Organizational Reputation in the EU Agencies: An analysis of the communication strategies of the Justice and Home Affairs Agencies

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Master Thesis Faculty of Public Administration/ Economics & Governance

Organizational Reputation in the EU Agencies:

An analysis of the communication strategies of the

Justice and Home Affairs Agencies

Ioulia Georgiadi s2070316 Supervisor: Dr. Dovile Rimkute Second Reader: Dr. Madalina Busuioc 2nd June 2020

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Abstract

The Justice and Home Affairs group is a network of agencies delivering technical, policy-making, and executory contributions to the Area of Freedom, Justice, and Security. The Area of Freedom, Justice, and Security has always been characterized by great challenges, jurisdiction issues, and apprehensions that have, ultimately, left the network in the centre of attention and of audience multiplicity, battling to manage the diverse sets of expectations. Bureaucratic reputation scholarship dictates that the successful governance of all expectations and audiences is incremental to an organization’s reputation and ensuing legitimacy. However, there has been no considerable literature accounting for the reputation strategies of all Justice and Home Affairs agencies collectively and comparatively. In light of this, this Master Thesis is offering the first analysis of the reputation management strategies of all nine agencies, by employing both quantitative and qualitative measurement tools. Taking into account the concepts of reputation uniqueness and threats, the empirical results demonstrate that agencies suffering from greater threats remain true to their inherent goals and last, but not least, that the Regulatory/ non-regulatory character of an agency incurs considerable variation in their reputation promotion strategies.

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1. Introduction, Goals & Scientific Relevance

1.1 Introduction

The European Regulatory State relies upon the centre of all of its activities on the European Union (EU) agencies. On their part, EU agencies, partaking in a cooperative harmony, are responsible for the full array of operational activities within the EU, starting from the assembling and supply of scientific evidence and expertise (technical information), weighing up to the (assistance of) decision-making and the safeguarding of the strict and veracious enforcement of decisions thereof (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 1). EU agencies, in their pursuit to regulate and steer the assigned responsibilities, are demanded to address and juggle around the anticipations and yearnings of a plethora of clashing audiences, on various levels of governance implementation, and amongst a plurality of institutional actors, on a European level (such as the European Commission), on a National - Member State - level (national regulators and other counterparts), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), political parties/ groups, the media, and last, but not least, their accountability to the EU citizens (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 1-2; European Union, 2014: 3; Europol, 2019; Puppis et al., 2014).

To that end, the EU has established a number of agencies, bearing Regulatory and non-regulatory functionalities, to assist with the managing of responsibilities and policies within the Regulatory State; these agencies are operating in different areas, performing the specialized tasks assigned to them, of legal, technical and scientific nature (Majone, 1999: 2; Rimkute, 2019: 5-7). In the Regulatory state, Regulatory agencies are characterized by greater degrees of freedom and independence in all of their operational aspects, while they all bear their own legal status and budget (Wonka & Rittberger, 2010). Among their core duties, they are tasked with fostering the smooth execution of policies, and with ensuring the commencement of an open dialogue on issues of importance to the European Commission (EC), according to their knowledge and area of expertise. At the same time, non-regulatory agencies are charged with providing practical support and enhanced information sharing between the Member States and other EU institutions (European Union, 2014: 3; Majone, 1999: 2).

At the moment, there are forty-five (45) EU agencies and bodies supporting all activities of the EU Regulatory State with only nine (9) of them contributing to the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)1_{(European Union, 2016: 6; Busuioc, 2017: 5). Namely, these agencies are}

the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), the European Union's Judicial Cooperation Agency (Eurojust), the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), and the European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU-LISA) (European Union, 2016; Busuioc, 2017: 5).

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The Area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), was established, as a network, in 2006, to tackle a series of developments and enforce collaboration in the area of security and migration (EMCDDA, 2018; Europol, 2019). During that time, the network of agencies has had to battle grave challenges; to begin with, the field of JHA activities has always been characterized by grievous concerns regarding the centralization of processes and procedures, with the Member States being reluctant to pass on the control of their safety and security issues or seek assistance from the EU institutions (Monar, 2006; Rijpma, 2014; Busuioc, 2017: 5). Notwithstanding what was said, the Member States have also tolerated profound challenges in this area as well. Particularly, since 2015, with the issue of cross-border safety and (illegal) migration, rising rapidly on the political agenda; in that regard, Member States now are demanding greater support from their European compeers, improved cooperation and the centralization of responsibilities and governance, thereby bringing the JHA agencies in the spotlight of concurrent events (Busuioc, 2017: 5; Notopoulou, 2016; EC, 2011; CNN, 2019).

As it was previously cited, EU agencies are being evaluated by a set of multiple opposing audiences at a time; thereby it is required of them to engage into innocuous acts so to ensure support from their environment, beneficial prioritization of tasks, and deliverables (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 2; see also Carpenter, 2010). Bureaucratic reputation scholarship is indoctrinating us that how public organizations strategize their responses to external audiences is of grave importance for their reputation and, subsequent, legitimization in the Regulatory State. An organization is legitimized through the perceptions of capability, audiences hold for them, granting, therefore, that the building up of their reputation is not according to equal distribution, but a matter of results, where both formal and informal audiences play a catalytic role in the shaping of an agency’s reputation (Carpenter, 2010: 45). Nonetheless, there has not been enough research and scholarship examining which aspects are important to the JHA agencies’ communications and which factors can attest to their respective variances. Subsequently, the research questions of this Master Thesis are formulated as follows:

On which reputation-management strategies do EU-JHA agencies rely in their communications to pertinent audiences? Do reputational considerations explain the variance in strategies among the JHA agencies?

Carpenter's (2010: 45) definition of organizational reputation is applied as the lead concept of this Master Thesis to operationalize, theoretically, the concepts of reputation and the reputation management strategies EU institutions are adopting. Carpenter’s (2010: 45) rationale highlights that public organizations are shaping their organizational reputation by implementing various strategies; according to his definition, (a) organizations can choose to promote their successful outputs and scientific expertise of their employees by promoting their technical reputational dimension, (b) their ability to take decisive actions for the greater good of the EU constituents by enhancing their performative dimension, (c) by transposing

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In addition to that, we are addressing two major considerations that we expect to play a significant role in reputation management strategies; the concept of reputation uniqueness and reputational threats (Gilad, 2008; Maor et al., 2012; Carpenter, 2001; 2010; Gilad, 2012). Reputational uniqueness is pointing out to an organization’s duty and obligation to submit results, advice and scientific expertise that no other institution can provide in the entity of all EU institutions, hereby highlighting an organization’s inherent rationale and purpose for creation (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a; 2019b; Rimkute, 2019; Majone, 1994; Lodge, 2008; Carpenter, 2001; 2010; Maor & Sulitzeanu - Kenan, 2015). Reputational Uniqueness is operationalized to argue, in this Master Thesis, that the organizational role, capacity, and overall behaviour of an agency can justify the multiple sets of reputational management strategies organizations choose to enforce. This approach was selected according to the recommendations presented by the work of Carpenter (2010) and Carpenter & Krause’s (2012) stressing that the development and security of reputation uniqueness are resting on the agencies’ intrinsic values and goals assigned to them upon their establishment.

