Peace and Politics: The Influence of the U.S. Election Cycle on the U.S. Foreign Policy During the George W. Bush Administration Concerning the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 2000-2008

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Peace and Politics

A Case Study of the Influence of the U.S. Election Cycle on the U.S.

Foreign Policy during the George W. Bush Administration Concerning

the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 2000-2008

Name: B.J.C.M. Hof Student number: 0591009 Master thesis History

Specialization: History of International Relations Supervisor: Dr. R. van Dijk PhD

Second reader: Prof. Dr. M. van Leeuwen

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I hereby declare that this thesis, "Peace and Politics: A Case Study of the Influence of the U.S. Election Cycle on the U.S. Foreign Policy during the George W. Bush Administration

Concerning the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Name

Benedicto Christina Maria Josefina Hof

Signature

Date

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The above quote by political scientist William B. Quandt, former member of the National Security Council in the Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter administrations, sums up his theory. During a four year period, a president, presidential candidates, congressional members and congressional candidates need to be responsive to the wishes of the domestic electorate and consider the viewpoints of major donors and pressure groups in order to get elected or remain in office. While the U.S. election cycle is a domestic affair, foreign policy is an important election issue, which is especially true in regard to Israel and, more broadly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Commentators consider U.S. foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as one of the main drivers of anti-Americanism in the Middle East.2_{Since 9/11, this argument}

has gained ground, with the inherent conclusion that the continuing conflict leaves Arab leaders hesitant to move closer to the U.S. Many U.S. leaders and officials therefore agree that solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would enhance U.S. interests in the Arab world.3_The

international community also considers the U.S. to be indispensable as a third party-mediator, due to its closeness to Israel and its role as a democratic superpower. Yet, 66 years have gone by without a resolution and the U.S. has not succeeded in bringing the parties towards a comprehensive solution.

Quandt mainly attributes this lack of progress to the influence of the U.S. electoral cycle, making it difficult for U.S. administrations to pursue an evenhanded and consistent foreign policy. American presidents were successful when they pressured the parties at the right moment and unsuccessful when they simply play a facilitating role. Quandt shows visible patterns in the foreign policy of U.S. administrations during the Cold War towards the

1 William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 1986) 8. 2 See for example, Sigrid Faath (Ed.), Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World (London: Markus Wiener

Publishers, 2006) 222.

3 For example, Barack Obama stated that the conflict ‘provides an excuse for anti-American militant jihadists to engage in inexcusable actions’, adding that solving the conflict is in U.S.’ ‘national-security interest’, in: Bruce Riedel, Frank Anderson, Philip Wilcox, Brian Katulis, 'Israeli-Palestinian Peace: What is the U.S. National Security Interest? How Can It Be Achieved?,' in: Middle East Policy Council Vol. 18 No. 1,

< http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/israeli-palestinian-peace-what-us-national-security-interest> [20-06-2014]. Also see: Hilary L. Krieger, 'Arab-Israeli conflict hurts U.S.,' in: The Jerusalem Post, March 18, 2010, <http://www.jpost.com/International/Arab-Israeli-conflict-hurts-US> [20-03-2014]

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Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with recurring symptoms for every year of an administration’s first term and patterns tied to a second term. These patterns will be further explained in Chapter Two. According to Quandt:

Perhaps more than any other foreign policy issue, the Arab-Israeli conflict can take its toll on the standing of a president. Domestic politics quickly becomes intertwined with strategic analysis. Presidents rarely tackle Middle East issues with enthusiasm, knowing they will invariably be controversial, and often intractable as well…the power of the United States as a mediator in complex international disputes…[and the] serious limits on that power, [are] limits that are deeply rooted in the nature of the American political system…Central to this analysis is the idea that presidents must function within boundaries set by the electoral cycle. In practice, these political realities limit the time that a president can devote to any foreign policy issue.4

Following this logic, a president will be more confident trying new initiatives in the first year than the fourth. Because a president has to consider the way he is being viewed before and during the midterm congressional elections in the second year, as well as his presidential re-election campaign in the third and fourth year, the president will take an explicit pro-Israeli stance to accommodate pro-Israeli Congress and pro-Israeli groups with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Criticism of Israel can aggravate congressional members and pro-Israeli groups, resulting in a significant loss of votes and influence.

While Quandt researches administrations during the Cold War, the world has changed since the end of the 90’s, arguably even more so since 9/11. His theory has not yet been applied to presidents of the 21st_{century. Israel has become increasingly isolated in the world,}

with the U.S. as its sole backer in the U.N. Security Council, hence increasingly

delegitimizing the U.S. as an evenhanded broker.5_{However, Pieter Beinart has shown that the}

U.S. election cycle had a considerable amount of influence on Barack Obama’s foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in his first term. He makes the convincing case that when ‘Obama’s initial inclination…toward a liberal democratic Zionism that challenges Israel’s occupation of the West bank…clashed with political reality, political reality won.’6

Using countless examples of Obama during his first term where he “clashes” with the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, Beinart shows how Obama wielded his demands of

4 Quandt, Camp David, 5.

5 See, for example, Rashid Khalidi, Michael D. Kurzer, Broker of Deceit: How the U.S. Has Undermined Peace in

the Middle East (Boston: Beacon Press Books, 2008); Noam Chomsky, 'A Middle East Peace That Could Happen

(But Won’t),' in: The Huffington Post, April 27, 2010, < http://www.huffingtonpost.com/noam-chomsky/a-middle-east-peace-that_b_554178.html> [20-06-2014]; Mark Lander, 'Mideast Frustration, the Sequel,' The

New York Times, April 8, 2014.

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Israel due to domestic pressure, especially in the years of his first presidential campaign, the congressional elections and his re-election campaign. Taking Beinart’s excellent account verifies that the election cycle had a big influence on Obama’s policy stances towards the conflict, which brings us to the post-Cold War administration of President George W. Bush.

In many ways, the Bush administration constitutes the opposite of Obama’s. While Obama is a liberal Democrat, and a pragmatist at his core, Bush is a conservative Republican that makes decisions based on his gut feeling, making the Bush administration an interesting case study. Moreover, he served for two terms, making it possible to use Quandt’s patterns tied to a first and second term, which have dissimilar features according to Quandt’s theory. If Quandt’s theory proves to be correct in explaining the U.S. policies towards Israel and the Palestinians, than it is to be expected that the Bush administration will still exhibit the same features as the Cold War administrations that were analyzed by Quandt, as well as Barack Obama’s first term. Therefore, Quandt’s theory will be used to find an answer to the main research question of this thesis: What, if any, influence does the political election cycles of the

United States have on the foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during 2000-2008? The answer to this question will help to fully

appreciate the scope of influence of the election cycles on the foreign policy decision-making of the Bush administration regarding the peace process and illuminate possible differences and similarities with Cold War administrations analyzed by Quandt. Although of minor importance, the case studies will also illuminate the usefulness of Quandt’s theory in understanding the foreign policy decisions of U.S. presidents towards the conflict.

