Who cares!? - The (male) self in contexts of structural
marginalisation
How intersecting factors of marginalisation problematise the identity formation
of young men
Bachelor Thesis
Name: Carolin Dürr Studentnumber: 10003926
Date: 20/05/2013
Supervisor: Dr. Karen Witsenburg
Second reader: Dr. Flip Lindo
1. Introduction
At the age of sixteen, I made friends with a groups of young men between the age of 16 and 22. They were all living in Neuperlach, one of the Munich neighbourhoods considered not completely safe, inhabited by mostly immigrants and the subsequent generations as well as other members of the working class. The guys were the first people of a marginalised context I got to know closely. And they showed it off, they did not try to behave or look like most people I knew until then (who were mostly comfortable middle-class). They acted “tough”, said they would not care about what other people think. They described themselves as Assis, a term derived from the word asocial, in it's meaning similar to the term 'underclass', commonly used among German youth to refer to people who are perceived to fail achieving societal standards and/or act against societal values. The boys thus did not see themselves as an important part of society, but rather as dysfunctional in “the real world”; they talked about this jokingly, but nevertheless almost always with some bitterness in their voices and their faces. They identified with certain clothing and ways of acting and talking. When they drank alcohol, their drinking regularly lead to violence; going out with the boys for me was fun, but it also meant being more alert and trying to intervene and calm someone down before a situation gets too problematic – which was not always possible.
When people in my school found out that I spent time with those boys, they showed reactions between shock and ridicule. They referred to them as gangsters and to the neighbourhood of Neuperlach as dangerous and dirty. They joked that these guys would turn me into a gangster, too. My mother was concerned about me going to the neighbourhood, especially at night. All this upset me. Why would they talk like this even though they had never met the boys? Why did everyone have such a negative and critical opinion, even though they never spent time in the neighbourhood? But also, why did the boys act out other's negative expectations of them in public?
This behaviour, or better, this idea about the self and the other in society, is not limited to the context of Neuperlach. I have seen and heard it in other parts of Munich, of Germany, in the Netherlands; I hear it in music and see it videos, read it in comments on music videos and articles. The problem encountered by the young men I met are thus not restricted to one society, the opinions and behaviour can consequently not purely be the result of a combination of individual and cultural factors. The context which those boys grew up in has many parallels with the social contexts in other urban settings in Europe, but also other parts of the world. They live in a working-class neighbourhood frown with features of urban marginality and inequality. The inhabitants are often seen to have their own culture which by popular media and popular discourse is presented as deviant from the societal norm. What are the consequences of the creation of categories of “us”
versus “them”, of omitting the interconnectedness and interdependence of all beings in a society ? Why do people accept their social position and stigmas attached to it? In neoliberal societies which are highly individualised, it is taken for granted that people are personally responsible for their own success and failure; current policies assume that people are rational, responsible and autonomous actors. To what extent is society blaming individuals in marginal positions for their personal situation?
In this thesis, I want to look at the processes at work in the marginalisation of young men from working-class, and often migrant, background, living in neighbourhoods which are marked off as poor, dangerous and dirty in public discourse. Furthermore, I want to find out more about how this marginalisation has influence on the identity and image of self and other of such young men. The image of youths from such contexts clearly differ along the lines of gender, which leads me to the assumption that the male gender role plays a role in the complex issue. How does the interplay of various factors of urban marginalisation, such as area of residence, ethnicity, age and gender, problematise the identity of young men from contexts of urban marginality?
In the following I will argue that there are multiple processes of marginalisation at work, all of which together create a situation for young men which makes it even more difficult to integrate into society. For one, there is the factor of social geography and stratification. Another factor, overlapping with the first, is the education and chances for work. Furthermore, there is the factor of masculinity. All these cause an internalisation of marginality, but simultaneously a resistance to such discourses, which problematises identity formation and perceptions of self and the other in society on the side of the marginalised young men. I wonder if the current attitude in policy that assumes autonomy, rationality and responsibility will lead towards improvement of their lives, or will these assumptions rather worsen the situation whereby structural constraints are consistently ignored?
