Women’s Shifting Role in the Islamic State
- in the Shadow of Daesh’s Pragmatism
Mercedes Abdalla S1358928 Leiden University Master of Science
Crisis and Security Management Thesis supervisor: Dr. Bart Schuurman
Second reader: Dr. Edwin Bakker 5 August 2018
ABSTRACT
The number of women flocking to the frontlines of the Islamic State’s strife has been growing, where taking up arms, and conducting terrorist acts in the name of jihad is slowly becoming a norm. The ideological model currently surrounding the concept of female jihad is thus slowly being falsified. Though historical precedents of other jihadi groups utilizing women in combatant roles exist, the academic debate has not assessed this progress to its full capacity. Straying from their formerly prescribed roles as child bearers and domestic managers, these women are leaving behind their obedient nurturing tendencies for more violent ‘male’ associated deeds. Using Al Qaeda as a comparative case study, this paper aims to offer insight as to how the absence of legitimization on the use of women in violent acts clarifies the rationale behind Daesh’s altered stance towards its followers. Just like Al Qaeda, this tactical utilization of women goes against IS’s initially proclaimed narrative. The fact that women are used in operative roles boils down to pure strategy – labeling the Islamic State as a pragmatic terrorist group rather than being a strictly ideologically oriented one.
Keywords: Islamic State, Female Terrorists, Al Qaeda, Dabiq, Propaganda, Threat Assessment, Strategic Logic
DEFINITIONS
Darul-kufr – the land of heretics, generally referring to the West in extremist jihadist context
Dunya – the world with its earthly concerns and material possessions
Hijrah – migration, relating to the journey of Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mekka to Medina in 622 AD
Jannah – the Islamic concept of paradise or heaven
Jihad – striving or struggling with a praiseworthy aim. Greater Jihād refers to an inner spiritual struggle within oneself. Lesser Jihād denotes an armed struggle against the enemies of Islam.
Khilafah – a term referring to the Caliphate or the so-called Islamic State
Kufr – heretics, individuals disbelieving in Allah and his messenger Muhammad Muhajirat – female migrant
Mujahidin – the plural form of a holy warrior engaging in armed jihad
Mushrik – an individual who worships other Gods than Allah and thus, practices polytheism
Shahid – honorific term referring to a martyr who died fulfilling his religious duty Shari’ah – body of Islamic law
Shirk – the sin of practicing polytheism and/or idolatry
Sunnah – the verbally transmitted teachings, records, deeds and sayings of the prophet Muhammad
Tawhid – the principle of oneness with God
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ... 2
DEFINITIONS ... 3
1. INTRODUCTION ... 5
1.1. Female Terrorists of Daesh ... 5
1.2. ISIL’s ‘Sisters’, ‘Brides’ and ‘Mothers’: the Current State of the Art ... 7
1.3. Problem Statement and Research Question ... 9
1.4. Societal and Academic Relevance ... 12
1.5. Research Methodology and Reading Guide ... 13
2. BODY OF KNOWLEDGE ... 15
2.1. Women’s Involvement in Modern-day Terrorism ... 15
2.2. Women in Al Qaeda ... 21
2.3. Women in Jihad: a Contested Topic ... 25
2.4 The Strategic Logic Behind Al Qaeda’s Utilization of Women ... 27
3. ANALYSIS OF WOMEN’S PORTRAYAL IN THE DABIQ ... 29
3.1. The ‘Virtual Caliphate’: Dabiq ... 29
3.2. The ‘Supporter Archetype’ and the Duty of Hijrah ... 31
3.3. The ‘Sister’ ... 32
3.4. The ‘Mother’ ... 33
3.5. The ‘Wife’ ... 34
3.6. The ‘Fighter’? ... 35
4. CURRENT TRENDS: THE SHIFTING ROLE OF ‘JIHADI BRIDES’ ... 37
4.1 Female Combatants of the Islamic State ... 37
4.2 Daesh’s Shifting Narrative: from ‘Sisters’ to ‘Soldiers’ ... 40
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS ... 45
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Female Terrorists of Daesh
With the eruption of the Syrian Civil War and the emergence of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (also referred to as IS, ISIS, ISIL or Daesh) – though undeniably being a global phenomenon – the issue of European citizens’ involvement in foreign conflicts has come to the forefront on the European security agenda. While some of these ‘travelers’ are assumed to have lost their lives on the battlefield, potential returnees will continue to pose a substantial risk for the security of European societies due to their acquired battlefield experience and their ability to carry out terrorist attacks on European soil (Boutin et al., 2016; Barrett, 2017).
Even though the exact numbers of those who have left to join Daesh’s in Syria and Iraq are subject to inherent inaccuracy, the available figures have been sounding alarms bells of European governments. In 2016, Boutin et al. from the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) aimed to map and assess the magnitude of the EU-wide foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon in the context of the political instability in Syria and Iraq. Based on data collected from EU Member States complemented with open source intelligence, the authors estimated the number of European FTFs between 3,922 and 4,294 (Boutin et al., 2016, p. 3). In its latest report released by The Soufan Center in 2017, Barrett argues that the total number of Europeans who flocked to Syria and/or Iraq with the aim to join extremist groups is in fact higher and amounts to roughly 5,800 (Barrett, 2017). Even though these numbers are neither conclusive nor do they reveal how many European residents have left to join the Islamic State in particular, they give a good indication of the volume of the problem at hand.
Although the majority of IS’s jihadi foreign terrorist fighters are men, since the declaration of the so-called ‘Caliphate’ in 2014 an unprecedented number of female recruits have responded to the call of jihad (Barrett, 2017). Already “in 2014, Member States … reported an increase in women and children travelling to the region” wrote EUROPOL’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), assessing prevailing trends of the European terrorism landscape in 2014 (Europol, 2015, p. 6).
Determining their exact number, however, remains difficult. In its reports published in 2015 by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, over 550 women were assumed to have joined the ranks of the Islamic State since the onset of the Syrian civil war (Saltman & Smith, 2015; Bradford et al., 2015). Another study authored by the ICCT suggests, “around 20 per cent of the FF population stemming from Europe consists of women”, scaling up previously identified figures at closer to 1,000 (“Promises of Paradise,” 2016; Boutin et al., 2016). According to most recent estimates outlined by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, the total number of female IS-affiliates who set off from Western Europe to join the terror group in the Levant region accounts to 1023, deriving this number from predominantly governmental and academic sources (Cook & Vale, 2018). Some of those who had left already came back to Europe; as Cook and Vale points out around 140 of these female ‘travelers’ are believed to have returned (2018, p. 15).