With regards to the literature since 9/11, it seems that most historical overviews include U.S. involvement in the Middle East, underlining the importance of oil and the evolving U.S.-Israeli relationship, and the U.S.’ role in the Middle East conflict. In many of these books, anti-Americanism has a special place in the narrative, viewing the U.S. role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its relations to Israel as its main source in the region, fueling extremism against the U.S.7_{Since 9/11 others have emphasized some sort of “clash of}

ideologies” between the Western world and the Muslim world, taking ideology as the explanation for U.S.’ foreign policy towards the Middle East.8_{However, ‘ideology’ has less}

7 For example: Khalil. T. Azar, American Foreign Policy & It’s Link To Terrorism In The Middle East (Bloomington: Author House, 2011); Kylie Baxter, Shahram Akbarzadeh, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roots of

Anti-Americanism (New York: Routledge, 2008)

8 Since 9/11 this has been a popular theme. For example: Mark L. Haas, The Clash of Ideologies: Middle Eastern

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of a role than ‘political pragmatism,’ Quandt contends, since policies ‘can be made to fit whatever ideological mold is currently in fashion.’9

Authors like Yahya Kamalipour underpin the cultural aspects and the historical perception of Israelis and Arabs in the U.S. to explain U.S. policy.10_{Many other factors also}

shape the U.S.’ perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Cheryl Rubenberg and Bernard Reich, for example, name various factors influencing U.S. foreign policy with regard to the conflict, such as the media and other watch groups, information generators, groups that focus on non-Jews, lobbies, and think tanks, public opinion and the media, Congress and Israel, Jews and politics (Jewish politicians, votes and money), links between American Jewish community and Israel, and the Israel lobby.11

Others highlight the influence of pro-Israeli groups on U.S. foreign policy,12_{with the}

controversial book The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy of Political Science Professor John Meirsheimer and International Relations Professor Stephen Walt, as the most recent example. They are two respected scholars in their field, rehashing the argument that ‘the real reason why American politicians are so deferential' with regard to foreign policy concerning Israel 'is the political power of the Israel lobby.’13_{Meirsheimer and Walt have a broad}

definition of the lobby, describing it as ‘a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction.’14_{They too identify the}

many domestic factors that shape U.S. foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinians. Critics of Meirsheimer and Walt, such as Ian Bickerton, primarily argue that ‘the causal link between those actions’ and ‘policy outcomes’ is lacking, mainly because there are also many examples of U.S. opposition towards the wishes of the lobby.15_{He has a point. Do} 9 Quandt, Camp David, 11.

10 Yahya R. Kamalipour, The U.S. Media And The Middle East: Image And Perception (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group 1997). Also see: Matthew F. Jacobs, Imagining The Middle East: The Building of an American

Foreign Policy 1918-1967 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). Matthew Jacobs takes a similar

approach when researching U.S. foreign policy between 1918-1967 and contends that (pro-) Zionists in the U.S. have constantly tried to convey the message that Israel and the Holy land in the Middle East are linked, disseminating images about Israel as sharing the same values and Judeo-Christian principles with the U.S., which reinforced U.S.-Israeli ties and shaped the U.S. foreign policy with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 11 Cheryl A. Rubenberg, The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace (Gainesville: Lynne Riener Publishers, 2003) 290-293.; Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel, Influence in the Special Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1989) 185-202.

12 Paul Findley, They Dare To Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby (Westport,

CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1985) 1-25., Janice T. Terry, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Role of

Lobbies and Special Interest Groups (London: Pluto Press, 2005)

13 John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (London, New York, Dublin, Toronto, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008) 5.

14 Ibid.

15 Ian J. Bickerton, 'America’s Israel/Israel’s America,' in: John Dumbrell, Alex R. Schafer (Ed.), America’s

‘special relationships’: foreign and domestic aspects of the politics of alliance (New York: Taylor& Francis, 2009)

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lobbies, for example, have a bigger influence before and during presidential elections or congressional elections? Quandt argues they do and his theory is designed based on this premise. Unlike Quandt’s theory Meirsheimer and Walt single out ‘the lobby’ as the

determining factor in influencing U.S. foreign policy without focusing on the election cycle as the main perspective.

Although works that name a variety of that shape U.S. policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are useful, the authors view the strength of these factors as constant. In Quandt’s theory, however, the strength of these factors influencing U.S. foreign policy varies according to the presidential year and term. Therefore, scholarly debates about U.S. foreign policy concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict all miss an important element that makes Quandt’s perspective timely in understanding the limits and constraints of the executive branch when dealing with this issue; they tend to focus on one variable that constitutes domestic influence or view the strength of these factors as constant. Quandt’s theory

encompasses all the aspects that have to do with the influence of domestic concerns, but takes the U.S. election cycles as the basis on which to test the constraints on the executive brach to conduct a viable foreign policy with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is a

framework that aims to determine why U.S. presidents will be more pro-Israel at certain times in their four years in office and will in theory, be able to predict why and when U.S.

presidents have more leverage in dealing with Israel and solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Surprisingly, little has been written about the influence of election cycles on U.S. foreign policy since 2000 towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To be sure, from the 1990s only a few invaluable studies have been conducted concerning the influence of the election cycle on the decision of U.S. presidents to go to war and on U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, as well as the limits of the electoral cycle on a second-term president. Miroslav Nincic takes U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union as a case study and concludes that

considerations of the domestic political competition, the election cycle, is a significant factor shaping U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.16

David Hasting Dunn researched the second term of the Bush Jr. presidency to see how the influence of the electoral cycle relates to term presidencies. He argues that second-term administrations are less successful. However, he makes the interesting case that the Bush administration encountered more constraints on domestic issues than on foreign policy issues.

when their interests coincide with U.S. national interests. See: Henry. F. Feingold, Jewish Power in America:

Myth and Reality (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008)

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According to Dunn, it explains Bush’s gear towards foreign policy in the second term. Unfortunately, he does not focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,17_{which this thesis does.}

One of the few authors that make the influence of domestic pressures on U.S. foreign policy towards the peace process a core component is Mitchell Geoffrey Bard. He aims to research causality by defining the limits of domestic influence on United States Middle East policy. Bard tries to measure the strength of the ‘Israel lobby’ and U.S. foreign policy decision-making towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This work is good at measuring the strength of the main U.S. pro-Israel lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC),18_{on U.S. presidencies’ foreign policy towards the Middle East between 1945-1984,}

making a convincing case that the lobby is not all powerful in this period but also not, as Steven Spiegel contends, un-influential when it comes to U.S. foreign policy concerning the Middle East.19_{Surprisingly, Bard argues that the presidential election cycle has no impact on}

the lobby’s success, and therefore no impact on U.S. foreign policy.