Methodology
This paper is based on literature research on various forms and expressions of marginalisation and theories on the self, creation of an 'other' and identity. In addition to this literature, I draw on my personal experience connected to this issue. My position in this might be described by what Goffman calls 'the wise': I come from a middle-class family, so from my personal background I never have experienced urban marginalisation and exclusion from society. However, after spending a lot of my time in what Wacquant calls places of advanced marginality, in various districts in Munich and to a smaller extend in Amsterdam, and befriending with ever more young men there, I
started to gain their trust. This is not to say that now I am “one of them” in the strictest sense, since listening and learning cannot make up for life long experience of course. But due to the fact that I do not judge them for what they are doing, approach everything with an open mind, and support them, we established a friendship which made it possible for the boys to talk about everything openly, despite my presence. I appreciate this for a variety of reasons: for one, I know that most of the guys initially mistrust anyone they meet, especially when they are not from their immediate social context; this is closely connected to negative and disappointing experiences, the potential for negative consequences and being betrayed, and also to illegal practices they were part-taking in. Another reason for my appreciation of my position is the fact that the boys are not ashamed to discuss “boys stuff” or private issues, like their visiting prostitutes and other sexual contacts, their relationships and problems therein, and their personal insecurities. This position of 'the wise' also enabled me to bear witness to opinions, stereotypes and reactions of people who could be described as more established members of society to my friends.
Furthermore I will use some Hiphop songs and videos to help illustrate certain ideas and show that the experiences I gain when spending time with my friends are not limited to only a friend group.
It is important to note that I do not wish to create further stereotypes or homogenise a whole group. This analysis is not valid for all members of marginalised societies. What I wish to show is the influence marginalisation and the strive for a dominant masculine identity can have on quite a large number of young men and what the dynamics are which create their position. This note is of further importance because I do not wish to sanitise the boys' behaviour; aggressive and violent behaviour is not acceptable, but I feel that condemning and moralising the concerned youth will rather lead to even more difficulties. Also, I want to enable the reader to understand such issues from a different perspective. In order to tackle problems of poverty, street criminality, violence, or more generally, urban inequality, we need to understand 'the other side', factors often not incorporated in policy, media, or public discourse.
'Advanced Marginality'
Marginalisation is commonly defined as 'the process of making a group or class of people less
important or relegated to a secondary position'.1 Most influential, according to Wacquant, is the
production of marginality by the state; he sees the state as result, terrain, and agency of struggles, but emphasised the difficulty in proving it and thus making states responsible for this (Wacquant
2008). The Fordist regime was characterised by unskilled wage work and patriarchal nuclear families with authoritative parenting. These factors began deteriorating from circa the 1980s on, leading to a new economic and socio-political paradigm, post-Fordism. According to him, there are some features of urban poverty which are new in the post-Fordist era, and which led him to call this new urban poverty 'advanced marginality':
[T]he growing internal heterogeneity and desocialization of labor, the functional disconnection of neighborhood conditions from macro-economic trends; territorial fixation and stigmatization; spatial alienation and the dissolution of place; the loss of a viable hinterland; and the symbolic fragmentation of marginalized populations (Wacquant 1994: 121).
With the fragmentation of the labour market, the scope of jobs has thus become much broader. Especially among the lower socioeconomic classes the unemployment rates are high; worst affected is the youth. Short term labour and jobs with low payment have come to fill in the gaps some times,
but this brings with it a drastic change in the wage-labour relations and feelings of self worth. 2
Schooling has become a general means to getting access to the labour market in this process;
however, there is considerable difference in the quality of schooling.3
For immigrant children,
factors such as language might pose a further obstacle.4
Wacquant also mentions that education used to be the territory of middle and upper classes; the norms and values at work at such institutions are thus part of middle and upper class socialisation. He argues that education works as major classifying system or agency, with elite schools at the top. Not only the economic, but also the social and cultural capital is largely inherited by the offspring of the elites, which makes it easy for them to function according to societies norms and values. At the “bottom” layers of society, however, problems emerge, since the various forms of capital, especially social capital, are
frequently differing from “the top”.5
This correlates with a study in the United States (Patterson 1990), which researched the correlations between the respective independent variables ethnicity, household composition, gender and income level, and children's competence in conduct of peer relations and academic achievement. The results were that overall, income level and gender were
2 Unemployment Statistics Europe,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics#Main_statistical_findings, accessed 20/05/2013
3 Neukölln Fremdes Land, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/berliner-ruetli-schule-neukoelln-fremdes-land-
1.884749, accessed 20/05/2013
4 Hilf dir Selber – Fard, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6SXfEtsMA4o, accessed 16/05/2013
5
The State as the Producer of Urban Marginality - Loïc Wacquant, www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JPAguOSA2E, accessed 17/03/13
the strongest predictors of children's competence, with income level correlating with ethnicity, although all four variable seem to be of influence. A report by the European Commission on gender differences in educational outcomes confirms that high academic performance correlates negatively with poverty, larger family size and parents in unskilled or low skilled employment. Positive correlations have been found with higher social class level, female gender, and having parents with
higher education.6
The concepts of the various forms of capital were originally developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1986) in order to explain the reproduction of various forms of inequality, tracing the latter back mainly to unequal power relations. Cleaver (2005) problematises widespread use of the notion of social capital in academia and policy. She poses that the focus on social capital as ultimate factor and as achievable through a production of capital is problematic, since it makes it possible to sidestep issues of structural inequality.
