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Agenda change at the European Commission:
the case of electric pulse fishing
Michael Kunst
S-1698524
BAP:
Agenda-setting and policy-making in the European Union
Mentor:
Dr. I.L. Elias Carrillo (Leiden University)
Word count: 7995 2 June 2020
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Table of contents
Chapter 1: Introduction p. 3
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework p. 5
2.1 Political actors in EU agenda-setting p. 5
2.2 Issue characteristics in EU agenda-setting p. 6
Chapter 3: Necessary adjustments to the Multiple Streams Framework p. 7
3.1 The problem stream: mechanisms of attention p. 8
3.2 The political stream: supporting an issue p. 9
3.3 The policy stream: possible solutions p. 10
3.4 Windows of opportunity and policy-entrepreneurship p. 11 3.5 Justifying the usage of the Multiple Streams Framework p. 12
Chapter 4: Methodology p. 12
Chapter 5: Analysis p. 13
5.1 The problem stream p. 13
5.2 The political stream p. 16
5.3 The policy stream p. 17
5.4 Window of opportunity p. 18
5.5 Policy-entrepreneurship p. 19
Chapter 6: Conclusion p. 22
3 Chapter 1: Introduction
The European Council’s Regulation No 850/98 prohibited the usage of electronic current for fishery in 1998 (European Commission, 1998). Electric pulse fishing is a fishing method that replaces tickler chains with a beam trawl that uses electrodes. Electrodes provide electrical stimuli instead of mechanical stimuli through tickler chains (Haasnoot, Kraan & Bush, 2016, p. 1236). Article 31 of Regulation No 850/98 describes the usage of electric current as an unconventional fishing method. However, Article 41 allows an exception: electric current was permitted for catching tuna and basking shark in the Skagerrak and Kattegat, which are parts of the North Sea and the waters between Denmark and Sweden. It was not until 2007 that the European Commission (henceforth: Commission) proposed amendments on the usage of electrical pulse current (European Commission, 2008). The Netherlands had requested for a derogation regarding the use of electric beam trawls (ICES, 2009). The advisory institutions issued a recommendation to the European Union (henceforth: EU) stating that: “Although the development of this technology should not be halted, there are a number of issues that need to be resolved before any derogation can be granted” (ICES, 2009, p. 14). However, the
Commission disregarded the advice and introduced a derogation on a restrictive basis as formulated in EC Regulation No 41/2006.
On behalf of the advice of the Scientific, Technological and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), the use of beam trawls with electric pulse current was allowed in certain zones as described by ICES. The fishing technique became allowed for no more than 5% of the beam trawler fleet of each member state (European Commission, 2008). The Commission relies on maritime advice of the STECF and ICES. Prior to electric pulse fishing becoming authorized under certain conditions in 2007, the ICES explained why a derogation to Regulation No 850/98 could be allowed:
Under EC regulation 850/98 (article 31.1) it is illegal to use such an electrical gear. The rationale for this was the potential increase in CPUE (catch per unit effort) with the electrified beam trawl at a time when policy was aimed at reducing fleet capacity. However, the environmental concerns relating to physical impact on the sea floor caused by beam trawling and the increased fuel prices, have caused a renewed interest in this technology (ICES, 2006).
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In their conclusions, ICES expected that electrical trawls could cause reductions in catch rates, lower trawl path mortality, and a reduction in fuel consumption because of the lighter gear (ICES, 2006).
Contrary to the regulations, the Dutch fleet was accused of having more than 5% of its fleet equipped with the electric pulse trawl by the NGO Bloom Association in 2017 (Bloom, 2017). Multiple media outlets caught wind of this story and published about the complaint (‘Pêche électrique: plainte contre les Pays-Bas’, 2017). Eventually, a prohibition on electric pulse fishing was implemented by June 2021 as covered in EU Regulation 2019/1241 (European Commission, 2019b).
This thesis will illustrate the progression of regulations and proposals regarding electric pulse fishing from initially being allowed to becoming a heavily criticized fishing technique, eventually leading to its prohibition in 2019. This study will research how electric pulse fishing became an issue on the agenda of the Commission and how its reputation changed. Therefore, the following research question will be studied in this thesis:
How can the Multiple Streams Framework explain the revaluation of electric pulse fishing as an issue on the European Commission’s agenda?
The word ‘revaluation’ refers to the fact that electric pulse fishing arrived on the
Commission’s agenda in 2006 as a promising, efficient fishing method, but eventually rose on the agenda as a harmful technique.
The analysis will be done by applying Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework
(henceforth: MSF). Kingdon composed five core assumptions to successfully change agendas (Herweg, 2016, p. 13). Briefly formulated, the political, problem, and policy stream must become ripe, a window of opportunity must open and finally, a policy-entrepreneur must couple the streams during the opened window of opportunity (Herweg, 2016, pp. 13-14). With this in mind, the original MSF was designed to study agenda-setting on the federal level in the United States and not political entities such as the EU (Herweg, 2016, p. 14). Therefore, the MSF must be adapted towards a framework that could be used to analyse agenda-setting in the EU. Adapting the original MSF will be done under the chapter Theoretical framework with the help of previous work on adjusting the MSF (Herweg, 2016 ; Zahariadis, 2008) to an EU suited theory.