Bard’s research has certain limitations, however, that lead to his flawed conclusion. Firstly, he only researches the influence of AIPAC on the presidential election cycle and takes no other factors, such as the electoral vote, into consideration.20_{Yet, merely researching the}

strength of AIPAC will not lead to an answer that aims to measure the strength of the domestic influence as Bard contends to do. Secondly, Bard’s research period covers 1945 to1984 instead of from the 1970s on, when the lobby had garnered in strength. 21_{As a result,}

Bard’s conclusion, that the presidential electoral cycle has no influence on the U.S. foreign policy, is not representative for the period after the 1970s. Lastly, he does not research the influence of the election cycle on U.S. policies towards the Palestinians. This would have likely altered his conclusions.

If we turn to books about the Bush administration, it seems as if the influence of the election cycle on foreign policy towards the conflict is deemed either nonexistent or

negligible. It is none other than Quandt’s book, Peace Process, which aims to provide an

17 David H. Dunn, 'Quacking like a duck? Bush II and presidential power in the second term,' in: International

Affairs Vol. 82. No. 1, 95-120.

18 AIPAC is an American pro-Israel lobby that lobbies Congress and the Executive Branch to improve the U.S.-Israeli relationship and consist and has Jewish and non-Jewish members. It has been described as one of the most influential and powerful lobbies in Washington. See chapter two for more information about AIPAC’s working method.

19 See Stephen. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to

Reagan (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 1986)

20 Mitchell G. Bard, The Water’s Edge: Defining the Limits to Domestic Influence on United States Middle East

Policy (New Jersey: Transaction Publisher, 1991) 275-278.

21 Marianne van Leeuwen, Wie Wint er Eigenlijk? Verkiezingen, geld en Amerikaans buitenlands beleid (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 1998) 39.

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analysis of Bush’s foreign policy in his first term towards the conflict. He underlines the electoral cycle as one of many factors that can influence the policies of U.S. administrations towards the conflict, but he does not implement his own patterns.22_{Also, valuable memoirs,}

such as those belonging to White House officials Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor from 2001 to 2005 and Secretary of State from 2005 to 2008, or Eliott Abrams, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director on the National Security Council for Near East and North African Affairs in Bush’s first term and Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy Strategy in Bush’s second term, have no place in the book. Another book co-written by Quandt, The Peace Puzzle, is more or less a chronological account of Bush’s first and second term and a short account of part of Obama’s first term and the Middle East peace process. Only vaguely do the authors point to domestic pressure during Bush’s terms, but do not elaborate or clarify what kind of pressures these were.23_These

scholars have also written Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace. In this book, various

recommendations are made for future administrations, but only one lesson, ‘Foreign policy process and U.S. domestic politics,’ touches upon the involvement of presidents and the influence of domestic politics, although it is nothing more than a general advice counting four pages.24

Aaron Miller, a former official in the Clinton administration who witnessed its failures personally, commented that far too often the U.S. acted as Israel’s lawyer,25_{and offers an}

account of his own observations during the first term of Bush. Although he acknowledges the influence of the pro-Israel community and lobbies, such as AIPAC, he is less inclined to believe that the executive standpoint can be changed once a decision is made, citing examples where U.S. presidents, such as George W. H. Bush, get their way.26_{However, the point}

Quandt makes is not about being successful or not, but that success is more probable in some years of a presidential term. Miller taking Bush Sr. as an example is telling, because,

according to some analysts, Bush’s withholding of U.S. funds for Israel, demanding that it

22William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy And The Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press) 406-407.

23 Daniel. C. Kurtzer, Scott B. Lasensky, William B. Quandt, Stephen L. Spiegel, Shibley Z. Telhami, The Peace

Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989-2011 (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2013)

24 D. C. Kurtzer, S. B. Lasensky, W.B. Quandt, S. L. Spiegel, S. Z. Telhami, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace:

American Leadership in the Middle East (Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008) 47-51.

25 Aaron D. Miller, 'Israel’s Lawyer,' in: The Washington Post, May 23, 2005,

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/22/AR2005052200883.html> [20-04-2014] 26 Aaron. D. Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search For Arab-Israeli Peace (New York: Bentam Books 2008) 123-124.

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promised to stop its settlement activity, contributed to his defeat in his re-election campaign.27

Unfortunately, there is no mention of the electoral cycle and little mention of the domestic pressures when it comes to his account of Bush’s presidency.

Arguably the most in-depth insider account of Bush’s record concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been written by Abrams. His work is useful because it contains a very elaborate personal account of the Bush administration’s struggle with the peace process, even though it has been written from an unapologetic pro-Israel perspective. Abrams, however, does not mention possible influences of the election cycle on Bush’s policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the role of domestic pressure in his account is negligible.28_The

same can be said with the memoirs of Vice President Dick Cheney, Bush and Rice.

An important aspect of researching the influence of the election cycle on presidential decision-making is the analysis of the deliberations of a U.S. president and his close circle. Given the fact that the research period is quite recent, primary sources are scarce. This is unfortunate, but not insurmountable. This has to do with the manner in which this thesis question needs answering. The election cycle of Quandt’s theory indicates certain public signals, speeches and acts that are purposely done in the open, instead of the private sphere, given that the president wants to send out clear signals on foreign policy stances in order to get a favorable view from Israel’s supporters. For this thesis, prominent newspapers, general works concerning Bush’s foreign policy, White House statements, White House press releases and presidential statements have been used to explore and evaluate the public positions of the White House regarding the Arab-Israeli dispute. Furthermore, memoirs of the following persons have also been consulted: President Bush; Foreign Service Officer on the planning staff of the State Department, Flynt Leverett; security advisor of Bush, and later on Secretary of State, Rice; Bush’s speechwriter, David Frum; Cheney; Secretary of State, Colin Powell; and White House advisor, Elliott Abrams.

In order to answer the research question of this thesis, it is important to understand the historical and the theoretical context of this thesis. The U.S.’ contemporary position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is impossible to fully appreciate without a comprehensive understanding of the historical relations with its ally. Next, Quandt’s theory is based on a few

27 Anonymous, 'Did the First President Bush Lose His Job to the Israeli Lobby?,' in: New York Observer, July 17, 2006, <http://observer.com/2006/07/did-the-first-president-bush-lose-his-job-to-the-israel-lobby/> [20-04-2014]. Also see: Michael C. Desch, 'The Myth of Abandonment: The Use and Abuse of the Holocaust Analogy,' in: Security Studies Vol. 15, No. 2, 106-145.

28 Elliott Abrams, Tested By Zion: The Bush Administration and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City: Cambridge University Press, 2013)

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factors which need further explanation. Therefore, the first sub research question that will be answered in Chapter Two is: How can the historical relationship between the United States

and Israel be characterized before 2000 and what does Quandt’s theory entail? This chapter

provides the context for the following chapters.

