Denying the unequivocally:
Plausible deniability of covert action in the
current Information Age
Jeske de Vries
Student ID: s1513117
Email: j.i.devries@umail.leidenuniv.nl
Supervisor: Dr. L. Block
Master Thesis
Crisis and Security Management Word count: 17 015
Abstract
This thesis examines to what extent states can (still) plausible deny their involvement in covert action in the current Information Age. In the modern, digitalized world a significant amount of data is available on the internet, making it increasingly difficult for states to maintain their covert operations unexposed. A content analysis of the official Russian responses to allegations in the Skripal case shows that it is no longer about the actual plausibility of the denials, but about the ambiguity resulting from them. Exposure of covert action is followed by persistent denials, discrediting the messenger and deflection. Exposure in combination with ambiguity might in fact have political value.
Table of contents
Abstract ... 2
1. Introduction ... 4
1.1 Context and relevance ... 6
1.2 Thesis outline ... 6
2. Literature review and theoretical framework ... 8
2.1 Covert action and plausible deniability ... 8
2.1.1 Developments in the twenty-first century ... 10
2.1.2 Embracing implausible deniability ... 11
2.2 Government responses ... 12
2.2.1 The classic discourse of official denial ... 14
2.2.2 Counteroffensive ... 15 2.2.3 Partial acknowledgement ... 15 3. Methodology ... 17 3.1 Research design ... 17 3.1.1 Case selection ... 18 3.2 Operationalization ... 18 3.4 Data collection ... 19 4. Analysis ... 21 4.1 Timeframe I ... 21 4.1.1 Initial accusations ... 21 4.1.3. OPCW report ... 27 4.2 Time frame II ... 31 4.2.1 Official charges ... 31
4.2.2 Suspects identified as GRU operatives ... 33
4.2.3 Identifying ‘Petrov’ and ‘Boshirov’ ... 35
4.2.4 Third suspect: Denis Sergeev ... 39
5. Conclusion and discussion ... 42
5.1 Conclusion ... 42
5.2 Discussion ... 46
5.2.1 Limitations and strengths ... 46
5.2.2 Future research ... 47
6. Reference list ... 49
1. Introduction
On 4 March 2018, former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter, Yulia Skripal, were found unconscious on a bench in a park in Salisbury, the UK. Both were taken to the hospital in critical conditions, but ultimately survived the attack. Yulia Skripal, who had arrived in the UK to visit her father the day before the attack, was discharged from the hospital on 10 April 2018 (Grierson, 2018). Her father was released a month later, on 18 May (Wolgelenter & Barry, 2018). Sergei Skripal is a former Russian military intelligence (GRU) officer, who worked as a double agent for the British intelligence service (MI6) from 1995 to 2004, when he was arrested. In 2006, Skripal was sentenced to prison, but four years later he was exchanged for American spies in a spy swap. Skripal moved to the UK, where he was living at the time of the attack (Michael & Barry, 2018).
A few days after the incident, the UK government discovered that a military-grade nerve agent, known as ‘Novichok’ had been involved in the attack. The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory at Porton Down had conducted the identification of the nerve agent (May, 2018a). Based on this positive identification, the knowledge that the Soviet Union had produced this nerve agent and Russia’s record of conducting state-sponsored assassinations on (among others) defectors led, the then prime minister of the UK, Theresa May on 12 April to conclude that it was highly likely that the Russian state is responsible for the attack against the Skripals (May, 2018a). Russian authorities denied any involvement in the case, but received sanctions from the UK and its allies either way. In September 2018, the UK
government officially brought charges against two Russian nationals who were believed to be officers of the Russian foreign military-intelligence agency (GRU). The UK police identified two men, based on CCTV footage and extraordinary movements to, in and from the UK. The released CCTV footage of the men was picked up by an independent ‘citizen investigative journalist’ collective, Bellingcat. The staff (18) and contributors (30) of Bellingcat are scattered across the world and carry out open source and social media investigations to conflict, crime and human rights abuses (Bellingcat, 2019a). Bellingcat describes its work field as a junction between advanced technology, forensic research, journalism,
investigations, transparency and accountability (Bellingcat, 2019a). The findings of Bellingcat receive world-wide attention from international (news-) media and governments. In
collaboration with its investigative partners The Insider and Respekt, Bellingcat discovered the real identities of the two men and published the steps that were undertaken to come to
their conclusions. Both the UK government as Bellingcat concluded that this operation was coordinated at a state level. Bellingcat later discovered that Russian authorities took unusual measures to erase public records on the suspect and therefore concluded the following: ‘’These unprecedented actions cannot plausibly be taken without direct involvement of the
Russian state, and add further credibility to the UK government’s assertion that the Skripal poisoning operation, and the subsequent cover-up, were coordinated at a state level’’
(Rakuszitzky, 2019) .
The assassination attempt of Skripal is an example of uncovered covert action in the twenty-first century. Covert action can be broadly divided into influence operations and paramilitary activity, assassinations fall under the scope of the second (Stempel, 2007). Covert action under American federal law is defined as ‘’an activity or activities of the United States
Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly’’ (Gross, 2009). This means the sponsorship of an operation has to remain unknown,
the act itself does not necessarily have to be secretive, since assassinations are hardly unapparent. Covert action allows a state to pursue its interests without the risk of military escalation or retaliation. Gross (2009) argues that denying knowledge or responsibility allows a country to pursue its national interests in foreign countries that forbid presence. Plausible deniability is, therefore, often seen as the primary rationale for covert action.
The conception of plausible deniability as being inherent to covert action is problematized in this thesis. If the sponsorship should be neither apparent nor acknowledged, exposure
threatens the plausibility of denials. In the literature it is not specified how much exposure leads to implausibility. Instead, exposure is often treated binary; an operation is regarded exposed or not exposed. In reality, parts of the operation can be exposed and threaten the plausibility of denial. In the contemporary world, which is highly connected, exposure may become increasingly common and may in the end lead to ‘implausible deniability’ of a covert operation. The question raises what this means for the nature of covert action. Cormac and Aldrich (2018) argue that implausible deniability does not spell the end of (successful) covert action and call for a reconceptualization of plausible deniability. A quick exploration shows that a considerable amount of information about the suspects of the Skripal poisoning is exposed by both state and civil actors. This makes it questionable whether analogue lies are still possible in a digital world and how states deal with the increased exposure of their covert
activities. The aim of this thesis is to establish to what extent plausible deniability of covert action can still exist when exposure increases. The following research question is therefore formulated: To what extent can states in the current Information Age plausibly deny their
involvement in covert action?
