Vulnerability of Small-Scale Spiny Lobster fishermen in southern Sri Lanka A study on the success of regulation measures in reducing the vulnerability of small-scale
spiny lobsters fishermen in the Hambantota district
Figure 1: The Kalametiya fish landing centre (Bavinck, 2011)
Berend Offerhaus (12308684) 28/05/2021 Utrecht
Supervised by: Maarten Bavinck, Jaap Rothuizen & Esther Jansen University of Amsterdam
Abstract
The economy of Sri Lanka is heavily reliant on its fishery industry. However, exploitation of marine resources is an increasing problem, which adds to the vulnerability of fishermen being reliant hereon for subsistence. This, especially, is the case for small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in southern Sri Lanka. In this research, an explorative view is obtained on the vulnerability of the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in the Hambantota district. Hereby, first of all, the villages Welipatanwila and Kalametiya are studied, whereafter, a research is conducted on Rekawa. Hereby, concepts as vulnerability, common-pool resources, cooperatives and legal pluralism are relevant.
Exploring the vulnerability of the fishermen at hand is done by using different perspectives, namely, governance, economic and environmental vulnerability. What, ultimately, became clear was that the regulation measures, developed by the government of Sri Lanka, were not financial feasible to execute for the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in southern Sri Lanka. Resulting in continuance of unsustainable harvesting practices. Therefore, although environmental awareness had increased in some instances, a reduction of vulnerability for the relevant small-scale spiny lobster fishermen is not significantly present.
Table of Contents:
1. Introduction1.1. General Problem Overview 1.2. Spiny lobster fishery in Sri Lanka 1.3. Vulnerability 1.4. Involved Organisations 1.5. Prevailing institutions 1.6. Area of Research 1.7. Research Set up 2. Theoretical Framework 2.1 Vulnerability 2.2 Common-Pool Resources 2.3 Cooperatives 2.4 Legal Pluralism 3. Methodology 3.1 Research Method 3.2 Operationalization Disquisition 3.3 Data Handling
3.4 Ethical and Positionality Considerations
4. Results
4.1. Governance Vulnerability 4.1.1. Formal Laws
4.1.2. Formal Law Compliance Fishermen 4.1.3. Monitoring
4.1.4. Informal Laws
4.2. Economic Vulnerability
4.2.1. Landing Site and Gear 4.2.2. Market Characteristics 4.2.3. Cooperative Society
4.3. Environmental Vulnerability
5. Discussion
5.1. Linking Rekawa to Kalametiya & Welipatanwila 5.1.1. Governance Vulnerability
5.1.1.1. State Law Legitimacy 5.1.1.2. State Law Compliance 5.1.1.3. Monitoring
5.1.2. Economic Vulnerability 5.1.2.1. Landing Site and Gear 5.1.2.2. Market Characteristics 5.1.2.3. Cooperative Societies 5.1.3. Environmental Vulnerability
5.1.3.1. Environmental Awareness Difference 5.2. Reflective Considerations
6. Conclusion
7. Literature 8. Appendix
8.1. Interview small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa (Sample size: 5) (2021)
8.1.1. President- Lobster Management Fisheries Committee-Rekawa (Fisherman number 5) (2021)
8.2. Interview NARA (2021) 8.3. Interview DFAR (2021)
8.4. Interview Ranjith Wickramasinghe (2021)
1. Introduction
1.1. General problem overview
Marine fisheries are crucial for the global economy by both its nutritional value, but also for its contribution to employment and its export value (Chuenpagdee et al., 2005). Therefore, many developing countries invest largely in improving the efficiency of harvesting the resource (Kurien, 2007). However, these technical innovative fishery practices overrule small-scale fishermen regarding harvesting levels, therefore, the viability of this particular sector is becoming increasingly vulnerable, both ecologically and economically (Kurien, 2007). These small-scale fishermen are, namely, often fully dependent on fisheries for both their own nutrition as their income (Béné et al., 2007).
Besides, a relatively lowered harvesting rate for the small-scale fishermen, another threat is urging, namely the exploitation of resource stock, which causes concerns for the
sustainability of the whole sector (Alison & Ellis, 2001). Due to the lucrative attribute of marine fisheries, the sector has heavily intensified over the years. Hereby, leading to global fishery exploitation of 52 percent of all stocks in 2007 (FAO, 2009). This is especially critical in coastal areas, where 65 percent of the fish stocks are located, which is only 6 percent of the physical acreage of the ocean (Kurien, 2007).
Furthermore, the problem of exploitation becomes increasingly critical due to the fact that declining harvesting rates give incentives for further intensification of fishery practices (Pauly et al., 2002).
1.2. Spiny lobster fishery in Sri Lanka
As the global dependency of marine resources is high, it seems crucial to enhance the sustainability of fish stock harvesting, by reducing its extraction. As is the case for marine fisheries in Sri Lanka.
The fishery industry is a crucial component of the economy of Sri Lanka. The export of the harvested resource provides significant earnings for the country and jobs for around 180.000 citizens. However, concerns are active regarding the vulnerability of the sector. Both
ecologically and socially. This by the means of several scientific statements regarding overexploitation of resources and on exceeding environmental equilibria in the process of harvesting. Whereby, there is an increasing ecological threat of extinction of fish resources and, hereby, also social and economical problems for related fishermen. (Abayasekera, Madhavie, 2003)
More specifically, this is the case for the spiny lobster species located in the coastal area of southern Sri Lanka. This so-called ‘Palinuridae family’ (represented in Sri Lanka by six different species) is in the past decades heavily overexploited because of its major popularity around the globe and, therefore, its corresponding high export price. (Senevirathna,
Munasinghe, 2013)
The international popularity of the spiny lobsters results in 95 percent of the harvest being exported, accounting for 5 percent of fishery foreign exchange income. On the south coast of Sri Lanka, the Panulirus Homarus is most significantly represented, consisting of 70 to 80 percent of the spiny lobster harvest. (Gunawardane, Jayakody, De Croos, 2010)
Spiny lobsters near the coast of southern Sri Lanka and within inshore waters can be
defined as common property resources (Bromley, 2010). Implying that the resource is under the ownership of a particular group of users and, hereby, exclusion of non-owners is justified (Bromley, 2010). However, open access characteristics are active as well, as harvesting licenses are not monitored at all and are often not considered legitimate due to the cultural relationship of fishermen with the resource (Agrawal, 2001).
Since the mid-eighties, overharvesting practices have caused the resources stock of spiny lobster to decline near the coast, implying lower reproduction compared to harvesting rates (Senevirathna et al., 2013). Therefore, it becomes crucial that the vulnerability of the resource stock is improved upon (Senevirathna et al., 2013). The government of Sri Lanka does recognize this and has stated several regulation measures, aiming to reduce the vulnerability of the reliant spiny lobster fishermen (Senevirathna et al., 2013). However, these state laws often conflict with what is considered legitimate in the perspective of small-scale fishermen communities and are, therefore, hard to implement (Wickramasinghe, 2010). On the other hand, if the sustainability measures of the government are in line with the prevailing norms and non-codified working rules the transaction costs of compliance are rather low (Wickramasinghe, 2010).
