Jakarta’s Turn: A discourse analysis of the Indonesian political elite’s construction of Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power of ASEAN and Southeast Asia from 2008-2012.

(1)

1

Jakarta’s Turn: A discourse analysis of the

Indonesian

political

elite’s

construction

of

Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power of ASEAN

and Southeast Asia from 2008-2012.

Ciarán Gill

S1959905

January 2019

Leiden University

(2)

2

3.2. PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO,STATEMENT TO ASEAN TO MARK THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE ASEANCHARTER, 2008 20 3.3. PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO,SPEECH TO ASEAN AT THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE 19TH_ASEAN_S_UMMIT_,_{2011 21} 4. CASE STUDY: INDONESIA’S EXPLICIT CONSTRUCTION OF AN IDENTITY AS A DEMOCRATIC POWER WITHIN NON-ASEAN SETTINGS ... 23

4.1.PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO SPEECH TO THE BALI DEMOCRACY FORUM,2010 ... 23

4.2.FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA STATEMENT AT THE GENERAL DEBATE OF THE 66TH_S_{ESSION OF THE}_U_NITED_N_ATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY,NEW YORK,SEPTEMBER 2011 ... 26

5. CASE STUDY: INDONESIA’S CONSTRUCTION OF AN IDENTITY WITH REGARDS TO THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN MYANMAR, 2009-2012 ... 28

5.1 PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO,SPEECH AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE,2009 ... 28

5.2. FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA, CONVERSATION WITH THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,2010 ... 30

5.3.INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM REPORT,2012 ... 31

6. CONCLUSION ... 34

(3)

3

Introduction

This thesis will attempt to elucidate the means by which the political elite of Indonesia has constructed an identity for the country as a ‘democratic power’ (Acharya 2015) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the region of Southeast Asia from 2008 to 2012. We can define political elites as “individuals and small, relatively cohesive, and stable groups with disproportionate power to affect national and supranational political outcomes on a continuing basis” (Best and Higley 2018: 3). A simple working definition of democracy is that it comprises two dimensions: liberal participation and electoral contestation (Dahl 1972 in Case 2015: 21). Intriguingly enough, Indonesia is the largest and most populous nation within Southeast Asia, yet the region itself has historically adopted a “recalcitrant” (Emmerson 1995: 227) approach to democracy. One line of reasoning for democracy’s general historic failure to acquire a foothold in the region points to Southeast Asian states’ weak bureaucratic capabilities (Case 2015: 4). Nonetheless, Indonesia’s development of a democratic identity has produced a striking contrast within the region, where the identity of its largest nation has been generally at odds with the identities of other states.

This thesis will explore how the political elite of Indonesia has constructed an identity as a democratic power in the aftermath of the ASEAN Charter coming into force in 2008. It will analyse how Indonesia has constructed a particular identity in the wake of inculcating a democratic agenda within ASEAN. In turn, it will explore how Indonesia has constructed an identity, a Self, via the implicit delineation of an Other, namely the remaining ASEAN states and the Southeast Asia of the past. This thesis will accordingly explore to what extent Indonesia has developed an identity as a democratic power in a manner that is respectful of the norms associated with ASEAN members, namely the ‘ASEAN Way’.

In 2007, ASEAN celebrated its fortieth birthday. As an accompaniment to the celebrations, the association adopted the ASEAN Charter. The emergence of this constituent instrument was the response to three primary aims of ASEAN (Woon 2017: 245): to provide the association with a legal personality, establish a robust institutional framework, and create a means of enforcing compliance to the multiple agreements and declarations that emerged from every interaction that took place under the ASEAN umbrella. By creating an institutional framework, ASEAN would therefore be able to realise its ambition of forming an ASEAN Community. This was to be comprised of three pillars: a Security Community, an Economic Community, and a Socio-cultural Community. All of this, however, theoretically amounted to

(4)

4

a legalistic turn that shifted away from the norms that governed ASEAN’s behaviour during the previous forty years: the ASEAN Way.

This set of norms prioritised interference in other states’ internal affairs, the non-use of force to resolve disputes, the promotion of regional autonomy, and the rejection of military pacts (Acharya 2001: 47-79). Moreover, it emphasised relative informality over legalism, a focus on personal relations among actors, the promotion of consultations and a “reliance on consensus and on common interest rather than on binding commitments” (Severino and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 2006: 11). The creation of the ASEAN Way was somewhat predicated upon the “lack of trust” (Emmerson 2008: 24) that had subsisted between Southeast Asian leaders in the years leading up to 1967. Moreover, it was built upon respective states’ wishes to build their economies in peaceful conditions. The ASEAN Way therefore stands in direct contrast to the legalism – complete with the “adversarial posturing” (Acharya 2001: 63) and majority vote procedures – that is found within Western multilateral institutions.

The constrained nature of the ASEAN Way has historically led ASEAN to differ from other regional organisations such as the European Union or the African Union (Dosch 2008: 528), as it accordingly inhibited the promotion of political liberalism within the region. However, Article 1.7 of the ASEAN Charter 2007 proclaims that one of the purposes of the organisation is to “strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN” (ASEAN 2007). The association’s provision of this legalistic commitment to its member states – a commitment generally at odds with the soft authoritarian nature of ASEAN’s regimes (Dosch 2008: 529) – therefore implies a deviation from the ASEAN Way. Moreover, it implies a partial embrace of liberalism, rendering it more alike other regional organisations such as the European Union.

Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy, was the primary force behind the inclusion of democratic principles within the ASEAN Charter (Acharya 2015: 13). This accorded with the state’s overall aim of placing ASEAN on a more liberal footing (Ibid: 55), dragging it into line with its own embrace of democracy that had arisen in 1998 after the downfall of President Suharto. With the ASEAN Charter coming into force in 2008, how did Indonesia build upon this success to solidify and enhance its identity as a democratic power? This research is important, firstly, as it adds to the ever-expanding and cutting-edge literature on identity, utilising the insights of Rumelili (2004), Hansen (2006) and Lebow (2016) amongst others. It enables us to see how elites can performatively create an identity for

(5)

5

their country by utilising language. The ascertainment of a state’s identity, i.e. the state’s Self, is supremely important. This is because the state’s Self can be thought of as a “space of perceivable and acceptable options for not only what type of foreign policy is considered right, smart or legitimate, but also for the boundaries for what are possible and acceptable suggestions and behaviour” (Neumann 2008 in Lindgren & Lindgren 2017: 381). Analysing a state’s identity therefore enables us to make sense of international relations and work out why states act as they do.

Further importance stems from what this research can tell us about Indonesia. A relatively new democracy, this research will illustrate how the world’s third-largest democratic state has solidified one of its major identities in recent years. The fact that such an identity exists is particularly intriguing given that it is an identity that is largely at odds with the identities of other states in its neighbouring environment. As Indonesia has been described as ASEAN’s “normative power” (Rüland 2009: 397), its influence upon Southeast Asia, and therefore the world, cannot be underestimated.

