Firm Performance and Board Composition: An Empirical Study of Chinese Listed Firms
Appendix A
Legal and listing requirements imposed on Chinese firms
(1). The firms applying to be listed must submit relevant documents to the security management department of the State Council for approval. The security management department of the State Council will approve the firms that are in compliance with the listed requirement. After the firms are approved by the security management department of the State Council, the listed firms must publish their shares and related reports. The application documents of the firms must be put in the assigned place for access by the public.
(2) The listed firms must publish the financial status and operations results according to the laws and regulations. The listed firms must publish the financial reports semi- annually.
Source Shenzhen Stock Exchange Standard Operational Guide of Chinese listed Firms
(June 1998).
Appendix I
Table 1. Results of regression analysis
DV: ROA 2000 DV: ROA 2001
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Control variables:
Firm age –.09 –.11 –.13 –.08 –.12 –.13
Firm size –.23** –.17
†–.19
†–.39** –.36* –.37*
State share ownership –.06 –.19
†–.20
†–.07 –.11 –.13 Board size .03 –.05 –.03 .07 .02 .03
Dependent variables:
Proportion of fully independent directors .06 –.11 .05 –.13 Proportion of affiliated directors .37** .51* .27
†.28
Curvilinear effect of board composition
Proportion of fully independent directors
2.17 .16 Proportion of affiliated directors
2–.21 –.05 F value 3.59 4.42** 3.58
**5.70** 4.45
**3.45**
R square .13 .25 .26 .21 .26 .26
Adjusted R square .09 .20 .19 .17 .20 .19
R square change .12** .01 .05
†.00
Values shown are the standardized regression coefficients. N = 126
†
p < .10
*p < .05
**p < .01
Appendix II
Table 2. Results of regression analysis
DV: ROE 2000 DV: ROE 2001
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Control variables:
Firm age –.11 –.16 –.14 .08 .07 .08
Firm size –.07 –.03 –.02 –.30** –.25* –.26*
State share ownership .04 –.05 –.07 –.12 –.13 –.16
Board size .01 –.07 –.06 .10 .06 .07
Dependent variables:
Proportion of fully independent directors .07 –.02 .10 –.09 Proportion of affiliated directors .32* .43 .29* .08
Curvilinear effect of board composition
Proportion of fully independent directors
2.12 .19 Proportion of affiliated directors
2–.11 .01 F value 1.59 2.38* 1.90
†2.43* 1.74
†1.48
R square .07 .16 .16 .10 .12 .12
Adjusted R square .03 .09 .07 .06 .07 .04
R square change .09* .00 .05 .00
Values shown are the standardized regression coefficients N = 126
†
p < .10
*p < .05
**p < .01
Appendix III
Table 3. Results of regression analysis
DV: Shareholders’ Right Ratio 2000
DV: Shareholders’ Right Ratio 2001
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Control variables:
Firm age .03 –.01 –.001 .03 –.02 –.02 Firm size –.49** –.41** –.44** –.39** –.31* –.34*
State share ownership –.17
†–.22* –.23* –.05 –.13 –.13
Board size –.03 –.09 –.07 .03 –.03 –.01
Dependent variables:
Proportion of fully independent directors .06 –.18 –.01 –.36 Proportion of affiliated directors .25* .54* .30* .54*
Curvilinear effect of board composition
Proportion of fully independent directors
2.23 .34 Proportion of affiliated directors
2–.32 –.29 F value 8.91** 6.62* 5.49
**4.12** 4.1** 3.53**
R square .29 .34 .35 .16 .24 .26
Adjusted R square .26 .29 .29 .12 .18 .18
R square change .04
†.01 .08* .02
Values shown are the standardized regression coefficients N = 126
†