It should be clarified that this study will not focus on the electric pulse fishing technique itself or its consequences, nor judge the prohibition as a whole. This study will research the agenda-setting process of electric pulse fishing in the EU. Different sources will
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be analysed in addition to previous scientific work on MSF and EU agenda-setting, EU
regulations and other institutional documents, and publications by involved non-governmental organisations. This thesis concludes by discussing the ability of the modified MSF to explain cases in agenda-setting processes.
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework
The original MSF was not developed to study cases of agenda-setting in the EU nor was it meant for institutional level cases. The theory focused on analysing the dynamics between agency and institutions to explain policy processes and policies change (Ackrill, Kay & Zahariadis, 2013, p. 871). Kingdon developed the MSF by implementing a ‘lens’ that was developed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). They designed the lens in the scope of their development of the Garbage Can Model (GCM). GCM studies how decision-makers make choices when they have to resolve problems (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 8). The lens is made up of three main assumptions. First, “policy-makers operate under significant and varying time constraints” (Ackrill et al., 2013, p. 872). This means policy-makers cannot concentrate on all problems simultaneously and they must compromise with outcomes that might not meet their preferences. Second, “means and ends, solutions and problems, are generated independently from each other” (Ackrill et al., 2013, p. 871). This results in information and consequences being unclear. Due to these inconsistencies, no policy-maker or institution is able to define the actual problem and its consequences (Alpaslan & Mitroff, 2011, p. 23). Third, “ambiguity permeates the process” (Ackrill et al., 2013, p. 872). The element of ambiguity is broadly analysed in MSF as well. Ambiguity in the light of policy processes could be explained by three assumptions: participations in the policy-making process have unclear targets, their participation in decision-making is overlapping different cases of decision-making, and decisions mandates usually are broadly applicable (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 517). Ambiguity does not solute problems, but it facilitates the opportunity to decision-makers to make a choice (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 16).
2.1 Political actors in EU agenda-setting
The process of EU agenda-setting is different from agenda-setting at the national level. The MSF cannot be applied to an agenda-setting study on the European level without adapting its fundamental concepts (Herweg, 2016, p. 16). One reason to adjust the MSF is the different types of actors that operate on the EU level compared to those at the member state level (Princen, 2016, p. 355). Previous work emphasized the role of supranational actors in the EU and how that relates to governments of member states. Looking at the EU, one could
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distinguish three different institutions that possess supranational power: the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice (Princen, 2016, p. 355). Member state governments are core actors in EU agenda-setting and decision-making but the Commission possesses exclusive power to propose policies (Herweg, 2016, p. 19).
Furthermore, the Commission acts on the principle of collegiality which makes it unlikely for a single Commissioner to work against a proposal. This further strengthens the narrative of the Commission as a unique entity in EU agenda-setting (Herweg, 2016, p. 19 ; Ackrill et al., 2013, p. 876). Therefore, aiming at the Commission is important because it has implications for the further adjustment of the MSF (Princen, 2016, pp. 355-356).
Another reason to focus at the Commission’s unique position is the possession of executive power. Executive power in the EU is shared between the European Council, the Council of Ministers, and the Commission (Hague, Harrop & McCormick, 2016, p. 32). Member states’ governments possess executive power too, but it is concentrated at one institution: the political leaders of the national administration (Hague et al., 2016, p. 146). As this thesis will reiterate later in this chapter, further explanations of MSF concepts will be provided by referring to the Commission’s unique supranational and executive position. 2.2 Issue characteristics in EU agenda-setting
Before adjusting the MSF to an applicable theory on EU agenda-setting, it is worth analysing the concept of ‘issues’ and how issues follow different paths to make their way onto the agenda. Those paths differ at the national and EU level (Princen, 2009, p. 24). Previous work defines issues by Cobb and Elder’s definition (as cited in Princen, 2009, p. 22): “a conflict between two or more identifiable groups over procedural or substantive matters relating to the distribution of positions or resources”. Issues go through different procedures within agenda-setting and various actors operate in the system. Whereas national agendas are relatively easy to control by a limited number of actors, the EU has a much larger number of actors trying to control the agenda (Princen, 2016, p. 353). Controlling the EU agenda seems more difficult than national agendas. However, the opposite might be true. The multiplicity of actors in EU agenda-setting creates a multiplied number of entries to the EU agenda (Princen, 2016, p. 353).
This relative openness of the EU agenda leads to a diverse field of possible receivers who might be interested in certain issues. But why are some receivers interested and others not? And why do agenda-setting actors prefer to raise issues at particular receivers instead of others? Those questions will be answered by the concept of venue shopping. Venue shopping
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is a strategy used by policymakers to create a setting that enables them to complain about current policies and introduce new policy proposals (Pralle, 2003, p. 233). There have been numerous studies done on venue shopping. Although the original concept was developed in the United States to study federal agendas, the concept can be applied to the EU as well (Princen, 2009, p. 28). Previous work on venue shopping led to a distinction between
‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ venue shopping. The former is defined by venue shopping between different EU institutions and the latter by venue shopping between different political levels (Princen, 2016, p. 353). Studies about both forms of venue shopping are done by Damro (2006) and Sheingate (2000) as described in Princen (2009, p. 28). Different strategies of venue shopping exist and they own unique characteristics. Otherwise, it would not be sufficient to shop between different venues to propose policies. Therefore, agenda-setting actors try to target one or more venues that offer them the best advantages compared to others. This is a rational calculation that must be completed before the agenda-setting actor starts its campaign (Pralle, 2003, pp. 237-238).
