University of Amsterdam
THE EU 'BIG THREE', TARGETED KILLING
AND SECURITIZATION OF TERRORISM
An analysis of the counter-terrorism discourse
Master's Thesis
'European Security Politics' research project
Name of student:
Aleksi Rantaniemi
Student number:
11127724
Date:
June 24th, 2016
Instructor:
Dr. Dimitris Bouris
ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that three major EU member states, namely France, Germany, and the UK are involved in targeted killings in one way or another. The activities defined as involvement in this thesis include, for example, intelligence sharing and operational support contributing to the capacity of another state to conduct targeted killings, and of course, directly conducting targeted killings. This thesis analyzes the discourse justifying this involvement from the perspective of securitization theory.
It is argued in this thesis that securitization, one of the most widely used security theories, is concerned with social construction of a security threat through speech-acts. By framing an issue as an existential security threat, it is lifted out of the normal democratic scrutiny into the realm of emergency politics, thus making resorting to exceptional security policies and “breaking free of rules” possible. Importantly, this thesis argues that the fight against terrorism functions as a paramount example of securitization, and that the aforementioned involvement in targeted killings is made possible through the process of securitization.
This thesis argues that the EU counter-terrorism discourse, as well as state-level discourse regarding involvement in targeted killings, clearly demonstrates that securitization of terrorism has taken place. Virtually similar phrases are used in the counter-terrorism discourse of all of the three countries studied. For example, with some variations, in all of the cases terrorism is characterized as a barbaric, ultimate evil aiming to destroy 'us' and the entire 'free world' and what it stands for. Furthermore, undertaking preemptive security measures is often presented as an only option in order to prevent the threat from materializing, or even, for the entire international system to survive.
In addition, this thesis argues that the 9/11 terrorist attacks sparked the EU's ambition to become an international counter-terrorism actor. Consequently, much of the counter-terrorism measures of the EU have a notable external dimension and the EU counter-terrorism policy emphasizes international cooperation. On the one hand, the EU has been criticized as a counter-terrorism actor, for example, characterizing it as an ineffective “paper tiger”. On the other hand, some authors argue that the EU is, in fact, the world leader in a number of preemptive security practices. In addition, it is argued that while some authors have called for a comprehensive EU policy on the use of armed drones and targeted killings, the EU has yet to form one or to take a clear position on the debate.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...5
INTRODUCTION...6
Research question and structure of the thesis...9
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK...12
1.1. Research method: discourse analysis...12
1.2. Securitization...15
1.3. Other 'schools' of securitization...17
1.4. Criticism of securitization...18
1.5. Securitization of terrorism...19
1.6. Preemption...20
1.7. Targeted killing as a preemptive security measure...21
1.8. Summary...23
CHAPTER 2: EU COUNTER-TERRORISM...24
2.1. Terrorism in Europe...24
2.2. Evolution of the EU as a counter-terrorism actor...26
2.3. Preemptive security practices of the EU...28
2.4. EU position on targeted killings...29
2.5. Criticism of EU counter-terrorism...30
2.6. Summary...31
CHAPTER 3: EU MEMBER STATES' INVOLVEMENT IN TARGETED KILLINGS...33
3.1. France...34
3.2. Germany...35
3.3. The UK...37
3.4. Summary...38
CHAPTER 4: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS...39
4.1. The EU counter-terrorism discourse...40
4.3. France...45
4.3.1. French counter-terrorism discourse...46
4.3.2. French discourse on counter-terrorism operations...47
4.4. Germany...49
4.4.1. German counter-terrorism discourse...50
4.4.2. The Ramstein base and cooperation with the US...51
4.4.3. German participation in the operation against ISIS...52
4.5. The UK...53
4.5.1. The UK counter terrorism discourse...54
4.5.2. The UK discourse on targeted killings...56
4.6. Summary...58
5. CONCLUSION...59
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (of the United States)
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy (of the European Union) EU The European Union
IS, ISIL, ISIS Islamic State (of Syria and the Levant), or Daesh (Arabic acronym) NSA National Security Agency (of the United States)
RAF Royal Air Force (of the United Kingdom) UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone
UN The United Nations
US The United States of America UK The United Kingdom
INTRODUCTION
Targeted killings, often conducted by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, have become a common mode of operation in the fight against terrorism, most notably during the last decade (Dorsey & Paulussen 2015a, 2015b; European Parliament 2014b, 3; Martins 2015; Romaniuk & Webb 2015, 1-2). Due to the clandestine operations of terrorist organizations, many countries are increasingly turning to specialized equipment and tactics, like drones and targeted killings, that allow more covert modes of operation (Dorsey & Paulussen 2015a; Hunter 2009, 3). The increasing number of these strikes has triggered global debates and raised numerous concerns with human rights and international law (Amnesty International 2012; Emmerson 2013; Human Rights Watch 2014; Martins 2015; Scahill 2015b; Shane 2015). These debates are driven by issues like the changing character of war, role of technology in international security dynamics, boundaries of counter-terrorism, and international legal issues such as definitions of probable cause, armed conflicts, and enemy combatants (Martins 2015, 247-248).
To this date, the vast majority of drone strikes has been conducted by the US; hence, much of the focus of the discussion on targeted killings has been on Washington (Martins 2015, 247-248). Although there are only a few countries that are known to have used drones to conduct targeted killings, the number of countries that either already possess the technology or are in the process of acquiring it is rapidly growing. That is, currently some 70 countries posses drones, 23 of which have programs to arm them. For instance, countries including China, India, Iran, Israel, Russia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates are all developing drones well-suited for intelligence gathering, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance, and attack (Hopia 2015, 17; Hunter 2009).
However, in spite of the fact that the use of armed drones has provoked global debates, there is a dimension that, for the most part, remains overlooked. That is the involvement of some EU member states in targeted killings. As Hayes et al. (2014) point out, European involvement in these strikes is often overlooked as several EU member states either possess armed drones or are involved for example in the US targeted killing program in one way or another, such as, through sharing intelligence. It is exactly this aspect that this thesis aims to discuss.
France, Germany, and the UK. First, in its fight against terrorism, France uses drones for surveillance and intelligence gathering for the purposes of conducting targeted killings by air-strikes in the Sahel region, and more recently in Iraq and Syria (Dworkin 2015; Griffin 2015, 25; Rubin & Barnard 2015); second, Germany is a key ally for the US by providing facilities to support drone strikes, without which it would be impossible for the US to carry out the majority of its strikes, and also participates in intelligence sharing to help its allies fight ISIS in Syria and Iraq (Bartsch et al. 2015, Scahill 2015a); and third, the UK has routinely carried out drone strikes in Iraq and Syria, and previously also in Afghanistan (Bowcott & Ross 2015, Doward et al. 2015, MacAskill 2015). However, it is to be noted that there are also other EU member states involved in targeted killings mostly through intelligence sharing with CIA or NSA; for example, Denmark (Crulckshank & Lister 2014; Shane 2012; Warrick 2012) and the Netherlands (Derix & Modderkolk 2014; Modderkolk & Effting 2015; Pieters 2015). Furthermore, the US will also be discussed to some extent as its cooperation in the fight against terrorism with the EU and its member states often makes them closely connected.