The poorest experience clusters of interlocking disadvantage that make it highly unlikely that they can draw on social capital to ameliorate their poverty, or that increased association and participation at community level is necessarily beneficial to them. Moreover, social relationships, collective action, and local institutions may structurally reproduce the exclusion of the poorest (Cleaver 2005: 893).
Hence, when social and cultural 'capital' is presented as a natural given, persons not familiar with such rules risk being categorised as 'abnormal' (Eriksen 2010 [1995]: 45). The post-Fordist processes thus create tensions for the working class; the positive image of a working class identity inherent in Fordism has been replaced by a negative image of this status. But it also creates social
anxiety of middle classes who might be in fear of downward mobility, socially and economically. 7
This can lead to closure of social status groups and contribute to the marginalisation and exclusion of poor members of society as a protection mechanism. This leads the urban poor into a situation which makes it necessary to look not only at crisis in their context, but rather to treat crisis as their context of everyday action and interaction (Vigh 2008).
6
Gender Differences in Educational Outcomes: Study on the Measures Taken and the Current Situation in Europe – Issued by European Commission, http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/thematic_reports/120en.pdf, accessed 20/05/2013
7 Loïc Wacquant – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iaIz32fUJkg&list=PLF8E8495C92D0341A, accessed
Interplay of stigmas
By handling notions of 'normal' and 'abnormal' in order to delineate socially expected behaviours, difference is produced. Such production of difference is frequently accompanied by processes of stigmatisation. Stigma is a term extensively elaborated on by Goffman. It refers to a certain quality an individual has, which marks the person off as flawed and thus excludes her or him from regular social interaction in established and institutionalised circles of society. This exclusion can vary from being treated differently to complete exclusion from regular processes and interaction in mainstream society. The three types of stigma mentioned by Goffman are physical deformation such as various handicaps, individual character flaws such as homosexuality, and phylogenic
stigmata which are passed on by generations, such as race, nation, or religion (1975 [1963]: 12-13).
Wacquant suggests a further category of stigma, which according to him resembles the category
phylogenic: blemish of place. It refers to places of residence as possible “disability”, as possibly
disqualifying an individual from being a fully accepted and included member of society, thereby posing 'dilemmas of information management, identity and social relations' (Wacquant 2007: 67).
The phylogenic stigmata, including blemish of place, are of greatest importance for the issue at hand, since they refer to racial, religious and territorial discrimination. Moroccan friends of mine for example told me about how when they sit down in the bus, the people next to them quickly grab their (hand)bags and hold them like they would have to protect them; the same thing happens in their neighbourhood on the street; as if people would be expecting to be robbed, they say.
Stigmas thus have different consequences in different social situations; they can also overlap, which
further complicates the concerned individual's or group's strive for social recognition and integration. Such social categories that are marked as 'other' by cultural ideologies, such as blackness, femininity or homosexuality, make unmarked social categories, such as the norm of whiteness, masculinity and heterosexuality, visible (Essed 2001: 447).