Furthermore, previous work analysed the reasons why some issues are transferred to the European level and studied the essential conditions that create this possibility. Three motivations explain why transferring issues is useful. First, actors might want to delegate issues to the EU level to create what Keck and Sikkink (1998) call a ‘boomerang effect’. National actors will move towards the international level when they do not succeed
nationally. They seek international support to increase pressure nationally or internationally. In this scenario, national actors benefit from new resources and attention raised by new actors. This might result in a transnational network pressuring the state (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 12-14). Second, creating a level playing field could be beneficial to overcome differences in production costs between countries (Princen, 2009, p. 29). Finally, there could be an
ideological motivation too. Some actors might want to transfer issues to the international level because they believe their proposals would be beneficial for other states too. This motivation is particularly used in human rights issues (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 12).
Finally, it is worth analysing the attractiveness of the EU as a venue. Bringing issues to the international level does not automatically mean that issues are brought to the EU agenda. Agenda-setting actors will ask themselves what the EU could possibly do for them (Princen, 2009, p. 30). That relies on the instruments that the EU possesses. Financially, the EU instruments might be limited since the EU budget contains roughly 2 percent of the combined budgets of all 28 countries (European Commission, n.d.). However, the EU has much to offer in terms of labour (228,7 million jobs ; Statista, 2018), trade (EU-US trade
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reached a value of $1,3 trillion in 2018 ; Office of the US Trade Representative, 2020), and in terms of regulatory instruments, such as regulations and directives. European legislation can be legally binding to its member states and the Commission is allowed to pressure non-compliant members (Princen, 2009, pp. 30-31).
Chapter 3: Necessary adjustments to the MSF
The previous chapter of this thesis described the differences and characteristics of actors and issues in EU agenda-setting. Now that those elements are described, the actual adjustment of the original MSF can be fulfilled. Firstly, the three streams will be conceptualized. Secondly, opening windows of opportunity and coupling the streams due to policy-entrepreneurship will be explained. Additionally, policy-entrepreneurs’ task to frame issues as problematic to become a problem in Kingdon’s model will be explained (Herweg, 2016, p. 18). This task relates to questions about why problems are subject to the EU and why it should be the EU that undertakes action. Finally, the concept of ‘attention’ will be defined in the light of
‘problem recognition’, a process that labels issues as problematic through indicators, focusing events, and feedback concerning previous policies (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, pp. 14-15). 3.1 The problem stream: attention mechanisms
The problem stream is defined by problem recognition and must offer the essential legitimacy to justify any political action (Bache, 2013, p. 31). Focusing events, indicators, and feedback concerning previous policies identify this stream. These mechanisms occur at the member state level as well as at the European level (Herweg, 2016, p. 18). Policy-entrepreneurs use these mechanisms to frame the problem as problematic since policies are not developed rationally and linearly (Ackrill et al., 2013, p. 873). Additionally, Herweg (2016, p. 18) argues that problems arisen at the member state level must be framed accurately to explain why the Commission should take action.
Focusing events are sudden, unpredictable events that catch attention from the public and the political elite simultaneously (Birkland, 1997, p. 3). Tragic examples are the 2004 and 2005 terrorist attacks in Madrid and London that led to new policies and changed visions on terrorism (Ackrill et al., 2013, p. 573). The strength of focusing events in the agenda-setting process is their harmful, sudden, and unexpected character (Birkland, 1997, p. 3). Indicators are used to describe and estimate the existence and magnitude of a problem (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 517). Herweg’s study (2016) provides examples about energy regulations in the EU. The article identified the EU’s dependency on gas imports as an indicator of the perceived problem of endangered energy security in the EU (Herweg, 2016, pp. 18-21). In EU
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setting, it is worth emphasizing the Commission’s role in regulating attention to specific issues. The Commission has a duty to collect indicators through reports or White Papers. The Commission’s involvement in problem recognition and problem definition means that stream ripeness and the opening of windows of opportunity overlap (Herweg, 2016, p. 20). Finally, feedback concerning previous policies could define the problem stream. The necessary organizational and individual adaptations that were required by previous policies could cause high sunk costs and “make policy reversal unattractive” (Pierson, 1998, p. 45). Actors that conform themselves to new rules do so because they expect the new rules to continue. Policies that try to exit from those new rules will drastically raise costs for those actors. Therefore, Pierson (1998, p. 46) argues that actors and institutions are “effectively ‘locking in’ previous decisions”. Pierson studied new housing and transportation policies in the United States after the Second World War. Those new policies demanded high investments in
consumption and residences. Similar investments related to suburbanization became the norm. This financing system ‘locked in’ social security policies in the US. Pierson calls this process “a kind of rolling intergenerational contract” (Pierson, 1998, p. 46).
3.2 The political stream: supporting an issue
Kingdon’s original framework defined the political stream as the institution with executive power, namely the government. As discussed earlier in this thesis, the executive power of the EU is spread over multiple institutions: the Council of Ministers, the European Council, and the Commission. Compared to member states, it is rather difficult to identify the ‘government’ of the EU. Simply replacing the government by all three EU executive institutions is not a sufficient solution. Applying the MSF to the EU demands an analytical change of the political stream as put forward by Zahariadis (2008). It will offer an answer for this inconsistency and also provide an explanation on stream ripeness.
