Between norms and interests : the EUs engagement with civil society organizations through the Madad Fund in Lebanon in response to the Syria Crisis

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Master of Science in Political Science, International Relations

Between norms and interests: the EUs engagement with

civil society organizations through the Madad Fund in

Lebanon in response to the Syria Crisis

Author: Bastiaan Minderhoud Studentnumber: 10839054 Supervisor: Dr Dimitris Bouris

Wordcount: 23.600 Amsterdam, The Netherlands

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Acknowledgements

The first person I want to thank is my supervisor Dr Dimitris Bouris, who has not only gone the extra mile, but an extra marathon in his help for me. Dr Bouris helped me come in touch with EU officials in Beirut through which the rest followed, providing the building stones for this thesis. Furthermore, without Dr Bouris his contributions, this thesis would not have been

able to be written.

Secondly, I want to thank my parents, who have made everything possible from day 1 until now. There are no words to describe my gratitude for the amount of support in every way I

have received from them.

Other people I want to thank include Dr Anis Nacrour, who Dr Bouris brought me in touch with. Despite his retirement he took the time to connect me with the EU Delegation head in Beirut and offer me good advice. I also want thank Dr Rosa Sanchez, who has provided me with advice on non-governmental organisations and civil society-organisations, and gave me

my first true introduction to the European Union and civil society. Without her, I would probably not have come to the idea of writing my thesis on this subject.

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List of Abbreviations

3RPP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan CFSP Common Foreign and Defence Policy CPE Civilian Power Europe

CSF Civil society facility CSO Civil society organization CSP Country strategy papers

DCECI Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument DCI Development and Cooperation Instrument

DG Directorate General

DG-DEVCO Directorate General International Cooperation and Development DG-ECHO Directorate General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

DG-NEAR Directorate General Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations EC European Commission

ECHR European Charter for Human Rights EEAS European External Action Service EED European Endowment for Democracy

EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights EMP Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument EP European Parliament

EU European Union

EUSR European Special Representative HIP Humanitarian Implementation Plan ICSO International civil society organisation

IcSP Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace) IfS Instrument for Stability

IHA Instrument for Humanitarian Aid IO International organisation

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LCRP Lebanon Crisis Response Plan

LCSO Local civil society society organisation MAI Macro-financial Assistance Instrument

MEDA MEsures D'Accompagnement; French for ‘accompanying measures’ MPE Military Power Europe

NGO Non-governmental organization NIP National Indicative Program NPE Normative Power Europe

SPRING Strengthening Partnership for Reform and Inclusive Growth UfM Union for the Mediterranean

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Abstract

The turmoil in the European Union’s Southern Neighbourhood poses a challenge to the European Union and its foreign policy in the region and provides a critical test for its newly

developed foreign policy approach, know as the ‘comprehensive approach’. The European Union, having been considered by a variety of authors to be a ‘normative power’, has always been at the interest of researchers seeking to explain the ‘nature of the beast’. This thesis will

apply Manners his conceptualization of the European Union as a normative power to its response to the Syria Crisis. The research takes Lebanon and the EUs engagement with civil

society through its new foreign policy mechanism, the Madad Fund, as a case-study. The research finds that the EU has not been normative in the way it has engaged civil society organisations through its foreign policy for two reasons: 1) the implementation of the Madad Fund as part of the Comprehensive Approach has faced institutional difficulties in relation to engaging with civil society and, 2) the European Union is more determined on maintaining

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Introduction

The EU has been increasingly active in its Southern Neighbourhood since the establishment of the EMP (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). Over the years, the European Union (EU) has increased its role as a foreign policy actor in its Southern Neighbourhood by adapting the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, along with establishing the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008 and a revised version of the 2004 ENP in 2011.

Over the last five years the situation in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood has quickly deteriorated. The Syrian Civil War has caused an immense amount of human suffering within Syria and one of the biggest refugee crises since the Second World War in Middle East and Europe. Especially hard hit were Syria’s neighbouring countries, facing the direct political, social and economic consequences of the Syrian Civil War, along with the influx of Syrian refugees, which has placed them in a dire situation in need of help. The EU, since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, has been the largest donor aiding countries in need and trying to contain the crisis on its Southern borders.

The objective of this thesis has been to research the EUs engagement with Syria’s neighbouring countries following the Syrian Civil War and the way it has conducted foreign policy through civil society actors in trying to combat the direct consequences of the crisis. It takes Lebanon as a case-study and one of the EUs new instruments, the European Union Trust Fund: The Madad Fund. Having received over 1 billion Euro’s in donations, the Fund is one of the largest funding mechanisms active in the region. In order to assess the EUs response to the Syria crisis, it will use Manners his conceptualization of the EU as a foreign policy actor: ‘Normative Power Europe’ (Manners, 2002).

The EUs increasing amount of challenges in its neighbourhood, along with the scope, size and complexities of the challenges, put an ever greater pressure on the EU to respond. At the same time the EU faces criticism at home over its perceived ineffectiveness and inability to find solutions. This thesis sought to contribute to the extensive body of literature, seeking to explain how the EU works and what is going well and not so well for the EU. It thereby seeks to contribute to the discussion on what the ‘nature of the beast’ that is the EU, is.

Manners is one of many scholars who have tried to explain the ‘nature of the beast’. Before Manners the EU had been described as a ‘civilian power’ (Duchene, 1973), a ‘military power’ (Bull, 1982) and many things in between (Hill, 1993; Lodge, 1996; Smith, 2000). However, Manners his effort at trying to explain the ‘nature of the beast’ is still one of the most

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influential. Manners conceptualized the EU as a ‘Normative Power’ and described the EU as a unique foreign policy actor, seeking to influence others not by force, but by ‘engagement, persuasion and differentiation’ with and ‘between institutions, governments, ministers, parties, social groups, NGOs and civil society – in order to allow many more voices to be heard’ (Manners, 2010, p. 40).

Considered to be one of the key actors through which the EU conducts its foreign policy is civil society, Manners consistently names civil society organizations (CSOs) as important for the EU, not only in terms of dialogue but also because: ‘Local ownership is crucial in ensuring that relationships are 'other empowering', in contrast to the self-empowering actions of much foreign, development and humanitarian policy’ (Manners, 2008, p.59). Manners hereby emphasized the primacy of aid, inclusiveness and the relative importance of social solidarity over merely the EUs own interests in the way it conducts its foreign policy.

Building on Manners, the main research-question this thesis sought to answer was: ‘Has the EU been a normative power in its engagement with civil society organizations through its foreign policy?’

Methodology

There are several reasons why Lebanon and the Madad Fund pose an interesting case study. One of the main reasons directly relates to Manners his theory and the criticism it has received ever since he first published it. The criticism mainly centred on Manners his conceptualization of the EU as a post-Westphalian normative power where self-interest is less important and norms and values determine foreign policy choices (Bicchi, 2006; Pace, 2009; Tocci, 2009). The criticism has mainly centred around foreign policy subjects where the EUs interests conflict with its normative ‘nature’. Considering the EUs interests in a stable region in relation to the potential for spill-over, the case of Lebanon poses an interesting challenge for the EUs norms and values.