Numerous concerns have been raised regarding drone strikes, for example, concerns that targeted killings are contradicting with international law and fundamental human rights. More specifically, human rights organizations, among others, argue that targeted killings are causing too many civilian casualties, while there are allegations of attempts to downplay the number of them (Amnesty International 2012; Currier 2015; Dorsey & Paulussen 2015a; Human Rights Watch 2013; Scahill 2015b). Therefore, greater transparency in the operations is being called for by human rights organizations (Amnesty International 2012; Human Rights Watch 2014), while Scahill (2015a) argues that the drone campaign “has been allowed free rein because it has been kept hidden from public scrutiny”.
Further concerns and criticism has been directed to a number of issues. For example, civilian deaths have allegedly been mislabeled as those of enemy combatants on the grounds of fitting a certain profile or a civilian being for example a driver for a terrorist suspect (Appelbaum et al. 2014; Bartsch et al. 2015; Hunter 2009, 1); the legal status of the strikes and sufficiency of international legislation to address the issue has been questioned (Paulussen et al. 2015, 39-42), for example, killing as extra-judicial punishment (European Parliament 2014a) as well as the legality of strikes outside active combat zones and recognized conflict has raised concerns (Martins 2015, 247-248); the counter-productivity of targeted killings and their possible political repercussions, as they might, in fact, increase the popularity of terrorist organizations among the local populations (Hunter 2009,
1); shortcomings in the target selection and reconnaissance processes, as the strikes often target the cellphone signal of a terrorist suspect, with little guarantees that the cellphone will be held by the suspect at the time of the strike (de Goede & Sullivan 2016, 68; Scahill 2015b); the psychological effects on local populations living under constant fear of drone strikes (Stanford Law School & NYU School of Law 2012); and finally, the engagement of western governments in “riskless warfare” by drones (Martins 2015, 248).
Citing a speech of President Obama, Dorsey and Paulussen (2015a, 2) argue that the US “sees itself in a just armed conflict against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces, which legally justifies the strikes”; and furthermore, the “strikes, outside of a 'hot battlefield' (but still within the US armed conflict paradigm), [are] targeted as a matter of policy, against al-Qaeda and its associated forces when capture is not feasible, whenever they 'pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat' and when there is 'near certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured'”. However, according to Appelbaum et al. (2014) and Scahill (2015b), who analyze leaked internal documents of various US state agencies, as well as Human Rights Watch (2013), this prerequisite of imminent threat to US personnel is almost never fulfilled in practice.
On the other hand, proponents of targeted killings argue that they can be a crucial means to fight terrorist organizations on a strategic, operational, and tactical level (Hunter 2009, 1). For example, American Lieutenant General David Deptula defends drone operations stating that they “really are the most accurate and precise means of applying force” (Scahill 2015a). Furthermore, due to terrorists' clandestine way of operating, conventional warfare can be ineffective in the fight against terrorism. For example, members of the terrorist organizations are often very difficult to distinguish from civilians. As Hunter (2009, 3) argues: “[r]ather than operating from fixed bases, terrorists often use the basements of homes, rented apartments, caves, nomadic encampments, and other locations from which they conduct their planning and subsequent attacks”.
Therefore, this special kind of warfare “requires a combination of accurate intelligence, highly trained and specialized soldiers, and oftentimes the use of unique and advanced tracking and detection equipment. Such is the nature of targeted killing” (Hunter 2009, 3). Furthermore, it has been argued that a sovereign nation has the right to defend itself from both internal and external aggression (Hunter 2009, 6). Sometimes practicing this right of self-defense, as in the case of targeted killings, is not a matter of black and white, but it has nevertheless been insisted by the
proponents of targeted killings that they do take place within the boundaries of international legal framework (Dorsey & Paulussen 2015a, 2).
The EU could be in a unique position to lead the discussion on targeted killings and developing a sufficient international legal framework. For example, the Vice President of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, has stated that his home country, the Netherlands, could play a leading role in the process of working “together to advance the discussion on the EU position on armed drones and targeted killing, including assisting in making the EU member state positions as comprehensive as possible” and that he would personally “use all relevant international fora for that and take initiatives” (Paulussen et al. 2015, 39-40).
However, for the most part, the EU and its member states have remained relatively quiet and distant from the discussion on targeted killings. Importantly, most of the member states' discourse on targeted killings focuses on justifying them as an exceptional security measure, as will be argued in this thesis. Consequently, as an important ally of the US, this could be interpreted as EU's consent to the US policy on drones, giving it more legitimacy (Dorsey & Paulussen 2015a, 4-6). Despite the European Parliament expressing great concern for the use of drones outside the international legal framework, and calling for development of a European-wide policy (European Parliament 2014b, 3-5), the EU lacks a policy on the use of armed drones (Dorsey & Paulussen 2015a; Dworkin 2013). Furthermore, Dworkin (2013, 2) argues: “torn between an evident reluctance to accuse Obama of breaking international law and an unwillingness to endorse his policies, divided in part among themselves and in some cases bound by close intelligence relationships to the US, European countries have remained essentially disengaged as the era of drone warfare has dawned. Yet, as drones proliferate, such a stance seems increasingly untenable” (Dworkin 2013, 2).
Research question and structure of the thesis
The research question of this thesis is: “How are France, Germany and the UK involved in targeted killings, and how does the counter-terrorism discourse justify this involvement from the perspective of securitization theory?”. The counter-terrorism discourse will be examined both on the levels of EU and the individual member states. The conceptual framework of this thesis will comprise of the securitization theory and preemption. According to Vuori (2013, 133), “the most widely used theoretical framework that explicitly uses speech act theory is the theory of securitization”.
Therefore, in this context, discourse analysis is a particularly suitable method to answer the second part of the research question. The Copenhagen School of securitization will be focused on as speech-acts, such as high-level speeches, used in legitimizing exceptional measures and policies are in the core of this securitization literature.
In line with a text adopted by the European Parliament (2014a) urging member states not to undertake “unlawful targeted killings or facilitate such killings by other states”, 'involvement' in targeted killings is defined in this thesis as either (1) directly conducting targeted killings by armed drones; or (2) conducting targeted killings by another method, for example by fighter jets or helicopters (such strikes are often supported by surveillance drones used for reconnaissance and target acquisition) (Dworkin 2015); or (3) performing and/or participating in a key supportive
function that directly contributes to the capacity of a third party to conduct targeted killings.
