Acknowledgements
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Dr Eamon Aloyo. Dr Aloyo guided and encouraged me to be thorough and truthful in my research. His generosity with his time and communications kept me feeling engaged, motivated, and included even after I left the Netherlands. I would also like to thank my second reader Dr Marieke Liem. I began this thesis journey with Dr Liem, and I am immensely grateful for the early feedback and guidance she provided me with that helped me chart my way forward. These thanks are also extended to Dr Pauline Aarten, who provided valuable feedback that proved instrumental to this finished thesis. Ik ben jullie beide zeer dankbaar, en waardeer jullie hulp.
Thank you to Leiden University, and all the staff I had the pleasure of meeting and learning from during the MSc Crisis and Security Management. They all had an impact on my work, and my whole, wonderful experience in the Netherlands. I am proud to have studied with the Institute of Security and Global Affairs. I also wish to extend my appreciation to the academic staff at RMIT University who I continue to stay in touch with, who are always happy to help me out. In particular, thank you to Dr Paul Battersby who kindly met with me to give his thoughts on Southeast Asia.
Finally, I would like to thank everyone that supported me personally. My friends at Leiden University constantly provided laughter, amazing conversation, and formed the core of my experience. My gratitude goes to Bridget who kindly read my thesis and provided wonderful feedback. My appreciation to Natalie who had to hear me whinge about the thesis more than anyone else. Thank you to my whole family, and in particular my Mum and Dad who have always been with me.
I owe any success I have to them.
~Michael Marinelli
Cover photo courtesy of Marfil Graganza Aquino Acknowledgements photo courtesy of Luc Moons
Table of contents
1. Introduction 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 The nexus 2
1.3 The research question 3
Figure 1: Map of Southeast Asia 5
1.4 Academic relevance 5
1.5 Societal relevance 6
1.6 Originality 8
1.7 Definition of key concepts 8
1.7.a Terrorism 9
1.7.b Organized Crime 12
1.7.c Insurgency 14
1.7.d Crime-Terror Nexus 15
Figure 2: The original CTC, 2004 16
Figure 3: The refined CTC, 2014 17
2. Background 19
2.1 Theoretical background 19
2.2 Empirical background 21
3. Methodology and Data Collection 30
3.1 Introduction – Qualitative research 30
3.1 Multiple case study method 31
3.2 Case selection 32
Figure 4: GTI Index of Southeast Asian countries 33
Figure 5: A selection of terrorist groups in Southeast Asia 35
3.3 Data collection 35
3.3.a Documents 35
3.5 Triangulation 38
3.4 Analysis 39
3.5 Visualizing results 42
Figure 7: Example of a simple sociogram. 43
3.6 Reflection 44
4. Results 46
Figure 8: GTI 2019 results on Southeast Asian countries 47
4.1 Cluster 1: The southern Philippines, Sulu and Celebes 48
Figure 9: Criminal and terrorist linkages in southern Philippines 49 Figure 10: Link structure between ISIL affiliates in Southeast Asia 51
4.2 Cluster 2: The Tri-Border Area & Jemaah Islamiyah 59
Figure 11: Criminal and terrorist linkages in Tri-Border Area 60 4.3 Cluster 3: Trafficking and the Golden Triangle Countries 69 Figure 12: Criminal and terrorist linkages in the Golden Triangle and surrounds 70
4.4 Other results 78
5. Discussion and Conclusion 81
References 92
1. Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Since the mid-1990s, law enforcement, intelligence services and academics have observed a growing trend within criminology and terrorism studies to explore the crime-terror nexus,1 widely understood as the degree of overlap between organized crime (OC) and
terrorism.2 UN Security Council Resolution 2195 noted the pervasive synergies between terrorism and transnational crime and called upon states to better understand and address the nexus as a threat to security and development.3 However, the nexus does not just represent an academic problem; terrorism is a growing threat in Southeast Asia.4 The region has been categorized an ‘emerging hotspot of terrorism’ by the 2018 Global Terrorism Index report, and the Philippines and Myanmar both recorded their highest number of deaths from terrorism in 2017 since 2002.5 Southeast Asia has also seen a marked increase in criminal engagement.6 Criminal activity in Southeast Asia is conservatively estimated to be worth upwards of $100 billion per year.7 In September 2018, the ‘Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Initiative’ launched a policy toolkit to assist states on how to tackle the nexus.8 Their conclusions were based on ranging discussions held with government officials, international, national and regional organizations’ representatives, members of the academicians, experts, and other relevant
stakeholders during four meetings held in Algiers, Tirana, Singapore, and Nairobi. The end of the Cold War, saw a shift in the international security environment which has contributed to
1 Sumpter, C., & Franco, J. (2018). Migration, Transnational Crime and Terrorism: Exploring the Nexus in Europe and Southeast Asia.
2 Grabosky, P. N., Grabosky, P., & Stohl, M. (2010). Crime and terrorism, p. 2 3
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2195 (2014) [on preventing and combating terrorism, including terrorism benefitting from transnational organized crime], 19 December 2014, S/RES/2195 (2014), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/54b4fd874.html [accessed 12 May 2019]
4
Attwell, R. (2017, November 6). Beer, Bombs, and Borders: Islamist Militancy in Malaysia | GSI. 5
Institute for Economics & Peace, (2018). Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the impact of terrorism, Sydney, Available from: http://visionofhumanity.org/reports (accessed 16 May 2019), p. 5, p. 54.
6
Attwell, R. (2018, November 2). Abu Sayyaf Returns? Maritime Kidnappings in the Sulu and Celebes seas in 2018 7 UNODC. (2016). Organized crime threatens peace and prosperity in an integrated Southeast Asia. Retrieved December 15, 2019, from Unodc.org website
8 The Hague Good Practices on the Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: https://www.thegctf.org/Initiatives/The-Nexus-between-Transnational-Organized-Crime-and-Terrorism
“once unthinkable scenarios where criminal and terrorist groups engage in strategic alliances to provide goods or services for example”.9 The GCTF is just one example demonstrating the clear and present appetite from both practitioners and academia to gain more insight into the nexus. However, it remains to be seen the extent to which there is convergence between organized crime and terrorism in various regions, or if it is even helpful to address those issues using such a model.
1.2 The nexus
The ‘nexus’ in question is commonly said to have been proven and established many times over10 but its usefulness is far from consensus.11 The various debates and contestations in the emerging field are important to consider, especially as new conflicts and phenomena in the 2010s and 2020s challenge the very theoretical underpinnings that traditional terrorism and criminology scholars rely upon when utilizing the ‘nexus’. There has been a recent deluge of academic work identifying and characterizing the crime-terror nexus in Europe,12 but the way the ‘nexus’ is used in a European context is wholly inappropriate to address a region like Southeast Asia. In an increasingly globalized world where resources are shared between many actors, it is inevitable that terrorists and organized crime groups will overlap in certain domains, but the degree of this overlap, and its characteristics is what the ‘nexus’ can help describe. A central problem is therefore not if the nexus can be established, but to what extent it be established, and thus, what characteristics it demonstrates.