1.1 Context and relevance
Although plausible deniability has rarely been the subject of critical analysis, it is a central concept in the academical and practical discourse on covert action (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018). This thesis attempts to determine whether plausible deniability still has a place in the twenty-first century. First of all, this has implications for understanding secrecy of covert action in the information age and the assumption that recent changes in information and
communications techniques (ICT) increase exposure and in this way lead to the end of (Cold War style) covert action (Joseph & Poznansky, 2018). In the second place, the findings contribute to the understanding of the Russian approach to exposure of its covert operations. The Skripal poisoning happened in March 2018, after culpability of the Russian state for the downing of MH-17 in July 2014 was exposed (amongst other by Bellingcat). In the MH-17 case, in spite of compelling evidence, Russia authorities swiftly denied any responsibility (Sienkiewicz, 2015). Another well-known case in which the Russian state preserved some plausible deniability is during the para-military actions and influence events prior to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The cases differ on multiple aspects, but this thesis provides some insights into the responses Russian authorities seem to maintain when being accused of something.
1.2 Thesis outline
This thesis is structured in the following manner. In chapter two, the literature on plausible deniability will first be reviewed and thereafter the hypothesized benefits of implausible deniability, including the role of two recent developments on exposure of covert operations. Subsequently, in the same chapter, research on government responses to human rights reports will be scrutinized to identify commonly used forms of reactions to criticism. In chapter three, the methodology section, the research design will be described. A qualitative content analysis is chosen complemented by an interview with a Bellingcat employee who was directly
outlined. This will be done in a chronological manner and is two part; reveal how the operation was exposed and how the Russian authorities react to the exposure. Chapter five contains the main results and an answer to the research question. Furthermore, the limits and strengths of this research will be discussed in this chapter along with suggestions for future research.
2. Literature review and theoretical framework
In this section the literature on plausible deniability of covert action is reviewed. Plausible deniability is often seen as inherent to covert action, but critical analysis shows that this is rarely the case. Instead, implausible deniability is a more accurate term, in particular due to developments in the twenty-first century. Implausible deniability is the non-acknowledgement of sponsorship and might in fact be functional in international and domestic affairs. Secondly, Stanley Cohen’s (1996) government responses framework to human rights reports is
described and its concepts will be operationalized in a way that can be applied to government responses of other allegations.
2.1 Covert action and plausible deniability
The work of intelligence officers can be broadly distinguished into three disciplines based on their purpose and methodology. These disciplines are the collection and analysis of
intelligence, counterintelligence and counterespionage and covert action (Daugherty, 2006). The concept of covert action has existed for centuries, states have always searched for ways to intervene abroad in a deniable manner. The term covert action only emerged after the Second World War, since the professionalization of intelligence services (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018). A general definition of covert action, that applies to all countries, is: ‘it is a program of
multiple, subordinate, coordinated, interlocking intelligence operations, usually managed over a long period of time, intended to influence a target audience to do something or to refrain from doing something, or to influence opinion (e.g., of the general public, business elites, or political or military leadership) (Daugherty, 2006, p. 12). Covert action is thus
activity to influence events in a plausibly deniable manner (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018). The opposite is overt action, wherein the sponsor makes its identity known, such as diplomacy, trade incentives or sanctions and foreign aid (Daugherty, 2006), or the use of military power (Joseph & Poznansky, 2018). Covert action has some important benefits relative to overt action. Covert action offers a middle ground between diplomacy and the use of military force, it is therefore sometimes referred to as the ‘third way’ (Daugherty, 2006). Covert action may take place in wartime, but the majority of the CIA covert action takes place in peacetime. Between peace and war, a grey space exists, in military terms the ’preparation of the battlefield’ (Daugherty, 2006). The ‘grey zone’ between peace and war is increasingly debated since the emergence of the labels hybrid threats, hybrid warfare and Gerasimov doctrine (Monaghan, 2015).
Examination of the literature leads to the assumption that covert action requires plausible deniability, which implies the sponsorship of the operation has to be concealed (Daugherty, 2006). The resultant operation itself is not concealed, since exposure is often necessary to influence events.1 Moreover, Meyers (2007) even considers the secrecy of the sponsor the
defining characteristic of covert action, because it is essential to accommodate plausible
deniability (Meyers, 2007). Concealed sponsorship of covert action means that it should be neither apparent nor acknowledged to the target audience (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018). The target audience of covert action is often a hostile government, but can also be a friendly government or a non-governmental actor (Daugherty, 2006). The target audience of the operation is not necessarily equal to the audience of plausible deniability. States may conduct covert action abroad, but address their denials toward the domestic audience without paying attention to international accusations. In the literature plausible deniability on the international level allows states to deny any involvement in a certain act, while on the domestic level it often allows the senior officials to deny personal knowledge (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018). For many authoritarian and repressive states the domestic audience is all that matters and denials can be hardly countered internally, because the state has control over the information streams (Cohen, 1996).
Cormac and Aldrich (2018) argue that the assumption that covert action is plausible deniable when the sponsorship is neither apparent nor acknowledged, is too binary. A sponsor can be apparent, but nonetheless not acknowledged. In reality, historic examples of covert action show that many were in fact an open secret. The failed overthrow of Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs and other large-scale para-military operations are obvious examples in which denials lacked plausibility, but the actions were not necessarily unsuccessful or fell outside the
boundaries of covert action (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018). In many cases the target audience was aware of the sponsor. The declassification of Soviet archives after the Cold War made this clear, when it turned out many secret operations were in fact known by the Soviet intelligence agencies (Madrell, 2005). The Cold War era became known as the ‘age of plausible
deniability’, whereas the sponsorship of most covert operations was known (Radsan, 2008). Another flaw in the conceptualization of plausible deniability is the lack of a timeframe.
1 For instance, it is evident that covert action such as assassinations or coup d’états will not be concealed. The
concealment of the sponsorship should make observers believe the actors of a coup d´état are indigenous citizens acting on their own without foreign support and in the case of assassination the assassin unknown.
There is no clear indication of how long sponsorship should remain a secret for an operation to qualify as covert action.
Covert action in terms of hidden sponsorship is arguably too simplistic. Sponsorship of covert action is often apparent, but not acknowledged, the denials range hollow and plausible
deniability is, in reality, often implausible deniability (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018). The chance of exposure of more details about a covert operation is subject to two developments within the Information Age; ICT developments and globalization.