Examples of the third aspect include sharing intelligence or providing facilities to support operations. Other aspects of involvement could include, for example, manufacturing and selling armed drones and weapons systems for drones; however, for the purpose of limiting the scope of this thesis, this aspect will not be included the discussion.
As for the delimitations of this thesis, it aims to be principally descriptive in nature. That is, this thesis seeks to explore the extent to which the said EU member states are involved in targeted killings; and to conduct a discourse analysis of the counter-terrorism discourse and of the justifications for participating in targeted killings. Another aim of this thesis is to shed light on the issue that remains largely under-researched. It is, however, outside of the scope of this thesis to discuss for example the legitimacy of this participation, or the possible human rights violations, or any other concerns and controversies discussed earlier. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to discuss the different degrees of engagement of the said EU member states in targeted killings as preemptive security measure, and to analyze the related discourse from the perspective of securitization theory.
Due to the unavailability of documented discourse as well as for the purpose of limiting the scope of the study, the involvement of the Netherlands and Denmark briefly discussed earlier will not be discussed any further. France, Germany, and the UK are, without question, among the largest military powers of Europe in terms of military expenditure, their commitment for international cooperation, and otherwise (European Commission 2015). Therefore, they constitute subjects significant enough for analysis.
In accordance with Kaunert (2012, 578-579), 'terrorism' is defined in this thesis as “the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies as to the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological”. Targeted killing, then, is defined in accordance with Hunter (2009, 3) as the “premeditated, preemptive, and intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or believed to represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and security of a state through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals”.
This thesis is structured as follows. In chapter one, following this introduction, a theoretical framework will be presented. The theoretical framework will consist of securitization and preemption, emphasizing the suitability of discourse analysis as a research method in this context. In chapter two, the evolution of EU as a counter-terrorism actor and its counter-terrorism policy will be discussed. Chapter three will discuss the aforementioned involvement of France, Germany, and the UK in depth. Chapter four will conduct the discourse analysis of the counter-terrorism discourse and justifications for involvement in targeted killings from the perspective of securitization theory. Chapter five will present the concluding remarks.
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter will begin with introducing the research method, discourse analysis. For the purpose of being able to gain deeper understanding of the fight against terrorism and targeted killings, a theoretical framework covering preemption and securitization will then be presented in this chapter. These concepts are imperative in discussing the fight against terrorism and the dynamics of targeted killings. In addition, the suitability of discourse analysis in the context of securitization will be emphasized in this chapter.
1.1. Research method: discourse analysis
Discourses are “related sets of ideas, expressed in various kinds of written and spoken texts, and employing a distinct arrangement of vocabularies, rules, symbols, labels, assumptions, narratives and forms of social action” (Jackson 2007, 234). Discourse analysis, then, is used to investigate how social and cultural perspectives and identities are enacted by language, both spoken and written (Gee 2011). Moreover, according to Jackson (2007, 234), it is at the same time a technique for analyzing both specific texts as well as a tool for understanding broader frameworks, or for the connections between discourses and social and political phenomena.
In addition, discourses are performative, meaning-making attempts to make sense of the world through words and language. Discourses consist of a number of statements and meanings, conveying an “accepted knowledge” of a subject (Baker-Beall 2014, 216). Thus, they define, limit and constrain what can be said about a subject. Furthermore, according to Baker-Beall (2014, 216), discourse analysis focuses on the creation of meaning through language, and particularly how identities and social beliefs are created through language.
Similarly, Carta and Morin (2014, 1) identify four functions for discourses, namely, they can be understood to exercise framing, generative, performative and coordinative functions. First, framing refers to structuring what can be conceived and expressed. Second, discourses function to generate meanings of what exists; that is, if something cannot be transposed into language, it does not exist. Third, discourses shape the perception of reality, and thus have a performative power through establishing connections between phenomena (Carta & Morin 2014, 1-2; Waever 1995). Fourth, discourses are produced interactively and intersubjectively, and therefore social interactions are
produced through “semantic fields” of discourse (Carta & Morin 2014, 2).
Particularly in the analysis of political discourse, analyzing labels and narratives is crucial (Jackson 2007, 234; Winkler 2006, 8-11). Labels refer to the “linguistic terms employed to describe agents or actors, acts, behaviour, scenes, qualities or purposes within the public vocabulary”; while narratives are the “stories that provide coherence and consistency to the scenes, characters and themes that guide the moral conduct of a society and which provide meaning to the lives of the community’s members” (Jackson 2007, 234). Further, narratives interpret and re-frame past events structuring the relationships between different sets of labels.
Discourse-analytic approaches are used in a wide range of epistemological paradigms, for example, poststructuralism, postmodernism, feminism and constructivism (Jackson 2007, 234). They share, however, a number of common theoretical commitments, including: an understanding of language as constitutive or productive of meaning and social reality, particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their relational positions within broader systems of signification; an understanding that discourse functions to produce social and political actors authorized to speak and act, legitimate forms of knowledge and political practices and, importantly, to construct accepted kinds of common sense within particular social and historical settings; an understanding of discourse as necessarily exclusionary and silencing of other modes of representation; and an understanding of discourse as historically and culturally contingent, intertextual, open-ended, requiring continuous articulation and rearticulation and, therefore, open to destabilization and challenge (Jackson 2007, 234).
Diez (2014, 322) argues that for social constructivists, discourse is important as norms and identities that directly shape foreign policy are transmitted in it. Furthermore, Diez (2014, 322) states, discourse and the norms that it contains are an independent variable explaining policy outcomes. An important role is thus given to the actors advocating the norms, for example, individuals or groups who promote norms and ac as “norm entrepreneurs” (Diez 2014, 322). This links directly to securitization theory, which is concerned with socially constructed threats by an actor with the capability to do so. Securitization theory will be discussed in depth in section 1.2.
By applying an interpretive rather than causative logic, discourse analysis aims to analyze how discourses affect social action. The way discourses affect social action, according to Jackson (2007, 235), is not directly or inevitably determining it, but rather, by making social action, for example, acceptable, conceivable, implausible, or their opposites. Therefore, discourse-analytic approaches
aim to “reveal how certain forms of language work to establish the initial ideational conditions of possibility for action, while simultaneously constructing the wider meaning structures or common sense that make those actions intelligible and legitimate. In the public policy context, it can be argued that discourse functions broadly to establish the limits, possibilities and interests of policy debate and formulation” (Jackson 2007, 234-235).
Taking a more critical approach towards the function of discourse analysis, Diez (2014, 322) argues that having its roots in poststructuralism, discourse analysis is primarily a critical tool. For Diez, the aim of discourse analysis is, therefore, to problematize given truths or challenge what is generally unchallenged, to “interrogate the familiar” (2014, 322). However, instead of using discourse analysis only as a critical tool in the analysis of foreign policy, it can be used interpretively to explain and understand how certain policies have come about. In fact, the two are not mutually exclusive, as discourse analysis can be used as a critical and explanatory tool at the same time (Diez 2014, 322).