In the same vein, scholarship is emphasizing that organizational behaviour and reputation management strategies are not solely determined by an agency’s uniqueness but also from the reputational threats commencing by the myriad colliding ideas of foreign audiences (Carpenter, 2010; Maor et al, 2012; Gilad et al, 2013; Gilad, 2008; 2012). Similarly, as Carpenter (2010: 832) has already stated, in order to translate a regulator’s/ agency’s reactions, we should, simultaneously, consider what are the threats and what are the audience’s responses. For this very reason, we are anticipating to evidence that organizations will manoeuvre with extreme delicacy among reputational threats and organize their reputation strategy accordingly.

Furthermore, in order to operationalize our concepts empirically, this Master Thesis is implementing both a quantitative and a qualitative content analysis model to analyse the communication strategies of the JHA network agencies. Through this research model, this Master Thesis is achieving to not only shape a better understanding of how this group of agencies corroborate and manage their operations in the Regulatory State but, even more so, is underlining the attributes of the reputational aspirations they seek to highlight. What is more, this methodology is allowing us, and future scholars, to map out the communication strategies of the JHA agencies, how they build their (positive) reputations and, as importantly, whether the observed presentations of the agencies’ “bestowed self” is in consonance with the scientific and expert-based logic commissioned by the EU Regulatory State or reputational threats are stirring them to deviate from their established course (Goffman, 1959; Busuioc & Lodge, 2016: 250; Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 3).

In the following chapters, we begin by examining the concepts of organizational reputation and introducing the hypotheses of this Master Thesis. Further on, we are diving into our empirical analysis and the presentation of our statistical and qualitative results, according to our research questions. In chapter six, we are discussing our (empirical) results in contrast to the theoretical considerations of organizational reputation scholarship. Finally, in chapters seven and eight we are providing an answer to our main research question and emphasize our recommendations for future research in the discipline of Public Administration and the EU organizational reputation discipline.

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1.2 Goals and Scientific relevance

This Master Thesis is attempting to narrow the gap between the EU Governance and organizational reputation scholarship; the discipline of bureaucratic reputation and regulatory communications has been significantly enhanced in the past years, albeit some of its dimensions and theoretical considerations have only, recently, begun receiving increasing attention, with a lot of these aspects remaining, still, underreported (Gilad et al, 2013; Maor et al, 2012; Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a; 2019b; Rimkute, 2019). This Master Thesis is offering the first insights on the building and management of organizational reputation, purely, within the nine EU-JHA group of agencies. Even though the topic of reputation and the EU agencies has been addressed before (Busuioc, 2015; Rimkute, 2019; 2018; Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a; 2019b), this Master Thesis is contributing to the scientific community of Public Administration, the first research addressing the reputation strategies and mapping, thereof, of all the agencies operating in the EU Regulatory State in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), at the moment, by providing, next to the statistical analysis, a qualitative interpretation of the JHA agencies’ most recent communications and reputational threats. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) (or as else known the JHA network of agencies) preserves the uppermost importance in the European Regulatory State; these agencies significance lays not only with the baseline protection they offer to (physical) threats, but it is also through these pillars that societal conflicts are managed, all EU citizens’ fundamental rights and personal information are retained, whilst, at the same time, ascertaining that no government or state is exploiting its executory and regulatory power (Guild & Carrera, 2010; European Union, 2019).

Previous scholarship has addressed these issues either as single case studies or by investigating the EU Regulatory State and its agencies, in its entirety (Rimkute, 2019; 2018; Busuioc, 2015; Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a; Pushkina, 2015), leaving a wide array of questions concerning the operations, prominence, and value of the JHA group, to the Regulatory State, unaddressed; vital questions, such as how do these agencies operate their communication strategies comparably? Which aspects and dimensions can account for the diverse set of their communications? This is why we believe that the implementation of a combined quantitative and qualitative research approach can provide statistically significant and undeniable answers to such questions while paving the road for future research to occur.

Moreover, the core focus of this Master Thesis is allowing us to investigate the theoretical considerations of bureaucratic reputation by applying it to a group of EU agencies that are active in both highly complex national- and EU- level governance structures. EU agencies are established on an ad hoc basis; they are constantly operating under significant pressure while being liable and dependent to their superiors (such as the EC, the European Parliament- EP, and their national counterparts from the Member States) (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a; Rimkute, 2019). In this setting, the JHA agencies are exposed to a number of audiences, be that professional, public, and the media interests, among which they are battling to achieve their legitimization, power, and control in the EU Regulatory State (Busuioc, 2017; Chiti,

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between the processes of legitimization, reputation strategies, and confronting constituencies.

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2. Literature review

2.1 Organizational Reputation

The auspicious establishment of a positive and firm organizational reputation can serve the interests and support the areas of work of bureaucratic agencies in multiple ways (Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter & Krause, 2012: 26; Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2013; Gilad, 2008, 2009). Governmental agencies can relish greater independence in their decision- and policy-making from their political superiors, or find intrinsic support against arising reputational threats by assuring a prudent, decisive and prolific application of their organizational reputation (Carpenter, 2010: 45; Carpenter & Krause, 2012: 26; Maor et al., 2012). The effectual governance of an agency’s reputation can enhance their accountability and grant further regulatory authority to it, which in turn can result to the agency exceeding their own binding legal and inherent mandates (Rimkute, 2019: 4-5; Puppis et al, 2014); such as the agency embracing into behaviours and activities that are neither favoured nor approved by their superiors but they are equally not in a position of power to restrict them (Carpenter, 2001: 17). Furthermore, adequate communication/promotion campaigns can lead to the expansion of propitious reputations with the ability to secure the public’s support, whilst assisting with the legitimization of the agency’s regulatory powers (Rimkute, 2018: 72; Puppis et al, 2014).