1.3. Vulnerability
To outline the vulnerability of the small-scale lobster fishery industry, two villages situated in the Hambantota district are invoked, which have been thoroughly studied by
Wickramasinghe (2010): Kalametiya & Welipatanwila. This district is relevant within southern Sri Lanka due to its significant dependency on lobster fisheries and threatening exploitation rate (Wickramasinghe, 2010). By studying the vulnerability of small-scale fishermen, its generated income and livelihood
dependency is studied together with the physical characteristics where they are reliant on for practising fishing.
Firstly, how the small-scale fishermen generate income is studied. Relevant, hereby, is that only a limited number of buyers are active in the two studied villages in Kalametiya & Welipatanwila to purchase the fishermen’s harvest
(Wickramasinghe, 2010). Due to this lack of competition on prices between demanders, small-scale fishermen are often unable to
generate enough income for subsistence (Wickramasinghe, 2010).
This is especially the case in Welipatanwila, where a great share of fishermen are practising other activities, besides fishing, to insure themselves and their family’s for their livelihood (Wickramasinghe, 2010). In Kalametiya, fishermen have got more income stability, from fishing-related activities, by more abilities to harvest throughout the whole year
(Wickramasinghe, 2010). Hereby, more financial means are present to invest furtherly in Figure 2: (Kalametiya Deep Sea Fishing, 2019)
harvesting gears (Wickramasinghe, 2010). This is the case due to the natural set-up and more extensive variation of used gears, as becomes clear in the next paragraph.
The physical characteristics and variety of used gear of particular landing centres in the Hambantota district are, namely, also important to take into account by studying
vulnerability. The capacity of fishery practices is, notably, dependent on how vast landing centres are and how they are shaped, sloped and to what extent physical protection is present (Wickramasinghe, 2010). These characteristics determine to what extent fisheries can operate throughout all seasons and, furthermore, are vulnerable to natural disasters (Wickramasinghe, 2010). Besides, it is crucial to consider whether different harvesting techniques are available, to adapt to the changing physical circumstances throughout the year (Wickramasinghe, 2010).
The natural set-up of Kalametiya is more favourable than that of Welipatanwila. This due to its physical boundary of rocks on both sides of the landing sides, which protects the beach from wave disturbance (Wickramasinghe, 2010). This is not the case for the landing site of Welipatanwila (Wickramasinghe, 2010). Furthermore, the variety of used harvesting techniques is more extensive in Kalametiya than in Welipatanwila, which increases its adaptation capabilities of active small-scale fishermen (Wickramasinghe, 2010). This results in the general income of citizens of Welipatanwila being lower than the poverty line, whereas Kalametiya has a general income above this line (Wickramasinghe, 2010).
1.4. Involved Organisations
What is furtherly crucial to outline the vulnerability of the small-scale lobster fishermen, and especially the reduction of it, is how organisations relate to the industry. At first, the rather social organisation within the small-scale fishermen community is important to invoke. This organisation supports collective action and working rules that benefit each fisherman (Wickramasinghe, 2010).
Secondly, cooperatives are crucial to invoke, as there conceptual potential lays in
representing all small-scale fishermen in a formal way. A cooperative, namely, is a member-led institution, that has abilities to enhance sustainable management and capital
development (Zeuli & Cropp 2004). In Kalametiya, the Bata-Atha South cooperative is active, which does support the livelihood of its members, however, in Welipatanwila this is not the case (Wickramasinghe, 2010). By the means of distrust and weak representation of the small-scale fishermen, cooperatives have become inactive in Welipatanwila
(Wickramasinghe, 2010).
As well functioning co-operatives support the financial vulnerability of fishermen, regulation measures to enhance the sustainability of harvested resources are seldom considered (Wickramasinghe, 2010). However, the state organisation, active in southern Sri Lanka, DFAR (Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) does consider sustainability (Wickramasinghe, 2010). This institution enforces regulative rules in order to decrease the extraction of marine resources (Wickramasinghe, 2010).
Furthermore, the NARA (National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency) conducts research in order to target regulation measures accurately (Wickramasinghe, 2010). The small-scale fishermen, however, do not have a harmonious relationship with these state-owned organisations. Due to unawareness of the contribution of implemented measures to the viability of the industry, fishermen have got no incentive to follow its
institutions. Besides, monitoring practices are lacking, which causes even fewer incentives to follow the measures for small-scale fishermen. (Wickramasinghe, 2010)
1.5. Prevailing institutions
Institutions that are active for the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in southern Sri Lanka can be divided into both prevailing norms and non-codified and codified working rules. Whereby, solely, the latter is implemented by the state. Whereas, norms and non-codified working rules stem from the community and, thereby, are considered legitimate. These institutions are supported, because of their benefits for each individual fisherman, for example by facilitating fair distribution of resources and risk incidence. (Wickramasinghe, 2010)
The stated codified working rules by the government are, however, by fewer means considered legitimate. Which increases the transaction costs of compliance, due to necessary monitoring expenses. Compliance with these working rules is often, solely, the case if they overlap with already prevailing institutions that are originated by the community itself. (Wickramasinghe, 2010)
Examples of these institutions for small-scale spiny lobster fishermen are as follows. Regarding norms, mutual respect and acceptance to other fishermen are active, whereby, stealing practices of gear and resource stock are considered highly unethical and are punished by the community. (Wickramasinghe, 2010)
An important non-codified working rule is that lobster fishing, by means of scuba diving with oxygen tanks is prohibited, as the community defines this as unfair harvest competition. Lastly, an example of a state working rule is that it is forbidden to harvest spiny lobster that carries external eggs, namely to not furtherly disturb regeneration processes. However, due to a lack of monitoring and unawareness of the necessity this state working rule is not followed in most cases by the small-scale fishermen. (Wickramasinghe, 2010)
1.6. Area of Research
As the vulnerability of the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen is outlined regarding the villages Kalametiya and Welipatanwila and the opportunities for reducing this discussed, it is relevant to study whether this data is generalisable for the whole Hambantota district.
Therefore, a new area of study is chosen, namely the small-scale fishery village of Rekawa, located near the coast of southern Sri Lanka. The small-scale spiny lobster fishermen active in this village are used as a case study for this research. With the use of this case study, an answer is provided to the following research question: To what extent are regulation
measures successful in reducing the vulnerability of small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in southern Sri Lanka?
By the means of conducting semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders, an explorative view is obtained on the vulnerability of the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa and to what extent the different regulation measures reduce this. Additionally, this data is generalised by comparing it to Welipatanwila & Kalametiya.
Furthermore, theory on vulnerability, common-pool resources, cooperatives and legal
pluralism is applied to small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa to put the case study in a broader theoretical framework.
1.7. Research Outline
To answer the research question ‘To what extent are regulation measures successful in reducing the vulnerability of small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in southern Sri Lanka?’, in a structural manner, different sub-questions are used to, at first, explore the case study of small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa. These sub-questions are aligned to three themes whence vulnerability is studied. Namely, by viewing the case study from the perspective of governance, economic and environmental vulnerability.
