"This was not an Irish referendum, but it might as well have been”
On security, Brexit and the shared Irish border
Emma C. Bakels S1909126
Crisis and Security Management Cohort February 2017
15,407 words
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Abstract
On 26 June 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. The vote does not only significantly impact the United Kingdom itself, but also its close neighbour the Republic of Ireland. The two countries have strong ties, both on the economic and societal level. Not only is an exit from the European Union unprecedented it will also drastically change the situation on the Irish island; where the United Kingdom has its only land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This shared border between the Republic and the North is much disputed and has been at the centre of many a conflict.
This research does not investigate the macro effects of a potential Brexit for (Northern) Ireland, as it is impossible to say, and thus research, what the future will look like.
Instead, this research investigates the impact the Brexit referendum has already made on the way youth on the Irish island perceives ‘security’, most particularly in relation to the shared border. It explores many emotions relating to economic security, physical security, (self-)identification and the island’s troubled past.
Ultimately, it finds that the referendum has already made a lasting impression on the perceptions on both sides of the border, namely a growing insecurity regarding the future and a growing ‘border in the mind’.
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Acknowledgements
First, in the Netherlands, I would like to thank my supervisor at the University of Leiden, Myriam Benraad, for reminding to keep asking the question “what do you want to know?”.
Second, I would like to extend my thanks to Stijn Bijleveld at the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Dublin, for helping me find a focus at the earliest stages of the research process. I would like to thank Kyle Hughes at the Ulster University in Coleraine, Gordon Ramsey at the Queen’s University in Belfast, Stefanie Wojtek at University College in Cork and Bernadette Connaughton at the University of Limerick – for assisting me with the logistics of my research in an unknown and foreign country. I would also like to thank Martinus Leendert Verschoor for having me in Dublin for those five weeks of field research and for brainstorming with me.
Third, I would like to thank Nora Trench Bowles at the European Movement Ireland and Patrick Smyth at The Irish Times for meeting me, answering my questions and explaining the fragile dynamics of Brexit and the Irish island to me with such knowledge and patience.
Fourth, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to all 570 respondents who took the time to participate in my research. Special gratitude goes to the 14 of them who participated in one of the focus groups, and the 9 further respondents who answered these follow up questions online.
This thesis could not have come about without assistance and participation from any of you. Thank you for all that you have told me, taught me and showed me.
3 Abstract 1 Acknowledgements 2 1. Introduction 4 2. Methodology 7 2.1 Research design 7 2.2 Sample 8 2.3 Survey methods 11 2.4 Geospatial limitation 12 2.5 Analysis 14
2.6 Reliability and Validity 14
2.7 Ethical concerns 14
2.8 Pitfalls 15
3. Theoretical framework 16
3.1 Constructivism 16
3.2 Border theory 16
3.3 Othering and Nationalism 18
3.4 Security 20
3.5 Perception 21
3.6 the case of the Irish isle 22
4. Analysis 26
4.1 The respondents 26
4.2 Border 29
4.3 Violence & peace 34
4.4 United Ireland 37
4.5 Socio-economic factors 40
5. Conclusion 46
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1. Introduction
After nearly two decades of relative peace, political turmoil has resurfaced on the Irish and British Isles. In June 2016, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland held a referendum on whether or not to exit the European Union, in which was decided in favour of ‘Brexit’ with a 51.9% majority. The vote caused uproar throughout the European Union, as an exit is unprecedented. However, it can be argued that the biggest shock, outside the UK itself, was experienced in Ireland – it was not an Irish referendum, but it might as well have been.1
The Republic of Ireland shares a much-disputed land border with the United Kingdom. The border on the Irish island is the only land border of the UK with another country and it was the centrepiece of the Troubles – a civil conflict in the second half of the 20th century between unionists and republicans in Northern Ireland. In 1998, the governments of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, in the context of their membership to European Union, signed the Good Friday Agreements, which put the Troubles to rest.2
Following the 2016 Brexit vote, the British Conservative Party sought to expand their majority in the House of Commons by calling preliminary elections. These elections failed to achieve that goal and the Conservative Party of Theresa May found themselves looking for a partner to maintain their majority. This resulted in a controversial cooperation with the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).3
The cooperation between the British government and the DUP is controversial, as the Good Friday Agreements state an impartial role for the British government. This impartiality is hard to match with the cooperation in the House of Commons. Moreover, the political controversy does not occur in a vacuum. It comes at a time when the Irish are already uneasy with the prospect of a further divided Irish island post Brexit. With the DUP supporting the pro-Brexit government, Irish unease about their future might be grounded – after all, the DUP is in favour of a Brexit and in favour of the current divided Ireland, whereas the interests of the Republicans and the Irish are for
1 T. Connolly, “Brexit & Ireland - The Dangers, the Opportunities, and the Inside Story of the Irish Response”, Dublin:
Penguin Ireland (2017), page 2
2 J. Ruane, “The dynamics of conflict in Northern Ireland: power, conflict and emancipation”, Cambridge: University
Press (1996)
3 UK Prime Minister’s Office, “Policy Paper - Confidence and Supply Agreement between the Conservative and
Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party - 26 June 2017”, through https://tinyurl.com/ycsd2gss, last viewed on 13 September 2017
5 the full island to remain European with as little separation as possible.4 This destabilisation of the political environment on the Isle adds to the lingering sentiments of rivalry between republicans and loyalists and is further becoming apparent by the discontinuation of the power sharing agreement between the republican party Sinn Fein and the DUP in the Northern Irish Assembly, in early 2017. The British government threatened an ultimatum, or it will install direct rule – which leads to another friction with the Good Friday Agreements. The peace agreement dictates a consultative role for the Irish government in the running of the British region. However, the call for such influence by the Irish Foreign minister in the case of direct rule was been shut down by London.
Adding to the existing uncertainties, is the Joint Report as presented in December 2017 by the negotiating parties in Brussels. The document ought to provide clarity on three crucial issues in the Brexit process: citizens’ rights, the border issue and the so-called divorce bill. Agreement over these three topics would mean sufficient progress to continue the negotiations in other areas. However, shortly after its publishing, the chief Brexit negotiator for the British government downplayed the Joint Report to a mere “statement of intent”. Moreover, the agreements laid out in the Joint Report are fully dependent on the outcomes of a possible, future trade deal. Thus, the uncertainty for so many Irish and Brits continues.