Acquiring and retaining positive organizational reputation can prove to be a beneficial and treasured asset for any organization, which is why agencies are going into large, extends to ensure one. For this very purpose, bureaucratic organizations are rather carefully orchestrating and governing their communications strategies in order to attract different audiences and attempt to shape their beliefs about their affairs and the prominence of their role (Gilad et al., 2013; Maor et al., 2012). Public organizations achieve so, by implementing different reputation-promotion games, specially crafted for each and all external audiences (Maor, 2015: 10). Withal, organizations are operating in an environment of diverse and competing interests, ideas and values, also known as reputational threats, to which they individually choose to respond to and that could possibly pose as threats to the sovereignty of their “presenting self” (Goffman, 1959; Busuioc & Lodge, 2016; Rimkute, 2018; Gilad, 2009; Gilad et al., 2013; Maor et al., 2012). Thereby, in order to ensure a good reputation, organizations are adapting their communication campaigns to align with the needs and expectations of their most loyal audiences (Rimkute, 2019; Puppis et al, 2014).

Organizational reputation is a multifaceted concept (Carpenter, 2010); being in a possession of a positive reputation is truly a highly considerable achievement since the agencies have to find the perfect balance among the highly diverse types of organizational reputation and their respective combinations (Rimkute, 2019; Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a). An organization can be acknowledged by general audiences for its efficacy and ability to quickly adapt and fulfil its

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Organizations have a wide array of available reputation management strategies to nurture, safeguard and preserve their favourable reputations; agencies can choose to contemporaneously implement different reputation promotion games to achieve their goals by concentrating on disparate reputational dimensions to promote their conduct and responsibilities (Carpenter & Krause, 2012: 26). Organizations, for instance, can choose to successfully manage and promote the shaping of a positive reputation by utilizing all four reputational dimensions, thereby generating an overall, general, reputational dimension (Lee & van Ryzin, 2018). Howbeit, there is little literature and scholars that have attested this desired balance among all four dimensions within the European Regulatory State and its highly distinctive number of EU agencies, where each one of them is up against a different set of reputational threats and their inherent uniqueness of mandates (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a; Rimkute, 2019).

2.2 The dimensions of bureaucratic reputation

No public organization is in possession of a good reputation by default; bureaucratic reputation as defined by Carpenter (2010) can be broken down into four dimensions, divided according to their content. Namely, these components are the performative, moral, legal-procedural, and technical dimension. Performative reputation is referring to the process of an organization’s understanding and the performing of its mandates in the most responsible, proficient, and appropriate manner feasible (Carpenter & Krause, 2012: 27). This reputational dimension is reflecting an organization’s capacity to achieve its predetermined set of goals and deliver, fully, on its objectives (Carpenter, 2010: 46). The performative reputation is the most vigorous, fundamental and unprecedented aspect of the four dimensions surrounding bureaucratic reputation, as it has the ability to boost, significantly, an organization’s positive reputation (Carpenter, 2001; 2010: 46; Lee & van Ryzin, 2018: 2; Busuioc & Lodge, 2016). In this prospect, it is important to mention that within the performative dimension, its capacity to “intimidate” is an essential feature; since, organizations bear the authority to coerce various stakeholders and are exhibiting greater degrees of power and aggressiveness in their effort of fulfilling their adjectives (Carpenter, 2010: 46).

Moving forward, moral reputation is the sum of values and ethics of an agency as key stakeholders translate them (Carpenter, 2010: 46). The discipline of public administration has already discussed that public agencies need to be the upholders of law and constitution (Hart, 1984; Rohr, 1988); public officials should under all circumstances act according to the normative of morality and ethics. In other words, they should always adopt an ethical behaviour, which is characterized by honesty; they should abide by the existing law regime and treat both externals and internals stakeholders fairly and with respect (Willbern, 1984; Hart, 1984; Lee & van Ryzin, 2018: 2). Moreover, according to Rohr (1988), a public official’s predominant duty should be to protect the established ideas, views, and beliefs of the civil government. Thereby, the moral reputational dimension is underlining these characteristics and values of an organization that reflect the virtue and uprightness of their operations (Lee & van Ryzin, 2018: 2).

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Equally, the legal-procedural reputation is referring to the fairness of the processes and procedures of an organization (Carpenter, 2010: 47). Modern society is an arduous network where multiple interests, conflicts, and stakeholders are fighting for fair co-existence and collaboration (van Ryzin, 2011; Willbern, 1984). Conflicting audiences, more often than not, judge an organization based on its “right” decision making, the transparency, openness, and justness of the processes and procedures they abide to; all of which attributes are traced in both the reputational dimensions of the moral and legal-procedural aspects and are employed by institutions to justify their rule-making to external audiences (Busuioc & Lodge, 2016). On that note, Carpenter (2010: 47) stresses that even though procedural and moral reputation overlaps in terms of their contents, it still remains of great importance to approach them separately. Narrowing that down, we observe that an organization presented as being high on moral ends doesn’t necessarily mean that it is also characterized by respect for just procedures and vice versa (Carpenter, 2010: 47).

Last, in order, but not of importance, the technical reputational dimension is referring to an organization's expertise, methodological, and analytical sophistication capabilities (Carpenter, 2010: 47). In essence, this dimension is attempting to measure the technical knowledge and expertise an established public organization is characterized by (Perry, 1997; Lee & van Ryzin, 2018: 3). Hence, by measuring an organization’s technical reputation an attempt is made to confirm the set of skills and experience each agency has in their respective fields and jurisdiction (Lee & van Ryzin, 2018: 3; Busuioc & Lodge, 2016). Finally, Lee & van Ryzin (2018: 3) with their research paper, on audiences’ perceptions of organizations, generated one more key reputational dimension concerning the overall general bureaucratic reputation of institutions. However, this reputational dimension is better approached by the literature of business administration and marketing (Fobrum et al., 2000: 242; Lee & van Ryzin, 2018: 3); be that as it may, we won’t seek to explore further this concept in this Master thesis.

TABLE 1 Summary of Carpenter’s reputational dimensions (Rimkute, 2019: 5) Reputation

dimensions

Signals that the agency sends to audiences

Focus of agency communication Technical Agency sends strong

professional and technical signals

Scientific accuracy, soundness of (scientific) evidence, methodological quality, rigorous evidence-selection criteria

Performative Agency emphasizes its ability to attain goals set in its formal mandate

Effective and efficient regulatory outputs and outcomes

Legal-procedural Agency emphasizes a thorough engagement in socially acknowledged

Due process, adherence to socially approved and fair procedures

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3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Reputation, Communication and Raison d’

être in EU Agencies

The European Regulatory State, as recited to the operations and activities of the EU institutions, is, more often than not, adopting an output/ performance-oriented ideology (Scharpf, 1999; Rimkute, 2019; Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a). In this institutional setting, EU agencies, as well as other bureaucratic organizations, can only survive by legitimizing themselves through the delivery of optimal solutions for conventional problems (Rimkute, 2019: 5).

