Solving migration or violating democracy?

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Solving migration or violating

democracy?

The securitization of migration and the legitimation of

illiberalism in Hungary

Nikki Zijderveld, s4608844

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master’s in Political Science (MSc): Conflict, Power & Politics

Supervisor: Dr. N. M. Stel

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Date: 16-6-2020 Wordcount: 24708

Abstract

This thesis explores the relation between the securitization of immigration and the implementation of illiberal policy in Hungary. The assumption that is being tested is that the Hungarian governments uses narratives that securitize immigration to legitimate illiberal measures. The methodology of this research exists of two complementary approaches: the indirect analysis and the direct analysis. The indirect analysis provides a broad overview of the securitization and illiberalism that have occurred in Hungary over the past ten years. This accounts for the context of the case. The direct analysis fixates on three specific policies and the way that they were legitimized. This provides the direct link necessary to answer the research question. The analysis finds that the securitization of immigration has played a role in the legitimization of illiberal measures. However, both the implementation of illiberal measures, as well as the securitization of immigration are often more subtle than theorized. Therefore, it is also not possible to observe the process of legitimation as straightforward as initially assumed. In the end, the research does provide meaningful contributions to the theoretical

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Chapter 1: Introduction

“In these elections we must demonstrate that there is an alternative to liberal democracy: it is called Christian democracy” … “Liberal democracy is in favour of multiculturalism, while Christian democracy gives priority to Christian culture; this is an illiberal concept. Liberal democracy is pro-immigration, while Christian democracy is anti-immigration; this is again a genuinely illiberal concept. And liberal democracy sides with adaptable family models, while Christian democracy rests on the foundations of the Christian family model; once more, this is an illiberal concept.”.

(Viktor Orbán, 2018)

This quote was taken from a speech by the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán1_{. This was}

not the first time that he expressed the desire to build a state with illiberal aspects. In 2014, Orbán already publicly announced the transformation of the Hungarian democracy into an illiberal one (Tóth, 2014). This speech illustrates the connection between the two political developments that have come to preoccupy scholars of Eastern Europe over the last decade: A concern about increased illiberalization of existing democracies and the observation of increased problematization of migration. This thesis aims to contribute to academic debates about the possible linkages between these two phenomena, exploring how the securitization of immigration has helped to legitimize the implementation of illiberal measures.

The concern about illiberalization is illustrated by articles discussing the “illiberal turn” of Eastern Europe (Rupnik, 2007; Jenne & Mudde, 2012; Hanley & Vachudova, 2018). However, there has been quite some controversy surrounding this type of research. After all, there is no clear definition for what exactly a liberal democracy is. Some researchers argue that the form and functioning of democracy might differ per country, but that as long as elections in which leaders are democratically chosen are held, countries cannot be considered undemocratic (Morlino, 2004). Others have pointed to the fact that it is possible to hold elections without giving your citizens much of a choice (Rhoden, 2013). If a ballot has two parties on it, but only one party was given the opportunity to campaign, this would not count as fair elections, they argue. Therefore, there are more requirements that a country has to guarantee – like freedom of press, or rule of law and possibly even rights of health and labour – before it can be considered a democracy (Baharuddin, 2012).

In other words, the question when a regime can be considered a democracy, is the subject of an ongoing scientific debate. By focusing on specific policies that have been implemented that could infringe upon certain democratic principles, this thesis demonstrates how the different facets of the liberal democracy might be undermined. More importantly, it tries to answer the question of how the implementation of these illiberal policies was legitimized.

1 The full version of the speech can be found on the website of the Hungarian government:

https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-29th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp

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After all, a democracy has safeguards in place to protect itself. Therefore, it should not be easy for a government to evade these safeguards.

For a possible explanation of how the undermining of the liberal rights, associated with democracy, is enabled, this research turns to another phenomenon that is often mentioned in relation to illiberalism: The framing of immigration as a threat to a countries’ national security (Kazharski & Tabosa, 2018). Over the years and across different countries, various frames with regards to immigration have been observed. Chong and Druckman describe a frame as “a way to describe reality, by providing meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (2007: 106). By using a specific terminology, or certain words, instead of others, one specific interpretation of a phenomenon is promoted over a different one. This practice can be considered framing. The terminology or set of specific words is considered the frame (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

In the case of immigration, Helbling (2014), identifies the following categories in which the phenomenon can be framed: nationalistic, multicultural, moral-universal, economic, labour and social security, security and pragmatic. Some of these categories are used to highlight benefits of immigration, while others are associated with its costs. The latter frames are often considered as a reflection of securitization, while the former can be associated with an overarching humanitarian perspective.

Immigration can be considered to be a humanitarian issue; in which case the receiving country protects the immigrant from some kind of danger that he or she would face in its country of origin. This danger can be of an economical kind, in which case the immigrant would not have been able to get access to basic necessities in its original country of residence. More often, however, the humanitarian frame is adopted when the immigrant, that in this case would be labelled a refugee, faces (unfair) persecution in its country of origin (Caviedes, 2015).

However, such frames with a positive connotation have been increasingly replaced by the security frame. In 2015, Europe was faced with an increase of refugee arrivals. As a reaction, in many countries ever more attention was being paid to the negative effects that immigrants might have on a country. Eventually this started to overshadow the positive sentiments of the humanitarian and economic opportunity frame (Brubaker, 2017). The phenomenon of an influx of migrants came to be known as the “refugee crisis”, which illustrates the growing acceptance of the frame that immigrants pose a threat to a countries’ stability and safety. In political science, this “framing a phenomenon as a threat to a countries’ national security” is summarized in the concept of securitization. The securitization theory was first introduced by Ole Waever in 1995. The idea behind the theory is that labelling something a security threat changes both the interpretation of a phenomenon and the possible solutions that are considered. By framing an issue as a threat to national security, it is presented as threatening the survival of the nation. Therefore, the frame provides an urgency that warrants exceptional (and often undemocratic) measures to prevent this threat (Taureck, 2006). Often,

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when research is conducted into the securitization of migration, it looks at the legitimation of measures, specifically targeting migrants (Szalai & Göbl, 2015). This research, however, focusses on measures that go beyond that. It looks at the impact of securitization of immigration on the legitimation of illiberal measures that concern the entire Hungarian population.