9 Smith, P. (2005). Terrorism and violence in Southeast Asia : Transnational challenges to states and regional stability, p. 169
10
Hübschle, A. (2011). From theory to practice: Exploring the organized crime-terror nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa. Perspectives on Terrorism, 5(3/4), 81-95.
11 Various academics debate the usefulness of the nexus. Some variation can be found in the following pieces: Hutchinson, S., & O’malley, P. (2007). A crime–terror nexus? Thinking on some of the links between terrorism and criminality. Studies in Conflict Terrorism, 30(12), 1095-1107; & Basra, R., & Neumann, P. R. (2016). Criminal pasts, terrorist futures: European jihadists and the new crime-terror nexus. Perspectives on Terrorism, 10(6); & Wang, P. (2010). The crime-terror nexus: Transformation, alliance, convergence. Asian Social Science, 6(6), 11.
12 For more studies on the nexus in Europe, see: Makarenko, T., & Mesquita, M. (2014). Categorising the crime– terror nexus in the European Union. Global crime; & Basra, R., & Neumann, P. R. (2016). Criminal pasts, terrorist futures: European jihadists and the new crime-terror nexus. Perspectives on Terrorism; Curtis, G. E., & Karacan, T. (2002). The nexus among terrorists, narcotics traffickers, weapons proliferators, and organized crime networks in Western Europe. In The Library of Congress, December.
1.3 The research question
This thesis seeks to answer the following research question:
To what extent is there convergence between organized crime and terrorism in Southeast Asia?
Focusing on Southeast Asia offers a number of benefits to strengthen this research: the geographic boundaries of Southeast Asia are commonly demarcated and recognized by local and international actors (most notably as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN), allowing my research to target the region without hazy conceptions of which countries are and are not included.13 This research does not examine the ASEAN organization, but simply qualifies ‘Southeast Asia’ as the countries that make up the members of ASEAN: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The make-up of the region is internally and externally recognized, and allows this research to be clear on which countries are included in the study. By using internationally recognized conceptions of the region, the findings in this thesis are more easily extrapolated out to existing policies, norms, and research on Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian crime tends toward the type of crimes commonly cited in discussions on the crime-terror nexus, 14 such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, kidnapping, and arms trafficking.15 Both crime and terror are transnational phenomena in the twenty-first century, making micro-studies on individual groups insufficient to find wider characteristics of a regional ‘nexus’, while a study any larger is beyond the allowed length of a Master’s thesis.
While this research is not technically limited by a specific time frame, the vast majority of sources used are from after 1991. 1991 is especially significant for studies on the interactions between criminal organizations and terrorist groups; the end of the Cold War saw a decline of
13
See figure 1.
14 UNODC. (2013). Transnational organized crime in East Asia and the Pacific: a threat assessment. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and UNODC. (2016). Transnational Organized Crime in the Pacific: A Threat
Assessment. 15
state sponsorship for terrorism which allowed organized crime to fill the vacuum, 16 creating new models of symbiosis between two disparate groups that had mostly avoided one another up to that point.17 The end of the Cold War as a contributor to the deepening of crime-terror
relationships is accepted and stated in virtually every academic work on the ‘nexus’ reviewed for this thesis.18 The research question aims toward a current-day understanding of the extent of convergence between crime and terrorism in Southeast Asia, rather than a historical review. So, while older sources were useful to build an understanding of the current situation, heavy
emphasis is placed on the most up-to-date research, news, and analysis. Southeast Asia and its own forms of terrorism and insurgency should not be conflated with Middle Eastern forms of the same phenomena.19 Data shows that terrorism is mixed in with ethno-nationalist conflicts that pre-date the Islamic extremist ‘wave’ of the 1990s through to present-day.20 Indeed, all research on these issues must take into account the differing cultural aspects of different regions.
Working toward establishing the ‘extent’ of complex social phenomena is difficult, especially when studying groups that operate outside of lawful society. Therefore, the ‘extent’ is first be shown using diagrams in the results section. The discussion section then elucidates some key points that speak to the significance of that ‘extent’. Between ‘no extent’ and ‘fullest extent’ exists a very broad area with which to place the conclusions of this thesis, an attempt to quantify convergence in this way is not appropriate. Other studies on the crime-terror nexus have
provided subjective ratings such as ‘degrees of confidence’ for certain hypotheses (from low to very high).21 This thesis uses the principle more generally, and forms conclusions about the ‘extent’ based on the direct results. The two major tasks of this thesis are to show the extent of linkages and convergences, and then to interpret them.
16
Chalk, P. (1997). Grey-area phenomena in Southeast Asia: piracy, drug trafficking and political terrorism (No. 123). Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University.
17
Giraldo, J., & Trinkunas, H. A. (2007). Terrorism financing and state responses: a comparative perspective, p. 40 18 See Makarenko (2004), Hutchinson & O’Malley (2007), Ryabchiy (2018), Dishman (2005), De Boer & Bosetti
(2015), Schmid (1996, 2018), Cornell (2006), Clarke & Lee (2008), Picarelli (2006), Hübschle (2011), etc. 19
Tan, A. T. (Ed.). (2007). A handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia. Edward Elgar Pub., p. 3 20 Croissant, A. & Barlow, B. (2007) in Giraldo, J. K., & Trinkunas, H. A. (2007). Terrorism financing and state
responses: a comparative perspective, p. 206
Figure 1: Map of Southeast Asia22
1.4 Academic relevance
This study contributes a number of important findings to the body of academic research that is developing on crime, terror, and the nexus between them. Firstly at the conceptual level it critiques explanatory crime-terror nexus models that are broadly accepted in the field, and assesses if these models ‘work’ when explaining Southeast Asian dynamics. Secondly, it specifically addresses a region that has, so far, been insufficiently examined on a regional level.
22 Derivative work: BluemaskASEAN_countries_capitals.svg: Martin Vigerske [CC BY 3.0
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)] Note: Papua New Guinea and East Timor are not considered Southeast Asian countries and are not included in this study.
When Southeast Asia is examined, it has been in the context of brief country or group level assessments, without wider implications for the region at large.23 Thirdly, the study explores if convergence between organized crime and terrorism is insubstantial, non-existent, or of a different character to current conceptions of the nexus. All of these findings would be
worthwhile contributions to the academic field, and such findings might be able to provide other interpretations of the nexus in non-Western regions. Within the field of crisis and security management, examining terrorism has remained a popular topic for research, especially in the post-9/11 context of the ‘Global War on Terror’, and the establishment, flourishing, and deterioration of Islamic State (ISIL)24 since 2014. This study does not comfortably fit strictly within the ‘terrorism studies’ or ‘criminology’ field, though it does place more of a focus on the terrorism aspect of this research. This thesis approaches the research question from the field of human security studies, a subsection of wider security studies. Human security studies provides a base to more holistically approach factors that are often missing when viewing terrorism from the state’s perspective; for instance, taking into account developmental factors, societal influence, and the social milieus that criminals and terrorists connect within. It also builds an implicit appreciation and acknowledgement that it is regular people in affected countries that must face the worst and most consistent victimization deriving from crime and terror.