The institutional framework of the Regulatory State is mandating for EU agencies to be fully equipped, admirably, to tangle with grace among all of the reputational dimensions and their accompanying challenges. In truth, however, the harmonization and successful delivery of all four dimensions have been proven to be a rather difficult challenge to overcome (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 5). Agencies are struggling with prioritization issues in their effort to choose which of the dimensions should tend their focus on without undermining the significance of the rest, instead of working on the improvement of all of them collectively (Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter & Krause, 2012).

According to the Public Administration scholarship and EU institutional paradigms, the technical dimension is the underlying reputational aspect traced in all of the EU agencies (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a; Rimkute, 2019). The European Commission has stressed on a number of instances, that the pretext and essence of the existence of all EU institutions are resting on the scientific expertise, reliable information, technical solutions, and politically independent nature of the products of their work (EC, 2002: 5; Majone, 1999: 157). Similarly, Majone (1997:152) has also emphasized that “expertise has always been an important source of legitimization” for EU agencies and the key rationale of their reputational uniqueness. EU agencies are created with the sole purpose to be fiercely available so to resolve any upcoming scientific or operational challenges with the highest technical expertise available in the EU Regulatory State, allowing the EU Commission to function singly on the political amplitude of the matters (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 5; Groenleer, 2009: 101). This notion is widely accepted and persistent with the theories coming from the regulation scholarship, where the regulator is even presented as a “technician” diving into his special “toolbox” to provide peerless proposals and outcomes that stir the problem towards the most appropriate path to development (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 5).

In the Regulatory State, achieving organizational legitimacy is widely resting on the agency’s potential to preserve the idea that it indeed is the most suitable one to tackle the challenges the European Commission has entrusted and instructed it with (Majone, 1999: 7). In similar fashion, previous studies have proven that EU agencies were concentrating all of their efforts into the successful formation of an output-oriented campaign, custom-made for all external audiences, where their technical and performative reputation was underlined, while fewer measures were recorded to be adopted by EU institutions when it came to the building up of their procedural and moral reputation, particularly, given that these competencies are not considered as the centrepiece idea behind the establishment of any EU institution (Rimkute, 2019: 11-16). Accordingly, we are foreseeing that the EU-JHA agencies will seek to cultivate

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their technical and performative reputational dimensions comparably more than their moral and legal-procedural ones.

Moreover, taking into consideration the exposure of EU institutions to the multitude of external audiences and conflicts they need to appease to, it will be an impossible task to achieve legitimation in the Regulatory State by emphasizing merely one side of their operational activities (Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 6-7). To this end, agencies might conclude into the shaping of more than one of their reputational dimensions, in order to support their work in the Regulatory State and satiate the general audiences (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 7). Existing literature is attesting that agencies are acknowledging the need to overlook their innate adjectives, become more reputational conscious, and work towards the finite necessity of acquiring the general public’s support (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 6-7). Therefore, in light of this view, we are estimating that EU-JHA agencies will choose to amplify their reputational-promotion games by increasingly focusing not only on their scientific expertise and technical competence but also on other reputational dimensions, like the performative and legal-procedural one.

Further comprising, it is noteworthy to mention, that we presuppose EU-JHA agencies will adopt and execute these campaigns, to specifically match and describe their own tasks and specialization within the EU Regulatory State (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). Exceedingly, different reputation management patterns and combinations will take place, according to the needs, aims, goals, and essence of each organization (Carpenter, 2010: 45-46). As it was already mentioned in the introduction, some agencies are devised to have a Regulatory- supervisory role while others bear a non-regulatory- advisory/ execution one; the different regulatory types adopted should play a significant factor in their reputational focus (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 7-8; Busuioc, 2013; Majone, 1996). So, we envisage all of these characteristics will act as a catalyst.

Summarizing, the result-reasoning iterated logic identified by the existing bureaucratic reputation scholarship, is providing the EU literature with a solid underlying baseline, assisting researchers to identify what are the processes and procedures EU institutions assume in their effort to achieve their legitimacy within the EU Regulatory State and, similarly, how they communicate effectively with all applicable audiences. What is more, bureaucratic reputation theory is stressing that the undergoing processes and challenges EU institutions come across in their way of achieving their legitimacy, are better described and illustrated by the concepts of reputation uniqueness and reputational threats (Carpenter, 2010: 45-46; Rimkute, 2019: 6). According to Carpenter (2010: 45), an organization’s reputation uniqueness in terms of its diverse capacities, roles, and obligations are playing a significant role in the management of its organizational reputation and strategy. However, the level of hazard generated from reputational threats along with the sets of beliefs external audiences hold about an organization’s potency and widespread behaviour can lead to a shift in their promotion strategies (Carpenter, 2010; Gilad, 2008; Gilad et al., 2013; Maor et al., 2012).

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3.2 Understanding the JHA agencies’ reputation and communication

strategy

The European Regulatory State (or else the European Commission) is assigning all set up EU agencies, within its spectrum, with a specific and unique set of mandates that are unparalleled in their nature and cannot be provided by any other institution. This set of tasks and responsibilities, in turn, is imperative for all EU institutions since this is the essence highlighting the need for their creation and, is subsequently, aiding an organization's reputation uniqueness (Carpenter, 2010; Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2015). The achievement of a favourable reputation and an organization’s evolution are widely interdependent with its specific responsibilities, challenges, undertakings, and further expertise (Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter & Krause, 2012); for this very purpose, an organization’s reputation uniqueness is shaped from the EU agencies by tracing the most desired equilibrium between blame avoidance/ protective strategies and reputation governance (Maor, 2011; Maor et al., 2012). Responsibilities, mandates, duties, and competences of organizations are signified by outstanding disparities. Their formation mandates, on the other hand, are often falling under the umbrella of the two following provided rationales: the efficiency or credibility-based rationale (Majone, 2001). Organizations that are established in order to perform as principals and tackle tenable issues are enjoying greater room for responsibility and independence (Regulatory/ supervisory) from the EC/ European Parliament (EP), in contrast to the organizations that are established merely for efficiency provided functions (advisory) (Wonka & Rittberger, 2010; Rimkute, 2019: 6-7). Against this, we notice that non-regulatory agencies are assigned with more clear responsibilities and goals; they are entrusted with providing assistance to the decision-making process of the Member States and other EU organizations (in other words with the coordination and adoption of policy-specific tasks). Taking into consideration the lack of executive powers commissioned to the non-regulatory agencies, we are classifying them as following the efficiency-based logic, according to Majone’s definition (2001). Therefore, in line with this literature, we are expecting to see EU-JHA non-regulatory agencies to have at the core focus of their reputational management strategy the performative dimension.