Additional importance derives from the research’s focus on Southeast Asia, and thus ASEAN, within global politics. Covering an area which, taken together, comprised the sixth largest economy in the world in 2015 (ASEAN 2017), ASEAN and its member states have, for over 50 years, comprised an arena in which global forces have consistently vied for influence (as exemplified by the West’s 20th_{century involvement in Vietnam).}

Lastly, significant importance stems from what this research can tell us about democracy itself. We are living in a time in which democracy and respect for democratic norms is becoming less prevalent across the world (Fuchs 2018). This thesis will help to shed some light on how the idea of democracy can be ostensibly woven into the fabric of an identity of a state.

Outline

In order to explore how Indonesia has constructed an identity as a democratic power of ASEAN and Southeast Asia, I will analyse key ASEAN documentation as well as discourse belonging to the two key members of Indonesia’s government. I will also analyse discourse belonging to a major Indonesian political institute. The following chapter reviews literature concerning Indonesia’s role as a regional democratic power in the years leading up to 2008, and literature in connection with academic theory surrounding the matter of identity. Chapter 3 analyses how Indonesia has obliquely created an identity as a democratic power via ASEAN documentation

(6)

6

and speeches made at ASEAN. Chapter 4 explores how Indonesia has explicitly constructed an identity as a democratic power outside of ASEAN settings. Chapter 5, meanwhile, explores how the country has explicitly developed an identity with regards to Myanmar’s democratic transition. In the concluding chapter, I will revert to the research question and explore potential avenues for future research.

1. Literature Review

1.1 Indonesia’s role as a regional democratic power pre-2008

Indonesia, the possessor of the role of primus inter pares within ASEAN (Dosch 2008: 538), is the organisation’s strongest supporter of democracy. The Indonesian government has constructed a foreign policy aimed at transforming ASEAN into an organisation that “actively subscribes” (Ibid: 538) to democratic values. Democracy promotion, in turn, has acquired a “vital place” (Ibid: 537) within Indonesian foreign policy. Indonesia, as such, has a “self-styled” role as ASEAN’s “normative power” (Rüland 2009: 397). This role, however, has nurtured “apprehension about Indonesian hegemony in ASEAN” (Ibid: 397).

Indonesia’s leadership role and identity as a democratic power can be seen as products of its recent history. In the midst of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), a student-led reform movement, assisted by the military, overthrew the long-standing Suharto regime. In the aftermath, Habibie, formerly Suharto’s Vice President, formed a new government. In order to accrue public support, however, Habibie introduced a raft of democratic changes. Press freedom and freedom of assembly were introduced, human rights were lauded as a focus for respect, and legislation was passed which guaranteed parliamentary elections (Ibid: 379). In the aftermath of the AFC, Indonesia temporarily had to rely on financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund in order to survive. We can therefore argue that the Indonesian political elite saw democracy promotion in ASEAN as a “noble cause legitimizing renewed claims to regional leadership” (Ibid: 397).

This view was further developed after the 2004 election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Indonesian president. Yudhoyono revitalised the characterization of Indonesia’s foreign policy as bebas aktif, “independent and active” (Acharya 2015: 5), a term which first emerged in the 1950s. This philosophy posited that it was imperative that Indonesia maintained its

(7)

7

independence amidst a time of rampant competition between the world’s two primary political blocs. It also stressed the need for Indonesia to be active in trying to bridge the gaps between the blocs. It was also utilised and extended to underpin ASEAN’s “independence” through its regional autonomy (Ibid: 52). This political heritage enabled Yudhoyono, in his first presidential speech in 2004, to declare that Indonesia was going to hold onto its “free and active foreign policy” and be a “voice for conscience to promote peace, enhance prosperity and stand up for justice” on the international stage. Indonesia, the president declared, was going to “keep growing into a democratic, open, modern, pluralistic and tolerant nation” (Acharya 2015: 8). For Yudhoyono’s Indonesia, democracy promotion was therefore seen as an action that upheld the country’s legacy of retaining independence and confidence in its own external policies. The country’s support for democracy, of course, would not have been shared by other members of ASEAN. The bebas aktif approach, however, emphasises the importance of Indonesia having the courage to follow through with its policies regardless.

Indonesia played the primary role within the incubation of a democracy agenda within ASEAN. In 2003, at an ASEAN meeting, Indonesia proposed forming an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) and declared that one of the ASC’s primary tasks would be to encourage “political development” (Sukma 2008: 137) in ASEAN member states. For Indonesia, this entailed the support of democratic norms and was necessary if ASEAN was to ensure that it could meet the novel challenges of the twenty-first century. This wording, however, proved controversial with other ASEAN members, fearful of the disintegration of the ASEAN Way. As a result, it was omitted from the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II that underpinned the eventual formation of the ASC.

Nevertheless, the wording did eventually find its way back into ASEAN discourse. Indonesian officials did this by directing attention to one of the agreed-upon aims of the ASC: bringing about “comprehensive security” (Ibid: 139) throughout Southeast Asia. The implication of Indonesia’s was therefore that domestic security had to be linked to regional security in order to usher in a state of comprehensive security. As such, this linkage would require the ASC to have the ability to take an interest in the internal affairs of its member states, and thus encourage “political development” as a means of realising connections between different member states. By the end of the 10th_{ASEAN summit in Laos, 2004, the phrase was}

incorporated into the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action (ASCPA), a document outlining the contours of the ASC that was still to be realised. The ASCPA declared that member states should promote “political development” in order to “achieve peace, stability,

(8)

8

democracy and prosperity in the region” (Ibid: 140). By Indonesia’s doing, a democratic agenda within ASEAN was born. In theory, ASEAN had therefore accordingly weakened its reservations about diluting the norm of non-interference.

This democratic agenda was developed further when ASEAN decided to devise a Charter that would provide the organisation with a legal personality, enabling it in turn to create an ASEAN Community to be comprised of three pillars. ASEAN provided an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and a High-Level Task Force (HLTF) with the responsibility of creating the Charter. The EPG was composed of former ASEAN officials from across Southeast Asia whilst the HLTF was composed of current officials from across the region. Given their “necessary loyalty” (Ibid: 140) to their incumbent governments, the HLTF was less supportive than the EPG of democratic principles having prominence within the Charter. As a result, the eventual Charter was not an “unalloyed instrument for the pursuit of democracy within Southeast Asia” (Ibid: 141). It did affirm that member states should enhance their democratic credentials yet it remained silent as to how such goals should be followed and what would happen to members who did not change their behaviour accordingly. This outcome served to exemplify the difficulties that Indonesia faced in constructing an identity as a democratic power within an environment that was sometimes itself ambivalent to democracy.