1.5 Societal relevance
There is a clear appetite from global actors to gain more insight into the potential crime-terror nexus.25 In discussions on illicit arms trafficking as it relates to international terrorism, the UNODC explicitly refer to the “need to address the growing nexus of organized crime and terrorism, with terrorist groups benefitting from crime as well as from links with organized
23 See Clarke, R., & Lee, S. (2008). The PIRA, D-company, and the crime-terror nexus. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(3) which examines only two groups and Singh, B. (2018). Crime-Terror Nexus in Southeast Asia: Case Study of the Abu Sayyaf Group. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 10(9), a short piece which exclusively examines Abu Sayyaf Group in Philippines, with an emphasis on their criminal behaviour, rather than links.
24 The ‘Islamic State’ is referred to by many names, including ISIL, ISIS, Daesh, Islamic State, IS, etc. This thesis will use the English acronym ‘ISIL’, short for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
25 United Nations Security Council. (2019, May 1). Three Security Council committees hold joint special meeting on linkages between terrorism and organized crime. Retrieved December 15, 2019, from Counter-Terrorism Committee website.
criminal networks”.26 They call for a holistic approach that confront the links between organized crime and terrorism. Discovering the character of connections and convergence between
terrorism and crime in Southeast Asia could have implications for security policy in the region, or the way in which law enforcement and counter-terrorism categorize those connections. While those agencies concerned are likely to have their own well-developed internal understanding, it is important and relevant to disperse that knowledge more widely to the public. With crime,
trafficking and terrorism all taking on greater relevance in the national security calculations of many Southeast Asian states,27 the findings will be of particular interest to states in Southeast Asia, such as ASEAN,28 and in the wider Asia-Pacific for countries like Australia and New Zealand.29 Criminality has undermined efforts to enhance the rule of law in the region, and in a region as intertwined as Southeast Asia, cooperation is vital, necessitating research and expertise from various backgrounds and countries. 30 This research fills a gap in the established academic discourse by engaging with conceptual models in a critical way to describe and display findings on Southeast Asia. As an Australian crisis and security management student, this study has allowed me to gain greater insight into a nearby region that has been described as Australia’s “local neighbourhood; what happens there matters [to us]”.31 This forms a motivation for the research, but I acknowledge that I am not from Southeast Asia, and approach it from an Australian perspective. Further, this study adds to the student repository of theses at Leiden University, contributing to the ongoing advancement of knowledge at the University. The
Institute of Global and Security Studies (ISGA) is enriched by every thesis published, and as one of the few students from the larger Asia-Pacific region, this research is valuable in providing more diversity in completed theses.
26
UNODC. (2018). Remarks on countering illicit arms trafficking in the context of fighting international terrorism. Retrieved January 9, 2020, from Unodc.org website: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2018/firearms-030918.html
27
Chalk, P. (1997). Grey-area phenomena in Southeast Asia: piracy, drug trafficking and political terrorism (No. 123). Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University.
28
ASEAN is a regional intergovernmental organization comprising the following ten countries in Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
29
Thrayer, C. (2016, October 30). Southeast Asia: Patterns of security cooperation. Retrieved May 12, 2019, from Aspi.org.au: https://www.aspi.org.au/report/southeast-asia-patterns-security-cooperation
30 Abbey, M. (2017, May 31). Crime, Terror, and Porous Borders in Southeast Asia - Asia Sentinel. Retrieved January 12, 2020, from Asia Sentinel website.
31 Frost, F. (2009). Australia’s proposal for an ‘Asia Pacific Community’: Issues and prospects, Research paper, no. 13, 2009–10, Parliamentary Library, Canberra
1.6 Originality
While research on the linkages and relationships between crime and terrorism has developed over the last two decades, the field is still in its relative infancy compared to other related fields like criminology, terrorism studies, or international relations. Fortunately, that means that there are clear opportunities to conduct original research to fill wide gaps in the current academic knowledge on the topic. After extensive research, and by examining
bibliographies and footnotes on the texts that were reviewed during this research, there does not appear to have been a wide-ranging exploration of the linkages between crime and terrorism in Southeast Asia as a whole region.32 Description and discussion of linkages (or lack thereof) between crime and terrorism in this region is therefore new, novel, and original. A study
examining Southeast Asia pushes the academic field forward by working to establish the extent of the regional crime-terror nexus, which could provide further basis to research larger
geographic dimensions of the nexus (Asia-Pacific), or could provide a useful comparison or contrast for those who wish to conduct regional analysis on other similarly sized regions. Studies on the crime-terror nexus that start with a terrorist group as the central case might tend toward working backwards from that point to prove links. On the other hand, by seeking to look at the ‘extent’ of convergence (which could be high, or non-existent) with countries as the cases, the thesis can work toward elucidating links that are present, but does not require links to satisfy and answer the research question.
1.7 Definition of key concepts
There are ongoing definitional debates in the field about exactly what constitutes both ‘terrorism’, ‘organized crime’ and the ‘nexus’ between them. This research does not seek to settle these debates, but definitions are necessary to explain the topic and parameters of
32 It is possible that such a document exists waiting to be published, but a deep search of Leiden University library, RMIT University library, public library, and online databases revealed nothing like this thesis. See footnote 17 for sources that do examine Southeast Asian nexus issues.
analysis.33 Rather, this study briefly explores current debates on certain definitions for the aforementioned terms, and settles on definitions that most fit with the aim and design of this study by examining the merits and inclusions of each definition.
1.7.a Terrorism
The modern study of political violence, or ‘terrorism’ has its roots in academic traditions dating back to the late 1970s and early 1980s, coinciding with a spike in aeroplane hijackings at the time.34 Terrorism studies is a mostly empirically based field that has changed dramatically in recent decades. While it is often spoken of as a sub-field within social sciences, its advocates maintain that it should be considered more than that.35 It is an interdisciplinary field, blending elements of Criminology, Political Science, Psychology, Anthropology, Sociology, Economics, and other disciplines to form ideas and structures around the concepts and fundamental questions of terrorism and counterterrorism. While terrorism is the primary focus of this study, it is not the
only important piece in the crime-terror puzzle. Despite ‘terrorism’ having existed in its modern
understanding since the anarchist terror of the late 19th to early 20th century, the field gained extraordinary momentum after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 where 3000 people lost their lives. The resulting political climate during the Global War on Terror led to large grants and a dramatic increase in funding for terrorism research. There are hundreds of definitions accepted by different bodies and institutions.36 A useful starting point is found in The SAGE dictionary of
criminology: terrorism is “an essentially premediated political act. The intention is to inflict
serious injury on the civilian population and to influence government policy by creating an atmosphere of fear and threat generally for a political, religious, or ideological cause”.37 The SAGE definition is useful but is limited by its strictness of ‘victim’ and that it presumes
33
Allum, F & Gilmour, S. (2011). ‘Introduction’ in F Allum & S Gilmour (eds), Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime, p. 6
34
Schmid, A. P., Jongman, A. J., & Documentatiecentrum, S. W. I. E. (1984). Political terrorism: A research guide to concepts, theories, databases and literature.