According to Fairclough (1996, 25), discourse involves social conditions, which relate to three different 'levels' of social organization. First, the level of the social situation, that is, the immediate social environment in which the discourse occurs. Second, the level of the social institution which constitutes a wider matrix for the discourse, and third, the level of the society as a whole.
Furthermore, Fairclough (1996, 26) argues “[i]n seeing language as discourse and as social practice, one is committing oneself not just to analyzing texts, nor just to analyzing processes of production and interpretation, but to analyzing the relationship between texts, processes, and their social conditions, both the immediate conditions of the situational context and the more remote conditions of institutional and social structures”. Therefore, discourse analysis is the analysis of the relationship between texts, interactions, and contexts. Fairclough (1996, 26, 109) distinguishes three stages of critical discourse analysis that correspond to the three levels of social organization (in previous paragraph): the first stage, description, is concerned with formal properties of the text. Second, interpretation is the stage that is concerned with the relationship between text and interaction. Furthermore, it regards the text as the “product of a process of production” (Fairclough 1996, 26). Third, explanation stage is concerned with the wider relationship between interaction and social context, that is, “with the social determination of the processes of production and interpretation, and their social effects” (Fairclough 1996, 26).
1.2. Securitization
Securitization theory is concerned with the process of forming, or social construction, of a security issue when “an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object [which is] traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society” (Buzan et al. 1998, 21). Furthermore, issues that might have formerly been considered to mainly concern domains other than security, such as migration or climate change, are increasingly presented as security threats through the process of securitization.
According to Floyd (2015, 1), securitization theory is one of the most popular security theories, and it aims to examine the process that frames issues as existential threats and “are subsequently lifted out of ordinary democratic politics and into the realm of emergency politics” (Floyd 2015, p. 1). Moreover, securitization theory has in the recent years established its position as one of the most influential alternatives to traditional security theories, as it has been developed to address the need to expand the range of security studies in the post-Cold War era (Holbraad & Pedersen 2012, 165-166). Securitization theory, as Holbraad and Pedersen (2012, 165-166) argue, “offers a conceptually cogent method for studying security as the product of certain socio-political discourses and practices”. Discourse analysis is, therefore, a particularly useful research method in the context of securitization (Vuori 2013, 133).
Discursive methodologies, according to Stritzel (2007, 358), are often applied in security theories, employing a critical stance on so-called realities that are often taken for granted in matters related to security. Moreover, securitization theory, as conveyed by the 'Copenhagen School', the school that spawned it, is arguably one of the most important contributions to this theoretical discourse (Donnelly 2013, 42). The prominent authors of the Copenahgen School, Buzan and Waever (2003, 491), define securitization as a “successful speech act through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat”.
Furthermore, Romaniuk and Webb (2015, 4) argue that once a security threat has been constructed through speech-acts, an integral part of securitization is the justification of the use of extraordinary security measures to deal with the perceived threat. In the words of Buzan et al. (1998, 21), the securitizing move, or the invocation of security, becomes the “key to legitimizing the use of force”.
Therefore, according to Buzan et al. (1998, 26), securitization is defined by three steps: (1) socially constructing existential threats, (2) calling for emergency action, and (3) “effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules”. Therefore, securitizing an issue is considered a prerequisite for introducing exceptional, preemptive security measures. This process will be discussed in section 1.6.
Through the process of securitization, the referent object can be framed as, for example, state sovereignty, national identity, social groups, health and physical welfare, environment, etc; and furthermore, the securitizing actor can be, for example, the political elite, government, social or advocacy group, military, etc. (Romaniuk & Webb 2015, 4). An existential threat, then, can in essence be anything that can be framed as a threat powerful enough to compromise the security of a referent object; for example, terrorism, warfare of all kinds, weapons of mass-destruction, cyber attacks, climate change and other environmental threats, transnational crime, migration, and many others (Buzan et al. 1998, 21; Huysmans 2006; Romaniuk & Webb 2015, 4).
In addition, there are many other conceptualizations of securitization; for example, Huysmans (2006, xi-xii) argues that securitization is a “political technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to mobilize politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust”. Therefore, security studies is not principally about evaluating if the identification of threats through political processes is based on real or imagined dangers, or about developing mechanisms for controlling threats, or rectifying mis-perceptions. Rather, security and insecurity are social constructions, and distinctions like 'friend' and 'enemy' are inter-subjectively constructed, stemming from a particular community's sense of identity, values, and history (Huysmans 2006, xi-xii). Therefore, regardless of how “real” a threat an issue represents, it can become a security issue, quite simply, due to the fact that it is presented and accepted as such, irrespective of its threatening qualities (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2014, 95; Romaniuk & Webb 2015, 9). It is thus not objectively given what is considered a security threat, and, in fact, it can even be the very opposite of reality (Hammerstad 2014, 266).
Securitization is, therefore, studying the power politics of a concept, aiming to understand who securitizes, on what issues (i.e., threats), for whom (i.e., referent objects), why, with what results, and under which conditions (i.e., how is successfulness of securitization determined) (Buzan et al. (1998, 32). Finally, securitization is a speech-act that “can only be successful (receive acceptance by a community of speakers) under certain felicity conditions, namely situations in which ‘a
securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is 'normal politics' (Buzan et al. 1998: 32).
1.3. Other 'schools' of securitization
Although one particular strand of securitization theory, the Copenhagen School, will be focused on in this thesis, the other schools will be briefly discussed as well. Such schools of securitization include the Copenhagen School, Paris School, and Aberystwyth/Welsh School (Floyd & Croft 2011).
All of these schools share the principle that a security threat is not objectively given, but rather, subjectively constructed, and possibly leading into change of behavior and policy. For example, Balzacq et al. (2015, 1), representing a 'Paris School' view, conceptualize securitization as a three-step process aiming to “explain the politics through which (1) the security character of public problems is established, (2) the social commitments resulting from the collective acceptance that a phenomenon is a threat are fixed and (3) the possibility of a particular policy is created”. This is very similar to the earlier process as explained by Buzan et al. (1998, 26), as well as Floyd's (2015, 1) definition: “(1) the identification of a threat that justifies a response (securitizing move) is followed by (2) a change of behaviour (action) by a relevant agent (that is, the securitizing actor or someone instructed by the same), and also (3) the action taken is justified by the securitizing actor with reference to the threat they identified and declared in the securitizing move”.