Chapter Three covers the foreign policy of George W. Bush’s first term towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict using Quandt’s model, answering the sub-question: Did the

political election cycles of the United States have a decisive influence on the foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the first term of the George W. Bush

presidency 2000-2004?

Quandt’s patterns for a second-term president change considerably. Chapter Four analyses the foreign policy of George W. Bush’s second term towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the use of Quandt’s model to answer the sub-question: Did the political election

cycles of the United States have a decisive influence on the foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the second term of the George W. Bush presidency 2004-2008?

CHAPTER TWO

A Historic and Theoretical Setting: U.S.-Israeli Historic Relations and Quandt’s Theory Further Explained

The first part of this chapter will deal with the historical U.S.-Israeli relationship. This covers the period between the establishment of Israel to the Clinton administration. The sole purpose of this section is to contextualize the following chapters. The second section lays out

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the theory of Quandt, which is used in this thesis as the theoretical framework to understand and test the influence of the election cycle on Bush’s foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

2.1 U.S.-Israeli Historic Relations

The U.S.’ continuation of its vast economic, military and diplomatic support29_{to Israel}

is a testament to the special relationship of the two countries. Today this special relationship entails that the security of Israel remains a sine qua non-issue in U.S.’ dealings with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the Cold War.30_{This ‘special relationship’ has not come}

about instantly and the relations between the U.S. have not remained static.

Harry Truman’s decision to recognize Israel as a de facto state within minutes went against the Secretary of State, the State Department, the Department of Defense and the Army. They deemed the U.S.' recognition of Israel as a threat to U.S. security, commercial, and strategic interests in the Middle East, because it would aggravate Arab countries, thus threatening U.S. oil supply and turn these countries into the arms of the Soviet Union. The State Department was pitted against the president’s assistant, speech writer and Zionist, Clark Clifford,31_{who tried to offset the objections of the State Department and turn U.S. support for}

Israel into a win-win situation, arguing that it was not only in the U.S.’ national interests (embracing Israel before the SU would),32_{but a ‘winning political strategy’}33_{with the}

upcoming presidential election that year. Truman was well aware of the political benefits and warmed up to Zionist pleas the same month when on March 8, 1948, he announced he would be running for president. Truman could not be clearer in his motivations when opposing the State Department’s objections concerning his policies towards Israel: ‘I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds and thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism: I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.’34_{Truman laid the}

foundation for the economic and diplomatic assistance to Israel.

29 Aid to Israel nowadays is primarily in the form of military aid. For year 2013, see: Jeremy M. Sharp, 'U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,' April 11, 2014, Congressional Research Service, Middle East,

<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf> [20-06-2014]

30 For a thorough analysis of Israel’s security as the pinnacle of U.S. foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see: Rubenberg, The Israeli-Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace.

31 George Marshall, a respected five star General and Secretary of State was obviously annoyed with Clifford: ‘The transparent dodge [of Clifford] to win a few votes would not in fact achieve this purpose. The great dignity of the office of President would be seriously diminished. The counsel offered by Mr. Clifford was based on domestic political considerations, while the problem which confronted us was international...unless politics was involved Mr. Clifford would not even be at this meeting,’ in: Peter Grose, Israel in the Mind of America (New York: Knopf 1981) 291.

32 Ibid. 268.

33 See, for example: John Snetsinger, Truman, The Jewish Vote and the Creation of Israel (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974)

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Nonetheless, until 1967, the United States’ support for Israel was solely based on moral arguments and domestic lobbying. Israel was not considered to be of great importance in the ideological struggle against the Soviet Union. The 1967 war changed the U.S.’

perception of Israel. First, it changed the connection between American Jewry and Israel, due to the fear among American Jews that another holocaust was in the making. As political theorist Shlomo Avirini explains: ‘it is a fact that [for Jews everywhere] being Jewish today means, in one way or another, feeling some link with Israel.’35_{The Six Day War in 1967 also}

transformed Israel in the eyes of the U.S. Government. Israel became viewed as a country that could protect itself, Bar-Siman Tov argues. After 1967, Johnson described Israel as a strategic ally against the Soviet Union. Some authors argue that the special relationship between the U.S., based on common political, ideological, and strategic needs, began right after this war:

The watershed in establishing the special relationship was Israel’s military victory in 1967, which not only increased Israel’s strategic importance but created a new and political and strategic situation in the Middle East, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict…Before 1967, the United States tended to perceive Israel as a strategic and political burden to its interests in the Middle East…The special relationship was established in stages after 1967 and resulted mainly from changes in U.S. global and regional considerations and in its perceptions of Israel’s stature and behavior.36

Richard Nixon was not pre-disposed to Israel’s wishes and was more concerned about American interests.37_{Yet, it was during Nixon’s presidency that the ‘strategic alliance’}

between the U.S. and Israel was formalized, increasing the U.S.’ aid to Israel and

institutionalizing the arms transfers to Israel. When the U.S. depended on Israel to push Syria back after they invaded Jordan in September 1970 and Israel delivered, Israel was perceived as a strategic asset.38_{Israel showed its worth again when Arab states led by Egypt and Syria}

decided to attack Israel on the Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur, in 1973, to reclaim the Sinai and Golan Heights. The Soviet Union backed the Arab states and the U.S. backed Israel. Nixon decided to back up Israel as soon as he knew that the Soviet backed coalition moved in on Israel because America ‘could not permit Israel to lose.’ Although the sentimental attachment

35 Shlomo Avirini, The Making of Modern Zionism (New York: Basic Books, 1981) 210., in: Edward Tivnan, The

Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy (New York: Touchstone Books 1988) 64.

36 Yaacov Bar-Simon-Tov, 'The United States and Israel since 1948: A " Special Relationship”?,' Diplomatic

History, Vol. 22 No. 2, 231-262, in: Abraham Ben-Zvi, 'Stumbling into an Alliance: John F. Kennedy and Israel,' Israel Affairs, Vol. 15 No. 3, 224.

37 See, for example, Stephen J. Whitfield, 'Nixon and the Jews,' Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 44 No. 5, 432-453. 38 See, for example, John P. Miglietta, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992: Iran, Israel, and

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of the U.S. to Israel's historic ties played a part, a disclosed NSA record showed that it was mainly a move to deter other countries ‘to rely increasingly on the Soviet Union’ instead of the U.S., undermining American interests in the region, and also to deter Israel from using its nuclear arsenal.39_{In this instance, geopolitical factors were key in backing Israel. After the}

war was won in Israel’s favor, Kissinger continued economic and political support, partly to reassure Israel.