35
Reinares, F. (2012, October 31). Discussion Point: Terrorism Studies is not a Sub-Discipline | START.umd.edu. Retrieved March 27, 2019, from START
36 Professor Alex Schmid chronicled up to ‘260’ different definitions of terrorism. See Kelkar, K. (2017, February 26). When it comes to defining “terrorism,” there is no consensus. Retrieved January 13, 2020, from PBS NewsHour website.
37
government policy change is the goal, where in many cases the goal may be to psychologically affect other audiences for various reasons. A more nuanced view was expressed by Schmid’s 2012 ‘academic consensus’38 definition:
Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.39
The above definition is useful because it deftly covers a number of aspects of terrorism as it is understood today: that is a tactic of political violence mainly against non-combatants that can be conspiratorial with propagandistic effects on a number of audiences. Schmid arrived at the definition after considerable study and comparison of existing definitions. Schmid does not clarify what ‘moral restraints’ refers to, and some might argue that refraining from attacking women or children is a ‘moral restraint’ which might lead to definitional issues for those that use terrorism selectively. However, ‘legal and moral restraints’ must be seen in context with the whole definition; Schmid is simply trying to convey that terrorism should not be seen exclusively through the lens of legality. Schmid intends this definition to be used even when describing the state’s use of terrorism, and in those cases, the state’s actions may be ‘legal’ but not reasonably ‘moral’. The definition is not used to describe what a ‘terrorist group’ is, but instead what ‘terrorism’ is. Seen in this light, terrorism is neither solely the realm of non-state actors nor the domain of ideological extremists.40 It is essentially a type of warfare that any party to a conflict can adopt when they believe it to be in their best interests. This definition is worthwhile to use for this research because it covers tactics, motives, legality, targeting, and notes the referent victims as mostly civilians and non-combatants. In August 2018, as part of research done by the
38 This was Schmid’s term for his own definition, seeking to specifically establish a definition that may be used widely.
39 Schmid, A. P. (2012). The revised academic consensus definition of terrorism. Perspectives on Terrorism, 6(2). 40 Schuurman, B., & Taylor, M. (2018). Reconsidering radicalization: Fanaticism and the link between ideas and
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) in The Hague, the same Dr. Schmid arrived at a definition for what is meant by a terrorist group specifically in his piece examining the crime-terror nexus:
A ‘terrorist group’ is a militant, usually non-state, clandestine organization with political goals which – by definition – engages, in whole or in part of its activities, in terrorism, that is, a communication strategy for psychological (mass) manipulation whereby mainly unarmed civilians (and non-combatants such as prisoners of war) are deliberately victimized in order to impress third parties (e.g. intimidate, coerce or otherwise influence a government or a section of society, or public opinion in general), with the help of portrayals of demonstrative violence in front of witnessing audiences and/or by means of induced coverage in mass and social media.41
The term ‘clandestine’ is commonly used in studies on terrorism and militancy. The Cambridge Dictionary defines ‘clandestine’ as “planned or done in secret, especially describing something that is not officially allowed.”42 Both terrorist and criminal organizations are
necessarily clandestine to avoid detection by law enforcement, military, and intelligence services. While terrorist groups are public in their attacks, their organization is clandestine and ‘done in secret’. While Schmid’s definitions may seem overlong, they certainly offer depth to the collective understanding of terrorism. While no definition on terrorism and ‘terrorist group’ has achieved widespread acceptance and usage, Schmid’s definitions are popular within the
academic community,43 including with terrorism studies scholars at Leiden University.44 Indeed, Schmid’s definitions have been adopted widely by varied actors from Jane’s Intelligence Group
41 Schmid, A. P. (2018). Revisiting the relationship between international terrorism and transnational organized crime 22 years later. ICCT Research Paper, The Hague.
42 Cambridge Dictionary. (2020, January 8). CLANDESTINE. Retrieved January 13, 2020, from Cambridge English Dictionary website.
43
See Schmid, A. P. (2011). The definition of terrorism. In The Routledge handbook of terrorism research (pp. 57-116). Routledge.
44 Schuurman, B., & Taylor, M. (2018). Reconsidering radicalization: Fanaticism and the link between ideas and violence. Perspectives on Terrorism, p. 7
to the Supreme Court of India.45 In this paper, the conception of terrorism and terrorist group adheres to Schmid’s above definitions.
1.7.b Organized Crime
Organized crime has a multitude of definitions which are subject to change depending on the political and social circumstances of the society that creates it.46 There are a number of major approaches to organized crime. Some literature aims at analysing the goals and motivations of criminal organizations,47 whereas some focus on the structural and organizational changes that lead to crime.48 Other literature takes a more practical route, explaining and exploring the methods used in organized crime, or on the activities that take place.49 Some definitions are strong, but lack the breadth needed. For example, Gill describes organized crime as “the ongoing activities of those collectively engaged in production, supply and financing for illegal markets in goods and services”.50 However, this definition lacks any reference to power, or influence, arguably a crucial aspect to modern criminal activity. These different objectives are not mutually exclusive; they do not negate each other, therefore it is possible to appreciate and include understandings of all of them in research. In Mendel and McCabe’s 2016 book
examining how U.S. Special Forces can assist in the fight against organized crime, the following definition is advanced:
Organized crime refers to those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their
45
Madan Singh vs State Of Bihar (2003), Appeal (crl.) 1285 of 2003, the Supreme Court of India.
46
Quinney, R. (1970). The Social Reality of Crime. Boston: Little Brown. 47
Schmid (1996); Hutchinson and O’Malley (2007); Asal, Forest and Nussbaum (2015)
48 Laqueur (1999); Napoleoni (2004); Love (2009); Picarelli (2012); De Bie, de Poot and Van der Leun (2014) 49
Grabosky and Stohl (2010); Forest (2012; 2013) 50
illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanism.51
The definition is useful. Coming from a military Special Forces perspective, who are inclined to view organized crime through the lens of competing security concerns (including terrorism), it offers beneficial contours including the acquisition of power. Given criticism of the nexus often views crime as being committed for purely commercial enrichment, this definition identifies other motivations and features of crime. In 2000, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) was finalized in Palermo,52 designed to bring member states together to sign a multilateral treaty to combat transnational organized crime. Balancing the needs and wishes of 180 member states resulted in no definition of organized crime itself, but they did settle on a definition for an organized criminal group:53
“Organized criminal group’ shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established pursuant to this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”
This definition is accepted by all but four member states, and has international legal standing; indeed, EUROPOL’s Serious Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) and the Victorian Law Reform Commission in Australia utilize the definition.54 It is useful to apply in this research because it has achieved widespread acceptance in the international policy domain. ‘Organized crime’ as described in the first definition may be understood to be the criminal activity enacted by groups that fit the group definition the United Nations uses. Taken together,
51
Mendel, W., & McCabe, P. (2016). SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime, p.1 52 For background and full text of the Palermo Convention and its three Protocols, see URL: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html
53 United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. Art. 2; Annex I of General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000. URL: https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=xviii-12&chapter=18&lang=en
54 Victorian Law Reform Commission. (2013). 2 The nature of organized crime. Retrieved October 3, 2019, from lawreform.vic.gov.au website: https://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/content/2-nature-organised-crime
organized crime can be conceptualized in a cohesive, internationally recognized way, which is how this paper will proceed.