On the other hand, despite the political independence they are enjoying, EU Regulatory agencies have to cope with increased legal constraints in their day-to-day activities (Chiti, 2013). Even though they are putting into effect the novel set of obligations, responsibilities, and mandates they are owning up to secure and enhance their credibility and legitimacy within the EU Regulatory State, (Majone, 2001), very often we see that Regulatory agencies are lacking the mandatory coercive adroitness, much needed in a command and control system such as the EU Regulatory State, to fulfil these mandates. Due to this, agencies begin to seek the development of a persuasion/ information - logic system of regulation as an alternative. The conception of such a system is demanding the development of corporate strategies and policies that are straying from the traditional requirements; Regulatory agencies provide the correct environment for such an idea to flourish by incentivizing their very own restrictions to their executives, who, ultimately, seek to evolve by implementing thee (Majone, 1997: 274). Hereupon, scholarship is highlighting that Regulatory organizations are more strategic and are adopting more sophisticated reputation promotion campaigns (Rimkute, 2019: 7). In light of this, we presuppose that the JHA Regulatory agencies will

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promote their moral, technical, and procedural reputational dimensions equally and simultaneously.

Moreover, we envisage that EU-JHA Regulatory agencies will implement more refined reputational promotion games, because of the EU institutions’ functionality as both intermediaries and fiduciaries. All EU institutions are important to the operations of the EC/ EP and, as such, the pressure for legitimacy is laying on their scientific outputs, economic knowledge, and expertise they provide to the Regulatory State (technical dimension) (Rimkute, 2018: 70; Majone, 1997: 157). This is why we presume that regulatory agencies, broadly defined by their scientific-oriented outputs at the kernel of their reputation uniqueness, will concentrate more on the technical reputational dimension than their non-regulatory compeers.

In parallel, we anticipate that EU-JHA agencies will become more reputational aware and procure further support from external and even opposing audiences, thereby surpassing their raison d’ être. Carpenter & Krause (2012) have argued that organizations taking into consideration the different audiences they need to accommodate, might encounter rather significant challenges concentrating in simply one of these reputational dimensions. EU-JHA organizations are no exception to this notion, ergo, we are hypothesizing that agencies, in order to achieve legitimacy within the regulatory state and satiate all audiences, will utilize multiple combinations of organizational management promotion campaigns.

Subsequently, EU-JHA regulators, according to their de jure restrictions, are hypothesized to immerse in a persuasion-oriented logic, next to the information-oriented one, by emphasizing and adopting moral and legal-procedural management strategies, as an input-oriented legitimacy nascence (Rimkute, 2019: 7). Being in this highly daedal legal position, where agencies can appear as either highly politically interdependent or even unprofessional, will result in EU-JHA Regulatory agencies being further exposed and putting at risk their widely-known reputation, not only within the Regulatory State but also more broadly, on a worldwide level (Majone, 1997: 262). In light of this, it is indeed safer for Regulatory agencies to choose to cultivate their legal-procedural reputational dimension as a means to engage with the various sets of external stakeholders. Going down this path, regulatory results will be presented to the general audiences through a better calculated and premeditated procedure that will ensure that all relevant stakeholders involved will contemplate the processes and procedures just, fair, transparent, approving of their practices, while even more so, consider that the means live up to the predefined mandates (Tyler, 2006). Likewise, taking into account that regulatory organizations often enthral into diverse persuasion techniques, compared to non-regulatory agencies, it is their inherent advantage to portray such operations as widely interrelated with the concepts of openness, inclusiveness, and good governance attributes that can only be achieved by the successful cultivation of the moral reputational dimension (Carpenter, 2010: 46). Thereby, our hypotheses are formulated as follows:

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Hypothesis 1a: EU-JHA non-regulatory agencies are more likely to focus on their performative

reputational dimension as opposed to the Regulatory EU-JHA agencies.

Hypothesis 2a/2b/2c: EU-JHA Regulatory agencies are more likely to focus on their

moral/technical/legal-procedural reputational dimensions as opposed to the non-regulatory EU-JHA agencies.

An agency’s organizational reputation promotion strategy is as equally dependent to the degree of reputational threats they are exposed to, next to its guiding reputation uniqueness attributes. Reputational threats are demurrals, the result of the compilation stemming from conflicting external, relevant, and not, audiences, that constitute a hazard to an organization’s widely known international reputation (Gilad et al, 2013: 452). Reputational threats are becoming an increasing risk, requiring attention, when political perusal, the media, and the general public’s attention are fixating on an organization’s regular operations. The rise of external scrutiny and surveillance about an agency’s outputs is directly affecting the organization’s processes, procedures, and overall daily activities; this is because the agency is demanded to find the perfect balance between satisfying external audiences and fulfilling its mandates (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). Thereupon, greater reputational threats, require organizations to pay more attention to their immediate responses and to engage in their strategic communication in blame avoidance/ preservation games by utilizing a most sophisticated combination of all reputational dimensions (Rimkute, 2019: 9). Against this backdrop, reputational threats mandate organizations to become more entrepreneurial, resourceful, and shift their core focus, from the technical and performative dimensions (results-oriented EU institutional legitimacy) to other reputational dimensions such as that of moral and/ or legal-procedural one (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 6; Wood, 2018).

Reputational threats grant event-driven legitimacy as an imperative but not as equally adequate for an organization to achieve a favourable reputation (Carpenter, 2010; Gilad, 2015). Substantial and ample reputational threats can impel bureaucratic organizations to become adrift from their inherent and preceded goals, mandates and responsibilities; scilicet, an agency’s legitimacy within the Regulatory State, and its further organizational image, are directly correlated to the organizational threats and incorporated risks it is experiencing (Carpenter, 2010; Gilad, 2015; Gilad & Alon- Barkat, 2018; Rimkute, 2019: 9). Diverse sets and levels of reputational threats are calling for different actions and strategy implementation. EU institutions, such as the JHA group, are operating in a highly controversial institutional framework, which grants them susceptible to growing reputational threats, creating the urgency to protect, inspire trust, and re-attest their reputation to external audiences (Busuioc, 2017; EC, 2011; CNN, 2019). EU agencies, achieve so, by demonstrating greater degrees of openness, transparency, ethical values, and morality through their day-to-day operations and rulemaking (Gilad, 2015; Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2013; Gilad & Alon-Barkat, 2018). Furthermore, the literature highlights that all bureaucratic organizations are engaging in different reputational games to appear more commiserate and perceptive in front of external audiences and ensure their livelihood in the Regulatory State (Carpenter, 2010). Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we hypothesize that organizations that suffer from higher reputational threats would make sure to appear more concerned regarding the citizens, most impacted by their rule-making and operations by emphasizing and stressing more the moral hallmarks of their proceedings.