Lebanon poses as an interesting case for another reason: it has a relatively unrestricted environment for CSOs in comparison to neighbouring countries and for that reasons has a flourishing civil society. This takes away the confounding variable of a having a restricted civil society in which the EU has trouble operating and increases the influence and scope of the EUs policy choices.

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The Madad Fund poses an especially interesting case to analyse the EUs engagement with CSOs through its foreign policy because it explicitly seeks to empower and include CSOs, therefor leaving no doubt over the EUs stated ambitions. Furthermore, it is a good example of the EUs newly developed foreign policy strategy known at the Comprehensive Approach (European Commission, 2013).

This is exactly where the academic relevance of this thesis lies: the novelty of the Madad Fund as a good example of the EU Comprehensive Approach in practice, along with the challenging environment in Lebanon and the conflicting interests in the region, pose an interesting case study and contribution to EU foreign policy literature, especially considering the near total lack of academic research on the Madad Fund until now.

The limit of the study lies in its scope: The Madad Fund encompasses five other countries in the MENA-region and a myriad of different policies. This thesis focusses solely on the EUs engagement with CSOs in Lebanon through its foreign policy and therefor has a limited degree of generalization.

To answer the main research-question this thesis used a qualitative research method, analysing relevant EU-documents and scientific literature in relation to the EUs relationship with its Southern Neighbours and civil society, including the EMP and the ENP. Following this, the relationship between the EU and Syria and the EU and Lebanon (including the EUs relationship with civil society in these two countries) was analysed, along with a document analysis on the EUs response to the Syria Crisis in Syria’s neighbouring countries. The empirical chapter analysed the Madad Fund and the EUs engagement with civil society organizations in Lebanon through EU-documents and semi-structured interviews conducted with EU officials and CSOs the EU has engaged with through the Madad Fund, wanting to determine the nature of their engagement and whether or not the EU has been a normative power in the way it has engaged with civil society organizations through its foreign policy. The interviews were partially conducted during field-research in Beirut, Lebanon (between the 5th of April and the 20th_{of April, 2017), and partially via Skype. The names of the NGOs and} spokespersons have been removed at request of the interviewees but are available for private use at request.

In relation to the EUs engagement with CSOs through its foreign policy, researchers have found large discrepancies between what the EUs stated ambitions are and what the EU actually delivers, which in turn is tied to the debate over whether or not the EU is a normative foreign policy actor or not. Bicchi’s framework of ‘reflexivity’ and ‘inclusiveness’ sought to offer a framework to analyse whether or not the EU could be considered normative or not.

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Reflexivity refers to the EUs ability to reflect on the consequences of its policy and whether or not it is rational in the choices it make in relation to inclusiveness or ‘routine-based’ and not rational. Inclusiveness relates to the EUs inclusion of actors targeted by its foreign policy. In relation to CSOs, ‘inclusiveness’ will be assessed by looking into Tocci’s three forms of dialogue.

Three hypotheses will be tested to answer the main research-question:

H1: The EU has acted as a reflexive, rational and non-inclusive actor in its engagement with CSOs through its foreign policy.

H2: The EU has acted as a non-reflexive and non-inclusive actor in its engagement with CSOs through its foreign policy.

H3: The EU has acted as reflexive, rational and inclusive actor in its engagement with CSOs through its foreign policy.

The results show that the EU has not been a normative power in its engagement with CSOs through its foreign policy and the Madad Fund in Lebanon since the onset of the Syria Crisis. The EUs ambitions were already partly security and interests-based in the documents concerning the Madad Fund. However, there still was room for a normative implementation and focus. Besides voicing security interests, the EU still voiced its commitment to normative aspects in its relation with CSOs. In practice however, the Madad Fund was considered to be institutionally unable to be inclusive and the EU was considered to be exclusive in its engagement with CSOs in all stages of policy making.

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Chapter 1: Literature review and theoretical framework

1.1. The EU as a foreign policy actor

Ever since the 1970s academics have sought to conceptualize the EU as a foreign policy actor, seeking to explain what kind of power it is, how it uses that power and what its goals are, in other words, what the ‘nature of the beast’ is.

The first effort to conceptualize the EU as a foreign policy actor has been by Duchene, with his conceptualization of the EU as a ‘civilian power’ (1973). The civilian power Europe (CPE) description of Europe’s place in the world and its foreign policy relies heavily on notions as ‘equality, justice and tolerance’ and an ‘interest for the poor abroad’ (Duchene, as cited in Orbie, 2008, p. 126) It seeks to proliferate these notions by civilian means, entailing diplomatic, legal and economic factors and placing less emphasis on nation-station and more on transnational cooperation. As such, it is best described by Duchene himself as being: “long on economic power and relatively short on armed force” (Duchêne, 1973, p.19).

The concept of CPE was a product of times of relative peace, hope and optimism about the EC, one of its first and most substantial critiques came in the form of MPE (military power Europe), and was a product of less peaceful times and a return to a focus on more traditional realist notions of power. Hedley Bull summarized the times of the CPE approach, and the CPE approach itself, to broader developments taking place around the world. The 1973-4 Oil Crisis by then had proved that influence was no longer state-centric and military, but more economic. The declining importance of military power, especially for Western countries to influence non-Western countries, was also demonstrated by the defeat of the United States in Vietnam and the need for other means to exert influence (Bull, 1982).

Bull’s main criticism was that the then state of affairs could only have taken form in times of détente. In particular, Europe and the perceived decrease of importance put on military power could only take place under the American security umbrella. For Bull, Europe’s lack of military power could proof to be a weakness when times would change, and if Europe would ever want to exert real influence on the world stage it would need to develop military (and nuclear) capabilities on its own: ‘the power or influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control’ (Whitman, 2002, p. 4).

It is important to note that in both the MPE and CPE approaches to Europe’s place in the world and its foreign policy, the EUs interests are considered to be paramount. The theories

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were developed in different times and from different perspectives (more peaceful times under CPE and less peaceful times under MPE) and from different theoretical perspectives (liberalism and CPE, and realism and MPE). Nevertheless, both men started their conceptualizations from the EU interests point of view, their paths determined by their theoretical lenses and influenced by the times they were living in. Another important aspect of both theories is that they have a high degree of speculation and theory, and are less extensive on the empirics. The reason for this straightforward: the EU was not yet as well developed and was not yet severely tested up until then.

