Table of Contents
ABSTRACT 3 INTRODUCTION 4 1. FOUNDATIONS OF REALISM: POLITICAL ETHICS 8
1.1 THE LEGACYOFTHE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 8
1.2 THE STRUGGLEFOR POWER: POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 12 1.3 HUMAN NATURE: THE FAULTY RATIONALEOFTHE SCIENTIFIC MAN 17 2. THE INTELLECTUAL CRITIC: SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER 21 3. VIETNAM: A REALIST’S NIGHTMARE 29
3.1 VIETNAMANDTHE “DEATHOFTHE STATESMAN” 29
3.2 THERISEOFTHE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 34
3.3 VIETNAM: REALISMAND JUST WAR THEORY 38
CONCLUSION: CRITICAL REALISM NOW 42 BIBLIOGRAPHY 46
Abstract
In the wake of the Vietnam War, realist theorist Hans J. Morgenthau emerged as a central figure in the American anti-war movement. A surprise to many, the man that advocated a classical realist theory of international relations based on considerations of power politics would become one of the fiercest critics of Lyndon B. Johnson’s government, rejecting the Vietnam War not only on political, but also on moral grounds. This thesis explores how Morgenthau’s opposition to the Vietnam War is rooted in his earlier thought and works. It traces his thought back to its German philosophical foundations, through the context of the rise and fall of the Weimar Republic, and two devastating world wars. A German Jewish émigré, Morgenthau was highly concerned with political ethics and the
normative constraints on power. Tracing the moral aspects of his thought
throughout his works and his later Vietnam critique highlight his attention to the necessity of “speaking truth to power,” mainly on the part of the academic world. This became more difficult due to the institutionalization of the national security state from the 1950s onwards, a process that Morgenthau saw as threatening the very basis of American democracy. Following the path of Morgenthau’s moral thought gives insight into the more critical aspects of classical realist theory, and in the wake of the resurgence of the national security state and the
neoconservatist foreign policy after 9/11, it can help us better understand American foreign policy today.
Introduction
“In the long run … the voice of truth, so vulnerable to power, has proved more resilient than power. It has built empires of the mind and the spirit that have outlasted, and put their mark upon, the empires of power. […] The experience of the 1960s has dispelled the illusion that truth can show power the way in direct confrontation. But historical experience reassures us that truth can indeed make people see a lot of things in a new light. And when people see things in a new light, they might act in a new way.”
– Hans J. Morgenthau, 1970.
This quote, drawn from his 1970 work Truth and Power, sums up Hans J.
Morgenthau’s decades long quest for promoting rational American foreign policy based on classical realism1 from the late 1940s until his death in 1980. Best
known for his realist theory of international relations (IR), Morgenthau became, and arguably still remains, one of the most influential scholars in the field of international politics. Admired for his power-driven view of the nature of
international politics and for this same reason scorned by IR liberalists, as well as for his pessimistic view of interdependence and international cooperation, Morgenthau’s theoretical legacy does not exist without much debate. It is due to the power-driven focus of his theory that his opposition to the Vietnam War and his support for the anti-war movement came as a surprise to many.
In order to better understand Morgenthau’s theory of classical realism and his later opposition to the Vietnam War, as well as the way in which these are related to each other, it is important not only to understand the way in which Morgenthau views the international political order, but also its intellectual roots as well as the context in which he developed his theory. The basic tenets of his realist theory – international politics as a struggle for power and maintaining the global balance of power – will be of constant presence throughout this narrative. These power principles are, however, closely related to the more normative and philosophical underpinnings of the theory, which have been somewhat obscured by history and long ignored within academic research.
1 I will refer to classical realism as simply realism from now on; when differences between classical and neo-realism will come up, neo-realism will be clearly defined as such.
These more philosophical tenets underlying the theory are the main focus of this thesis, and give insight in the way in which Morgenthau’s Vietnam
criticism is rooted in his realist theory. They can roughly be divided into two elements, both of which illuminate the normative aspects of his realist theory: Morgenthau’s perception of human nature and its subsequent importance for power, and the relation between power and truth. In order to understand these aspects and the ideas that drove them it is important to consider the historical context that shaped Morgenthau’s thought. Strongly influenced by German intellectual thought and philosophy, exiled due to the rise of National Socialism and his Jewish identity, Morgenthau’s thought developed in the context of two World Wars and continued to evolve during the rise of an ever-growing
ideological Cold War. While often portrayed as the father of American realism, the basis of his thought is strongly rooted in the context of the interwar period of Weimar Germany.2
The thesis is divided into three chapters, all of which explore a different side of Morgenthau’s considerations of morality, ultimately connecting his theoretical works to his Vietnam critique. The first chapter looks at the ways in which Morgenthau’s thought is connected to the German philosophical and political traditions, and outlines and highlights the moral aspects of
Morgenthau’s view on human nature, his rejection of scientific methods for politics, and his perception of power politics. These theoretical underpinnings present the roots of his opposition to the Vietnam War, and help explain them.
The second chapter dives into Morgenthau’s understanding of the relation between truth and power, and explores the more critical sides of realist IR theory. It looks at the role of the intellectual in speaking truth to power, and the balance between the academic and political world. Exploring this relation between power and the academic world, and the role of the intellectual not only in telling power what it can do, but also advising it on what it ought to do, stress the more critical aspects of realist theory and its possibilities regarding keeping power in check.
The final chapter focuses on Morgenthau’s Vietnam critique. Disillusioned by the perceived misbehaving of the American government, the main points of 2 For an excellent distillation of this see Udi Greenberg, The Weimar Century:
German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War. Princeton:
Morgenthau’s critique can be drawn back to his earlier theoretical framework. Exploring the failure on the part of the statesman as well as the
institutionalization of the national security state further emphasize
Morgenthau’s concern regarding political ethics, as well as his overtly idealist understanding of the statesman’s role. The Vietnam War and Morgenthau’s opposition to it show the dichotomy between political theory and political reality. This complicates the role of morality within foreign policy formation, especially with regard to the determination of ‘just’ war, something that Morgenthau became increasingly concerned with as the war progressed.