Different strands of securitization theory, according to Balzacq et al. (2015, 2), differ in regards to whether the “performative power” of speech-acts is 'built-in' to the word 'security'. Furthermore, there are disagreements on whether security acquires its “performative power” only when used by particular actors in particular contexts (Balzacq et al. 2015, 2). Additional differences between the schools are apparent in their approach to the separation between 'normal' and 'exceptional' politics; and related to this, the definition of 'successful' securitization has been contested. That is, it is up to debate whether the recourse to exceptional security measures are required in order for the securitization to be successful (Buzan et al. 1998; Floyd 2015). Another notion of the speech-acts and the successfulness of securitization the different schools disagree on, is whether they are independent from the audience; that is, if the acceptance of the audience is required in order for securitization to be successful (Floyd 2015, 1-2).
The Copenhagen School is chosen as a most appropriate strand for this thesis due to its focus on, for example, speeches of high-level officials and official statements and policies of government agencies. In contrast, other schools might emphasize analysis of bureaucratic procedures or technocratic documents, which are in the particular context of this thesis largely unavailable.
1.4. Criticism of securitization
The Copenhagen School is widely considered to have spawned the theory of securitization, but the school, and the entire theory of securitization, has also been subject to criticism by a host of scholars. Floyd (2015) argues that there are two interrelated problems in the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory; first, the challenge that non-exceptional security polices pose to the theory, as per the assumption that securitization is ‘successful’ only when it results in the adoption of extraordinary emergency measures. Second, the theory suffers from a “constructivist deficit” because the criteria for the ‘success’ of securitization are set by scholars instead of practitioners. According to Floyd (2015, 1) a more “radically constructivist” security theory would require practitioners to be in charge of defining the ‘success’ of securitization.
Furthermore, according to Romaniuk and Webb (2015, 5), securitization theory has been criticized for “under-theorization” of several relevant aspects in the overall securitization process, for example the relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience. Further criticism against the Copenhagen School is due to its sole focus on speech-acts and the dismissal of aspects that exist outside the discourse, for example, historical and social contexts that arguably facilitate the development of security issues (Romaniuk & Webb 2015, 5). Similarly, according to Bigo (2014, 211), the shortcomings of securitization include “'presentism' by a lack of attention to the space/time 'structuration' that rendered possible an event, sensationalism linked to media pressure, 'decontextualization' regarding the specific social universes the security actors come from, implicit 'decisionism' through the focus on ‘exceptional events’, and lack of attention to the dispositions of the agents and the contexts”. However, it could also be argued that the historical and social contexts are included in the discourse; and therefore, securitization indeed takes them into account.
In spite of this criticism, the securitization theory, especially the Copenhagen School, remains one of the most widely used security theories. Especially the approach of the Copenhagen School has
arguably been fruitful in building a general analytical framework that can effectively be applied to scores topics ranging from immigration, health, the rights of minorities, and the war on terror (Romaniuk & Webb 2015, 5).
1.5. Securitization of terrorism
“Macrosecuritization”, a concept introduced by Buzan and Waever (2009), is a 'high-level' securitization of a 'top rank threat' that consists of many 'mid-level' or 'lower-level' securitizations. A paramount example of such macrosecuritization is the war on terror, for it is the result of bundling together of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, migration, drugs, and crime (Buzan & Waever 2009, 257). In accordance with this idea of macrosecuritization, Romaniuk and Webb (2015, 10) argue that, in spite of its criticism, securitization is particularly useful in the context of war on terror, and that securitizing the war on terror has lead into the establishment of an incredibly powerful narrative. An overarching macrosecuritization of international terrorism has been constructed by combining a number of low-level, niche-, and other securitizations, resulting in a “monolithic threat” (Romaniuk & Webb 2015, 1).
At the very fundamental level of this narrative is the juxtaposition of the US, liberal democracies, and the 'free world' against terrorist organizations seeking to destroy the former (McCrisken 2012, 786; Romaniuk & Webb 2015, 10). The western world has been portrayed as the referent object so effectively that this narrative is oftentimes difficult to question and problematize. Furthermore, this narrative is unquestionably linked to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in America, and a great deal of symbolism, emotional value, and “representation of a zero-sum game” has been attached to it (Romaniuk & Webb 2015, 10-11). In addition to becoming a significant part of the US foreign policy, the securitization of war on terror has clearly become institutionalized and normalized. That is, the terrorism narrative has become a powerful social structure, or even, a “hegemonic discourse” (Romaniuk & Webb 2015, 10-11). In Jackson's (2007, 234, 238) words, an almost incontestable “acceptable knowledge” of terrorism has emerged.
Therefore, Romaniuk and Webb (2015, 11) argue that the fight against terrorism serves as a “normative organization” allowing the securitizing agent to “construct understandings of and sensitivities about security and threats to that security”. In accordance with securitization theory, consequential to this construction of public perceptions about the existential threat, a number of
exceptional security measures have been adopted by many governments. For example in the case of the US, while many of these policies existed before 9/11, the post-9/11 narrative has significantly facilitated a more substantial application of these policies and the adoption of new exceptional security policies (Romaniuk & Webb 2015, 11). Therefore, this thesis argues that the fight against terrorism serves as a paramount practical example of securitization theory.
1.6. Preemption
“Self-defense and preemption, while perhaps less controversial now than in times past, remains a vociferous subject of international debate” (Hunter 2009, 7).
This section will discuss preemption, a concept inherently related to the earlier conceptualization of securitization. Dershowitz (2007, 153-154) argues that we are undergoing a fundamental shift in our approach to controlling harmful conduct. As a result of securitization of a perceived (existential) security threat, policies aiming to preempt the threat, that is, to stop it before it can materialize, have emerged. These policies, as discussed in previous sections, stem from lifting an issue from 'normal' politics to the realm of 'emergency' politics, justified and legitimized through speech-acts. Therefore, such policies materialize in exceptional measures that are introduced by bypassing normal democratic procedures. Furthermore, these policies would not be likely to have been introduced through normal democratic procedures. This shift in the way of dealing with security threats, according to Dershowitz (2007, 153-154), can have tremendous, and possibly unconsidered, implications on civil liberties, human rights, criminal justice, national security, foreign policy, and international law.
“By saying 'security'”, Buzan et al. (1998, 21) argue, the securitizing actor declares a sense of emergency, claiming a right and a need to use whatever means necessary to stop the threat from materializing, that is, to preempt the threat. Furthermore, Buzan and Hansen (2009, 226) state that “in times of (discursively constituted) war, the money and manpower allocated to the military increase, and encroachment on civil, liberal and human rights are more likely to meet with public acceptance”. Therefore, the perceptions of 'security' and 'threat' have become the key to legitimize the use of force and other preemptive measures by 'breaking free of rules'.
security practices incapable to deal with the incalculable, disastrous and imminent threat of terrorism (de Goede 2008, 162). These measures include, but are not limited to, law and border enforcement, monitoring passenger name records, communications, and financial data, and an all-out war. Therefore, according to de Goede (2008, 163-164), “the politics of preemption in the war on terror is a practice of securitization that has to be conceptualized through the larger philosophical-political turn towards risk in diverse areas of contemporary politics”.