This changed, and the EC was tested on several occasions since Bull’s article had appeared. Soon after these developments, the influential contribution by Hill is quick to list them as examples of his overall analysis: The Yugoslavia crisis, Uruguay Round and the Gulf War, all showed that the EU was not capable of coming to a coherent and adequate response (Hill, 1993). He reinforces Bull’s premise that military power and nation states are still the primary actors in the international system and the prime variables used for predicting foreign policy outcomes. The idea of the EU as a civilian power has been dealt a severe blow by these events, and Hill seeks explain why the idea does not hold true in practice as it was intended to. Hill’s effort to explain the nature of the EU is stooled on a pragmatic approach, whereby he explicitly chose to not place himself on the liberal-realist spectrum and instead seeks to explain what the EU has done in relation to the crises it faced since Bull’s article (The Yugoslavia crisis, Uruguay Round and the Gulf War), what was expected from it and what he thinks we can expect of it in the future (Hill, 1993). In his efforts to conceptualize the EUs role he explicitly emphasized that he did not seek to define a ’single role’ for the EU but would rather focus on understanding the EUs various activities in the international community in a broader context.

It is therefore ironic that the terminology he used to discuss these activities do sound like he is defining what the EC (European Commission) could be in terms of the potential roles it could play. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Hill does make the distinction between certain elements of foreign policy which might be classified as being more related to CPE and certain elements more related to MPE. In relation to the power of the EC and CPE, Hill was more optimistic, noting that the EC in the future might intervene on more occasions by ‘military force but more often with economic and political instruments, in states or regions where instability seemed likely to threaten European interests and/or the peaceful evolution of the international community of states’ (Hill, 1993, p. 313).

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In the end, Hill concluded that the internal readiness must be matched by the external need for coherent action in certain areas. The balance between costs and benefits of granting the EC more powers and instruments to conduct a united foreign policy will be determined by external and internal factors, with the threshold for political and economic tools lower than for military tools and the latter probably never happening except for in the most extreme cases. The title of Hill’s article refers to this very notion, namely that at the start of the 1990s academics and other people alike expected more from the EC than it was capable of (Hill, 1993).

More authors have tried to distinguish what the EU ‘is’ and ‘does’ in terms to its foreign policy and place in the rest of the world. Where some have argued that the increased importance played by more traditional notions of defense, such as military capability and cooperation, are effectively the death of the notion of CPE, others have argued that it simply contributes or alters the concept of CPE, with CPE still being important in defining what the EUs nature and place in the world is (Smith, 2000; Stavridis, 2001; Maull, 2000; Whitman, 1998; Lodge, 1996).

Having discussed the main literature on EU foreign policy until the beginning of the 2000s, it is now time to introduce Manners’ seminal work on what he calls ’Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) (Manners, 2002). Manners starts his discussion by stating that Duchene and Bull had more in common than one might think. Both thought in traditional terms, focussing on keeping the status quo by strengthening international society, not civil society. Thereby maintaining the centrality of the Westphalian nation-state in their work. The second element they shared was their definition of influence. Although Duchene preferred civilian forms of influence, by means of contractual agreement, economic cooperation and interdependence and Bull focussed on the EUs need for military power to exert influence, both valued direct physical power. The final element they had in common was their assumption of EU interests as paramount. Manner’s seeks to move beyond this and names the collapse of the Soviet Empire as an example of what he deems as important for the EUs role in world politics: normative power. He argues that the Soviet Empire collapsed by the ‘collapse of norms rather than the power of force’ (Manners, 2002, p.238). Normative instead of empirical power is thus more important for the EU in world politics, according to Manners.

Manners names two reasons for why the EU is a normative power: First, the historical context of the EUs creation as an institution moving past the ‘reviled nationalisms that had led to barbarous war and genocide. Because of this the creation of Community institutions and policies took place in a context where Europeans were committed to ‘pooling their resources

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to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty’ (Manners, 2002, p. 240). According to Manners the Community moved beyond traditional notions of the Westphalian state-order to create a new, hybrid and autonomous political actor in which certain values and principles are its main building stones.

The second reason the EU is a normative power stems directly from the first one: its constitution is based on elite-driven treaties underpinned by constitutional norms and values in which the principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights and social justice as the main components (see table 1).

Table 1.

The different tenets of normative power Europe

Note: Adapted from Manners (2002).

These elements of the EU, whereby the commitment of placing universal norms and principles at the center of its institutional being and policy, makes the EU different from the more traditional interests-driven Westphalian nation-state. At the implementation phase, Manners argues, the EU sticks to the principles of the UN Charter ECHR (European Charter for Human Rights), reiterating its commitment to such norms and values in all the decisions it makes and implements. The policy itself aims at contributing to sustainable peace and development, for its own intrinsic value instead of out solely European interests. Manners stresses that a military instrument is not part of the EU and its normative power influence in the world (Manners, 2002).

Manners continues his argument by outlining the EUs normative basis, which is stooled upon five core norms; peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights and four minor norms; social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.

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According to Manners, these are at the forefront of the treaties, declarations and actions the EU signs and undertakes and best capture the EUs role in the world and its foreign policy means and ends (Manners, 2002). Important to note herein is that the EU is more than the sum of its parts and is a normative power not only for what it does ‘’but for what it is’’.

Manners his approach is different from CPE and MPE for several reasons, of which the most important and profound one is his definition of the EU as an actor exercising influence by means of what it is and what is consequentially does. Manners, contrary to the authors discussed before, does not consider whether or not the EU is or should be a state and how it influences third parties for its own benefit out of an interests-driven motivation. CPE and MPE both had European interests as their starting point, the difference between the two is in how to serve those interests best. Especially in relation to CPE, Manners suggests that CPE used norms, values and ‘civil means’ from a Eurocentric perspective to serve EU interests, whilst NPE defines certain norms and values and their exportability as universal and more altruistic. Manners further departs from this interpretation by stating that the EU has political influence because of ‘’what it is rather than what it does’’ (Manners, 2002). Third parties are not coerced into accepting these (universal) norms and values, they want to implement them themselves for their universal applicability and truth and the attraction of the European project as being an economic and political success. The EU thus shapes conceptions of what is deemed normal, influencing third parties to adapt to these norms, values and standards (Manners, 2002).

Other efforts of contextualizing the EU as a foreign policy actor have been done since the publication of Manners his article and respond and contribute to it. Four relevant alternative conceptualizations of the EU as a foreign policy actor publicized since Manners his 2002 article I would like to briefly discuss are Ethical Power Europe (EPE) (Aggestam, 2008), Empire Europe (Zielonka, 2008), Market Power Europe (Damro, 2012) and Ideal Power Europe (IDP) (Cebeci, 2012).

Zielonka, in his article, argues that the EU has not become a state but it more akin to an empire. Zielonka argues that the EU exports norms, values and certain liberal market-capitalist forms of government to increase its influence over them and constrain them (and their agency) domestically. On the lack of non-coercion by means of military might, Zielonka argues that other material incentives which are also powerful are at the EUs disposal, such as sanctions and conditionality. According to Zielonka, the subjugation of local actors to European ideals of norms, values and good governance takes away their power and their agency and thereby decreases the legitimacy of the EU as a normative power. The EU should instead develop a

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more inclusive idea of norms, values and governance in order to empower other actors and be truly normative (Zielonka, 2008).

