking about radicalization
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processes. When connecting this method to the structural factors which will be discussed in this research, it will mainly look into the demographics of the population. What is the current economic and financial situation of the average inhabitant of the countries in general, of the Islamic minority, but also of the population of the neighbourhoods? Are there big inequalities within these countries and neighbourhoods? Within this method, this study will mainly look into data on poverty and financial inequality.
Thirdly, and finally, the research has also extensively examined and analysed policy reports from both the Dutch and the Belgian government. Focussing on counter-terrorism measures, tactics and policies, the research has analysed the measures used by both Belgium and the Netherlands in order to identify differences within these measures. Examples of such reports are the Dutch counter-terrorism strategy report (2016) and the Belgian action plan for radicalization (2016). But also, a more local level counter-terrorism strategy report by the municipality of Brussels (2017), and progress reports by the mayor of The Hague on the progress of the action plan on radicalization of the city (2019).
1.3.2 Limitations
While doing this research I might run into several limitations. First of all, by comparing radicalization processes in Molenbeek in Brussels and in the Schilderswijk in The Hague in order to understand the reasons for the high radicalization numbers in Belgium compared to the Netherlands, I am fully aware of the fact that the quarters mentioned above might not represent the rest of the country. Therefore, it can be seen as a danger towards the plausibility of this research to overgeneralize the outcome. However, due to both time and word
restrictions, a full research on both of the countries in its entirety is not doable.
Secondly, access to data has been another limitation of this thesis. As radicalization and terrorism are topics highly connected to the secrecy of secret services, the data needed might not always be publicly available. For example, the data used on the number of foreign fighters from Europe, and EU countries in particular, are estimations. Therefore, this data should be treated with caution. Furthermore, the latest available data on the number of foreign fighters comes from 2016. Current numbers might deviate. Therefore, this data is a topic of debate.
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2. Literature Review
After having elucidated frequently used concepts and established a working definition of radicalization, we have yet to look into the causes of these radicalization processes and terrorism. There are many different factors which could be of explanatory value. This chapter aims to review the different factors and causes discussed within the academic debate on the causes of terrorism. These different explanations can be distinguished on its level of analysis. Most of the authors who will be discussed in this section discuss causes of terrorism and radicalization on the individual or group level. Examples of such individual explanations are psychological factors. This thesis, however, will focus on the causes of radicalization and terrorism on a more national, structural, level, in order to unravel differences between Belgium and the Netherlands.
2.1 The causes of terrorism
Martha Crenshaw is one of the scholars who has paid attention to explanatory factors of terrorism, focussing on the causes of terrorism. She argues, when looking into the causes of terrorism, it is of importance to divide preconditions from precipitants. Preconditions are the processes which could lead to terrorism in the long run. Precipitants are sudden events which could immediately trigger terrorism (Crenshaw 1981, 381). This thesis will solely focus on the preconditions of radicalization and terrorism, as these are the conditions which could possibly be prevented by means of structural-level changes.
Furthermore, Crenshaw argues that terrorism is not so much caused by mass
dissatisfaction in the society, but rather dissatisfaction of a section of the society who see it as their duty to champion the minority from grievances as discrimination and to express
discontent on behalf of this minority (Crenshaw 1981, 396). McCauley and Moskalenko also name grievances as one of twelve posed mechanisms which cause radicalization (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, 418). This personal grievance would usually not lead to radicalization of a whole group but rather remains on the personal level. Unless this personal grievance ‘’is
interpreted as representative of group grievance’’ (419). Furthermore, McCaulay and
Moskalenko mention how the state can contribute to radicalization (McCauley and
Moskalenko 2008, 416). An interesting note that Crenshaw makes in her article on the causes of terrorism, agreeing with McCaulay and Moskalenko, is that the ‘’unwillingness to prevent
terrorism’’ by governments can also be seen as a major cause of terrorism (Crenshaw 1981,
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opportunity for political participation (Crenshaw 1981, 383) and, more individual, psychological factors (389).
2.2 Structural-level causes of terrorism
Rather than focussing on these individual factors, this thesis will focus on the structural-level causes of terrorism. Structural causes have been defined as ‘’causes which affect people’s
lives in ways that they may or may not comprehend, at a rather abstract macro level’’ (Bjørgo
2005, 3). These structural causes include, among other things, class structure, demographic imbalances and globalization (Ibid., 3). It chose do so because individual causes of terrorism and radicalization have little to say about the country level differences between Belgium and the Netherlands. A structural-level analysis could possibly reveal factors which are unique to Belgium, and therefore, could contribute to the difference in foreign fighter numbers in Belgium and the Netherlands.
Edward Newman is one of the scholars who has looked into the structural causes of terrorism. He proposes several structural factors which could possibly be considered as a cause of terrorism. Firstly, he distinguishes permissive structural factors, as poverty, demographic factors and urbanization, from direct underlying causes (Newman 2006, 751-752). The latter section containing social inequality and exclusion, human rights abuse and a clash of values (Ibid., 752-753). These conditions, when combined with precipitants, could trigger the emergence of terrorist organizations and violence (Newman 2006, 750). Newman furthermore argues that these precipitant factors, as state sponsorship and funding, can be considered root causes of terrorism as well (Ibid., 751). His understanding of precipitants therefore differs from the understanding by Crenshaw who argued precipitants are ‘sudden
events’ which trigger terrorism (Crenshaw 1981, 381).