Connected to its desire to develop an identity as a democratic power, it could be argued that Indonesia has constructed an approach to global politics that is region-centric. This is channelled through the idea of “dynamic equilibrium” (Acharya 2015: 11), which stresses the imperative for Indonesia to forge adaptive, inclusive, transparent, effective, and cooperative relationships with countries from Southeast Asia and further afield. It is an idea that stresses the autonomy of Southeast Asia over external powers, yet it is simultaneously an approach that stresses the value of cooperation with outside powers, as opposed to antagonism. Dynamic equilibrium, of course, builds upon the philosophy of bebas aktif which has underpinned Indonesia’s independence and confidence within the international political environment. Furthermore, it is an alternative to the “conventional balance of power approach” (Ibid: 12). The goal of Indonesia is not to “create order through military build-up, alliances and arm races” (Ibid: 12) but to generate a state of equilibrium amongst powers through the development and implementation of common “norms and principles” (Yudhoyono 2013 in Acharya 2015: 11). Given its prevalence within the organization, the goal of Indonesian policy is therefore to maintain ASEAN centrality, rendering it like the “conductor in an orchestra” (Acharya 2015: 12). By doing this, Indonesia has the best chance of developing common norms and common

(9)

9

identities, consequently bringing about its preferred state of dynamic equilibrium. Jakarta’s ambitions and desires for ASEAN, however, do have the potential to contradict some tenets of the ASEAN Way, namely the prioritisation of non-interference in member states’ affairs. As a result, the embedded nature of the ASEAN Way within the region ensures that ASEAN itself could hamper Indonesia’s aim of creating a state of regional dynamic equilibrium. Nonetheless, ASEAN does continue to be the “cornerstone” (Acharya 2015: 49) of Indonesian foreign policy. This stems from Indonesia’s belief that its global status is built primarily upon its regional legitimacy. This, in turn, stems from the fact that Indonesia’s material power – relative to the power of a state like China – renders it a regional power instead of a global power. Jakarta, as a result, has utilised regionalism to underpin its nationalism (Ibid: 49).

1.2. Identity

This section of the literature review draws upon theory concerning identity, which falls within constructivist thought. Constructivism is a social theory which posits that we inhabit a “world of our making” (Onuf: 1989), a world possessive of meaning which ultimately stems from humanity’s social interaction. Although constructivism does indeed hold that there is a material foundation to the world (Onuf 1989: 40), it proclaims that actors’ identities and interests are “endogenous to interaction” (Wendt 1992: 394). With culture and history, for instance, two key elements that can underpin the identities and interest of an actor, we can view these as ultimate products of social interaction. Constructivism maintains that through social interaction – the basis of the construction of identities and interests – actors build the social structures in which they operate. These structures are neither objective nor subjective but “intersubjective” (Wendt 1999: 406). Taken altogether, these intersubjective social structures comprise the international political environment. Constructivism, of the Wendtian variety, therefore posits that identities are products of interaction. As such, they are “inherently relational” (Wendt 1992: 397), which means that they are formed from the Self’s interaction with an Other.

In line with the varied nature of human interaction, it has been argued that there are several types of identity that an actor can hold at any one time: type, role, collective, and corporate (Wendt 1999: 224-230). Type identities refer to identities that emerge to reflect particular social characteristics, e.g. holders of particular social values. Role identities are those that reflect actors’ social positioning within certain relationships, e.g. the identities of manager/employee. Collective identities arise when Self and Other identities are fused, e.g. the

(10)

10

collective identity that formed after the expansion of the EU to include Balkan states (Björkdahl 2011). Lastly, corporate identities are the base identities upon which other multiple identities can be formed.

The school of critical constructivism (e.g. Zehfuss (2001) strongly attacks the concept of Wendtian constructivist identity. This school declares that Wendt’s formation of ‘corporate identity’ – an aspect of identity that is “exogenously given” (Wendt 1999: 328) – is flawed due to its implication that a part of identity is actually formed wholly antecedent to social interaction. This, of course, differs considerably to the other forms of identity, which derive from relational circumstances. The difficulty of this is compounded by the fact that Wendt affirms that corporate identity is the base from which all other identities arise. Critical constructivism’s primary issue of contention with Wendtian constructivism is therefore that in order to make sense of its ramifications for the international system, “we have to imagine states as prior to and independent from social context” (Zehfuss 2001: 332). According to critical constructivism, the writing of Wendt overlooks how the Self comes to be crystallised in the first place (Ibid: 327) and is reflective of an overriding desire to attain measurability and certainty within a quest to follow a “scientific approach to social enquiry” (Wendt 1999: 1). The claim that state identities are based upon “certain essential properties” (Wendt 1999: 225) can therefore be viewed as a misperception of the levels of contention within domestic spheres concerning just what the Self should be. After all, it is reasonable to posit that the vast majority of states in the world have robust internal debate about just what their identity is. Critical constructivism therefore claims that Wendtian constructivism assumes a stability within national identities that may not be there.

A further critical constructivist approach, embodied within the writing of Rumelili (2004), declares that Wendtian constructivism fails to appreciate the significance that difference plays within identity construction. This approach, which draws upon post-structuralism (Rumelili 2004: 33), affirms that the prominence of difference arises from the fact that certain discourses are “intertwined with oppositional structuring” (Ibid: 31): democracy, for instance, to be a “meaningful” identity category, presupposes the existence of non-democracy. Rumelili states that critical constructivism also entails a belief that identities are “performatively constituted” (Ibid: 31) by practices of representational differentiation that distinguish identities from other identities. With regards to democracy again, the “performance” of a democratic identity involves the differentiation of multiple degrees of democracy. Some states, for instance, may be democratic in name only. Rumelili’s critical constructivist view does not necessarily state that interaction with other identities is required

(11)

11

for the constitution of an identity, merely that the constitution of an identity “presupposes the existence of alternative identities” (Ibid: 32). This approach therefore declares that identity is constituted via difference instead of interaction. As such, this approach disagrees with Wendtian constructivism and its emphasis upon corporate, or pre-social, identities.

When thinking about identity it is undoubtedly important to discuss othering: the development of a behavioural relationship that is characterised by “mutual exclusion and the perception and representation of the Other as a threat to one’s identity” (Ibid: 29). This is likely to occur, firstly, when Self/Other interaction is built upon exclusive identities instead of inclusive identities. With the former there is, of course, no real possibility that difference between the Self and Other can be bridged. Secondly, othering is more likely to occur whenever there is an element of resistance on the part of the Other to the Self. The Self, in turn, feels more insecure, which creates a greater probability that the identity of the Self will be reinscribed, together with the differences of the Other (Ibid: 38). Thirdly, othering is more likely whenever there is ample social distance between the Self and Other. Inclusive identities are amenable to smaller distances than exclusive identities due to the fact that they can be bridged. Moreover, there is less likely to be social distance between the Self and the Other if they both inhabit the same society or community. This analysis, however, does not deny the existence of an Other with regards to the construction of the Self; difference, after all, as expressed by the existence of an Other, is integral to the construction of the Self. Instead, this analysis states that the negative practice of othering is not instrumental to the construction of the Self.