Marginalised male youth is regularly stigmatised, and presented as inherently dangerous to themselves and to others in popular discourses, media, and policies. When I started hanging out with the boys from Neuperlach, the people in my surrounding were initially shocked. A boy from my school commented: 'Neuperlach? I would not even stop there with my car at a red traffic light at night. Otherwise someone might come and rob me. Hahaha.' This statement was proof enough that stereotypes about this district overshadowed experience or 'rational' thought. When looking for an apartment in Amsterdam, I encountered a similar scenario. 'You really do not want to move to De Bijlmer, it is really dangerous, you won't even be able to be outside at night, especially not as a girl.', such were comments I recall. The most danger is in such statements said to come from boys
and young men 'hanging out in the streets'. On the Dutch online news-page
dagelijkseSTANDAARD.nl I found an article called 'Schaamtecultuur weer op volle touren', which
could be translated as 'culture of shame fully back on track'. It refers to the story of two Moroccan boys who were shot in a drive-by shooting in Amsterdam this year; the author of the piece is expressing his criticism on the fact that family and friends of the boys defend an image of the young men as good and innocent. The people who were close to the boys states that they had nothing to do with such criminal activity and that they most probably were mistaken for someone else by the gunmen. Especially interesting are the comments posted under this article; they present a very negative image of Moroccan youth, not allowing for the possibility that not all young men from Moroccan descent are criminal, with statements such as 'He worked in a school, refilling candy
machines? Sounds like a cover for drug trade!'8
I talked about this to a group of young men I know who are from Moroccan descent, and they mentioned knowing one of the boys personally and that they indeed had been at the wrong place at the wrong time. They had thus not been the actual targets, but this possibility is not allowed for according to the article and the comments. Such (re)production of stereotypes, however, is not restricted to the upper and socially accepted layers of society which can be said to be giving form to official images of a society. The processes also take place “from below”, but in this case the outcomes are often different. The German rapper 'Tayfun' for example uses (partly negative) cultural stereotypes in a song in which he promotes solidarity for
all people living a life full of struggles.9
The negative images that accompany stigmas can be seen as part of creating of an 'other', of a 'them' opposed to 'us'. This is closely connected to Vigh's concept of negative potentiality; the concept indicates that people act in expectation and anticipation of possible future negative effects that an invisible agent or force is seen as being capable of producing, thereby expressing the relation between insecurity and social action (2011: 93). It also resembles what Eve Ensler mentions in her TED Talk Security, which is that in modern societies, you cannot not (emphasis added) know who you are, so you cling onto “hard” identities – religion, ethnicity, culture, and the similar - with
protecting yourself as main goal.10 In this way, social insecurity or anxiety can lead to a
reinforcement of imagined communities such as nations, ethnicities, religions and other possible points of reference for displaced individuals. According to Wacquant (1996), neighbourhoods used to function as communities as well, but this has changed with the new configurations which have formed in urban settings. I think that neighbourhoods, especially such which are inhabited by people from lower socioeconomic layers, still function as point of reference for outsiders as well as
8 http://www.dagelijksestandaard.nl/2013/01/schaamtecultuur-weer-op-volle-toeren , accessed 07/05/2013 9 Heb die Faust – Tayfun, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sZCdimIXNsc , accessed 24/04/2013
insiders. This is thus the next issue to turn to.
The neighbourhood
Young men from marginalised backgrounds are frequently framed as such an 'other' in society; 'the other' is 'a category which describes people who live in subordination of the self' (Laws 1994: 8). Bad behaviour of some is used to draw a picture of a whole group as homogenous, thereby creating and maintaining stereotypes. Such rhetoric is confirmed by other social scientists studying social geography and the discursive making of places. Glasze et al. (2008) compared such phenomena in Germany, France, and Poland. They identified two central forms of discursive othering, namely the dichotomy of dangerous versus endangered people, and a social location inside versus outside society (1). This shows the connectedness of spatial differentiations with social ones, delineating a social and spatial 'us' versus 'them', thereby constituting a certain social order. Laws also mentions that urban areas are sometimes oppressive, and if they are, this oppression is often contested; consequently, such areas are constantly restructured as a result of ongoing confrontations between oppressor and oppressed (ibid.: 7-8). The marking off of the 'outside', the 'others', as inherently dangerous and different, is in line with Elias argumentation on the relations between established and outsiders.