This research aims to perform an in-depth analysis, exploring the process of illiberalization and the relation with securitization, which is why the entirety of Eastern Europe would be far to comprehensive. However, in previous research on illiberalization and securitization in Eastern Europe, Hungary has been named as a “frontrunner” with regards to both processes (Hanley & Vachudova, 2018; Szalai & Göbl, 2015). As is explained more in the scientific relevance, this makes it a particularly suitable case for this research.

Therefore, this research examines the way in which the Hungarian government has instrumentalized the 2015 refugee crisis and used the security frame of refugees to increase the power of the current government over its citizens. For example, by eliminating checks and balances or securing the political position of the governing party. Therefore, it also deals with the process of legitimization. After all, securitization is a narrative that focuses attention on the urgency of certain phenomena. This urgency is assumed to legitimize the use of extreme measures to prevent whatever it is that is claimed to threaten the national security from happening.

Thesis outline

The goal of this research is to explore how the securitization of migration might be used to legitimize implementing illiberal policies that go (far) beyond migration by more closely analysing the case of Hungary. The research question that lies in the core of this is:

How has the increasing securitization of immigration by the Hungarian government contributed to the legitimation of illiberal measures over the last decade?

The assumption of this research is not that the securitization of immigration can alone provide a complete legitimation of illiberal measures. Presumably, there are multiple factors that play a role in the legitimization process. However, it is presumed that securitization is one of these factors. The purpose of this research is to investigate how this process operates in practice. Obviously, in the ten years that this research encompasses elections took place. However, during this period of time the same two parties have been in power (Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People’s Party). Moreover, all three coalitions that have been formed during this time have been led by Viktor Orbán as prime minister (The Economist, 2019). As such, this government has had the opportunity to continuously shape policy, in line with their views. For this reason, the research question focuses on this ten-year time period. This research employs two complementary approaches to research the process of legitimization of illiberal measures by means of the securitization of immigration. The first approach looks at the overall type of securitization of immigration that the Hungarian

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government propagates and compares this with the type of illiberal measures that have been implemented over the past ten years. The eventual question is whether the narrative that the government puts forward is in line with the policies that they eventually implement. A supposed threat to a countries’ economic security would presumably warrant different policies than a threat to its national security. The theoretical basis for this, is explained in the theoretical framework in chapter two.

The second approach zooms in on three specific illiberal measures and investigates the narrative legitimating them. These measures can be considered key policies when looking at illiberalization in Hungary. This approach provides the direct link needed to substantiate the relationship between securitization and illiberalization. The relevant policies are selected from the same overview of illiberal measures that have been implemented over the past ten years in Hungary that is used for the indirect analysis. The policies that are selected are presented as battling immigration, but they have (side-)effects that infringe on the countries’ democracy. In the end, the focus is on policies that have impact on other area’s than immigration, that definitely infringe on the level of democracy and could be legitimized using securitization of immigration

The reason that these two approaches are combined in this research is to provide a complete picture. It is important to look at the legitimation of specific measures, because this is the only way to directly illustrate how the concept of legitimation operates when it comes to securitization of immigration. However, the indirect analysis is necessary in order to really understand the context of the case of Hungary and to be able to place the specific narratives surrounding the measures into the larger narrative that has been present in Hungary.

Both of these analyses are further explained during the description of the methodology in chapter three. Before that, in chapter two, the theoretical foundation of the various concepts is discussed by sketching the larger academic debate that this research contributes to. The information that has been collected this way, has been used to draft three hypotheses. In chapter four and five, the results of the indirect analysis and the direct analysis are presented, respectively. In chapter six, the results of the two approaches are compared and applied to the research question, which, as a result, is answered.

Scientific relevance

A lot has been written about both the concept of securitization and (il)liberalism and the relation between them (Buzan et al., 1998; Skleparis, 2015; Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; Waever, 1995; Taureck, 2006). The current situation in Hungary has also frequently been covered (Majtényi, Kopper & Susánszky 2018; Malaguti, 2019). Nonetheless, this research contributes to the existing scientific knowledge by highlighting certain aspects of securitization of migration and its relation to illiberalization that have not yet been extensively researched.

First of all, this research contributes to the conceptual debate about the ramifications of securitization of migration. This research shows that securitization of migration can affect

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policies that go beyond immigration. In original securitization theory it is already pointed out that securitization can bring issues into a realm of urgency where the government can legitimize more extreme measures than normally would be accepted (Waever, 1995). The research about the securitization of immigration, however, has only addressed this partially. Most of the previously mentioned research, focuses on the consequences of the securitization for immigrants. This research, instead, establishes the broader effects of the legitimizing power of securitization of immigration: How does the securitization of immigration lead to the implementation of illiberal measures that go far beyond migration and affect a population at large rather than migrant communities?

Moreover, it contributes to the empirical debate about how the process of legitimation operates. Research into securitization has mostly focused on how the securitization is being executed. For example, it has focused on the words that are used, or whether the frame is accepted by other actors (Ibrahim, 2005; Buonfino, 2006). This research, on the other hand, tries to expose how particular frames can be used to legitimize specific policies. As is shown in chapter 2, this process of legitimization has often been assumed, but its workings have not always been made clear.

Already a lot of information has been collected about the case of Hungary. Moreover, the literature has been in agreement about securitization occurring as well as the government implementing measures that infringe on democratic requirements. This makes it a perfect pathway case to go more into depth and look at the possible consequences of the securitization of immigration for other areas of the society than just migration. Instead of just assuming there to be a relationship between the securitization of immigrants and the illiberal measures that the government has implemented, this research shows what this relationship might look like. In this way, it contributes to both our understanding of the Hungarian case and a broader comprehension of the interface between securitization of migration and illiberalism in general.

Therefore, it is the ideal case to explore the link between these concepts, which would also show the broader ramifications of securitization. Moreover, most of the research addressing the illiberal measures implemented by the Hungarian government, also expresses concern about the developments and how the Hungarian case might impact other (European) countries. This research would contribute to the understanding of the process that played out in Hungary, which can lay the basis for theorizing about the same process in other cases.