2.1.1 Developments in the twenty-first century
Although plausible deniability lacks conceptualization in the literature and arguably barely existed even in ‘the age of plausible deniability’, some cases of plausible deniability do exist. Most successful cases have not come to light yet. However, due to recent developments, even less space for plausible deniability exists in the twenty-first century (Joseph & Poznansky, 2018). Two important developments are globalization and changes in ICT, which are also interconnected. In the modern global digital media environment, more data is shared by more actors with the ability to communicate with each other from wherever they are (Crowsley, 2012). Recent ICT changes include global internet access; affordable, worldwide and real-time coverage; and access to commercial mapping and space imagery systems (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018). The media environment is fragmented through many new media channels and informal reporting. A quantitative research to covert action points out that countries with dense ICT networks have less chance of becoming the target of covert action than countries with less dense ICT networks (Joseph & Poznansky, 2018). Joseph and Poznansky (2018) argue that dense ICT networks threatens plausible deniability and that target states with dense ICT networks are therefore less attractive for other states to undertake covert measures. This research is based on an existing decision-making model. In this model states have three options to pursue their foreign policy goals. The first option is not to act and thus accept the status quo. The second option is to choose a form of overt action, including diplomacy and the use military force. The last option is to turn to covert action. It is argued that covert action will disappear when ICT becomes more advanced. However, this prediction is made with the assumption of plausible deniability as neither apparent not acknowledged, which is
Secondly, the globalized civil society further challenges state secrecy. The critical element is that world is more connected, people are better informed and transparency is increasing. Globalization leads to a ‘hyperconnected world’ in which citizens act and react in real-time. The secret mission to capture Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, for example, only remained a secret during the preparation until the mission started. Once the special forces reached the compound the unfolding mission was traceable via Twitter (Growsley, 2012). In the
globalized world, citizens communicate with each other amongst which are investigative journalists, whistleblowers and human right activists. ICT allows citizens to collect data, share it, put it together and in the end compromise plausible deniability (Joseph & Poznansky, 2018).
2.1.2 Embracing implausible deniability
Cormac and Aldrich (2018) propose a new conception of covert action: ‘unacknowledged interference in the affairs of others.’ The traditional view on plausible deniability rests on false assumptions and misconceptions and certainly has little place in the modern, hyper-connected world (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018, p. 482). It is also argued that implausible deniability does not mean the end of (successful) covert action. In fact, implausible deniability of covert action may have logic and political value in three different ways. Implausible deniability is the combination of visibility of sponsorship and
unacknowledgement, which might create ambiguity. Mastriano (2017) argues that a common thread among Russian operations is the use of ambiguity to confound and confuse Western decision makers.
At first, ambiguity can create a gap in the decision-making process of the NATO, create disunity within NATO and test NATO’s responses. The use of ambiguity after covert action
creates a gap in the decision-making of institutions like the EU and NATO. The annexation of Crimea by Russia is an important example of Putin operating within the decision-making cycle of NATO. Despite contradictory evidence, Putin denied there were Russian soldiers present in the Ukraine, he used ambiguity to confuse and confound the West until after the annexation was completed. Deception and disinformation after an operation like this prevents a quick reaction from the West and exploits fissures in NATO and the EU (Mastriano, 2017). Thereby does the non-acknowledgement in combination of the exposure of covert action
allow Putin the test NATO responses and the utility of article 5 in which collective defense is laid down (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018).
Second, ambiguity may create space for myths and powerful narratives. Exposure of non-acknowledged covert action leads to fear and uncertainty which makes Western policymakers see Russian subversion everywhere. The ambiguity after the annexation of Crimea first led to suspension of quick reaction, which in the end created the image that Putin can undertake these actions and can get away with it. This image of omnipotence creates fear and
overestimation of Russian military capabilities. The notion that Russia is already waging a hybrid war against the West, which is repeated by many Western policymakers and scholars, might therefore play right into Putin’s hand (Renz & Smith, 2016). Some scholars argue that operations like the poisoning of Skripal and Litvinenkoare done, because it conveys a
strategic message (Gioe, Goodman, & Frey, 2019).2 The message contains a warning towards those who contemplate disloyalty. It is argued that theatrical murder can be seen as a part of state power embraced by Putin (Gioe, Goodman, & Frey, 2019).
The third useful feature of implausible deniability is the message it sends to the domestic
audience without acknowledging guilt. The same principle applies here. Implausible
deniability allows governments to communicate to their citizens that action is being taken. In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, the approval ratings of President Kennedy reached 82 per cent, because the operation made him look action oriented (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018).
Governments can leak or plant information about operations to their public, without officially acknowledging anything.
2.2 Government responses
Governments respond in different ways to criticism. Multiple factors play a role in these differences between countries: the human rights situation; the political history and current status in international arena; and the source, timing and nature of the criticism (Cohen, 1996, p. 521). Stanley Cohen’s work (1996) on government responses to human rights reports provides a theoretical understanding of the different strategies that governments may use
when they are being accused of something.3 The framework is applicable to this research, because allegations arising from human rights reports have important similarities with
allegations of covert operations. Three aspects are important: 1. the nature of the accusations; 2. the type of critic; and 3. the type of criticized. First of all, the accusations in both cases entail illegal conduct. Naturally, major human right violations might differ in scope from an assassination. However, Cohen does not differentiate according to the extent of a violation, assassinations therefore might fall within the scope of his research, but in a different context. Second, the critics in Cohen’s work are a human rights organization that express their
criticism by means of a report. The publications of Bellingcat are comparable to these reports, especially with regard to one of the intended purposes: conveying the truth. In the Skripal case, the UK government is added as criticizing actor. Finally, the actor that reacts to the criticism is in both cases a state actor: the perpetrator government.
The most radical form of denial is silence. Those countries do not feel political necessity to explain or defend themselves. Cohen (1996) distinguishes three active forms of reaction: the classic discourse of denial, a counter-offensive on the critic and partial acknowledgement of the criticism. The classic discourse of denial includes literal denial (nothing happened), interpretative denial (what happened is really something else) and implicatory denial (what happened is justified). A counteroffensive turns a defensive position into an attack at the critic. In more democratic states it might be inevitable to partially acknowledge to criticis. Denial is not necessarily binary. On the continuum between full denial and full
acknowledgement, multiple forms exist. The forms of reaction that fall under the classic discourse of official denial are closer to the denial side, while partial acknowledgement is the opposite. Forms of reaction can be deployed in sequence, switching to a new form when the previous one fails. Forms can also be deployed simultaneously. A sponsored coup d’état can be literally denied, but at the same time justified by criticizing the toppled governmen (Cohen, 1996).
2.2.1 The classic discourse of official denial
Literal denial asserts that ‘nothing happened’, the claims of the critic are false. Totalitarian
states, that lack internal accountability and control domestic information, may brush allegations laconically away. Most states, however, have to be more extensively in their response, because of internal accountability and international scrutiny. The methods to deny are unlimited; cover-up, explain away, or lie are the most common. When the events are current and visual evidence is presented, the denials often become more desperate. The reliability, objectivity and credibility of the observer is often attacked. The observer might be accused of selectivity, or more even staging the incident. Finally, countries with strong formal allegiance to international law may argue that because an act is prohibited in that country, it could not have happened, pointing out ratified international conventions (Cohen, 1996).