The social stratification of cities as well as the marginalisation of certain neighbourhoods are thus major issues. They contribute to the internalisation of the marginal position in society by people living there, which again can be seen as reinforcing 'destructive' behaviour in the area and a widening of the gap between middle class and such working class areas. Formal and informal surveillance and control in form of security organisation and increased police presence is on the rise in e.g. social housing estates. This is combined with the strong presence of youth care and child protective services, presenting the image of members of such communities as naturally more in need of such services than high socioeconomic classes and/or status groups (Stephen and Squires 2004: 352-353). The family is often blamed and made responsible for failed socialisation of youngsters by social services, in media, and in public discourse. They are positioned as in need of correction, which omits the important role the society and social environment plays in socialisation (Collins 1998, Kagitcibasi 2011).
The penal system functions as a tool to control urban marginality and for reasserting the state's authority. In such territories, security and police control is often heightened. This is visible when looking at for example the security firms active in neighbourhoods such as Amsterdam De Bijlmer, Amsterdam Noord, but also for example in Neuperlach. During my last visit I was
surprised at the fact that there were security guards walking around the whole night, even with a dog on a leash. There was always a lot of police, but I never saw security guards the last few years, and I even lived in the neighbourhood for a few months myself. These observations resemble Wacquant's theory of territorial stigmatisation in a time of changing urban marginality, in which he
argues that the post-Fordist11
regimes generate forms of poverty that 'are fed by the ongoing fragmentation of the wage labour relationship, the functional disconnection of dispossessed neighbourhoods from the national and global economies, and the reconfiguration of the welfare state in the polarizing city' (Wacquant 2007: 66). The result is what he calls advanced marginality, which is mainly concentrated in isolated and clear-cut territories which are perceived by outsiders and insiders as the abyss of the post-industrial society (ibid.: 67). This also has to do with the gaze urban elites have trained on street illegality and the increased number of police forces and control active in settings of urban marginality. In this way, the social question and the penal question can be seen as merging at the “bottom” of society; this is a tool for the state to decrease social anxiety of especially the middle class (Wacquant 2008). Extreme examples of this can be found in the United States, but also European cities are increasingly concerned by such issues. What is needed is thus clearly an improvement of the lives of collectives which are formed by individuals from lower social status instead of moralising the individual. This is in line with Haylett's statement:
Cultures are not things on which normative and political judgements can be passed. The production and practice of class-cultural differences within late capitalist societies is a process that is historical and complex (Haylett 2003: 60, original emphasis).
Hence, what we find here is an interaction of multiple factors problematising the integration in mainstream society. Of great importance is the constructed difference of places; the idea of the homogeneity of a geographical community, be it country or neighbourhood, has become part and parcel of the global system of domination. The capitalist system of accumulation is based on such exploitation and exclusion of groups of people, in order for others to enrich. This could be seen as legitimated by the construction of fixed difference, whereby an 'other' is created which is said to be deviant from the norm; groups of people are thus exoticised, they are said to be inherently different from 'us', whoever this 'us' and 'them' might be. In this way, cultural difference is also produced by academia, the media, policy and public discourse. The message of this argument is not that there is
11 Definition Post-Fordism, http://understandingsocialscience.wordpress.com/2010/01/11/key-term-definition-post-
no such thing as cultural difference. But the way this notion is commonly handled frequently indicates a picture which is only black and white. It does not allow for the possibility that for example a young man whose parents have migrated from Turkey to Germany, but who himself grew up in Germany, might feel more German than Turkish, or feel like both cultures are part of his identity. The same might be true for people who were born in one country but have been living in a
different country for quite some time already.12 In his song Immigranten, rapper Nate57 turns to the
problem that immigrants are often not accepted and even when someone is integrated, this is
regularly not taken seriously: 'blackhead stays blackhead'.13
The spatial location and exclusion of the urban poor play major roles in processes of marginalisation. Impoverished neighbourhoods are also referred to as ghettos, especially in (originally black) popular culture. Jaffe argues that the concept of the ghetto has become a global imaginary, referring to urban experiences of sociospatial marginalisation (2012: 674). This idea indicates a feeling of social exclusion and immobility from the side of it's inhabitants, and is at the same time connecting the socially excluded from various parts of the world; it even bridges national
and ethnoracial devides (ibid.: 675).14
This attitude is exactly what I encountered in relation to this issue: In their song Von Siedlung zu Siedlung the German rappers Xatar and SSIO mention the occurrence of such neighbourhoods in every city and talk about the parallels between the events
happening in such territories.15
With this idea of the ghetto usually comes a certain view of the world and the relationship between the self and others; it seems to be a reaction to social exclusion, and subculture offering new mechanisms of social and economic inclusion. Now I will elaborate what role masculinity plays in this.