Aggestam came with her EPE idea in 2008, building on and revising the idea of NPE. Contrary to NPE she describes the EU as having a proactive mission as being a force for good and wants to update or build upon the concept of NPE by offering a new point of discussion for the new, more proactive role the EU wants to take in the world: Ethical Power Europe. Aggestam describes this as a conceptual shift for the EUs role from what it ’is’ to what is ‘does’: from a power of attractiveness to a proactive role of speaking and acting on its vision of what is the global common good. She argues that the EU is now looking to influence the world by military and civilian means to spread its vision, and thereby is stepping out of its ‘post-modern’ bubble to bring peace and justice to ’modern and pre-modern worlds’ (Aggestam, 2008).

She states that the time to move the debate to EPE has come for five reasons: 1) The EU increasingly seeks to play a strategic role in the world and therefor should be analyzed by what it ‘does’ than what it ‘is’. Thus, the research agenda seeks to look into the active exercise of EU power, 2) it seeks to move beyond MPE and CPE to look into the ethical considerations of choosing either or both in exercising power, 3) it seeks to move beyond the internal description of NPE and move to the external manifestation of the EU as an ethical power, 4) EPE seeks to include several interpretations of European influence and not shy away from comparisons to other actors on the world stage, and finally 5), EPE seeks to include national considerations and and their influence on EU policy, acknowledging that they sometimes converge. The same goes for the intertwinement of interests and ethics (Aggestam, 2008).

Aggestam continues her argument by stating that ethics are often contested and that the EUs conception of what is good is contested throughout the world. In relation to the use of ethics to legitimize foreign policy decisions, she argues that they can be hijacked to serve European interests. She emphasizes that the EU has mixed-motives, ethical as well as interests-based ones. According to her, the EU can conduct itself in three ways: 1) as being driven by an altruistic concern for the well-being of others, thereby assuming that the spread of certain norms and values by civilian means is undisputed when done by civilian means, or 2) opposing this view, is the EU spreading certain norms and values to further its own interests. She names the ENP as an example, where democracy is promoted to stabilize neighbouring countries. And 3), the EU is ethical in terms of what it does rather than what its goals are. It does not seek to further its goals by any means necessary but rather takes ethical considerations in the serving of its interest and seeks to do so by persuasion instead of coercion.

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She concludes by stating that the EU does not ascribe to any one of these three descriptions exclusively. She states that the ability of reflexivity on the EUs side, in relation to other actors their thoughts and perceptions, is key. If the EU, following this reflexivity, does not alter its course, it is indeed opposing its norms and values. If its does, it can be considered to be an ethical power.

Cebeci (2012) in her article on ‘ideal power Europe’ criticizes the entire discourse related to NPE and CPE. From a post-structualist perspective, she seeks to show that the entire discourse on European foreign policy simply perpetuates and reinforces a certain image of the EU, namely the EU ‘as a force for good’ (Cebeci, 2012). This ‘ideal’ image of the EU is then used to legitimize EU foreign policy decisions which are anything but normative, arguing in line with some of the previous authors critical of NPE that the EU ‘others’ non-European countries it seeks to influence, and dominates them through an asymmetrical power-relationship. What Cebeci finds problematic about the NPE discourse is that ‘it is constructed as an ‘ideal’ polity and legitimises the projection of its example, values and norms to other regions and countries. It further acknowledges and reinforces the Union’s asymmetrical approach to those regions and countries’ (Cebeci, 2012, p. 583). By ascribing such value, importance and relevancy to to the EUs image of itself as a normative power, it legitimizes the EUs dominative relationship to others whilst empowering EU member states themselves. The EU is the one setting the bar for what is considered to be ‘normal’ and measures the ‘other’ against this standard, which is Eurocentric and asymmetrical, and therefor not truly Normative.

Damro’s argument, Market Power Europe, differs from NPE ’by arguing that the EU’s identity is not a particular set of collective norms but rather a comparatively large regulated market with institutional features and interest group contestation’ (Damro, 2012, p. 697). Damro seeks to provide a reductionist conceptualization of the EUs place in the world by looking into its economic policy and influence and how the EU as an economic actor influences its ‘outside’.

A trend throughout the literature contributing to, or critiquing the concept of NPE, is the ‘self and othering’ of the EU in relation to non-Europeans and what this means for the normative aspect of their relationship (being equal or being dominant). Two other camps are also distinguishable: the authors seeking to critique but not replace the concept of NPE and the authors seek to alter or entirely replace the concept of NPE. How ever you put it, all articles are either intentionally or unintentionally contributing to the discourse of NPE by continuing to write on it. In relation to the theories seeking to replace it, none have had the impact NPE has had.

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1.2. Bicchi’s analytical framework and NPE

Federica Bicchi, in her 2006 article, seeks to take apart and apply the concept of NPE to European foreign policy by looking at the criteria of ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘reflexivity’. She undertakes this exercise to determine whether the EU is truly normative, the debate of which has: ‘acquired substantial momentum thanks to the argument put forward by Manners, according to which the EU can be conceptualized as a ‘normative power’. In his view, the EU is normatively different and promotes ‘universal norms and principles’ in its relations with non-members’ (Bicchi, 2006, p. 241). She does this by offering two concepts used as an analytical framework to assess whether or not the EU is truly normative or not: ‘reflexivity’ and ‘inclusiveness’.

In terms of inclusiveness she refers to the EU promoting principles which empower actors affected by European foreign policy, instead of promoting principles which are Eurocentric and predominantly empower the EU itself. Bicchi concludes pointedly that in order for the EU to be truly normative in its foreign policy it: ‘must give a voice to people outside of the EU. There is, however, a thin line between ‘giving a voice to’ and ‘speaking for’’ (Bicchi, 2006, p. 204-205). According to Bicchi, the EU should be judged on its capability and willingness to give non-EU members and actors affected by European foreign policy a voice and actively engage with them.

Giving a voice to people affected by EU policy outside of Europe is also discussed by Pace (2009) in relation to democracy promotion. She states that the EU sought to introduce democracy from the top-down instead of more radical empowering schemes because of its fear of instability and risk-averse behaviour. EU normative power by means of democracy promotion is thus seen as an instrument to stabilize neighbouring countries and impose norms and values, instead of creating a truly participatory process and implementation. Pace reiterated this criticism on the EUs underlying rationale for being inclusive of local actors in her article with Seeberg & Cavatorta (Pace, Seeberg & Cavatorta, 2009). Stating that the EU could be deemed realist for using local actors only instrumentally to serve its interests, but normative in the way it conducts itself, seeking to achieve freedom and democracy by normative means.