Henry Ford and Jimmy Carter were less receptive to Israel and both insisted on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to the annoyance of Israel. Neither achieved to broker a peace, although Ford pressured Israel out of important strategic places in the Sinai and Carter brokered a peace between Israel and Egypt.40_{Only under Ronald Reagan was}

Israel again branded as a strategic ally. During Reagan’s presidency, strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Israel, as well as the military aid for Israel, grew substantially. Reagan perceived the world, much more than previous presidents, through an East-West prism41_and

Israel was viewed as its most reliable ally in the Middle East against the Soviet Union. Reagan described the relationship as such: ‘we work together, we will plan together, we will execute those plans together, in agreement, for the benefit both of the U.S. and Israel and the free world at large.’42_{Ideological factors, thus, constituted an important aspect of Reagan’s}

decision to describe Israel as a strategic ally. Reagan’s perspective also had something to do with Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, who tried to convince the world that Israel was a strategic asset, even a bargain, and with papers and articles produced by pro-Israel pressure groups such as AIPAC, explaining why Israel was a strategic asset for the U.S.43

When the Soviet Union collapsed in the 1990’s, Israel’s strategic value was questioned again, and with the passing of the Soviet state, it became increasingly important to get a peace deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The U.S.’ strategic interest of having a stable Middle East and friendly Arab regimes was inconsistent with the U.S.’ vast continued military support for Israel after the Cold War. Israel’s strategic value has, although presently still a

39 The October War and U.S. Policy, October 23, 1973, National Security Archive, documents: Middle East and South Asia, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-63.pdf> [20-06-2014]

40 See, for example: Herbert Druks, An Uncertain Alliance: The U.S. and Israel, from Kennedy to the Peace

Process (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001) 171- 187, 239-242.

41 William. B. Quandt (Ed.), The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988) 228.; Jonathan Marcus, ‘The Politics of Israel’s Security’ International Affairs Vol. 65 No. 2, 233-246.; Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel Relations After the Cold War (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995) 44.

42 Reagan’s remarks during the welcome ceremony of Prime Minister of Israel, Menahem Begin, September 9, 1981, The American Presidency Project, Public Papers of Presidents <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu> [12-06-2012]

43 Helena Gobban, 'The US-Israeli Relationship in the Reagan Era,' in: Conflict Quarterly, spring 1989, 5-10 of 5-32.

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hotly debated issue,44_{at least declined since the end of the Cold War. The advent of the}

George W. H. Bush’s administration signaled a change in relations with the Israelis. Secretary of State, James Baker, stated in AIPAC in May 1989, that Israel had to relinquish its

expansionist policies and Bush told the press in 1990s that Jerusalem is occupied territory. It was clear that the Bush administration and the Israeli government did not see eye to eye. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. formed a coalition (Arab nations included) to attack Iraq, which started the Gulf War. Iraq attacked Israel and Saudi Arabia with scud missiles, hoping to provoke a reaction from Israel which could lead Arab countries to withdraw its support for the attack on Iraq, due to their reluctance to fight alongside Israel. The U.S. had to force Israel not to respond, because it could increase Arab support for Iraq. In this instance, Israel was not viewed as a strategic asset.

Bush and Baker also tried to push the parties to peace negotiations, which led to the Madrid peace conference in 1991. It was clear that Bush and the Israeli government did not have a very amicable relationship. Israel’s leaders were frightened that Bush would lean too much to Arab states, thereby undercutting Israel’s military edge.45_{Bush urged the Israeli}

government to stop the settlement activity and eventually withheld a loan guarantee to Israel, for the construction of housing units for Soviet Jewish immigrants moving to Israel, on the condition that these units would not be built on occupied land.46_{Bush stood up against the}

Israeli government, which, according to some analysts, contributed to his defeat in his re-election campaign.47

44 This debate began during the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War the debate has risen again, especially after the Gulf War when Israel posed a strategic liability to the U.S. in fighting Iraq. Recently, however,

Meirsheimer & Walt brought the debate to the fore again, with the argument that Israel poses a strategic liability to U.S. Foreign Policy. This argument has been backed up by many, but most recent prominent figures are Lawrence Wilkerson, former chief of staff to United States, former Secretary of State, Colin Powell and Chas Freeman, former U.S. ambassador.Prominent figures that have countered this argument and made the case for Israel as a strategic asset are Robert D Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Walter D. Slocombe, senior counsel in Caplin & Drysdale's Washington, DC, office,that have written the report ‘Israel: A Strategic Asset for the United States’, published in 2011, basically countering Mearsheimer & Walt’s argument that Israel is a strategic asset to the U.S.. See: Robert D. Blackwill, Walter D. Slocombe, 'Israel: A Strategic Asset for the United States,' October 31, 2011, The Washington

Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Analysis: Monographs And Special Studies

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/Blackwill-Slocombe_Report.pdf> {20-06-2014] 45 See Anonymous, 'Bush, Shamir, Upbeat about relationship,' in: Times Daily, December 12, 1990,

<http://news.google.com/newspapers?

nid=1842&dat=19901212&id=MNEdAAAAIBAJ&sjid=W8cEAAAAIBAJ&pg=1436,1605285> [12-04-2014]; Anonymous, ' Shamir, Bush Hope to Warm Cool Relations,' in: The Christian Science Monitor, December 11, 1990, <http://www.csmonitor.com/1990/1211/asham.html/(page)/2> [20-04-2014]

46 Tom Harvey, ‘Bush Ire At Israelis Remarks, Has Deeper Cause, Experts Say’, in: SunSentinel, February 20, 1991, < http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1991-02-20/news/9101090587_1_west-bank-housing-zalman-shoval-shamir

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Bill Clinton had warmer relations with Israel than Bush, especially during Clinton’s first term, when Yitzhak Rabin was the Prime Minister of Israel. Rabin appeared willing to compromise for peace. He issued a stop to the settlements construction and held secret

meetings with the Palestinians to come to a peace agreement, leading to the Olso agreement in 1993, which was intended to establish agreement on all core issues within five years.