Morgenthau’s theory has been the subject of decades of criticism. The sudden, unexpected, and peaceful end of the Cold War shook the field of
international relations theory. An outcome not expected or predicted by anyone or any theory, it was particularly damaging for this theoretical field, for the peaceful ending of great power rivalry was something deemed impossible by realists.3 The criticisms with regard to Morgenthau’s – as well as broader realist
IR theory – theory have proven particularly persistent over time, and they have taken on many different forms. Conceptually, Morgenthau was attacked for his pessimistic view of human nature and his inability to exactly define the concepts of power and the national interest. Furthermore, he provided a theory of power that was, in the eyes of those who opposed him, the last thing that the late 1940s United States government needed because it only led to the continuation and exacerbation of Cold War tensions instead of to its solution.4 There are also those
critics who state that Morgenthau realism has become irrelevant, arguing that with the end of the Cold War the age of great power rivalry – and with that the applicability of power driven IR theory – has come to an end. In a world that is becoming ever more interdependent, state-driven power rivalries supposedly have become a thing of the past.
All of these criticisms have merit to them, yet they tend to overshadow the more critical and nuanced aspects of Morgenthau’s work. Over the past decade, 3 Richard Ned Lebow, “Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change,” in Realism
Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations. ed.
Michael C. Williams. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 243. 4 Michael C. Williams, ed. Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J.
however, renewed interest in Morgenthau’s work has led to increased research not only with regard to his theoretical framework but also into the intellectual connections to other scholars, philosophers, and historical context. That is where this thesis finds its place also. Rather than perceiving Morgenthau’s thought as historically redundant, the neo-conservatist shift in American foreign policy from the George W. Bush era onward has led to a renewed applicability of realist theory. Parallels can be found between the American foreign policy and
governmental security apparatus of the 1960s and that following 9/11, through which the same questions regarding American intervention abroad become relevant again: to intervene or not to intervene? What is in the national interest? When is a war a ‘just’ war? Morgenthau’s concern with the normative side of realist theory may help us gain valuable insight into these types of questions by critically examining the decision-making process that drove the intervention in Vietnam. Where Morgenthau’s critical 1962 piece asked “Vietnam – another Korea?,” we can easily ask – and have asked – the similar question “Iraq – another Vietnam?”5
The relation between realist theory, its normative basis, and
Morgenthau’s critique of the Vietnam War also highlight something that is often passed over and deemed contradictory to realist theory: its critical dimension. Rather than being solely explanatory of the way in which power considerations drive international politics, Morgenthau’s realism holds the political decision makers accountable for their actions, especially when they overstep their
boundaries and do not handle in line with the national interest. This is something that Morgenthau himself demonstrated through his strong criticism of the
American government during the Vietnam War, and something that we can draw inspiration from, both with regard to current politics as for the future.
1. Foundations of Realism: Political Ethics
5 See as an example Robert K. Brigham, Is Iraq Another Vietnam? New York: PublicAffairs, 2006; Hans J. Morgenthau, “Vietnam – Another Korea?”
Credited as the founder of realist theory, Morgenthau is often equated with the power principles of his theory, most notably the concept of the balance of power and the pessimistic perception of international politics as a struggle for power. His thought, however, is far more nuanced, closely related to a tradition of famous German philosophers. His thought is shaped in part due to his extensive study of politics and law, but is also the result of his growing up in the context of the First World War, subsequently experiencing the tumultuous years of the collapse of the Weimar Republic in the interwar period, and witnessing the rise of aggressive National Socialism during the 1930s. Academic research has, for a long time, focused on the aspects of power within Morgenthau’s theory, thereby ignoring the more moralistic notions inherent in his thought. Political ethics, however, has always been of major importance to Morgenthau. Exploring the relationship between power and human nature in Morgenthau’s work gives insight into the rooting of his later Vietnam critique in classical realist theory.
1.1 The Legacy of the Weimar Republic
Born in Coburg, Germany, in 1904, Morgenthau studied philosophy at the
University of Frankfurt, later transferring to the University of Munich to focus on studying law. The two disciplines gave him a wide background of knowledge in both German philosophical as in political and legal thought, which would continue to influence his own work, even after his move to the United States. Despite publishing most of his work after his move to the United States in 1937, Morgenthau remains above all a European intellectual whose perceptions have been heavily influenced by a tradition of influential German academics and philosophers, of which the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, and his contemporary intellectual – and good friend – Reinhold Niebuhr are most notable.6
In Nietzsche, Morgenthau valued distance and the Nietzschean rejection of idealism. He identified with Nietzsche’s commitment to reality and his 6 Since the specific ways in which these German philosophers affected Morgenthau’s work are enough to write separate theses on, I cannot do them justice here, which is why they will not be more fully elaborated. It is, however, important to recognize Morgenthau’s roots in German philosophy and the influence these philosophers had on his thought.
emphasis on seeing things the way they really are instead of how they are
supposed to be.7 Referring to Nietzsche as “the God of my youth,” and continuing
to closely read his works throughout his life, the Nietzschean outlook colored Morgenthau’s perception of international politics and is traceable throughout his work.8 Similarly, Weber’s emphasis on objectivity, the importance of the political,
and his perceptions of the ethics of responsibility on part of the statesman guided Morgenthau’s emphasis on it in his own works.9 As for his good friend
Niebuhr, Morgenthau strongly valued Niebuhr’s opposition to the scientific method as well as his views on the nature of power, yet rejecting Niebuhr’s Christian basis.10 These positions Morgenthau made his own and they became
the subject of his first main work, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. Morgenthau continued to actively stress his relation to Niebuhr throughout his career, stating that “Reinie and I come out about the same on politics, but I do not need all his metaphysics to get where we both get.”11
Next to influencing his direct political thought, these German philosophers also instilled in Morgenthau a strong suspicion of liberalism, especially the kind that promoted internationalism.12 His highly critical attitude
towards liberalism was also in no small part due to his negative perception of the 7 Christoph Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 2001), 102; Michael Cox, “Hans J. Morgenthau, Realism, and the Rise and Fall of the Cold War,” in Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans
Morgenthau in International Relations. ed. Michael C. Williams. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 171; Michael C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 58 (2004): 648. 8 Felix Rösch, Power, Knowledge, and Dissent in Morgenthau’s World View (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 34.
9 Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 139-40; Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism. Trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Dover Publications,
2003).
10 Daniel Rice, “Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau: A Friendship with Contrasting Shades of Realism,” Journal of American Studies 42 (2008): 259-261. 11 Smith, Realist Thought, 134; Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political
Problems, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953); Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (London: Charles Scribner, 1932); Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation (Louisville:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2004).