Manners (2008) incorporated the concept into his own work by ‘asking what principles and practices are considered important, by whom and why. Normative ethics focuses on the impact these beliefs have on actions taken by groups and societies in order to understand which

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actions are considered right or wrong’ (Manners, 2008, p.55) and that ‘Coherence entails ensuring that the EU is not simply promoting its own norms, but that the normative principles that constitute it and its external actions are part of a more holistic strategy for world peace’ (Manners, 2008, p. 56). Concluding that the EU needs to be: ’ensuring that it reasons and rationalizes its external actions through processes of engagement and dialogue. Engagement entails initiating and institutionalizing regular and transparent patterns of communication or partnerships’ (Manners, 2008, p. 58).

Her second concept, ’reflexivity’, is defined by whether or not the EU is conducting itself on the basis of non-reflexive routine-based behaviour, or reflexive rational behaviour. For the EU to be truly normative it needs to be reflexive by attaining context-specific knowledge and acting on it. If it does not, it has become routine-based rather than context-based, and it has ’become ritualised and symbolic. While behaviour can still be seen as

intentional, it is ‘not willful’ (Bicchi, 2006, p. 206).

Diez & Pace (Diez & Pace, 2011; Pace, 2009) offer a similar argument by stating that the EU, being non-reflexive on the impact of its policies, risks becoming blinded by its own ’normative reflection’, and get stuck in a static image and identity, no longer being able to learn. Aggestam (2008) agrees and states that if the EU is not reflexive on how others view the norms and values on basis of which the EU develops and implements its policies, it is not normative. Manners has responded and contributed to the definition of reflexivity as part of NPE and has incorporated it in his analytical framework. In her article with Diez (2011), they state that reflexivity will be an important part of the application of NPE and should be done by looking into the way the EU interprets its own actions and adjusts when necessary.

In his 2008 article (Manners, 2008) he states that normative EU foreign policy involves: ‘analyzing the impacts of EU actions and their implications for others’ (Manners, 2008, p. 58) and that the EU ‘thinks reflexively about the impact of its policies on partner countries and regions, in particular through encouraging local ownership and practicing positive conditionality. Local ownership is crucial in ensuring that relationships are 'other empowering', in contrast to the self-empowering actions of much foreign, development and humanitarian policy’ (Manners, 2008, p.59). Concluding that reflexivity is an important part of NPE and that whether or not the EU reflects on the impact of its policies and then changes course (or does not), tells something about whether or not it is truly normative.

In this sense the EU can either conduct itself ‘normatively’, being both inclusive in relation to the actors it seeks to influence and reflexive on thinking about what policy to make and implement, or what Bicchi calls ‘civilian’, being reflexive and Eurocentric in its imposition

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of norms and values and not inclusive of the actors it seeks to influence. Her main point in relation to NPE, is that the EU can either intentionally use certain norms and values to serve its own interests and only allow inclusiveness when it is beneficial for these interests, or it can principally adhere to these principles, for better or worse.

This is an important point to make in relation to her ‘routine-based’ behaviour outcome, namely that the EU can be a normative actor in its intention and implementation, but by doing so risks to not be normative but Eurocentric and ’civilian’ in its consequences (because of not being reflexive on the consequences of such policies). Bicchi thus offers a nuance to NPE and asks relevant empirical questions to be solved in relation to the application of the concept.

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1.3. European foreign policy and CSOs

Having conceptualized what it means for the EU to be a normative foreign policy actor, along with the other perspectives on NPE offered by the literature in relation to the two main concepts used in this thesis (reflexivity and inclusiveness), the following section will outline the relevant literature and define the relevant concepts with regard to the EUs relation with CSOs (civil society organisations) in its foreign policy. After which the analysis on whether or not the EU has been a normative foreign policy actor in the way it conducts foreign policy through CSOs will begin.

The use of CSOs and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) for foreign policy purposes in general has been extensively written on by several authors. NGOs and CSOs were seen as an important partner in the delivery of humanitarian and development aid because they were considered to be the voice of the people and promoted private initiative and innovation (especially local NGOs). Also, the former dominant strategy to disburse development aid, namely via the state, lost its prominence and NGOs were seen as the ideal vehicles for accounting for state – and market-failures.

The rise of NGOs and CSOs is highly related to the ideas and principles of liberal democracy and the decreased importance of the state. The possibilities for bottom-up development, local participation and initiative, and the development of democracy and peace, coupled with the more efficient and direct provision of aid, made them increasingly popular actors for state and international organization funding. Especially in developing countries, where governments were viewed as inefficient and corrupt, a majority of the aid was channeled through NGOs and CSOs, which were deemed more reliable and efficient (Barber & Bowie, 2008).

Since the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s there has been a return of emphasis on the state, with a focus on good governance and human rights. Although this turned some of the attention away from NGOs and CSOs, they are still considered to be a critical part of development policy, ‘checking’ government policy and being the ‘voice of the people’. The increase of humanitarian interventions and the onset of the ‘War on Terror’, along with the accompanying security concerns have also contributed to a partial continuation (although not as dramatic) of the policy of the 1980s, whereby a high percentage of aid aiming at promoting peace and development has been channeled through NGOs and CSOs (Bank, Hulme & Edwards, 2015; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Fowler, 2000; Koch, Dreher, Nunnen & Tiele., 2009;

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Marchetti & Tocci, 2009; Ottoway, & Carothers, 2000; Reimann, 2006; Smits & Wright, 2012).

Up until now, I have used both the terms NGOs and CSOs. There is no exact definition on what constitutes a CSO or an NGO and the literature suggests the terms can take several different meaning (Bank & Hulme et al., 2015; Fowler, 2000; Marchetti & Tocci, 2009; Reimann, 2005). One important distinction is that NGOs often have distinctive service-roles which CSOs not always have (Fowler, 2000) For matters of simplicity, the limited length of this thesis and the possibility to include the broadest range of possible actors, this thesis will focus on all civil society organizations and make a distinction between local CSOs (LCSOSs, in the case of this these, Lebanese and Syrian CSOs) and international CSOs (ICSOs), thereby looking at both NGOs and CSOs and being able to gauge the broadest amount of potential engagement. If the source material throughout the thesis makes a clear distinction between an NGO and CSO, this will be mentioned, specifically in relation to the empirical chapters. LCSOs will be defined as having veritable organic grass-roots ties to the societies they work in (also being headquartered there), and ICSOs will be defined as having their headquarters elsewhere. Important to note herein, is that ICSOs can have a high percentage of locally hired personnel, beneficial for socialization with EU norms, local knowledge and advocacy to the EU level, but will not be classified as local because they are not part of local civil society by nature and lack grass-roots origins. This is important, because exactly this component of LCSOs is valued for its benefits of creating and implementing more effective policy (Fowler, 1998; Fowler, 2000; Hoksbergen, 2005; Scott & Liikanen, 2011; Smits & Wright, 2012;).