Troubles with Masculinity
It seems to me that one of the most important factors playing into this issue is that of the negotiation of a masculine identity. More generally, adolescence is the time in which identities are being negotiated. The negotiation of a masculine identity can be seen as more complex even. When identity is conceived of as multiple, as a constant process of becoming in which racialised and classed gender identities are constructed and used to engage in and interact with wider society
12 Doku “Neukölln Unlimited”: “Sie schüren den Hass in mir”, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/medien/doku-neukoelln-
unlimited-bei-arte-sie-schueren-den-hass-in-mir-1.1291013, accessed 20/05/2013
13 Immigranten – Nate57, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4uVO3wXR2rM , accessed 11/05/2013
14 Ghettos in der B.R.D. - Serkan feat. Capo Azzlack & Jasha, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JSQYdzmE8lQ,
accessed 20/05/2013
15 Von Siedlung zu Siedlung – Xatar ft. SSIO, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=piBDSMmBpmY, accessed
(Archer et al. 2001: 432). A few months ago, a group of friends came over to my house. At some point the topic of masculinity came up, of what characteristics define a man. The boys were between 17 and 25, and the youngest said: 'As a man, you can hardly do anything. Women, they can do everything a man cannot do.' I asked him what it is a man cannot do. He said he cannot show emotions or weakness, or be dependent; as a male you cannot behave as you please.
While gender has been studied around the globe in the last decades, these discussions in academia, policy and media are largely directed at women's rights. Contrary to women, men are often presented in academia, media and public discourse as willingly taking on the respective role given to them by society, since the role of the dominant man is seems to be better adapted to men's interests. This does not mean that ideal masculinity is the same in every social situation; it is constantly renegotiated.
[D]ifferent masculine identities will be produced from differential locations within and across social divisions, entailing different relations of dominance/subordination in relation to other racialised, gendered, classed groups (Archer et al. 2001: 432).
Nevertheless, there is a general ideal of the man as p rovider, as strong, tough, and protective inherent in patriarchal systems. I asked some of my friends what they conceive of as characteristics of a real man. All argued that a real man is independent and providing for his family. Exemplary statements are:
A real man is defined by the fact that he is not dependent on anyone. That he can take care of his family. In the end it is always about the money. Of course it is more important that your family sees you. That you have good contact with everyone. But in this world, you can help people most with money. … He is the head of the family.
A man should always look out for what is best for his family and wife. He should be prepared to go through fire. To bring sacrifices.
This resembles theories of heroic masculinity as suggested by Whitehead. Heroism here refers to being a strong, independent, controlling, and heterosexual citizen. This emphasis on heterosexuality is a further issue which came up in conversations with various young men I know. In his study on
masculinity as risk factor, Whitehead describes how men demonstrate manhood in relation to other men, rather than in relation to women, as commonly expected (Whitehead 2005: 412). He includes Connell's argument that hegemonic notions of masculinity contain tensions between dominance and violence as opposed to rationality and technical expertise; physical masculinities are becoming subordinated in gender ideology and practice associated with institutional power. Social success might be seen as implying success in attaining a masculine identity, which makes it harder for men with a low social status to prove to themselves and others their masculinity (ibid.: 418). This sheds light on the preoccupation of many men, especially those who are young or who find themselves in a context of marginalisation (Eldering and Knorth 1998), on physicality and heroic masculinity. It also explains why young men engage in violent conflict more frequently than older men: they have not completed the transition to manhood yet, their identity is less developed, and they have less social capital and status affirming them in their selfs (Whitehead 2005: 415).