A Brexit is scheduled for May 2019, though experts differ about the feasibility of this planning. For now, the Irish isle remains the same as before the Brexit vote. However, given the aforementioned controversies and disputes about Ireland, Brexit and the shared border, it can be argued that even the Brexit vote of 2016 has already had a major influence on the local politics and the perceptions and expectations of the people – on both sides of the border. These influences can be seen on all levels of society; from an institutional, such as local politics, to an individual level, in one’s perceptions and expectations of current events and the developments of the future.
This thesis will take a look at the impact of the 2016 Brexit vote on the individual level, specifically, the changes in the personal perception that occurred due to the Brexit referendum.
Admitted, Brexit has already been widely discussed in disparate of settings. These discussions often focus on the national and governmental level – what would a Brexit mean for the countries on the Irish isle as a whole?5 What would Brexit do for (or rather, ‘to’) the (Northern) Irish economy?6
4
D. Foster, “Could Theresa May’s pact with the DUP lead to a united Ireland?”, The Guardian, 29 May 2018
6 Even when such research does manage to penetrate to the individual level, it remains within a top-down approach – the application of macro findings to the micro level. This thesis aims at a bottom-up approach: to start by talking to the individuals about how they think, or perhaps fear, Brexit may, or may not, influence their lives. This application to the personal level is highly relevant, as many of the policy decisions to be made regarding Brexit will have a direct effect on the lives of the people in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Moreover, especially in the case of Brexit, where many feel their voice has gone unheard, the personal perceptions of citizens affected by such a historical decision are worth examining.
During the development of this thesis, there was a lack of work focussing on the topic of the shared border, rather than consequences for the topics of economy and trade. Furthermore, research on an individual, personal level was still lacking in the body of knowledge regarding the Irish island and Brexit. During the research process, however, a similar research was published by the Queen’s University Belfast, surveying the border communities in both states. Though similar, this current thesis and the ‘Bordering on Brexit’ research will complement each other and start to fill the aforementioned gap in the body of knowledge together. The Queen’s University’s research focuses on the border communities and has a sample with an average age of 30+, whereas this study does not focus on the border region specifically but rather on the island as a whole, and surveys only 19 – 24 years old.
This thesis investigates the impact of the Brexit vote on the individual, young, (Northern) Irish people. Their perception of the shared border and security are at the centre of this study. In order to assess the impact of Brexit on the (perception of) security and the shared border, in which ‘the border’ can be seen as symbolic for other types of security issues arising, this thesis aims to answer the following research question: to what extent did the result of the June 2016 Brexit vote influence
the perception of security in relation to the shared border amongst (Northern) Irish youth?
First, the methodology will be explained. Second, the Theoretical Framework will give insight into the complex (historical) context. Third, the analysis will discuss several themes in order to understand the question at hand: the border itself, the violent history, politics and socio-economic factors. Fourth, the research question will be reflected upon and answered in the conclusion.
6 For example: “Brexit, Northern Ireland and the Island Economy: An Update” IIEA, “The economic consequences of
Brexit: a taxing decision” OECD, “Scoping the Possible Economic Implications of Brexit on Ireland” RTÉ ,
“Modelling the Medium to Long Term Potential Macroeconomic Impact of Brexit on Ireland” ESRI, and “Brexit and its Impact on the Irish Economy” National Treasury Management Agency.
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2. Methodology
This chapter explains the design and set up of this research, as well as all the choices made to get to the methodology mentioned below.
2.1 Research design
This research was conducted along a mixed methods research design. Quantitative methods were used to process and analyse the questionnaires, whereas qualitative methods were used for the following group and expert interviews. More about these survey methods can be found in section 2.3.
These mixed methods also dictate it to be a cross case study, as many different respondents were asked to participate. It concerns a longitudinal research design as it measures perceptions of different time periods.
2.1.1 Unit of analysis and observation
The unit of analysis in the research is the group level of the Irish society, and more particularly the group level of youth from both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, between the ages of 19 and 24.
The unit of observation are the individual respondents, from this group, participating in this study and providing the most important data.
2.1.2 Data collection
The data for this research was collected using triangulation of methods, by using both qualitative and quantitative methods. First, a short, historic analysis is given in combination with a theoretical framework, to paint the context of the current research.
Second, new data has been gathered through a questionnaire and group interviews with (Northern) Irish youth about their perceptions. Several variables were questioned in order to get a complete picture of both their perceptions, but also the factors that form this perception. These variables will be further explained in section 2.4.1.
8 Finally, individual interviews with experts on the topic were held to discuss the emotions and perceptions that surfaced in the questionnaire and group interviews. This is not in any way to discrete or validate the perceptions of the respondents. In talking to experts on the topic, the aim is to see to what extent these perceptions are related to reality or are perhaps rather formed by other factors. This is to be able to link the personal experiences of the respondents back to the reality of the due Brexit.
This method of data collection allows for a thorough understanding of the different perceptions and expectations amongst participants, while at the same time keeping in touch with the reality and facts of the Brexit developments.
2.2 Sample
The participants for the online survey are young Irish people, in the age category of 19 to 24 years old. This group was selected because they grew up after the ending of the Troubles with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. As they did not experience the Troubles themselves, but only know them from second hand stories, the expectation is that their ideas and perceptions will be less coloured than those of someone who actively remembers the Troubles. Moreover, these young adults are the generation of the future – the generation which will rule over the Irish isle in a post-Brexit era. In order to get the best results, only people of Irish upbringing will be asked to participate – Irish or British nationality is not required in this.