Interpretative denial is an alternative form of reaction, when literal denial is being made
difficult by more convincingly evidence. Reinterpretation of what happened may contain elements of literal denial. The raw facts are being admitted, but the interpretative framework denied. The government claims the events have to be seen in a different light. The harmful effects of an act are being minimized. Four techniques are being used: euphemism, legalism, denial of responsibility and isolation. These techniques tend to be used in combination. Euphemism is the usage of palliative terms, the harmful act is given a neutral status by a speech act. Legalism takes place on a legal-diplomatic terrain, the act did happen, but it does not fit the appropriate category (right, law, article, convention). Denial of responsibility can happen in four variations. The responsibility can be placed on the victim(s), on forces that have nothing to do with the government or responsibility cannot be found anywhere (most plausible when state authority has collapsed). The fourth variation is to report in an ‘agentless passive form’ which creates the idea that cruelty just happens. Isolation accepts responsibility for a particular act, but denies any systemic, routine or repeated quality of it. Therefore, it is unfair to accuse the government of serious violations (Cohen, 1996).
The third form, implicatory denial, means the harmful act is acknowledged, but justified. A government may argue that under certain circumstances different sets of values predominate over universal values or that any society can act according to its own morality. Necessity claims that there was no alternative to the act. The act could for instance be necessary for self-defense or national survival. Furthermore, victims of the event can be denied, blamed or
legitimized. All justifications are in a sense a form of contextualization. It means that particular circumstances in which an event occurred are special and therefore normal standards of judgements cannot apply. The situation has a certain uniqueness under which violence is normal or at least acceptable. Finally, an advantageous comparison of the record of the accused government with the record of the critic can be made with different results. The critic is being discredited and it justifies the act, because ‘everyone is doing it’ (Cohen, 1996).
2.2.2 Counteroffensive
A counteroffensive is aimed at the critic, it turns a defensive position into an attack. The broad objective of the strategy is to prove that the allegations are untrustworthy, biased, part of a hostile campaign or undeclared political agenda. The most radical form of a
counteroffensive is the rejection of all allegations as lies, disinformation or/and propaganda. More subtle forms are citing mistakes and contradictions in the allegations, which does not have to concern important details as long as it reduces the overall credibility of the accuser. Secondly, questioning the political motives of the informants or financial contributors of the critic. Lastly, attacking the timing of the allegations. Arguments must lead to decreased credibility of the allegations by pointing to underlying motives and to mistakes (Cohen, 1996).
2.2.3 Partial acknowledgement
Full acknowledgement of the perpetrator government is rare. However, in some situations countries have to at least make an effort to go in this direction, mainly democratic countries. Either because their allies demand this or because the evidence is too thorough. Specific details are often avoided, but the country promises improvement in the future. When details are conceded three arguments are often being made. Spatial isolation: ‘The act was an isolated event, this does not normally happen; there is no pattern’. Temporal containment: ‘These events happened in the past, but not anymore’. Self-correction: The government takes a sensitive, self-correcting and accountable position and takes measures to improve the situation (Cohen, 1996).
It could be reasoned that partial acknowledgement becomes more common since recent developments enlarge visibility of covert action. However, sponsorship of covert action can be apparent, but not acknowledged, as Cormac and Aldrich (2018) have set out. Increased exposure therefore does not automatically lead to increased acknowledgement. States may still react in alternative ways to allegations. Events can be denied on the literal, factual level; the interpretative framework can be changed; and the events can be justified or rationalized. Furthermore, the critic can be attacked without necessarily elaborating on the allegations. In fact, the combination of visibility and non-acknowledgement leads to ambiguity and has possible benefits. Persistently denying, even after an operation is (partially) exposed, possibly disrupts collective, immediate responses from NATO. Furthermore, covert action can send a message without officially acknowledging responsibility. This message can be directed towards the international community (posture) or the domestic audience (action-oriented government). At least some degree of exposure is in fact necessary for the message to be conveyed.
3. Methodology
The main purpose of this thesis is to assess how states respond to the uncovering of their covert operations, based on a single case study. A case study is chosen, because the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context without the researchers having control over the events (Yin, 2003, p. 1). In the Skripal case, a qualitative content analysis of documents will be carried out. The focus is on two parts. First, the responses of the Russian government to the accusations will be analyzed. Subsequently, it will be examined to what extent these responses are plausible given the data publicly available about the Skripal case. An overview of the available data that indicated the involvement of the Russian state will be provided linked to the approach that has been used to gather the data. A timeline will then be constructed alternating the exposure of the Russian state involvement and the Russian denials. This should give insight into the sub-questions: 1. how did the Russian state deny its
involvement in the Skripal case?; and 2. to what extent have their denials been plausible in light of the available data as exposed by Bellingcat?
3.1 Research design
To accomplish the purpose of this research a qualitative content analysis methodology is chosen. Content analysis can be defined as the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of the characteristics of a message (Neuendorf, 2001). However, the analysis can also be done qualitatively through ‘reading and understanding’ of text instead of ‘counting’. Krippendorf (2004) even argues all content analysis is basically qualitative even when characteristics are counted. Content analysis is the thorough inspection of texts or visual human communication. It is the examination, not only of what is being communicated, but also why and with what effects this is done (Babbie, 2004). The purpose of content analysis is to objectively study human communication without the influence of the presence of the researcher.
Characteristically for content analysis is the process of codification. The data is being divided into categories which are established in advance and sometimes during the analysis. These categories with their appurtenant codes and coding rules are laid down in a codebook, which is accessible. Because the data is readily available and the codebook accessible, the research is replicable and transparent.
The unit of analysis are the main claims or arguments of a publication. This choice has been made to incorporate the large amount of data, but also because a smaller unit of analysis would not give enough context to understand the argumentation in the Russian publications. Multiple sentences and often entire paragraphs are used to make one claim or argument. Analyzing those sentence or paragraphs independent from each other provides a fragmentary and invalid analysis. By taking the message of the publication in its entirety, interdependency of paragraphs and context is taken into account.
Following the qualitative content analysis, the results will be complemented by an interview with an employee of Bellingcat who worked on the Skripal case. The purpose of the interview is not to gain more data, but to obtain explanation and interpretation to the results of the document analysis. This interview as a complementary method in sequence also gives insight into the opinion, attitude, perception and knowledge of the expert (Harrell & Bradley, 2009). The interview was structured and done by e-mail. The employee, with a background in ICT, has been involved with Bellingcat since 2014, where he conducted research on the downing of flight MH-17 and another GRU officer (Appendix 1).