1.7.c Insurgency
This thesis periodically makes reference to ‘insurgency’, which occupies a different category than organized crime group or terrorist group. This definition will not be as extensive as the others provided, because insurgencies are not the focus of this thesis but they are an
inexorable part of violence and criminality in Southeast Asia, and are often the movements terrorist groups can trace their formation back to. Many of the terrorist groups in this thesis were formed in social conditions created by ongoing armed insurgencies, such as those in southern Philippines, southern Thailand, and Shan state in Myanmar. The use of the term insurgency recognizes the political motivation of those who participate, in comparison to brigandry which implies no such political affiliation or objective.55 The U.S. Department of Defense defines insurgency as “The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.”56 Many insurgencies are borne out of harsh repression and lack of representation from states, whereas others aim at asserting violent repression on those in their area of control based on ethnicity, race, and/or religion. Insurgencies can achieve levels of legitimacy based on ceasefires and agreements with state governments and generally have overt, even legal, political wings that complement their fighting programme,57 which is generally not the case for terrorist groups. Insurgencies may use ‘terrorism’ as a tactic in their conflicts, however the use or non-use of terrorism does not define an insurgency. Insurgencies in Southeast Asia are larger, more closely resemble traditional militaries and hierarchies, and function more as militias and small armies compared to terrorist groups.58 This thesis focuses on the links between criminal and terrorist groups, and the
55 Lieber, F. (1983). Lieber's Code and the Law of War. Transaction Publishers, p. 95
56 US Department of Defense (2019), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 106
57 Morris, M. F. (2005). al-Qaeda as Insurgency. Army War College Carlisle Barracks PA. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA434874
58 Schreer, B. & Tan, A. T. (Eds.). (2019). Terrorism and insurgency in Asia: A contemporary examination of terrorist and separatist movements, p. 231
appropriation of tactics between the two, and while insurgencies are part of that discussion, they are not the focus. They are classified distinctly in the results section.
1.7.d Crime-Terror Nexus
The Cambridge Dictionary defines a nexus as “an important connection between the parts of a system or a group of things.”59 In the context of this paper, this simple definition is perhaps the most useful. The crime-terror nexus refers to the important connections between the two referent parts, crime and terror. Grabosky simply calls it “the degree of overlap between organized crime and terrorism”.60 The nexus is not deep theory; it serves as a term that can be broadly used to describe a phenomenon that is inadequately served without the term. Pure discussions of criminality and terror as individual concepts preclude the researcher from resolving deeper issues related to their interplay.
Given the relatively short time the crime-terror nexus has explicitly identified and researched, academics have built primarily on the ‘continuum’ model that first took shape in the early 2000s. The crime-terror continuum (CTC) model was introduced by Tamara Makarenko in 2004. Makarenko was a research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St Andrews University, which primarily approaches terrorism and crime from political science and international relations backgrounds. Makarenko is viewed widely as a pioneer in the study of the crime-terror nexus, exemplified by her recent invitation to speak to the United Nations Security Council on the issue in July, 2019.61 The 2004 CTC model is a linear model that charts a sliding scale with terrorism on one end, and organized crime on the other. At different points along the X axis, groups can be placed in four categories: alliances, appropriation of tactics and operational motivations, convergence, and ‘black hole’.
59
Cambridge Dictionary. (2019, October 2). NEXUS | meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary. Retrieved October 4, 2019, from Cambridge.org website: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/nexus 60
Grabosky, P. N., Grabosky, P., & Stohl, M. (2010). Crime and terrorism, p. 2
61 UN News. (2019, July 9). Threat from petty criminals who turn to terrorism, a growing concern, Security Council hears. Retrieved November 12, 2019, from UN News website: https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/07/1042111
Figure 2: The original CTC, 200462
Before discussing the CTC, it is necessary to expand on the term ‘black hole’. ‘Black hole’ refers to two situations where weak or failed states foster convergence between organized crime and terrorism, and ultimately foster a safe haven for the continuation of the convergent groups.63 The first situation is where the primary motivations of groups engaged in civil war turn from political aims to criminal aims. This point is shared by political economist David Keen who said “Increasingly, civil wars that appear to have begun with political aims have mutated into conflicts in which short-term economic benefits are paramount.”64 Makarenko reasons that the end of the Cold War resulted in the decline of proxy conflicts and state support which indirectly caused a decline in the strength of revolutionary political ideologies.65 There exists a parallel with terrorist groups who increasingly abandon their political ideology as a result of having to depend on criminal activity for their survival and their continued power. The second ‘black hole’ situation is the emergence of a de-facto ‘black hole state’ where a ‘hybrid’ group takes over the state – in this context, Makarenko means the ‘hybrid’ of a governing body with criminal or terrorist elements. While the second situation is classed as the most extreme expression of convergence, the concept can be observed in the real world on a smaller scale in certain geographical areas like the Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan, or parts of Indonesia and Thailand where government control is extremely weak.66 Complete takeover examples are rare,
62
Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime-terror continuum: tracing the interplay between transnational organized crime and terrorism, p. 129
63
Ibid, p. 138
64 Keen, D. (2005). The economic functions of violence in civil wars. Routledge, p. 11
65 See Makarenko (2004), Hutchinson & O’Malley (2007), Ryabchiy (2018), Dishman (2005), De Boer & Bosetti (2015), Schmid (1996, 2018), Cornell (2006), Clarke & Lee (2008), Picarelli (2006), Hübschle (2011), etc 66 Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime-terror continuum: tracing the interplay between transnational organized crime and terrorism, p. 138
but Makarenko posits that examples can be observed.67 Groups that thrive within ‘black hole’ environments are motivated by the ‘accumulation of wealth, control of territory and people, freedom of movement and action, and legitimacy”.68 However, perhaps because of the many conceptual issues the ‘black hole’ raises, Makarenko later removed it from future models without explanation.
Given the simplicity of the continuum’s structure, Makarenko refined it in 2014 to more distinctly illustrate some of the complexities in the nexus. Makarenko created two planes that showed one group eventually transforming into its counterpart, but demonstrated that there are different levels of convergence: operational convergence where groups form an alliance for actions; appropriation of tactics, wherein groups adopt the methods and tactics of the other; and organizational convergence, or hybridity, when the two groups form as one, or a group becomes indistinguishable as either type. The model suggests that no group is guaranteed to stay in its original position and may evolve over time to occupy different places along the continuum. The continuum highlights a more sophisticated phenomenon which operates within a series of planes: one operational, one organizational and one evolutionary.