19 to 24-year olds as a target group are relatively easily reached through universities and/or on campus. To illustrate: over 50% was enrolled in an Irish university in 2015 – 2016.7 It would be rather difficult to find such a high concentration of the target group elsewhere. Therefore, promotions were predominantly focused on universities and colleges in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It is important to note that the study is not limited to people enrolled in (higher) education – anyone who matched the age criteria could participate. Students were encouraged to share the survey in their own networks, as to further include people who are currently not attending university but do fit the age group identified for this study. Additionally, I used my personal network in Ireland to distribute the survey and I made use of social media in order to reach locals whom are outside of the university and/or my own network. For this, I have
7 UK Department of Economy, “Enrolments at UK Higher Education Institutions: Northern Ireland Analysis 2015/16”,
through https://tinyurl.com/yddx8xfz and Higher Education Authority (HEA), “Statistics”, through
9 contacted over 150 admins of local Irish Facebook groups and was given permission to promote the survey online. These Facebook groups may be targeted at the student population of each city, but also include unrelated groups such as ‘buy and sell’ groups. The use of differentiated Facebook groups increases the chances of reaching Irish respondents from all backgrounds, and not just higher educated ones. The survey was also shared in generic Reddit threats, frequently visited by a random sample of Reddit users. Last, local universities were contacted and asked for help and advice. For this to have the best effect, lecturers and staff of relevant departments have been personally contacted and asked to share the survey with students. This channel has also been used for further assistance with the logistics of the research (such as interview locations).
In order to motivate participation, two gift cards were raffled off to one respondent from the Republic, and one from the North. This is only applicable for participants who leave their email addresses at the end of the survey.
2.2.1 Sample size
In 2016, The Republic of Ireland had a population of 4,757,976 people.8 The target group, 19 to 24-year olds, made up for 7% of the total Irish population, with 331,208 people. That same 24-year, 179,850 people were registered as full-time students at one of the 43 universities or colleges supported by the Department of Education & Skills in the Republic of Ireland. They made up for 3,8% of the Irish population and, assuming that all these students match the target group, for 54,3% of the 19 to 24-year olds in the Republic of Ireland.
Total population Sample population Students
Republic of Ireland 4,757,976 331,208 7% of total population 179,850 3,8% of total population 54,3% of sample Northern Ireland 1,862,136 142,629 7,7% of total population 114,735 6,2% of total population 80,4% of sample Total Irish island 6,620,112 473,837 7,3% of total population 294,585 4,5% of total population 62,2% of sample
In 2016, Northern Ireland had a population of 1,862,136 people.9 The target group made up for 7,7% of the total Northern Irish population, with 142,629 people. That same year, 114,735 people
8 Central Statistics Office (CSO), ‘Census 2016 profile 3’, via http://www.cso.ie/en/statistics/population/, last viewed
on 20 September 2017
9
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA), ‘Population per year 2011 – 2016’, via
10 were registered as full-time students in Northern Ireland.10 They made up for 6,2% of the Northern Irish population and, assuming that all these students match the target group, for 80,4% of the 19 to 24-year olds in Northern Ireland.
Combined, there were 6,620,112 people living on the Irish isle in 2016, of which 294,585 enrolled in higher education. 473,837 of the total fit this research’s target group of 19 to 24-year olds. The sample size is set to be 0.1% of this target group, with a maximum deviation of 10%. The required number of respondents thus results in a minimum of 427 people (298 in the Republic of Ireland, and 129 in Northern Ireland).
In total, 570 responses were recorded for the questionnaire of which 366 respondents grew up in the Republic of Ireland, 196 in Northern Ireland, 2 respondents spent their formative years on both sides of the border and 5 respondents have indicated to have grown up elsewhere, of whom 1 in the United Kingdom. Together, the respondents represent all 32 counties on the Emerald Isle and make up 0,12% of the sample population. All respondents are equally spread across the selected age range as well as the gender spectrum. These statistics can be found in the survey results in appendix 2 and the figure below.
10
Department of Education, via https://www.education-ni.gov.uk/articles/qualifications, last viewed on 22 September 2017
11 2.3 Survey methods
2.3.1 Online questionnaire
An online questionnaire (using a Likert scale) has been conducted about the way young people experience and perceive the border, the ‘other’ Ireland, Irish politics, religion and how their background plays a role in their perception on both sides of the border. The list of questions can be found in appendix 1.
The Likert scale questions are used to gain insights into the variables. First, questions were asked concerning the control variables - the context of the respondent. These are factors rather unrelated to the intervening and/or (in)dependent variables, and include but are not limited to: knowledge, religion and individual decision making. These questions mostly relate to the period between the end of the Troubles and the Brexit vote, thus 1998 – 2015 which correspondents with the majority if not all of the respondents’ childhoods and formative years. This context may influence the answers to the dependent variable questions. Next, the dependent variables will be questioned. These may have changed due to the Brexit vote, and relate to the perceptions of the individual respondents. The independent variables are the focus of the research and will be asked in order to assist with the interpretation of the questionnaire. They concern the time period shortly before the Brexit vote until now (2016 – present). Last, several questions were asked to determine how the respondent currently views the situation on the Irish isle.
Perception, in this research, is measured not by questioning the perceptions themselves, but by asking questions relating to the perceived objects such as safety and security and the respondents’ thoughts about the shared border.
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2.4.2 Follow up interviews
A group interview per city has been conducted in order to ask open questions relating to the survey topics. These interviews were meant to provide the researcher with more insights into the indicated perceptions. Participants for the group interviews were found through the online questionnaire. The online survey opened 3 weeks prior to the group interviews to leave room to tailor the follow up questions. The interviews were held in four out of the seven university cities: Coleraine, Belfast, Cork and Limerick. The other three cities – Waterford, Letterkenny and Dublin – proved to be logistically unfeasible. Respondents from these three remaining cities were asked to participate in the follow up through another online questionnaire. Questions for the follow up interviews were drawn up based on the preliminary results of the online questionnaire and are attached to the thesis in appendix 3. The results of the online questionnaire can be found in appendix 2.
Where the online questionnaire was chronological organised, the line of questioning for the group interviews was organised thematically. The interview opened with a round of headlines to be discussed, which functioned as an icebreaker for the respondents, after which it progressively moved towards heavier subjects regarding taboos, security, the border and Brexit.
Prior to the group interviews, all participants were asked to answer questions about their opinion on the topic of the research. The codified replies can be found in at the beginning of each transcript. The transcripts of the interviews can be found in appendix 5 through 10.