However, two years later Rabin was assassinated, making Benjamin Netanyahu the new Israeli Prime Minister, a leader that was less willing to compromise and cooled Israeli relations with the U.S. Another sour point was that Netanyahu used AIPAC as a channel to lobby the U.S. Congress in pressuring Clinton to be more supportive of his government. Clinton’s last efforts were the Camp David talks, which did not end in any agreements. Many would describe the U.S. role in these talks as acting more as Israel’s attorney than an honest broker.48

Martin Indyk, one of the main U.S. negotiators under Clinton, shows himself more pro-Israel at times than the Israelis, and portrays the Palestinians as unreasonable in their negotiations with Israel, in his accounts. He portrays the U.S. as innocent and naïve in his book something that seems an uneducated answer. The Clinton administration knew that it could not pressure Israel, and therefore pressured the Palestinians.49_{It does not imply equality}

or a balance of power in the relations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The U.S. did not have a balanced approach as a mediator in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and Indyk was not a balanced U.S. negotiator.50

From the mid-1940s to the end of the Cold War, U.S. support for Israel was based mainly on moral arguments and domestic lobbying. During the Cold War, U.S. military support for Israel was based on the perception that Israel could play an important anti-Soviet role in the Middle East, thus the strategic argument gained ground, depending on the

perception of U.S. presidents, which added another dimension to the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

48 Aaron D. Miller, the man who had been part of the Clinton negotiating team, for example, has described the U.S. negotiating team at Camp David as acting as Israel’s attorney, In: A. Miller, 'Israel’s Lawyer'

49 Martin Indyk explains the approach of Ehud Barak, Israeli Prime Minister, towards the Camp David Summit as a 'high temperature pressure cooker' in which Clinton’s task was to put Arafat in the pot and turn up the heat’ because Arafat would only make concessions to Israel if ‘he was cornered and had no other choice’. The moment they had Arafat cornered, Indyk explains, ‘Barak would make his best offer-or have Clinton do so’. If Arafat refused this offer, than it was key, Indyk explains, that the U.S. and EU would blame Arafat for not accepting ‘Barak’s tangible, far-reaching concessions’. He also explains the Clinton’s administration’s reluctance to stand firm as a negotiating party: ‘One reason for our capriciousness and improvisation lay in the

asymmetrical nature of our relations with the two sides. Israel was our ally and Clinton was strongly committed to its security and well-being. The United States had no such commitment to the Palestinians…’. Indyk also describes how the U.S. worked together with the Israelis to get their deal: ‘As Israel’s best friend, Clinton had a right to know how far Barak was prepared to go, I argued. Then they could discuss the strategy for getting there,’ in: Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 290-291, 308, 321.

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However, serious foreign policy analysts would say that Israel’s strategic importance has at least diminished since the Cold War,51_{although domestic considerations of U.S.}

administrations continue to play a big role in U.S.-Israeli relations.

2.2 Quandt’s Theory: Mechanism and Components

To fully grasp Quandt’s theory it is important to explain its mechanisms and main components. To be clear about the patterns of Quandt’s theory used to analyze Bush’s first and second term, this section will explain some of the most important factors in Quandt’s theory, as well as the patterns of the theory, for every presidential year.

2.2.1. Domestic considerations

Even the most seasoned Washington insider cannot appreciate the special pressures exerted on the White House when Middle East issues become

controversial. On-the-job training is the only way to learn about the problems of dealing with the press, Congress, and the pro-Israeli lobby when U.S. policy is seen as tilting too far towards the Arabs.52

A crucial aspect of understanding Quandt’s theory, regarding U.S. foreign policy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the domestic pressures related to the U.S. political system. As Miller argues:

No president can ignore them [domestic politics], nor would want to rile up a powerful pro-Israel constituency without a reason. No administration I worked for went looking for a fight with the American Jewish community; some went to considerable lengths to avoid one. For good reason: Arab-Israeli diplomacy is hard enough without a domestic political handicap.53

Although much has been written about the following aspects, which could, in themselves, cover whole thesis topics, this section's aim is broadly highlighting the main domestic pressures U.S. administrations have to face. This is to understand the pressures exerted on a president during congressional and presidential elections. Please note the sections covering the roles of Congress, interest groups and public opinion have been separated for the sake of structure, but are related.

2.2.1.1 Role of Congress

51 See note 44.

52 Quandt, Peace Process, 12.

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‘Generally, Congress takes a predictably pro-Israeli stance, so that any administration will be sensitive to the possibility of adverse congressional reactions if it seeks to pressure Israel.’54

As Quandt contends, Congress plays an important role in the Middle East foreign policy of presidents. U.S. presidents have considerable leeway with regard to executive decisions. Yet, in practice, Congress can shape U.S. foreign policy due to their control of budget. Congress has to approve, and may block, aid levels, arms sales or troop deployments. Also, Representatives and Senators often try to influence public opinion through speeches and press conferences. In addition, they can mobilize public support against policies of the U.S. administration.

It is certain Congress takes a pro-Israeli stance. In general, this entails Congress will try mobilizing public support to offset a presidential decision when it is viewed as

unfavorable towards Israel or too favorable towards the Palestinians. Congressional members need money and votes to stay in Congress. Pro-Israeli views ensure that will get this, while support of Palestinians or a more even-handed approach to the Middle East conflict will not.55

This is due to U.S. public opinion (and funds), which has a more favorable view of Israe. Perhaps, more importantly, it is due to special interest groups that could target congressional members by supporting their opponents if those members steer away from support of Israel and its policies. Those groups can also reward those congressional members with support and money when they take positions that are, in their view, favorable towards Israel.56

2.2.1.2 Interest Groups

Not only do special interest groups promoting Israel’s cause have at least some grip on Congress’ stance, they are also important in mobilizing public support. Of course, lobbying is a normal feature of the U.S.’ political landscape. Numerous lobbies try influencing U.S. policy for their cause. With regard to Israel, there are plenty.57

54 Quandt, Peace Process, 7.

55 Palestinian ambassador in the Netherlands, Nabil Abuznaid, interview with author, March 30, 2014. While stationed in Washington, an anonymous congressional member explained to Abuznaid that he would like to be more evenhanded towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and understands the predicament the Palestinians are in, but that as a congressional member ‘I need money and votes, and you cannot give me neither’.

56 Former congressional members, Gus Savage, Cynthia Mckinney and Paul Findley, for example, have spoken out against Israel’s policies and, according to them, been defeated by the pro-Israeli lobby AIPAC as a

consequence. Mckinney and Findley even say that AIPAC asked them to sign a document, pledging their allegiance to Israel on a list of issues, such as Jerusalem being the Israeli capital, continued economic, political and military support, and maintaining Israel’s military edge in the Middle East, upon coming into congress. See: Video production (lecture), How Does the Israel Lobby Influence Congress? 00:20-00:25 min, March 7, 2014, Washington D.C. (National Press Club) < http://www.c-span.org/video/?c4486492/10-israel-lobby-influence-congress 00.20-00.25> [20-06-2014]

57 For example: Anti-Defamation League (ADL), J-street, American Jewish Congress (AJC), Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), Zionist

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The most powerful is the pro-Israel lobby AIPAC. AIPAC's tactics have been well documented. AIPAC itself does not make campaign contributions to congressional members, but exercises oversight, and coordinates the contributions of (presently) 30 smaller pro-Israel PACs. AIPAC points out specific congressional candidates to whom these smaller PACs should donate. Although PACs can only donate $10,000 per candidate, add up the donations of 30 PACs and you can understand the importance of having a pro-Israeli view as a

congressional member. Contributions are then made to pro-Israel candidates, or opponents of candidates deemed to be less than pro-Israel.58_{The same is true for presidential elections.}

Therefore, presidents are inclined to take the views of these pro-Israeli PACs into serious consideration.