12 Michael Cox, “Hans J. Morgenthau, Realism, and the Rise and Fall of the Cold War.” 171.
Wilsonianist American foreign policy following World War I. Morgenthau did not believe in institutionalism, and took a pessimistic position toward the idea of institutionalizing politics into an international governing body such as the League of Nations, from which Weimar Germany was excluded.13 He perceived
these attempts as ideational, arguing that it did not into account the true nature of the international system as an arena for competition through power politics.14
A liberal foreign policy in the interwar period had not successfully halted the rise of totalitarianism in the form of Nazi Germany, nor did it provide stable peace whatsoever. Not only did this – in Morgenthau’s eyes – faulty foreign policy not prevent the outbreak of another international crisis in the form of the Second World War, it also directly affected Morgenthau on a personal level. The rise of National Socialism forced him to flee Germany, made it nearly impossible for him to find a job in academics, and ultimately drove him into exile in the United States. Morgenthau himself recognized the influence this had on his thought: “My relationship to the social environment is determined by three factors: I am a German, I am a Jew, and I have matured in the period following the [First World] war.”15 It is therefore understandable that many refer to Morgenthau’s realism
and his views on international politics as pessimistic. While this may be true, these views are, however, mostly driven by a Nietzschean focus on reality and Weberian emphasis on objectivity rather than on ideational possibilities.16
It was not only Morgenthau’s personal experience that shaped his views on morality, but also the national debates about the place of Weimar Germany following the First World War. He was caught in between the debates about the merits of liberalism as well as the opposing voices of nationalists. For
Morgenthau, international conflict could be divided into two separate ways of 13 Robert J. Myers, “Hans J. Morgenthau: On Speaking Truth to Power,” Society 29 (1992): 67; Udi Greenberg, The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the
Ideological Foundations of the Cold War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2014): 214.
14 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, updated edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014), 15.
15 Quoted in Joel H. Rosenthal, Righteous Realists: Responsible Power, and
American Culture in the Nuclear Age (Baton Rouge & London: Louisiana State
University Press, 1991), 40.
16 Jennifer W. See, “A Prophet Without Honor: Hans Morgenthau and the War in Vietnam, 1955-1965,” Pacific Historical Review 70 (2001): 422.
conflict: tensions and disputes. Disputes, according to Morgenthau, can be solved through international law, for they are not considered to be essential by nations. Tensions, on the other hand, are inherently political in nature, “conflicts that nations invested with extreme emotional intensity,” and therefore cannot be resolved through international legal means.17 For Morgenthau, both idealists and
nationalists displayed tunnel vision because they believed that conflicts were either always disputes or always tensions.
These differences also reflect Morgenthau’s early ideas on the role of Weimar Germany in international system. He argued that Germany needed a new foreign policy strategy focused on what Morgenthau called “dynamic diplomacy.” This would distinguish between disputes and tensions, letting cooperation and power politics exist side by side. Such a foreign policy, guided by strong
leadership would find the balance between disputes and tensions within the international order. It would be able to peacefully solve some conflicts without losing sight of political realities, thus willing to resort to violence at times when this was needed. Morgenthau took the concept of dynamic diplomacy with him when he moved to the United States, advocating a policy that found the balance between morality and power.18 While the power aspects of his argument
resonated well within the context of rising Cold War tensions, his emphasis on the balance with political ethics got lost in the ideological struggle with the communist enemy, the USSR.
The relation between political ethics and power politics becomes more clear when exploring Morgenthau’s views on human nature, and the importance of the role of the statesman in international politics. Recognizing Morgenthau’s intellectual and personal background – rooted in the German intellectual tradition and the historical context of multiple international crises in the first half of the twentieth century – is important, for it strongly steered his views on international politics and explains the basis for his later Vietnam critique.
17 Greenberg, The Weimar Century, 217. 18 Greenberg, The Weimar Century, 225-26.
1.2 The Struggle for Power: Politics Among Nations
Morgenthau’s most influential work, Politics Among Nations, was published in 1948 and would become a major work in international relations theory.
Morgenthau argued that power and interest exist at the center of international politics. The international realm is inherently anarchic, and various states
compete for power and influence within it. Protection of interest is what drives a state’s foreign policy. Realism does not distinguish between “good” and “bad” states; it solely distinguishes based on relative power. This leads to the oft-repeated perception that realism is immoral, unethical, and simply harsh. This perception of realism, however, lacks nuance. It does not do justice to the complexity inherent in realism’s theoretical framework, let alone the more ethical conundrums of especially classical realists like Morgenthau.
It was Politics Among Nations that strengthened Morgenthau’s position on the political and academic radar. Still one of the most widely read books on international relations theory, the text was considered relatively provocative at its time of publication. This was mostly due to the fact that with the ideas set out in the book, Morgenthau essentially broke with the dominant political trend of internationalism that had reigned during the interwar period following World War I. The increased focus on cooperation and law in international politics was radically reversed by Morgenthau, who had no positive regard for these trends due to his vision of human nature and the national interest.
When World War I came to an end in 1918, the international community was bound on preventing the outbreak of a second devastating world war. It was determined on reforming the international community into a system based on and driven by international law. The first serious commitment to this vision came in the form of the founding of the League of Nations at the 1920 Paris Peace Conference. With a focus on promoting international peace, collective security, and peaceful dispute settlement it became the first international governmental organization to operate on the basis of international law. American President Woodrow Wilson powerfully outlined this vision of international cooperation and collective security in a speech before Congress in 1918. His Fourteen Points, articulated roughly a year after the start of American participation in World War I, were focused mostly on moral rather than material aims.
A critical note, from a realist perspective, is important here. The demise of Germany and Russia after World War I resulting from the Allied victory led to a significant shift in the balance of power, not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world. The demise of two great powers that had played an important part in the pre-war balance of power in Europe led to a necessary reconsideration of power relations. Wilson posed to create an international order based on cooperation and equality, at the Paris Peace Conference and through the
establishment of the League of Nations. However, as William Keylor has argued, there was a reflection of the balance of power and inequality already visible at the Paris Peace Conference: the five great powers “dominated the peace
conference because they dominated the world after the defeat of Germany and collapse of Russia.”19 Thus while there existed a theoretical opposition between
the idealist liberal internationalism of Wilson and Morgenthau’s classical realism, power politics were never completely off the table, something that Morgenthau was highly aware of and tends to point out throughout Politics Among Nations.