Another important aspect to consider is the phenomenon of ‘home-grown’ jihadists. These individuals can be best described as ones “radicalized in their country of residence without having travelled to join a terrorist group abroad” (Europol, 2018, p. 5). Generally speaking, ‘home-grown’ terrorists are believed to have loose ties with terrorist networks and do become radicalized mostly by the consumption of jihadi propaganda on the Internet (Renard, 2017). Yet, it is important to keep in mind that the characteristics of ‘home-grown’ jihadists are not clear-cut and the underpinnings of the phenomenon are more nuanced. ‘Home-grown’ jihadists, just as foreign terrorist fighters, tend to establish ties with a terrorist group, either in their country of residence or in the virtual reality - on social media platforms, online chat groups or forums. In this regard, the role of ISIS’ “virtual planners”, recruiting and enticing European individuals over the internet to mount attacks should not be underestimated (Barr & Gartenstein-Ross, 2016). Considering that women have been particularly involved in the dissemination of IS-affiliated online propaganda and recruitment – an issue considered more in details in the successive sub-chapter – there are female individuals who also fall under the category of ‘home-grown’ jihadists. However, establishing precise figures of (female) ‘home-grown’ jihadist is nearly impossible.
Even though precise figures are problematic to determine indications do point to growing number of women pledging allegiance to the Islamic State over the past years, be it in the Levant region or in their European countries of residence. Given the emergent phenomenon of women’s increasing involvement in Daesh, it is essential to further a more nuanced understanding of their role within the terrorist organization.
1.2. ISIL’s ‘Sisters’, ‘Brides’ and ‘Mothers’: the Current State of the Art
Though in general there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ profile of a European terrorist, attempts have been made to explore the backgrounds of Daesh’s women. In their effort to identify some key personal characteristics of the IS’s female terrorist fighters, Bakker and de Leede (2015b) seek to shed some light on who these women are. As the authors argue, some of them are “(very) young … who travelled either with their husbands (often as newlyweds), with other young girls, or even alone” but there are also known cases of older mothers who even took their children onto their journey (p. 3-4). Moreover, while some of these female ‘travelers’ experienced a troubled childhood and had problems at school, there are also “women who are highly educated … [and] come from families with no known problems with the authorities” (Bakker & de Leede, 2015b, p.4.). Perhaps less surprisingly, one characteristic arguably all ‘sisters’ of ISIS share is their devotion to Islam and their affiliation to the radical, distorted interpretation of the religion.
Just as it is the case with profiling jihadist women, motivations to migrate to ISIS-held territory also vary from one person to another. Due to the limited availability of empirical data it is particularly challenging – if not impossible – to draw an overarching picture of European women’s motivations to travel to the Islamic State. Research conducted thus far has identified a set of different reasons. One of such is romanticism. Analysis of posts and messages on different social media platforms suggests that for some women jihad tends to be seen in a romanticized light and “the idea of being married to a heroic fighter who is willing to sacrifice himself for a greater cause, is an appealing one” (Bakker & de Leede, 2015b, p. 6). Moreover, finding a noble husband in the Islamic State also marks the transition to adulthood and “is considered a core factor in migration” argue Bradford et al. (2015, p. 13). That
being said, women’s motives to join the ‘Islamic Caliphate’ nonetheless do not exclusively emanate from their desire to become ‘jihadi brides’.
In their study, Bradford et al. (2015) assessed twelve female ISIS supporters’ social media accounts and identified three distinct reasons behind their travel to the Islamic State. As the researchers point out, one of the main drivers behind some of the young women who have traveled to the Islamic State stems from their perceived oppression of the Muslim community around the world. “The empathy these women feel for the Muslim victims of violence and the complicity they feel the Western powers have in perpetuating these conflicts are important factors in their decision to leave the West and seek an alternative society” note Bradford et al (2015, p. 11). In addition to this, female ‘travelers’ also seek to part-take in the establishment of a new Islamic utopia and society as well as to contribute to the ‘state-building’ project of the ideologically pure ‘Caliphate’ (Bradford et al., 2015; Strømmen, 2017). Assisting in the creation of a Muslim caliphate is also regarded by many of these women as a mandatory religious duty. Taking part in this process is seen essential in securing their place in Jannah1 (et al., 2015; Saltman & Smith, 2015).
Additional push and pull factors have been identified that similarly drive female jihadists to leave their European homes behind. As Saltman and Smith argue, ‘identity gaps’ and “uncertainty of belonging within a Western culture” can be decisive push factors, especially when it comes to ethnic minorities residing in the West (2015, p. 9). Migrating to ISIS-held territory and joining the struggle of the terrorist group may give a sense of purpose and define their societal role. In light of this, an arguably important pull factor is the sense of ‘belonging’ and ‘sisterhood’ the Islamic State allegedly offers. The online milieu, the images posted on social media platforms by women living in IS-controlled territory often ascertain this proposition; ‘sisters’ in
niqab pose together and speak about a deep sense of belonging (Bakker & de Leede,
2015b; Saltman & Smith, 2015; Strømmen, 2017).
The current state of the art on Daesh’s Western ‘sisters’ also seeks to account to what roles these female individuals assume within the terrorist organization – both within
IS-held territory in Syria and Iraq as well as outside of the group’s territorial strongholds. The dominant assumption within the literature is that women assume a secondary and domestic role within the terrorist group (Bakker & de Leede, 2015b, Bradford et al., 2015; Huey & Witmer, 2016). Their participation, as generally seen within the current state of the art, predominantly revolves around facilitating activities such as being propagandists, recruiters and mothers of the next generation of jihadi fighters.
As Klausen argues (2015) the most striking feature of the ‘umm’2 factor is women’s function in the ISIS propaganda machinery in which they act as producers and disseminators of violent material on behalf of IS on different social media outlets (p. 15). “The broader threat emanates from these women’s online presence” state Bradford et al. (2015, p. 33). Another prevailing assumption is that one of jihadi women’s core tasks boils down to the encouragement of others to join the religious struggle of the terrorist group; either by facilitating their travel to the Levant region, or recruit new followers online or in Western countries (Bakker & de Leede, 2015b, p. 8; Bradford et al., 2015; Barrett, 2017). As for those women who already reside in the Islamic State, researchers suggest that their primary duty is to support male
mujahedeen fighters by mainly assuming logistical roles. These pertain to taking care
of wounded fighters and bringing up the next generation of courageous children.
In short, when examining the academic discourse in regards to the ‘female factor’ of IS, it becomes evident that the dominant assumption is that women are active in background roles rather than in operational, violent acts.
1.3. Problem Statement and Research Question
Even though the female contingent within the Islamic State has recently garnered increased attention among scholars and policy-makers alike, academia is predominantly focused on identifying the characteristics, motivations as well as the
background roles of Daesh’s female sympathizers. Marginal attention has been paid
to the recently emerged combatant potential of these women. Sharing Strømmen’s
(2017) argument this can be regarded as a natural consequence of the widespread “gendered perception of violence and extremism” in which women are regarded as “misunderstood victims rather than motivated agents” (p.1.). As Cunningham neatly sums it up “popular opinion typically considers women as victims of violence, including terrorism, rather than perpetrators, a perspective that is even more entrenched when considering women from states and societies that are believed to be extremely “oppressed” such as those in the Middle East and North Africa” (2003, p. 172).