This thesis explained the principle of institutional ambiguity in Chapter 2. Institutional ambiguity results in unclear mandates and different cases of decision-making overlap each other (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 517). In terms of the Commission, it means that different policies might overlap the mandates of the Directorate-Generals (Herweg, 2016, p. 19). Another aspect is the principle of collegiality in the Commission. Each Commissioner might address the same issue differently, but all Commissioners must express themselves as the voice of the whole Commission. Individual Commissioners will not work openly against a decision taken by the College of Commissioners (Herweg, 2016, p. 19). Furthermore, the procedure by which the Commission is appointed supports the idea of the Commission operating as one
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voice as well. During the procedure, individual Commissioners are heard by the European Parliament but the Commission as a whole is subject to a vote of approval (Böttner, 2018, pp. 47-48). When the Commission is appointed, it will be responsible to the European Parliament as one entity. Commissioners also cannot be impeached individually. The Commission can only face a motion of censure as a whole. When that happens, the complete Commission will resign (Böttner, 2018, p. 48).
Given the arguments above, the political stream will be assumed as ripe when the Commission supports an issue. The Commission’s right, or sometimes monopoly, of legislative initiative is another indicator for this assumption (Böttner, 2018, p. 40). 3.3 The policy stream: policy
The policy stream is a mixture of policy ideas developed by specialists in EU policy networks, who might be member of national networks too (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 518).
Specialists in EU policy networks are officials of individual Commissioners, national ministry experts, and industrialists. In the starting phase of the policy stream, there is a diversity of policy proposals. Few of them ever receive serious attention (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 518). There might be a recognized problem but not a convenient policy solution. Sometimes there is a recognized problem and a policy solution, but the political circumstances lack the ability to undertake action (Bache, 2013, p. 23).
However, the core question in this stream is about stream ripeness. How are policy solutions chosen out of the ‘European soup’ of proposals? The specialists in the policy networks must somehow sell their proposal to policy-makers during an opened window of opportunity (Ackrill et al., 2013, p. 880). In order to ‘sell’ a proposal successfully, the specialists must agree on a proposal that possesses technical feasibility and a high degree of network integration (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 518). Since the conditions of stream ripeness are equal to those on domestic levels (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 518), the policy stream counts as ripe when at least one solution is available, technically feasible, and discussed by the EU policy network (Herweg, 2016, p. 21).
Finally, it is worth mentioning the differences in policy networks. For example, the EU has more stakeholders – a term used by the Commission to illustrate the consultation process – than member states (Richardson, 2006, p. 23). Therefore, the EU policy network is characterized by its heterogeneity in contrast to national policy networks (Herweg, 2016, p. 21). Another important notion is the fact that the EU policy process only functions well when a high number of public and private actors from different member states and policy networks
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are mobilized (Richardson, 2006, pp. 6-8). The EU policy network is also unique since the Commission has a ‘hub role’, which is barely the case at the national level (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 518).
3.4 Windows of opportunity and policy-entrepreneurship
When all three streams are coupled, a window of opportunity will open. Windows of
opportunity always arise in the problem or politics stream and they can be very unpredictable or as predictable as elections (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 519). Kingdon described windows of opportunity as rare occasions where all three streams converge (Wendon, 1998, p. 344). However, stream ripeness does not automatically mean that a window of opportunity opens. The streams must be coupled by a policy-entrepreneur to open a window.
Especially in EU politics, the Commission is usually referred to as the policy entrepreneur (Schön-Quinlivan & Scipioni, 2017, p. 1175). Numerous studies with the Commission as policy entrepreneurs have been done over time (for an overview: Maltby, 2013, p. 436). The process of coupling streams is a dynamic but difficult process. As
mentioned earlier, the policy entrepreneur must sell his ‘package’ of problem and policy to a receptive political institution or individual (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 517). Generally speaking, a successful policy entrepreneur must comply to four elements: defining the problem,
displaying social acuity, building cooperative networks, and leading by example (Schön-Quinlivan & Scipioni, 2017, p. 1175). Another aspect is the framing of problems by policy entrepreneurs. Framing is important to emphasize the necessity of a problem and their policy solution. Finally, leading by example means emphasizing the workability and credibility of a specific policy option. However, this element is irrelevant in case of the Commission (Schön-Quinlivan & Scipioni, 2017, pp. 1175-1176). Briefly summarized, the Commission could become a successful policy entrepreneur when it identifies problems, proposes solutions, and tries to find compromises (Wendon, 1998, p. 344).
An example of how the Commission operates as a policy entrepreneur is shown by Maltby (2013). The study analyses how the Commission fulfilled its role as policy
entrepreneur in the light of European energy policies. In short, the article shows to what degree the Commission’s framing could be interpreted as successful, how the Commission supported certain policy solutions, and whether or not the solutions increased policy competencies (Maltby, 2013, pp. 437-439).
12 3.5 Justifying the usage of the MSF
So far, this thesis has outlined the core assumptions of Kingdon’s original MSF and how the framework should be adjusted to be applied to EU agenda-setting studies. However, in order to explain why an adjusted MSF would be suitable and scientifically justified, there will follow references to other studies that developed explanations and justifications. Previous work on the application of the MSF to EU agenda-setting is not rare although it found its momentum recently (Herweg, 2016, p. 12). Since then, a wide range of studies have developed in this field.