The problem with some of the structural causes of terrorism as proposed by the author mentioned in the paragraph above, however, is that they seem to focus on radicalization and terrorism in less developed countries. For example, human rights abuse, urbanization and state sponsorship. In less developed countries human rights abuse by the government and state sponsorship for terrorism could indeed be contributing to terrorism. Within the scope of this research, focussing on Belgium and the Netherlands, structural factors like state sponsorship and human rights abuse seem less relevant and of no explanatory value for the high
percentage of radicalized people in Belgium. Structural factors like poverty and social inequality however, can be applied to the case of Belgium and the Netherlands.
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2.2.1 Structural-level causes of terrorism in Europe
A scholar who has solely focused on Europe while doing research on the recruitment of Islamic terrorists, is Taarnby. According to him, one of the major ways through which Islamic terrorists are recruited is through radical mosques (Taarnby 2005, 7-8). Furthermore, he also mentions the existence of terrorist networks within countries which could contribute to the recruitment of new terrorists (Taarnby 2005, 16-18). Therefore, it can be believed that the presence of radical mosques and terrorist networks in a country can cause radicalization and terrorist violence.
Schuurman, Bakker and Eijkman have focussed on structural causes of terrorism in Europe as well. In their article on the structural influences on involvement in European home-grown jihadism, they do not only distinguish precipitants from preconditions, but they also divide the preconditions in enablers and motives. By doing so they argue that only having an opportunity to turn to terrorism is not enough to actually do so, unless it is matched with a motive (Schuurman, Bakker and Eijkman 2018, 98). Furthermore, in their article, they have identified ten structural explanations of terrorism which they believe are applicable to Europe. These structural explanations are the internet, popular support for terrorism, external
assistance, social/cultural facilitation of violence, political opportunity structure, ineffective counter-terrorism policies, deprivation, intergroup inequality, political grievances and clash of value systems (Schuurman, Bakker and Eijkman 2018, 99).
Hafez and Mullins also name access to the internet and social media as possible causes of radicalization (Hafez and Mullins 2015, 968). They argue that websites like Twitter and Facebook are interactive and personalized. This causes a sense of communal belonging to people otherwise alienated (Ibid., 969). Factors like access to the internet and social media however, will not be the cause of the high number of foreign fighters leaving from Belgium compared to the rest of Europe, as the differences in internet access in the Netherlands and Belgium will be relatively small. In addition, in their article, Hafez and Mullins stress the importance of an individuals personal network in the process of radicalization (Hafez and Mullins 2015, 964). They argue individuals often join specific groups or movements because they have family or friends who are also part of this movement (Ibid., 964).
Both Newman and Ross, furthermore, argue that several structural factors together could be considered the cause of terrorism. Ross hypothesizes ‘’the higher the number and
intensity of structural causes of terrorism, the higher the number of acts perpetrated by any particular terrorist or terrorist organization’’ (Ross 1993, 318). Structural factors alone
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cannot be of any explanatory value, but when combined with other structural factors they can be (Newman 2006, 751). This is in line with the idea that opportunities for terrorism will only be taken if combined with a motive, as proposed by Schuurman, Bakker and Eijkman (2018, 98). Therefore, these ideas and hypotheses explain that there is no one ultimate cause of terrorism, but rather an accumulation of smaller causes, whether called opportunity, motive or enabler, which ultimately leads to terrorist violence.
2.3 Analysis
In short, many possible causes of radicalization and terrorism have been proposed and discussed within academic literature. As this study will be a cross-country analysis, the focus will be on structural causes rather than on individual- or group causes of terrorism. However, not all of the structural-level causes discussed can be applied to the case of Belgium and the Netherlands in Europe. Factors which do not seem likely in Belgium and the Netherlands are for example human rights abuse and state sponsorship. But also when only focussing on factors which apply to Belgium and the Netherlands, it is impossible to be able to focus on all structural-level factors which could contribute to the existence of terrorism, because of the small scope of this research. Therefore, this study will focus on three of the structural-level factors in order to study the differences in number of people radicalizing between Belgium and the Netherlands.
The three structural factors on which this study will focus are poverty and social inequality, the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks, and ineffective counter-terrorism measures. The study has decided to focus on these factors because of several reasons.First of all, these structural factors could be of explanatory value for the presence or absence of radicalization and terrorism in the cases of the Netherlands and Belgium
specifically. As explained above, structural causes like state sponsorship are not likely to have caused the high percentage of foreign fighters in Belgium, nor will it be the cause of
radicalization or terrorism in other European countries. Many of the structural-level causes of terrorism proposed in academic literature simply cannot be applied to the democratic
European countries.
Secondly, the three factors selected are found to be present in most of the academic works on the topic of structural causes of terrorism. Both Malečková and Newman for example, have considered poverty and social inequality as a root cause of radicalization and terrorism. Both Taarnby (2005) and Hafez and Mullins (2015) have mentioned the importance of radical mosques and networks in the direct surroundings of individuals in the process of
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radicalization. Finally, both Schuurman, Bakker and Eijkman (2018) and Ross (1993) have mentioned the failure or ineffectiveness of counter-terrorism measures as a cause of terrorism. This fact makes it more likely that either or all of these three factors have an influence in the percentage of people radicalizing within a country.