The EU has constituently prioritised the promotion of sustainable peace through several of its instruments and policy areas in its neighbourhood, and emphasizes CSOs, especially LCSOs, for their role in maintaining and/or achieving peace through several different policy areas. The EU has largely followed the international trend on conducting foreign policy through CSOs, as described in the previous paragraph. The underlying rationale from the EUs perspective on the inclusion of CSOs as an important part of its foreign policy relates to the liberal peace theory and ’liberal internationalism’. Herein it is argued that the combination of democracy, trade and international cooperation lead to peace and stability within and between countries, and that CSOs form a necessary part of liberal democracies, and are therefor in need of support.

EU policies, specifically in relation to its neighbours through the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy), are drafted in an effort to expand the liberal peace zone beyond the EUs own borders by adapting policies conductive of democracy, trade and international

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cooperation through transnational partnerships between state and CSOs and the supporting of projects entailing conflict resolution/prevention, democracy promotion, human rights promotion and development. Institutionally, several DGs (Directorate-Generals) manage aid as part of the EUs foreign policy through several instruments. The most important (for this thesis) of which are: DG-DEVCO (DG International Cooperation and Development) and the instruments of EIDHR (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights) and the IcSP (Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, formerly IfS; Instrument for Stability), DG-ECHO (DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection) and the instrument of HIP (Humanitarian Implementation Plan) and DG-NEAR (DG Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations) and the instrument of IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) and the Madad Fund (Arts & Dickson, 2004; Balfour & Missiroli, 2007; Liden, Mikhelidze, Stavreska & Vogel, 2016; Manners, 2006; Scott & Liikanen, 201; Youngs, 2010).

Tocci (2013), in her research on conflict transformation, provides an especially useful argumentation, stating that the EU promotes and uses CSOs through its foreign policy for two reasons: 1) as an ends in and of itself and 2) to be more effective in the reaching of its objectives in relation to peace, development and human rights. Other authors agree, and state that the EU particularly views LCSOs as important actors in the neighbourhood, being part of the EU and its democratic and pluralist form of interest representation and governance, and by providing the EU with advisory and implementation functions, having local knowledge and providing the needed local context and ownership, thereby increasing efficiency and legitimacy (Arts & Dickson, 2004; Carbone, 2008; Challand, 2010; Manners, 2010; ; Marchetti & Tocci, 2009; Mirimanova, 2010; Reynaert, 2011; Scott, 2011; Tocci, 2011; Tocci, 2013).

Tocci also provides a useful summary of how the EU works with and through CSOs, international and local, namely in three different ways: through dialogue, training and funding (Tocci, 2013). Dialogue will be discussed separately in the analysis because it captures the EUs engagement in a broader sense. Training and funding will be discussed simultaneously in the analysis because they have considerable overlap and entail the structural and institutional opportunities the EU concretely offers in terms of engagement with CSOs.

EU institutions engage in dialogue with CSOs for different reasons, among which facilitating direct or indirect meetings between the EU and CSOs themselves along with other IOs (international organisations) are the most important. According to Tocci, the EU does this for reasons of information sharing, gaining a deeper understanding of a particular situation or context, and getting answers to questions on implementation. These dialogues take place with

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EU officials individually as well through conferences, committees and special forums. These forums and committees mainly consist of large European CSOs (Tocci, 2013).

Besides dialogue, EU institutions also engage with CSOs through training. Of particular importance in the list of training engagements for CSOs with EU institutions, are the opportunities the EU provides for LCSOs in terms of capacity building. This mainly relates to making LCSOs familiar with the necessary procedures and criteria needed to apply for EU funds. This also works the other way around, where LCSOs are trained by the EU to provide them with information and expertise as an early warning system (Tocci, 2013).

The final form of engagement relates to direct or indirect funding of CSOs. These are available under several different instruments, including the ENPI (European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument) and IPA. Most of the funding from these instruments flows through official country institutions before reaching CSOs, local ones especially. Other instruments, such as the EIDHR and EED (European Endowment for Democracy), seek to bypass local government and fund CSOs directly (Tocci, 2013).

The two reasons for the EUs engagement with CSOs, international and local, and the three forms of engagement through which the EU does so, are reiterated and analysed from different perspectives and policy areas, drawing different conclusions on how and why the EU works through and with CSOs in its foreign policy. The fundamental differences come down to whether or not the EU is truly inclusive and reflexive, or is lacking in true inclusiveness as a consequence of being reflexive and rational (using NGOs instrumentally and/or being risk-averse), or not (not being truly inclusive because of routine-based behaviour). The outcome of the application of these concepts on European foreign policy and its engagement with CSOs in turn reflect upon whether or not the EU can be considered to be normative or not.

Especially the underlying rationale pertaining foreign policy decisions of direct and indirect funding of CSOs and the EUs ability to be reflexive on the consequences of its foreign policy, mainly in relation to its inclusiveness (and the resulting effectiveness), have been extensively researched. The EUs institutional structure for cooperating with CSOs is also discussed by authors and relevant for this thesis, and will thus be included.

Manners (2006) himself has offered a welcome contribution to the EU foreign policy and its goal of sustainable peace through working with local CSOs. Arguing that the EU should focus on long and short-term problem solving in order to battle the causes of conflict and not just the symptoms. He quotes Duchene by stating that the EUs policy is informed by the need to build ‘’civil capacity that facilitates reconciliation’’ (Duchene, as cited in Manners, 2006, p.187). According to Manners, CSOs since the end of the Cold War were increasingly

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consulted on matters regarding development, and have thereby contributed to the ’explicitly acknowledged relationships between the structural causes of instability and violence and the need to link both aid and foreign policy together in conflict prevention’ (Manners, 2006, p. 188). In another article Manners emphasizes the importance the EU places on engagement with CSOs in the neighbourhood countries, first through the EMP and then the ENP for reasons of legitimacy and expertise. The EU is normative because it exercises influences through ‘engagement, persuasion and differentiation’ with and ‘between institutions, governments, ministers, parties, social groups, NGOs and civil society – in order to allow many more voices to be heard’ (Manners, 2010, p. 40).

Pace (2009) and Seeberg, Pace & Cavatorta (2009) offer a realist analysis on EU democracy promotion through CSOs, whereby the EC drafts ambitious goals through its Action Plans with neighbouring countries, but fails to deliver because the underlying practical implementation phase has not been underpinned by an agreed upon overarching strategy. Pace relates this to the differing priorities in relation to EC-CSO cooperation between Member States, whereby different states take different approach (some being risk-averse, some being more open to inclusiveness).

The consequences are, that despite the EC acknowledges the importance of CSOs in democracy promotion projects and voicing the ambition of working with them, in practice they do so very little. She concludes by stating that the plethora of instruments available for cooperation with CSOs, ranging from the ENPI to EIDHR are flawed and non-normative for two reasons: 1) they serve EU security interests by assuming that a vibrant civil society is a prerequisite for a healthy democracy. This, in turn, is related to the aforementioned democratic peace theory, whereby it is assumed that democracies are more stable (Seeberg & Pace et al., 2009). And 2), the differing priorities have lead to onerous control mechanisms related to financial management and reporting requirements for CSOs applying for funds. The lack of an overarching agreed upon strategy makes it hard for CSOs to draft programs and get them approved if even the EU is not sure what its doing.