The governance perspective on vulnerability relates to whether particular regulation
measures are considered legitimate and are, therefore, complied with or not. By this means, the legal pluralism applying to the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen community in Rekawa is studied. To illustrate this, both informal/customary laws and formal laws developed by the state are analysed. Furthermore, it is relevant to study to what extent monitoring of particular laws takes place and by which institution this is executed. This breakdown of governance vulnerability leads to the following sub question: To what extent is legitimacy present for both formal and informal laws applying to the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen and by what means do these laws reduce the vulnerability of the fishermen?
Secondly, the economic vulnerability of the fishermen is studied. This is done by exploring different aspects that relate to their economic position. Firstly, by studying what the physical characteristics of the landing site in Rekawa are together with the harvesting gear they use. This is relevant, as these are factors that fishermen are reliant on for their financial means, because of the fact that it influences harvesting rates. Furthermore, the market
characteristics of the spiny lobster is analysed together with the income these fishermen generate by harvesting the resource for their livelihood. Lastly, the operations of the East Fisheries Cooperative Society is explored, to study whether small-scale spiny lobster are being financially supported by the institution. This leads to the second subquestion: What are the economic conditions of the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen and to what extent does this lead to vulnerability?
Thirdly, the environmental vulnerability of the spiny lobster resource stock, where the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen are reliant on, is explored. This theme relates to whether the fishermen are aware of overexploitation practices and environmental degradations, resulting in endangering the viability of the spiny lobster industry. Consequently, it is relevant to what extent this awareness results in a reduction of the environmental vulnerability of the spiny lobsters. This is all processed in the following subquestion: To what extent are the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen environmentally aware and by what means does this reduce vulnerability?
After studying these three themes, within the discussion paragraph, the link is made to the data on Kalametiya & Welipatanwila. Hereby, a paragraph is dedicated to comparing this exact data and, besides, on doing an effort to explain the differences in findings.
Furthermore, reflective considerations on the research are stated within the discussion paragraph. The thesis is completed by a conclusion, in which an answer is formulated to each sub-question and, ultimately, the main research question.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Vulnerability
As the vulnerability is studied of small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa, it is, firstly, crucial to gain an theoretical understanding on the precisely this concept.
The concept of vulnerability within scientific literature is often used to indicate the level of susceptibility and sensitivity to disturbance of system equilibria. Besides, it is a tool to provide normative visions on how to act upon the determined vulnerability. A concept, closely related to hereto, is resilience. This concept involves the systematic characteristic of bouncing back or adapting to occurred system shocks. (Adger, 2006)
These concepts are especially relevant in social-environmental systems. Namely, systems with interconnections between institutions that guide human behaviour and the natural environment. Hereby, vulnerability studies condemn isolated views on both worlds and, hereby, emphasize its indissoluble interrelation. Food insecurity is an example, hereto, which is rather a distributional problem than a natural problem in itself. Vulnerability within systems can, therefore, be improved by reconsidering guiding institutions. (Adger, 2006)
There are, however, different streams with normative perspectives on how to tackle system vulnerability (Adger, 2006). It is, in this regard, interesting how the different stakeholders, involved in the case study of Rekawa, view their vulnerability and by what measures this should be reduced or not.
2.2. Common-Pool Resources
Secondly, the concept of common-pool resources is outlined regarding the relevance with the spiny lobster resource stock at the south coast of Sri Lanka. Hereby, it is interesting how management practices take place to ensure its sustainability.
In 1968 Garret Hardin, an American ecologist published his theory of the ‘’Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968)’’. This theory described how a finite commonly shared resource stock that can be extracted freely, will become overexploited by the means of the
assumption that agents are selfish and will act out of short term profits maximization
interests (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994). In this case, agents that use the resource are assumed to be alike in cultural standards, extracting techniques, knowledge and future extraction interests indicated by discount rates (Ostrom, 2008).
Although this theory of Hardin’s received global attention and has shown to be empirically verified in many studies, it is important to emphasize the assumptions Hardin made in his predictive theory. This mainly regards Hardin’s assumption on the mutual communication absence among the agents. Namely, implying that communities are unable to develop organisational institutions from bottom-up, which defines authority and rules for the common good. (Ostrom, 2008)
Based on the theory of Hardin (1968), governmental institutions have sharpened several resources controlling policies, aiming at centralizing management. The results of a majority of these policies are, however, contrasting the implications of the decentralised tragedy trap. Namely, on several occasions, resource exploitation had accelerated when nationalisation and exclusion policies were implemented. These results indicate that no general conclusion can be drawn from Hardin’s theory. When investigating resource management
improvements, it is crucial to consider the case-specific characteristics together with the conditions Hardin states in order for the tragedy to occur. (Ostrom, 2008)
Several case studies, namely, implicate that these barriers, to collectively arrange resource management, are often overcome (Ostrom, 2005).
By the means of communication between extracting agents, self-governmental institutions are widely established, which have shown to keep exploitation levels within environmental thresholds (Ostrom et al., 1994).
A crucial aspect of such a successful collective resource management agreement, hereby, regards the trust in other agents acting alike. This trust can be generated by activating monitoring institutions and which enable over-extract sanctions. (Ostrom, 2008)
The potential of the development of self-government institutions managing common-pool resources depends on different characteristics of the case. This potential is high, in case agents have low discount rates (long term interest in the resource), analogous extraction rates, similar cultural values, and low friction costs of communication and therefore collaborative action. (Ostrom, 2008)
As these characteristics mainly refer to close communication and homogeneous conditions for agents, establishing agreements between a larger group of agents is suggested to be more complex. However, the division of agents into smaller groups each targeting different components of the collective problem has shown to be successful. By this collaborative action on the management of the resources, it becomes operational to extract within natural boundaries of reproduction. Such an outcome serves both the environmental need and hereby the productivity of the resource itself. Besides, securing the economic viability of the sector reliant on the particular resource extraction. (Ostrom, 2008)
This theory is relevant, as it is, regarding the the case study of Rekawa, crucial to explore whether the spiny lobster resources is managed properly by the local community and how this conflicts with regulation measures developed by the state.
2.3. Cooperatives
Cooperatives have potentials for community development in a variety of aspects, therefore, could play an important role in reducing the vulnerability of small-scale spiny lobster
fishermen.
A cooperative can be defined as an institution that facilitates collaboration, aiming to support the interests of the community and the members. It does so, by mobilizing and distributing local resources (Zeuli & Cropp 2004). An important characteristic of cooperatives is that they are owned and controlled by users and their income is divided based on profits (Zeuli & Cropp, 2004).