Nonetheless, in the past years the terrorist organization has arguably altered its modus operandi, also increasing its reliance on female ISIS members (Cook & Vale, 2018; Europol, 2017). Sketching out trends prevailing in 2015 concerning religiously inspired terrorism, the strategic analysis of the European Law Enforcement Agency at that time suggested that “[w]omen [of the Islamic State] … [were] probably not … actively taking part in frontline combat. … Their roles may change in the future, which may have an effect on the nature and impact of IS operations in the EU” (Europol, 2016, p. 7). Nonetheless, this trend – as Europol also observed based on operational data and intelligence it processes and provides – has shifted as of 2016. “Women … are playing increasingly operational roles in committing terrorist activities …, not only facilitating other operatives in various ways, but in the (attempted) execution of terrorist attacks themselves” wrote the 2017 edition of the TE-SAT (2017, p. 7). Additionally, as the latest TE-SAT emphasizes, for the first time in 2017 the Islamic State “appeared to be openly calling on women to take up arms” (Europol, 2018, p.33). Several recent IS-affiliated terrorist plots involving women – that took place in and outside of Europe – point to this recently emerged trend.
Last year, a terrorist attack near the Notre Dame Cathedral was prevented, also dismantling a cell of ISIL in France consisting of three women (Chrisafis, 2016a). In September 2016, an attack on the local police station was carried out by three women in Mombasa, Kenya which was later on claimed by IS (“Islamic State behind Kenya’s Mombasa,” 2016). These incidents are only a few examples of this newly arising phenomenon. An arrested ISIS member revealed that “ISIS trained women to become terrorists. … [teaching them] how to deal with explosives, after which they were
prepared to travel to Europe via Turkey” during his questioning earlier this year (Pieters, 2018). The role of women has arguably gone beyond their predisposed position as wives, child-bearers and background facilitators. Several thought-provoking questions arise in light of this new trend. What are the reasons underlying this alteration and has a similar shift been previously observed in the case of other jihadist terrorist groups? How has Daesh justified this change, if they have at all?
In order to find answers to such questions, more scholarly attention needs to be dedicated to the female contingent of the Islamic State, in particular to the recently changing role women have come to assume within the terrorist organization. Considering the very concept of jihad and ISIL’s notoriously conservative views concerning women and gender segregation, this study also aims to shed more light on the pragmatism of the Islamic State. As such, an approach exploring the initial IS narrative surrounding women contrasted with their newly emerged combatant role and its legitimization – or the absence of such legitimization – would drive a more nuanced understanding of the issues at stake.
In light of the above, the following exploratory research question will guide this study:
How has the Islamic State justified women’s shifting role within the terrorist organization after the group’s loss of strongholds and manpower?
In an attempt to find a comprehensive answer to the research question posed, the thesis will also reflect upon the following sub-research questions:
Why – according to the academic literature – has Al Qaeda deployed women in combatant roles?
1.4. Societal and Academic Relevance
Bringing more clarity to women’s position in the Islamic State would be a valuable addition not only to academia, but it could also reshape the mold of policy-making processes when addressing the phenomenon under consideration. Looking at the terminology prevailing in public conscience pertaining to the issue it is often the case that jihadi women are referred to as ‘brides’, ‘mothers of the Caliphate’ or ‘female migrants’ consciously avoiding the term ‘fighter’ (Strømmen, 2017). Such generalizations also stem from the fundamental Islamist ideology IS praises and allegedly strictly adheres to. Known accounts on the reality of life under IS rule also suggest that female recruits have to comply with strict rules on a daily basis or if you will, are blatantly oppressed (Gaub & Lisiecka, 2017; Kneip, 2014).
Uninformed perceptions, however, impact how female recruits of the Islamic State are addressed; be it upon their potential return or in general threat assessments. Not seeing these women as actors capable of committing violent acts have already resulted is less harsh punishment than it is usually the case with charges against male foreign fighters. Court documents in these cases have revealed that those trialed were perceived as ‘victims’, ‘mislead’ or ‘lured’, implying that these women did not act of their own volition (Strømmen, 2017). Comprehending the shifting role of women with the Islamic State is necessary to address gaps both in judicial processes as well as in the current security structure. As Cook and Vale emphasize, women of the Islamic State “require specific attention, including their access to fair trial” (2018, p. 5).
Moreover, furthering a more nuanced understanding as to why the Islamic State has increased its combatant reliance on women and essence of its respective legitimization would also shed more light on the nature of the terrorist organization. Is the Islamic State an ideologically driven or a rather pragmatic clandestine group? Examining such questions would arguably have implications on devising appropriate counter-terrorism measures.
Addressing the issues at hand more thoroughly would also add to the currently prevailing gap in the academic literature. In general, women’s involvement with the Islamic State is a significantly under-researched field of inquiry. What is presently
observable is that the current state of the art repeats the same assumptions made about jihadi women of Daesh. Drawing upon insights on other jihadi terror groups’ use of women would further enhance the present academic debate, with hopes of bringing some clarity to the topic.
1.5. Research Methodology and Reading Guide
The thesis is structured as follows. In the first chapter, a short introduction is presented on women’s presence in the Islamic State, painting the picture with the currently prevailing assumptions established in academia in relation to ISIL’s female members. One of the goals of this research is to enrich the debate and bring further clarity to women’s shifting role in the terrorist organization, also reflecting upon the pragmatism of Daesh.
In doing so, the initial section of the second chapter will first present a broader overview of women’s involvement in terrorism in modern day history. The second chapter will be concluded by specifically looking at female participation in jihadi terrorism, particularly in Al Qaeda. Academic arguments as to why these two Islamic terrorist groups have assigned combatant roles to their female supporters will be similarly outlined, also reflecting upon the contested nature of women’s participation in jihad. Since the subject under study is still a relatively new phenomenon, it is almost impossible to assign a theoretical framework to this research. Instead, the standing body of knowledge presented in the second chapter will serve as the pretext of the analysis. Therefore, the research design of this thesis rests on two pillars. Essentially, it will follow a comparative case study design resorting to a two-step approach. In the first place, it will consider what roles women were traditionally assigned to within Al Qaeda and how they were perceived in the context of jihad. This will be followed by an evaluation on what grounds the terrorist group ascribed combatant roles to their female members. Based on insights drawn from this analysis, a comparison will be applied to women’s newly emerged operational capacity within Daesh.