Members of Congress are sure to remain pro-Israel. AIPAC has direct access to congressional members, and congressional members actively seek AIPAC’s advice.

Therefore, if a president has another point of view other than AIPAC's, it is almost certain that congressional members will support AIPAC against their own president. When a president makes statements and takes stances that are unfavorable to Israel in the view of pro-Israel groups, especially AIPAC, then it is sure the president will get a backlash from these groups and, by extension, congressional members. This can be through individual speeches from congressional members critiquing the U.S. administration, to letters sent to the president, often instigated and co-written by AIPAC. A president will not want to risk its support in Congress or in his political base and will, therefore, not take these criticisms lightly.

AIPAC also lobbies Congress for pro-Israel policies, which can take the form of a resolution calling on support for Israel or, for example, call for sanctions against adversaries of Israel. Furthermore, groups such as AIPAC also influence public opinion through

information dissemination, by stating arguments in support of Israel, or arguments against criticism of Israel.

2.2.1.3 Public Opinion

Public opinion is also important in presidential and congressional (re-) election campaigns. The American public can contribute campaign money through PAC’s, but also, more importantly, through votes. Americans have a considerably more favorable view of Israel than of the Palestinians. This is simply a fact.59

Organization of America (JOA), Zion’s Christian Soldiers, Christians United for Israel.

58 Video production (lecture), How Does the Israel Lobby Influence Congress? 00:20-00:25 min.

59 Michael Lipka, 'Strong Support for Israel in U.S. cuts across religion,' Pew Research Center, February 24, 2014, <

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http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/27/strong-support-for-israel-in-u-s-cuts-across-The reason why Americans align themselves with Israel at the expense of Palestinians is less important to understand for this thesis. The main point is that for congressional and presidential candidates and U.S. presidents, it makes sense from a political standpoint to take note of public support of Israel and to campaign with this notion in mind. A pro-Israel view will not only accommodate the general American public, it also will help a presidential candidate to win the Jewish and the evangelical Christian vote (the latter of which sometimes is even more pro-Israel than U.S. Jews), which can be a determining factor in presidential elections.60

2.2.2 Quandt’s Theory: the Patterns

Quandt assesses the foreign policy of American presidents during the Cold War towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and concludes that the American election cycle prohibits U.S. administrations from conducting a consistent foreign policy. This is especially the case when presidents take an unpopular stance towards a controversial issue, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to Quandt’s theory of the presidential cycle, there are some fixed patterns with regards to the foreign policy decisions of every new president. When they are in office longer, presidents tend to learn to be more pragmatic with regards to

complex foreign policy matters. They learn about Middle East realities, and tend to move more towards an even-handed position (support for Israel with concern for the Arab

perspective) in the Arab-Israeli conflict. When considering the domestic political situation, presidents often take a firm pro-Israel approach. Therefore, presidents tend to abstain from controversial matters before and during congressional elections and presidential re-election periods that could cost them many votes at home. This section will deal with the specific symptoms that Quandt attributes to every year of a U.S. administration.

2.2.2.1 Quandt’s Pattern for the First Year

Quandt argues presidents (and presidential candidates) often have fairly little understanding of foreign policy issues, which is especially true for the complexity of the Arab-Israeli conflict that is ‘often lost in the midst of campaign slogans.’61_{This is especially}

religious-lines/> [20-04-2014]

60 For example: Mark J. Rozell, 'Presidential election, religious voting groups could determine the winner,' in: The Washington Post, October 31, 2012, < http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/presidential-election-

religious-voting-groups-could-determine-the-winner/2012/10/31/2b2f91e6-2380-11e2-ba29-238a6ac36a08_story.html> [20-04-2014]. Also see his book: Mark J. Rozell, Religion and the American

Presidency (New York: Palgrave Macmillen, 2007)

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true for Washington D.C. outsiders. Still, a presidential candidate has to take a stance with regard to such an important foreign policy issue as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because it is an important issue for his constituents. This means campaign rhetoric will be based on criticizing the previous administration’s policies with the promise of doing everything differently.

The positions taken during a campaign usually will be used in the beginning of a presidential term, since the administration still has a lot to learn. ‘If Middle East issues’, Quandt argues, ‘are treated as matters of importance, and if presidential propositions are reflected in the charting of the initial course, the early months of the new term are likely to be marked by activism.’62_{In the first year, presidents are often ambitious and set unrealistic}

goals.

All the while, a president still is learning on the job, which makes the first year more experimental in nature than any other year. At the end of the year, a president may feel his course of action or his policy was on the wrong track, realizing that his policy needs

reassessment. Therefore the foreign policy (outlook) of an administration will change at the end of the first year and the beginning of the second, even though a president may have devoted a lot of time and energy to pursue a success.

The administrations of Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, analyzed by Quandt, all followed a similar pattern in the first year. Nixon sought to create a framework to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which became known as the Rogers Plan. When this plan was rejected by Egypt, Israel and the Soviet Union by fall, the Nixon administration

reassessed its policy at the end of the year. Likewise, Carter promoted a comprehensive Middle East peace through negotiations, which would culminate in a peace conference in Geneva. Carter wanted to have a set of principles worked out in advance of the conference. When the U.S. and the Soviet Union issued a statement on the Middle East in line with the Rogers Plan, it was heavily critiqued by Israel. However, Carter's policy was heavily critiqued domestically, and by the end of October he realized his policy needed to be reassessed. Reagan placed more emphasis on the threat of the Soviet Union than on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To counter Soviet influence in the Middle East region, his administration sought to create a "strategic consensus" with pro-American regimes in the region through a series of arms sales. When the Reagan administration sought to sell surveillance aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Israel launched a major campaign against this decision by having Congress block the

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sale. Reagan got his way, but at great cost and after many months. By fall the plan for a "strategic consensus" was relinquished, followed by a policy reassessment.63

2.2.2.2 Quandt’s Pattern for the Second Year

In their second year, administrations most often will revise their foreign policy and have a more realistic outlook. Because they have a more realistic outlook and more moderate plans, the second year can be marked by great achievements. However, decisions made in the first year can have consequences for the second year that can haunt a president.

In addition, because congressional elections are right around the corner, from the midst of the second year on, presidents will tend to take no controversial initiatives which Israel or pro-Israeli groups would reject. The party in power usually will encounter some losses during congressional elections, but the president needs Congress to stay with him to remain supportive of his policies, so he needs his party to side with him. Congressional members are themselves very pro-Israel, especially during these times, since this will ensure their political survival through campaign contributions and votes.

The president will not want to hurt his party in congressional elections and, therefore, will avoid taking ‘controversial initiatives in the Middle East that may be strongly rejected by Israel and its friends in the United States.’64_{Thus, a president will voice his support of Israel}

and avoid critiquing Israel or doing anything of which Israel or its supporters in the U.S. disapprove.