Societal relevance

Apart from filling a gap in the academic literature, this research also has a clear societal impact. Many of the potential illiberal measures that could be legitimized using securitization, would violate democratic norms and values that citizens in many European countries have come to hold in high regard (Ferrín & Kriesi, 2016). It is important to analyse how this might transpire and to disclose it. Only when this has been determined, possible countermeasures might be taken.

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Moreover, it is important to realize that securitization has ramifications that go beyond immigration, and therefore, impacts not just immigrants (Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014), because otherwise, these consequences might go unnoticed. Even though, as mentioned before, the consequences could challenge the norms and values that have been increasingly valued. The analysis also investigates whether the Hungarian government implements policies that are in line with their narrative. It speaks to the honesty and transparency of their governing. Whether a government is honest in their reasons for implementing a certain policy impacts the way in which they are held accountable (Rothstein, 2004). Therefore, it is relevant to society as a whole.

Finally, the securitization of immigrants is not phenomenon that takes place exclusively in Hungary. It has been observed almost all around the world. From Canada, to Brazil, to the Netherlands, there has been a shift in narrative regarding immigration, which portrays immigrants as a threat to national security (Freedman, 2004: 1; Messina, 2017: 28). It is important to realize how this might impact other areas of society as well.

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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

This research deals with a number of concepts. The goal of the research is to investigate the legitimation of illiberal measures using a narrative that relies on the securitization of immigration. In order for the research to be conducted, first these concepts (securitization, illiberalism & legitimation) need to be put in a larger context of prior research. Only then it is possible to show how this research builds on that foundation and explain the definitions that are used. The concept that lies at the foundation of this research, is the theory of securitization. After all, securitization is here considered to be the explaining factor of how illiberal measures can be legitimized. This concept is first characterized in general. Then it is specified to the case of immigration. The second concept is the notion of illiberalism. Again, first, the larger context of the debate is sketched. Afterwards, Merkel’s (2004) definition that is central to my operationalization, is elaborated on. Finally, it is important to also discuss the theories on the basis of legitimation, because this is the concept that links the previous two phenomena. Therefore, the theory of what this link might look like has to be analysed before the hypotheses are drafted.

Securitization

As mentioned in the introduction, securitization is the act of framing a phenomenon in such a way that it is perceived to be a threat to the audience. When looking at securitization by the government, this audience could be the people that the government represents. According to the definition by Ole Waever (1995), securitization is a “speech act”. Possible negative consequences of a phenomenon are highlighted and potentially even exaggerated. In other words, an issue is framed in a way that it can be considered a matter of national security (Chong & Druckman, 2007). As mentioned in the introduction, framing is a way of promoting one interpretation of a phenomenon over another. In the case of securitization, the interpretation that is promoted is that a phenomenon is a risk to national security, instead of, for example, a humanitarian issue (Rushton, 2010).

The first step also seems to be the most obvious one. First, an issue must be identified as an existential threat (i.e. the securitizing move). The threat itself can vary. After all, the idea of securitization is that issues that would not normally belong in the sphere of security, are moved there (Boswell, 2007). Therefore, securitization can also be applied to phenomena that, at first, one might not associate with security. In this research, migration is the phenomenon that is identified as a threat.

The identification of a phenomenon as a threat can be done by a number of actors. According to Waever (1995), the process of securitization is executed by elites (often the state) to pass policies that are not necessarily wanted by the people, or in the best interest of the country. Instead, measures legitimized using securitization only affirm and increase the power of those elites. Although this approach has been criticized for being too state-centric (McDonald, 2008), this research falls back on this, by focussing on the government as actor. After all, the goal is to explore the relation between securitization and the implementation of

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illiberal measures. The government is the only actor that is directly in charge of implementing these policies.

This research also implies the state to be a unitary actor. Obviously, this is a simplification of reality. Within the government of a state and between various levels of government, there will be multiple interests and motivations (O’Neill, 2004). Therefore, the eventual outcome will be the result of interaction between these actors and eventually some kind of compromise. However, in research, choices have to be made about the focus. This research focuses on the mechanisms of the process of securitization leading to the legitimation of illiberalization. This requires a clear fixation, unfortunately rendering the issue of the multiple interests within a government beyond the scope.

In this research, the focus is on the Hungarian people as the audience of the securitization, and thus are they presented as the actors being threatened. However, the focus is on the securitizing actor, and their motivations, not on the audience. Nonetheless, it is important for the securitizing actor to keep in mind their target audience (Balzacq, 2005). Because, after this first step, it might seem like every issue could hypothetically be securitized. Theoretically, this might be the case. However, as is illustrated by the next steps, in practice, not for all issues it can be made credible that they present a security threat (Taureck, 2006). Therefore, there is not a clear divide for which issues can be securitized and which cannot. It depends on whether the next steps can be successfully completed as well.

The second step is using the security frame as legitimization for the implementation of extraordinary measures. In this research, the focus is be on the legitimation of government policies, but it can be used for all kinds of measures, by all kinds of actors (Taureck, 2006). In any case, however, before an issue can be considered securitized, the securitizing actor should have convinced its audience of its urgency and therefore, the legitimacy to take extraordinary measures in response to a perceived threat (Bigo, 2002).

This means that the security frame has to resonate with the targeted audience – in democracies that would usually be the voting public. For a successful securitization process, a phenomenon has to be considered a plausible threat to the human security by the population (Balzacq, 2005). In security theory, human security is considered to be made up out of seven domains: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political (Floyd, 2007). So, for a phenomenon to be considered securitized, the target audience would have to believe that it could infringe on one, or more of these domains. This could be achieved by the securitizing actor either directly trying to alter the publics associations to the phenomenon, or indirectly, by targeting media, or institutions within civil society that might influence the public opinion (Williams, 2003). Considering the populist background of the Fidesz party, which builds on the idea that the party is legitimate because it executes the will of “the people,” presumably, they are more likely to directly address a broad audience, instead of trying to target civil society (Csigó & Merkovity, 2016).