In doing so, the third chapter will cast the spotlight onto the Islamic State; it aspires to outline how women were at first addressed in the official narrative of the jihadist
group since the declaration of the so-called ‘Caliphate’ in 2014. In its effort to structure the analysis of the female contingent’s changing role within IS, the study rests upon discourse analysis combined with insights from the literature as its primary research methodologies. To this end, the currently prevailing findings in the academic literature will be presented, supporting the arguments by empirical evidence from the official online magazine of ISIL, the Dabiq. Thereafter, the fourth chapter will present some cases in which IS-affiliated women took part in the execution of terrorist plots, deriving such evidence from open sources. The second section of the fourth chapter will set out the shift in IS’s rhetoric on the permissibility of women combatants. Finally, the concluding chapter will provide answers to the research question posed and present possible implications for further research.
2. BODY OF KNOWLEDGE
2.1. Women’s Involvement in Modern-day Terrorism
Despite terrorism being generally regarded as a male ‘occupation’, women have also played their fair share in terrorist organizations. A cursory look at modern-day terrorism provides ample examples of women’s involvement in terrorist activities that has been widening in ideological and spatial terms over time (Cunningham, 2003). Resorting to Rapoport’s academic model on the development of terrorism in modern day history, one could argue that in fact, female terrorists have been involved in all the four different ‘waves’ of terrorism (Weinberg & Eubank, 2011; Poloni & Staudinger, 2013; Bloom, 2005).
Already during the ‘Anarchist Wave’, the earliest modern stage of terrorism commencing from around the 1880s, women were part of resistance movements pursuing revolutionary change during the descent of Czarist Russia. As Poloni-Staudinger and Ortbals argue, “women in anarchist movements [were] forerunners to women in terrorist groups” (2013, p. 33). While some provided only logistical support, others rose to higher ranks. Fanny Kaplan – a prominent figure of her time and a long-time member of the anti-Bolshevik Revolutionary Party – fought for ‘stirring back’ the allegedly misdirected revolution and was one of the masterminds behind the attempted murder of Lenin. Another influential female revolutionary was Vera Zasulich, the young university student who came to play a crucial role in the pledge of People’s Will3 to bring about change in the feudal Russian society. Both women became (in)famous for their attempts to assassinate political figures, a modus operandi that generally characterized the first ‘Anarchist Wave’ (Weinberg & Eubank, 2011).
Throughout the ‘Anti-colonial Wave’, a time span condensed between post-WWI up until the 1960s, there were similarly notable examples of women who played visible
3 Russian revolutionary political group active in the 19th century, promoting reforms in the
roles in anti-colonial struggles, Djamile Bouhired4 being one of them. During the
Algerian resistance in the 1950s, both ‘veiled’ and ‘unveiled’ women were mobilized into terrorist activities, taking up arms, carrying grenades and setting off bombs against their French colonizers. In the ranks of the National Liberation Front (FLN) – the most significant terrorist organization that rallied Algerian Muslims against the French – there was a significant female cadre present, whose members were mostly educated Muslim women, largely from middle class backgrounds (Weinberg & Eubank, 2011). As Cunningham notes, the “Algerian resistance against external, colonial control led to broad political mobilization that included women, a process engendered not only by the promise of socialist “equality” but also by the colonial state’s efforts to regulate the veil” (2003, p. 174). This play between religion and politics portrays the way in which women use religious garments to their political advantage when fighting against their enemies, proving it to be a pragmatic approach to the situation rather than a religiously oriented strife.
Women were also involved in some of the Zionist covert operations during the postwar years of the 1940s. Many young women assumed supporting roles in paramilitary organizations whose ultimate goal was to evict British authorities from Palestine. One of the most well-known female terrorist in this regard was the young Geulah Cohen who acted as a clandestine radio operator in Irgun, a Zionist revisionist militant group that operated in the British Mandate of Palestine (Weinberg & Eubank, 2011).
Late 1960’s marked the beginning of the third wave, the so-called ‘New Left Wave’. This stage of terrorism was characterized by a world-wide emerging resentment towards the proclaimed Western value system, “fueled by Castro’s revolution in Cuba and the U.S. disaster in Vietnam” (Bakker, 2015a; Rapoport, 2017, p. 6). Such developments prompted a wave of demonstrations in the US and beyond, often having educated, middle-class youngsters in the forefront. Several left-wing terrorist groups emerged out of this upheaval, including the Italian Red Brigades, the Red Army Faction in West Germany and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), to name only a few. All of these regarded themselves as the vanguards of the
4 Revolutionary figure who was part of the FLN fighters against the French. She was
oppressed masses and the warriors fighting against capitalism, advocating socialist, revolutionary ideals (Bakker, 2015a).
Many women had a prominent position within such social-political formations. “Not only did women serve in operational capacities carrying out or helping to carry out attacks on Italian and German businessmen and politicians, but they were also leaders of the groups involved” (Weinberg & Eubank, 2011, p. 28). In 1969 the 25-year-old Leila Khaled, member of the PFLP, who hijacked a commercial flight between Rome and Athens, mesmerized the world; for many it was simply illogical to link the ‘weaker sex’ to political violence (Poloni-Staudinger & Ortbals, 2013). “Violence was a way of leveling the patriarchal society through revolutionary zeal – the women would demonstrate that their commitment was no less than those of their brothers, sons, or husbands” stated Khaled, explaining the rationale behind her undertakings (as qtd. in Bloom, 2005, p. 58).
Nonetheless, Khaled was not the only prominent example of female figures that assumed an important role in the revolutionary groups at that time. In Italy, the country that witnessed the most serious spasm of left-wing terrorism at the time, both the Red Brigades and Front Line were in fact co-founded by women and had a significant feminine presence in their ranks (Weinberg & Eubank, 2011).
West Germany also witnessed left-wing terrorist activity in the era under consideration. The main revolutionary groups at the time – June 2 Movement, the Red Army Faction and the Revolutionary Cells – likewise had a substantial female cadre present within their structure. According to available criminal records from the 1980s, around one third of those charged with terrorism-related crimes were in fact women (Kolinsky, 1988). During one of the emblematic hijackings of the 1970s – illegitimate type of violent actions that characterized the era of the New Left Wave – members of the June 2 Movement terrorist cell together with their Palestinians ‘colleagues’ took control over an Air France flight. Women were not only seated among passengers; it was two female terrorists who coordinated the whole operation (Weinberg & Eubank, 2011).
Latin America was yet another stage of the revolutionary new wave. Both in Colombia’s FARC and the Shining Path of Peru female members have ascended throughout the ranks of these organizations. As Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan note, around 30-40% of FARC combat force was comprised of women while Peru’s Shining Path enjoyed a 50% female participation rate (2014, p. 200). Women were predominantly deployed in intelligence gathering, and they were present both in underground cells as well as in the senior leadership structure, particularly within the Shining Path (Cunningham, 2003; Lazaro, 1990).