Figure 3: The refined CTC, 201469
The first plane consists of the appropriation of tactics of the ‘other’. Two nodes are present. The first node represents an ‘alliance’ of sorts, where different groups collaborate for shared operational advantages. Makarenko provides the example where a “terrorist group would
67 Makarenko explains that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is most illustrative of a criminal state. DPRK officials have allegedly engaged in criminal activity since the 1970s; the Norwegian government expelled all the staff of the North Korean embassy in 1976, based on allegations of narcotics trafficking. See Galeotti, M. (2001) ‘Criminalisation of the DPRK’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, p. 10 for further information. 68 Manwaring, M. (ed.) (1993) Grey Area Phenomena Westview, pp. 7–8
pay an organized criminal group for counterfeit documents.”70 Other examples would include Italian criminal groups smuggling arms to Palestinian and North African-based terrorist groups, in return for support in Italian narcotics smuggling networks,71 or that the explosives used in the 2004 Madrid terrorist were purchased with hashish, highlighting the illicit space that criminals and terrorists share.72 Connections between European criminal organizations and terrorist
organizations, especially when it comes to smuggling routes through the Balkans have long been established.73 The second node identifies the appropriation of methods or tactics from the other. This might entail a terrorist group developing aspects of market or commercial crime, or an organized crime group adopting terror tactics for political purposes.
The second plane accounts for the merging of a terrorist and criminal organization, which could develop into a hybrid organization or could simply involve the absorption of one group into the other. Hybrid organizations might display both the ideological and economic aims that were the primary drivers of the original organizations. Some traditionally terrorist groups in Northern Ireland, for example, have maintained their foothold in terrorist activity while predominantly pivoting their operations toward organized crime, becoming, in essence, “full-time criminals and part-“full-time terrorists”.74
The final sphere of the crime-terror continuum refers to the transformation of a terrorist or organized crime group into the other due to a complete evolution in their tactics and
motivations. Makarenko notes that this is the most difficult nexus to identify because it is largely a conceptual exercise in defining where crime ends and terrorism begins, or the other way around.75 Given the low costs and high gains that can be made, the exploitation of organized crime methods by terrorist networks has been described a “natural development that has partially neutralized the ‘global’ effort to undermine terrorist finances.”76
70
Ibid, p. 260 71
Ibid, p. 260
72 Giraldo, J, & Trinkunas, H. A. (2007). Terrorism financing and state responses: a comparative perspective, p. 78 73
Trad, R. (2019, September 17). The Alliances of Criminal and Terrorists Groups in Europe. Retrieved December 12, 2019, from European Eye on Radicalization website.
74
Makarenko, T., & Mesquita, M. (2014). Categorising the crime–terror nexus in the European Union, p. 261 75 Ibid, p. 261
2. Background
2.1 Theoretical background
The majority of literature on the connections between organized crime and terrorism note a fundamental difference between terrorist and criminal organizations because the motives guiding their actions are completely different.77 Dr Bruce Hoffman, a political analyst specializing in the study of terrorism and counterterrorism, stated in his 1998 book Inside
Terrorism that it was “useful to distinguish terrorists from ordinary criminals”,78 arguing that criminals are driven by material gain, and do not seek to send political messages, to influence the public, or to provoke a psychological reaction through their criminal acts. According to
academics like Williams, these objectives are the domain of terrorist groups.79 This divergence in motive has been described as a “great chasm” that makes the two sets of groups distinct.80
Terrorist organizations focus on delivering political changes, whereas criminal organizations focus on maximizing profits, and often wish to do so with as low a profile as possible. This dichotomy forms one of the most significant and often repeated debates in the field. It is this distinction that is often cited as the fundamental reason terrorists and organized criminal group would not wish to be connected or aligned with one another.81 The argument is well made by a number of scholars, including Schmid, but it is misleading when applied to modern terrorist organizations. Contemporary terrorist organizations are more ideologically murky compared with the groups of the 20th century which were characterized by clear hierarchies and goals. Where bin Laden’s al-Qaeda was largely made up of ideologically motivated followers who deferred to his instruction, modern terrorist organizations like ISIL and Abu Sayyaf Group are infamously made up of former and current criminals, and their priorities appear to more heavily
77
Snow (1996), Makarenko (2003; 2004), Napoleoni (2004) Shelley and Picarelli (2005), Tupman (2009), Wang (2010), Grabosky and Stohl (2010) Forest (2012), Akchurina and Lavorgna (2014), Carrapico, Irrera and Tupman (2014), De Bie et al. (2014), Lewis (2014), and Rossi (2014)
78 Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (Vol. Rev. and expanded ed). New York: Columbia University Press, p. 36 79 Williams, P. (2012). The terrorism debate over Mexican drug trafficking violence. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 24(2), p. 261
80 Phillips, B. J. (2015). What is a terrorist group? Conceptual issues and empirical implications. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(2), p. 237
81 Schmid, A. P. (2018). Revisiting the relationship between international terrorism and transnational organized crime 22 years later. ICCT Research Paper, The Hague
skew toward profit than the terrorism of the 20th century. These recent developments, and the acceleration of globalized technology have seen an ever-growing number of academics focus more intensively on the fading distinctions between crime and terrorism.82 Consequently, Makarenko developed her innovative crime-terror continuum model that provided a way to analyse and categorise the relationships between the two concepts and two methods of
behaviour. Section 1.7.d provides a detailed account of the development of the continuum model. There are two primary schools of thought on the nexus. The first, represented primarily by Makarenko, Stern, and Dishman,83 firmly argues that a crime-terror nexus is present. The second school of thought, represented by Hutchinson and O’Malley, Bale, and Schmid84 (to a lesser degree), assert that the difference in motivation is too great a hurdle to surpass, making convergence unlikely to occur meaningfully. Bale adds that he sees the ‘nexus’ as ‘much ado about nothing’, that the reality is that any entity that operates in clandestine, illicit settings will encounter and interact with criminal networks.85 Indeed, Bale believes the nexus should be treated with scepticism in the absence of verifiable proof that one exists. In contrast, a recent detailed systematic review of the ‘state of evidence’ for the ‘nexus’ by de Boer and Bosetti found clearly that “research and facts on the ground have demonstrated - with increasing levels of confidence - that organized crime, terrorism and rebel groups often possess multiple agendas and strategies simultaneously, policy at national, regional and international levels continues to be boxed into outdated and compartmentalized notions that differentiate these groups based on pre-conceived motives and methods.”86 Additionally, a comprehensive review of the literature on the crime-terror nexus and the crime-terror continuum model also concluded finding broad
agreement with the first school of thought confirming the existence of a nexus.87 Emerging research demonstrates that organized crime may be best understood as a ‘strategy’ adopted by a range of conflict actors (including the state) to achieve their objectives, which lends itself to Makarenko’s continuum that would place this ‘strategy’ as something that could be appropriated
82 See Grabosky & Stohl (2010), Laqueur (2000), De Boer & Bosetti (2015), Reitano, T., Clarke, C. P., & Adal, L. (2017), etc.