The institution is being financed by investments of the users, but also by the means of loans from financial institutions, as banks. However, these loans, from non-users, have got
restrictions in order to conserve the user's ownership and control. Implying that profit returns are being limited and no administrative participation is allowed. (Zeuli & Cropp, 2005)
Furthermore, cooperatives are internationally organised by the seven principles stated by the International Cooperative Alliance (1995). These principles emphasize the importance of transparency, pro-active participation, democratic governance, autonomy and human capital and community development. (Zeuli & Cropp, 2005)
Moreover, a crucial aspect of the functioning of cooperatives is their facilitation value to the creation of social capital. Scientific research widely acknowledged how inclusive
cooperatives enable and strengthen interpersonal relationships, norms, values and, thereby, trust and cohesion between members. Investments in social capital, hereby, leads to
financial benefits for the members, which are caused by the lowered friction and transaction costs, and enable community development (Putnam, 2000). An important emphasis is,
however, needed regarding ‘inclusive’. In communities in which cooperatives are active which lack their representational value, development is being hindered by distrust and inequality tendencies. In addition, asset management can be attained via cooperatives, which is relevant for this study. (Zeuli & Cropp, 2005)
By specifying to active cooperatives in Sri Lanka the following can be stated. Fisheries cooperatives are identified as formal organisations by the Sri Lankan government,
as they are instigated by the state organisations ‘Department of Cooperative Development and the ‘Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources’. By this fact, Sri Lankan fishery cooperatives do not comply with the definition of the International Cooperative
Alliance, as they define autonomy as a prescription for a validly operating cooperative. However, for practical reasons, the term cooperative is still used to further analyse the institution. Nevertheless, this governmental dependency can be defined as a first weak attribute for the Sri Lankan fishery ‘cooperatives’. (Amarasinghe & Bavinck, 2011)
These cooperative fishery societies are generally founded to support fishermen with credit provisioning, insurance and harvesting innovations, which intensified by the blue
revolution after world war two. In this period, the Sri Lankan government aimed to facilitate technological innovation for fishermen with poor equity and, thereby, inclusive development. (Amarasinghe & Bavinck, 2011)
The conceptual thought was, also, that these cooperatives had a large level of
independence in arranging and establishing community supporting strategies. However, the aim of inclusive development of fishery cooperatives has not widely succeeded in Sri Lanka. Namely, merely, 47 percent of the cooperatives are considered active by The National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency (NARA, 2007). This consideration is done by reviewing their contribution to resource management, awareness creation, membership activity and loan recovery rates. Furthermore, only 20 percent of fishermen are adjoined to a fishery cooperative in Sri Lanka. (Amarasinghe & Bavinck, 2011)
2.4. Legal Pluralism
As the different regulation measures, on enhancing the sustainability of the spiny lobster resource stock in southern Sri Lanka, are explored for the case study at hand, it is relevant to gain some theoretical insights on the concept of legal pluralism.
The definition by Vanderlinden (1971) of legal pluralism is: ’’When different legal ideas, principles, and systems are applied to the same situation (Vanderlinden, 1971). This concept is, thereby, relevant for an interdisciplinary consideration as it affects a variety of societal aspects (Jentoft, Bavinck, Johnson, Thomson, 2009). However, it primarily relates to the juridical and cultural conditions of a particular system (Jentoft et al., 2009). Hereby, there is mostly a conflict between customary laws, which can be distilled from routines, practices and their knowledge framework, and laws implemented by the state (Von Benda-Beckmann, 2001). These conflicts arise in the context of situation-specific institutions that stem from the community that have regulated local systems for years, and rather general state laws that are implemented nationwide (Jentoft et al., 2009).
In the case of governments not accurately anticipating developments of particular local systems, customary laws often become increasingly active to prevent damage to the livelihood of locals (Jentoft et al., 2009). This fact is often contradictory with the intuition of
active marine resource managers, as they assume chaos occurs without the intervention of state actors: predicting a tragedy of the commons (Jentoft, 2009).
Much empirical research has shown that this is rather a dystopian view. Due to local
communities showing that they are highly able to implement and monitor their own regulation measures effectively to protect the maintenance of resources they are reliant on. Inhabitants, hereby, do feel the urge and necessity of these measures as they are aware of the
corresponding risk to their livelihood. These negative consequences, to the viability of community industries, are avoided by implementing a local legal system. This defines the concept of legal pluralism, as these local legal systems are active besides/together with governmental legal systems. The different legal systems represent different authorities and norms. In cases of overlap, it is imaginable that problems of compliance and legitimacy arise. Whereby, individuals have got space for interpretation. (Jentoft et al., 2009) Vanderlinden describes this situation as the ‘’legal battlefield’’, if an individual or even a whole community is confronted with contradictory legal orders (Jentoft et al., 2009). These actors, subsequently, make decisions stemming from their social environment, as their behaviour is steered by corresponding community institutions (Benda-Beckmann, 2001). These institutions are, however, consistently dynamic and adaptive to changing external and internal systemic conditions, as environmental threats for example (Vanderlinden, 1989).
However, as these local institutions could differ from rules implemented by the state, no clearance could be present on which rule to follow for community members (Jentoft et al., 2009). Which legal should prevail is a conflict of effectiveness, social justice and normative considerations (Jentoft et al., 2009). Often accompanied by differences of power as well (Jentoft et al., 2009). Thus, when talking about the management of situations where multiple legal systems apply, no objective strategies can be thought of (Jentoft et al., 2009).
Management decisions, namely, go along with valuing conflicting perspectives, norms, cultural conditions and power relations (Jentoft et al., 2009). Legal pluralism, thus, adds another level of complexity to management (Benda-Beckmann, 2001).
Interesting it seems, how this concept of legal pluralism and the difficulties it brings to management, applies to the case of declining spiny resource stock in the Hambantota district, which is studied more thoroughly in the paragraph on governance vulnerability of small-scale spiny lobster fishermen active in Rekawa.
3. Methodology
3.1. Research Method
To formulate an answer to the research question ‘‘To what extent are regulation measures successful in reducing the vulnerability of small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in southern Sri Lanka?’ the case study of Rekawa is studied. This is done by analysing its characteristics in a detailed and intensive manner, as Bryman (2016) suggests (Bryman, 2016). This case study of Rekawa is, ultimately, compared with the characteristics of the small-scale fishermen in Welipatanwila & Kalametiya. Hereby, it is important to mention that no case study is the same and therefore comparing data has to occur in a prudent manner (Bryman, 2016).
To study the vulnerability of the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa, a
This is executed by the means of conducting face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with open-end questions, resulting in received answers being detailed and rich (Bryman, 2016). This due to the fact, that interview-space is available for further focus on topics that
particular respondents have more knowledge about or have a stronger opinion on (Bryman, 2016).
This primary data is obtained on a variety of relevant respondents. Namely, five small-scale spiny lobster fishermen are interviewed together with Mr Upul Liyangage, a representative of the NARA (National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency). Furthermore, an interview is conducted with the manager of the Rekawa East Fisheries Cooperative Society (also being one of the five interviewed fishermen), the president of the Lobster Management Fisheries Committee in Rekawa and, lastly, with a representative of the DFAR (Governmental Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources).
Besides these interviews, several secondary data is invoked as well. This secondary data is used to put the conducted primary data in a broader theoretical and societal context. The theoretical context consisting of vulnerability, common-pool resources, cooperatives and legal pluralism; spatial context regarding Kalametiya and Welipatanwila. For each individual sub question, the focus shifts to particular primary and secondary data that is relevant in order to explore the case from either a governance, economic or environmental perspective.
3.2. Operationalisation Disquisition
Research Question:To what extent are regulation measures successful in reducing the vulnerability of small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in southern Sri Lanka?
Sub Questions:
To what extent is legitimacy present for both formal and informal laws applying to the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen and by what means do these laws reduce the vulnerability of the fishermen?
Concepts: Formal/State Laws, Informal/Customary Laws, Compliance, Legitimacy, Monitoring
Indicators: Governmental Interference, Environmental Awareness, Financial Feasibility, Interpersonal Contact
Interviews: Small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa, NARA, DFAR, (Rekawa East Fisheries Cooperative Society, p.c., 2021)
What are the economic conditions of the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen and to what extent does this lead to vulnerability?