Although the MSF was developed to analyse American federal agenda-setting processes, it adopted one of its key concepts – the spillover – in a study on EU integration (Ackrill & Kay, 2011, p. 73). Other scholars emphasized the appropriateness of the adjusted MSF by arguing its qualities to deal with the EU’s complexity and heterogeneity (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 517 ; Schön-Quinlivan & Scipiono, 2017, p. 1174). In case of the ban on electric pulse fishing, the MSF is highly recommended because the model aims to explain agenda change (Herweg, 2016, p. 14). This explicitly is the case in fishery policies because several policy changes took place. After a period of stability in fishery policies considering the ban electrical current, there evolved new arguments arguing to allow derogations on EC
Regulation no 850/98. However, less than 10 years later those derogations were reversed, and a complete ban was implemented by the Commission. Those changes in policy stability recommend the usage of the MSF (Herweg, 2016, p. 14).
Previous applications of the MSF to EU agenda-setting focused on the Commission’s role as policy entrepreneur (Nowak, 2010), how policy windows open due to
policy-entrepreneurs’ actions (Natali, 2004), and Dudley (2013) explained how the MSF could be applied to different levels of government. Common critics on MSF applications to the EU mainly criticize the streams for being not more than a heuristic device (Copeland & James, 2014, p. 3).
Chapter 4: Methodology
In this section, the research design of this thesis will be outlined. It will explain what data will be used and the relevance of it, before the actual analysis will be done. The analysis will be done through a qualitive case study using carefully selected literature and EU fishery related proposals, regulations, and conclusions from different institutions. All fishery documents were published prior to the ban on the use of electric pulse trawls that was established in February 2019. This will allow to carefully analyse the agenda-setting process of electric
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pulse fishing. Numerous relevant documents for this thesis were published by the EU institutions, ICES, the non-governmental organisation Bloom, and media outlets such as Le Figaro and NOS.
The analysis will be made through a step by step approach using the adjusted MSF. First, all three streams will be identified in the light of the electric pulse fishing case. Second, the opening of a window of opportunity will be explained together with an analysis of the policy-entrepreneur in this case. Furthermore, the strategy of the policy-entrepreneur will be explained as well as the different venues that were available to sell the entrepreneur’s
‘package’ (Ackrill et al., 2013, p. 873). The purpose of this qualitative case study is to obtain a better understanding of the process of agenda-setting in the EU. Since the application of the adjusted MSF in EU related cases can only be reviewed through empirical findings from case studies (Herweg, 2016, p. 14), this thesis will add new insights on the usability of the adjusted MSF in EU agenda-setting processes.
Chapter 5: Analysis 5.1 The problem stream
As described in Chapter 2, the problem stream can be defined by focusing events, indicators, and feedback concerning previous policy. Furthermore, the problem must be framed as being ‘problematic’ and as a problem that can only be solved through action by the Commission. Focusing events seem not to be relevant in the electric pulse fishing case. An event hadn’t occurred that could be characterized as sudden, unexpected, or even harmful, as outlined by Birkland (1997). Therefore, this thesis will particularly concentrate on indicators. As formulated in different ICES reports, the research on the question whether electric pulse fishing is harmful to the environment (the sea bottom specifically) or not, and whether it is more efficient or not, is an ongoing process. Scientific research has shown different results so far.
However, this thesis concentrates on the revaluation of the electric pulse fishing case and how the subject came back on the Commission’s agenda in terms being problematic. Therefore, the analysis of indicators starts in 2010. In this year, the Workgroup to Assess the Ecosystem Effects of Electric Pulse Trawls was formed. Shortly after, the Study Group on Electrical Trawling (SGELECTRA) met in 2011 and 2012 (ICES Advice, 2012a). Those workgroups provided updates on the research to electric pulse fishing. It is important to remember ICES’s advice of 2006:
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Subsequently, the European Commission granted The Netherlands a derogation for 5% of the fleet to use the pulse trawl on a restricted basis provided attempts were made to address the concerns expressed by ICES. This derogation has been granted every year since 2007 (ICES SGELECTRA, 2011, p. 5).
As this citation clearly describes, ICES still had concerns about the consequences of electric pulse fishing for the environment. Another concern was the question whether laboratory experiments were representative for the behaviour of maritime organisms that undergo in a pulse trawl (ICES SGELECTRA, 2011). The final conclusions of this report recommended additional studies to (1) the damage caused by the electrical pulse, (2) the consequences of the wider introduction of electric pulse trawling on target and non-target species, (3) and to increase the scale of testing, not only in the Netherlands (ICES SGELECTRA, 2011).
In Spring 2012, SGELECTRA met on two occasions to continue their work. A new concern entered the stage: it was unclear whether the 5% derogation covered the whole fleet of every single member state or only the beam trawl fleet (ICES SGELECTRA, 2012b). The study group also mentioned the fishermen’s risks of investing in the electric pulse gear because the gear might have negative impacts on the maritime life and environment. Overall, they concluded that the investigations that had been done so far gave more information about damages to different fish species (ICES SGELECTRA, 2012b). These results encouraged France to ask for a review (November 2012) on the work of SGELECTRA so far, and especially a review on the amount of injuries and the mortality rate of targeted and non-targeted species that contact the electric pulse trawl (ICES Advice, 2012a). ICES answered that the scientific knowledge at that time suggested that the introduction of the electric pulse systems could decrease the mortality rate of different species. However, numbers about delayed mortality, or long-term population effects, were not yet clear because the effects could not be transferred to the marine environment. ICES concluded by stating that conventional beam trawling had demonstrated negative impacts on ecosystems and that electrical pulse systems could be an ecological friendly solution (ICES Advice, 2012a). In 2016, France filed a second request and received similar answers from ICES. Two new insights were shown: knowledge about pulse trawling in saltwater conditions increased and ICES considered a low risk of negative impacts on fish and habitats in EU protected areas like Natura 2000 areas (ICES, 2016).