Third, the three factors on which this study will focus could be of interest in the comparative case study of Belgium and the Netherlands. Rather than for example the internet as a structural factor which could give an opportunity for terrorism as proposed by
Schuurman, Bakker and Eijkman (2018, 99), the three factors on which this study will focus can differ among countries and even among neighbourhoods. The percentage of people with access to the internet will not differ drastically among the Netherlands and Belgium, and will therefore not be of explanatory value for the difference in number of foreign fighters in Belgium and the Netherlands. The poverty and social inequality, presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks, and a country’s counter-terrorism measures, could differ among the Netherlands and Belgium.
Fourthly, and finally, the three factors on which this study will focus are measurable. Other structural-level factors which have been discussed in the section above, like for
example popular support for terrorism, deprivation, and grievances, are much more difficult to measure on the national level. The three factors of poverty and social inequality, the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks, and ineffective counter-terrorism measures,
however, are all measurable. These factors will further be operationalized in chapter 3. Hence, the focus of this study will solely be on the three structural factors of poverty and social inequality, the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks, and ineffective counter-terrorism measures. The next section of this chapter will in turn review academic literature on the influence of the three possible structural causes on radicalization and terrorism, in order to strengthen the justification for this selection. In what way could these structural-level factors contribute to the emergence of radicalization and terrorism?
2.3.1 Poverty and Social Inequality
The first structural-level factor of which is believed that it could cause radicalization and terrorism, is poverty and social inequality. Do poverty and social inequality indeed provide a motive for terrorism, or is it rather about one’s perceived social position within a society?
Poverty is often considered a root cause of terrorism. This argument is not only made within academic literature, but also tends to be popular opinion within politics, the media and
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the general public (Malecková 2005, 34). Although it is argued that absolute poverty cannot be seen as a characteristic of modern-day Western European societies anymore (Schuurman, Bakker and Eijkman 2018, 99), relative poverty could still contribute to terrorism and the emergence of terrorist organizations. Conditions of poverty and social exclusion are believed to provide grievances which could, when combined with precipitant factors, result in
involvement with terrorist organizations (Newman 2006, 750). Furthermore, it has been said that if poverty and social inequality affect distinct religious or ethnic groups, it is a breeding ground of conflict (752).
In contrast, however, the impoverished terrorist has also been regarded as a stereotype. Malečková, for example, has argued that there is no correlation between poverty on the national level and the number of terrorist attacks carried out in this country (Malecková 2005, 41). These results, however, do not say anything about economic differences within countries, but rather about poverty in a country in general. While terrorism could be non-existent in an extremely poor country, the phenomenon could be present in a rich country which is dealing with high economic inequality among the population. This thesis will therefore further examine the correlation between poverty and social inequality, and terrorism.
The first structural-level cause of terrorism which will, therefore, be discussed in the next chapter is poverty and social inequality within the country in the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands. As this study specifically focusses on jihadist foreign fighters who have left in order to fight in Syria, it will try to take a deeper look into the economic situation of the Muslim minority specifically where possible.
2.3.2 The presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks
Secondly, the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks in a particular country is also believed to have an influence on the amount of people radicalizing in this country. To what extent can the influence of the presence of radical mosques on the amount of radicalization be proven? Or can this argument be considered obsolete?
One of the most robust arguments made on the causes of radicalization, is that people who radicalize or join violent groups often do so because other people in their personal network have joined this violent group as well (Hafez and Mullins 2015, 964). This personal network can exist out of family or friends, but an imam can be considered to be part of
someone’s personal network too. Therefore, when solely looking at the recruitment process of foreign fighters, radical mosques and jihadist networks are believed to be one of the main
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channels through which foreign fighters have been recruited (Taarnby 2005, 7). However, it is argued that this changed after 9/11. While before 9/11, militant Islamists were not considered very important or dangerous because there were no clues that they could perpetrate a terrorist attack in Europe, after 9/11 European authorities realized there was a terrorist threat in Europe as well. Consequently, since 9/11 recruitment through mosques has become much more difficult (Taarnby 2005, 17).
Therefore, the second possible structural-level cause of the difference in amount of people radicalizing in Belgium compared to the rest of Europe, is the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks.
2.3.3 Counter-terrorism measures
Another structural factor of which is argued that it could possibly influence the state of radicalization and terrorism in a country, as also mentioned by Schuurman, Bakker and Eijkman (2018, 103-104), are its counter-terrorism measures and policies. In recent years, European countries have introduced a large number of counter-terrorism measures and policies as a response to the increased terrorist threat (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011, 155). The effectivity of these measures is, however, highly debated. Do counter-terrorism measures actually decrease the likelihood of terrorism? Or do they bring along unintended side effects?