Ideals of such a dominant masculinity and the naturalness of almost dichotomous gender
roles for men and women are often reinforced in mythology and entertainment 16
(Whitehead 2005: 413). Masculine ideals of this kind are especially problematic because they can be strived for and maybe achieved episodically, but it cannot be achieved as an identity. The notion of masculinity as heroism, of the ideal man as strong, tough, and overcoming all fears, is difficult if not impossible to combine with the emotional and fragile nature of human beings; it omits the possibility of expressing emotions in a constructive way and of allowing oneself to be fragile and even weak at times (Whitehead 2005: 411). It can for example reinforce a young man's idea that he cannot show
weakness or ask others for help.17
The strive for a traditional dominant masculine identity is in this way producing emotional instability in the individual man and hinders the expression of emotions (Jakupcak 2003: 118; Hemert van et al. 2011: 406; Whitehead 2005: 414). The higher prevalence of crying in females is documented in multiple studies, some of which also indicate a higher overall prevalence in crying (in both genders) in more “liberal” (Western) countries with less social control and more emphasis on extraversion (Hemert van et al. 2011: 399). This makes masculinity a dynamic risk factor, regardless of socioeconomic class, ethnicity or similar.
As such, the emphasis on the man as provider of economic and physical security of the family is problematic as well; when the man is not in a position to function as such, this has considerable consequences for his self-esteem and the evaluation by others. This perceived need for the fulfilment of the traditional male gender role is frequently reinforced by the behaviour of relatives and friends, both male and female. The use of language openly presents such hegemonic
16
“Tough guise”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=np2PP76_PxQ, accessed 18/03/13
ideologies, which can be seen in for example the frequent use of words such as “sissy” or “pussy”, which represents an association of failed masculinity with femaleness (Bucholtz 1999: 449). I have to admit that I can recall plenty of situations myself in which I called a boy who did not act tough or did not dare doing things a sissy, pussy, or girl.
Such tensions between reality and ideal are not consistent in their levels since there are multiple roles in daily life which overlap with being masculine, such as being an employee, thus subordinated. The climax of such tension is reached when coming into conflict with other men, a situation which makes it easy to think that others are testing oneself (Whitehead 2005: 414-415). This strongly reminds me of the nights I went out with the boys in Munich and how easily things escalated. When I asked them why, they said they were provoked and that others should show respect. 'Respect who respects you. Otherwise, head off.' This 'head off' is of course a bit of an exaggeration, but it indicates how quick some – definitely not all – young men are reacting in a violent manner. What might be playing into this is that, according to Whitehead, the hero/man is defined through conflict with a villain, wherein the two are reflections of each other, divided by social or ideological difference. The negation of both is the non-man, the latter of which thereby helps defining the qualities of masculinity: “real men” can export failures in achieving masculinity from them onto him, frequently by feminising him and/or ascribing non-heterosexual qualities to him (Whitehead 2005: 416). Such a non-man would for example be a homosexual or really feminine man in many cases. Bucholtz argues that 'as constructed dialogue, the utterances [e.g. fag or pussy] also work within the narrative to project a view of the antagonist's masculinity as constituted in ideologies of misogyny and homophobia' (Bucholtz 1999: 449). When I asked my friends about what characteristics a real man should not have, they replied:
A gay man is not a man. If so, only biologically. … Part of being a man is having sex with women.
This is a statement from my friends in Munich, but I heard almost the same phrase from boys I know in Amsterdam. One of my friends in Munich admitted to me in a private message that he thinks that a gay man can be a real man as long as he has control over his life. But he emphasised that I could not tell the other guys how he thinks about this issue. This reinforced to me the statement of Whitehead that masculinities are defined predominantly vis-à-vis other males. This is also confirmed by research showing a greater endorsement of risk-behaviour and poor health behaviours of men who are oriented toward dominant norms of masculinities vis-à-vis those men with less traditional beliefs (Courtenay 2000: 1392). Courtenay relates this to the idea that
'masculinity requires compulsive practice, because it can be contested and undermined at any moment' (ibid.: 1393, original emphasis). He mentions that health behaviours are a part of the daily construction and negotiation of social status, power, and gender roles, with masculinity often being signified by social practices undermining men's health. Combined with other factors problematising identity formation, such as various forms of discrimination, the tendency to carelessness and risk- behaviour is likely to increase (ibid.: 1387).