The New Left Wave was not only characterized by socialist-revolutionary upheaval, but it similarly borrowed tropes of nationalist sentiments from the preceding, Anti-Colonial Wave. With the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam in 1973, additional social-political dynamics came to the fore of the third stage of modern-day terrorism. Nonetheless, in contrast to the second wave, such clandestine groups’ nationalist aspirations remained international in their nature (Kaplan, 2016). Several terrorist groups emerged during the 1970s and 1980s that waged secessionist national insurgencies.
The aforementioned movements included groups like the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna – most commonly known as ETA – and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Northern Sri Lanka. Both terrorist organizations had secessionist political intentions, and harnessed women in their illegitimate intentions and operations. Both ETA’S and the LTTS’s female membership has been on a steady rise throughout the 1980s that continued till both groups ceased to exist in the past decade. While women mostly assumed supportive roles in the first few decades of ETA’s existence, in the early 2000s it was believed that two women took over the leadership of the resistance group (Poloni-Staudinger & Ortbals, 2013; Balasubramaniyan & Raghavan, 2014).
From the late 1980s onwards, the Tamil Tigers assigned a different task to their female members. In May 1991, former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi was assassinated during a political rally. It was Dhanu – a female assassin of the LTTE and part of the terrorist groups suicide squad, the Black Tigers – who detonated an explosive device strapped to her body while respectfully kneeling before the Indian
political activist (Bloom, 2005). Nonetheless, this incident was not unique in its nature. It was Sana Mekhaidali, the secular Syrian Social Nationalist Party that has become known as the first female suicide bomber when she blew herself up nearby Israeli military vehicles in 1985 (Poloni-Staudinger & Ortbals, 2013). Around the turn of the millennium an increasing number of terrorist groups started making use of women as suicide martyrs. As Bloom (2011) points out, “between 1985 and 2010, female bombers committed over 257 suicide attacks” (representing about a quarter of the total) on behalf of many different terrorist organizations (p. 2).
One of the most significant factors that contributed to women becoming suicide bombers, is the operational advantage they enjoy. Since women are usually perceived as victims of violence rather than perpetrators, it is consequently less common to expect a woman to become a martyr. In the words of Bloom, “female suicide bombers are even more effective than man … [as] their use as operatives has been completely unexpected. … Terrorist organizations have deliberately used this preconception to their advantage by employing operatives who do not fit the conventional profile” (2011, p.21). Consequently, given the tactical advantage female bombers enjoy an increasing number of clandestine terrorist groups adopted female suicide bombing as one of their operational activities. Suicide missions, perpetrated by women entail increased lethality and media attention due to its less, if not unexpected nature.
Nonetheless, the 1980s were not limited to the emergence of women carrying out suicide attacks on behalf of exclusively separatist terrorist groups. Revisiting Rapoport’s model on modern-day terrorism, this decade can also be considered as the starting point of the fourth and current phase, the so-called ‘Religious Wave’ – in which Islamic terrorist groups take the forefront (Bakker, 2015b). Initially, women were less involved in such groups. However, the 1990s and the turn of the millennium marked a significant shift witnessing the appearance of female suicide bombers in terrorist organizations in which radical Islamist ideology was also featured as a central tenet (Davis, 2006; Bloom, 2005).
One of the most often cited examples in this respect is the case of the so-called ‘Black Widows’ as “Chechen women were the first Islamic females to engage in militancy” (Ness, 2005, p. 360). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chechen
nationalists began to seek independence in the Northern part of the Caucuses; their plea for secession soon assumed a religious connotation “with the Muslim separatists [being] influenced by militant Wahhabi ideas drawn from Saudi Arabia” (Weinberg & Eubank, 2011, p. 36). Not only did Chechen separatists add suicide bombing into their plateau of brute force against Russian targets, but they similarly assigned the task of setting off improvised explosive devices to some of their female members. As Bloom argues, the suicide attacks executed by women were seen by many Chechens as a legitimate “response to ‘the most crude, the most terrible’ crimes Russian forces had committed against Chechen civilians during the war” (2005, p. 59). Between the years of 2000 and 2005 it is roughly estimated that half of the suicide attacks affiliated to the Chechen secessionist clandestine group was carried out by Chechnya’s female bombers, the notorious ‘Black Widows’ (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006).
Though the ‘Black Widows’ embraced the distorted interpretation of Islam and considered it as an important component in their struggle against the Russians, their acts were not necessarily committed in the name of jihad. In their attempt to explain the role of radical Islamist ideology in the Black Widows’ deeds, Speckhard and Akhmedova find that the “jihadist ideology provide[d] ill-fated psychological help to the trauma” the Black Widows had gone through during the Chechen war (2006, p. 68). During the continued conflicts against the Russian Federation, Chechens suffered from evasive psychological traumatization, in which virtually no family or individual was untouched by the violence. This provided a fertile breeding ground “to embrace a new non-indigenous form of radicalized Islam” (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006, p. 69). Though the radical Wahhabi terror ideology became intertwined with the mission of the Black Widows, the cause of jihad essentially served as means not only for a new sense of belonging to a distinct ethnic-religious group as opposed to the Russians, but more importantly it was regarded as a justification for the secessionist movement of the region. Although the Black Widows are considered to be the pioneers in attaching a religious face to their terrorist acts, according to Ness “it is not clear at all how religion factor[ed] into their actions … [and they have] largely been characterized in terms of … grief and revenge, rather than … political agency” (2005, p. 360).
In contrast to Chechnya’s separatist Black Widows, female militancy in other jihadi movements was less prevalent owing to a “specific ideology that deterred it” (Ness, 2005, p. 359). Historically speaking, waging the ‘holy war’ of jihad has been regarded as the sole responsibility of males. As Davis argues, “due to the conservative nature of … religious [groups] which also tend to view women in a subordinate role or as weaker members of society … radical Islamic terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda and others linked to the global jihad were slow to begin incorporating women into their ranks” (2006, p. 3-5). Nevertheless, this tendency gradually changed in the beginning of the 2000s, which became exemplified through the altered stance of Al Qaeda towards its female sympathizers.
2.2. Women in Al Qaeda
Founded in the 1980s, the militant-Salafist terrorist organization of Al Qaeda was initially reluctant to embrace female participation in their ranks, recruiting only a handful of women to support their global jihadi cause. Before the 2000s, the terrorist group emphasized that both the obligation of hijrah and jihad were exclusively the duty of male fighters and respectively assigned supportive, ‘housewife’ roles to women (Aasgaard, 2017). As Abdullah Azzam, a theologian, the mastermind of Global Jihad and one of the most influential ideological fathers of Al Qaeda declared “[t]he participation of women in jihad is stated in the Shari’a, but … opening the door [to women to participate in jihad] amounts to a great evil” (as qtd. in Lahoud, 2014, p. 780). Joining the jhadis’ caravan for women is thus, according to Azzam, not permissible.