Bicchi (2010) also writes on the EIDHR and its ineffectiveness in relation to the reaching of its stated objectives. She elaborates on the structural challenges of the instrument in more detail, whereby the long-chain of command within the EU, between the EU Delegations and Brussels in particular, inhibited its ability to be flexible and having a lasting impact. One of her most important findings in relation to this thesis, apart from the long-chain of command, is that the large sums of money involved in the bigger projects were mainly granted to large European NGOs, with local CSOs only receiving a relatively small fraction of

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the available funds through the part of the mechanism dedicated to direct funding of local CSOs. These smaller grants were authorized by the Delegation while the disbursements of larger grants were decided upon in Brussels. Because of this, she stated that there were large differences in relation to CSO funding between ENP, whereby some Delegations were more proactive than others. Balfour & Missiroli (2007) agree, and state that the EIDHR was a welcome innovation for allowing the direct funding of local CSOs, but state that: ’Nonetheless, EIDHR is a drop in the ocean given the many challenges to democracy and human rights in the neighbourhood countries’ (Balfour & Missiroli, 2007, p. 20).

Funding opportunities are consistently linked to inclusiveness and effectiveness of EU policy and partly explain the discrepancy between what the EU intends to do and what it actually does, from development to peace-building objectives (Arts & Dickson, 2004; Liden & Mikhelidze et al., 2016; Marchetti & Tocci, 2009; Mirimanova, 2010; Pace, 2009; Scott & Liikanen, 2011; Youngs, 2004;). Mirimanova (2010), in her article on EU peace building missions in the neighbourhood through several instruments, argues that the long-term support structure and locally contextualized knowledge needed for sustainable peace do not match the EUs conventional project-based planning and cooperation mechanism of the EU. This leads to ineffective policy.

Marchetti & Tocci (2009) have researched Kurdish CSOs in Turkey and find that this discrepancy between the EUs operational requirements and goals of peacebuilding were also present there. Stating that: ‘The general complaint made by all organizations regards the fact that EU procedures to apply for civil society funding are extremely complicated and bureaucratized’, and that this leads to the selection of large scale professional for direct funding (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009, p. 13). They do argue that the EU Delegation in Ankara was aware (and reflexive) of this and had responded by offering training to local and smaller CSOs in order for them to apply for funds successfully. Furthermore, the EU also spelt out the requirement of including local Kurdish CSOs in partnerships applying for funds. These were meant to open the way for learning opportunities for local Kurdish and larger national Turkish CSOs, in practice however, most problems persisted. Local Kurdish CSOs were dominated by their larger counterparts in partnerships. According to Marchetti & Tocci, and in line with Mirimanova (2010), this is mainly due to the fact that EU projects are tailored to be implemented by large scale CSOs. While the EU Delegation was aware of this, it could only do what was in its power, not being able to alter the underlying structure producing the problem (as Pace (2009) and Bicchi (2010) wrote about).

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Scott & Liikanen (2011) write on the EUs goals working through CSOs in the European neighbourhood and that despite the EU insisting they are trying to foster non-exploitive relationships with CSOs in its neighbourhood, the ‘EUs desire for state-like political authoritativeness and its focus on security issues, has promoted bureaucratic practices and policies of conditionality and tend to complicate these partnerships’ (Scott & Liikanen, 2011, p. 12). The EUs requirements on certain types of bureaucratic discipline, including financial accountability and reporting and evaluation and monitoring, often determines the kind of CSOs that are capable of implementing EU projects.

Furthermore, according to Liden & Mikhelidze et al. (2016), the EUs need for tangible results leads CSOs to becoming project based and short-term, thereby limiting sustainability. Marchetti & Tocci share this observation, stating that: ‘EU’s programming and financing is accused of being complex and bureaucratic as well as of focusing on short-term projects rather than longer-term programme’ (p. 17, Marchetti & Tocci, 2009, p. 17). They add that the EUs programming has resulted in distortionary effects on local civil society, buffing up technical and professional CSOs while marginalizing smaller grass-roots CSOs and conclude by stating that the EU is ‘well aware of it, but are yet to reconcile their internal needs for transparency and accountability with the external need of an effective civil society policy’ (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009, p. 17). These observations are reiterated by several authors (Arts & Dickson, 2004; Mirimova, 2010; Pace, 2009; Youngs, 2004).

Marchetti & Tocci (2009) also offer a more fundamental critique on the EUs goals in relation to working through CSOs in its foreign policy, echoing Pace (2009) and Pace & Seeberg et al. (2009). They state that EU foreign policy seems inclusive in its conception and implementation with a wide array of normative goals, including peace building and development, but that the local contextualization often shows another picture. The EU is not truly inclusive but rather imposes it policy in a top-down fashion to promote particular changes in neighbouring countries reflecting its own interests, rather than local ones. The selection procedure of CSOs only exacerbate this problem, arguing that the inability or unwillingness to truly include more LCSOs through dialogue, training or direct funding has lead to policy ineffectiveness and the questioning of the EUs normative ‘image’.

The corollary of this absence of participatory methods has been the creation of a disembodied local civil society and that the ‘drafting of policy objectives without engaging in a prior debate with local societies over the identification of such changes, is rarely, if ever, problematized as such by EU actors’ (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009, p. 18). According to Marchetti & Tocci (2009) this has lead to CSOs, international and national alike, becoming more like

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subcontractors than genuine CSOs, a development acknowledged by several authors writing on CSOs (Banks & Hulme et al., 2015; Fowler, 2000; Townsend & Townsend, 2004; Tvedt, 1998; Tvedt, 2006). Especially for LCSOs, relevant for their perceived benefit of ‘independence, flexibility and effectiveness, largely explained by its local rootedness, tend to vanish and are replaced by the perceived “fit” between CSO identities and the aims and instruments of liberal peacebuilding’ (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009, p. 4).

The effects of the current predominant way the EU conducts foreign policy through CSOs have been twofold: 1) local and smaller CSOs have been largely excluded in all three forms of engagement (dialogue, training and funding) for reasons of lack of capacity and/or EU unwillingness/inability to include them because of its restrictive and elaborate operational criteria and 2) CSOs which have managed to gain funds have adopted the EU strategies and goals as their own, at cost of their own grass-roots developed goals, thereby decreasing the effectiveness and sustainability of the projects they implement and risking to lose legitimacy. This has lead some authors to come to the fundamental critical suggestion that the EU is simply following its own interests in its foreign policy objectives and engagement with CSOs, without being truly inclusive or participatory, while others suggest the EU has partially been reflexive but has been unable to change in a meaningful way (routine-based behaviour) (Arts & Dickson, 2004; Bicchi, 2006; Liden & Mikhelidze et al., 2016; Mirimanova, 2010; Marchetti & Tocci, 2009; Pace, 2009; Scott & Liikanen, 2011; Youngs, 2004).