2.3.3 In depth interview
Individual in-depth interviews with experts regarding the survey topics were held. The interviewees were asked to shed a light, from their respective professional areas of expertise, to add to the understanding and interpretation of the perception. Questions for these interviews are attached to the thesis in appendix 11. The interview transcripts with Nora Trench Bowles of the European Movement Ireland and Patrick Smyth of The Irish Times can be found in appendix 12 and 13.
2.4 Geospatial limitation
The following cities have been selected for participation in this research for the group interviews: • Republic of Ireland: Limerick, Dublin, Cork, Waterford, Letterkenny (5)
13 The research was not limited to only these cities – meaning that respondents from other areas, cities or towns were not refused participation. These seven cities however were the prime logistical focus of the research and were thus the main focus of promoting the surveys and conducting the group interviews. Together, these cities and their universities provide both geospatial and socio-economic spread. Sampling young people in these cities, in combination with the people outside of the main cities who may also participate, provides a fair representation of the sample on the Irish island.
2.4.1 Justification
Several choices had to be made to come to the mentioned selection of cities. Preferably, no choices would have to been made at all, but given the limited time and resources available it was to the benefit of the research to limit where possible, without harming the data collection.
In Northern Ireland, a selection had to be made out of the three main university cities. (London)Derry and Belfast were the initial choices, for their spread across the country as well as (London)Derry’s proximity to the border. However, diversification of the responses is another important factor in the selection of participating cities. (London)Derry and Belfast both have a rather intense history in relation to the events of the Troubles, whereas this is less applicable for the third city, Coleraine. A part of the research focuses on the context of the respondents - by choosing Coleraine over (London)Derry, different contexts were covered. The chances of a young person's family from Coleraine being directly affected by events relating to the Troubles (in any way) were deemed smaller than for (London)Derry or Belfast, thus diversifying the sample. The proximity to the border was a 'sacrifice' to make in the case of Northern Ireland.
Another choice to be made concerns the Republic of Ireland, where all cities are on the outskirts of the island. The choice that had to be made was between two cities in particular: Letterkenny (Co. Donegal) and Athlone (Co. Westmeath). Even though Athlone would have covered the inlands of the Republic, the geographical location of Letterkenny was deemed more valuable for the research due to its remoteness as well as its proximity to the border with Northern Ireland. Keeping in mind the motivation to diversify the sample, it is expected that responses from Letterkenny will differ more from the average than responses from Athlone would. The towns are comparable in size and both have one major educational institution.
14 2.5 Analysis
The analysis consists of a combination of multiple sources. First, the survey data was analysed through Qualtrics using quantitative methods, to determine whether relationships can be found between various factors, such a geographic location, religion and political views.11
Second, the found relationships are supported through arguments made in and/or based on the group interviews conducted. Quotes from these interviews are used to illustrate certain sentiments, experiences or facts related to the topics of the argumentation.
Third, the combined analysis of the survey and interviews is further supported with theories as presented in the theoretical framework, and new insights from supporting literature. As it is an ever-developing subject, news sources and think tanks will also be consulted for analysis input.
2.6 Reliability and Validity
Because it concerns the personal perception of individual participants in this research, which may change as the context of the research is developing, answers to a similar study at another point in time may be different. To compensate for this, the questions are put into context by the interviews. The two measuring points in time will increase the reliability of the combined answers.
During these interviews, specifically, participants were asked to indicate “us/them” on a map of the Irish island. This is a survey method that can easily be recreated at another point in time and would generate the same responses. Moreover, it contributes to the researchers understanding of the views of the respondent on the Irish isle and particular in relation to the shared border.
The validity of this research is guaranteed through triangulation – by approaching the same study with three different methods, the validity of the research can be secured. Instead of approaching it from one side, the topic is approached from multiple sides which are all aimed to overlap. This forces the researcher to stay exactly on topic, and the methods verify each other.
2.7 Ethical concerns
There are several ethical concerns at play when conducting social research. First, the questionnaire asks respondents to provide details about their backgrounds. As these are private subjects which respondents may not want to disclose, they have the option to ‘rather not say’. However, the
15 questions are essential for the study as these factors draw up the context of the respondent and thus influence the answers in the rest of the questionnaire. Therefore, the questions remain in the survey but answering can be avoided should a respondent want to. Last, should participants choose to provide the information, they are guaranteed that all data gathered will be processed anonymously.
Respondents are requested to give their informed consent at the beginning of both the survey and the interview. For the online questionnaire, it is a short introduction text about the research which informs the respondents of their guaranteed privacy and anonymity as well as the option to withdraw from the questionnaire at any given point. For the interviews, it is similar in the shape of a signed form. The text can be found in appendix 1 and 3.
2.8 Pitfalls
Several pitfalls have been identified for this research project. First, this study only looks at 19 to 24-year olds, of which mostly students, while national populations vary greatly in age groups. People who do actively remember may still see Northern Ireland differently. These people will also be the ones currently holding (governmental) positions of importance. Regardless of the target group being the generation of a post-Brexit future, transition of power from generation to generation goes slowly. Therefore, this study may only show part of reality.
Second, the topic is one of constant developments. This could disqualify the research relevance. However, even though the changes in the Brexit developments are high in number, they are not fast. This means that it will take quite some time before the actual future becomes clear, and for these perceptions, emotions and expectations to become outdated. Moreover, even if the study is not relevant anymore in a near future, it still is highly relevant now and worth the research.
Third, the sample size ought to be taken with a grain of salt. Even though all numbers are based on official governmental documents from both countries, it is difficult to determine the actual correct numbers relevant for this research. For example, not all enrolled students fit the age group. Furthermore, not all students may be of either Irish nor British origin, and not all people in the selected age group may study in (Northern) Ireland. However, looking at an age group as a whole, instead of only a studying fraction of it, will give a better representation of either national population and their emotions. Variations are expected to be low as it is common in Ireland and the United Kingdom to finish studies at once – which would mean that students start and finish their formal education within the limits of the selected age group.
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3. Theoretical framework
This theoretical chapter aims to provide the research of a very practical topic with academic roots and a more scientific foundation. The chapter is written following this funnelling scheme:
Constructivism General border theory
Borders & othering Security Irish island Irish isle & the EU 3.1 Constructivism
Perception – a construct, and not per se factual – forms the cornerstone of the analysis in this research. Constructivism lines up with the study of perception, as perceptions are ideas about the world around us, formed not because it is pushed on individuals, but because of their interpretation of their context. This applies to both micro and macro studies.12 Hence, perceptions may vary from one individual to another, and may change over time as ideas are (re)shaped.