An even more overt post-structuralism is injected into the study of identity through the work of Hansen (2006). Post-structuralism affirms, like constructivism, that we inhabit a social world created primarily through discourse. It differs from constructivism, however, in its conception of language. For post-structuralism, language is a “field of social and political practice” (Shapiro 1981 in Hansen 2006: 16) which means that language itself is a product of social and political forces. As a result, language cannot be viewed as an objective tool which represents reality. This differs from constructivism’s approach to language, which sees it as a “transparent tool functioning as a medium for the registration of data” (Hansen 2006: 16). This, in turn, accords with a correspondence theory of language, which assumes that words act as objective “labels” for objects in reality (Fierke 2013: 194). Constructivism further differs from post-structuralism in its adherence to positivist methodology, which ensures its commitment to “causality and hypothesis testing” (Ibid: 192). As language is seen as an objective signifier of reality, which, in turn, implies a distance between language and reality, constructivism can

(12)

12

therefore claim that causality can be measured, for this also implies the existence of a distance between different elements, e.g. language, objects, identity, policies.

Post-structuralism’s view of language, however, results in the view that ascribing causation to an ostensible variable like identity, for example, is impossible. For post-structuralists, a state’s national identity and a state’s policies are both discursively constructed. As identity comes from the same place as policy, we therefore cannot deem identity to possess causative power over policy (Hansen 2006: 24). Instead, identity and policy are ontologically linked: identity is articulated as the reason why policy should be enacted, but it is also (re)produced through the very same policy discourses (Ibid: 19). Identity therefore constitutes, and is constituted by, policy, whilst the unstable nature of language ensures that both identity and policy are always prone to change (Ibid: 19). This post-structuralist view goes some way in ameliorating the contradiction found within constructivism – namely its combination of a social ontology with a positivist methodology – and puts forward a view of identity that is not built upon Wendtian constructivism’s flawed conception of pre-social identities.

Identity is constructed via the simultaneous linkage and differentiation of signs within discourse. With regards to the historical identity of ‘woman’, for instance, the common signs of “emotional” and “motherly” (Ibid: 17) were linked together to comprise the ostensible identity of ‘woman’. At the same time, these signs were differentiated against the signs which people used to believe comprised the identity of ‘man’, inclusive of “complex” and “independent” (Ibid: 17).

Connected to the work of Jacques Derrida is the assertion that language is a “system of differential signs” (Hansen 2006: 17), where a thing’s meaning is established not through reference to the thing itself but through juxtapositions, i.e. by reference to what it is not. This view therefore provides the foundation underpinning the assertion that the construction of identity is tethered to difference, i.e. to what it is not. In order to illuminate the composition of a state’s national identity, therefore, we have to identify the signs underlying the identity whilst simultaneously delineating something that is different or other (Ibid: 17). By identifying signs – primarily adverbs and adjectives – within discourse (through discourse analysis) we are able to identify linkage and difference which helps to elucidate the identities in question. Identities, of course, may be constructed after a process of Othering – e.g. Japan’s identity with regards to China (Suzuki 2014) – yet this is not a necessary component of the identity construction process. The Other may even come to comprise a “potential part of Self” (Björkdahl 2011: 88), yet difference still comes into play as the Other still acts as a distinct part of the Self, not the Self as a whole.

(13)

13

An instrumental view to identities declares that different actors can promote different types of national identities for political gain. These actors manage to do this by “influencing official or collective memories” (Lebow 2016: 7), which, of course, can be done through discourse. After all, states are “legal entities and imagined communities and do not possess a collective consciousness that can reflect on themselves and their situations” (Ibid: 10). We can say that the most appealing identities are positive ones which elucidate the “alleged distinctiveness” and “superiority” of a state and its citizens (Lebow 2016: 3). These identities, in turn, “build and buttress self-esteem” (Ibid: 3). The lack of objective foundations underpinning identities can allow us to deem them to be “labile”, which renders them to be neither a source of “unity” or “continuity” (Ibid: 71). Nonetheless, elites do harness identities for political gain. After all, by promoting a certain form of national identity by, for instance, “juxtaposing a unified and orderly ‘inside’ to a chaotic and different ‘outside’” (Rumelili 2004: 35), a state can “secure its existence” (Ibid: 35). It is reasonable to assume that this process can entail the enhancement of unity within the state.

Identity, as shown, has been written about in a multitude of ways. This research paper disregards Wendtian constructivism’s claim that causation can be ascribed and instead, in line with a belief in the social composition of language, seeks to follow Lene Hansen’s view (2006) that identities need to be measured through discourse analysis. The impossibility of measuring the causative power of identity therefore means that this research will take up the task of measuring how Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power came to be. As a result, this research will analyse the means by which language has generated the meaning (Hansen 2006: 15) underpinning a primary identity of one of the most populous nations in the world.

(14)

14

2. Theory and Methods

2.1. Discourse Analysis and its relationship to identity

In order to analyse how Indonesia has constructed an identity as a democratic power, this thesis will utilise discourse analysis. The value of discourse analysis stems from the view that “discourse produces this world” (Milliken 1999: 236). Discourse constructs the contours within which actions and policies are deemed to be legitimate. Our knowledge of the world, therefore, arises from discourse: a “specific series of representations and practices” through which “meanings are produced” and “identities constituted” (Fierke 2013: 234). If language and its representations produces reality for humans, discourse analysis aims at “specifying the bandwidth of possible outcomes” (Neumann 2008: 62). Discourse analysis, as a result, is so valuable because it enables us to “denaturalize dominant forms of knowledge and expose to critical questioning the practices that they enable” (Milliken 1999: 236).

As already mentioned, discourse analysis is also being utilised because identity can be identified through “signs” (Hansen 2006: 42) that are found within discourse. By identifying how signs connect to other signs and how this set of signs is then juxtaposed to other signs, we are thus able to identify how Indonesia has constituted its identity (Lindgren and Lindgren 2017: 381) through the concept of difference.

This emphasis upon signs accords with predication, the “linking of certain qualities to particular subjects” (Doty 1993: 306) through the use of predicates - linguistic elements that affirm a “quality, attribute or property of a person or thing” (Ibid: 306). Predicate analysis therefore enables us to identify the make-up of a subject’s composition, and its “particular features and capacities” (Milliken 1999: 232). Doty (1993) asserts that “clusters of predicates” (Ibid: 307) can be drawn from discourse, which, in turn, outline the qualities of subjects, constituting them in a certain way accordingly. From the sentence “he knows the duties of no occupations with efficiency”, we can therefore acquire the impression that the subject of the sentence is “inefficient” (Ibid: 307).

We can therefore see the connection between predicate analysis and Hansen’s emphasis upon the importance of identifying signs within discourse in order to constitute a subject’s identity. Both approaches highlight the importance of looking at what the subject thinks and does in order to define the subject itself. Hansen’s example of the signs that underline the historic construction of the identity of ‘woman’ are adjectives (Hansen 2006: 18). As a result, we can reasonably infer that Hansen’s emphasis that identity can be ascertained through the

(15)

15

identification of signs can be held to mean that identity can be ascertained through the identification of adjectives. What Doty’s analysis tells us, however, (as Hansen has omitted to define ‘signs’ within this context) is that we can utilise adjectives and elements like “descriptive characteristics”, “capabilities”, and “adverbs” (Doty 1993: 310) in order to help us define the composition of a subject’s identity. Combining the insights of both Hansen and Doty, the discourse analysis within this research will therefore seek to identify predicates within discourse that can be construed as signs comprising Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power. As is the case with Hansen (2006:18), signs will primarily be adjectives within discourse. Utilising Doty’s analysis, however, enables us to also identify as signs adjectives that exist implicitly within discourse: e.g. the implicit adjective within Doty’s already-mentioned example of “he knows the duties of no occupations with efficiency” is “inefficient” (Doty 1993: 307). This research will therefore analyse discourse in order to illuminate the signs that are derived from predicates, enabling us to identify how Indonesia has constructed its identity as a democratic power as a result.