Other authors have researched the EU and LCSO capacity-building to enhance inclusiveness and came to other conclusions (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009; Reynaert, 2011; Simao, 2010). Marchetti & Tocci (2009) in the same article discussed above, also name: ‘a much-quoted exception is that of the southeast-based women CoSO KAMER, which has successfully combined its growth thanks, inter alia, to EU support, alongside its rootedness in society’ (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009, p.13). Scott & Liikanen (2011) also describe certain successes in relation to the EUs foreign policy and CSOs, finding positive results in relation to certain local service provision CSOs (thereby compensating for the shortfall of public services) and the spread of European values through the required operational criteria. Simao (2010) and Reynaert (2011) also describe certain exceptions in terms of capacity-building, but add an important nuance. The EUs choice for which LCSOs get this assistance is highly determined by their perceived benefit to promoting EU interests in terms of what it deems beneficial to democracy and human rights. The perceived ability for the EU to change its course (albeit limited) is important to note however.

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The literature suggests that the EU faces a lot of challenges in relation to its foreign policy and cooperation with CSOs. The literature review suggests has shown the EU has several hurdles to overcome before it can be classified as being a normative actor and has a mixed track-record on being so. For the EU to be truly normative it needs to be truly inclusive in the development and implementation of its foreign policy, and reflexive on the consequences of its policy in relation to inclusiveness.

Tocci’s three forms of EU engagement with CSOs (dialogue, training, and funding) through its foreign policy offer a useful framework for assessing the inclusiveness and reflexivity of the EU in its foreign policy and cooperation with CSOs, and as such, will be used in the empirical chapters to assess the impact of EU policies. One final important conclusion concerning the literature review is the perceived discrepancy between what the EUs ambition are on paper and what the EU actually does. This is either because the EU is stuck in ‘routine-based behaviour’ and is non-reflexive (and non-normative), or because the EU is rationally choosing to differ from its stated policy to pursue its own interests, thus being reflexive, but non-normative too. This should be kept in mind when reading the following chapters and is important for the empirical chapter as well. Before commencing on the empirical chapters, the following chapters will provide an overview of the EMP and ENP and the EUs response to the Syria crisis in the region, with Lebanon in particular.

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Chapter 2. the European Union and its Southern Neighbours

2.1. The EU and its Southern Neighbours: the EMP

Before the Berlin Wall had come down the European Community already started defining its relation in the Mediterranean by conceptualizing the scope of the Mediterranean as a region. The ‘Mediterranean as a region’ was consequentially developed, and culminated when the EU initiated the Global Mediterranean Policy in the 1970s, thereby grouping a defined number of countries together. This changed with the EUs Southern enlargement in 1980, whereby the former group was effectively partitioned into EU-members and non-members. The broader idea of building a common Mediterranean region had survived into the 1990s however, and its formalization came in the form of the EMP (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). The EMP was set up in 1995 with the Barcelona Declaration (Bicchi, 2006; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005; Guney, 2008; Pace; 2007).

The EMP was initially designed to be region-building exercise in the Mediterranean region, inspired by the idea first brought up in the 1970s and the fear of Southern member states that with the fall of the Berlin Wall the Southern neighbours would be overshadowed by the foreseen Eastern Enlargement. The EMP formed a partnership between the 15 EU-countries and 12 South-Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority), cooperating on a number of policy areas, including security, political, cultural and social issues (Pace, 2007; Fernandez & Youngs, 2005). These are grouped in three dimensions (‘baskets’): ‘a political and security partnership, an economic and financial partnership, and a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs’ (European Commission, 2017), and are implemented with different partners, such as governments, economic agents and civil society. Multilaterally through conferences and meetings and bilaterally via Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements.

The EMP and the Barcelona Declaration state the objectives of sustainable development, human rights, cultural cooperation, democracy promotion etc., not as isolated objectives but as part of the bigger and more encompassing strategy of conflict prevention and resolution and development with the ultimate objective of fostering structural stability and a peaceful region (Aliboni, 2005). The development of civil society was given far greater importance in the EMP than in other international agreements (Reinhardt, 2002). According to Reinhardt, the emphasis on the inclusion of civil society actors was seen as essential ‘because that distinguishes the Partnership from traditional foreign policy approaches’ (Reinhardt, 2002, p. 4). The ambition was to draw on the experience of European cooperation and integration

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(whereby it was understood that the support of society at large was paramount) and foster cooperation between transnational civil society networks to contribute to creating a ‘common area of peace and stability, shared prosperity and mutual understanding’ (Barcelona Declaration, as cited in Reinhardt, 2002, p. 4).

This was based on the idea of decentralized co-operation, first brought up in development studies in the 1980s, and was epitomized in the the new body called ‘EuropeAid’, created in 2001. This body would monitor and evaluate the external assistance programmes. Along with this, the programming would be based on Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and through a de-concentration process (similar to decentralization) the management tasks of programs would be delegated to the EU Delegations, to promote more local ownership and coordination CSOs were involved with assessing and preparing the CSPs through EU Delegations, although formalized mechanisms of engagement were not developed (Bousac, Delcour, Rihackova, Solonenko & Gabrielyan, 2012; Carbone, 2008). The ultimate goal was to create stability through development and cooperation, making optimal use of local knowledge and link CSOs with each other in order for them to learn from each other and create transnational networks. Furthermore, without involving civil society actors, the ultimate goal of structural stability would lack legitimacy and effectiveness. Acknowledging their importance throughout the Barcelona Declaration in relation to several policy areas, the EMP provided several means of engaging with CSOs and promoting cooperation and communication between them (especially in the third basket (social, cultural and human domains)) (Aliboni; 2005; Fernandez & Youngs, 2005; Pace, 2005; Reinhardt, 2002).

Examples of these forms of engagement include dialogue opportunities, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum and through funding with the the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) instrument (Aliboni, 2005; Reinhardt, 2002). These were part of the third ‘basket’, entitled: ‘Developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies’ (Khader, 2005, p. 84).

The EMP and Barcelona Declaration entail many of Manners his NPE concepts, an example of this is the EU seeking to export its own successful model for regional cooperation and sustainable peace to other regions, leading by ‘virtues example’ (Manners, 2002, p. 244). Other elements, such as the promotion of democracy, good governance and sustainable development, were also included and emphasized (Bicchi, 2006; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005; Fernandez & Youngs, 2005; Pace, 2007). Indeed, as Pace states: ‘The EMP, or Barcelona process, was framed in a language of ‘shared norms’ and the vision of an eventual development of a secure, stable and peaceful Euro-Mediterranean space’, and that the projection of ‘EU

Between norms and interests : the EUs engagement with civil society organizations through the Madad Fund in Lebanon in response to the Syria Crisis