This thesis research deals with mainly constructs – that of borders, but also of identity and security. This chapter aims to explain these constructs, as well as link them to the case at hand: the shared border on the Irish island.
3.2 Border theory
3.2.1 a fixed demarcation
Borders can be seen as physical demarcations of territory, often that of a state.13 A border, in this sense, is nothing more than a line where one state ends and the next begins. In relation to this definition, ‘state’ and ‘society’, otherwise known as a nation, are almost synonymous – resulting in borders being the demarcation between one nation-state and another. This definition is especially true in the context of mid-20th century, after the Second World War but before the surge of globalisation. After the War, the state apparatus expanded and state intervention in society became the norm. These nation-states were deemed rather self-reliant as everything of importance
12 R.H. Jackson & G. Sørensen , “Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches”, Oxford:
University Press (2010)
17 happened within their society. Everything outside, including the borders demarking the nation-state, were ignored.14 However, with the rise of consumerism and globalisation in the second half of the 20th century, states were no longer able to maintain their protectionist attitudes. Instead, cross-border cooperation and communications were becoming more and more a requirement for the ever-growing global economy. The understanding of borders as merely demarcations, started to fail.
3.2.2 a dynamic process
Alternatively, borders can be seen as a dynamic process. Even though the world is becoming more and more borderless, the boundaries between nation states are not disappearing as much as their physical equivalents.15 As much as borders are based on these demarcations, they have also become a social construct – a divide between what happens on ‘this’ and ‘the other’ side of the border, a border in the mind.16 According to Newman, borders should not be seen as just the physical separation of nation-states, but as a process. ‘Bordering’, as this process is to be called, concerns not the physical separation, but the process through which borders are socially constructed and through which the separation between identities is created.17
3.2.3 the unique border situation on the Emerald isle
Regardless of whether borders are seen as static demarcations or dynamic processes, such theories on bordering often concern the organic growth of states through nation building: society – the ‘nation’ – and state eventually fall within the same borders. However, the matter becomes less clear in the case of colonial borders, or separatist states. In these cases, many nations are, to this day, still in active pursuit of their own state, or any other revision of current borders.18 As in the Irish case, the border did not form naturally over time, but was imposed by the British ‘colonial’ power along the extremities of the majority of the Ulster province counties on the isle. Alternatively, the specially founded Boundary Commission had the option to include all republican electorates in the
14 J. Anderson, L. O’Dowd & T.M. Wilson, ‘Why study borders now?’, Regional and Federal Studies, 2002 (12) 15 D. Newman, ‘The lines that continue to separate us - borders in a borderless world’, Progress in Human Geography,
2006 (30)
16 C. Gormley-Heenan & A. Aughey, ‘Northern Ireland and Brexit: three effects on the ‘border in the mind’’, The
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2017 (19)
17 D. Newman, ‘The lines that continue to separate us - borders in a borderless world’, Progress in Human Geography,
2006 (30)
18 newly formed Irish Free State (currently the Republic of Ireland). However, British rulers feared this would leave Northern Ireland unviable. Therefore, parts of the same identity group were caught on the other side of the border. It can thus be said that bordering Ireland was never a process - instead, it was a hasty and static demarcation in order to swiftly end the Irish war of independence.19
It is this niche in the study of border constructs – a rather problematic colonial border in the modern Western world - that will be addressed in this research.
3.3 Othering and Nationalism
3.3.1 othering
The construct of borders does not only imply a separation between two peoples equally. Borders limit the society within a confined geographical space, the ‘us’ or ‘we’ of a nation state. However, ‘us’ cannot exist without ‘them’ – the other side of the border. Thus, not only does a border separate the nation states of each other, it also differentiates the ‘us’ from ‘them’ – making the two sides of the border unequal in each other’s perspective.20
This is known as othering, a process that can be both passive and active. In the passive sense, ‘othering’ means that a separation is formed between two groups, whether they once used to belong to the same group or not. Examples of passive othering may be the formation of a border between east and west Germany after the Second World War, or the indoctrination of Hutu’s and Tutsi’s which led to the Rwandan genocide.21
Active othering might follow in its footsteps, which Weis defines as the “process to mark and name those considered different from oneself”.22
Besides there being a difference between active or passive other, there is also a division between inclusionary and exclusionary othering. According to Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, bordering is inherently paradoxical. On the one hand, borders are used to take away any ambiguity regarding territories and identities in an attempt to create a nation state. It can be said this process rejects ‘othering’ as it is inclusionary. On the other hand, these borders are an important instrument
19
K.J. Rankin, ‘The role of the Irish boundary commission in the entrenchment of the Irish border: from tactical panacea to political liability’, Journal of Historical Geography, 2008 (34)
20 J. Agnew, ‘Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking’, Ethics & Global Politics, 2008 (1)
21 M.K. Canales, ‘Othering, towards an understanding of Difference’, Advances in Nursing Science, 2000 (4) 22
L. Weis, ‘Identity Formation and the Processes of "Othering": Unraveling Sexual Threads’, Educational
19 in the process of othering, by erecting not only physical but also more symbolic and social boundaries between two groups on either side of the border – making it an exclusionary process.23
The process of othering on the Irish island started before the introduction of the border, separating North from South. Before the division of the island in the early 20th century, two groups were already to be distinguished which actively ‘othered’ each other based on heritage, culture and religion. So actively, that it led to the political and later more definite physical division of the countries along these lines. The border caught part of the “us” on the wrong side of the border – for both groups.24 The institution of the border continued the process of othering, which could mean that although there is a wish for a united Ireland and a belief in one Irish people, the two current states may have grown apart over the past century, in part due to their difference in political leadership. Whereas the Irish Republic gained the freedom to emphasis Irish and Celtic culture and heritage, the North remained focused on the United Kingdom for its leadership. They may thus have become the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the border process of othering.