Furthermore, also in 2016, the Commission developed a Commission staff working document on the conservation of fishery resources and the protection of marine ecosystems.
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Laws and regulations on fishing in EU waters are written in the technical measures
framework. Early in 2016, the Commission expressed its worries, supported by stakeholders, about measures implemented on a temporary basis but in fact had changed to permanent measures (European Commission, 2016). The Commission explicitly referred to electric pulse fishing as such a measure:
Another example is a temporary derogation for use of an electric pulse trawl in the North Sea to catch flatfish. This was introduced to allow scientific research into the impacts of this fishing gear but 10 years later and despite extensive research being carried out it remains unchanged (European Commission, 2016, p. 18).
The fact that the Commission viewed electric pulse fishing as a temporary derogation instead of a new permanent fishing method is an indicator in this case. The derogation on the use of electrical pulse had a temporary character and the stakeholders argued that: “The flexibility mechanisms have been used as a way to impose long-term restrictions on their operations under the guise of short term, reactionary measures” (European Commission, 2016, p. 18).
One year later, a new ICES WGELECTRA report was published showing results in favour of the electrical pulse techniques. Scholars suggested to do more research to the consequences of electrical stimuli on the ecological functioning of the benthos (the flora and fauna on the sea bottom) and the chemistry of the seabed (ICES WGELECTRA, 2017). However, just before the publication of the report, then French minister of Environment, Energy, and the Sea, Ségolène Royal, wrote a letter to Commissioner Vella of Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fishery. Royal was also chairman of the COP 21 United Nations climate negotiations in Paris in 2015. In her letter, Royal argues that fishing with electrical stimuli is highly criticised by traditional fishermen, non-governmental organisations, and French scientists because of the techniques hyper-efficiency and its violent impacts on the fishing resources (S. Royal & A. Vidalies, formal letter, 24 February 2017). Furthermore, the French minister complained about the fact that derogations on EC Regulation no 850/98 were
allowed under the guise of scientific research but that the number of vessels equipped with electrical pulse gear surpassed the allowed number of vessels under the pilot structure (S. Royal & A. Vidalies, formal letter, 24 February 2017). Official complains regarding
surpassing the limit of vessels equipped with electrical pulse gear (see page 3: no more than 5% was allowed) were submitted to the Commission and directed to the Netherlands by the NGO Bloom Association (Bloom, 2017).
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In short, for the problem stream to become ripe, one of the mechanisms (indicators, focusing events, or feedback concerning previous policy) must raise attention to an issue and the issue must be interpreted as problematic (Herweg, 2016, p. 18). As outlined above, there were two indicators that illustrated electric pulse fishing as problematic. Firstly, there was the concern about the derogation on electric pulse fishing becoming a permanent measure, used to impose restrictions on those operations, instead of the actual temporary basis of the
derogation (European Commission, 2016). Secondly, the number of Dutch vessels equipped with the electrical pulse gear surpassed the limit of 5% of the fleet, as demonstrated by Le Manach, Bisiaux, Villasante, and Nouvian (2019, p. 226). The Commission perceived this as being problematic because it recognized the illegality of those licenses in February 2019 (European Commission, 2019a). This led to a ‘Trilogue’, an institutional tripartite meeting to discuss legislative proposals between the European Parliament, the Council, and the
Commission (European Parliament, 2017). At this point, the problem stream was ripe since indicators raised attention to the practise of electric pulse fishing and it was interpreted as being problematic.
5.2 The political stream
The role of the Commission is central in the political stream because the stream counts as ripe when the Commission supports an issue (Herweg, 2016, p. 19). The Commission’s receptivity for regulation is a form of support (Herweg, 2016, p. 22). This will be illustrated by the development of the 2016 proposal COM (2016) 134. The proposal resulted from an Impact Assessment (IA) and a consultation with stakeholders, as mentioned in the eventual proposal (European Commission, 2016). With the knowledge that the Commission introduced a proposal in response to the IA and the consultation, the political stream could be considered ‘ripe’. The process described above is similar to Herweg’s (2016) description. The
Source: Le Manach et al., 2019, p. 226
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Commission responded to the policy network’s behaviour and the Council backed the
proposal in 2017 (Herweg, 2016, pp. 21-22 ; Council of the European Union, 2017a). 5.3 The policy stream
The issue of electric pulse fishing is a topic that falls under the ‘Technical Measures
Framework’ of the EU. The framework explains how, where, and when fishing is permitted in European sea basins (European Commission, 1998). Stakeholders state that the technical measurements framework harmonises measurements in EU waters and therefore “established a ‘level-playing field’” (European Commission, 2016, p. 12).
In the Commission’s proposal of 2006, the Commission proposed to implement derogations to justify the use of the electrical pulse gear (Le Manach et al., 2019, p. 225). However, as argued earlier in this thesis, the derogation was only granted on a temporary basis under the guise of scientific research. With this in mind, the Commission became alerted and expressed its concerns: “ The flexibility mechanisms have been used as a way to impose long-term restrictions on their operations under the guise of short term, reactionary measures” (European Commission, 2016, p. 18).