To better understand the relation between power politics and the
morality of human nature in Morgenthau’s thought, it is worth looking at the six principles of realism that he set out in his 1948 seminal work Politics Among
Nations, and which form the basis of his theory of international relations. I have
already touched upon Morgenthau’s first principle, which holds that politics is directed by objective laws inherent in human nature. Human nature itself has not changed since ancient times, and therefore rational historical analyses can help us understand these laws. Facts, however, are not enough. In order to understand the true meaning of these facts, it is necessary to develop a rational hypothesis by putting “ourselves in the position of the statesman” and looking at possible alternatives that he might choose or have chosen.20 Testing these rational
hypotheses against the facts “gives theoretical meaning to the facts of international politics”21
19 William Keylor, “The Peace of Paris and the New International Order,” in
Twentieth Century World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 78.
20 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 4.
The core tenet of realism – and the main reason why classical realism is often understood as an immoral power struggle – lies in Morgenthau’s second principle of realism, that international politics is “interest defined in terms of power.”22 Connecting the reason for understanding politics to the facts to be
understood, the concept of interest defined in power terms sets the political23
apart from other spheres. It also infuses rational order into international politics, which makes it possible for us to understand these forms of politics. Historical evidence allows us to trace the (ever rational) steps of former and current
statesmen, and anticipate those of future statesmen. Through this rational order, classical realism “will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences.”24 This rejection of motives
and ideology is often used as a point of criticism by international relations liberalists and constructivists, who argue that the realist perception is intellectually flat because it does not take these notions into account.
It is worth looking closer at this rejection of motives and ideology within realist theory. Rather than showing its apparent “lack” of ideational notions, it actually shows a part of the conceptual complexity of the theory. Realism does not simply throw every non-power notion out the door. It is not that motives and ideologies do not exist or matter in realist theory, but rather the fact that they are not the main driver within international politics, which is why realists do not tend to focus on them. Exact motives are very hard to measure, and while they may influence a personal decision on behalf of the statesman to some extent, calculation of interest prevails over ideology. Finally, good motives do not guarantee a successful, let alone morally right, foreign policy. There have been many instances in history where decisions were made out of good intentions yet these led to disastrous consequences, or the other way around.25 Rather than
22 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5.
23 For an extensive elaboration on what Morgenthau considered to be “the political,” see Hans J. Morgenthau, The Concept of the Political, eds. Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch, trans. M. Vidal, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Originally published as La Notion du Politique, 1933.
24 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5.
25 Morgenthau himself gives the example of Neville Chamberlain’s policies, which – according to Morgenthau – came out of good motives, but ultimately “helped to make the Second World War inevitable.” Morgenthau, Politics Among
denouncing ideology and motives, realist theory takes a critical position with regard to ideational factors in order to point out when these notions produce faulty policy decisions. As Morgenthau argues, “good motives give assurance against deliberately bad policies; they do not guarantee the moral goodness and political success of the policies they inspire.”26
The third principle of realism sheds light on the flexibility of realism as a theory of international relations. While often portrayed as quite static – taking structural neorealist instead of classical realist considerations as the basis of realist theory – Morgenthau explicitly emphasizes the changing nature of interest and power. What power is depends on the context of time and place. The
changing nature of power is something that remains continually relevant within current scholarly debates.27 As Joseph Nye has argued, “power always depends
on context.”28
Morgenthau’s fourth principle of realism is concerned with the
application of moral principles to the realm of politics. Tensions exist between what is deemed ‘moral,’ and what is considered successful political action. Because the moral action for the state is to pursue its national interest, other abstract principles of morality only cloud it from acting truly moral. Universal moral principles therefore do not apply to states, whose political action is deemed to be based on prudence and taking into account specific contextual circumstances of time and place.
This also leads to the fifth principle of realism, which further explains the relationship between universal moral principles and the moral principles of states. The reason that these universal moral principles do not apply to states is because the state’s national interest is based on power, not morality. States will try to “clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes
26 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 6.
27 Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011); Ernest J. Wilson III, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” American Academy of Political
and Social Science Annals 616 (2008): pp. 110-124; Giulio M. Gallarotti, “Smart
Power: Definitions, Importance, and Effectiveness,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38(2015): pp. 245-281.
of the universe,” but their actions are in actuality based on consideration of the national interest.29
The sixth and final principle of Morgenthau’s realism acknowledges the difference between the realist approach to international relations, and that of other approaches. The realist, like others, is focused on the autonomy of his sphere, and “thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks of in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral principles.”30
Realism is not concerned with universal morality or with legal considerations: it keeps the autonomy of the political realm intact. It solely concerns itself with following the national interest defined in terms of power, and thereby sets itself apart from other approaches. The five preceding principles set the standards for political action, and realism makes all other considerations secondary to that of the national interest.
Despite the focus on the national interest, the pursuit and importance of which is set in stone, there is much room for context and changes to the national interest over time, making the theory less static than it might appear to be at first sight. Unlike neo- (or structural) realists such as Kenneth Waltz and later
influential academics such as John Mearsheimer, classical realism does not subscribe to the idea that the reasons for conflict are inherent in the structure of the international system. While both theories believe that the struggle for power is a main drive within international politics, neo-realists argue that it is the structure of the international system that drives state behavior. Classical realists, in contrast, argue that “politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.”31 It is thus far more focused on the
human factor in international politics, stating that the desire for power is rooted in human nature rather than the international system itself. This distinction is important for it provides classical realism with a much broader range of human influence and the importance of historical context than that present in
neorealism. In order to better understand the role of human nature in politics 29 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12.
30 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 13. 31 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4.
and the influence this has had on Morgenthau’s realism, it is worth exploring his views on human nature.