This proposition, though in a less harsh manner, was maintained Osama bin Laden’s religious declaration of war in 1996. Here, the terrorist leader acknowledged women’s participation, but laid emphasis on their role as facilitators and supporters, encouraging the male members of the family to wage jihad.
“Our women had set a tremendous example of generosity in the cause of Allah; they motivated and encouraged their sons, brothers and husbands to fight - in the cause of Allah – in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechenia and in other countries … Our
women encourage Jihad saying: Prepare yourself like a struggler, the matter is bigger than words!” (“Osama Bin Laden’s Fatwa 1996,” n.d).
From this passage, it becomes visible that according to the belief system of Al Qaeda, women’s primary role in the context of jihad was to provide moral support and reinforce the principles the fundamentalist Islamic terrorist group upheld throughout generations. In the words of Spencer “[w]omen [in Al-Qaeda were] principal actors in the “vertical transmission” of family morals and values” (2016, p. 77).
A significant modification was brought forward in the early 2000s when women’s positioning within jihad considerably changed. In 2003, Al Qaeda announced the establishment of its suicide division, aimed at training its female members to carry out suicide missions. “The idea gathered interests after female suicide missions in … Chechnya. … We are willing to take any Muslim woman and we have Chechens, Afghans, and Arabs from all countries. We are preparing to carry out operations as our predecessors did in Palestine and Chechnya” claimed Umm Osama, the alleged female leader of the then-newly established unit in an interview published in the Asharq al-Awsat, an influential Arabic online newspaper headquartered in London (as qtd. in von Knop, 2007, p. 404).
As Aasgaard puts is, “although [Al Qaeda’s] ideology excludes women from operative combat, there are examples of local adjustments” (2017, p. 106). This alteration first became present in the case of the Iraqi offspring of Al-Qaeda, under the command of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi5. In 2003, a car explosion devastated one of
the US checkpoints in the Western part of Iraq, resulting in the death of several soldiers. After the incident, video footages emerged of the two female suicide bombers responsible for the attacks, swearing on the Quran to protect the Islamic community of Iraq (von Knop, 2007, p. 402). As of then, female suicide missions became a “routine tactic during the US occupation [of Iraq]”; and though in the beginning their numbers were relatively scarce, towards the end of the 2010s a surge of female suicide martyrs could be observed (Gonzalez-Perez, 2011, p. 59).
The tendency to employ women in combatant roles appeared to be rather contagious, spreading among other Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist cells as well. In 2003, two young
5 A jihadist of Jordanian nationality, founder of al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and mastermind behind
girls of age 14, allegedly influenced by the Al Qaeda-linked Salafia Jihadia, were arrested on their way to a liquor store to commit a suicide attack (“Girls guilty of terror charges,”, 2003). In 2005 for the first time, Egypt witnessed the first attack that was carried out by female combatants on behalf of jihadi movements. Two women, armed with guns, boarded a tourist bus and indiscriminately started shooting at its passengers. The attack was claimed by the Abdallah-Azzam Brigades, the Lebanese branch of Al Qaeda (von Knop, 2007, p. 402). In the same year, a wedding reception in Amman, Jordan ended in tragedy when three women set off explosive devices, killing 56 people and injuring more than 100. The Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia group claimed itself as being responsible for the attack (Fattah, 2005). The role of female perpetrators in Al Qaeda-linked terrorist acts in practice became seemingly less denounced than the terrorist movement first advocated. Nevertheless, no ideological ground behind these attacks was postulated.
Despite the apparent alteration in Al Qaeda’s standpoint on women’s participation in violent jihad, the terrorist organization did not provide any validation for women’s increasing utilization in combatant roles. As Gonzalez-Perez points out, “Al Qaeda did not even attempt to cobble together a religious justification for its actions” (2011, p. 61). Considering the religious declarations made by proponents of the terrorist organization, it becomes evident that legitimization for women’s use in combative acts was virtually missing. In his statement made in 2002, bin Laden maintained his previous position regarding the female aspect of jihad by emphasizing that “you [women] have spurred on and exhorted [men to join jihad], and you have raised all the men who fought in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Chechnya, and you are the ones who produce the squadron of heroic [men]” (as qtd. in Lahoud, 2014, p. 783).
In 2008 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the current leader of Al Qaeda and influential ideologue of the terrorist group, similarly stressed the non-military support women are delivering to the cause of Al Qaeda, and the jihad it wages. “The women of the mujahidin play heroic role in taking care of their houses and children under the difficult circumstances of immigration, travel, and steadfastness. “[T]he mujahidat … are doing a heroic job watching over their homes and their children” (“Jihadist Website Releases ‘Second Round’ of Open Interview,” 2008, p. 30). Both figures praise women for their nurturing and supporting contribution; mentioning of their
combatant role – be it in ideological terms or in reference to the suicide attacks Al Qaeda-affiliated women committed – is absent.
In his treatise, the ‘The Role of the Women in Fighting the Enemies’, Yusuf al-‘Uyayri, the founder of the offspring of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (QAP), maintained a similarly ambiguous position concerning women’s jihad. He argued that it is essential for men to have women on their side, in a moral sense and not effectively on the battlefield. In his writing Al-‘Uyayri stresses the importance of the role women assume in the ‘struggle’ of the ummah.
“And the reason we address the woman in these pages is because of what we have
seen in that, when a woman is convinced about a matter [jihad], she will be from the greatest impetuses for the men to fulfil it. And if she is against a matter, she will be from the biggest obstacles to the men accomplishing it” (“The Role of the Women in
Fighting,” n. d., p. 3)
Therefore, women are just as important as men in the success of the ummah’s jihad, but the responsibility of failed jihad equally falls on their shoulders. In a similar vein, Al-‘Uyayri cites examples of heroic women from the classical era who made sacrifices for the ‘noble’ cause of jihad or even personally fought in the defence of Islam (“The Role of the Women in Fighting,” n. d.). Yet, despite applauding women for their active role on the battlefield it becomes clear from the treatise that the leader of QAP does not explicitly urge women to engage in the ‘holy war’. As Lahoud also explains “al-‘Uyayri falls short of calling on women to take up fighting; indeed he urges them not to” (2014, p. 787). Instead, he writes:
“[W]e do not want you to enter the battleground because of the crudeness and the trials it contains, but instead we want you to follow the women of the Salaf in their incitement to fight and their preparation for it and their patience on this path”
(“The
Role of the Women in Fighting,” n. d., p. 15).
Despite giving appraisal to the heroic female predecessors who had allegedly been active on the battlefield during the time of the Prophet, al-‘Uyayri avoids making an explicit revolutionary call and discourages women to take up arms.
Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi was the only Al Qaeda-affiliated jihadi leader who made a less disputable proclamation in calling on women to take part in jihad. In his statement al-Zarqawi shames man and writes that “war has broken out … if you [Muslim men] are not going to [be] chivalrous knights in this war … make way for women to wage it … Yes, by God, men have lost their manhood” (as qtd. in Lahoud, 2014, p. 788). Though it seems al-Zarqawi advocates a less equivocal stance, he in fact blames men for the need to call on women to enter the arena of violent jihad, rather than making a genuine assertion on the matter.