The Nixon and Carter administrations are clear examples where the patterns of Quandt tied to the second year are validated. In the second year, the Nixon administration was able to bring about a modest success, by bringing the "war of attrition" between Israel and Egypt to an end, with many incentives and much pressure. The parties were brought together to talk to each other, resulting in a cease-fire.65_{With the congressional elections scheduled that year,}

Nixon was under pressure to abandon the Rogers plan and members of Congress were particularly vocal in their support for Israel. Although for more than only domestic reasons, Nixon was trying to create a warmer relationship with Israel.66_{In Carter's second year, the}

efforts to bring Israel and Egypt to a peace agreement took a central role, culminating in the signing of the Camp David Accords in September. The peace treaty was ratified the year

63 Ibid. 15-19. 64 Ibid. 19-20. 65 Ibid. 20.

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after.67_{Carter's sympathy for the Palestinians and his willingness to pressure Israel to move}

forward was countered by great domestic pressure. With the congressional elections in 1978, he avoided further confrontation with Israel by scaling down his aims of a comprehensive peace agreement involving a settlement for the Palestinians, to a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt.68

2.2.2.3 Quandt’s Pattern for the Third Year

In the third year of a presidential term, Middle East issues ‘can damage a president’s political prospects.’ Therefore, presidents already are looking ahead towards their re-election campaigns. This means presidents will tend to ‘try for the appearance of success if

negotiations are underway, even if the result leaves something to be desired.’ They will magnify successes, or at least uphold the view that all is going well. Sometimes huge investments are made to uphold this view or to drive a (minor) success. Therefore, mistakes can be made because of the rush and need for (the appearance of) success.

A second approach is that presidents will steer away from the issue. This mostly happens when the prospects for success do not look good. Consequently, the president will retreat and cut his losses if the policy could bring about a serious political loss or if he could be seen as responsible for a failure.69_{The best thing that a president can do is take no}

controversial stance towards the issue, which means appearing pro-Israel.

The Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations are good examples of Quandt's patterns tied to the third year. The Nixon administration was considering Egyptian President Sadat's idea about the possibility for an agreement to re-open the Suez Canal. The administration kept the idea alive until August, when it was clear they did not want to commit themselves

seriously. Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon in 1974 as president and was planning run for re-election in 1976. The Arab-Israeli conflict was still an important issue for the administration. The administration tried brokering an agreement between Egypt and Israel, but failed. In the summer, the administration came under severe pressure from the Senate to tilt towards Israel. The U.S. made a considerable amount of concessions to get Israel to withdraw from the Sinai, only to keep the negotiations afloat. The Carter administration followed similar patterns. Carter was determined to make the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations a success, making commitments to both parties. During this year, Carter was less inclined to spend political

67 Quandt, Camp David, 21.

68 Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle east Policy (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press ) 183-184.

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capital for a Palestinians settlement. Although he promised to remain engaged in negotiations with Egypt and Israel with the aim of establishing a Palestinian regime for the West Bank and Gaza, by mid-1979, Carter became worried and stopped focusing his attention on the Arab-Israeli issue.70

2.2.2.4 Quandt’s Pattern for the Fourth Year

The fourth year is all about the presidential election. Quandt says presidents will not want to take any controversial stance during the elections and will want to appeal to the Jewish vote. This is due to the importance of their vote and, more so, for their considerable campaign contributions to a president's party and congressional candidates. Quandt explains the pattern for the fourth year as follows: ‘…Try to avoid controversy. Steer clear of new initiatives. Try to defer arms sales to the Arabs, while appearing generous to Israel. Speak of Israel as a strategic asset, even if you have not previously used this term.’71_{Not surprisingly,}

the fourth year is a year where nothing of significance will happen with regard to the peace process.

Quandt takes the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan administration as a case in point to illustrate the patterns tied to an election year. The Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan

administrations all stayed clear of issues tied to the Middle East and abstained from taking any stance that would be deemed controversial by Israel's supporters in the U.S.72_.

2.2.2.5 Quandt’s pattern for a Second-Term President

The patterns for a second-term president change. The first two years are the most favorable years for a president to make foreign policy decisions. In the first two years of a second term, the president can make a lot of headway with his goals. He has learned much of the domestic pressures on his foreign policy and he will have more insight about foreign affairs than he had during his first term. However, in the second year, congressional elections will move a president clear of controversial stances towards Israel. The president needs to keep support in Congress alive if he wants to get anything done the his last two years.

Yet, after two years the president's political power already begins crumbling because all parties involved understand the man in the White House cannot be re-elected. This is where the famous “lame-duck president” expression comes from. A president will not be able to enforce his decisions because no one will take a president seriously

70 Ibid. 23-24. 71 Ibid. 26. 72 Ibid. 25-27.

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because he cannot be re-elected.73_{Although Quandt does not use any specific examples of}

U.S. administrations in their second term, his patterns are clear. 2.2.2.6 Additional Aspects to Quandt’s Theory

When (re-elected) presidents face a time of crisis, Quandt's theory changes a bit. Presidents will be able to pursue a foreign policy more to their liking. In this situation presidents can afford to disregard domestic pressures from Congress or interests groups, because they can rely on public support. So the president will less likely be influenced by the electoral cycle.74_{This will mean the U.S. has to pay less attention to domestic pressure and}

Israel and can pursue a more evenhanded approach to the conflict.

Finally, the U.S. election cycle also offers openings for foreign leaders to try influencing the administration' s stance in favor of their view, to try getting concessions. Considering the domestic pressures of U.S. presidents during the election are based on pro-Israeli views, it entails U.S. presidents can be pressured by pro-Israeli leaders, who could, if they wish to, try influencing the elections to their benefit.75

CHAPTER THREE

The Election Cycle and George W. Bush’s Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 2001-2004

This chapter concerns Bush’s foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in his first term. To analyze the applicability of Quandt’s model, every year of Bush’s first term is analyzed using the patterns of Quandt’s model linked to each presidential year. In the conclusion of the thesis, the aspects of Quandt’s theory that match Bush’s positions taken during his first term are further discussed to come to a better understanding of the influence of the election (pertaining to the model of Quandt) on Bush’s foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

3.1 Bush’ First Year: a Unique Presidency and 9/11

From Quandt’s point of view, a first-term president will tend to begin with more confidence in trying new initiatives, sometimes even taking a controversial stance. He will be ambitious in his goals and base his campaign rhetoric on the presumption that the previous

administration was on the wrong track. For Quandt’s patterns to show, however, a first-term

73 Ibid. 13-14. 74 Ibid. 7-8. 75 Ibid. 14.

Peace and Politics: The Influence of the U.S. Election Cycle on the U.S. Foreign Policy During the George W. Bush Administration Concerning the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 2000-2008