1.3 Human Nature: The Faulty Rationale of the Scientific Man
Before Politics Among Nations Morgenthau published another work in which he outlines his views on human nature. In Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, published in 1946, Morgenthau challenged the dominant 1940s rationale that viewed international politics from a purely scientific point of view. As he already explains in the preface of the book, "the consideration of the general causes points to a general decay in the political thinking of the Western world. This decay is represented most typically by the belief in the power of science to solve all problems and, more particularly, all political problems which confront man in the modern age.”32 According to Morgenthau, the idea that questions of politics can
be solved through a methodological approach is flawed because it does not account for the fact that “life is in constant flux.”33 The fact that certain political
theories and philosophies persist over time is not due to their strict methodology or logic but to the relation they have to the actual reality and experience of life.34
Thus, a certain form or school of thought will only remain relevant so long as people can continually relate to it, for “man will not forever accept a philosophy which is patently at odds with his experience.”35 Morgenthau’s argument here is
closely related to his perception of human nature.36
Morgenthau’s understanding of politics centered on his tenet that a hunger for power – the animus dominandi – is at the core of human nature. It is necessary, he argued, to understand that “power politics, rooted in the lust for power which is common to all men, is for this reason inseparable from social life itself.”37 This lust for power is combined with a certain selfishness. All the action
of man “emanates from himself and refers again to himself.”38 These actions can
32 Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946): v-vi.
33 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 7. 34 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 7. 35 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 8. 36 Smith, Realist Thought, 137. 37 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 9. 38 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 191.
either positively or negatively affect others, which leads to a moral tension between self and other. Ideally, Morgenthau argued, people should be unselfish, yet the pressures of the world often make this impossible. For
“the demands which poverty alone puts to our unselfishness are so overwhelming that any attempt at even faintly approximating
unselfishness would of necessity lead to the sacrifice of the individual and would thus destroy his ability to contribute at least a certain share of unselfishness to the overwhelming demands of the world.”39
You need to be selfish in order to survive, and it is for that reason that man can never be completely unselfish in his actions. Together with the lust for power, this selfishness leads to a kind of Hobbesian competition between men, for one wants what the other already has, while simultaneously the other wants to keep what he already has for himself. 40 This leads to continuing conflicts of interest
between men, a notion that strongly infused Morgenthau’s perception of international politics as the struggle for power.41
Conflict, Morgenthau stated, thus stems from a universal desire for power and selfishness inherent in human nature. This poses problems regarding the possibilities for moral behavior in politics. The necessity for selfishness and the hunger for power infuse every political action with some small amount of evil because they put one man’s interest over another’s.42 Political action is therefore
inherently unethical, because “it is unattainable for an action at the same time to conform to the rules of the political art (i.e., to achieve political success) and to conform to the rules of ethics (i.e., to be good in itself).”43 Political success,
39 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 191.
40 According to Thomas Hobbes, there are three aspects in the nature of man which lead to conflict, namely competition, diffidence, and glory. Morgenthau draws on the idea of competition in Scientific Man versus Power Politics, and adds to it in Politics Among Nations. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: or the Matter,
Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, ed. Michael
Oakeshott, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962), p. 92-94.
41 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 192; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 243. 42 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 195.
furthermore, is – according to Morgenthau – measured by the extent to which one has power over others, which makes it impossible to be morally good.
Due to the inherently evil nature of every political action, the question of political ethics remains a problem. All that man can do, Morgenthau argued, is “choose, since evil there must be, among several possible actions the one that is least evil.”44 Moral judgment then lies in the choice of the lesser evil among
various options for political action. Rationalism, or the scientific man, cannot understand this, for it perceives the world as deterministically set up for the victory of reason over unreason. It does not take into account what Morgenthau, drawing on Sigmund Freud, somewhat dramatically called “the dark and evil forces which, as manifestations of the unconscious, determine the fate of man.”45
Rationalism ignores the constant ongoing tensions between human nature and the realities of life experience. The true realist therefore is not the scientific man, but the man who can translate his experiences and relate them to human nature. The realist “is embodied not in the scientist who derives conclusions from
postulated or empirical premises […] but in the statesman who recognizes in the contingencies of the social world the concretizations of eternal laws [of human nature].”46 The statesman, therefore, is the one with the ability to connect
political action with the nature of man, and the one able to decide the way of the lesser evil.
In advancing the argument of the statesman as the one to determine the path of lesser evil, Morgenthau draws on an argument by Irish political theorist and statesman Edmund Burke, who argued that the statesman needs to be guided by circumstances while never losing sight of principles.47 Morgenthau
advanced this argument, arguing that “as the scientist creates a new nature out of his knowledge of the forces of nature, so the statesman creates a new society out of his knowledge of the nature of man.”48 His fate is a tragic one, for the statesman
is perpetually “suspended between his spiritual destiny which he cannot fulfill and his animal nature in which he cannot remain, he is forever condemned to 44 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 202.
45 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 203. 46 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 220. 47 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 220-21. 48 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 221.
experience the contrast between longings of his mind and his actual condition as his personal, eminently human tragedy.”49
This vision of the statesman’s tragic obligation to truth and the making of the right decision based on strict moral principles puts a lot of responsibility for conduct within international politics on part of the statesman. Who is to say that the statesman will always act in the ‘right’ way? The dogmatic trust in the
unwavering moral character of the statesman and the power of diplomacy to solve international conflict is characteristic of a longing on Morgenthau’s side, back to “the golden age of international diplomacy” of the eighteenth and
nineteenth century European powers that he admired.50 Morgenthau is, as Martin
Griffiths has argued, a “nostalgic idealist” at times.51 His strong belief in the
power of diplomacy and the steadfast ethical conduct on the part of the
statesman border on idealism. This idealist nostalgia sometimes blinds him to the harsh realities of the political realm, something that the Vietnam War made very clear.
All political action of man is thus driven by, and relates back to, his longing for power and his selfish nature, which in Morgenthau’s view infused every political action with a certain degree of evil. The inherent connection between power, selfishness, and social life drove Morgenthau’s rejection of extreme rationalism in the understanding of politics. Rather than the scientist, it is up to the statesman to display moral judgment and pursue the option of the lesser evil in political action. The importance of the role of the statesman as presented by Morgenthau in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics and later in Politics Among
Nations sheds light on the role of political ethics and moral considerations in
Morgenthau’s thought, and helps to explain his strong opposition to the Vietnam War in the 1960s.
2. The Intellectual Critic: Speaking Truth to Power
49 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 221.
50 Martin Griffiths, Realism, Idealism and International Politics, (New York: Routledge, 1992), 35.
Throughout his academic life, Morgenthau displayed a strong commitment to the relationship between truth and power. His strong engagement with seeing the world as it is, combined with his beliefs on power and interest within the
international system, however, has resulted in realism often being seen as – and reduced to – a rather intellectually flat theory. Morgenthau’s opposition to the scientific methods dominating American academics in the 1940s derived from his belief that these methods did not accurately describe the realities of the political. Power, Morgenthau argued, is the core and reality of international politics. The task of political science is to “isolate the truth of political
experience.”52 This is not an easy task, for power tends to try and deceive and
bend the truth in order to advance its own interest.