This thesis research pays attention to the possible othering effect the border has had on the island of Ireland, while remaining open to all interpretations of nationalism on the isle.
3.3.2 nationalism
The separation of the two, ‘us’ and ‘them’, plus the creation of a nation state, has strong ties to nationalism. The Irish isle makes for an interesting case in this regard, as the border poses such a complex situation. Nationalism refers to the motivation of a people (a nation) to obtain their own state, often based on a shared history, culture and/or language, therefore creating a nation within a state – a nation state.25 However, on the Irish isle, the creation of the border and the two separates states did not satisfy this motivation as one might initially expect. After all, the Irish got their own Republic, and thus created their own nation state. However, not all members of their nation were included in their newly formed state – therefore failing the motivation of Irish nationalism. To this day, the motivation to obtain their own state for the Irish nation, is the source of many political issues on the isle. The border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland is a symbol of these issues.
23 H. van Houtum & T. van Naerssen, ‘Bordering, Ordering and Othering’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale
Geografie, 2002 (2)
24 K.J. Rankin, ‘The role of the Irish boundary commission in the entrenchment of the Irish border: from tactical
panacea to political liability’, Journal of Historical Geography, 2008 (34)
20 The Irish situation is particularly difficult because it there is a long-lasting incongruence about which nation should be in which state. Meaning, nationalism on the island of Ireland may mean several things. First, nationalism in the Republic of Ireland may refer to the wish to maintain the Republic as it is now, consisting of 26 counties. Second, it may also refer to a larger (pan) Irish nationalism, which hopes to see all 32 counties on the island of Ireland united in one state. This strand is strongly related to Irish republicanism – the wish for Northern Ireland to join the Republic of Ireland. Third, there is Northern Irish nationalism – a strand which is not particularly bothered with either the Republic of Ireland or the United Kingdom, but rather with Northern Ireland as a nation state itself. Fourth, there is British nationalism - which in Northern Ireland relates to the desire to remain part of the United Kingdom. This last interpretation is strongly related to loyalism and unionism in Northern Ireland.26
3.4 Security
The construct of borders is closely related to that of security. With the introduction of consumerism and globalisation, borders became obstacles and states were unable to maintain their protectionism without suffering economically. With loosening the concept of borders came the loosening of the concept of security and that to which it is to be applied.27
Accompanying the post-war surge of globalisation, the concept of security was confronted with the reality that nation states were unable to secure themselves in a vacuum. After all, physical borders were disappearing, and more and more components of society were flowing across more symbolic borders. Following, the provision of security has moved towards an international level in recent decades. Nation states need each other in order to provide their own security, as they no longer are, nor can operate, in a vacuum. In this context, borders may be either the central focus of a security debate, or an instrument in the process of securitisation.
3.4.1 Human Security
This research looks beyond the state when it comes to security. It is defined as human security, which approaches security as much more multifaceted than traditional security studies would.
26 J. Ruane, ‘The dynamics of conflict in Northern Ireland: power, conflict and emancipation’, Cambridge: University
Press (1996)
21 Traditionally, security may be defined as the absence of threat or harm to what we hold dear and/or value most.28 This is a broad definition that is applicable to many facets of life, though most commonly only applied in the narrow sense of physical well-being. Security is then often intertwined with safety and charged on the government to provide to its citizens. However, in the broad sense, security can also be interpreted as less related to a physical threat of harm, but as a certainty – to be able to rely on something. In this interpretation, one can include job security, environmental security and financial security. Human Security sits at the crossroads of these interpretations, where it “underscores the universality and interdependence of a set of freedoms that are fundamental to human life: freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity. As a result, human security acknowledges the interlinkages between security, development and human rights and considers these to be the building blocks of human and, therefore, national security”.29
In this thesis, security is assumed in all its facets: national security (the duty of a government or state apparatus to protect their citizens from harm – from both internal and external threats), economic security (in the case of the Irish isle specifically related to trade security and job security) and related to this also financial security (the ability to provide for oneself and their family), as well as personal, physical security (to be free of harm, and able to keep oneself safe).
3.5 Perception
Security and the experience thereof differs from one individual to the next. This is because perception and experience are highly personal factors, which are formed and influenced by the personal context of the individual. Where they grew up, what they have experienced so far in life, who their friends were and their relationship with their parents – these are all factors that influence and/or challenge the way an individual perceives the world around them. This is no different for the topics discussed in this thesis.
How does one define perception? Simply put, it is the collection of emotions such as fear and hope – projected on a certain topic. These emotions are influenced by aforementioned factors. It
28 D.A. Baldwin, ‘Concept of Security’, Review of International Studies, 1997 (23) 29
United Nations, ‘Human Security for All’, through
22 can be said that experience and perception are a construct of individual context.30 Another question that rises when discussing and researching perception, is that of how to measure it. Because the variations differ from one individual to the next, it is hard to draw one model on how to measure perception. However, perception can be measured not by questioning the perception in itself, but through questioning the predetermined factors making it up.
3.5.1 perception of security
This thesis looks at the perceptions of security, the border and the other. Security is an abstract concept, that is often understood on an institutional level. Governments or international institutions are charged with the provision of security to their citizens as though a commodity. However, security is, to a large extent, a construct subjective to perception of the individual citizen. How ‘secure’ a state (or in a globalised world a region) is, does not always correlate with how secure the inhabitants perceive it to be.
This friction in the (perception of) security, in relation to the previously discussed construct of the Irish border, is the primary focus of this research.