Counter-terrorism strategies include a large amount of different tactics and tools, among which airport screening, educational programs and investigation strategies (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley 2006, 490). The Netherlands, for example, has a five-year action plan with as a goal ‘’to provide a strategic framework for combating the terrorist and extremist
threat against the Netherlands’’ (NCTV 2016, 5). The fact that governments introduce
counter-terrorism strategies, already shows their believe in the effectivity of the measures. In contrast, Choudhury and Fenwick argue counter-terrorism measures might
counteract the actual goals of the measures. They believe counter-terrorism measures cause a sense of alienation among the Muslim community, caused by the discrimination and social marginalisation of Muslims which emerges through particular counter-terrorism measures (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011, 173). These consequences are thereafter often used by terrorist organizations as Al-Qaeda as a narrative in order to recruit people (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011, 151-152). Therefore, while counter-terrorism measures are meant in order to counteract terrorism, it is also argued that these measures contribute to the emergence of radicalization and terrorism. In addition, Lum et al. also conclude that in some cases,
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terrorism measures led to increases of terrorism (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley 2006, 508). Furthermore, they argue that it is highly uncertain whether counter-terrorism measures in general, can be considered effective (508).
Therefore, also counter-terrorism measures as introduced and implemented by a country in order to prevent terrorist violence, can contribute to the exact opposite, the emergence of terrorism. A third possible structural cause which will be examined in this research, therefore, is ineffective counter-terrorism measures.
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3. Structural causes of radicalization in Belgium and the Netherlands
Starting with focussing on poverty and social inequality, where after the presence of radical mosques and terrorist networks will be further analysed, and finishing off with focussing on ineffective counter-terrorism measures, this chapter will apply the three selected structural-level causes of terrorism to the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands. After having identified all differences and similarities, it hopes to unravel factors which are unique to the case Belgium. These possible unique characteristics of Belgium could, therefore, be the cause of the high number of foreign fighters leaving from the country.3.1 Poverty and Social Inequality
The first possible structural-level cause of the difference in foreign fighter numbers between the Netherlands and Belgium which will be discussed within this study, is poverty and social inequality. Rather than discussing these factors separately, they have been combined into one possible structural-level cause. This is done because both factors are related to the economic situation and social position of a specific group of people. This combination will therefore prevent the analysation from recurrence. This section will firstly operationalize how poverty and social inequality will be measured and analysed, where after it will look into poverty and social inequality in both Belgium and the Netherlands.
In order to be able to study the degree of poverty and social inequality within both Belgium and the Netherlands, this study will firstly look into data on the amount of people living under the poverty threshold in both countries. This is done in order to examine what is considered to be poverty in both countries, and what percentage of the population of both countries is living in poverty. Thereafter, it will look into look into quantitative data on income and capital (in)equality by identifying the percentage of the total capital which is owned, and income which is earned, by the richest 10% of the population of both countries. This economic inequality highly contributes to social inequality. The income inequality will furthermore be measured through the Gini-coefficient1. By doing so, it will try to identify factors which are unique to Belgium and could thereafter possibly be seen as a structural-level cause to the high number of foreign fighters from the country.
1 The Gini-coefficient is a number between 0 and 1. If the Gini-coefficient is 1, then one person/household owns all income. If the Gini-coefficient is 0, than all income is equally distributed. The closer the number is to zero, the more equally distributed the income in the country is.
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3.1.1 Poverty and social inequality in Belgium
In Belgium poverty is defined as a situation in which people are being confronted with at least one of three indicators of poverty. These indicators are also referred to as poverty risks. The first possible poverty risk is severe material deprivation. Within this poverty risk households are not able to pay for certain items which are believed to be necessary in order to have a sufficient life (STATBEL 2018). An example of such an item is a place of residence. The second possible risk is a low work intensity which applies if members of a household work for less than 20% of their total potential. These people are not considered unemployed, but are still at risk for poverty. Finally, there is the risk on monetary poverty which refers to the percentage of people who live under the poverty threshold (STATBEL 2018).
This analysis will solely focus on the risk on monetary poverty, the percentage of people who live under the poverty threshold, in order to be able to compare the case of Belgium with the case of the Netherlands. In Belgium the poverty threshold, which is the minimum amount of money households should earn in order to provide for basic needs, is a total disposable income of 1139 euro a month for a one-person household in 2017 (STATBEL 2018). The latest data on the percentage of people living under this threshold in Belgium comes from 2017. In this data it is stated that in 2017, 15,9% of the Belgian households had an income which was below the poverty threshold (STATBEL 2018). When taking migratory background into account, however, it is argued that over 40% of the households which are living in Belgium but were born outside of the European Union live below the poverty
threshold (Noppe, et al. 2018, 263). When focussing on people which do not have the Belgian nationality, 49% of the households live under the poverty threshold (Ibid., 263).
When looking into the economic inequality in the country, Belgium belongs to one of the countries with a relatively low wealth inequality compared to other OECD countries2. According to the OECD, in a working paper on inequalities in household wealth across OECD countries, it is stated that the richest 10% of Belgian households own 42,5% of all wealth. This number is the fifth lowest among the 28 OECD countries studied in the paper (Balestra and Tonkin 2018, 15). Compared to other OECD countries, therefore, the wealth inequality in Belgium is relatively low. When solely focussing on income, the richest 10% of Belgian households earn around 21% of all income (Balestra and Tonkin 2018, 25). In
addition, according to the latest available data, the Gini-coefficient of income of Belgium was
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0,26 in 2017 (Eurostat 2019). Compared to the European average of a Gini-coefficient of income of 0,307 (Eurostat 2019), the Gini-coefficient of Belgium is relatively low. Therefore, both the wealth and the income inequality in Belgium seems relatively low on the first hand.