Much of the discourse that is analysed within this research largely extols the benefits of adhering to democratic norms. By analysing this democracy-focused discourse, we are able to identify reasons why actors adhere to democratic norms. As a consequence, we are able to identify the reasons that are implicitly given for Indonesia’s development of an identity as a democratic power. These reasons often correspond with signs that are located within discourse. By approaching the discourse in this way, we are able to see how Indonesia has constructed an identity as a democratic power.

2.2. Structure of the analysis

Each discourse analysis needs to address four questions (Hansen 2006: 81). First, we need to decide which Self is to be studied. Secondly, we need to address what time period the discourse analysis focuses upon. Thirdly, we need to ascertain the number of issues that the analysis will cover. Fourthly, we need to select the “agents of discourse” (Hansen 2006: 81). For this thesis the research design and focus of study is therefore expressed as follows: 1) the Indonesian political elite; 2) the period from 2008-2012; 3) its support and promotion of democracy; 4) ASEAN, President Yudhoyono, Foreign Minister Natalegawa, and the Institute for Peace and Democracy.

This research will be intertextual (Ibid: 53) in that it will analyse an ASEAN official text alongside discourse belonging to other actors. The decision to engage in intertextual

(16)

16

analysis stems from the belief that each individual text inhabits a “shared textual space” (Ibid: 49) with other texts, and that the full meaning of a text can only be ascertained via the analysis and interpretation of related texts within the space. As no text exists in isolation, a thorough understanding of texts can only be accrued from intertextual analysis. Discourse produced both in the name of ASEAN and within ASEAN settings will be analysed in order to highlight how Indonesia has obliquely constructed an identity as a democratic power. Discourse produced in non-ASEAN settings will be analysed in order to illuminate how Indonesia has explicitly constructed an identity as a democratic power.

Discourse will be analysed from the years 2008 until 2012 for several reasons. Firstly, 2008 is the year that the ASEAN Charter was ratified. This thesis aims to explore how Indonesia developed its identity as a democratic power in the aftermath of this. Secondly, identifying pieces of discourse within a period of four years enables a thorough analysis of how an identity was constructed, yet allows for the analysis to be contained within a relatively short piece of research. The texts to be analysed are the following:

 The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, 2009

 Speech of President Yudhoyono at the Ceremony to mark the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter, 2008

 Speech of President Yudhoyono at the Opening Ceremony of the 19th_{ASEAN Summit,}

2011

 Speech of President Yudhoyono at the Bali Democracy Forum III, 2010

 Statement of Foreign Minister Natalegawa at the General Debate of the 66th_{Session of}

the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 2011

 Speech of President Yudhoyono at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2009

 Interview with Foreign Minister Natalegawa at the Council of Foreign Relations, 2010  Institute for Peace and Democracy Comprehensive Program Report, 2012

(17)

17

3. Case Study: Indonesia’s oblique construction of an identity as

a democratic power within ASEAN settings

As mentioned in the introduction, it is this research’s argument that Indonesia has constructed a Self, i.e. an identity as a democratic power of ASEAN and Southeast Asia, in connection with the Other that is the remainder of ASEAN and the Southeast Asia of the past. The fact that ASEAN is the “cornerstone” (Acharya 2015: 49) of Indonesia’s foreign policy makes it reasonable to posit that Indonesia’s major identity as a democratic power will be constructed with regards to ASEAN. The fact that the Other is the remainder of ASEAN and Southeast Asia of the past is in itself not a construction that is novel. It has been argued that the collective identity of Europe, for instance, has been constructed against the Other that is Europe’s own past (Waever 1998 in Rumelili 2004: 33). The following case study will shed light on how Indonesia has constructed an identity of a democratic power in a similar way. Initially, this case study will highlight how Indonesia has constructed an identity whilst placing a democratic agenda within ASEAN. The first part of the analysis will therefore focus on key ASEAN discourse in order to highlight how Indonesia has obliquely constructed its identity as a democratic power within the ASEAN environment.

3.1. The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, 2009 (APSCB)1

The ASEAN Charter, ratified in 2008, provided legal foundation to ASEAN’s commitment to create an ASEAN Community comprised of three pillars: a Security Community, an Economic Community, and a Socio-Cultural Community. In 2009, ASEAN made progress in the realisation of this ambition by publishing the APSCB. This blueprint asserts that it envisages that the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) will ensure that “the peoples and member states of ASEAN live in peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment” (ASEAN 2009: 1). Moreover, it declares that the APSC shall “promote political development in adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as inscribed in the ASEAN Charter” (Ibid:1). From this discourse,

1_{By this stage, ASEAN has changed the name of the Security Community to the}

(18)

18

it is clear that ASEAN, at least on a rhetorical level, has strengthened its commitment to democratic norms, a commitment that had been realised most notably within the ASEAN Charter. As mentioned previously, the architect of ASEAN’s democratic agenda was, of course, Indonesia (Sukma 2008). In fact, the phrase “political development” was first mentioned within an ASEAN meeting in 2003, in which Indonesia proposed forming an ASEAN Security Community and asserted that one of the main tasks would be to encourage “political development” (Sukma 2008: 137) in ASEAN states. We can therefore trace the wording within the APSCB to Indonesia’s initial efforts six years before the APSCB’s publication. Furthermore, the statement that the member states of ASEAN should live in peace with “one another and with the world at large” can be connected to Indonesia’s idea of “dynamic equilibrium” (Acharya 2015: 11). This, as mentioned previously, is an approach that highlights the importance of simultaneously maintaining both Southeast Asian autonomy and good relations with the rest of the world. We can therefore view the APSCB as a piece of discourse that significantly reflects Indonesian influence. As the discourse is in ASEAN’s name, we can surmise that this discourse constructs Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power in a manner that is oblique. It is oblique instead of explicit for two main reasons. The first reason is that not every reader would be able to ascertain Indonesia’s connection to the text. After all, a certain amount of contextual knowledge is required in order to know that Indonesia is the architect of phrases such as “political development” within ASEAN environments. The second reason is that the discourse is in ASEAN’s name instead of Indonesia’s name. This makes the process of identity construction to be indirect.

With this in mind, further attention should be thrust upon the discourse’s emphasis upon the importance of “the rule of law and good governance, respect for and promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms…” (ASEAN 2009: 1-2). The discourse ties these issues to democracy and implies that ASEAN, and thus Indonesia, envisages a political future for Southeast Asia that embraces liberal democracy. Analysing this discourse, and the predicates within it, enables us to surmise that ‘liberal’ is a sign which underlines Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power. Within this setting we can posit that the Other to this Self is the unliberal Southeast Asia of the past.