Concepts: Physical Characteristics Landing sites, Used Gear, Market Characteristics, Cooperative Society
Indicators: Wave Disturbance Landing Site, Harvesting Ease, Gear Variety and Specifications, Amount of Demand, Market Competition, Financial Support, Loan Provisioning
Interviews: Small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa, NARA
To what extent are the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen environmentally aware and by what means does this reduce vulnerability?
Concepts: Environmental Awareness
Indicators: Societal Involvement, Knowledge Depth, Regulation Law Legitimacy Interviews: Small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa, NARA
3.3. Data Handling
Data is obtained by both desk and field research. Hereby, literature is reviewed via the search tool ‘Google Scholar’ and field data is obtained by the means of conducting interviews and collecting survey data from local respondents. The interviews are being transferred by an audio file and transcribed via the software of Atlas.ti. This is all done in a trustworthy manner, as personal information is being left out and the anonymousness of respondents is being respected. Furthermore, data sources are triangulated on their level of objectivity, validity, accuracy and credibility.
Privacy-sensitive data of respondents is, initially, stored and studied by the use of an
external hard drive, which is not furtherly shared. In case of scientific relevance to the study, it is being transferred to the software of ‘Google Drive’. In this manner, leakage of private information is being prevented.
If, for any reasons, the software of Google experience technical complications or problems regarding integrity, audio data is transferred to ‘MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3 (.mp3)’, data on images to ‘JPEG (.jpeg)’ and textual data to ‘MS Word (.docx)’. Furthermore, intellectual property rights are secured by rules following the University of Amsterdam.
3.4. Ethical and Positionality Considerations
To ensure ethical standards are applied in the process of conducting interviews and surveys to local respondents, a variety of relating normative aspects are considered. Hereby, the rules of integrity regarding personal data within scientific studies are respected, as stated by the Dutch royal scientific academy (KNAW, 2003). These rules diminish the chances of manipulation or delusion and contribute to a transparent and trustful research process (Bryman, 2016). This implies that respondents are being thoroughly informed on the academic relevance and context of the study. Furthermore, information is provided on their privacy, the extent of spread of the conducted data and rights to being silent. Especially in the context of this research, this is highly important. Namely, questions are asked on their attitude towards the community and their own colleagues. When tension is active for small-scale fishermen to be transparent about their feelings, regarding potential leakage of study results, they may give dishonest answers in order to maintain their status in the community. By thoroughly informing the respondents on the privacy of the data and right to be
anonymous, this dishonesty is minimized and the safety of the respondents is secured.
Regarding the positionality of the researcher, the following is being considered. By the means of not structuring the interviews fully, but leaving space for other interpretations, insights or perspectives which could steer the research in unanticipated directions, the reliability of the obtained data is being improved upon. Furthermore, all the interview and survey questions are credibility grounded by scientific literature, which minimizes subjective
short-sighted considerations on relevant topics. However, positionality can not be fully avoided. The study is conducted by a researcher from a relatively rich western country, namely Holland, and has studied a bachelor in sustainability (University of Amsterdam), which contributes to a particular frame of reference. Furthermore, for such a study the dependency on available literature is high, which steers studied areas and topics as well.
4. Results
4.1 Governance Vulnerability
As stated in the theoretical framework legal pluralism is present when different legal ideas, principles, and systems are applied to the same situation (Vanderlinden, 1971). This is an accurate perspective for studying governance vulnerability in Rekawa. Namely, it is relevant to consider which legal systems and institutions are active and which are viewed as
legitimate by the small-scale fishermen community. As Wickramasinghe (2010) indicated, three categories of institutions can be put, namely: norms, non-codified working rules and working rules developed by the state. For simplicity reasons, for the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa, there is referred to customary/informal laws (consisting of norms and non-codified working rules) and state/formal laws. Whether these two rules are in conflict and which rules the community considers legitimate, is pointed out in this paragraph.
4.1.1 Formal Laws
To start with, the active formal laws are studied. These laws are implemented by the government of Sri Lanka, aiming to regulate harvesting practices of marine resources, to improve upon its sustainability. Besides, these laws support the fair distribution of resources and, thereby, income.
An important general formal law is ‘Fisheries and aquatic resources act No.2’ which was put in 1996, which consists of several marine resources regulation measures. By this law, license issuance for marine resource access was obligated and particular fishing gear was forbidden which substantially damaged the marine environment. Furthermore, more power was given to governmental authorities to enforce these rules. (Udayanga & Sandaruwan, 2020)
Besides these national laws, Rekawa imposed more specific marine resource regulation measures for their own community in 1982. This act states that, solely, drift and cast nets are permitted to use for fishermen and, additionally, also the use of drift nets are limited to a maximum of fifty users. (Udayanga & Sandaruwan, 2020)
Interestingly, the DFAR states that these regulatory measures have been developed by the means of co-management, implying that multiple parties were involved (DFAR, personal communication, 2021). Thus, also by the means of interaction with the local communities (DFAR, p.c., 2021). By this means, the DFAR claims, legitimacy for the measures are created within the local fishermen communities.
4.1.2. Formal Law Compliance Fishermen
It is evidently important to consider what these formal laws precisely are, however, for this research it is more relevant whether the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen, indeed, consider these rules as legitimate and, thereby, comply with them. To study this, the interview data on this small-scale spiny lobster target group in Rekawa is invoked.
The first formal law that is, hereby, discussed is the harvesting ban for spiny lobsters, which is active in the months of February, September and October (Wickramasinghe, 2010). This law is developed to stimulate the reproduction of the resources stock and, thereby, enhance the sustainability of the industry. Interview data shows that the respective fishermen are all highly aware of the necessity and functionality of this measure and, thereby, consider it as a legitimate rule (All fishermen, p.c., 2021).
What has to be stated, on this law, is that this was not directly the case as individuals cheated by putting lobsters in cages and, subsequently, harvested just after the ban. However, environmental awareness has recently increased within the fisher community. (Fisherman 1, p.c., 2021).
A second formal law that is pointed out, is the prohibition to harvest too small spiny lobsters, namely those weighing less than 210g, spiny lobsters with a shedding ring or skin and those that carry external eggs (DFAR, 2021). The small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa do not fully comply with these prohibitions. Being the case, because leaving the spiny lobster which carries external eggs in the sea, would too significantly affect their income (All
fishermen, pc, 2021). Only lobsters that are both too small and carry external eggs are left in the sea, claims one fisherman (Fisherman 1, p.c., 2021). Although the fact, that the
fishermen are aware of damaging the reproduction of spiny lobsters by continuing this practice, they have do not generate enough financial means to leave matured spiny lobsters in the sea.
The fishermen do leave solely too small spiny lobsters in the sea. This is due to the fact that the community norm is in line with the formal law, by arguing that the same spiny lobster will be harvested later and will be worth more money (Fisherman 1, p.c., 2021).