However, when taking migratory background into account, the income inequality becomes much higher. A study on the median net income of households in the EU15
countries3 distinguishes between people who were born in these countries and people who are not. It shows that the median net income of a person born in Belgium is much higher than a person who is currently living in Belgium, but born outside of the EU (Noppe,
Vanweddingen, et al. 2018, 262). The median net income of a person born in Belgium in purchasing power parity4 (PPP) Euro was 21.787 in 2015. The median net income of a person born outside of the EU but living in Belgium in PPP Euro was 13.341 in 2015. This difference of 8.446 PPP Euro’s is, after Austria and Luxembourg, the highest income inequality between people who were born in the country versus people who were born outside of the European Union, from the EU15 countries (Noppe, Vanweddingen, et al. 2018, 262)
In Belgium, the risk of poverty is connected to the risk of social exclusion. It is believed that if households have to face at least one of the three poverty risks, they do not only have a greater risk of poverty, but also of social exclusion (STATBEL 2018). The percentages of chance on poverty therefore are believed to be the same as the percentages of chance on social exclusion. Therefore, households of people born outside of the EU have a greater risk of social exclusion.
In short, on the first hand the percentage of households living under the poverty threshold and the wealth and income inequality in Belgium seem relatively low. When distinguishing people who were born outside of the European Union from people who were born in Belgium, however, it can be seen that both the percentage of households living under the poverty threshold and the income inequality are much higher. Although there is no data available on the Belgian Muslim community in particular, on an average, households with a migration background have less to spend than households who do not have a migration background.
3 Composition of the European Union per January 1st, 1995. Including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands and The United Kingdom.
4 Purchasing Power Parity is way of measuring economic variables in different countries using an indicator of price level differences across countries. PPP’s are established by comparing price levels for a basket of goods representing a country’s consumption patterns (Eurostat Glossary, 2018).
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3.1.2 Poverty and social inequality in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, poverty is defined as an absolute shortage. A shortage is absolute if households are not able to achieve a minimum standard of living with their income (Hoff, et al. 2016, 5). This poverty threshold is believed to be objective, and does therefore not depend on how households experience their situations themselves (Hoff, et al. 2016, 5). The poverty threshold, known as the basic needs budget, is 971 euro a month for a one-person household in 2016 (Hoff, et al. 2016, 10). The latest data of households who have an income which is below the poverty threshold dates from 2016. In this year, 8,2% of the households in the Netherlands had an income which was below the basic needs budget (Wennekers, et al. 2018, 40). Although the percentages of 2018 have not been published yet, the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) has made an estimation that in 2018, 7,9% of the Dutch households have lived below the poverty threshold (Wennekers, et al. 2018, 40). While there is no data on Muslim communities in the Netherlands in particular, there is much data on non-western migrants available. Among non-western migrants who live in the Netherlands, the percentage of households living under the poverty threshold is higher than compared to the rest of the population. In the latest data available, from 2016, it is stated that in 2014, almost 19% of the non-western migrant households in the Netherlands have lived below the poverty threshold (Hoff, et al. 2016, 36).
When looking into the wealth inequality in the Netherlands, it is argued that out of the OECD countries, only the United States has a higher wealth inequality than the Netherlands (Wennekers, et al. 2018, 40). In the working paper on inequalities in household wealth across OECD countries by the OECD, it is stated that the richest 10% of Dutch households own 68,3% of all wealth (Balestra and Tonkin 2018, 15). Compared to other OECD countries, therefore, the wealth inequality in the Netherlands is relatively high. When only focussing on income, the richest 10% of Dutch household earn more than 23% of the total income (Balestra and Tonkin 2018, 25; Wennekers, et al. 2018, 40). According to the latest available data, the Gini-coefficient of income was 0,271 in 2017 (Eurostat 2019). Compared to the European average of a Gini-coefficient of income of 0,307 (Eurostat 2019), the Gini-coefficient of the Netherlands is relatively low.
Similarly as in the case of Belgium, income inequality becomes even more clear when distinguishing people with a non-European background from people born in the EU. In the previously mentioned source which distinguishes people born in the EU from people who were not born in the EU in order to look into the median net income of households in the
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EU15, it is stated that the median net income of a person born in the Netherlands in
purchasing power parity (PPP) Euro was 21.676 in 2015. The median net income of a person born outside of the EU but living in the Netherland in PPP Euro was 16.278 in 2015 (Noppe, et al. 2018, 262). Although this inequal division of income between people from Europe and people from outside of Europe is clearly visible, the difference of 5.398 PPP Euro’s seems to be the average among the EU15 countries (Ibid., 262).
In addition, a report on the social state of the Netherlands in 2016 discusses other factors which influence the social position of people with a so-called ‘migration background’. It is, for example, discussed that, although the general level of education among non-western migrants improved in the last ten years, non-western migrants still have an educational disadvantage when compared to both Dutch people and western migrants (Wennekers, et al. 2018, 27). This disadvantage might not only influence the economic position of non-western migrants, but also the social position of these migrants in the country. Furthermore, it is stated that less non-western migrants do sports weekly compared to Dutch people without a ‘migrant background’ (Wennekers, et al. 2018, 86). This is also believed to contribute to social
exclusion.