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What is more, we envisage that agencies bereaved with greater reputational threats will shift their communication management strategies to underline the fairness, justness, and legality of their processes and procedures, posterior they will focus more on the cultivation and promotion of their legal-procedural reputational dimension. Keeping in mind that Carpenter (2010) has emphasized that being attentive to this reputational dimension is the most efficient means to assure organizational conduct legitimacy, hereupon, public institutions are acquiring legitimacy through the decision-making process by progressively promoting the positive effect of openness and inclusiveness their activities are characterized by (Worthy, 2010). Contrastingly, we expect that EU-JHA agencies confronted by fewer reputational threats will stay true to their founding mandates and continue to prioritize their event- or technical-driven rhetoric to legitimation in the Regulatory State.

Hypothesis 3a/3b: EU-JHA agencies suffering from greater reputational threats will, more

likely, focus on the positive framing of their moral/ legal-procedural reputation contra to the JHA agencies suffering from lesser threats.

Hypothesis 4a/4b: EU-JHA agencies suffering from lesser reputational threats will, more

likely, focus on the positive shaping of their performative/ technical reputation contra to the JHA agencies suffering from greater threats.

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4. Research Design

In order to empirically control our hypotheses, this Master thesis is utilizing the most recent communications and annual reports of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies, a total of nine EU agencies that are actively cooperating and working on multiple projects in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Notably, we processed all News/ Press Releases the network of agencies has made in the course of six (6) months, starting on the 01/09/2019 up to and until 29/02/2020, their Annual Reports (2018) displaying their major operations and activities and lastly their Multiannual Programming Documents accounting for the years of 2019-2021.

Analysing the agencies’ communications is allowing us to pinpoint which of the reputational dimensions, the JHA network of institutions, are prioritizing whilst introducing and/ or displaying themselves and operations to pertinent audiences collectively as well as individually (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 9). To begin with, by examining the most recent publicized annual reports we sought to see how the JHA agencies are governing their reputation strategies. The annual report is a document of great significance for EU agencies since it is through these records that organizations select the type of attributes, characteristics, and operational aspects they wish to communicate and promote, thus, allowing us to study the peculiarities of each one of them in both their internal and external reputation governance strategies (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 9; Rimkute, 2019: 10).

Secondly, we examined the News/ Press Releases the JHA agencies promulgate through their communications; News/ Press Releases are of paramount importance for any and all organizations, fostering their accountability, and subsequent legitimacy, to a plurality of germane actors in the EU Regulatory State (Boumans, 2017; Rimkute, 2019: 10). Addedly, News/ Press Releases documents are adhering to a very meticulous and stringent structure that serves an organization’s broader perceptibility through governed exposure. Notably, News/ Press Releases are employed to raise the audiences’ awareness about the agency’s operational and scientific achievements, in a certain manner, while being an easily accessible and convenient way to directly address threats and challenges, guided by the principles of openness and transparency (Boumans, 2017; Rimkute, 2019: 10).

The last source data type we sought to investigate is that of the multiannual programming document; a depository of documents accounting and outlining an organization’s feasible aims and goals they seek to fulfil, as well as, the overall future operations planning orientation in terms of their work (Rimkute, 2019: 10; Europol, 2020). Multiannual programming documents are steering an agency’s decision-making, narrating its core values, and last but not least are behaving as an internal appraisal and assessment tool in all aspects of their operational activities. Therefore, the analysis of their communications in combination with their multiannual programming documents is allowing us to observe and generate empirical results about how the JHA agencies venture to narrow down the differences between their promoted/ displayed self and the reputation they seek to acquire, by highlighting their successful operations, collaborations, future attributes, and strategies they wish to implement (Rimkute, 2019: 10; Europol, 2020).

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All of the aforementioned documents can be found on the “about us” section of each agency’s website, and are documents that one can freely access through the official websites of all EU institutions (Appendix I). In total, we assembled and analysed a single file ranging from 180 to 430 pages per agency. This material is of great importance for the agencies’ communications since this is the bread and butter all EU institutions employ to communicate with a manifold of audiences; all the information presented on their website is intended to “speak” to mass media outlets and citizens while organizations are using annual reports and multiannual programming documents to showcase themselves to a wide array of stakeholders, from concerned citizens to more sophisticated and professional actors (NGOs, CSOs, other EU institutions) (Rimkute, 2019: 10). All of these files entail wealthy information and statistics, and are drafted with the sole purpose to illustrate an agency’s areas of focus, operations, values, goals, and achievements in accordance with their documented strategy objectives (Rimkute, 2019: 10).

4.1 Operationalization and Limitations

In the interest of quantitatively operationalizing and studying the four reputational dimensions and key variables of this Master thesis, we implemented Busuioc & Rimkute’s (2019a) measurement tool. The measurement tool is relying on the definitions of the four reputational dimensions as provided and presented through Carpenter’s (2010) work. The list of keywords created by the authors was tested to assure that each keyword is reflecting apiece the reputational dimensions thoroughly (technical, performative, legal-procedural, moral) and fully. Even though the authors stress their list has not been exhaustive, the biggest advantage of their study, and assessment tool, is bordered on their strict interpretation of all relevant theoretical notions, the tool’s repeatability and, lastly, their goal to generate keywords that specifically “speak” to each reputational dimension (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 10-12). (Appendix II)

With reference to the limitations of the measurement tool applied, the authors have declared that it is suitable to only count the frequency with which organizations are making a reference to either of the four reputational dimensions but is unable to interpret hidden messages or to analyse whether agencies are utilizing “technical” words to promote the social policy, procedural or moral aspects of their activities (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2019a: 11).