The APSCB discourse also brings to light the existence of signs such as ‘mature’ and ‘successful’. The document asserts that the aim of enhancing “political development” is to “ultimately create a Rules-based Community of shared values and norms” (ASEAN 2009: 2). This, in turn, will “bring to maturity the political elements and institutions in ASEAN, towards

(19)

19

which the sense of inter-state solidarity on political systems, culture and history will be better fostered” (Ibid: 2). As such, this discourse is essentially declaring that a “liberal turn” (Dosch 2008) for ASEAN will result in the organisation’s maturation, bringing about better inter-state relations. Such better inter-state relations, it can be implied, will result in more cohesion within ASEAN, therefore maintaining and strengthening ASEAN centrality (Acharya 2015: 12). The discourse is equating an embrace of liberalism with maturity, political success, and political harmony. As Indonesia – ASEAN’s “normative power” (Rüland 2009: 397) – is the ultimate progenitor of the agenda of “political development”, we can therefore surmise that Indonesia equates liberal democracy with political maturity and political success. Implicit within this is the claim that Indonesia’s Other – ASEAN and Southeast Asia of the past – resides within a condition of immaturity and disharmony given its relative ambivalence towards liberalism. As such, it has constructed an identity as a democratic power that derives legitimacy from the implication that embracing liberal democracy is productive of certain benefits.

The blueprint also obliquely implies that Indonesia is ‘forward-looking’ and ‘progressive’. The discourse asserts that the APSC will endeavour to engage in democracy promotion. In order to do this, the document states that “principles of democracy” will be taught to “ASEAN youth at schools at an appropriate stage of education, bearing in mind the educational system in the respective ASEAN member states” (ASEAN 2009: 6). Analysing this discourse implies that ASEAN, and thus Indonesia, views the embrace of democratic norms as being a long-term goal to be worked towards over several years. The discourse, in turn, implies that embracing democracy is an act that is forward-looking and progressive. The corollary of this is that the ASEAN of the past can be described as ‘regressive’. Moreover, the discourse implies that the future generations are key to democracy’s development within Southeast Asia. From this discourse, we can therefore gather that ASEAN, and therefore Indonesia, are ‘forward-looking’, and concerned with the future and the long-term outcome of their plans. Implicit within this, also, is a claim that the current generation of ASEAN members may be preventing democracy’s full realisation within the region, preventing progress as a result. The phrase “bearing in mind the educational system in the respective ASEAN member states”, however, highlights the constraints associated with the ASEAN Way. Indonesia’s agenda of “political development” has been crystallised within official ASEAN literature, yet this phrase illustrates that there continues to exist the norm of non-interference in other states’ affairs – a strong component of the ASEAN Way (Dosch 2008: 541).

(20)

20

3.2. President Yudhoyono, Statement to ASEAN to Mark the Entry into Force of the ASEAN Charter, 2008

Undertaking an intertextual analysis of discourse concerning Indonesia’s construction of a democratic power means that documentation not in ASEAN’s name needs be analysed in order to ascertain how Indonesia has truly constructed an identity as a democratic power. One of the primary ways to ascertain how Indonesia has created an identity in a less oblique manner is to analyse the discourse of its leader: President Yudhoyono. The Indonesian leader’s discourse in the ASEAN environment still qualifies as oblique as much of the subject of the discourse is ASEAN and not Indonesia. Regardless, the inability of Yudhoyono to be seen as anything other than the President of Indonesia renders his discourse instrumental in the oblique construction of an identity for his country.

In a 2008 speech to ASEAN member state delegations, at an event to mark the ratification of the ASEAN Charter, President Yudhoyono declares that the creation of the Charter is “long-awaited” (Yudhoyono 2008). Moreover, he declares that it is a “watershed event that certainly cannot be delayed” (Ibid). Similar to the language within the APSCB, the language within this speech implies that ASEAN’s liberal transformation is long overdue and that it was always inevitable. In effect, the discourse implies that liberal transformation is a universally major stage of political development. As is the case with the APSCB, the discourse implicitly constructs Indonesia, as ‘forward-looking’ and ‘progressive’. As such, this identity’s Other, the remainder of ASEAN and its past, is constructed via signs that are characterised by difference.

Yudhoyono further describes ASEAN’s ratification of the Charter as an “elevation” into a “rules-based and people-centred organization with a legal personality” (Yudhoyono 2008). From the word “elevation”, we can gather the impression that a liberal transformation is a natural change for any international actor to make as it brings actors closer to a perceived universal and “rational” (Fukuyama 1992: 4) end state. Implicit within this is a view that the Indonesian Other, the remaining ASEAN members states, resides within a de-elevated environment due to their relative lack of support for legalism and Western-style multilateralism. The Indonesian President makes his first and only overt reference to democracy in the statement when he declares that the Charter has embodied ASEAN’s “commitment to the universal values of democracy and good governance” (Yudhoyono 2008. It should be reaffirmed, however, that this is the only mention of ‘democracy’ within the

(21)

21

statement. As such, it signifies the existence of a constraint stemming from the ASEAN Way. Nonetheless, Yudhoyono, within this discourse, has constructed ASEAN’s transformation as one that is committed to the ideal of universal progress. Given that Yudhoyono’s audience was the delegates of other ASEAN states, however, we can also surmise that he has also helped to construct the same identity for his own country. As such, this stand of discourse again obliquely implies that Indonesia is ‘progressive’ and ‘forward-looking’, two signs which link together to comprise the country’s identity as a democratic power. Moreover, they are two signs that are differentiated against that which is different: the remainder of ASEAN and its past.

From this discourse, in general, it is possible for us to put forward two main views. Firstly, that Indonesia possesses a considerably strong belief in the universal benefits of a liberal transformation, benefits, in Jakarta’s mind, that should pre-emptively quell any dissent within ASEAN. The second view is that the discourse is reflective of an Indonesian hegemony within ASEAN, which has reconfigured the organisation to Jakarta’s liking. ASEAN, after all, is an organisation that “comprises mainly soft authoritarian regimes and governments” (Dosch 2008: 529). If the second view is correct, then it is pertinent to bear in mind that language and the signs within it can easily shield true intentions.