In short, also in the Netherlands the percentage of households living under the poverty threshold seem relatively low on the first hand. When distinguishing people with a migration background however, the percentage increases. While the wealth inequality in the Netherlands is one of the highest in the Western world, the income inequality is relatively low. When comparing people who were born in The Netherlands with people who were born outside of the EU it can be seen that there is an inequal division of income in the country. However, this income inequality seems to be the average among the EU15 countries.
3.1.3 Differences and similarities
As can be seen in the data on the percentage of households living under the poverty threshold in both countries, a higher percentage of households live under the poverty threshold in Belgium compared to the Netherlands. 15,9% of the households in Belgium and 8,2% of the households in the Netherlands live below the threshold. This difference, however, could partly be caused by the fact that the poverty threshold is higher in Belgium than in the Netherlands. A household earning €980,- a month would be considered poor in Belgium, while this is not the case in the Netherlands. When analysing the data on wealth inequality in Belgium and the Netherlands, it seems that the wealth inequality in the Netherlands is much higher when comparing it to Belgium. In Belgium the richest 10% of households own 42,5% of all wealth,
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while the richest 10% of the Dutch households own 68,3% of all wealth. The share of households’ income is much more similar in both countries. While in Belgium the richest 10% of households earn 21% of all income, the richest 10% of households in the Netherlands earn 23% of all income. These percentages are close to the OECD average of around 25% (Balestra and Tonkin 2018, 25).
However, it has also been found that these numbers and percentages on poverty and income (in)equality drastically change when households with a non-western migratory background are distinguished from households born in the European Union. While the average percentage of households living under the poverty threshold in Belgium was 15,9,%, it is stated that out of the Belgian people who were born outside of the European Union, more than 40% live under the poverty threshold. In the Netherlands this difference is smaller. The percentage of Dutch households living under the poverty threshold is 8,2% and the percentage of non-western migrants living under the poverty threshold is 13%. When focussing on the net median income of households in PPP Euro’s, on average, Belgian people born in the
European Union earn 8446 PPP Euro’s more than Belgian people who were born outside of the EU. People of Belgian origin earn a net median income of 21787 PPP Euro’s while Belgians born outside of the EU earn a net median income of 13.341 PPP Euro’s. In the Netherlands, this difference is 5398 PPP Euro’s, 21,676 PPP Euro’s of people of Dutch origin and 16.278 PPP Euro’s for people born outside of the EU. Therefore, the inequal division of income among households with a migratory background is higher in Belgium.
3.1.4 Influence of poverty and social inequality on terrorism
On the first hand it seems that, although the percentage of households living under the poverty threshold is slightly higher in Belgium, money is much more equally distributed in Belgium when compared to the Netherlands. However, it has been found that if people who were born outside of the EU are distinguished from people born in either Belgium or the Netherlands, the opposite is the case. On average, people born outside of the EU are financially worse off in Belgium than in the Netherlands. As stated in the introduction of this section, it has been argued that if poverty and social inequality affect distinct religious or ethnic groups, it is a breeding ground of conflict (Newman 2006, 752). The fact that in Belgium households with a non-western migratory background, which could be considered a minority, are financially worse off than people who were born in Belgium could therefore possibly be a breeding ground of conflict.
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However, both this argument and the data presented above should be treated with caution. First of all because the numbers of poverty and social inequality are believed to be objective. This means, that it is not considered how households experience and feel about their own financial situation. As mentioned in the introduction of this section, absolute poverty is basically non-existent within modern-day Europe. Relative poverty or
financial/social inequality could, however, still trigger terrorism. The framing theory, as connected to terrorism by Dalgaard-Nielsen, explains how particular groups or social movements frame messages, in order to give meaning to them (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008, 6). When connected to radicalization and terrorism, the framing theory explains how constructed realities could guide meaning making. For example, bad environmental conditions, as poverty and social inequality, are seen as injustices instead of misfortune (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008, 7). Therefore, although there is no absolute poverty in either Belgium or the Netherlands, and income inequality in both countries is believed to be relatively low, only a small
difference in income could already trigger a person to turn to terrorism. This does also mean, however, that although on average the financial situation for people born outside of the European Union is better in the Netherlands than in Belgium, it could still trigger terrorism in the Netherlands and not in Belgium. If a Dutch person simply frames his or her financial situation as injustice, although there are many households who are worse off, it could still lead to terrorism.
Furthermore, it is difficult to say to what extent these economic differences have had an influence on the number of foreign fighters leaving from either Belgium or the
Netherlands, because of all the economic differences within the country. First of all, of course, the different poverty threshold which the two countries have determined. But furthermore, also the purchasing power in both countries and all the possible social benefits households can receive. Therefore, this factor will be re-analysed on a smaller scale in the case study on the Belgian neighbourhood of Molenbeek and the Dutch neighbourhood of the Schilderswijk in chapter 4. By doing so, it hopes to find even more clear differences between the two countries.
3.2 Presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks
The second possible structural cause of the difference in foreign fighter numbers between the Netherlands and Belgium which will be discussed within this section, is the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks. Just like in the case of the previous section, these two factors will be combined into one possible structural cause. This is done in order to avoid
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recurrence. Although it can be argued that the influence of the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks on terrorism seems common sense, and a possible research outcome that the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks indeed causes terrorism seems obvious, it could just as well be that this is not the main cause of the difference in number of foreign fighters between Belgium and the Netherlands, as these phenomena are present in both countries. Therefore, in this section it will firstly be operationalized how the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks will be measured, where after it will further look into radical mosques and jihadist networks in both Belgium and the Netherlands. Finally it will examine whether the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks indeed has an influence on the number of foreign fighters in the Netherlands and Belgium.