For example, the National Security Strategy of the United States, a policy document released shortly after the 9/11 attacks, has been in a major role in justifying preemptive security measures against suspected future terrorist activities (de Goede 2008, 161-163; Dershowitz 2007, 153-157). The document has been widely criticized for justifying the war in Iraq, but it also defines and justifies, in a wider sense, the preemptive measures of the US introduced in order to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations at an early stage (de Goede 2008, 161-162; Dershowitz 2007, 153-157; White House 2002, 5)
As for preemptive security measures in Europe, de Goede (2008, 161) maintains that it has been argued that Europe would be especially opposed to preemptive security practices due to its preference to rely on the rule of law; however, in a number of key policies of preemptive security practice, Europe is, in fact world leader as opposed to a “reluctant follower”. Interestingly, the European aspect of targeted killings might emphasize this view. This aspect will be discussed in the following chapters in more depth. The EU as counter-terrorism actor will be discussed in the next chapter, and in particular, the preemptive security measures undertaken by the EU will be discussed in section 2.3.
1.7. Targeted killing as a preemptive security measure
“Targeted killing is, without question, a form of preemption” (Hunter 2009, 7-8).
In accordance with Hunter (2009, 3), targeted killing (or assassination) is defined in this thesis as the “premeditated, preemptive, and intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or believed to represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and security of a state through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals”. In the context of the fight against terrorism, the goal of targeted killing is to proactively eliminate, that is, to preempt, the terrorist threat by eliminating
the suspects before they have a chance to attack their supposed target (Hunter 2009, 7-8).
There is an important distinction, according to Hunter (2009, 3-5), between targeted killing and assassination. That is, assassination is the killing of an individual or group of individuals for purely political or ideological reasons, while targeted killing, in contrast, is the killing of an individual or group of individuals without regard for politics or ideology, but rather exclusively for reasons of state self-defense (Hunter 2009, 5).
Appealing to for example the Article 51 of the Charter of the UN (United Nations 2016), many nations view targeted killing as a legitimate form of (proactive) self-defense in the war against terrorism. However, due to the often transnational and asymmetric nature of the terrorist threat, Hunter (2009, 8) argues that the UN is institutionally and materially ill-equipped to deal with it. Therefore, nations are by and large left on their own to resolve the problem, which has often lead into adoption of preemptive measures like targeted killings.
Self-defense, then, is a socially constructed and often a relatively vaguely defined concept that can also be applied to scenarios where proactive and offensive action is taken. This sort of logic is characteristic to, for example, the EU counter-terrorism policy that has a notable external dimension, as well as the counter-terrorism discourse of the countries studied in this thesis. This aspect will be discussed in more depth in the following chapters.
Securitization of international terrorism in the war on terror, according to Romaniuk and Webb (2015, 1), has been powerful enough justify the use of drone warfare and targeted killings as a preemptive security measure. Therefore, during the last decade of the fight against terrorism, targeted killings have become remarkably common (Dorsey & Paulussen 2015a, 2015b; European Parliament 2014b, 3; Martins 2015; Romaniuk & Webb 2015, 1-2). The clandestine operations of terrorist organizations have lead into many countries increasingly turning to specialized equipment and tactics, such as targeted killings by drones (Dorsey & Paulussen 2015a; Hunter 2009, 3).
As noted in the introduction of this thesis, there are numerous concerns raised regarding targeted killings. These include, for example, the number of civilian casualties and contradictions with international law and human rights (Amnesty International 2012; Currier 2015; Dorsey & Paulussen 2015a; Human Rights Watch 2013; Paulussen et al. 2015, 39-42; Scahill 2015b), lack of transparency in the operations (Amnesty International 2012; Human Rights Watch 2014; Scahill
2015a), the extra-judicial nature of targeted killing as punishment (European Parliament 2014a), the legality of strikes outside active combat zones (Martins 2015, 247-248), the political repercussions and possible counter-productivity of the strikes (Hunter 2009, 1), the shortcomings in the target selection process (de Goede & Sullivan 2016, 68; Scahill 2015b), the psychological effects on local populations living in fear of the strikes (Stanford Law School & NYU School of Law 2012), and the engagement of western governments in “riskless warfare” (Martins 2015, 248). However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to analyze these concerns further, as it aims to analyze the engagement in these strikes through the lens of securitization theory.
The academic focus on targeted killings is, however, limited, with most of the scarce literature focusing on the US targeted killing program (Hunter 2009; Martins 2015, 247-248). The reluctance of most nations to acknowledge any formal policy regarding targeted killing further contributes to the scarcity of published literature (Hunter 2009, 2).
1.8. Summary
This chapter has argued that securitization, one of the most widely used security theories, is concerned with social construction of a security threat through speech-acts. By framing an issue as an existential security threat, an issue is lifted out of the normal democratic scrutiny into the realm of emergency politics, thus making the call for exceptional security policies and “breaking free of rules” possible. Furthermore, this chapter has argued that a number of exceptional, preemptive security practices have been introduced consequential to the securitization of terrorism. One of the most controversial of such measures, yet often overlooked, is targeted killing. Targeted killings conducted by drones and other methods have become a common mode of operation in the fight against terrorism. This chapter has argued that the fight against terrorism and the recourse to exceptional measures like targeted killings function as a case point for securitization. Due to the central role of discourse in securitization, this chapter has emphasized the suitability of discourse analysis as a research method in this context. The next chapter will discuss the evolution of EU as a counter-terrorism actor, its counter-terrorism policy and preemptive security policies it has developed.
CHAPTER 2: EU COUNTER-TERRORISM
Although this thesis is concerned with individual EU member states rather than the EU as a whole, discussion about EU counter-terrorism policy is important as a starting point for analysis. The countries discussed are major EU member states and security actors, and furthermore, crucial parts of the EU military capacity.
As a consequence of 9/11 and the subsequent terrorist attacks, the terrorism threat has become a major focus of attention in European Union and its member states. That is, it is now the focus of enormous intellectual and material investment from policy-makers, the security establishment, the emergency services, industry and commerce, and the media (Jackson 2007, 233).
The external dimension of EU counter-terrorism, according to Ferreira-Pereira and Martins (2012, 460-461), remains theoretically mostly unexplored, however, some pioneering analyses have been conducted, for example, by de Goede (2008), Kaunert (2012), Keohane (2008), and Martins and Ferreira-Pereira (2012). The following chapter will draw on the work of these authors in order to be able to conceptualize the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism policy.