3.3. President Yudhoyono, Speech to ASEAN at the Opening Ceremony of the 19th

ASEAN Summit, 2011

A second Yudhoyono speech that we will analyse takes place at ASEAN in 2011. In this speech to the organisation, Yudhoyono again just references democracy once, thus implying the existence of the constraints of the ASEAN Way. Nonetheless, speaking about ASEAN’s desire to forge an ASEAN Community, the Indonesian president declares that this will bring about a “more peaceful, just, democratic and prosperous world” (Yudhoyono 2011). Analysing this discourse strand illuminates the sign that Indonesia is ‘successful’. Yudhoyono is effectively declaring that a stronger contribution of ASEAN to global affairs will bring about more democracy within the world, which, in turn, will bring about prosperity and justice. As such, the president is essentially connecting democratic principles to success. This sign, of course, was also constructed within the APSCB. Moreover, Yudhoyono is drawing a connection between democracy and justice. By obliquely constructing Indonesia’s identity through the creation of such signs, Jakarta’s president is shedding light on Indonesia’s Other, the remainder

(22)

22

of ASEAN. By declaring that ASEAN’s transformations will bring about “more” justice, democracy, and prosperity, the implicit assumption is that ASEAN, pre-transformation, was less conducive to justice, democracy, and prosperity. Again, although the President is talking about ASEAN within this speech, the virtue of his role and the composition of his audience – who know that he is speaking primarily for his country – serves to obliquely construct Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power. It can be argued that the constraints of the ASEAN Way, however, have diminished the potential for the construction of an Indonesian identity. As such, we can say that Yudhoyono’s speech has somewhat focused on the maintenance of mufakat (A: 44), otherwise known as consensus, within the organisation (Acharya 2014: 44). If identity is discursively constructed, discursive constraints will inevitably hamper the construction of identity. The next phase of the analysis will overcome this hindrance by analysing discourse in which Indonesian actors have been able to construct the country’s identity as a democratic power in a way that is explicit instead of oblique.

(23)

23

4. Case study: Indonesia’s explicit construction of an identity as a

democratic power within Non-ASEAN settings

4.1. President Yudhoyono speech to the Bali Democracy Forum, 2010

Initiated by Indonesia, 2008 saw the staging of the first Bali Democracy Forum (BDF): the “first intergovernmental forum in the Asia Pacific that focuses on regional cooperation in the field of democracy and political development” (Karim 2017: 394). Reflective of Indonesia’s “global aspirations as promoter of democracy” (Acharya 2015: 110), the BDF counter-intuitively does not restrict membership to democratic countries alone. As a result, countries such as China and Brunei have been members of the BDF since 2008. Essentially a “talking shop” (Karim 2017: 397), the BDF has acted as a forum in which Asian states have discussed democracy in all of its varying forms. In accordance with this, Indonesia has refrained from advocating a certain ideal of democracy. Instead, Indonesia has prioritised developing the BDF into an “inclusive forum” (Ibid: 395) where democratic countries can share their experiences with other countries that are seeking to improve their democratic credentials. The emergence of the BDF can be seen as Indonesia’s means of fortifying its identity as a democratic power, somewhat transcending the “limitations” (Ibid: 395) associated with operating within ASEAN. In turn, we can view the BDF as an Indonesian attempt to create a larger role for itself outside of the “confines of ASEAN” (Ibid: 395).

During the third BDF forum, in 2010, President Yudhoyono made a speech concerning Indonesia’s relationship with democracy. From this discourse, we can identify signs within Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power inclusive of ‘progressive’, ‘successful’, ‘ethical’, and ‘secure’. In his speech, Yudhoyono declares that democracy is a “never-ending process” and that it “continues to evolve and progress with its dynamics, which are unique to each country” (Yudhoyono 2010: 17). Moreover, he asserts that democracy is a “process that enhances the welfare, justice and equality of rights and freedom of humankind” (Ibid: 17). Yudhoyono then goes onto declare that democracy “must serve to create a feeling of safety, tranquility and peace for its people” (Ibid: 17).

This discourse, first of all, presents the notion that democracy is an idea that is progressive and evolutionary. As Yudhoyono declares that democracy is “never-ending” and evolves in accordance with the dynamics “unique to each country”, he is essentially declaring that, far from being a wholly Western import, democracy is an idea that is flexible, nuanced,

(24)

24

and able to take root anywhere. By then emotively declaring that democracy “enhances the welfare, justice and equality of rights and freedom of humankind”, Yudhoyono is asserting that any Asian embrace of democracy will lead to them being ‘ethical’ and ‘successful’. He is also asserting that any such embrace will not necessarily be an attack upon Asian social or cultural milieus. In essence, Indonesia’s president is connecting democracy to political ‘success’ and implicitly forging a division between states who embrace democracy and those who do not. If Indonesia is the Self that is democratic and produces good “welfare” for its citizens, then it is reasonable to posit that the Other in this scenario is the remainder of ASEAN. By affirming that democracy is able to evolve in accordance with dynamics “unique to each country”, we could posit that Yudhoyono is implicitly sending a message to Asian states who are hesitant to embrace democracy for fear of diluting their cultural heritage. It is as if Yudhoyono is declaring that his country has overcome preconceived restrictions in order to usher in a better environment for the country’s citizens. In effect, we can opine that he is sending a message to other Southeast Asian states that they must embrace flexibility in order to do the same.

Yudhoyono additionally implies that states, if they embrace such flexibility, can accrue “safety, tranquility and peace”. Much like his declaration that ASEAN is committed to achieving a “more peaceful, just, democratic and prosperous world” (Yudhoyono 2011), Yudhoyono is essentially declaring that peace and security stem from the embrace of democracy. By speaking of the virtues of adopting democratic norms, the President is constructing Indonesia as ‘secure’. As Yudhoyono also talks of the importance of “fair, just, open and transparent” (Ibid: 17) elections, however, we can gather that his view concerning the flexibility of the democracy idea does have limits. In other words, from the discourse, we can derive the impression that the President is mindful of the chance that democratic processes will be instrumentally utilised by, for example, electoral authoritarian regimes (Schedler 2002). Yudhoyono is therefore implying that Asian countries should strive to adhere to the liberal idea of democracy yet strive within their own way unique to their national environment. This reticence to advocate a specific means of developing a liberal democracy adheres, of course, to the ASEAN Way and the norm of non-interference.

Within this discourse we can also bear witness to the emergence of the sign that Indonesia is ‘non-interfering’. Building upon the claim that democracy is an idea that is flexible and able to be deployed in a variety of ways in accordance with different national environments, Yudhoyono asserts that “democracy must be grown from its own society” (Yudhoyono 2010: 18). He also claims that democracy is not “something that can be imposed from abroad” (Ibid:

(25)

25

18), because if it is, it “may lead to political complications and run out of steam” (Ibid: 18). This discourse strand cultivates the impression that Indonesia is of the view that a democratic power should not impose democracy upon others. Of course, it is a view that clings closely to the ASEAN Way and its norm of non-interference.

In addition, Yudhoyono implicitly states that Indonesia is ‘transparent’ by declaring that an “architecture that is democratic will bring about transparency of policies and foster “predictable behaviour” that will bring about greater trust and build confidence” (Ibid: 18). This discourse equates democracy with transparency, positioning democracy, in turn, against the opaque governance that is found within the soft authoritarianism of ASEAN’s regimes (Dosch 2008: 529). In addition, Yudhoyono’s affirmation that democracy brings about “predictable behaviour” in citizens can be seen as a development of the claim that democracy accords with strong security. We can additionally perceive it as an implicit claim that democracy is conducive to order. Moreover, we can view it as being supportive of the liberal idea that fulfilling individuals’ needs will produce compliance and support.