Given the vagueness used when commenting on the existence of women fighters, it almost begs one to ask why Al Qaeda explicitly avoids the endorsement of women in
jihad.
2.3. Women in Jihad: a Contested Topic
The problematic nature behind women’s presence in militant activities within the context of jihad as well as the consequent ambiguity jihadi leaders use to endorse such acts is due to the fact that to the issue is still in contestation. The main reason behind this lies in the ambiguity surrounding women’s position in the fundamentalist Islamic understanding of jihad. As Cook argues, “according to the usual interpretation, women are not permitted to fight in jihad, but were told that their jihad was a righteous pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj)” (2005, p. 376). However, one can hardly argue against the universally deemed impermissibility of female combatant involvement in jihad existent in Islamic fundamentalist tradition. As Davis suggests, this can be attributed to the fact that “the issue of women fighting in jihad is still being interpreted by Islamic scholars” (2015, p. 4).
The question of women fighting for the cause of jihad has been a controversial topic when regarded through classical Islamic material. When examining the religious permissibility of women fighting in jihad, one must find ‘concrete’ historical depth. In other words, historical examples, traditions or statements originating from and endorsed by Prophet Muhammad provide a lead in determining women’s right to take up active military position in the modern ‘holy war’ (Cook, 2005). Considering treatises accounting to the topic of jihad from classical Islamic accounts, examples of
women accompanying the Prophet in the participation of jihad can indeed be found in these. Nonetheless, as Cook stresses, when analyzing these accounts more thoroughly no explicit reference is made to women’s militant role dating back to the time of the Prophet; “women participated in battles in a supporting role, usually by accompanying the fighters, encouraging the men, or by providing medical and assistance” (2005, p. 376). As Cook stresses, women play a marginal role in the classical jihadi collections, citing the example from the Qur’an in which Prophet Muhammad responded to an envious woman that women will be rewarded in Jannah
too, if they “obeyed their husbands and kept to their houses” during the course of the
‘holy war’ (2005, p. 376).
In general, the literary heritage on jihad in the Islamic tradition seldom refers to women as subjects of combatant roles. Both in the Sunni and the Shi’ite tradition, women are assigned a different function in this struggle without a topical reference to fighting, while for men it is about sacrificing their wealth and blood for Allah; “the jihad of the woman is to endure suffering at the hands of her husband and his jealousy” (as qtd. in Cook, 2005, p. 377; Lahoud, 2014). In this respect, it could be argued that a pervasive division arises between the male and female versions of jihad. While men are expected to engage in combat, women, being excluded from the battlefield, are ought to support the cause of the ‘holy war’ by aiding their husbands, the ummah and nurturing the next generations of jihadi warriors.
As Cervone and Peresin argue, one of the most prominent reasons behind women’s exclusion from the front line in Islamic traditional communities is “the willingness to preserve them from situations at odds with the traditional principles of modesty … [such] as public mixing of genders” (2015, p. 497). According to the conservative understanding of a woman’s position in Muslim society “women’s traditional role … [is] in [the] family … as a mother and nurturer of her children … [and] a Muslim woman [is] seen as the responsibility of her male relatives” (Von Knop, 2007, p. 407). Actively inciting women to commit martyrdom operations would also presuppose the contravening of gender dictates that are upheld in conservative Muslim societies. Consequently, jihadi ideologues – including those of Al Qaeda – have refrained from actively inciting women to assume military roles. Carrying out attacks would entail the mixing of genders in a public sphere without male companion and outside of her
‘assigned’ private sphere (Lahoud, 2014). As “fundamentalist movements fight against … a world characterized by sexual disorder, one in which females are seen encroaching on the male domain” allowing a woman to fight by assuming the same positions as a Muslim man would arguably be contested by the religious, conservative society jihadi movements appeal to (Ness, 2005, p. 359).
Considering the above, the reasons as to why Al Qaeda has remained reluctant to endorse female jihadi fighters, (despite the increase in female suicide missions as of the 2000s) becomes much more apparent. Arguably, openly approving female operatives would have undermined the very ideological foundation of the terrorist organization. A critical question follows from this – why did Al Qaeda not condemn the martyr operations executed by its female sympathizers?
2.4 The Strategic Logic Behind Al Qaeda’s Utilization of Women
As argued, conservative Islamic tradition advocates a restrictive view in regards to a woman’s position in traditional Muslim societies. Considering the disposition radical Islamist terrorist movements rally around concerning female roles, women become even more constrained solely to auxiliary functions – at least, in principle. Indeed, as Khelghat-Doost also underlines, “the social restrictions on women’s participation in social activities set by the conservative interpretation of the Islamic jurisprudence combined with traditional cultural value system are … the main reasons for the assumption that the level of women’s incorporation into jihadi organizations is low” (2018, p. 2). This belief system is also central to the ideology of Al Qaeda. That being said, what accounts to the establishment of the Al Qaeda’s suicide squad and the, albeit not overtly endorsed, increase of female martyr operations committed on behalf of the terrorist group?
The logic behind this phenomenon is linked to strategic considerations. As Khelghat-Doost argues, Al Qaeda being an operation-based jihadist terrorist organization, it relies “on asymmetric guerilla warfare”, such as suicidal bomb attacks, assassinations, hijackings and hostage taking, to name the most commonly used modus operandi (2018, p. 5). As briefly mentioned in the introduction of this study, the idea of women resorting to the use of violence runs counter to the prevailing assumptions of pacifism
and weakness concerning femininity. Given the relatively cost and low-technology aspects of suicide missions, coupled with the unanticipated nature of female violence, utilizing women in jihadi movements simply increases operational advantages. Due to the aforementioned reasons, an attack carried out by a woman entails increased lethality, exerts powerful psychological impact and garners widespread media attention, disseminating the clandestine group’s political message in a much more intensified way. Even if Islamic fundamentalist tradition is ambiguous, if not negative, concerning women’s combatant role in jihad, “if organizations believe that increased female participation is to their advantage, they are likely to encourage the participation in any way possible” argues Von Knop (2007, p. 401). Accordingly, Khelghat-Doost underlines that the incorporation of women into jihadi terrorist groups and roles in particular reflects a strategic logic “to enhance organizational success” (2018, p. 1). Al Qaeda was one of the first pioneers of this approach.