In order to be able to study the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks within both Belgium and the Netherlands, this study will look into policy documents and official reports on the existence and presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks in both Belgium and the Netherlands. As official data on the presence of both radical mosques and jihadist networks is not always available, this study will also look into news articles in which media outlets claim to possess such data. By doing so, it hopes to be able to identify a
difference in the amount of radical mosques, the magnitude of the radical message and the number of jihadist networks in both countries which could possibly have influenced the high number of foreign fighters from Belgium when compared to other European countries.
Within the research into radical mosques and networks, the focus will be on Salafist networks and mosques under Salafist influence. This study has chosen to do so because academic literature, institutional research reports, and policy documents all have the tendency to write about Salafism in the radical context (Berger, Kahmann and El Baroudi 2018, 12). It is important to note that the two concepts of radicalism and the strictly-orthodox Salafism are not equal, and therefore not all Salafists are radicalized. But because academic literature, institutional research reports and policy documents in both the Netherlands and Belgium tend to write about Salafist mosques when focussing on radical mosques, and this study will analyse these particular documents, it will also focus on Salafism in the radical context (Berger, Kahmann and El Baroudi 2018, 12).
3.2.1 Presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks in Belgium
In a widely spread brochure on Salafism dating from 2018, the Belgian intelligence services (the VSSE) state that the influence of Salafism on the Muslim community and the amount of Salafist institutions and organizations in Belgium has increased slowly in the past few years
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(VSSE 2018, 4). However, despite this increase, the VSSE also argues that only a small section of the Belgian Muslim community are considered to be Salafist. Out of the 600 to 700 thousand Muslims in Belgium, only ‘several thousands’ are believed to be Salafist (Ibid., 13). The VSSE, therefore, refers to it as a ‘’marginal phenomenon within the Belgian Muslim
population’’ (VSSE 2018, 13). The exact numbers of Salafist Muslims in Belgium are not
publicly known.
When focussing on the number of Salafist mosques or other Salafist organizations in Belgium, there is not much more clarity. According to the brochure spread by the VSSE, the number of Salafist organizations in Belgium is unknown. They argue that the numbers which circulate every now and then are a simplistic representation of the reality (VSSE 2018, 13). However, according to several Belgian newspaper articles, in April 2019 the VSSE has counted that there are almost hundred Salafist organizations in Belgium known (Bové 2019; De Morgen 2019). The media argued this was said by the Belgian Minister of Justice, Koen Geens (Bové 2019). These organizations do not only include mosques, but also religious centres and educational institutions. Furthermore, these organisations have been labelled Salafist because the VSSE has detected at least one or more alarming matters at these organizations. Examples of alarming matters are the fact that a Salafist imam preaches, its followers are Salafist, or the organization has been funded by Salafist organizations or governments (Bové 2019).
Additionally, it is impossible to determine an exact number of jihadists in Belgium as well. This is simply the case because of the secrecy of both the jihadist movement itself and the Belgian secret services dealing with these jihadist movements. Therefore, the number of jihadist or terrorist networks in Belgium is unknown. One of the biggest jihadist networks which has been known in Belgium was Sharia4Belgium. Although the terrorist organisation already got lifted in 2012, the members got prosecuted in 2015 (van Poppel 2015). According to the verdict of the Court of First Instance Antwerp, all 46 members of the organisation have been prosecuted (Rechtbank Eerste Aanleg Antwerpen, VerdictFD35.98.47-12 -
AN35.F1.1809-12 2015, 2-10).
In short, not much is known about the presence of Salafist/radical mosques,
movements and communities in Belgium. The Belgian intelligence services have stated that several thousands of Belgian Muslims are Salafist. Furthermore, they have stated that there are almost hundred Salafist organizations within Belgium. One of the best-known jihadist organisations in Belgium is Sharia4Belgium. Although the organisation discontinued to exist
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in 2012, the verdict made public by the Court of First Instance Antwerp stated the
organisation had 46 members. This is believed to be the only data available on the number of individuals who are a member of a jihadist organization in Belgium.
3.2.2 Presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks in the Netherlands
Although much research is done on Salafism and the presence of Salafist mosques in the Netherlands, just like in the case of Belgium, it is not clear how many Salafist mosques there are and how many people adhere to the Salafist movement (van Nassau 2017, 5). Similarly, to Belgium, it is said to be known that the magnitude of Salafism in the Netherlands, and the amount of Salafist mosques in the country, has grown (NCTV 2018, 8; van Nassau 2017, 79). According to estimates on the number of Muslims in the Netherlands who are believed to be attracted to the ‘radical message’ of Salafist preachers, dating from 2007, 20.000 till 30.000 of the Dutch Muslims do so (Berger, Kahmann and El Baroudi 2018, 15). According to the most recent estimates, dating from 2010, 40.000 to 60.000 of the Dutch Muslims are believed to be ‘strictly orthodox’ and therefore sensitive to Salafism (Berger, et al. 2018, 15). These numbers vary considerably. This can either be caused by a huge increase of Salafist influence over a short period of time, or simply because of the different method through which the numbers have been determined.