83 See Dishman, C. (2005). Stern, J. (2003), and Makarenko (2004).
84 See Hutchinson and O’Malley (2007), Howard & Traughber (2013), and Schmid (1996). 85
Howard, R. O., & Traughber, C. (2013). The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of the World or So Much Hype?, pp. 2-3
86 De Boer, J., & Bosetti, L. (2015). The crime-conflict ‘nexus’: State of the evidence. Occasional Paper, p. 15 87 Ryabchiy, K. (2018). Rethinking the crime-terror continuum in the 21st century: post-9/11 to the
by a terrorist organization to fund itself. Statements from international officials echo the sentiment that the nexus does exist and is a serious threat to security.88 In a 2010 meeting with representatives from 44 countries, the U.S. National Security Advisor General James L. Jones spoke a “world of transnational threats” and said “If we do not act together to prevent them, these trends will only continue to intensify in the years to come. And that is something that should concern all our nations.”89 Though some disagree with the nexus’ ongoing popularity, others such as Gen. Jones see it as a security threat worth investigating, especially with the risk that criminal networks could successfully transfer weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists, or to exploit their smuggling routes to infiltrate weapons or even terrorists into other countries.90 The rise of terrorism and organized crime have shown that transnational threats are primarily non-military in nature and are inextricably linked into more traditional causes of conflict – in a complex web of interdependence that cannot be ignored by states.91 However, on the balance of the evidence and research in the body of literature, this research is positioned within the first school of thought, that the nexus is a tangible issue, both from a policy and academic perspective.
2.2 Empirical background
Conceptions around the nexus have developed over time. A precursor to current discussions on the nexus, the 1980s saw the term ‘narco-terrorism’ coined as a way of categorizing drug traffickers who used terror tactics against officials for political purposes.92 This term explicitly connected traditionally criminal activity (narcotics) with terrorism. Primarily these were groups in Colombia93 that engaged in extortion and other forms of economic crime to fund their illicit
88 The fifteenth Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Coordinating Committee in Malaga in March, 2019 launched a Policy Toolkit with the view of operationalizing the The Hague Good Practices on the Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism.
89 Remarks for Gen. James L. Jones, National Security Advisor at the Sochi Security Council Gathering, Sochi Russia. (2013, April 30). Retrieved October 6, 2019, from whitehouse.gov
90 Ibid
91 Smith, P. (2005). Terrorism and violence in Southeast Asia : Transnational challenges to states and regional stability, p. 15
92 Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime-terror continuum: tracing the interplay between transnational organized crime and terrorism, p. 130; and Cornell, S. E. (2006). The narcotics threat in greater Central Asia: from crime-terror nexus to state infiltration?. In China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, p 37.
93
activities. Over time, links between terrorism and organized crime developed and took greater shape, with prominent scholars including Walter Laqueur arguing that “a symbiosis between terrorism and organized crime has occurred that did not exist before”.94 Laqueur, himself an influential scholar on political violence who pioneered the study of guerrilla warfare and
terrorism, stopped short of providing explanations or theories as to why crime and terrorism were beginning to coalesce in significant ways, which left the gap open for Tamara Makarenko. She postulated that the end of the Cold War and subsequent decline of state sponsorship for terrorism allowed organized crime to fill the vacuum, creating a new model of symbiosis between two disparate groups that had hitherto avoided one another.95 Makarenko then developed the first conceptual model to analyse the nexus, which will be used in this research: the Crime-Terror continuum.96 While the nexus is an established term and concept in academia, there are still doubts about its usefulness.97 Findings in 199698 and 200599 suggested the relevance of the ‘nexus’ trend was minimal and that there was only regular cooperation primarily around the drug trade, and empirical studies have demonstrated “inconclusive links” between organized crime and terrorist groups.100 However, while some scholars downplay the magnitude of the nexus, they at least generally concede that it is a useful tool to examine the links between crime and terror.101
The most popular way to study the nexus has been by case study.102 These case studies have supported the notion of a nexus, and in almost every case the ‘big four’ categories of trafficking (human, weapons, drug, and contraband) are cited as being the area in which the nexus is most strongly represented, as well as financing. Funding sources have also been a
94
Laqueur, W. (2000). The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction, p. 211
95 Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime-terror continuum: tracing the interplay between transnational organized crime and terrorism, p. 129
96 Ibid 97
Reitano, T., Clarke, C. P., & Adal, L. (2017). Examining the Nexus between Organized Crime and Terrorism and its implications for EU Programming.
98
Schmid, A. P. (1996). The links between transnational organized crime and terrorist crimes. Transnational Organized Crime, 2(4), 40-82.
99
Schmid, A. P. (2005). Links between terrorism and drug trafficking: a case of narco-terrorism?. International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security,
100
Hübschle, A. (2011). From theory to practice: Exploring the organized crime-terror nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 91
101
Hutchinson, S., & O’malley, P. (2007). A crime–terror nexus? Thinking on some of the links between terrorism and criminality. Studies in Conflict Terrorism, 30(12), 1095-1107.
102
popular topic for researchers; proceeds from criminal enterprises allow terrorists to diversify financial sources and to diffuse risk across multiple sources of financing.103 Moving their
business to black or grey markets104 means reducing the risk of financial intelligence discovering transaction records that would be left if they operate in the legitimate business world.105
Research by Croissant and Barlow distinguished three sources of funding for terrorist groups in the region: criminal activities, charities, and commercial activities. The first and second are more easily deployed by local groups, the third by transnational groups.106 Human trafficking has generally been seen as the least established link to terrorist groups, but recent years have seen transnational terrorist groups intensify their trafficking in people.107 These case studies have already established that drug profits are particularly important for groups such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah whose other forms of financing are drying up.108 Expressions of their relationships vary from ‘marriages of convenience’ between drug traffickers and Jihadist extremists to a true convergence ‘nexus’ in the case of the Colombian FARC, the world’s first narco-terrorism group.109 A case study on the nexus in Central Asia found the nexus concept insufficient to describe the complexity of linkages among a range of different non-state violent actors, and the state itself.110 The difficulties in making broad generalizations comes from the observation that different categories of Islamist militants are more or less likely to build relationships with criminal networks based on their spatial localities and if they are ‘ephemeral-sporadic’111 or not. On the terrorism side, Lewis ultimately found that in the case of Central Asian terrorism, the applicability of the nexus is limited, misleading, and unhelpful given the historical reality of
103
Giraldo, J. K., & Trinkunas, H. A. (2007). Terrorism financing and state responses: a comparative perspective. Stanford University Press, p. 40
104 A grey market is a market in which goods have been manufactured by or with the consent of the brand owner but are sold outside of the brand owner's approved distribution channels. Using grey markets can be an effective way to launder money.
105
Giraldo, J. K., & Trinkunas, H. A. (2007). Terrorism financing and state responses: a comparative perspective. Stanford University Press, p. 41
106 Croissant, A. & Barlow, B. (2007) in Giraldo, J. K., & Trinkunas, H. A. (2007). Terrorism financing and state responses: a comparative perspective, p. 203
107
Welch, S. A. (2017). Human trafficking and terrorism: Utilizing national security resources to prevent human trafficking in the islamic state. Duke Journal of Gender Law Policy, 24(2), 165-188.