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Third and finally, the impact of the extraordinary measures that are legalized because of the securitizing move should have a larger impact than just the direct consequences of the measures on the securitized phenomenon (Buzan et al., 1998). The measures that the securitizing actor legitimizes should in fact be extraordinary. If an actor were to legitimize a perfectly normal measure, that would also have been possible to implement under normal circumstances, it does not ‘count’ as securitization (Taureck, 2006). The measures should be proportional to the exaggerated emergency reality that was claimed by the securitization, and therefore go beyond the ordinary “rules of the game”. The urgency of the situation, portrayed by the securitization, should be demonstrated by taking measures that would not be considered legitimate in a less urgent situation. An example of this might be a law that allows the prime minister to govern without interference of the parliament for an undetermined period of time. This can be legitimized by arguing that a threat requires decisive and immediate decisions.

The assumption in this research is that if the “rules of the game” are ignored once, because the situation is considered to be extraordinarily urgent, it sets a precedent. It makes it easier to claim the need for unorthodox measures, because of an emergency in a different situation, until the use of once unprecedented measures become normal practice. This mechanism is described by Skleparis (2015), who observes it in the case of Greece and Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen (2014), who label it “the emergency trap”. Moreover, a measure that is implemented with a certain intent, can often also be used for a different reason. For example, a measure that gives the intelligence services more authorizations can be intended to battle terrorism. However, once the authorizations are granted, it is usually harder to control what they are used for afterwards.

This risk was also acknowledged when the concept was first introduced. Therefore, in his description of the process of securitization, Waever (1995) also takes a clear moral stance on the practice of securitization. He considers securitization a measure of last resort. It takes an issue out of the regular (democratic) sphere of politics and moves it into the emergency sphere, that warrants undemocratic measures. He therefore argues for a trend of desecuritization in which issues are moved away from the security frame and out of the emergency sphere. This clear moral stance has been critiqued by various authors, while others believe that it does not go far enough.

There are two main moral critiques on securitization theory. The first one argues that scientists should be objective, and that the way securitization theory has been composed, makes it impossible to not condemn the act of securitization, when it is observed (Taureck, 2006). These criticists find that Waever, voicing his aversion against securitization, breaches such objectivity. While they are right in arguing that Waever voiced a subjective opinion, this does not necessarily merit then discarding the entire theory. Calling the entire theory subjective would be ignoring the analytical properties of the theory. In the end, securitization is a political process that can objectively be observed and analysed.

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The other moral criticism is based on the idea that by describing the process of securitization, the scientist is going along with the frame and therefore validates it. This scientific movement argues that scientists should be more subjective in their studies and worry about the impact of their studies (Aradau, 2004). By labelling something as ‘merely’ a speech act, one runs the risk of becoming relativistic and ignoring the consequences that are usually related to it (Williams, 2003). Again, this criticism merits caution and reflection. However, it does not warrant discarding the theory entirely. Although it is true that scientists cannot be seen as separate from their environment, securitization theory is about describing a process that either is happening or has already happened. Describing the process of securitization will do very little to aid it, if it was already taking place to begin with. In fact, it may even draw attention to the process and the underlying motives of the actors, which could hinder it.

Other criticisms are about the kind of research that the original definition of securitization generates. For example, the theory is largely focused on speech and could therefore miss important factors. After all, not all communication happens through speech. Although, it is not addressed by Waever, framing something as a threat can happen via actions, depictions, spatial and material configurations, as well as words (Williams, 2003; Abrahamsen, 2005). While this is a legitimate concern, this research follows in the tradition of focussing on the speech act for reasons of feasibility. Keeping in mind the reliability and the importance of the ability to check research by reproducing it, it is most logical to analyse something that has been said or been written down. Moreover, it is easier to link speech acts to specific measures.

Finally, some criticize the practice that securitization research often focuses on one specific event, or action that causes a phenomenon to be regarded as a threat, from that moment on. They argue that securitization is a process that happens over time and cannot be reduced to one specific moment (McDonald, 2008). This is a legitimate and valuable criticism, which is why this research focuses on an entire 10-year period, instead of one specific moment in time.

Securitization of immigration

As mentioned in the introduction, there has been a variety of frames used to describe the issue of immigration. Usually, these frames can exist side by side (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017). These different frames usually also focus on different types of migrants. Usually, when it is framed as a humanitarian phenomenon, the focus in on refugees, while economic and illegal migrants often have a negative connotation to them (Jørgensen & Meret, 2012). With regards to immigration, there seems to have been a shift in dominant frames used by the governments of several countries. As described by Ibrahim (2005), immigrants used to be regarded as assets to a country’s economy and productivity. In his analysis about the perception of immigrants in Canada, he describes how the cold war, combined with talking about migration from a perspective of realpolitik and the focus on individualism has led to a

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link between migration and security, the so called “human centred approach”. This caused migrants to increasingly be described as risks, or threats to the population of the receiving country.

In the case of Hungary, the sentiment about and framing of immigration has never been very positive (Barlai & Sik, 2016). Therefore, the shift to a negative frame as described above is not as clearly visible in Hungary as in Canada. However, as is elaborated on in chapter five of this research, this does not mean that there has not been an observable shift in the narrative regarding immigration.

This also nicely illustrates that even when a security frame is being used it can still address a wide variety of issues. Therefore, some authors have already divided securitization of migration into subtypes. For example, when discussing the securitization of migration in Western Europe since 1980, Huysmans (2009) looked at three factors, often mentioned in combination with immigration:

1. Internal security, which mostly entails the security of the internal financial market of a country.

2. Culture, which deals with the various challenge that multiple cultures can pose if combined in one country. These challenges include sentiments of nationalism or xenophobia among the population.

3. Welfare, which is best summarized in the question of who has the right to the provisions guaranteed by the government?

Another example of a subcategorization of the securitization of migration can be found in the work of Ceyhan & Tsoukala (2002). They identify the following categories of arguments being used to argue a problematic view on migration:

1. A socioeconomic category. Arguments in this category usually hinge on, the question of who is entitled to welfare as the risk of immigrants taking jobs from the native population, or the contribution of immigrants to the informal economy.

2. A securitarian category. Arguments in this category frame immigration as a phenomenon to be problematic, because it implies a lack of sovereignty and a loss of security.

3. An identitarian category. Arguments that fall into this category are based on the assumption that immigrants are a threat to the host countries’ identity and dominant culture.

4. A political category. This category does not deal with the content of the arguments, but it is dependent on the intent. It encompasses all narratives that are meant to generate political benefit.