Similarly, as on the number of Muslims attracted to the Salafist message, there is a lot of uncertainty on the number of Salafist mosques in the Netherlands. In 2017, the research department of the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Safety released a report in which they state to have no information about the number of Salafist influenced mosques in the Netherlands (van Nassau 2017, 13). However, in April 2018, Dutch media received information on Islamic organizations in the Netherlands which have requested or received money flows from countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Holdert and Kouwenhoven 2018). Because of these money flows, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait can therefore directly influence the direction and message of these mosques. Mosques or other Islamic organisations which have received money from these countries are therefore often influenced by the so-called fundamentalist variant of Islam, also known as Salafism. According to the information received by these media outlets, 30 Islamic organizations in the Netherlands have requested such a funding (Holdert and Kouwenhoven 2018).
There is much uncertainty on the amount of jihadist networks in the Netherlands as well. Again, it is impossible to determine the exact number of jihadists in the Netherlands, simply because of the secrecy of both the jihadist movement itself and the Dutch secret
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services. Though, the latter have published an estimation in 2018. According to a publication of the Dutch intelligence services (the AIVD) in 2018, the Dutch radical jihadist movement exists out of more than 500 followers and several thousands of sympathizers (AIVD 2018, 20). The sympathizers can be defined as the individuals who agree with, and support, the radical jihadist ideology, but are not active such networks.
In short, both the NCTV (The National Coordinator of Counter-terrorism and safety) and the AIVD (The Dutch security services) have not shared any data on the number of Salafist people and the number of Salafist organizations in the Netherlands. Though, several media outlets have received information in which is stated that there are at least 30 Islamic organizations in the Netherlands which have requested funding from Salafist governments. Furthermore, the AIVD has stated that more than 500 people in the Netherlands are part of jihadist organizations and several thousands can be considered sympathizers of jihadist organizations.
3.2.3 Differences and similarities
As can be seen in both sections above, there is much unclarity about the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks in both Belgium and the Netherlands. Therefore, before going into the differences and similarities between the Netherlands and Belgium, it is important to note that all numbers mentioned above should be treated with caution. As there barely are official numbers or percentages on jihadist networks, radical mosques, or sympathizers of Salafist or jihadist movements, all numbers mentioned above are estimations. Although the estimations are made by the VSSE, the AIVD and the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Safety, and therefore seem to be relatively reliable, they remain estimations. Actual numbers could therefore deviate.
When comparing the numbers proposed above, it can be seen that in Belgium has more Islamic organizations of which is known they have Salafist characteristics than in the Netherlands. In Belgium the number is set on ‘almost hundred’ while in the Netherlands the number is set on thirty. This difference can have two causes. First of all, the difference could be caused simply because the jihadist network is bigger in Belgium. However, it is important to note that the number of Salafist organization in Belgium and the Netherlands include different things. In Belgium the number includes all organizations in which at least one of the following characteristics are present: a Salafist imam preaches, its followers are Salafist, or the organization has been funded by Salafist organizations or governments. The proposed number of Salafist organizations in the Netherlands only include the organizations which have
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requested funding from Salafist organizations or governments. Therefore, it is difficult to compare the data on the number of Salafist organizations in both countries.
The data on the number of Muslims who adhere to Salafism is difficult to compare as well, as the Netherlands has data which varies considerably, and Belgium has data which is considerably vague. Though, the ‘several thousands’ of Salafist people in Belgium will not overcome the average number of 40.000 Salafist Muslims in the Netherlands. Assuming that the numbers are correct, the Netherlands has a much higher number of Muslims who adhere to Salafism. This difference could, again, have several causes. First of all, simply because the data is unreliable and it is not determined when an individual can be considered Salafist. Therefore the operationalization of the concept of ‘Salafist Muslims’ could differ. Secondly, the difference can also be caused by the fact that the Muslim community in the Netherlands is bigger than the Muslim community of Belgium. In the Netherlands there are approximately 850.000 Muslims (CBS), while in Belgium there are 600.000-700.000 Muslims (VSSE 2018, 13).
3.2.4 Influence of presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks on terrorism
Even though it has been argued that one of the major reasons why individuals radicalize is because people in their personal networks are part of terrorist or jihadist networks (Hafez and Mullins 2015, 964), not much can be said on the influence of the presence of radical mosques and jihadist networks on the difference in number of foreign fighters from the Netherlands and Belgium. Although the influence of the presence of Salafist mosques and networks possibly is there, reliable data on the amount of Salafist Muslims and Salafist organizations is rare, and the data which is available, cannot be used for a comparison because of the big differences in operationalization of the concept.
Furthermore, another aspect which is important to keep in mind, is that the presence or absence of jihadist networks in a country of residence of a radicalized individual does not mean that this person has not been influenced by a particular radical network in general. As argued by Hafez and Mullins, home-grown militants are often linked to radical networks abroad (Hafez and Mullins 2015, 959). Therefore, the data on radical mosques and jihadist networks in both Belgium and the Netherlands should be treated with caution, as a country with a very low number of jihadist networks and radical mosques might still have to deal with high percentages of home-grown terrorism because radical individuals can be influenced by jihadist networks abroad. The fact that the Netherlands probably has a higher number of Salafist Muslims does therefore not automatically mean that they also have more foreign