108
Howard, R. O., & Traughber, C. (2013). The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of the World or So Much Hype?, p. 46
109 Ibid 110
Lewis, D. (2014). Crime, terror and the state in Central Asia. Global Crime, 15(3-4), 337-356.
111 Ibid. In this case, ‘ephemeral-sporadic’ refers to the term put forward by Hutchinson, S., & O’malley, P. (2007) to describe a group that may engage in ‘one-off’ or inconsistent activity.
Islamist militancy in the region; and on the crime side, it was equally unhelpful given that organized criminal networks were more interested in cooperating with the state than terrorist groups.112 This study in particular is a useful balance to other studies that find extensive
expressions of the nexus. It demonstrates the usefulness of making judgements about the extent to which the nexus can be applied, and shows how one can demonstrate that there is hardly a nexus, but still arrive at compelling and functional conclusions.
Those who have researched Southeast Asia have identified that the resulting shift in the international security environment following the Cold War has contributed to “once unthinkable scenarios where criminal and terrorist groups engage in strategic alliances to provide goods or services for example”.113 Case studies on Southeast Asia and the countries within have been infrequent and insufficient to make findings based on the region as a whole. One study examined the nexus of arms trafficking in Thailand. A notorious weapons trafficker Viktor Bout reportedly sold weapons to FARC, the Taliban, as well as violent factions in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo and Rwanda.114 The case shows the symbiosis that can form between crime and terror; in this case the two formed a nexus, relying on each other to sustain the relationship upon which both parties benefitted. The nexus moved to the point beyond the adoption of similar methods, but did not reach the point that they shared motives. A case study on the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines showed that criminal activities have become an important part of the group’s political-economic-security architecture, but author Dr. Bilveer Singh states “ending political instability and insecurity in the affected region” is as important as countering the nexus on a purely criminological plane.115 Criminal groups in Southeast Asia (in the Philippines and Thailand for example) have taken advantage of chronic instability to increase their operations and to secure political support, whereas some terrorist groups (like Abu Sayyaf Group) have “used the veneer of Islam to secure lucrative criminal operations.”116
112
Ibid, p. 350
113 Smith, P. (2005). Terrorism and violence in Southeast Asia : Transnational challenges to states and regional stability, p. 169
114 Ibid, p. 17 115
Singh, B. (2018). Crime-Terror Nexus in Southeast Asia: Case Study of the Abu Sayyaf Group. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 10(9), p. 10
116 Smith, P. (2005). Terrorism and violence in Southeast Asia : Transnational challenges to states and regional stability, p. 15
Contemporary security-related phenomena such as terrorism can be challenging to study, due in part to tightly maintained secrecy and sensitivity around important information and statistics. Clandestine organizations, as an operational necessity, avoid publicity on their numbers, members, and other data. Naturally, questions should be raised regarding any study examining sensitive, secretive topics: How much information are we missing? How has public knowledge and institutional knowledge diverged in history? Do governments release information selectively? To the first question, questioning how much ‘classified information’ is missing is legitimate, but may be overblown. One of the leading academics in the field of ‘secrecy studies’, Melley, posits that the “covert sphere” is “a cultural imaginary shaped both by institutional secrecy and public fascination with the secret work of the state”.117 This is, in part, encouraged by the national security apparatus, particularly during the Cold War, who have placed emphasis on “secrecy and deception” as two central pillars of security and intelligence.118 Broadly, Melley believes that it is through popular fiction that the public has developed an understanding that secrecy is key to national security and intelligence work,119 including terrorism. The phenomena of giving added credence and credibility to secret information is not restricted to the public. A randomized controlled trial experiment by Pedersen and Jansen found that intelligence analysts themselves assign significantly more credibility to secret intelligence than to identical open-source intelligence, even when the information is identical.120 In the vocabulary of social science research, open source information has been likened to secondary data, with covert and
clandestine information likened to primary data. 121 The ‘secret’ aspect of information prompts an automatic and heuristic cognitive processing-mode that induces analysts to predetermine that open sources are less valuable than secret sources. However, the value of secret information against open source information is largely irrelevant; every piece of intelligence and information may be accurate, or inaccurate, and its status as open or secret becomes secondary to its innate and provable credibility. Mark Lowenthal notes that it is natural for intelligence agencies to
117
Melley, T. (2012). The Covert Sphere: Secrecy, Fiction, and the National Security State, p. 5 118 Ibid, p. viii
119 Ibid 120
Pedersen, T., & Jansen, P. T. (2019). Seduced by secrecy–perplexed by complexity: effects of secret vs open-source on intelligence credibility and analytic confidence. Intelligence and National Security, p. 881
121
undervalue open source information, due to the fact that the historical creation of intelligence agencies was explicitly to gather secret information.122
Despite the cognitive reasoning that classified information is more useful than open source information, there is widespread agreement among experts at the value and wide usage of open sources: Professor Harry Howe Ransom, a leading authority on the intelligence community in the United States, wrote “95 percent of peacetime intelligence [comes] from open sources.123 Indeed, the late Richard Helms, former director of central intelligence in the U.S., stated that between the deactivation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) used the Library of Congress as its main source of data when building intelligence assessments on the USSR.124 Pedersen and Jansen note that “the usefulness and employability of open source intelligence grew with its astonishing amount of information and its accessibility - almost for free”.125 This thesis relies on that accessibility and breadth of information. Classified material is an important source of data, but it is not a panacea. Additionally, it is also a mistake to believe that government sources of data are complete, or even shared. Even AUSTRAC, Australia’s financial intelligence agency places a caveat in its Regional Risk Assessment on Terrorism Financing 2016: “As with any analysis of clandestine behaviour, information on terrorism financing can be fragmented,
inconsistent and incomplete. The assessment team collected a valuable body of information from participating countries but does not purport to be comprehensive in all of its findings.”126 The same caveat must also be applied to this thesis. This thesis uses information solely from publicly available and unclassified sources. While this approach increases the transparency of findings and allows other scholars to review and control the results, it does so at the cost of additional evidence available from classified material and confidential sources. This same approach is standard in the field, and is identically undertaken in a chapter on Southeast Asian terrorism and financing in Giraldo and Trinkunas’ 2007 book Terrorism financing and state responses.127
122
Lowenthal, M. M. (2019). Intelligence: From secrets to policy. CQ press, p. 119 123
Ransom, H. H. (1970). The intelligence establishment. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, p. 20 124 Helms, R., & Hood, W. (2004). A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency. Presidio Press, p. 73
125 Pedersen, T., & Jansen, P. T. (2019). Seduced by secrecy–perplexed by complexity: effects of secret vs open-source on intelligence credibility and analytic confidence. Intelligence and National Security, p. 882
126 AUSTRAC. (2016). Regional Risk Assessment 2016 - South-East Asia & Australia, p. 8
127 Giraldo, J. K., & Trinkunas, H. A. (2007). Terrorism financing and state responses: a comparative perspective, p. 204