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Both of these subcategorizations of securitization of immigration are relevant this research. Combined they give a complete and exhaustive overview of the ways in which immigration can be considered a threat. Therefore, in this research, both subcategorizations are incorporated into a new framework. Moreover, they are rewritten to fit this particular research. After all, some of the categories that are identified in the other papers overlap. More importantly, some of the types might be responded to by the same type of policies. Because of this, the categories mentioned above are rearranged into 3 types of securitization:

1. Regarding economic security. This can be divided into the (1) security of the internal market, which would entail threats to job security, but also financial drawbacks of criminal activity, supposedly caused by immigrants and (2) the burden that immigrants (might) pose on a countries’ welfare system.

2. Regarding national security. This would entail both the threat of terrorism, as well as other threats to the physical safety of citizens, like violence as the result of criminal activity.

3. Regarding cultural security. This would cover the perceived threat that immigrants pose to a countries’ way of living. The threat to its dominant culture and habits, established because of a countries’ history and its shared values.

In order to establish in which of the types of securitization the securitization by the Hungarian government falls, the collected data is coded. This is elaborated on in chapter 3.

(Il)liberalism

In the following paragraph, a lot of theorizing about the infringement on “liberal institutions” and “liberal safeguards” are discussed. However, to determine whether such infringements are occurring, and thus to determine whether a measure is illiberal, first, it has to be established what is at the basis of this liberalism. The definition used in this thesis draws on Merkel’s (2004) conceptualization of embedded democracy. He recognizes various spheres, or ‘regimes,’ that exist within a liberal democracy.

- The electoral sphere . The basis of any liberal democracy is the provision of regular, free, general, equal and fair elections.

- Political rights/liberties . Without this sphere, the elections will not be of much significance. The political rights ensure that the people can make an informed and thought-out decision when they vote. This regime includes, for example, the right to freedom of speech and opinion and the right to association, demonstration and petition.

- Civil rights . This sphere embodies the “rule of law”. In particular, this regime limits and controls the power of the government over its people. Where the political rights ensure that the people have “freedom to”, the civil rights regime makes sure that they also have “freedom of”.

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- Horizontal accountability . This sphere encompasses the checks and balances on the government. It is about the division of power, that ensures that the government has to account for other institutions in their governing, such as an independent court of justice, or a division in legislative and executive bodies.

- Effective power to govern . This means that the institution that has the control on paper also has the power in real life. It is meant to account for the discrepancy that might exist between a countries’ formal rules and the practical execution.

For a measure to be illiberal it must somehow infringe on or hinder one or more of the democratic regimes listed above. In practice, this infringing might not always be direct. As explained by Majtényi, Kopper and Susánsky (2019), the Hungarian government often implements policies that are unspecific about the practical application. Therefore, a certain ambiguity is created about the extent to which the policies will infringe on democratic liberties. However, just the fact that the policies could be used to infringe on these liberties, creates an atmosphere of uncertainty, which leads to self-censorship. If there is uncertainty about the (legal) consequences of an action, the actor is more likely to pre-emptively refrain from performing this action. This idea of self-censorship has been extensively researched with regards to publishing or expressing an opinion in the media, but has been less often linked to other activities that would be protected in a liberal democracy (Polyák, 2019). However, it is not unlikely that the same mechanism is at work in those area’s as well. Therefore, if the policy leaves room for it to be used to violate liberal spheres, it indirectly also contributes to the illiberalization of the society since rights and liberties are compromised or rendered uncertain.

The concept of illiberal democracies is not a new one. In 1997, Fareed Zakaria published an article warning about the problems associated with democratic institutions that lacked the corresponding liberal safeguards. As a result, he observed the rise of democracies without any of the basic constitutional requirements. He labelled these new forms of government “illiberal democracies” (Zakaria, 1997). Therefore, originally, the concept referred to countries that did not (yet) have the constitutional liberal institutions in place, while implementing democratic institutions, like elections. Zakaria explains that we cannot judge these countries the same way as we judge “Western democracies”. He also warned that these liberal institutions would not necessarily be implemented afterwards, which would lead to the establishment of a whole new type of democracy. Therefore, he argued, democratic procedures, like elections, should always be preceded by the institution of constitutional liberalism.

This article has received criticism from other authors. In a critical note on Zakaria’s article, Møller (2008) disputes the observation that illiberal democracies were rising at the time that the article was published and concludes that, since then, the opposite has happened. Instead of illiberal democracies increasing, he argues that the number has actually declined. He also argues that it would be easier to implement liberal institutions after democratic procedures

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have been put into practice, because they would not face opposition from an autocrat, that would fear for the decrease of its power.

In his later research, Zakaria (2007), addressed this, by acknowledging the process of some countries, returning to illiberal democracies. Consequently, he disputed the claim that illiberal democracies would eventually turn into liberal democracies. After all, even if they do for a certain period, there is always the chance that the process gets undone. According to Zakaria, the reason that this is possible lies in a number of problems with democracy.

The first problem he addresses is the idea that democracy is the will of the people. Because of this idea, it is possible for politicians that claim to represent this will, to infringe on the implemented system of checks and balances. After all, if that person is the embodiment of the will of the people, why should he/she be restrained?

The second problem that he identified, is closely related to this. It is the risk of a democracy becoming the rule of the majority. In a liberal democracy, there are safeguards in place that ensure that everyone is granted basic rights and liberties. However, if the focus is on democracy as the will of the majority, it could legitimize the abolition of these safeguards. Finally, he points to the tendency of democracy to foster conflict in a society. Because of the process of elections, different parties, that often represent different groups in society, are stimulated to feud with one another in order to gain votes. In a society that does not have a history of multiculturalism, he argues, the easiest way to organize a base of support is among cultural or ethnic lines. This pitting of groups in society against each other can lead to the first and second problem being triggered.

At this point, the critique that has been discussed has been purely about the question whether the concept of illiberalization occurs in practice as described by Zakaria. However, there has also been criticism on the concept itself. Some authors point to the inherent moral associations with the term. They argue that by using the concept, the ideals of a liberal democracy are assumed to be universal, while simultaneously rejecting other forms of democracy are, without considering their potential value (Parekh, 1992).