Morgenthau understood truth as acknowledging the reality of power being the center of international politics: “The truth of political science is the truth about power, its manifestations, its configurations, its limitations, its
implications, its laws.”53 Politics Among Nations essentially tries to establish these
realities or truths, and hence helping politics to understand them. According to Morgenthau, “a political science which is faithful to its moral commitment of telling the truth about the political world cannot help telling society things that it does not want to hear. “54 It is the task of the scholar to show power the real
truth, even if power does not want to hear it, despite it being a risky venture with the possibility of leading to great personal loss. Morgenthau himself was clearly unafraid of doing this, being the first scholar to publicly voice his opposition to the American policy in Vietnam and continuing to do so throughout the 1960s.
A government faced with intellectual opposition is, according to
Morgenthau, able to react in various ways, of which trying to corrupt, discredit, and silence truth are the ones that the Johnson administration decided to follow in the wake of the Vietnam War. The Johnson administration tried to forcibly work against Morgenthau, setting up an entire project in order to find flaws in his line of thinking aimed at discrediting his reputation as a respected scholar. In 52 Sean Molloy, “Truth, Power, Theory: Hans Morgenthau’s Formulation of Realism,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 15 (2004): 7.
53 Hans J. Morgenthau, The Decline of Democratic Politics, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962a), 37.
doing so, power thus actively tried to silence opposition, a development not only aimed at ‘offensive’ intellectuals, but also more generally at influencing public opinion. Johnson’s crackdown on opposition led Morgenthau, as well as his contemporary Hannah Arendt, to question the very foundations of American democracy and republicanism. Yet despite being ousted by the political
establishment and becoming the center of a governmental investigation by the Johnson Administration aptly named ‘Project Morgenthau,’ Morgenthau refused to back down. He held on to his commitment to voice the truth to power,
participating in protests and university teach-ins, and writing articles opposing the war throughout the 1960s. While Morgenthau’s vision on what “truth” actually entails has changed throughout his career, his pledge of holding power accountable has not.55
One aspect of Morgenthau’s personal identity that helped him become especially strong in his criticism of American foreign policy was his foreign intellectual position. Like many other influential political thinkers at the time, Morgenthau could be considered an outsider. Many of these intellectuals were of European descent. Morgenthau himself was a German Jewish émigré, and
Reinhold Niebuhr was a second generation German American. Likewise, Hannah Arendt, the political thinker Carl J. Friedrich, and Ernest Fraenkel were German émigrés. Even George Kennan, while American, spent much of his life overseas. These intellectuals were often highly critical of the “crusading nature” of American foreign policy.56 Highly aware of the deceptive nature of power, they
strongly opposed the ideological foundations of American exceptionalism, its puritanism, and the missionary inclination that infused American political decision-making, and, according to Morgenthau for one, clouded its judgment. Their outsider status allowed these intellectuals to look beyond and recognize these exceptionalist underpinnings of American foreign policy, and gave them the ability to point out its dangers and faulty rationales.
In his 1970 essay “Truth and Power,” Morgenthau elaborated on this role of the intellectual in the relation between truth and power. Written after ten years of tense relations with the American government due to his Vietnam 55 Molloy, Truth Power Theory, 2.
opposition, the essay explores these relations in the context of Morgenthau’s relationship with the Johnson administration and the broader connection between the academic and the political worlds. “It is commonplace to say that the relations between President Johnson and the intellectual community are not what they ought to be,”57 Morgenthau stated. The reason for this tense
relationship can be found in the difficult relationship between truth and power within different social spheres.
The academic and the politician live in different worlds, yet their worlds intertwine. Their worlds differ from each other because they are directed towards different values. The politician strives for power, while the intellectual strives for truth. They are connected however, because power and truth are connected; “for truth has a message that is relevant to power, and the very
existence of power has a bearing both upon the expression and the recognition of truth.”58 Because their objectives differ, and truth does not always neatly line up
with political ambitions, this produces a sometimes-hostile relation between the two worlds and a tension between the intellectual and the political establishment of the powers-that-be. For it is the intellectual that forces upon the establishment the mirror of truth, even if this truth is counterproductive to the establishment’s goals.
The connection between the political and academic worlds and the what Morgenthau called “existential estrangement” between truth and power may lead the intellectual to respond to it in four different ways.59 Disillusioned by the
discordance between power and truth, he may reject the political sphere and “retreat into the ivory tower” by pretending the political sphere simply does not exist.60 This, however, does not solve the problem. It only evades it.
Secondly, the intellectual might stay outside the political sphere but actively attempt to transfer his knowledge into it. That way, “he tells power what it can do and what it ought to do, what is feasible and what is required.”61
However, the intellectual stays detached from the political sphere, watching from 57 Hans J. Morgenthau, Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade , 1960-1970,
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), 14. 58 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 14. 59 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 15. 60 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 15. 61 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 15.
the distance. His words may have consequences, or they may not, depending on whether they are picked up by the opposition within the political sphere.
The third option for the intellectual is actively engaging with the political sphere in the form of being an expert. This, however, requires the intellectual to accept the political sphere and the way in which it operates as it is. He advises the government on how to reach a distinct effect or obtain a specific goal. He might or might not approve of these goals, yet will give advise in order to achieve these ends. According to Morgenthau, “the ultimate standard by which he orients himself is still the truth and not power, even though he puts his truth at the service of power.”62
Interestingly, Morgenthau did not actively go into the fourth and final option: surrender. This suggests that it is not an option; by surrendering to power, the intellectual gives up his duty as “the professional guardian[…] of truth.”63 Morgenthau was adamant about this commitment to truth, arguing that
being an academic required a lifelong dedication to truth. The intellectual is expected to “be truthful not only between 9 and 10 am when he teaches, but always.”64 Surrendering to power therefore would eradicate an intellectual’s duty.