2.1. Terrorism in Europe
In a 2015 Europol report titled 'EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report', the Director of Europol, Rob Wainwright, states that terrorism is an “ongoing threat to the security of EU citizens and interests, which has been particularly exacerbated by the conflict in Syria and Iraq” (Europol 2015, 5). Moreover, the report maintains that terrorism has increased on a global scale for over ten years, and that the relatively low number of attacks in the EU, as compared to that of for example Africa or the Middle East, is due to the successful interventions of intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the EU member states (Europol 2015, 5).
In spite of this relative success in counter-terrorism operations, the Europol report (2015, 5) states that particularly religiously inspired terrorists have “continued to demonstrate their intent and capability to conduct indiscriminate violent acts”, and that the threat from these groups is increasingly acute. Furthermore, according to the report, citizens and residents of the EU traveling to (and returning from) countries including Syria, Iraq, and Mali for the purpose of fighting for
extremist groups “continue to be of major concern to all Member States” (Europol 2015, 5). In addition, the report points out that in 2014 a first attack carried out by a returned fighter from Syria took place. Finally, according to the report, the 2015 attacks in France and Denmark have re-confirmed the need for strong international terrorism cooperation and made counter-terrorism an even higher priority in the EU (Europol 2015, 5).
Similarly, according to many scholars, a number EU governments insist that terrorism, 'Islamic terrorism' in particular, constitutes a remarkable threat to European and global security (Guild 2008, 178; Kaunert 2012, 578-579; Keohane 2008, 125-126). Further, terrorism is considered to be one of the five key threats to European security, the other ones being proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (Bendiek & Kaim 2015, 1; European External Action Service 2003, 3-5; Keohane 2008, 125-126).
It is, however, important to notice that the way terrorism is commonly being referred to, is mostly concerned with post-9/11 Islamic extremism or terrorism. Yet, as a phenomenon, terrorism has emerged significantly before the notorious Islamic terrorist attacks have taken place in early twenty-first century. Indeed, according to Law (2009), terrorism can be traced back to Antiquity, while the nineteenth century was a key period in its emergence. In addition, there is a strong tendency to understand only Islamic extremism as terrorism, while attacks of for example left-wing or right-wing extremists are not always considered terrorism with similar media attention. In the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, for example, the Red Brigades of Italy and the IRA in Great Britain are good examples of politically-inspired terrorism that has taken place in Europe before the current 'wave' of Islamic terrorism (Hunter 2009, 20-25). Another recent example of political terrorism is the 2011 killing of 77 people in Norway by a right-wing extremist, Anders Behring Breivik.
Nevertheless, consequential to the terrorist attacks in early twenty-first century in the US, Spain and the UK, al-Qaeda emerged as the most dangerous international terrorist organization (Kaunert 2012, 578-579). Furthermore, the danger that al-Qaeda represents mainly stems from its specific organization and structure, making international cooperation crucial in fighting it. That is, due to its 'modus operandi' and the structure of a transnational network, fighting al-Qaeda and gathering intelligence also has to happen in a transnational setting. Al-Qaeda is, according to many authors (see Kaunert 2012, 578-579), the most widely dispersed terrorist organization in the world, with presence in more than 60 countries. In addition to al-Qaeda, there is another major global terrorist organization that has emerged more recently and also struck Europe (for example the devastating
attacks in Paris in late 2015) and continues to pose a significant threat, namely the Islamic State, or ISIS. Similar to al-Qaeda is its transnational structure and mode of operation (Callimachi et al. 2016; DePillis 2015).
2.2. Evolution of the EU as a counter-terrorism actor
“That the European Union has become an important security actor is no longer in doubt” (Guild 2008, 173).
In contrast to the recent calls for cooperation to effectively tackle the threat presented by terrorism, the situation in the EU at the time of the 9/11 attacks was characterized by a general lack of cooperation in counter-terrorism (Kaunert 2012, 578-579). However, concurrently with the aforementioned rising fear of terrorism since the attacks in early 21st century, those events launched an “ever more profound engagement by the EU in security issues both within the Member States and outside the territory of the EU” (Bigo et al. 2006; Guild 2008, 173). Similarly, many authors (Argomaniz et al. 2015, 196-197; Boin et al. 2014, 134; Ferreira-Pereira & Martins 2012, 461; Guild 2008, 173; Kaunert 2012, 578-579; Keohane 2008, 125-126) argue that greater European co-operation in fighting terrorism has been called for by the EU politicians since 9/11, and especially after the attacks of 2004 in Madrid and 2005 in London. According to Guild (2008, 178), until these terrorist attacks there had been very little coordination at the EU level, but a framework for an EU counter-terrorism program was developed rapidly in the aftermath of the attacks. Until then, there had been no European-wide response to terrorist attacks that took place in Europe in 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's, for they were mostly considered internal affairs of the states to be addressed by national authorities (Ferreira-Pereira & Martins 2012, 461).
However, according to Boin et al. (2014, 134), there had been some European-wide counter-terrorist cooperation also prior to the said attacks. That is, established in 1976, the so-called 'Trevi Group' consisted of high-level officials from interior ministries of the member states as well as heads of security and intelligence agencies. During this time, political violence, or terrorism, was encountered on a regular basis in some European countries, for example in the UK by the IRA and in Italy by the Red Brigades. The group organized informal gatherings of the officials, with the aim of facilitating information-sharing on terrorism and international crime. Consequential to the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the group formally became a part of the former 'third
pillar' of the EU policy. Moreover, following the concern expressed by many heads of state that “terrorism should be considered a common threat to democracy, economic, and social development”, a specific reference to terrorism was included in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. It noted that that in order to be able to ensure safety of its citizens, preventing and combating crime, terrorism in particular, is one of the key tasks the EU must achieve (Boin et al. 2014, 134).
In fact, member states have recently worked through the EU to deepen collaboration on all types of security-related issues. Further, cooperation in the military realm has increased considerably. The EU has formulated a new generation of multilateral responses to other transboundary threats as well, such as pandemics, terrorism, infrastructural breakdowns, health and environmental hazards, and, most recently, financial crises (Boin et al. 2009, 285-286).
There is, however, no denying that the counter-terrorism agenda of the EU gained a significant momentum after the 9/11 attacks, with the European Council pledging to increase counter-terrorism cooperation (Boin et al. 2014, 134). Indeed, the literature is unanimous in recognizing that the 9/11 attacks had a groundbreaking effect, challenging the very understanding of terrorism and the means to deal with it (Argomaniz et al. 2015, 192-193; Boin et al. 2014; de Goede 2008; Dershowitz 2007; Ferreira-Pereira & Martins 2012, 461; Kaunert 2009; Keohane 2008). Argomaniz et al. (2015, 192-193) argue that even though counter-terrorism is an area that remains undefined in its broadest and fullest sense, it is clear that it covers a wide range of other policy areas across all of the areas that were formerly known as the three pillars of EU external policy.