This criticism should definitely be taken into account. The reason that this research still uses this somewhat controversial term is because the research addresses the elimination of liberal rights that used to be present in Hungary. It looks at the infringement of certain liberal areas of the society. Therefore, “illiberal” seems the only way to accurately describe the subject of this research. However, one should keep in mind that the moral associations with the concept should not be accepted without careful consideration of the personal background and prejudices.

If we link this discussion of liberal and illiberal aspects of particular democracies to the previous discussion of securitization, it is relevant to note that in the definition of securitization, it is already stated that securitization can be used to strengthen the position of the elites that brought about the process in the first place (Buzan et. al). After all, for

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securitization to be complete, it must be used to legitimize “extraordinary measures”. Although these measures do not necessarily have to be illiberal in theory, in practice they often are.

In this paper, the elites in question are the parties currently forming the government. “Strengthening the own position” in this context means either ensuring the dominant position of these parties in the government or giving the current government more abilities to implement their ideas. This can be done by changing the law, so that the system of checks and balances, that is in place in a democracy, is undermined. This way, the party in power will not have to account for this anymore. In the process, often the aforementioned safeguards will also be threatened (Buzogány, 2017).

If the elites in question are the government, the strengthening of their own position often also means the violation of liberties for the people. After all, these checks and balances are in place to protect the people from the overreach of the government (Grzebalska & Pető, 2017). Because of this, securitization by governments is often connected with the implementation of illiberal policies/measures. A political party, or leader can have several motivations (Ezrow & Frantz, 2011). For one, they can act out of an ideological motivation. However, it can also be out of a longing for power or self-interest (Ezrow & Frantz, 2011). Often, it is a combination of all of these motivations that leads to the desire to gain more power.

Legitimization theory

In this research, legitimacy is the concept that connects securitization to illiberalism. Because of securitization of immigration by the government, illiberal measures are legitimized. There has been a lot of discussion about the exact definition of legitimacy (Schaar, 1981: 20). However, many of these discussions are essentially about the question of how to operationalize it. In its essence, legitimacy is the belief that something, or someone is appropriate or morally proper and their instructions therefore merit following (Dogan, 2002: 116). How this belief in the appropriateness, or moral correctness might or should be achieved, is still subject to discussion and depends on the type of legitimacy (Dogan, 2002). Considering that this is still a rather vague concept, often the definition of Weber is used (Dogan, 2002: 117). Weber (1978) distinguishes three types of authority that legitimacy might be based on: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational. Traditional authority is based on an existing framework of norms and traditions. If something has been established practice, it is easier to be accepted. The legal-rational type is similar in that it depends on previously established rules. However, instead of the legitimacy depending on traditional norms, in this case it depends on legal norms. Finally, the charismatic type differs from the previous two, because it does not hinge on a previously established basis. Instead, it is based on a subjective attraction of the target audience to the authority. As long as the rules, or activity are implemented by this person/group, they are considered to be legitimate, because of this attraction (Spencer, 1970).

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The established definitions described above mostly deal with the legitimacy of the decision-maker(s): how do they gain authority? However, in this research, the focus is on the legitimacy of policy. Obviously, this is linked to and influenced by the legitimation of the people or government implementing the policy. However, as is discussed in a later section of this chapter, the legitimacy of a policy can also be evaluated on its own.

In the case of a liberal democracy, the legitimacy of a government and its actions comes from two pillars. The first one being the rule of law (Rosenfeld, 2001) and the second one being the believe that the government that is chosen, executes “the will of the people” (Buchanan, 2002). When a country makes the shift from a liberal democracy to an illiberal democracy, often one kind of legitimation is made more important than the other: the rule of law is made subordinate to the will of the people.

One might ask the question why it is relevant whether a government, or policy is considered legitimate. The reason that it is important and plays such a dominant role in this research is that without legitimacy, a government holds no control over its citizens. If the people do not accept the authority of its government, they will also be less inclined to accept its rules and its policies (Zelditch, 2018). However, if the government is considered to be more legitimate than other institutions in the country, it can impose rules that would not usually be accepted. In other words: legitimacy partly determines a governments’ power. Obviously, this only applies in regimes in which the government’s power is dependent on the people.

Overall, there are two reasons for people to consider a policy legitimate. First of all, there is the so-called symbolic or process legitimacy, which stems from the (perceived) fairness of the procedure (Wang & Groot, 2018). If the procedure is considered to be appropriate, or correct, the outcome is also more likely to be accepted. Content legitimacy, on the other hand comes from support for the content of the policy. So, if someone agrees with a policy, he or she is more likely to accept its legitimacy (Mondak, 2004). Securitization relies on content legitimacy. The theory is that people are convinced of the urgency of the situation and believe that the policy is the only way to resolve it. Therefore, they agree with the content of the policy.

This means that what the policy can accomplish is considered more important than whether the established procedure is followed. This importance is contingent on the urgency that securitization lends to an issue. As explained in the section about the securitization of immigration, there are three types of frames that can be used to make this case. Immigration can be framed as an imminent threat to a countries’ security by focusing on economic implications, implications to the national security or implication to a countries’ dominant culture. Each of these frames legitimizes urgent and extraordinary measures. However, realistically they do not necessarily legitimize the same measures. After all, it would not be effective to combat the negative impact of immigration on the economy by expanding the authorization of the national security services. Such a policy, however, could be legitimized by focusing on national security and the threat of terrorism.

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In summary, the different securitization frames that can be identified with regard to migration can be expected to lead to, or allow for the legitimization of, different illiberal measures. The economic security frame will most likely legitimize policies regarding labour laws and access to welfare. However, it could also be used to legitimize policies that establish stricter punishments for crime. The national security frame, as already mentioned could be used to expand the authorization of intelligence services, or the military. Finally, the frame of cultural security could be used to implement policies that dictate the private sphere. For example, policies that dictate how (not) to dress, or what language to speak.