Furthermore, catching lobster with the use of oxygen tanks is prohibited by the state as well (Wickramasinghe considered this a non-codified working rule (2010)), which is complied with by small-scale fishermen (fisherman 1 & 5, p.c., 2021). As it is unfair competition and leads heavily to overexploitation of the resource stock (fisherman 1, pc, 2021). Mainly, by the fact that nets have got limits of capacity to catch lobsters; not being the case for harvesting with the use of oxygen tanks (fisherman 2, pc, 2021). Besides, fishermen who dive into the sea scare spiny lobsters, causing them to hide between the rocks and making them less accessible to harvest (Fisherman 4, p.c., 2021).
Another formal law is that only villagers are allowed to fish at the Oru Wella landing site. These villagers can get a license from the Ministry of Fisheries of Sri Lanka (fisherman 5, pc, 2021). Subsequently, monitoring is done by the villagers themself (All fishermen, pc, 2021).
Moreover, what is interesting to invoke is that fishermen 1 argues that there is no real difference between formal laws and customary laws (fisherman 1, p.c., 2021). Also, fishermen 2 argues that mostly the rules implemented by the government are followed (fisherman 2, p.c., 2021). Fishermen 3 argues that solely the rule of not fishing on poya days is an extra rule that is followed besides the state/formal laws (fisherman 3, p.c., 2021). What can be concluded from this data is that, legitimacy for state laws are active and that they are majorly in line with the active customary rules. However, it is for the fishermen not feasible to comply with every law.
4.1.3. Monitoring
Furthermore, it is relevant to study whether these formal laws are enforced by the government of Sri Lanka or another institution.
Fishermen 2 argues that monitoring practices are not active at the landing site in Rekawa ‘Oru Wella’’ (fisherman 2, p.c., 2021). Only very rarely a representative from the NARA comes to the landing sites. Only when suspicious thoughts on a particular individual are present it is being reported (fisherman 1, p.c., 2021). Fisherman 4, confirms this, by stating that officers come solely, incidentally to check the landing site for caged spiny lobsters after the harvesting ban has ended (fisherman 4, pc, 2021).
Fisherman 5 confirms this lack of monitoring practices. By arguing that fishermen remain active in catching lobsters weighing less than 210g and earn income from it (fisherman 5, p.c., 2021).
Fishermen 5 has informed authorities frequently, about this fact, however, has not observed significant improvements. He, hereby, claims that sometimes the Navy comes, however, too brief. Besides observations are too superficial and potential punishments are not
threatening. This monitoring problem regards the case using Tangus nets as well. These nets are, namely, prohibited, as they do not decay and break into pieces within the sea and, hereby, damage the marine environment and cause many lobster deaths. (fisherman 5, p.c., 2021)
Thus, the fishermen come to a consensus that monitoring by the government is heavily lacking.
Following the NARA, monitoring should be done by the coast guard, however, this is not happening. They have the power to arrest fishermen, when acting illegally, to hand them over to the police or the DFAR. DFAR has, thus, the ultimate responsibility for the proper functioning and implementation of the rules. (NARA, p.c., 2021)
Continuing on this, DFAR claims that monitoring practices are left to the community itself. If illegal practices are observed, the Lobster Management Fisheries committee can be
informed. The president of this committee can, subsequently, decide whether the fishing license of this individual at hand is issued or not (Rekawa East Fisheries Cooperative Society, p.c., 2021). Furthermore, officers of the DFAR, police or navy can be informed if an individual needs further punishment. (DFAR, p.c., 2021)
Thus, the DFAR publicly claims that monitoring practices is left in the hands of the local communities.
4.1.4. Informal Laws
What is, furthermore relevant to study by considering governance vulnerability is informal laws active within small-scale fishermen communities. These laws are not enforced by the government but are respected due to the cultural, social and religious arguments of fishermen. Often with greater success than state laws. An active informal law is, for example, prohibiting resource access for foreigners and, also, the time slot of fishing allowance per fishermen. (Udayanga & Sandaruwan, 2020)
Besides, based on the seniority of boat owners the ideality of landing spaces are divided. Whereas, a first come first served strategy is used for the location of fishing nets within the sea. Additionally, cultural norms restrict women to be active in fishing practices to ensure family care, however, also due to the high level of physical activity within the job.
The interpersonal relationship between fishermen is, by studying these informal rules, highly important to emphasize. By the means of their social network, monitoring practices take place. Fishermen hereby watch each other to follow communital imposed rules. (Udayanga & Sandaruwan, 2020)
The importance of these informal rules to manage and regulate the spiny lobster fishery industry is confirmed by the interview data on the fishermen themselves. As they claim that the social connection between the small-scale fishers in Rekawa is strong, as they
exchange relevant information frequently and update each other on their fishing practices. (All fishermen, p.c., 2021).
Furthermore, the fishermen claim that social control and interaction among small-scale spiny lobster fishermen occurs in a pleasant and effective manner. Causing that the distribution of fishing locations, for example, happens friendly. Fishermen 3 explicitly refers to this
relationship by stating: ‘’We do our jobs without getting into fights (Fisherman 3, p.c., 2021, p.6)’’. Fisherman 4 confirms this by stating that work is done in unity and everybody keeps what they catch; no problems are caused. Fishermen 5 confirms this as well. (Fishermen 3,4,5, p.c., 2021)
This social cohesion helps with implementing regulation measures within the community. As Fishermen 1, namely, states that after much conversation has passed Thangus nets are not used anymore to harvest marine resources. Besides, polythene, a damaging substance, is not dumped anymore in the sea. Fishermen 1 considers this principles and not rules, as they are implemented by the community and monitored by social pressure. (Fisherman 1, p.c., 2021)
An example of such an informal, customary law is that fishing is not practised on Poya days (Fisherman 2, p.c., 2021). There are two Poya days per month, one in honour of the full moon and one for the new moon (Fisherman 2, p.c., 2021). The community is very strict in monitoring each other on these working-free days (Fisherman 2, p.c., 2021). This
compliance is amplified of by their Buddhistic religious belief relating to the Poya days (Fisherman 4, p.c., 2021). Fisherman 5 even argues that villagers previously have got punished if they did not comply with this customary rule (Fisherman 5, p.c., 2021).
Furthermore, the fisher community restricts outsiders coming to the Oru Wella landing site. Fishermen 3 considers this is an informal rule, set by the community, and considers this fair
(Fisherman 3, p.c., 2021).This is not entirely in line with the formal rules, as licensing practices are active as well, which are given out by the Ministry of Fisheries, confirming interpretation differences legal pluralism brings forward.
This Fishermen 3 and 4 do not agree with the statement, that foreigners are being restricted to harvest at the Oru Wella landing site, as he argues that outsiders from the
‘kahadamodara’ harbour come over and harvest. The Rekawa community, subsequently, is not making any obligation to that (Fishermen 3 & 4, p.c., 2021).
Fishermen 5, subsequently, does not agree to this accommodating attitude towards
restricting foreigners, he argues that only fishers with a license can practise fishing and that monitoring is done by the community. This is necessary, argues fisherman 5, as 360
fishermen are active in Rekawa. When more outsiders are allowed, lobster fishing is not going to be productive anymore. (Fisherman 2, p.c., 2021)
Fishermen 4, further, argues that monitoring too small lobster coming to shore should be executed more via fisheries experts. The weighing place is used too little, he states.