We can therefore view order, security, and peace as being interconnected nodes within Indonesian discourse concerning democracy. Implicitly opposing the notion that only authoritarianism accords with security and order, Indonesia has constructed an identity as a democratic power by affirming its status as a nation that can provide security. This adheres to the construction of Indonesia as ‘secure’. Moreover, it has done this whilst affirming that it can provide fulfilment for its citizens. This fulfilment is linked to Yudhoyono’s construction of the country as ‘ethical’ in line with his claim that “the essence of democracy lies in how we can utilize all elements of society to uphold the dignity of all the people” (Yudhoyono 2010: 19). This is a view that emphasises the ostensible ethical imperative underlining democracy, the imperative to ensure that every individual has a voice. In addition, it is a view that implies that only democracy can ensure true human flourishing and that only democracy is conducive to an equality of a citizenry. By defining democracy as the means by which all people can lead dignified lives, the corollary is that not everyone can lead dignified lives in non-democratic environments. By constructing Indonesia, the Self, as a democratic power, the implication that we can draw from this discourse is that the remainder of ASEAN, the Other, cannot in general provide all of their citizens with a “dignified” (Ibid: 19) existence.

Claims like this can be made because identity is predicated upon the existence of an Other. After all, identity is constituted via difference and upon the presupposition that

(26)

26

alternative identities exist (Rumelili 2004: 32). In this case, the Indonesian democratic Self has been constituted against the Other that is the remainder of ASEAN and the Southeast Asia of the past. This is not to say, however, that Indonesia and ASEAN are engaged in a process of othering. After all, Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power is an inclusive one – any state can become democratic – and there is sufficient social closeness between Indonesia and the remainder of ASEAN to prevent the emergence of othering. Instead, it is the case that Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power has been created through the simultaneous linkage of signs within discourse – e.g. ‘rational’, ‘modern’ - and their differentiation from something that is ostensibly different, i.e. the remainder of ASEAN and the Southeast Asia of the past. As is the case with the discourse analysed so far, this differentiation does not need to be explicit. By noting the contexts in which Indonesia has both obliquely and explicitly presented its views, however, we can reasonably gather that the thing (or Other) that is different to the Indonesian democratic Self is the remainder of ASEAN and the Southeast Asia of the past. Indonesia, after all, has constructed a foreign policy – and arguably an identity – that is focused upon transforming ASEAN into an organisation that supports democracy (Dosch 2008: 538).

4.2. Foreign Minister Natalegawa statement at the General Debate of the 66th_Session

of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 2011

In 2011, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa gave a speech at the United Nations in New York, USA. This discourse inhabits the same intertextual space ((Hansen 2006: 49) as the discourse of President Yudhoyono. Together, speeches and statements of both the President and the Foreign Minister help to construct Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power within ASEAN and Southeast Asia.

Like the discourse of Yudhoyono, Natalegawa’s discourse crystallises the existence of the sign of ‘progressive’. In his statement, Jakarta’s Foreign Minister declares that one of the world’s challenges is the existence of “intolerance and discrimination” within the world, and “authoritarian regimes bent on suppressing the clamor for democracy and respect for human rights” (Natalegawa 2011: 2). This strand helps define Indonesia’s identity as a ‘progressive’ democratic power as it implies that authoritarian states are ‘suppressive’. An awareness of Southeast Asian affairs enables us to appreciate that much of the remainder of ASEAN states are authoritarian states. Therefore, by implicitly defining them, the Other, as ‘suppressive’, we

(27)

27

can posit that Indonesia, the Self, is ‘progressive’. This, of course, coincides with Rumelili’s assertion that certain discourses are “intertwined with oppositional structuring” (Rumelili 2004: 31). For a state to be ‘progressive’, it presupposes the existence of opposite states, i.e. ‘supressive’. Yudhoyono and Natalegawa’s representational cultivation of such signs within their discourse enables us to surmise that Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power is “performatively constituted” (Ibid: 31). Natalegawa’s discourse also presents Indonesia as being ‘successful’. By declaring that “Indonesia is reaping the democratic dividends” (Natalegawa 2011: 3) of democratic change, the Foreign Minister is developing Indonesia’s Self via the delineation of non-democratic states as ‘unsuccessful’. The remainder of ASEAN, via this discourse, is implicitly constructed as being unsuccessful, thus upholding the sign that was also constructed within discourse of Yudhoyono.

From the discourse we are also able to identify the existence of ‘collaborative’ as a sign comprising Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power. Natalegawa affirms that states should “share lessons” that they have learnt, alongside their “experience” to other states so that they can forge their “unique paths towards democratization” (Ibid: 3). This discourse strand constructs Indonesia’s preference for an approach to democracy promotion that is collaborative. As such, this approach is one that disavows the idea that states can only become democratic in one way only. It is an approach that is tailored to the different social and cultural milieus that states inhabit. Most importantly, it is an approach that adheres to ASEAN’s norm of non-interference. It is an approach that disavows interference in other states’ affairs in favour of collaboration. Therefore, it is an approach that squarely places Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power within the region of Southeast Asia. This Self, this aspect of Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power has therefore been constructed against the Other that is the West. After all, Western democratic powers have typically interfered in other states’ affairs in order to promote democracy and have tended to promote democracy at other states. Indonesia, however, has cultivated its collaborative democratic power identity on the basis that alternative democratic power identities exist (Rumelili 2004: 32).

(28)

28

5. Case Study: Indonesia’s construction of an identity with

regards to the democratic transition in Myanmar, 2009-2012

Since its independence in 1948, Myanmar has spent much of its existence oscillating between military and civilian rule, or “direct and indirect” military rule (Bünte 2014: 744) on account of the military’s pronounced influence upon civilian rule. In 2010, the military junta held elections which ushered in a form of “disciplined democracy” (Ibid: 745). The junta’s proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), achieved substantial success at the behest of oppositional parties which had to overcome “severe financial hurdles” (Bünte 2014: 752) due to onerous registration fees. Myanmar’s first elections of the 21st_century

consequently resulted in a huge victory for the military-sponsored USDP. One week later, however, the Burmese authorities decided to release Aung San Suu Kyi, the hugely popular democracy campaigner from her third house arrest in 21 years.

On 30 March 2011, the day of the previous ruling junta’s official disintegration, the ex-military leader Thein Sein was sworn in as leader of Myanmar. Soon after, Myanmar undertook sweeping reforms which played a major role in the country’s rise of 18 places in the Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders (Egreteau 2014: 414). In 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi rose to the forefront of Burmese politics when she won a by-election to become a member of parliament (MP) for the constituency of Kawhmu. This was accompanied by more than 40 other by-election victories for members of her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), at the expense of the USDP. The 2008 constitution, however, continued to prevent Myanmar from attaining a wholly free democracy. For instance, Articles 109b and 141b reserved one quarter of the seats of both houses of parliament for the military. (Ibid: 419). This accordingly diluted the civilian composition of Myanmar’s presidential cabinet. These issues notwithstanding, Myanmar has undergone a general democratic transition. This section of the research, as such, explores how Indonesia has constructed an identity as a democratic power in relation to Myanmar’s transition to democracy.

5.1 President Yudhoyono, Speech at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2009

Jakarta’s Turn: A discourse analysis of the Indonesian political elite’s construction of Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power of ASEAN and Southeast Asia from 2008-2012.