3. ANALYSIS OF WOMEN’S PORTRAYAL IN THE DABIQ
In order to understand women’s shifting position within the Islamic State and to what extent the terrorist group has endorsed this change, it is first essential to examine how IS addressed its female supporters in the first place. What is the predominant portrayal of women in the context of the jihad waged by the Islamic State? What kind of roles has IS traditionally assign to its female followers? If one were to find answers to such questions, conducting empirical research – and in particular qualitative discourse analysis on IS’s propaganda – would yield invaluable insights. As Ingram underlines, “propaganda is arguably the central means by which IS reaches out to and mobilizes support” (2017, p. 4). Further examination of ISIL’s propaganda material reveals how the terrorist group frames and justifies its activities to its devotees, including women.3.1. The ‘Virtual Caliphate’: Dabiq
A crucial component of the Islamic State’s propaganda strategy has been its digital magazines with the aim of reaching out to its audience, advocating its political-military as well as the religious and social agenda of the group. In conjunction with the establishment of the so-called ‘Caliphate’ in 2014, it became apparent that in essence, ISIS engaged in a holistic state-building project. The terrorist organization similarly channeled a robust effort into the development of a highly centralized, “structured, and well-resourced bureaucracy” in order to sustain its media production and promote its vision and activities in a systematic and comprehensive way (Gambhir, 2016, p. 20). As Gambhir reveals, ISIL’s media production was predominantly orchestrated from the so-called al-Mu’asasat al-Um that is ‘The Base Foundation’. This central office oversaw the production activities of the Auxiliary Media Units, the Regional ‘Distant’ Wilayat Media Offices and the Primary Media Houses. The latter administered, among others, the Al-Hayat Media Center that was responsible for the production of Daesh’s long-form online magazines (Gambhir, 2016).
Entitled symbolically as Dabiq6 and published by ISIS’s official media wing, the
Al-Hayat, the digital magazine series can be regarded as one of the main imprint of Daesh’s ‘virtual caliphate’. Between 2014 and 2016, 15 issues of Dabiq were published digitally primarily in English, but also translated into other languages such as French, German, Russian and Arabic (Gambhir, 2014). The periodical lends its readers insights into the Islamic State’s military offensives, provides religious commentary, reflecting upon the ideological and political underpinnings of the terrorist organization. “Al-Hayat Media Centre decided to carry on the effort - in sha’allah – into a periodical magazine focusing on issues of tawhid7, manhaj8, hijrah,
jihad, and jama’ah9” reads the introductory notes of the first issue of the Dabiq (“The
Return of Khilafah,” 2014, p. 3).
Central to this study is the accounts presented in the magazine about the portrayal of women’s role within the Islamic State. Even though the first few issues do not address women explicitly, as of the seventh issue onwards the publication introduces a section specifically addressed to women, titled interchangeably as ‘To Our Sisters’ and ‘From our Sisters’. These discuss issues of religious obligations and rules – such as modesty and chastity, among others – to which a Muslim woman should obey according to the value system IS represents. Additionally, the articles – often presented in the form a first-person narrative – draw upon the roles women are assigned to within Daesh.
6 Dabiq, a small town north to Aleppo, is believed to be the site where according to a
well-know hadith Muslims and Western ‘disbelievers’ will engage in their final fight.
7 Oneness with God
8 Best translated as the following of the Quran and Sunnah in accordance to Salafi
interpretation
3.2. The ‘Supporter Archetype’ and the Duty of Hijrah
Analyzing the predominant discourse pertaining to women, it becomes apparent that the narrative surrounding the roles of mujahiraat (female migrants) boils down to three significant aspects; the sister, the mother and the wife. In sum, as Ingram argues, “the most significant portrayal of women in Dabiq is the supporter archetype” (2017, p. 5). In this regard, women are – first and foremost – called upon to escape the reins of ‘false’ Islam that prevails in the darul-kufr, the land of disbelief and perform the
hijrah to the true land, the land of Islam. As Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah writes in
the 8th issue of Dabiq, ‘Shari’ah alone will rule Africa’:
“Hijrah, as it was defined by Ibn Qudāmah is “to leave dārul-kufr for dārul-Islām … migrating from the places of shirk and sin to the land of Islam and obedience. … So
dārul-Islām is the place ruled by Muslims, where the Islamic laws are executed, where authority is for the Muslims, even if the majority of its population are kuffār from ahlul-dhimmah. As for dārul-kufr, then it is the place ruled by kuffār, where the laws of kufr are executed, where authority is for the kuffār, even if the majority of the
population are Muslims.” (2015b, p. 32).
“The āyah indicates the general obligation of hijrah. So everyone who lives amongst the mushrikīn while being able to perform hijrah and not being able to establish his
religion, then he is wronging himself and committing sin. … This ruling is an obligation upon women just as it is upon men, for Allah (ta’ālā), when excluding
those incapable of performing hijrah“ (2015b, p.33).
Umm Basir al-Muhajirah, supposedly the widow of Amedy Coulibaly10, reveals in her
interview given to the magazine that“[l]ving in a land where the law of Allah … is implemented is something great. I feel at ease now that I have carried out this obligation. All praise is due to Allah” (“A brief interview,” 2015, p. 50).
By abandoning the land of heretics, ‘the West’ and performing the journey to the Islamic State, Dabiq reassures its female readership that not only would they have
10 The prime suspect and hostage-taker of the Hypercacher Kosher Supermarket siege, carried
fulfilled their religious duty, but they would also meaningfully contribute to the state-building of the ‘Caliphate’. Additionally, after carrying out the deed of hijrah, women are ascribed to important positions, fulfilling “powerful roles as “mothers” and “wives” to uphold the Caliphate, alongside fellow “sisters” in an everlasting “sisterhood” ” (Ingram, 2017, p. 6).
3.3. The ‘Sister’
Several references are made in the Dabiq on the concept of sisterhood, as a special community. As Musial also points out, “relationships with other women in the Islamic State are found to be a focused topic in the material” (2016, p. 69). Accordingly, issue 8 of the periodical reflects upon the equality of women belonging to the sisterhood, based on their shared belief and devotion to the Khilafah. “Their colors and tongues are different, but their hearts are united upon [the shahada] ‘there is no god but Allah” (Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, 2015b, p. 33). Women belonging to the community of the Islamic State are seen as the true female followers of the religion; “these are the women of our Ummah” (Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, 2015a, p. 45).
Advice on virtuous female behaviour and ways to preserve earnest character to be preserved within the sisterhood is also provided in these writings. In the article featured on the positive aspects of polygyny, ‘Two, three or four’ highlights how women ought to embrace the polygamous way of living. Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah stresses the benefits of polygyny to the whole sisterhood stating that it provides assurance to ‘sisters’ with regards to their honor and economic livelihoods, emphasizing the positive attributes of remarriage to the wives of the shahid11. “Let every sister just put herself in the shoes of a wife of a shahid and sacrifice some of the selfishness that is part of our nature” states al-Muhajirah’s counsel referring to the jealousy a woman might feel for her husband (2015c, p. 22). The act of giving up selfish considerations and committing to selfless deeds can be considered as an act of sisterhood, which benefits the whole community.