Fishermen 4 thinks it is good to follow rules imposed by the government, however, because of the fact that these rules are still lacking in many ways, customary rules should be followed in the meantime. Fishermen 5 confirms this, by stating the state rules are not functioning well and customary rule works anyhow. (Fishermen 4 & 5, p.c., 2021)
Thus, informal, customary rules are highly active and broad-based within the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen community. Also, by the fact that state laws are not anticipating accurately to ongoing communal developments.
4.2. Economic Vulnerability
To outline the economic vulnerability of small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa, different corresponding factors are pointed out. First of all, the physical characteristics of the landing site are pointed out together with used harvesting gears. These factors determine whether these fishermen can harvest spiny lobster throughout the year. Furthermore, the market characteristics of the spiny lobster are studied, to state whether prices received for spiny lobster are fair and are sufficient for their livelihood. Lastly, the operations of the active cooperative in Rekawa is pointed out, to find out whether this institution supports the small-scale fishermen financially.
4.2.1. Landing Site and Gear
The physical characteristics of the relevant landing site ‘Oru Wella’ at Rekawa regard one being dangerous and full of rocks, therefore, being a challenging landing site to practice fishing (Fisherman 1, p.c., 2021). This is especially the case in monsoon times, which lasts for 4 to 5 months, as in these times waves get rough (Fisherman 3, p.c., 2021). Within this period it is often too dangerous for boats to depart (Fisherman 3, p.c., 2021).
The government does recognise this and does invest in the local infrastructure by building a harbour at the Oru Wella landing site (Fisherman 4, p.c., 2021). However, without significant
effect, as the government officials do not listen properly to the needs of the locals (Fisherman 4, p.c., 2021).
These challenging fishing conditions, however, do not affect the spiny lobster harvest as much compared to other marine resources. Namely, lobsters are caught within the day, whereby waves can be detected easily with the use of daylight. Subsequently, the lobster resources are caught by setting a net in the morning or evening, subsequently catching the lobsters happens the next morning. (Fisherman 3,4, p.c., 2021)
The gear that these small-scale spiny lobster fishermen use is rather alike, consisting of nets of 4,5 inch together with fiber boats. These gears are a major expense for these fishermen, as reinvestments have to be made herein (Udayanga & Sandaruwan, 2020). After a period of 2 years, major investments should be made, to maintain the quality of the gear (Udayanga & Sandaruwan, 2020). Besides, every half year the boat its engines need repair. (Udayanga & Sandaruwan, 2020). Crucial for these investments is the access to loans for these
fishermen, which is provided by the fishery cooperative (Udayanga & Sandaruwan, 2020). Being covered later in this chapter.
4.2.3. Market Characteristics
To further explore the economic vulnerability of the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen, it it relevant to study the market characteristics where they are reliant on.
An important characteristic of this respective market being that there are very few spiny lobster collectors active, causing the market to be an oligopoly of 2 to 4 buyers (Fishermen 2,3,4, p.c., 2021). The subsequent received price, fluctuates throughout the year based on the harvesting rates of spiny lobster, this being high, for example, after the harvesting ban ends, resulting in a lowered price for the fishermen (Fisherman 2, p.c., 2021).
These fishermen claim that this market is not fair, as competition on demand is lacking. The collectors determine the price of the marine resources, not leaving any space open for negotiating with the fishermen. This results in trading prices under the theoretical market equilibrium, negatively influencing the vulnerability of the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen. Besides, these tradings are pre-arranged by the means of informal contracts, enabling fishing men to switch to other buyers. (Udayanga & Sandaruwan, 2020)
Resulting in claims, by respective fishermen, that they generate an income being not sufficient for subsistence (All fishermen, p.c., 2021).
Due to spiny lobster harvesting practices not being sufficient for subsistence, these
fishermen seek other opportunities to generate income. Mostly practised by harvesting other marine resources as well (Namely: Kelawalla, Salaya, Hurulla, Alagoduwa, Gal Malu,
Trevallies & Hurullo’s) (fishermen 2,3,4, 2021). Furthermore, some fishermen choose to not practice spiny lobster harvesting in certain periods of the year as harvesting rates and corresponding profit rates vary (fishermen 2,3,4, 2021). Another interesting practice of a fisherman, to cope with low market prices, is that this individual travels to Tangalle where more is received per kilo spiny lobster (Fisherman, 5, 2021).
4.2.4. Cooperative Society
As the corresponding theoretical framework paragraph indicated, cooperatives can play a crucial role in the reduction of vulnerability for particular sectors. Likewise, for the case of
small-scale lobster fishermen in Rekawa, it is relevant to study what the precise contribution of the East Fisheries Cooperative Society is to the livelihood of small-scale spiny lobster fishermen.
Following the negativity in fishery cooperative performance rates in Sri Lanka, stated in the theoretical framework, specifying to the Rekawa East Fisheries Cooperative Society
complies with this tendency. It scores low rates on several crucial criteria, following the study of Amarsinghe & Bavinck (2011). The fishery cooperative in Rekawa was founded in 1989 by the means of a corresponding reorganization program initiated by the Sri
Lankan Government. Services this cooperative, hereby, aimed to offer had regard to inclusive support to small-scale fishermen on different facets such as harvesting training, livelihood support and financial aid/ assistance. (Amarasinghe & Bavinck, 2011)
However, associated rates, to verify this, seem critical as the Rekawa cooperative scores less on each individual criteria. Namely, regarding the density of membership, index of heterogeneity, meeting attendance, decision-making index, cash/work contribution.
Furthermore, on criteria regarding transparency, diversity of services, attention, leadership, and expectations, the cooperative in Rekawa scores low as well. Lastly, also regarding small-scale fishermen’s access to harvesting tools, the cooperative fishery society of Rekawa could do many improvements as well. (Amarasinghe & Bavinck, 2011)
This being stated, it is relevant how the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen themselves view the operations of the East Fishery Cooperative Society. From the interview data it became clear that the cooperative society does provide loans to cover the expenses of the fishermen in particular months with low harvesting rates (All fishermen, p.c., 2021). For these loans the interest rates are low, being beneficial for the fishermen (Fisherman 4, p.c., 2021) .
However, from an operational perspective, the statements by Amarasinghe & Bavinck (2011) are confirmed, as no individual of the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen sample was active in the cooperative society (All fishermen, p.c., 2021).
4.3. Environmental Vulnerability
Within this paragraph the environmental vulnerability is outlined of the spiny lobsters in southern Sri- Lanka by invoking relevant documents together with analysing self-obtained interview data on the local awareness on unsustainable harvesting practices.
As stated, Rekawa is situated on the south coast of Sri Lanka in the Hambantota district. The coastline of Sri Lanka is shaped by barrier reefs, mangroves, rocky outcrops, lagoons and salt marges; serving a major number of biodiverse species, mainly birds and fish, for their habitats (Perera & Weerakkody, 2004).
This physical diversity, together with the turby water of the sea, of the southern coastline of Sri Lanka, is well suited for the spiny lobster species, indicated by their major presence in the south (NARA, 2009).