Why is it relevant to emphasize the Commission’s work on simplifying the Technical Measures Framework and the Commission’s concerns of the derogations on electric pulse fishing? And why should those two aspects be analysed together? In the Commission’s working document of 2016, the Commission developed three policy options: (1)
Consolidation, (2) Framework Approach, and (3) Elimination of the Technical Measures (European Commission, 2016). The second policy option, the Framework Approach, was the preferred option by the Commission and most other members of the policy community. According to the Commission, this option best met the objectives and included most technical measures that were required to meet the regionalisation plans, a new governance structure of fisheries policies (more on the regionalisation process: European Commission, 2016, p. 9) (European Commission, 2016). The policy stream became ripe when the Commission took notice of the Framework Approach and implemented it as their preferred option. Part of this regionalisation strategy is the vision on electric pulse fishing (European Commission, 2016). In the Commission’s working document of 2016, there was no intention to propose a full ban on electrical pulse fishing. However, the European Parliament amended the Commission’s proposal of 2006 in 2018 and voted in favour of a full ban on electric pulse fishing (European Parliament, 2018). Eventually, this opened the way for the Fishery Committee members of parliament to start negotiations with the Council (European Parliament, 2018). The final
18
Figure 2: Regulatory structure of the Framework Approach option
breakthrough took place during the trilogue of 13 February 2019, when the Council, European Parliament, and the Commission made an agreement: Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 (European Commission, 2019b). As of that date, electric pulse fishing was legally banned with due consideration of a transition period.
5.4 Window of opportunity
The opening of a window of opportunity, sometimes called a policy window, is a key
condition for a policy-entrepreneur to successfully couple the streams (Herweg, 2016, p. 16). Windows of opportunity open due to changes in the problem stream or the politics stream (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 519). The opening of a policy window itself does not lead to policy change. Rather, the event should be used by policy-entrepreneurs to couple the streams. If a policy window occurs but policy-entrepreneurs cannot couple the streams, the event will pass by and the possibility to change policies will be left unutilized (Copeland & James, 2014, p. 8). Finally, there are different consequences depending on where the policy window opens. When policy windows open in the problem stream, policies are usually created rationally to solve societal problems. Windows that open in the political stream usually lead to policy-makers searching for problems through previously developed policies (Copeland & James, 2014, p. 15).
With this in mind, the chronology towards the opening, and attempts to open the window of opportunity, will be discussed in this section. The Commission proposed the
19
derogation to permit electric pulse fishing under the guise of scientific research (European Commission, 2007). However, in the light of policy windows, the Commission staff working document of 2016 is more relevant. As mentioned in section 5.1 , the Commission was concerned about the implementation of their derogation partially allowing electric pulse fishing. The Commission started to perceive this as problematic and came up with three policy options (European Commission, 2016). Then, in January 2018, the European Parliament amended the original Commission’s proposal of 2016 by voting in favour of a total ban on electric pulse fishing (European Parliament, 2018). In the end of October 2018, the Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries gave a mandate to start the concluding trilogue negotiations. These negotiations did not result in an agreement on the Technical Measures Framework. This is illustrated by new amendments on the original proposal of 2016
demanding for an exclusion of electric pulse fishing from a list of activities acknowledged to receive EU subsidies (Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, 2018). Since trilogue meetings take place behind closed doors, documentation of the actual trilogue meeting itself is unavailable. Therefore, it is impossible to make statements on whether a policy window opened or not, and whether that was caused by a change in the problem or political stream.
Finally, another trilogue negotiation took place in February 2019. Two weeks prior to this meeting, the Commission acknowledged the illegality of some Dutch licenses granted for electric pulse fishing (Spekschoor, 2019 ; English reference: Bloom, 2019). This event opened the policy window due to a change in the problem stream and eventually led to policy change. The Commission, an executive institution, perceived the license granting as problematic and labelled it as a violation (these are the core conditions as described in Herweg, 2016, p. 19). Even a formal infringement procedure against the Netherlands had been considered but eventually not started (Spekschoor, 2019 ; Bloom, 2019). In the trilogue negotiation that followed two weeks later, an agreement was accomplished (European Council, 2019). 5.5 Policy-entrepreneurship
In this thesis, policy-entrepreneurship will be studied as a practise fulfilled by collective actors such as the Commission (Herweg, 2016, p. 18). In general, the European Council’s acts provide information on the issues that have been on the governmental agenda. Therefore, European Council conclusions documents provide couple opportunities for
policy-entrepreneurs through framing the information (Herweg, 2016, p. 20). Besides, the Council of the European Union has a right to initiative by submitting non-binding requests to the
20
Commission and thereby requesting for legislative proposals. Governmental officials will pay attention to the requested issue. Therefore, also meetings of the Council of the European Union open policy windows and cause opportunities for policy-entrepreneurs to couple the streams (Herweg, 2016, p. 20).