3.1.1 Case selection
On Sunday 4 March 2018, Sergei Skripal and his daughter, Yulia, were found unconscious on a park bench in Salisbury. Sergei Skripal had worked as a GRU officer, when he has
convicted for espionage for the West. He was convicted in Russia, but after he served some of his time he was exchanged in a spy swap. His daughter came to visit him in March, when the attack happened. It turned out the two had been exposed to a military nerve agent, Novichok, which was developed in the Soviet Union between 1971 and 1993 (Lewis, 2018). Both survived the attack. The poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter was chosen, because this is a recent example of covert action that is publicly debated in real-time and received considerable media attention and (private) investigations. Covert action can be hard to study, because operations are often not exposed or not even detected. The exposure in this particular case makes it suitable for research. In particular, the Bellingcat publications contain a
considerable amount of verifiable details. 3.2 Operationalization
The analysis is two-part, with on the one hand the uncovering of the involvement of the Russian state and on the other hand the denial strategy of the Russian authorities. The analysis
will be done chronological, with the denials following the developments in the investigation. A timeline will be constructed of those developments linked to the employed methodology that was being used to gain the data and the Russian denial strategy.
Part of content analysis is the codification process. A codebook is developed, to convert the data into categories. The first part, the gathering of the data, will be coded inductively. The employed methodology will be explored, after which overarching categories will be
established. The second part, the Russian denial strategy, will be coded deductively, but leaves room for adding new concepts. Based on the research of government responses to human rights reports of Cohen (1996), three overarching categories are being used.
Subsequently, the subcategories from this framework are also incorporated. Due to the fact that the allegations in the Skripal case are not equal to a human rights report the subcategories always include the code ‘other’ to capture all forms of reaction.
The distinguished categories are the following:
1. Classic discourse of denial Literal denial Interpretative denial Implicatory denial 2. Counteroffensive 3. Partial acknowledgement 4. Other 3.4 Data collection
For the collection of the data, one of the six common sources is being used: documents (Yin, 2011, p. 10). These documents are statements, interviews, reports, briefings, press releases and replies to media questions. To uncover the involvement of the Russian state in the attack, both official documents from the UK government will be collected and research reports from Bellingcat. The documents will be collected from the official website of the UK government (GOV.UK) and website of Bellingcat (Bellingcat.com). Data for the denials of the Russian government will be collected from the officials website of the Kremlin (en.kremlin.ru), which includes publications of Putin and the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation (mid.ru/en), which includes publications of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Maria Zakharova, and other government officials and representatives. When a reference is made to a report or article that is not on one of these websites, the report or article is also included to improve completeness. All data is publicly available on the internet. The use of exclusively official publications from Russian authorities means this thesis merely attempts to establish the official denial strategy, informal channels are left out of the analysis. Specific terms were inserted in the search engine of the different websites (‘Skripal’, ‘Salisbury attack’, ‘Salisbury poisoning’ and ‘Novichok’), but the search term ‘Skripal’ covered all results and is therefore used as the only search term. The documents included in this thesis are published between the day of the incident, that is 4 March 2018, and 4 July 2019. No
significant developments in the case were made public after this date. All results of the search term Skripal were explored on relevance. All relevant documents from the Russian side were included in the analysis to enhance completeness of the denials. The documents from
GOV.UK and Bellingcat.com were included in order to sufficiently describe the allegations and the information on which these are based. This means that repetition of accusations has been omitted and consultation on sanctions too, as it has no added value for the current investigation.
4. Analysis
In this section Cohen’s government responses framework is used to identify the forms of reaction of the official Russian responses to the allegations in the Skripal case. In addition, it will be studied how the uncovering of the operation was affected by globalization and ICT developments. The analysis is divided into two timeframes. Timeframe one covers the period from the incident until the charges were brought against two individuals. Allegations in this timeframe are mainly based on general characteristics of the poisoning, including the use of the military-grade nerve agent Novichok. The Russian state in its entirety is initially accused, no specific actors are being associated to carrying out the attack. Specific evidence is limited and based on, for outsiders unverifiable, intelligence. In the second timeframe, however, two individuals are marked as suspects and a considerable amount of specific details about the case and the individuals are uncovered by Bellingcat. A chronological analysis will show how the Russian authorities respond to the allegations and the exposed data in the Skripal case.
4.1 Timeframe I
4.1.1 Initial accusations
One week after the incident, the UK government starts pointing to the Russian state as the culpable actor behind the Skripal poisoning. Theresa May stated on 12 March that ‘either this was a direct act by the Russian State against our country. Or the Russian government lost control of this potentially catastrophically damaging nerve agent and allowed it to get into the hands of others’ (May, 2018a). The Russian Ambassador to the UK was summoned by the British Foreign secretary and was asked to explain within 24 hours how a Russia-produced nerve agent could have been used in the UK against the Skripals. In the same statement, May sets out the available evidence that led to her conclusion that it is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attack. At this point, the accusations are based on
intelligence and the identification of the toxic weapon by chemical experts. The first strand of evidence was the identification of the chemical agent by the experts at the Porton Down Laboratory, Skripal and his daughter were poisoned with a military-grade nerve agent that is part of a group known as ‘Novichok’. This nerve agent was developed and previously
produced in Russia and Russia would still be capable of doing so, based on intelligence. Two other strands of evidence that are put forward are Russia’s record of state-sponsored
assassinations (May, 2018a). A reference to the Litvinenko case is made, in order to indicate that the Russian security services have executed a similar assassination before with
comparable motive. In 2006 Alexandr Litvinenko, a former KGB officer and defector, was poisoned in the UK with Polonium, for which the Russian State was held responsible (Owen, 2016). May refers to the modus operandi in both cases and how Russia had promised to assist in the investigation, while this cooperation only led to denial and obfuscation of the inquiry (May, 2018a).
In response, Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Titov summoned the Ambassador of the UK to the Russian Federation to strongly protest these allegations. In a press release of the Russian Foreign Ministry on 13 March, it was stated that these accusations are evidence-free and clearly provocative. The Russian official position, immediately after the incident, is that the Russian Federation was not involved in the Salisbury attack, but is ready to cooperate in accordance with the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (hereafter: OPCW) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2018a). Foreign minister Lavrov and Spokesperson Zakharova react strongly. The allegations are dismissed as provocative fakes and Lavrov states that Russia is ‘’accused of not only this, but everything that our Western partners believe is wrong on this planet’’ (Lavrov, 2018a). Further questions are not yet to be answered by Lavrov, because no factual information through official channels is provided by the UK authorities, only through propaganda channels (Lavrov, 2018a). The Litvinenko case is also mentioned at the Russian side. Zakharova compared the Skripal case with the
Litvinenko case by arguing this is another ‘story’, stirred up in the media, followed by ungrounded and unsubstantiated accusations, after which the whole case will be classified again (Zakharova, 2018a). The permanent representative of Russia to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Lukashevich, (2018) argues that Russia is not the only country that is capable of producing Novichok, but other countries could also be the source of the chemical toxic. On top of that, Russia has destroyed its chemical weapons, while other countries continued developing. He concludes that at least the formula and samples of Novichok must have been available to the Porton Down laboratory to identify it (Lukaschevich, 2018).