However, overexploitation practices of natural resources heavily undermine the sustainability of the local ecosystems. This is the case because of the high export prices locals can get for their harvested marine resources. As is the case for all the spiny lobster species, the
Panulirus Polyphagus is even extinct within the area at hand. Besides overfishing, in the harvesting process, gear is used that harms the environment, for example, bottom set nets which causes erosion of physical habitats. Additionally, waste dumpage causes further environmental degradation as well. (NARA, 2009)
As invoked in the paragraph on governance vulnerability, state institutions as the NARA are aware of the critical decline of the spiny lobster resource stock and environmental
degradation harvesting further causes. Due to this fact, regulation measures to reduce the environmental vulnerability of spiny lobsters are developed by the NARA. For these regulation measures to be successful, however, sustainable awareness should be present for the spiny lobster fishermen themselves.
What follows, from the interviews, is, interestingly, that all five fishermen claimed to be environmentally concerned to a substantial extent (All fishermen, p.c., 2021). This by the fact that these fishermen acknowledged spiny lobster resource exploitation as an increasing problem to the industry and that they are ambitious to do something about this urging problem (All fishermen, p.c., 2021). Thereby, they considered laws to enhance sustainable harvesting practices as crucial to implement (All fishermen, p.c., 2021).
This ambition, to protect the spiny lobster resource by small-scale spiny lobster fishermen, is identified by their claims to extend or amplify certain regulatory measures. As is the case for the harvesting ban of three months. Although fisherman 1 argues that this measure leads to significant recovery rates of the resource stock, suggestions were made to lengthen this ban from three to six months, as only this duration will cause significant recovery rates that would protect the species from going locally extinct (Fisherman 1,2,3, p.c., 2021).
However, this motivation of fishermen is not backed by financial means. As they all claim, that they are currently too dependent on spiny lobster resources to implement this ban extension, for example, by themselves (All fishermen, p.c., 2021). These fishermen are currently too dependent on the lobster harvest throughout the year for their livelihood. Indicated by the following quote: ‘’Within the current economic situation, if we don’t catch spiny lobsters we cannot live (Fisherman 1, p.c., 2021, p. 2)’’.
This financial conflict between following regulation measures and harvesting sustainably is also expressed regarding harvesting too small spiny lobsters or those that carry external eggs. This is legally prohibited, however, not widely complied with by fishermen, as leaving these spiny lobsters in the sea would harm the financial means to their livelihoods too significantly (All fishermen, p.c., 2021). To cover this problem, fisherman 4 argues for a breeding programme by the Sri Lanka government, whereby external eggs are removed and can grow to a mature level elsewhere (Fisherman 4, p.c., 2021). Hereby, income can be still generated from the matured spiny lobster and no exploitation harm to the resource is done
(Fisherman 4, p.c., 2021). Such suggestions underscore the environmental awareness and readiness to reduce the environmental vulnerability of the spiny lobster resource stock. Furthermore, it reports that the Sri Lankan government lacks to consider the financial incidence to the livelihood of resource reliant small-scale fishermen of the developed regulation measures on spiny lobsters.
5. Discussion
5.1. Linking Rekawa to Kalameitya & Welipatanwila
In this paragraph data on the vulnerability of small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa, is compared to that of Kalametiya & Welipatanwila. Hereby, self-obtained data, referring to the interviews with fishermen and relevant state actors active in Rekawa, is linked to the PhD work of Wickramasinghe (2010) on the livelihood, Institutions and fish resource use in Kalametiya & Walipitanwila. Additionally, a personal interview was conducted with Dr Wickramasinghe to put the obtained data on Rekawa in a broader perspective. By this means, an indication is made on the extent of generalisability of the data on determining the vulnerability of small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in the Hambantota district. This data comparison is, first of all, executed on governance vulnerability, whereafter, economic and environmental vulnerability are discussed.
5.1.1. Governance Vulnerability
By studying the vulnerability of governance, it is crucial to analyse to what extent the
regulation measures developed by the state are complied with by the small-scale fishermen communities in Welipatanwila, Kalametiya & Rekawa. By this means, the legitimacy of these measures is studied. Besides, studying the key role of customary laws in these spiny lobster regulating practices is essential in this respect.
5.1.1.1. State Law Legitimacy
What became clear from the data by Wickramasinghe (2010), regarding to what extent the fishermen communities in Welipatanwila & Kalametiya view the state regulation measures as legitimate, is that this precise legitimacy is heavily lacking. Wickramasinghe (2010) divides the institutions that guided the behaviour of the fishermen in three categories: norms, non-codified working rules and non-codified working rules. By this means, the statement was made that the fishermen only followed regulation measures that stem from the community, thus the norms and non-codified working rules. Following this lack of compliance, Wickramasinghe (2010) further states that the awareness of the necessity of these regulatory measures is not widely present, partly caused by a high time preference due to low educational levels.
These findings are in conflict with the self-obtained data on the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa. The sample size of five relevant fishermen, namely, expressed their environmental awareness in a variety of ways. The fishermen were aware of the gradual decline of the spiny lobster resource stock and viewed state regulation measures as legitimate to protect the viability of the spiny lobster industry. This became mostly clear by the suggestions the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen made to intensify or expand certain regulatory measures. For example, by arguing for governmental breeding programs for either too small lobster or spiny lobsters that carry external eggs. Furthermore, three fishermen argued for extending the fishing ban from three to six months.
Along with these suggestions, which underscores the involvement of the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in the environmental concerns of the resource, three fishermen explicitly stated that there is no significant difference between state laws and customary laws. The fishermen, thus, consider the regulation measures developed by the NARA as fair.
5.1.1.2. State Law Compliance
As clarified, the awareness, motivation and involvement of these fishermen active in Rekawa on threats of overexploitation of the spiny lobster resource are present, however, the
financial feasibility of complying with all these regulatory measures is yet another story. Namely, although the small-scale spiny lobster fishermen in Rekawa claim that, for example, not harvesting spiny lobster which carry external eggs is fair, they argue that they have no financial margin to do so.
Thus, to compare the vulnerability of governing the spiny lobster resource stock in Kalametiya & Welipatanwila and Rekawa the following can be stated. It seems that the environmental awareness and involvement is significantly higher for the small-scale fishermen in Rekawa than in Kalametiya & Welipitanwila. However, the financial means to comply with all the regulatory measures are too little in all three villages.
5.1.1.3. Monitoring
What is furthermore relevant to study regarding governance vulnerability, is to what extent monitoring practices are executed by the government in the three villages. This exact matter is, interestingly, heavily lacking on all three landing sites at hand.
Wickramasinghe (2021) explains this by stating that it is not in the financial interests of the government to invest in proper monitoring (Wickramasinghe, p.c., 2021). Namely, as this monitoring should occur at sea, major state investments should be made in suitable staff and gear (Wickramasinghe, p.c., 2021). The related benefits associated with minor improvement in rule compliance by fishermen, would not be worth the cost for the economy of Sri Lanka as communities already monitor themselves (Wickramasinghe, p.c., 2021). An informative role of the government is more efficient and effective than further investment in monitoring expenses (Wickramasinghe, p.c., 2021). By the means of investing in awareness programs on environmental degradation and overexploitation, small-scale spiny lobster fishermen become intrinsically motivated to comply with regulation measures, which will be, subsequently, monitored by the fishermen community (Wickramasinghe, 2021).