He would no longer be an intellectual, but an “ideologue, that is, a political agent, subject to the criteria of power.”65
In the quest of speaking truth to power, it is the intellectual that has to hold up the critical mirror of truth when power oversteps its boundaries and, worse, tries to deceitfully justify its actions. Morgenthau admitted that it is important to note the relatively ideal position that the intellectual is in, and the constraints that power puts upon the statesman in contrast. The intellectual has the ability to speak truth to power because of his position of being outside of the realm of politics, a position not bestowed on the statesman. Unlike the statesman, the intellectual is not subjected to internal political pressures. As Morgenthau related it to his own personal experiences, he explained:
62 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 15.
63 Hans J. Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960): 14.
64 Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics, 15. 65 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 17.
“He [the intellectual] has the freedom to speak truth to power without needing to be afraid of more than irritating reprisals of the power-that-be. The White House could threaten me with the FBI and make the Internal Revenue Service waste many man-hours in repeated audits of my income tax return; it could order the Secretary of Defense to fire me as consultant to the Department of Defense, banish me from the councils of
government, and ostracize me socially. But it could not deprive me of my livelihood or of my freedom to speak and write, insofar as the media were willing to resist its pressure to deny me a hearing.”66
This position outside of the political sphere thus allows the intellectual to openly speak his mind without regard for direct consequences. Morgenthau was aware of the fact that the statesman cannot be held against the same standards as the intellectual, because he operates within a field of various political pressures. He must therefore recognize, and be “tolerant” of, the inability of the statesman to behave in similar fashion as the intellectual himself, but be the force that counters the statesman in case he loses his way.67
A critical point to keep in mind here is the relation between the American government and the academic world from the 1940s throughout the 1960s. These spheres were far from separate, as Morgenthau’s own position as a consultant for the State and Defense departments at various points in his career show.68 While the intellectual is in a remarkable position of independence, it is
not without threats. Morgenthau recognized that due to the intertwining of the two spheres, it is a small step to a point where “the intellectual becomes an agent of the powers-that-be while maintaining his pretenses, and drawing upon his prestige, as an intellectual.”69 This risks the intellectual justifying political
positions as being true even if they are not, rather than juxtaposing the political position with the position of truth. The relationship between truth and power, between academic and political, were thus far from actively divided. Morgenthau,
66 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 16-17. 67 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 17. 68 Rosenthal, Righteous Realists, 15. 69 Rosenthal, Righteous Realists, 17.
however, acknowledged this, and referred to it as the
“academic-political-complex,” something that poses a risk towards the truthfulness of intellectuals.70
This duty of speaking truth to power on part of the intellectual highlights a critical component to Morgenthau’s classical realism. Drawing back on the second possible reaction on the part of the individual above, the intellectual is not only supposed to advise power on what it can do, but also what it should do. Instead of solely explaining power and the way in which it works in the
international system, the scholar must therefore also give advice as to what power ought to do without regard for the possible consequences. This is interesting when thinking about the fact that realist theory is often being perceived as having the only ethics with which it is concerned be the ethics of political responsibility and effectiveness.71 The intellectual thus has a normative
commitment on the part of truth, even if this may result in less effective use of power. In a way, the intellectual works as sort of checks-and-balance system with regard to the political sphere. It is not only letting power see what it can possibly do, but also making it aware of its limits and the importance of the context in which the power is being yielded.
The role of political science as a way to balance out political
miscalculations of power also explains Morgenthau’s different points of emphasis throughout his career.72 What often puzzled – and arguably sometimes continues
to puzzle – both admirers and enemies is the difference between the Morgenthau who wrote Politics Among Nations and the Morgenthau of the Vietnam
criticisms.73 Throughout his works Morgenthau always continued to stress the
importance of context, which is something that explains his various stances towards Cold War conflicts. That is why he was a strong proponent of containment of the Communist USSR but an active opponent of containing communism in South East Asia. Context is vital in determining the power realities at a given time. Misunderstanding these realities and political context can have disastrous consequences, as the United States ultimately experienced in 70 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 25.
71 Murielle Cozette, “Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism: Hans J. Morgenthau on the ethics of scholarship,” Review of International Studies 34 (2008): 10.
72 Cozette, “Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism,” 12. 73 Greenberg, The Weimar Century, 212.
Vietnam. It is the intellectual’s task to point out misconceptions in international politics. Thus, at a time when liberalism dominated American foreign policy Morgenthau pointed out the necessity of relying on power rather than (in Morgenthau’s eyes) idealist perceptions of international cooperation. The other way around, when there was an overreliance on hard power, Morgenthau pointed out the importance of the political realties and context necessary for effective policy.
Morgenthau’s commitment to speaking truth to power is interesting especially with regard to the fact that his classical realism had often been referred to as a conservative discipline. Attacked by critical theorists and constructivists for being ‘problem-solving’ rather than ‘critical,’ realism is often perceived as a power-tool for the elite and a means of preserving the status quo.74 A stubbornly steadfast misconception, these views equate Morgenthau’s
classical realism with the more structural approaches of neorealism. Classical realism, however, tends to have a strong critical dimension, something that is supported by Morgenthau’s lifelong quest to “speak truth to power.”75
Within the field of international relations theory there seems to be a persistent antithetical relation between “realism” as a term, and being “critical.” These terms, however, are not paradoxical; perceiving them in this way does not do justice to the critical dimensions of Morgenthau’s theory, and realism’s inherent characteristics of being critical of the status quo and those who yield power. It is this critical aspect that spurred his powerful opposition toward the Vietnam War and misuses of power. While power exists at the center of classical realism, a strict normative framework restrains it from accepting excesses of power.
For the complicated relationship between truth and power, and its critical aspects it is worth looking back at Politics Among Nations. Here, Morgenthau strongly cautioned for the deceptions of power: ‘The true nature of the policy is concealed by ideological justifications and rationalizations.”76 Power, therefore,
will always try to appear morally “right” in order to hide its true colors. 74 Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders.” Neorealism and its
Critics, ed. R. Keohane. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986): 209.
75 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 16.
Morgenthau explicitly warned not to accept these rationalizations as truth. He “repeatedly stresses that the use of moral claims by states is always to be regarded as a disguise for power politics, and consequently denounced as such: power lies when it pretends to be the embodiment of Truth or Justice.”77 This is in
part why Morgenthau was so opposed to the ideological rhetoric of the Cold War; it was not an ideological battle that drove the conflict, but rather the change in the balance of power after the end of the Second World War, and the resulting bipolarity of the international system.