In short, the official position of the Russian government in these first two weeks is that they are not involved in the Salisbury poisoning and the accusations are ‘nonsense’ (Lavrov, 2018b). The Russian state denies its involvement literally; ‘it was not us’. In addition, the
accusations against Russia are described as fake, propaganda and provocative. Russia is depicted as the victim of Western Russophobia and propaganda. First attempts to prove these allegations are part of a campaign of vilification show that a counteroffensive has already started from the beginning. Thirdly, Lukaschevich points to other countries with possession of chemical weapons, attempting to divert the attention away from Russia.
On 14 March, Theresa May (2018b) announced punishment measures against Russia, on behalf of the state involvement in the Skripal poisoing. Russian authorities have not given a credible explanation within 24 hours that suggested the lost control of the nerve agent. Immediate action included the expulsion of 23 Russian diplomats (May, 2018b). Out of solidarity, but most importantly the recognition of the Russian threat to the European Union, eighteen countries collectively expelled a total of more than 100 diplomats from their
countries. The diplomats were expelled as undeclared intelligence officers (May, 2018c). In response to May’s announcement, the Russian Foreign Ministry argues that the allegations in the Skripal case merely serve as a legitimization for the hostile measures that the UK authorities beforehand wanted to carry out against Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018b). Furthermore, both Lavrov (2018d) and Lukashevich (2018) explain the Skripal case as an attempt to divert the public attention in the UK from the Brexit. The decreased approval ratings of the government because of the Brexit would be the reason to shift attention away from these matters towards the Skripal allegations (Lavrov, 2018c; Lavrov, 2018d;
Lukaschevich, 2018). Lavrov adds to this argumentation that the British have a desire not to be forgotten and remain in the lead, due to the conservatism of their government they chose for Russophobia as the way to do this. Another matter of which the public’s attention had to be drawn away from by the Skripal case was, according to Lukashevich (2018), a network of pedophiles in Telford that abused children while authorities looked the other way. Lavrov (2018d) mentions another motive, that is the Skripal case provocations make holding the World Cup in Russia more difficult.
Several explanations are given for the allegations directed towards the Russian state. The underlying motives for the accusations are mentioned, asserting the Skripal allegations are part of an undeclared political agenda and deflecting the attention away from Russia as the only possible perpetrator. Deflection could be regarded as a function of other forms of denial, but the presence of deflection in this early stage is so prominent, that it will be recognized as a
separate denial form. There is no focus on one plausible explanation, but rather on several at the same time:
I. The accusations serve as a legitimization for punishment measures against Russia II. The accusations divert attention from the Brexit
III. The accusations divert attention from a scandal including a network of pedophiles IV. The accusations should ensure that Britain remains in the lead
V. The accusations make holding the World Cup in Russia more difficult
4.1.2 Further reactions
New official evidence from the UK authorities is not provided in the period that follows, but the Skripal case is highly debated in the media. On 18 March, Putin is asked about the case during media questions. Accusations are waved away laconically and the argument is made that if a military-grade nerve agent was used, the victims would have died on the spot. Because the victims have survived, Novichok could not have been involved. This
argumentation not only implies a mistake in the British allegations, but without a chemical weapon involved the act can also be regarded as less harmful. The interpretative framework is changed; the attack is not a chemical attack. It is, however, still emphasized that Russia does not possess such chemical weapons and that it is unthinkable the Russian state would do such thing ahead of the elections and the World Cup (Putin, 2018a). The timing of the incident therefore rules out Russian involvement.
In multiple publications the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation addresses the matter of transparency. The UK government is accused of withholding information about the case, while spreading the presumption of Russia’s guilt without an objective and
comprehensive investigation into the incident (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2018c). Attacking the transparency of the UK authorities has two functions, literal denial and countering the source of the information. Literal denial takes the form here of the justification of ignoring allegations. Zakharova argues that all information the Russian authorities receive is through the media, no officials channels are being used, which makes it hard to react to the allegations and not necessary (Zakharova, 2018c). With this logic,
allegations to which can be responded favorably are cherry-picked and others are brushed aside or ignored. The withholding of information should also show that the UK government is unreliable and unwilling to carry out an objective investigation. Maria Zakharova (2018c)
described the communication between the British and Russian authorities in a briefing on 4 April as a ‘steady stream of misinformation’. The UK does not provide any official
statements, but constantly spins the subjects and leaks it to the media. The question is asked whether the UK simply does not have more information or does not release it, because there are things to hide. The Russian authorities are also not allowed to communicate with the Porton Down facility, which is considered as a sign that there are things to hide there too (Zakharova, 2018c). Zakharova states that new versions of the scenario emerge every day in reference with ‘’sources’’ implying these lack credibility, because of their anonymity. Zakharova also involves the animals of the Skripals, because those living organisms should have been affected as well and she asked why Britain would hide such an important fact (Zakharova, 2018c). The Russian Foreign Ministry concludes that these circumstances show that the UK government does not want to find the real perpetrator and suggests that this indicates involvement of the British intelligence services (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2018c).
Furthermore, an extended counteroffensive is carried out, going a step further than attacking the credibility of the allegations. The ‘attack the messenger’ strategy seems to merge into a strategy of ‘blaming the messenger’. The Russian narrative starts assuming the British state played a role in the poisoning of the Skripals. The allegations are still being described as anti-Russia campaign, but seems to become slightly more intense.
Lavrov (2018e) for example states that ‘’crude political provocations are staged to fuel
confrontation and demonize Russia’’. The fact that Yulia and Sergei Skripal both survived the
attack is a returning topic for the Russians and considered a sign that Novichok was not used in the Skripal case. Vassily Nebenzya (2018a), Permanent Representative to the United Nations, has another explanation: the only plausible explanation for the survival of both Skripals is that the UK was in possession of an antidote. Nebenzya states that experts agree that those who provided the antidote knew exactly what poison was used. Nebenzya adds that the Porton Down laboratory is nearby Salisbury and that their operations are questionable (Nebenzya, 2018a). In another publication it is set out that the Porton Down laboratory is one of the UK’s most important facilities in terms of developing and researching toxic agents, the facility is near Salisbury and in 2006 it has experimented on humans to study the effect of sarin (Yermakov, 2018). Direct accusations are not being made, only insinuations and a mysterious atmosphere is created around the facility. The effect is two-fold. First of all, the
reliability of the Porton Down laboratory is called into questions, which should make their analysis less credible. Second, insinuations regarding the Porton Down facility about
involvement in the attack, because of alleged possession of Novichok, should deflect attention away from Russian state responsibility.