The emergence of transnational terrorism, according to Ferreira-Pereira and Martins (2012, 461-462), called for an integrated EU response; and thus, since its coming into existence, both EU counter-terrorism policy and rhetoric have arguably had an external dimension. Importantly, the EU counter-terrorism operations are undertaken in a very complex environment. That is, the EU is not a federal state, nor does it have a 'regular' government at the supranational level with all the powers and capabilities of regular government, which underlines the complexity of the European security environment. International cooperation is, therefore, deemed crucial (Kaunert 2012, 579-580).
It is also important to note that with the exception of the EU’s Counter-terrorism Coordinator, none of the EU agencies and institutions involved in EU counter-terrorism have a mandate exclusively for counter-terrorism. Similarly, many of the legal instruments utilized in the fight against terrorism are by and large anti-crime measures. Hence, Argomaniz et al. (2015, 194-195) and Boin et al.
(2014) argue that it is important to notice that there are, in fact, three levels of abstraction of EU counter-terrorism capacities. These are, namely, capacities explicitly designed to contribute to the fight against terrorism, capacities designed to manage a variety of threats and natural disasters in general, and capacities of the EU institutions helping a number of national agencies to respond to a variety of threats (Argonamiz et al. 2015, 194-195).
2.3. Preemptive security practices of the EU
Shortly after 9/11, the EU made a number of efforts to introduce preemptive security practices. For example, it adopted a 'Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism', an 'Action Plan to Fight Terrorism', and a programme aimed to address chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats (Boin et al. 2014, 134). Furthermore, in 2003, the European Council adopted the 'European Security Strategy' insisting that “terrorism poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe and that Europe is both a target and a base for terrorism” (Boin et al. 2014, 134). Shortly after the 2004 Madrid attacks, the European Council called for a revised Plan of Action. The revised document recommended increasing the authority of Europol and authorized a special anti-terrorist unit to improve the sharing of police data and information and to conclude operational agreements with other countries, most importantly the United States. It also proposed further measures aimed at the suppression of terrorist financing, including several instruments to allow for the freezing of assets and the tracking of transfers of funds across borders (Boin et al. 2014, 134).
In addition, 'The Hague Programme' of 2004 took another clear step towards politics of preemption, emphasizing “prevention, preparedness, and response to terrorism offences, reduction of terrorists’ financial and economic resources, and exchange of investigation information and protection of critical infrastructure programmes” (Boin et al. 2014, 134). Further, other crucial EU counter-terrorism components include the exchange of information between police and intelligence agencies, development of external action, production of counter-terrorism legislation, border control, and fight against terrorist recruitment (Argomaniz et al. 2015, 192-193; Kaunert 2012, 579-580). It is exactly due to this kind of rhetoric, programmes and practices that de Goede (2008, 161-163) describes the EU as a “world leader” in a number of preemptive security practices. What is more, the first EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, Gijs de Vries, has claimed that the fight against terrorism is changing “the role and functioning of the European Union” as it adopts an increasingly operational character in this area (quoted in Argomaniz et al. 2015, 196-197).
One of the key preemptive measures of EU in the fight against terrorism is the creation of lists of organizations and persons who are suspected of having links with international terrorism in order to have their assets frozen (Guild 2008, 174-175; de Goede & Sullivan 2016). The use of blacklists of organizations and persons developed rapidly after 9/11, both in the US and in the EU. The creation of the lists of persons suspected of links with international terrorism has depended heavily on the pooling of information from intelligence services in the member states. This is clearly another indication of the EU’s growing role as a security actor and the increase in its preemptive security practices.
2.4. EU position on targeted killings
Targeted killings have a long history in international relations, and Schweiger (2015, 269) argues that the perception of them seems to has fundamentally changed. That is, until recently targeted killings on foreign territory have been regarded as clearly unlawful political practices. The EU Council in early 2000's, according to Schweiger, had taken a very strong stance against targeted killings, and “condemned the extra-judicial killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and seven other Palestinians” by Israel (Council of the European Union 2014, 1; Schweiger 2015, 269).
However, despite public critique, governments of EU member states have not taken a clear stance towards the ongoing practice of targeted killings using armed drones. According to Schweiger (2015, 269), whatever the reasons are for the silence, in international law a “non-reaction is not a mere absence”, and furthermore “the silence of governments functions in particular ways and has become part of the current interpretative struggle about changing international principles regarding the right to self-defence and 'targeted killing'”. Silence is necessarily a political act which has an effect on the debate over whether and how international law is changing. Moreover, some experts count this silence as tacit consent to targeted killing practices (Dworkin 2013; Schweiger 2015, 269).
In rare statement, one of the few of its kind, the European Parliament has expressed great concern over the use of drones outside the international legal framework, and called for development of a European-wide policy (European Parliament 2014). However, the EU still lacks a policy on the use of armed drones, and as pointed out earlier, it is a topic mostly met with silence (Dorsey &
Paulussen 2015; Dworkin 2013; Martins & Backhaus 2015). Furthermore, not only have the EU and its member states remained relatively silent on targeted killings, the European perspective mostly remains overlooked on the academic front as well (Martins 2015).
Another occurrence of EU-level discussion on the use of armed drones is the European External Action Service (2014) document, in which the EU identifies five scenarios in which civilian and military drones could could be deployed in the CSDP missions (European External Action Service 2014, 10; Martins 2015, 249-250). These are, namely, separation of parties by force; stabilization, reconstruction and military advice to third countries; conflict prevention; evacuation operations; and assistance to humanitarian operations (European External Action Service 2014, 10). These scenarios, however, are very broadly defined and are not sufficient to serve as framework for the use of armed drones.
Therefore, the author of one of the few academic studies on the topic, Bruno Oliveira Martins (2015, 248) argues that a “clear positioning of Brussels is required due to consistency with former practices in similar events and with fundamental vectors of EU foreign and security policy, as well as legal and strategic demands”. Furthermore, Dorsey and Paulussen (2015) argue that the EU position should resolutely reconfirm that the current international legal framework is suitable to address issues that arise with drones; that there must be a legal basis for drone strikes; that drone strikes in the context of an armed conflict must fully comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law; and that drone strikes outside of armed conflict situations must be governed by the law enforcement paradigm.
2.5. Criticism of EU counter-terrorism
Guild (2008, 174-175) argues that academic concern on the human rights consequences of the EU’s counter-terrorism policies is substantial. For example, the practices of blacklisting and other security lists have gained a lot of attention and concern for their alleged human rights violations.
The EU counter-terrorism in general has also faced some criticism, for example, its efficiency, coherence, and implementation has been questioned; characterizing the EU as an ineffective counter-terrorism actor, a bureaucratic “paper tiger” (Kaunert 2012, 579-580). Furthermore, Guild (2008) criticizes the mechanisms by which the EU became a counter-terrorist actor. That is, after the