This commitment to recognizing the true nature of power, drawing back on the Nietzschean legacy of seeing the world as it is, makes realism especially well suited to confront power when it behaves wrongly. In Morgenthau’s view this meant behaving in ways other than in the national interest. Therefore, rather than just explaining power, Morgenthau was also very much concerned with the way in which power tends to deceive and pretends to be truth, and the necessity of political theory to unveil this deception. As Murielle Cozette has convincingly argued, “by permanently reminding power that it lies when it pretends to embody Truth or Justice, a realist theory is in essence a critical weapon turned against power.”78 That Morgenthau’s realist theory has a highly
critical side to it became very clear during the Vietnam War.
3. Vietnam: A Realist’s Nightmare
If a desire for power and selfishness are inherent in human nature, this becomes compelling basis for explaining conflict. Translating this to a global environment, international politics becomes the struggle for power, the argument that
Morgenthau advanced in Politics Among Nations. While this seemingly purports a perception of politics as an immoral free for all, in actuality the importance of political ethics has always had a presence within Morgenthau’s thought. This is 77 Cozette, “Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism,” 10.
found both in the aforementioned duty of the intellectual to speak up against power when its application is faulty, as well as in the importance of adhering to the standards of political ethics by acting in the national interest on the part of the statesman. Morgenthau clearly expressed both of these visions in his decade-long critique on the Vietnam War.
3.1 Vietnam and the “Death of the Statesman”79
The rejection of the scientific methods of political thought and action, explained in Scientific Man versus Power Politics in 1946, remained relevant in the wake of the Vietnam War. The idea of the statesman as the one safeguarding political ethics in international politics, balancing the interest driven world of the international political system with the moral ethics in choosing the path of the lesser evil, turned out to be untenable. The reality of American foreign policy in the wake of the Vietnam War showed the split between Morgenthau’s idealist vision of the statesman and the realities of foreign policy formation, and with that, of human nature.
The Vietnam War showed the limits of the statesman’s idealism. As Morgenthau later acknowledged, he had been naïve.
“I remember with wry amusement my strenuous and ultimately
unsuccessful efforts in 1965 to bring my views on the Vietnam War to the attention of President Johnson — efforts undertaken in the naïve
assumption that if power were only made to see the truth, it would follow that lead.”80
Where the scientific man is too focused on explaining everything from a highly rational perspective, the reality of American foreign policy showed that the idea of the ethical statesman was too idealistically inclined. In reality, political
experience showed that power dominated truth in the American political apparatus, however rational – ironically – the political criticisms, expressed by 79 Douglas B. Klusmeyer “Death of the Statesman as Tragic Hero: Hans
Morgenthau on the Vietnam War,” Ethics & International Affairs 30 (2016): 63. 80 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 5.
many intellectuals, were. Morgenthau and his contemporaries learned this the hard way, when they realized that “power positions do not yield to arguments, however rationally and morally valid, but only to superior power.”81 This leads to
continuity of policy that is favored by the powers-that-be, even if such policy is morally and rationally unjust.
Morgenthau’s Vietnam critique shed further light on his understanding of the relationship between power and truth as well as between theory and policy, and the practical gap therein. Many of his arguments against the policy in Vietnam can be drawn back to the basis of his political thought in Scientific Man
versus Power Politics. Central here is Morgenthau’s rejection of any universal
approach to international politics, as well as the increased militarization of American policy due to the institutionalization of the national security state. These developments affect the relation between truth and power and the possibility for triumph of truth over power.
Morgenthau’s perception of power and his understanding of the political system drove his opposition to American foreign policy since the early Cold War years. When President Harry S. Truman declared in 1947 that “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,”
Morgenthau immediately became highly critical of what later became known as the Truman Doctrine.82 Essentially taking the fight against communism to a
global level, the Truman Doctrine would become the foundation of an American Cold War policy that would last for most of the second half of the twentieth century. Expanded into a grand strategy that would become known as
containment – which aimed at structurally preventing the spread of international communism – the Truman Doctrine continued to dominate American foreign policy throughout the Cold War, especially during the 1950s and 1960s.
At the core of Morgenthau’s opposition to the Truman Doctrine and the subsequent global containment policy was the universalistic notion of protecting 81 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 5.
82 Truman Doctrine, 1947; Douglas B. Klusmeyer, “The American Republic, Executive Power and the National Security State: Hannah Arendt’s and Hans Morgenthau’s Critiques of the Vietnam War,” Journal of International Political
all “free peoples.” Morgenthau was very critical regarding the trend of treating a great variety of regions as if they were similar. From the early 1950s onward, Morgenthau warned against this universal approach to communism in Europe and in the rest of the world, mainly in Asia.83 He argued that it was important to
consider the differences in political context in the regions, and the necessity for taking different political action that flows from these differences.84 For
Morgenthau, the American intervention in Vietnam was clearly grounded in this idea of the global containment of communism, without taking into account the particularities of the specific situation. American policy thus ignored what Morgenthau considered to be the most important task of the statesman: to be guided by circumstances in the crafting of morally sound political action.85
While Morgenthau supported containment of the Soviet Union, he strongly opposed it in Asia. He, in contrast to many American policymakers, actively zoned in on the contextual differences between the two regions.
According to Morgenthau, containment of the Soviet Union was a valid strategy due to the USSR being an imperialist power with territorial ambitions that could easily spill over to other countries in the European region.86 Communism an sich
was not the threat, Morgenthau argued, but the expansionist tendencies of the USSR were.87 Europe was a strategically important region for the United States
and it was therefore in the country’s national interest to make sure the balance of power stayed intact. A militarily strategy based on hard power and the display of strength was therefore fitting for the specific situation. Revolution in Asia,
however, had much more to do with genuine nationalist fervor against continued governmental oppression than with international communism.88 Morgenthau
83 See, “A Prophet without Honor,” 419; Michael Cox, “Hans J. Morgenthau, Realism, and the Rise and Fall of the Cold War,” 180.
84 Klusmeyer, “The American Republic, Executive Power and the National Security State,” 72.
85 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 220-21.
86 Lorenzo Zambernardi, “The Impotence of Power: Morgenthau’s Critique of American Intervention in Vietnam,” Review of International Studies 37 (2011): 1340.
87 Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a new Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of
Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003):
68.
88 Alan Gilbert, Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999): 67; Zambernardi, “The Impotence of Power,” 1343; Cox,