The accusations against Russia are being spoken of with sarcasm, astonishment and absurdity. Nebenzya (2018a) asked if the UK government could not invent a more plausible fake story and involves 'what Tony Blair said’ in the run up to the Iraq War in 2003 to point out the incredibility of British intelligence. Alexander Shulgin (2018a) involves the Kennedy murder and states that, as in the Skripal case, the Russians (and Soviets) are being blamed without any solid facts. Meanwhile, Zakharova (2018d) speaks about an information warfare, rather than a campaign. The information warfare consists out of UK media deliberately distorting facts which is encouraged by the UK authorities. Both the number of discrepancies within scenarios and the number of versions of the scenario is increasing (Zakharova, 2018d) The main point remains that the Skripal case is merely part of anti-Russian propaganda, and the only ones benefiting from the provocation are the British intelligence services. With this ‘qui bono’ argument Russian responsibility is ruled out and the British intelligence services designated as the probable organizer of the poisoning (Zakharova, 2018e). An entire publication is committed to how Western states have a record of staging dramatic shows before Russian elections. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018c) cited some examples of this propaganda to reinforce this argument. Yermakov (2018), the Russian Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, goes further than labeling the accusations as propaganda and argues that the Skripal case is obviously ‘a clumsy staged provocation’, orchestrated by a still unknown actor. In the week of 4 April Russia proposed a joint inquiry to the incident. This request was defeated by the Executive Council of the OPCW, because the OPCW had not completed its technical assistance to the UK yet. Following this rejection, Lavrov (2018f) stated that when the OPCW report is published, it cannot be supported, because Russia is not part of the investigation. Even before the OPCW has finished its analysis and published its report,
Lavrov has already discredited it and provided the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation with a reason not to accept the conclusions that would be drawn from the report.
4.1.3. OPCW report
On 12 April, the OPCW (2018) published the executive summary of their report on the incident in Salisbury. The full report was classified, but available to States Parties. Tests were held in four different OPCW designated laboratories outside the UK. The results of the analysis confirmed the findings of the laboratory in Porton Down about the identity of the toxic chemical, the name and structure were contained in the full report. The analysis of environmental samples collected on-site showed the presence of the identified toxic chemical. Finally, blood samples were collected of three affected victims, Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nicholas Bailey (a police officer who was poisoned while investigating the attack). Analysis of the blood sample demonstrate exposure of the three victims to the identified to the toxic chemical. Finally, it was found that the toxic chemical was of high purity (OPCW, 2018).
The positive identification of the nerve agent is an essential strand of evidence, but the laboratories cannot determine where this toxic chemical was made. The conclusion that Russia is behind the attack was reached based on the belief that only Russia has the technical
means, operational experience and motive to carry out an attack like this (Wilson, 2018). The
development of Novichoks started in the 1980s in the Soviet Union as part of an offensive chemical weapons programme, code-named ‘FOLIANT’. It is unlikely that other former Soviet republics executed such a programme after independence. Neither is it likely that the nerve agent is produced by non-state actors, because of the absence of significant impurities in the samples. However, Russia has produced and stockpiled small amounts of Novichok within the last decade. The technical experience refers to a programme in 2000s that Russia started to test the means of delivering nerve agents, which includes the application to door handles. Furthermore, the Litvinenko case is cited as an example that Russia has done this before. Finally, the motive is the Russian view of defectors as legitimate targets. It was found that the GRU was interested in Yulia Skripal’s email accounts in 2013 (Wilson, 2018).
Reactions to the OPCW report
Since the OPCW is an independent research body, arguments regarding its political motives hard more difficult to hold up. Nonetheless is the OPCW report not accepted in Russia. Zakharova repeated the previous statement of Lavrov that no conclusions can be accepted until Russian experts are granted access to the victims and the material on which the
conclusions are based (Zakharova, 2018d). Drawing on Lavrov’s request, the OPCW is discredited without citing mistakes or discrepancies.
Lavrov (Lavrov, 2018g; Lavrov, 2018h; Lavrov, 2018i) demands answers from the OPCW, because of the detection of traces of a second category nerve agent called BZ (BZ.28) by one of the designated laboratories, the Spiez laboratory. This Swiss laboratory had tested the samples in the Skripal case and had found traces of BZ, according to Lavrov. It was admitted that Novichok was found too, but if the victims were poisoned with Novichok they probably would have died. Therefore, he concludes that the used poison was probably BZ. This nerve agent is not in possession of Russia, but in operational service of several NATO countries. The discovering of traces of BZ would not only point to gaps in the OPCW report, but also aims to direct suspicion to NATO countries, deflecting it from Russia. The Spiez laboratory reacted immediately, invalidating the statement. The same chemical was found in Salisbury that was identified by the experts of the Porton Down facility, the samples did not contain BZ. Only the control samples contained a derivative of BZ (Spiez Laboratory, 2018). Lavrov’s claim for answers was dismissed by the OPCW. The Spiez laboratory annual report (2018) showed that this was not an unfortunate misunderstanding. The presence of a derivative of BZ in the control samples was deliberately distorted in a way that denied Russian involvement, raised suspicion towards others and attacked the credibility of the OPCW report.
Another question that is being raised on the Russian side is how the chemical toxic is found in a high concentration almost two weeks after the incident. Novichok is known as an extremely unstable chemical in humid conditions, causing the OPCW conclusions to be impossible (Nebenzya, 2018b). Nebenzya (2018b) suggests that the toxic agent was probably injected into the blood of the victim prior to collecting the blood samples, because the
non-decomposed toxic was found in the blood of one victim, but not in the blood of another, more exposed victim. Again, the arguments that state high purity of Novichok found in the samples is impossible, should raise doubts about the OPCW report. The implausibility of the than provided explanation regarding the injection of the toxic chemical raises questions. The explanation deflects attention away from Russia by pointing to others, but the implausibility also leads to confusion in another respect. It could be argued that the use of implausible explanations aims to undermine the belief in objective truth.
President Putin sticks to his previous point of view, even after the OPCW has confirmed the identification of Novichok, that the survival of the victims rules out the use of a chemical warfare agent. In addition, Putin states, the mere fact that the British have said a chemical warfare agent was involved makes that everything else they have stated can be called into question (Putin, 2018b), clearly attacking the reliability of the UK authorities. The Ministry of Foreign affairs of the Russian Federation comes up with an alternative substance that could have been used. Fentanyl, a fairly harmless and accessible substance should explain how the victims have survived the attack (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2018d). This alternative substance turns a chemical attack into a less harmful act.
Finally, Lavrov commenced discrediting the OPCW in more general terms. Lavrov states Russia has lost faith in the OPCW, because the organization was grossly manipulated. A decision by vote has passed that required the Technical Secretariat to contribute to the identification of perpetrators behind chemical attacks. This is a very dangerous step and it violates all the provisions of the convention, according to Lavrov (2018j).