Hypotheses

The policies that might be legitimized by the securitization of migration, mentioned above, depending on the way in which they are formulated, might infringe on one, or more of the spheres of a liberal democracy. However, not all policies can be formulated so that they infringe on the same spheres. For example, the national security frame can be used to legitimize policies that infringe on political rights/liberties and horizontal accountability. The economic frame, on the other hand could most likely only be used to legitimize infringement on the sphere of political rights/liberties and civil rights. The same goes for the cultural frame. As a result, the following hypotheses emerge from the analysis of the existing research:

H1: When the government legitimizes illiberal measures by securitizing immigration using

the national security frame, the related illiberal policies are expected to infringe on the political rights/liberties, civil rights and horizontal accountability spheres.

H2: When the government legitimizes illiberal measures by securitizing immigration using

the economic and cultural frames, the related illiberal policies are expected to infringe on the political liberties and civil rights sphere.

Therefore, if the goal is to legitimize a wide arrange of illiberal policies (that can strengthen the position of the government), it would be logical to use the national security frame as the dominant frame, when addressing the issue of security. Therefore, a third hypothesis about the way that the securitization is executed arises:

H3: The national security frame is used more frequently than the economic and cultural

frame in the securitization of immigration, if the frame is used to legitimize illiberal measures.

This research does not deal with how the legitimacy that the frames provide are received by the population, only with internal logic and consistency of the narrative and the subsequent policies.

In the end, it is clear from the theoretical overview that was presented in this chapter that the three concepts should correspond with each other. The idea of securitization theory is that a narrative, or frame is used to legitimize the implementation of extraordinary measures, including illiberal measures. However, how this would work exactly and what it

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would look like in practice has not been documented as well as the theory. Moreover, the idea that securitization of one specific topic (i.e. immigration) might have impact on other areas of society has also not been explored enough by the existing research. The mechanism that can be deducted from this theoretical framework and that is tested in this research, is summarized in figure 1.

Figure 1: How certain types of securitization, because of content legitimation, can lead to specific illiberal measures

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Chapter 3: Methodological framework

The general question that this research tries to answer is:

How is securitization of migration used to legitimize illiberal policies? Therefore, the goal is to reveal the following causal mechanism:

Ideally, the answer to the question of how the process of legitimization works in the case of securitization of immigration and illiberal policy would be based on multiple case studies, comparing the results between countries. Unfortunately, an endeavour like that is beyond the scope of this master’s thesis. Therefore, the research question of this paper has been narrowed down to:

How has the increasing securitization of immigration by the Hungarian government contributed to the legitimation of illiberal measures over the last decade?

The hypotheses that were drafted are:

H1: When the government legitimizes illiberal measures, by securitizing immigration using

the national security frame, the illiberal policies are expected to infringe on the political rights/liberties, civil rights and horizontal accountability spheres.

H2: When the government legitimizes illiberal measures, by securitizing immigration using

the economic and cultural frames, the illiberal policies are expected to infringe on the political liberties and civil rights sphere.

H3: The national security frame is used more frequently than the economic and cultural

frame in the securitization of immigration, if the frame is used to legitimize illiberal measures.

This chapter discusses the methodology that is used to test the hypotheses and answer the research question. First, it is discussed why the case study of Hungary was chosen. Afterwards, the indirect and direct analyses are discussed.

The method of case study

A case study is the in-depth study of a phenomenon in a specific context. It can be used to generate a deeper understanding of the inner workings of that phenomenon. By analysing how exactly the phenomenon works in that one case, hypotheses can be drafted about the general working of the phenomenon. A case study can therefore be used to generate theory, which is the most widely accepted purpose of a case study (Flyvbjerg, 2006). However, arguably, it could also be used for theory testing.

A case study can also be used to reveal the causal mechanism of a phenomenon. In this instance, the type of case study that would be used, is the so called “pathway case” (Gerring,

Illiberal measures Securitization of

immigrants

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2012). This is a case in which the workings of a phenomenon are clearly visible, and the occurrence of the phenomenon is widely accepted. A pathway case can be used as an example of how a causal mechanism might function in practice. This is only possible if a case is an “example” of a broader phenomenon. This adds also a unique value to the qualitative nature of case study, because it is the closest one can come to observing causality.

One of the critiques of a case study is that it is not possible to generalize from it. The argument is that you can never generalize from a single case, because there is always the risk of case-specific factors playing a role, that have not been taken into account (Flyvbjerg, 2006). This is why it is important to carefully consider and justify the choice of case. Although one case is never a large enough population to achieve statistical generalization, it can be used to contribute to a larger framework of theory, so-called theoretic or analytic generalization (Eisenhart, 2009; Polit & Beck, 2010).

Hungary is an example of such a pathway case. Both the phenomenon of securitization as well as the phenomenon of the implementation of illiberal measures has been documented already to occur in Hungary (e.g. Szala & Göbl, 2015; Bánkuti, Halmai & Scheppele, 2012). Moreover, it is often mentioned as an example of a broader phenomenon: the illiberalization of Eastern Europe. It is therefore the perfect case to investigate how the two phenomena relate. This relation has also been previously theorized, making it possible to use the Hungarian case as an example of what this theorized relation would look like in practice. This way, the Hungarian case provides an insight into the broader phenomenon that is the relation between securitization of immigration and illiberalization. Additionally, it can contribute to a more comprehensive insight in the Hungarian case. The goal, however, is to explore how the relationship between securitization of immigration and illiberalization manifests itself in practice.

In order to test these hypotheses, two types of analyses are performed: the indirect analysis and the direct analysis. They are first briefly introduced here and then each explained more elaborately in different sub-sections of this chapter. In each sub-section, the type of analysis, the data sources and the way that it is coded is discussed.

As mentioned in the introduction, the indirect analysis evaluates the overall narrative regarding immigration over the last ten years. The goal of this evaluation is to categorize the securitization, based on the three types of securitization that were identified in the theoretical framework (cultural, economic & national security). This categorization is based on an analysis of previously conducted research into the securitization of migration. The type(s) of securitization that can be found in the overall narrative surrounding migration are then compared to the type of illiberal measures that have been implemented in the same ten-year period. The overview of illiberal measures is based on a collection of reports, published by three different organizations. For all of the measures it is determined which sphere of democracy they violate.

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The direct analysis evaluates the narrative surrounding three specific measures that were selected from the overview that was drawn up during the indirect analysis. These narratives are categorized in one of the types of democracy. The analysis of the narrative of the selected measures is based on a content analysis of translated government publications. These publications are taken from the official government website. This narrow focus on specific measures allows for a more in-depth analysis of the legitimation process.