3.6 the case of the Irish isle
In the case of the Irish isle, the border has served as both a focus of a security debate, as well as an instrument in the process of securitisation. Over the course of the 19th century, the Irish independence movement grew. Had there been mention of a home rule for Ireland, that quickly changed around the turn of the 20th century when the Irish could not find a common stance in their wishes for an autonomous rule. The situation erupted shortly after the first decade of the 20th century, when the Irish war of Independence broke out. The island was divided along the borders of (most of) the Ulster counties in an attempt to accommodate both sides of the debate. The region of Ulster consists of six counties in the North, which was the historic location of British plantations and therefor predominantly protestant. The Southern part of the island, on the other hand, is composed of predominantly Catholic nationalists. The division of the two Ireland's along these counties became an issue when separation turned into a permanent setting after the Irish war of Independence. The populations on neither side were homogeneous, catching thousands of
30
G. Wachinger, O. Renn, C. Begg & C. Kuhlicke, ‘The risk perception paradox – implications for governance and communication of natural hazards’, Risk Analysis, 2013 (33)
23 republicans and unionist on the ‘wrong’ side of the border. The institution of the Boundary Commission ought to solve the problem, by determining exactly where a fair border would lie. However, including Northern Irish nationalist regions in the newly formed Irish Free State in the South would barely leave anything of the North, and so it was decided to keep the border as it was. This complex history of the Irish border and of Irish identities displays how the border was indeed used to swiftly end the civil war, rather than create a solution of lasting peace.31
It is this exact creation of the border, a process of securitisation, that lead to a move of de-securitisation: the institution of a Common Travel Area (CTA). Because the border did not please many Irish, a solution was needed to keep the border as least invasive as possible in order to maintain the fragile peace.32 As a result, the Common Travel Area was instituted as an open borders area between Ireland and the United Kingdom, meaning that people are able to cross with minimum obstruction and requirements of documents. The CTA was first founded as in informal agreement between the Irish Free State and the British government in the 1920’s. With the institution of the Common Travel Area, the border has again been at the centre of an international play, but this time one focussing on de-securitising the border rather than drawing up both physical and social boundaries in a process of securitisation. Although, it can be argued that the institution of a CTA can be seen as securitisation, too - even though, or especially because, it diminishes the influence of the border on the Irish isle thus leading to less political tensions. 33
Other than a tool to securitise or de-securitise the Irish isle, the border has also been a focus of the security debate itself. This period of security concerns occurred regardless of the CTA, and is most commonly known as the Troubles. This civil conflict in Northern Ireland lasted from the 1960’s until its peace treaty, the Good Friday Agreement, was signed in 1998. The violence was the consequence of decades of tension building up between different subgroups in Northern Irish society.34 Though difficult to define correctly and objectively, the conflict concerned predominantly British, Protestant loyalists who wished to remain with the United Kingdom on one hand, and Irish, Catholic republicans on the other hand who wished to join the Republic of Ireland.
31 J. Ruane, ‘The dynamics of conflict in Northern Ireland: power, conflict and emancipation’, Cambridge: University
Press (1996)
32
G. Anthony, ‘Brexit and the Irish border: Legal and Political Questions’, a Royal Irish Academy & British Academy Brexit Briefing, October 2017
33 G. Anthony, ‘Brexit and the Irish border: Legal and Political Questions’, a Royal Irish Academy & British Academy
Brexit Briefing, October 2017
34
J. Ruane, ‘The dynamics of conflict in Northern Ireland: power, conflict and emancipation’, Cambridge: University Press (1996)
24 Besides strong political motives, the conflict concerned the existence of a border in general – hard or soft. One party wanted to maintain it, the other wanted it removed. During the civil conflict, the border was closed and heavily patrolled by the British army, in a response to attacks of the Irish Republican Army (IRA).35 The Troubles ended with the ceasefire and peace agreements in 1998, though the underlying sentiments are ever present, on both sides of the border. Now that the political environment will have less a stabilising function, these sentiments may rise again in the build-up to a Brexit.
3.6.1 the European Union and the Emerald Isle
The border has long dominated the political environment on the island. There are several reasons why Brexit poses a unique yet challenging situation for this environment.
The first reason is the joint accession to the European Union by the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland in 1973. Prior to this joint accession, the two countries regulated the border themselves in the CTA. Since 1993, the European Single Market prevents checks at inter European borders to advance the internal market – the Irish border included.36 As the two countries joined at the same time, there has never been a situation in which one country was able to rely on the variety of frameworks offered by the European Union while the other was not. Brexit means a first asymmetrical border dynamic.
The importance of the European Union is not limited to the physical border. Besides the joint accession strengthening the ties between the two troubled countries, the accession to the European Union happened when the Troubles were at their most intense in the early 1970’s. The European Union has been actively involved in the peace process on the Emerald isle, which resulted in the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, also known as the Belfast Agreement. This peace agreement depended upon the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland as partners in the European Union.37 At the time of writing, agreements about the future of the Good Friday Agreements and the consequent North – South cooperation are yet to be made. However, the European Union and the Government of the United Kingdom have reiterated the wish to uphold the
35 Queen Mary University London, ‘Borderlands – road closures and checkpoints’, through
http://www.irishborderlands.com/living/roadclosures/index.html, lasted viewed on 10 December 2017
36 European Union, ‘Single Market Act - article 2.2’, 1993 37
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland, ‘Good Friday Agreement’, 1997
25 Good Friday Agreements in the first joint statement after the conclusion of the first phase of the Brexit negotiations.38
Another point of concern regarding the European Union’s involvement on the island of Ireland concerns the Schengen exempt made for the Republic of Ireland. One of the main motivators for the Brexit referendum was the wish to take back control over national immigration policy. It was for the same reason that the United Kingdom did not join the European free travel zone of Schengen. As the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland’s arrangement regarding the border predates their EU accession, while emphasising the special nature of the Common Travel Area, they were given a shared opt-out of the otherwise mandatory Schengen zone at the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.39
Besides the above mentioned, there are many other important links between the European Union and the Emerald isle as a whole, as well as the two countries individually. Some of these will be further discussed in the analysis chapter of this thesis, while others are less relevant to the specific topic of this research and will thus, however unfortunate, be disregarded in order to keep the research focused.
38 Joint Report from the Negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on Progress during
Phase 1 of Negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the European Union, 8 December 2017
39
European Union, ‘Treaty of Amsterdam - Protocol on the application of certain aspects of Article 7a of the Treaty establishing the European Community to the United Kingdom and to Ireland’, 1997
26
4. Analysis
This chapter explores the results from the diverse set of dynamics questioned in this research. This is done thematically. However, first, a short analysis is given of the respondents who provided the data analysed in this chapter. After all, these results can only be understood when the source is understood as well. Second, the main themes of this research are discussed in the following order: the border itself, violence and peace on the Irish island, politics, and socio-economic factors.