In this Master Thesis, we attempted to bridge this gap by engaging also into a qualitative analysis of the News/ Press Releases communications of the JHA agencies, a documents’ archive, holding great significance to the agencies’ operations and can be used as an instrument of convenience by organizations to broadcast their values, and positive achievements in a concise, transparent, and immediate manner (Boumans, 2017; Rimkute, 2019: 10). After carefully examining the sum of the News/ Press Releases, we noticed that all

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engaged into the sound analysis of fifteen (15) representative, in our opinion, Press Releases, per agency (Appendix III). The communications’ material we qualitatively examined, in-depth, was within the same time period of 01/09/2019 up to and until 29/02/2020 that we used for our quantitative data.

The thematic division, we implemented, protruded the following classifications: (a) the group accounting for the successful operations/ cooperation’s; this classification is making a reference to the performative reputational dimension. Through our qualitative analysis, we evidenced that the successful operations were among the most recurrent News/ Press Releases agencies were publishing to praise their attained goals. (b) Publications/ expert’s information sharing; this category is concerning the portrayal of the agencies’ technical reputational dimension; our research illustrated that agencies preferred to demonstrate their technical competency with the disclosure of their own scientific reports and/or the network of experts they have at their disposal. Finally, the last categorization we created is the (c) remaining/ other; through this sort we sought to make a reference to the procedural and moral reputational dimensions, two components that, as we observed, an attribute was not being made to as often through the agencies’ News/ Press Releases.

The secondary research method employed, despite being significantly smaller in terms of its sampling size, was applied to provide additional insights on this Master Thesis quantitative data, along with a more comprehensive interpretation of the JHA agencies’ communications and the “hidden messages” they might seek to convey to all relevant audiences through their News/ Press Releases. However, it should be stressed that the qualitative analysis of the JHA agencies News/ Press Releases communications cannot be characterized as being a systematic review, given that it is contingent on the Master student’s interpretation bias, together with the lack of randomized sampling (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Elo et al., 2014). In the next chapters, we are moving to the categorization of the explanatory factors concerning this Master Thesis; to achieve so, firstly, we implemented Majone’s (1997) definition regarding the distinction between Regulatory and non-regulatory JHA agencies by taking into consideration the founding EU Regulation, values, and goals each agency was assigned to upon establishment. Additionally, in order to investigate which JHA agencies are suffering from greater threats, we adopted Font & Perez Duran’s (2016) rationale, stressing that the number of questions the European Parliament (EP) is receiving regarding an agency’s activities is directly corresponding to that agency’s broadly mass media exposure and, posteriori, being subject to higher reputational threats.

4.1.1 Credibility - Oriented Rationale

In the interest of operationalizing our explanatory factors concerning the credibility- oriented rationale we implemented Majone’s (1997) view characterizing as Regulatory agencies those tasked with providing technical advice, contributing to policy and decision-making processes, and, lastly, those responsible for the processes of information gathering. The EC has identified the exceptional and unique character in the operational activities of all of these agencies, as well as, the importance of their contributions to the Regulatory State (European Union 2014: 3; 2016; Busuioc, 2015: 45; Groenleer, 2009: 18). Taking into consideration this definition and after extensively examining the EU Regulation applied in all

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of the JHA agencies, we categorized FRA, Frontex, the EMCDDA, and EIGE as Regulatory organizations.

Going into more detail about the JHA Regulatory agencies’ character and unparalleled responsibilities, we start off from FRA2; The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

(European Union, 2014: 20). FRA’s reason for establishment, except for its inimitable character, is including the offer of support to all EU institutions with the best available expertise to tackle the concurrent and challenging issues of data protection, civil rights, and equal entitlement to work (European Union, 2014: 20). For that very reason, the agency is enjoying greater independence in their activities and increased legislative power in the EU Regulatory State. Furthermore, as it is portrayed through its website and via the transmission of the agency’s core values and goals, FRA is sending strong signals emphasizing its moral conduct, by using heated phrasing such as “We help make Europe a better place to live and

work. We help defend the fundamental rights of all people living in the EU.” (FRA, 2020, About

FRA section, para. 3), while at the same time promoting its technical expertise as a hub for information and regulation in the discipline of fundamental rights within the EU Regulatory State - “We are the independent centre of reference and excellence for promoting and

protecting human rights in the EU.” (FRA, 2020, About FRA section, para. 1).

Further comprising, EMCDDA3 is the Regulatory JHA group agency focused on feeding

information and expertise to the European Community in all matters concerning drugs, drug addiction, and the significant impact they hold for the European society, on a collective and individual level (European Union, 2014: 15). Following the trend of the rest of the EU JHA Regulatory agencies, EMCDDA is also highlighting its technical conduct and expertise through its core values and mission by stating on its website “EMCDDA, your reference point on drugs

in Europe.” (EMCDDA, 2020, About the EMCDDA section, heading).

Another Regulatory agency is EIGE4, the European Institute for Gender Equality. EIGE is

stemming from a side branch of the EU’s Fundamental Rights convention and is the agency working, solely, on the safeguarding and on guaranteeing that gender bias and discrimination have no place in the European Society, in any of its areas (European Union, 2014: 13). The agency’s inherent goal is to increase awareness and encourage gender equality nationwide (European Union, 2014: 13). It is also noteworthy, that EIGE, given the specific nature of its tasks and mandates, is the only JHA Regulatory agency which is highlighting significantly more the moral direction of its mission and values in the Regulatory State, “Making equality

between women and men a reality for all Europeans and beyond is our vision.” (EIGE, 2020,

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The last JHA Regulatory agency is Frontex5; the agency responsible for the external border

management both on a European Union level and at a national one. The EC has very recently increased the agency’s regulatory independence and legislative power in the Regulatory State (European Union, 2014: 7). The first amendment to its founding EU Regulation, and also the first document referring to Frontex as a Regulatory agency, was in 2016 and it was rather shortly followed by a subsequent amendment in 2019, where the agency’s regulatory and legislative grasp was even more enhanced with the creation of the first uniformed and armed European Union body (Frontex, 2019). What is more, Frontex is the only JHA Regulatory agency that is promoting, equally, all four reputational dimensions on its website through its mission and values; in the agency’s own words “We are professional. We are respectful. We

seek cooperation. We are accountable. We care.” (Frontex, 2020, Mission, Vision & Values

section, para. 3).