Indirect analysis

For the indirect analysis, an extensive analysis of Hungary’s overall securitization of migration has to be carried out in order to determine which type of securitization frame is most dominant. Then, it can be determined which illiberal measures would logically be legitimized by the securitization of migration and, hence, the extent to which the securitization of migration has contributed to the legitimation of overall illiberalization in Hungary. The indirect analysis is mostly used to test the third hypothesis and to assess the share of illiberal measures that are legitimized using securitization of immigration. After all, illiberal measures that infringe on spheres that cannot logically be legitimized using securitization of migration might be legitimized with reference to other types of perceived threats beyond migration. It is not possible to test the first two hypotheses, using the indirect analysis, because if the type of securitization cannot logically lead to the measures that have been implemented during the same period, it might just be the case that they were legitimized in other ways.

The analysis of the overall securitization of immigration is based on a literature review of previously conducted research. As mentioned in the section on scientific relevance, there has already been conducted quite some research into the execution of securitization by the Hungarian government. Therefore, it is possible to classify the overall securitization, without performing a separate analysis, which would be beyond the scope of this research.

After examining the analysis of the securitization of immigration outlined in the existing literature, this securitization of immigration is re-classified according to the types identified in the theoretical framework, using the following coding scheme2_:

Codebook

Type of

securitization

Description Examples

2 The examples used in the coding scheme are all from communication from the Hungarian government. This way, it is ensured that the types can be applied to the Hungarian context. However, they are not necessarily taken from data used in during either one of the analyses.

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Economic security

The policy is framed as a way of combatting the supposed negative impact of immigrants on the internal market (including a supposed contribution to the level of criminality) and the welfare system. Concepts that are related to this are:

- Free movement of goods and people within the European Union

- Mention of illegal immigration

- Criminality related to border security (e.g. drug smuggling or human trafficking)

- Fortune seekers, or economic migrants as a term for immigrants

- The sustainability of a country’s financial system and its welfare system

“Migration poses a threat to both

healthcare and education, in addition to shaking the foundations of the welfare state

…”3

“Regarding the economic dimensions of the

migrant crisis, Mr Szijjártó described the issue of the sustainability of the economy as a „primary economic issue” from the viewpoint of Europe.”4

“… the money for which we have worked, for which we have laboured, would not go to Hungarian people, not to Hungarian local governments and settlements, would not go to Hungarian families, but would simply go to immigrants.”5

National security

The policy is said to be aimed towards protecting the people from the threat of terrorism and other violent crimes, supposedly caused, or enhanced by migration. Related concepts are:

- Ideologies or religions that are assumed to promote violence being adhered to by immigrants

- The loss of autonomy and control over the (kind of) people entering the country

- The mentioning of national security

“… terrorists and Wahhabi missionaries spreading the doctrines of aggressive Islam and inciting terrorist acts are also arriving in Europe together with migrants.”6

“And many among them will become

terrorists and criminals after they arrive in Europe, so they endanger the security of Europeans”7

3 Quote by Bence Rétvári, from the Ministry of Human Resources (2019, March 13). Retrieved April 6, 2020 from, https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-human-resources/news/migration-poses-a-threat-to-both-healthcare-and-education

4 Fragment from an article about the disintegration of the Schengen system (2015, Oktober 19). Retrieved April 6, 2020, from, https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/disintegration-of-schengen-system-would-have-unforeseeable-economic-effects

5 Quote by Viktor Orbán, during an interview at a radio show (2018, March 13) Retrieved April 6, 2020 from,

https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-kossuth-radio-s-180-minutes-programme20180330

6 Quote by György Bakondi, Chief Security Advisor to the Prime Minister (2016, September 7) Retrieved April 6, 2020, from https://www.kormany.hu/en/news/we-must-be-prepared-for-another-wave-of-migrants

7 Quote by Viktor Orbán, during an interview at a radio show (2018, November 23) Retrieved April 6, 2020 from, https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-good-morning-hungary-20181126

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Cultural security

The policy is advertised as a way to protect the “Hungarian way of living”. Immigrants are considered a threat to the dominant culture and religion of Hungary. Related concepts are:

- A discrepancy between basic societal values (e.g. treatment of women, or the role of the family)

- A fear of the replacement of the native population by those of a different nationality, possibly as a purposefully designed complot

- Immigration as a threat to the dominant Christian culture

- An emphasis on the importance of the Hungarian nationality and its traditions

“At the European Parliament (EP) elections, the Hungarians gave the Government an obligated mandate with relation to three fundamental issues: stopping illegal immigration, national sovereignty and the protection of Christian values”8

“If things carry on like this, there will be a clear Muslim majority in Europe’s major cities, and London will not be an outlier, but a pioneer”9

After the overall securitization of immigration is classified, an overview of the illiberal measures that have been implemented in the same time period is presented. This overview is based on yearly reports of three external organizations10_.

The first organization is Freedom House. This organization collects information about the level of freedom and democracy of countries worldwide. An overview of the collected data, as well as the conclusions that the organization draws from them, are published in a yearly report.

The second organization whose reports are used as a source is Human Rights Watch. This organization is interested in policies violating rights worldwide. This makes it a valuable source for finding policies that infringe on the political and civil rights spheres. The organization publishes a yearly report, discussing the developments of that year in various countries, including Hungary.

The third organization, the SGI project, evaluates the sustainability of various governments, by analysing a countries policy performance, the level of democracy and the functioning of the government. This makes it the only source that is not specifically focused on illiberal policies. As a result, maybe not all information provided by the project might be as useful. On the other hand, it might give a more complete overview of the implemented policies over the past years, than the other sources.

8 Quote by Zoltán Kovács, State Secretary for International Communication and Relations (2019, June 4) Retrieved April 6, 2020 from, https://www.kormany.hu/en/government-spokesperson/news/the-hungarians-have-given-us-an-obligated-mandate-to-stop-migration-and-to-protect-sovereignty-and-christianity

9 Quote by Viktor Orbán during his “state of the nation” address (2018, February 19) Retrieved April 6, 2020 from, https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/for-us-it-s-hungary-first

Solving migration or violating democracy?