The shared border on the Irish island is more than either Anderson’s physical demarcation or Newman’s dynamic process. Instead, in the context of the upcoming Brexit, the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland has become a metaphor for much more. The border now is a symbol of the many uncertainties that were amplified by the Brexit referendum, and will continue to do so in the times leading up to the actual British exit from the EU. Whereas this research set out to concern merely the physical border, it has progressed to take into account all these extra layers of metaphoric and symbolic interpretation.
These analyses aim to aid the researcher in answering the research question of this thesis, while keeping the above-mentioned in mind: To what extent does the result of the June 2016 Brexit vote influence the perception of security in relation to the (Northern) Irish border amongst young Irish youth?
4.1 The respondents
The assumption is that, because the respondents grew up after the Troubles and after the Good Friday Agreements, these individuals might perceive the Irish – British dynamics differently. The respondents underlined the assumption during the interviews;
“Most of us in the younger generation have lived post-conflict, or at least the vast majority of our lives has been post-conflict, whereas most of the older generations would have been our age when the conflict was at its worst. They’ve seen it from a different angle and that’s why they tend to be a bit more blinded in their views. They tend to be a bit more wary of integrating with the other side. […] There is definitely a generational gap in Northern Ireland, as there probably is in most countries, but I think particularly because of the conflict there is a difference” 40
27 Moreover, they will be the generation of a post-Brexit era – the ones whose future now might look drastically different. A related and equally valid dimension of the body of respondents is given by Nora Trenches Bowles of the European Movement Ireland, she said;
“[…] these people have never known not being an EU citizen, and have never known their country not to be a member of the EU. I think that’s an interesting dynamic. It’s rare that citizenship rights are taken away from people, in the way that could potentially happen in Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. As we know from the Brexit referendum, the majority of young people voted to [remain] and the majority of older people voted to leave. There’s an interesting age dynamic at play there that is good to investigate” 41
There are a few side notes to make about the body of respondents and their environment, before delving into the respondents’ perceptions and emotions as indicated during this research.
4.1.1 changing Ireland
One of the distinct characteristics of the generation surveyed in this research, is their awareness of a changing Ireland. Religion is a big part of Irish culture and history, and to the present day a dividing line along which many people identify. However, the body of respondents shows a different trend. Many respondents have indicated a turn away from the Church;
As with any situation, this figure too shows a few exceptions to the rule. While the majority of the respondents indicated to be of religious upbringing and now consider themselves non-religious, a few respondents moved in the other direction. Another exception are respondents who were brought up with both religions, coming from a mixed family in Northern Ireland. The thickness of
28 the arrows in the above figure indicated the flow from one to the other. However, it remains that the majority of the respondents is of a religious upbringing, and currently identify with ‘non-religious’. This move away from religion is striking for the current political environment in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. In recent decades, the Republic has gone through major societal changes which are having their effects on this young generation. The secularisation in Ireland goes hand in hand with liberalisation of society. Many things once forbidden or taboo, are now being discussed and even slowly changed. A good example is the marriage equality referendum in 2015, or the 2018 referendum to start legislating abortion – two topics strongly connected with religious views.42 In fact, 56% of the survey respondents indicated they strongly disagree with the statement that religion played an important role in how they form their political views. This secularisation, but also the rise in education, the liberty of press and growth of a digital environment, contributes;
“Younger people are much less religious than the older generations, thus hold very different views on [certain] topics. Younger people today I feel are more educated than their elder counterpart – the majority of young people in the Republic complete secondary school and many proceed to college or university […]. Similarly, the younger generations are more informed thanks to the internet and social media, therefore rely less on the teachings of catholic schools and local media to inform their decisions” 43
Strongly related to the secularisation is not only the liberalisation of societal norms, but also the liberalisation of political affiliation. Where the Church one went to, used to largely determine the political affiliation one had, this too has changed dramatically for the population surveyed in this research. Protestants are no longer strictly Unionists, and not all devout Catholics believe in a united Ireland. These assumptions are based on a long history of the struggle for Irish land, and power. However, this distinction is becoming more and more vague as secularisation is a phenomenon in Northern Ireland, too.44
42 For example: The Journal, ‘Catholic leaders are out in force arguing against same-sex marriage’, 10 May 2015 and
The Guardian, ‘Irish archbishops say abortion vote shows church's waning influence’, 27 May 2018
43 Respondent 2 Republic of Ireland, online interview by author. November 2017 44
B.C. Hayes & I. McAllister, ‘The political impact of secularisation in Northern Ireland’, Institute for British-Irish
29 Moreover, Brexit unbalanced the scale even further;
“Those coming from a previously unionist background, who saw the parties they’d previously identified with speaking quite favourably of leaving the European Union, now are in a position where they don’t know who they can identify with because they no longer feel they are being represented by the parties and representatives within unionism. It has definitely shaken the playing field up in politics” 45
This marks the political and societal climate of the Irish island these respondents call home and is defining for such a young generation. They were brought up in a world that is no longer relevant, and for the first time in a long history, Irish youth is able to form, and stand up for, their own identities. However, as will by explained in this chapter, many respondents feel that they are not being overheard in the current Brexit developments.
4.2 Border
This section analyses the border using three different approaches. First, the respondents’ geographical locations vis-à-vis the border is discussed, and this proximity’s influence on their perceptions and understanding of the current events. Second, the border is briefly analysed in physical form, and the implications of Brexit for the border as found in this research. Third, the border is discussed in a wider understanding – as a symbolic boundary in a polarising world.
4.2.1 proximity to the border
The relationship between the proximity to the border and the perception of security exists in twofold. First, there’s the positive relationship that the closer to the border people live, the safer they feel. People may believe in the optimistic notion that insecurity, be it in the form of outright violence or mere societal tensions, must occur ‘elsewhere’. Second, the negative relationship reads that the closer people live to the border, the less safe they feel.46 People might perceive their direct environment to be less safe than other, further afield areas – because they have more knowledge of and/or experience with their own surroundings. However, this negative relationship between
45 Respondent 1 Belfast, group interview by author. Queens University Belfast, 22 November 2017. 46
C.E. Sanson, “How does people’s proximity to crime influence their perception of safety?” (MSc Thesis), University of Huddersfield Repository