The OPCW findings are subjected to a gradual counteroffensive. First, the report was not accepted, because Russia was not involved in the investigation. Second, gaps and mistakes were cited or insinuated. Finally, the OPCW as organization was discredited. Furthermore, alternative explanations were provided, deflecting the attention from Russia.
Further reactions
The Russian Foreign Ministry is increasingly questioning the credibility of the UK government and appeals to the lack of evidence in their case. Alexander Shulgin (2018b) sums up a list of eight lies of the British government, which Shulgin considers only a few of the examples of misinformation and open lying of the British. Although highly disputable whether they are lies, the function of the listing is, besides discrediting the UK authorities, that lying is something all governments do. This makes it harder to establish what to believe and who to believe and also inadvertently justifies lying for the Russian authorities.
One of the lies Shulgin mentions is that the UK authorities say that Yulia Skripal avoids contact with her relatives and has turned down consular help. ‘Yulia only spoke for a minute
Lavrov only makes insinuations, Shulgin (2018b) explicitly states that Yulia is being hidden from the public and is denied consular access, which makes her a hostage of the British authorities. All arguments are aimed at raising questions about the role and motives of the UK state actors. For instance, it is suggested that Yulia is being kept away from the media,
because she could shed light on the case, which is against the will of the UK authorities. Another suggestion is that the Skripals might not have been poisoned at all and therefore have not appeared in the media (Chrizhov, 2018; Zakharova, Briefing by Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, 2018f). The questions about the whereabouts of the Skripals, in particular Yulia, are being asked in a way that raises uncertainty about the situation. In many press releases and publications of the Russian Foreign Ministry the topic returns. The function of the questions about the whereabouts will, however, change as the investigation progresses from raising doubts to merely divert attention from other questions.
Since no new evidence is presented two to three months after the incident, the Russians argue the UK government has not presented any evidence at all. The fact that the London
Metropolitan police urges people to get in touch with them who have anything to say about the Skripal case is a clear sign to Maria Zakharova that there is a complete lack of evidence (Zakharova, 2018g). Another statement the Russian Foreign Ministry makes, is that UK allies, Western media and Western citizens also become more and more aware of the real reasons behind the allegations of London towards Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2018d) and that they are increasingly skeptical about Russia’s guilt (Zakharova, 2018h). Also, within the UK doubts about the accusations are said to be growing. Zakharova (2018h) speaks about certain British media that express their doubts. On top of that,
Zakharova claims to have received dozens of letters from British citizens that apologize for ‘the anti-Russia escapades of their government’ . Naturally, it is hard to verify this kind of information, but the intention is irrefutable, raising doubts. Now, even Western actors
apologize for the anti-Russia attitude, that is how bad it is. Zakharova (2018g) even dedicated one content of her briefing to British Russophobia.
The British government is also accused of quietly destroying evidence (Nebenzya, 2018b) and preventing evidence from becoming public (Chrizhov, 2018). Finally, the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation states that the British government flout norms of international law and law in general, laws of diplomacy and common sense (Nebenzya, 2018b). The overall
against Russia, there is no evidence that objectively points to Russia as the perpetrator and now the UK authorities prevent finding out the truth. Russia portrays itself as the victim of Western Russophobia and being ungrounded accused of the poisoning, since a few months have passed without significant developments in the investigation. Mainly, the lack of evidence is heavily emphasized.
4.2 Time frame II
The second timeframe starts with the official charges against two individuals. After the
pictures of the suspects had been released, Bellingcat started releasing publications about their investigation. The investigation can be broadly divided into three parts based on the key findings. First, the identification of the suspects as GRU operatives, outlined in two
publications. Second, the identification of the real persons behind the personas, outlined in four publications. Third, the identification of the third person, outlined in four publications. 4.2.1 Official charges
On 5 September 2018, new developments in the investigation led to the conclusion of the British that sufficient evidence was produced to bring charges against two individuals (May, 2018d). The police had identified two Russian nationals as suspects of the poisoning of the Skripals and tracked their movement by analyzing CCTV footage. Theresa May (2018d) announced an Interpol red notice and European Arrest Warrant against the two men. The indictments were supported by publishing the movements of the men. The British police force had set out how these two men, traveling under the names Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov, had entered and left Salisbury (May, 2018d):
March 2 Petrov and Boshirov arrived at Gatwick Airport (flight SU2588 from Moscow) at 3pm and travelled by train to London. They stayed in the City Stay Hotel in Bow Road East London.
March 3 Petrov and Boshirov visited Salisbury for approximately two hours, arriving around 2.25pm and leaving at 4.10pm.
March 4 Petrov and Boshirov visited Salisbury again, leaving Bow at 8.05am and returning around 4.45pm. CCTV footage proved that the two men were near to
Skripals’ address at 11.58am, moments before the attack. Petrov and Boshirov flew back to Moscow at 10.30 pm that same day (flight SU2585).
Furthermore, in their hotel room traces of Novichok were found. The names Petrov and Boshirov were believed to be aliases and based on intelligence the two men were believed to be officers from the GRU. Since the chain of command of the GRU is well-established, May argues that the operation was almost certainly approved outside the GRU, at a senior level of the Russian state. The CCTV footage of the two suspects was released to the public by the police (May, 2018d).
Reaction to the charges
The view that there is sufficient evidence to bring charges against the two men, is not shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Zakharova states that the charges are being brought without any documentary support or trustworthy testimonials and the nationality of the men is still to be confirmed (Zakharova, 2018k). The new presented evidence receives little attention. The only notable evidence, according to Zakharova, remains that ‘only Russia had the technical means, operational experience and motive to carry out the attack’, while the CCTV footage is dismissed as just photos of the accused. The timeline of the movements of Petrov and Boshirov is not mentioned at all (Zakharova, 2018k). Earlier Zakharova had already argued that London simply does not want to establish the truth and therefore she labels these charges as an attempt to bring the investigation to a deadlock (Zakharova, 2018j). Zakharova (2018k) adds that Russia continued the dialogue in an appropriate manner, while the UK authorities have not asked Russia any questions, but to acknowledge either that Russia: a) committed a crime in Salisbury or b) lost control of toxic chemical agents. Furthermore, the Russian Foreign Ministry has sent multiple inquiries, most of them without a formal reply. The UK government is again accused of ignoring
international law and legal procedures and of making use of anti-Russian speakerphone diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2018e).
The new developments in the Skripal case are being discussed superficially and selectively. The curious movements in the UK and from and to Moscow are being ignored; the nationality is still to be established; and the CCTV footage are just pictures. According to Zakharova, the accusations are still groundless. These laconic denials and ignoring the inexplicable evidence