Having said that, the emphasise will be on the Commission’s entrepreneurship. An act of policy-entrepreneurship is proposing regulations (Wendon, 1998, p. 344). The first steps were made in 2016 when the technical measures proposal was developed together with three policy options (European Commission, 2016). The Commission fulfilled a dual
entrepreneurial task by proposing a regulation while at the same time putting forward possible policy options. For the Commission to be a successful policy-entrepreneur, the legitimacy of a policy outcome is crucial. Therefore, the Commission seeks to include a wide network of experts and stakeholders (Maltby, 2013, p. 436). Considering the three policy options, the Commission asked the policy network’s preference for a policy option before the 2016
proposal was developed. The policy network preferred the Framework Approach: “The public consultation showed that the catching sector, Member States and NGOs favoured a
framework approach, covering all sea basins (European Commission, 2016, p. 31). However, the Council disagreed on the proposal and on the Council’s general approach (Council of the European Union, 2017a) and thus the Commission could not couple the streams. An amended general approach was developed by the Council (Council of the European Union, 2017b) and the Commission published an additional proposal one year later (European Commission, 2018). Again, this illustrates the Commission’s effort in policy-entrepreneurship as described by Herweg (2016, p. 22) as well. As mentioned earlier, in February 2019, another trilogue took place and resulted in an agreement. Finally, an amended proposal by the European Parliament was sent to the Council and, in line with the trilogue, agreed to the proposal (Council of the European Union, 2019). Since an agreement was reached at the trilogue of February 2019, the Commission did not have to do much work in terms of policy-entrepreneurship anymore.
21
Table 1
Overview of the operationalization of the MSF core concepts
MSF concept Operationalization Empirical observation
Problem stream The stream becomes ripe due to focusing events, indicators, and / or feedback concerning previous policy
Indicator 1: the usage of the 5% derogation as a non-temporary measure instead of a temporary, scientific research related derogation
Indicator 2: the exceedance of the permitted number of Dutch vessels equipped with electrical pulse gear
Political stream The stream becomes ripe when the Commission supports an issue
Following the Impact Assessment and the consultation with stakeholders, the Commission developed the proposal COM (2016) 134
Policy stream The stream becomes ripe when at least one policy option is technically feasible and discussed by the policy network
COM (2016) 134 describes how the Framework Approach was developed and how the
Commission consulted the policy network
Window of opportunity A window opens when all three streams are coupled successfully by a policy-entrepreneur
The Commission acknowledged the illegality of numerous Dutch licenses. The window opened due to a change in the problem stream
Policy-entrepreneurship Proposing regulations
Consulting the policy network
Commission’s proposal COM (2003) 589 led to regulation EC No 41/2007
Commission’s proposal COM (2016) 134
Source: Table made by author. The theoretical underpinning to operationalize was retrieved from Birkland (1997), Copeland & James (2014), Herweg (2016), Le Manach et al. (2019), Wendon (1998), and Zahariadis (2008).
22 Chapter 6: Conclusion
The MSF is used regularly to study agenda change in EU agenda-setting. This thesis demonstrated how the MSF can be adjusted and applicated to the case of electric pulse fishing. By studying this case, the element of agenda change stood central. Electric pulse fishing arrived on the Commission’s agenda in 2006 and the ‘revaluation’ took place in 2016. The adjusted MSF explained this event by identifying the core concepts of the original MSF and two analytical findings should be emphasized. Firstly, the MSF successfully identified the Commission’s changed perception of electric pulse fishing in terms of innovation and
efficiency. This was operationalized in the problem and political stream. Especially the Commission’s working staff document of 2016 provided clear insights on the Commission’s changed perception due to the consultation among stakeholders and information about the non-temporary use of the 5% derogation. Secondly, the MSF successfully identified options to open policy windows. Multiple policy windows had opened before the Commission coupled the streams.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the eventual ban on electric pulse fishing adopted elements from the proposal that indicated the Commission’s worries about electric pulse fishing. The Commission’s Framework Approach was adopted in Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 as well as the focus on the regionalisation strategy. This finding shows how the policy option in the policy stream was implemented in the final regulation.
This thesis provided a case study on electric pulse fishing. This was an appropriate case since it meets the MSF criterium regarding agenda change. Furthermore, this thesis contributes to the literature that studies the adjusted MSF’s core assumptions empirically. Since those adjusted assumptions can only be substantiated empirically (Herweg, 2016, p. 14), the case of electric pulse fishing can be considered as a contribution to the field.
However, pointing at the thesis’ weaknesses should not be left out. The adjusted MSF’s concepts have certain disadvantages. Firstly, the concept of stream ripeness remains abstract and difficult to measure. This concept changed the most in the adjusted MSF. Further studies are needed to develop a better conceptualization of stream ripeness in EU agenda-setting. Secondly, Kingdon’s original theory sets out criteria that must be met to survive the ‘policy primeval soup’. The criteria used in MSF studies on EU agenda-setting are rather weak because of the different configuration of the European policy network (Herweg, 2016, p. 30). Future research should develop a better framework that remains closer to Kingdon’s original criteria. Thirdly, this thesis referred to ‘trilogue’ meetings and discussed the role of
23
those meetings in the light of electric pulse fishing. Since documentation is not published publicly, it was difficult to understand the role of those negotiations and to estimate the importance of them in this case.
Finally, this thesis contributed to the literature on EU agenda-setting. Using a case study design on electric pulse fishing provided new empirical findings on the application of the MSF to the EU. It contributed to the literature on adjusting MSF core assumptions and what conditions must be met. An adjusted MSF is a helpful theoretical tool to study agenda change in the EU although it is not beatific. Having said that, there is a wide field of EU topics that could be analysed through the MSF. Therefore, other scholars are encouraged to study this area of EU agenda-setting.
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