4.1.2 Efficiency - Oriented Rationale

Majone’s (1997) definition regarding non-regulatory agencies and their activities, is dictating that organizations falling under this category are tasked with offering assistance and advice to the policy decision-making processes and procedures, as well as with the fostering of cooperation among the Member states and respective competent authorities. Thereupon, according to their founding EU Regulations, on the coordination of tasks, we sorted Europol, Eurojust, EASO, CEPOL, and lastly, EU-Lisa. The main tasks of the JHA non-regulatory agencies are broadly similar; these agencies’ activities are highly concentrated on the gathering, exchanging, sharing and analysis of information and intelligence, coming from the national competent authorities (also third countries, non-EU agencies, and other international bodies), by utilizing a network of experts, specialists, liaison officers, and significantly complex information exchange systems (Groenleer, 2009: 18; Busuioc, 2015: 45; European Union, 2014; 2016; Busuioc et al, 2011).

More specifically, Europol6, the European Union’s Law Enforcement Agency, was established

with its main task being the coordination and enhancement, between their operations and the competent authorities, in the context of promoting a centralized agency to battle organized crime, terrorism and other serious forms of crime affecting the Member States collectively (European Union, 2014: 19). Furthermore, the agency’s goal and mission are to protect all EU citizens, which is also depicted by the demonstration of their core values, highlighting the performative nature of their functions “Our main goal is to achieve a safer

Europe for the benefit of all the EU citizens.” (Europol, 2020, About Europol section, para. 1).

5 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the

European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 and (EU) 1052/2013.

6_{Regulation (EU)}_2016/794_{of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European}

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In the same vein, CEPOL7, the European Police College, has been founded to advocate and

promote the cooperation and coordination of national police forces by organizing educative pieces of training and activities, in the area of policing, in order for law and police professionals to advance their knowledge and share national strategies with the wider network of the European Community (European Union, 2014: 17). CEPOL, despite being a non-regulatory agency is seeking to point out the technical aspect of their operations, by enunciating that their core value and mission is to “Make Europe a safer place through law

enforcement training and learning.” (CEPOL, 2020, Mission, Vision & Values section, para. 1).

In addition, Eurojust8, the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, was

established with the explicit mandate to strengthen the cooperation and task coordination of all Member States’ judicial authorities and support Europol with the prosecution of the cases assigned to them (European Union, 2014: 22). It is noteworthy to mention that Eurojust only became officially a European agency as of December 2019 (Eurojust, 2019). Despite, the agency’s newly established status, its mission and values remained broadly similar, with the agency strongly underlining its performative attributes by remarking that its mission is to

“Keep European citizens safe.” (Eurojust, 2020, Home section, title of the video by the Council

of the EU).

Furthermore, EASO9, the European Asylum Support Office, has been founded to promote and

improve the cooperation and assessment tools among the EU Member States with regard to the immigration and asylum processes and procedures (European Union, 2014: 11). The non-regulatory agency is advocating its aims and responsibilities by advocating its respect for fair processes and consequently the legal-procedural dimensions of their work; in its own words

“The aim is to ensure that individual asylum cases are dealt with in a coherent way by all Member States.” (EASO, 2020, What we do section, para. 1).

Lastly, with regard to the EU Regulation of eu-LISA10_{, the European Union Agency for the}

Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the AFSJ, the agency was created with the extraordinary mandate of supporting all operational large scale IT system and telecommunication infrastructures of the JHA agencies (European Union, 2014: 9). It should be pointed out, that eu-LISA, next to CEPOL, are the only two non-regulatory agencies that are harping their technical conduct through the communication of their core mission and values - “Continuously supporting Member States effort through technology for a safer

Europe...Grow as a centre of excellence.” (eu-LISA, 2020, Mandate and Mission section, para.

1-4).

7_{Regulation (EU)}_2015/2219_{of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on the}

European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and replacing and repealing Council Decision 2005/681.

8_{Regulation (EU)}_2018/1727_{of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the}

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4.1.3 Reputational Threats and the JHA network of agencies

In order to investigate, which of the JHA agencies are subject to higher threats we counted the number of questions the European Parliament (EP)11 has received with regard to

the operational activities of all JHA agencies independently. The scholarship has argued that there is a positive correlation between the reported number of questions and the vulnerability of organizations to external reputational threats that can be hazardous to their legitimacy and operations in the EU Regulatory State (Font & Perez Duran’s, 2016; Carpenter, 2010; Gilad, 2012; Maor et al., 2012).

Thereupon, we counted the number of questions the EP has received for the time period starting from 01/07/2019 up to and until 31/12/2019. We selected this specific timeframe of six months while taking into consideration the collective chronological diagram of publications of all JHA agencies, so to control what type of reputational threats are generated and if these threats are corresponding to the operations, values, and future set out goals the agencies disclose in their annual reports and multiannual programming documents. In our research, we noticed that in principle the EU JHA agencies were disseminating their annual reports, for the year of 2018, between the months of end of May and June, while their Multiannual Programming Documents, displaying their goals, budgetary commitments and missions vary in terms of their publications and availability to all public audiences; we managed to pinpoint these dates for the agencies most recently revised and publicized Programming documents between the months of November 2018 and going as late as up to July 2019, accounting for the years 2019-2021 (Appendix I). Additionally, we decided to have an overlap of, overall, four months between the counting of reputational threats and the agencies’ News/ Press Releases, to detect, through our qualitative sample, if agencies exposed to reputational threats sought to address these issues in the most immediate, and conventional source type, they have at their disposal, as well as to identify if there is a correlation between these documents and the type of threats agencies received.

The content analysis we conducted, via the EP’s website, revealed that the EU-JHA agencies were the recipients of external hazards disputing various components and elements of their work; from the operational activities traced in the agencies’ annual reports to the procedural and moral mandates of their internal infrastructures. In addition, the research underscored that for the specific time period of six months the agencies exposed to greater reputational threats within the JHA network were Europol and Frontex, who ranked a total of forty-eight (48) questions (22 and 26 respectively) as opposed to the rest of the agencies who recorded a total of fifteen (15) (Appendix IV). Over the course of six months, the two JHA agencies exposed to higher threats received a wide array of questions that varied in terms of content and were touching upon issues with respect to the performative and technical reputational dimensions embedded to their activities. Particularly, while analysing the type of threats addressed to Frontex, we detected that the questions received were widely similar with respect to their thematic components, with the topic of migration and border control management being widely eminent. Furthermore, all of the threats were focused on the performative and technical features of the agency’s work product. Contrastingly, in the case of Europol, we noticed that the agency received a handful of questions, that were very dissimilar in their essence and were examining the agency’s budgetary commitments, stance

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on police brutality and other distinct operational activities, such as counter-terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, and trafficking in human beings.

Organizational Reputation in the EU Agencies: An analysis of the communication strategies of the Justice and Home Affairs Agencies