These factors show how masculinity as an independent factor complicates the perception of the self and others, and how this problem increases with low social status, in interaction with other marginalising factors. This strive for the achievement of masculinity, I argue, should be considered as one major factor in public discourse, academia, media and policy when addressing the behaviour of marginalised young men. The emphasis on rational choice and personal responsibility of the autonomous actor, which is a characteristic of the current neoliberal paradigm, interacts with norms of dominant masculinity. In trying to be always in control of their representation, to be tough, strong, independent and not emotional, problems come up concerning the care for themselves, others, and their environment (Whitehead 2005; Tronto 1987). The notions of rational choice, autonomy and personal responsibility thus stand in contrast to the needs of the body. Together with values of dominant masculinity, this can lead to risk-behaviour. The internalisation of other factors of marginalisation are said to be further contributing to this tendency.
The paradox of met negative expectations
Für jeden Bruder, ganz egal wo du her bist,
Für jeden dessen Heimat verbunden mit Schmerz ist.
Ich heb die Faust für die Brüder, für die Schwestern, und für die Freunde von früher, Ich heb die Faust, heb du sie auch,
Das Leben ist n Käfig aber irgendwann kommen wir raus, was!?18
This is a quote from the song 'Heb die Faust'/'Raise the fist', by Tayfun, a rapper from the group 089 Battalion, which presents itself as the voice of the ghetto in Neuperlach. The video shows the neighbourhood from its greyest perspective, portraying various young men with mostly grim faces in what could be described as tough or aggressive poses. The rapper talks of all people he raises his fist for, making use of one or two stereotypes ascribed to various groups: he talks of different ethnicities, of his “brothers”, whether still on the streets or in jail, of those disrespecting and
resisting the system, of those women who are decent, those who are “bitches” and all those who are loyal to the neighbourhood. I chose this song and clip for two reasons: firstly, I perceive it as emblematic of the perception of self and other, as well as everyday interaction, of many young men who have been growing up in marginalised neighbourhoods; secondly, this perception is reinforced by the fact that my friends from Neuperlach talked about this song and this rapper as well as his ability to talk “truth” quite a few times already. This is not to say that such talk and behaviour is representative for all people, not even all young men, living in the neighbourhood – my aim is not to homogenise and create further stereotypes. Rather I hope to show the impact of dominant marginalising discourses and practices in society on many young men, and their reactions.
What is represented in this song and video is a certain social context these boys and their families find themselves in. Boys I know from working-class neighbourhoods are treated as 'others' in society, not a normal, integrated part of it. I used to wonder what might cause this: the lack of knowledge about their lives, their ethnicity, or maybe their socioeconomic situation? Elias argues that in societies, an 'other' is necessary to draw the lines of appropriate behaviour and to act as example for what happens if a member of the group breaks with the norms and values characteristic of this group (Elias 1993: 12). He elaborates on the distinction made between 'us' and 'them', and relations of groups, in his study The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Inquiry. According to him, the phenomenon of groups of people positioning themselves as superior to other groups and thus individual, based on the higher position of power the discriminating 'established' group takes in, is universal. The discrimination and exclusion itself should be seen as a mechanism to maintain the power of the group and their feeling of integrity and qualitative superiority, physically as well as mentally (ibid.: 11-12).
An individual's identity and image of self and others is based for a big part on the 'we-image' and 'we-ideal' of the status and/or social group one belongs to. Individual morality and consciousness based on the collective ideals and norms as well (ibid.: 40). Such groups of belonging and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion are often multiple in modern societies, especially in urban contexts: there are social components, racial and ethnic issues, economic factors, differentiations based on gender and/or sex, religion, and so on. (ibid.: 8). The problem here is that the oppressed or outsider group in many cases internalises the image given by the 'established' group, leading to a low self-esteem and an image of oneself and one's group as qualitatively and morally inferior human beings. According to Elias, the image given to outsiders is generally based on the 'worst' and most deviant behaviours that can be found within the powerful groups (ibid.: 16). In line with this the excluded are put down as dirty, and their filthy-ness as being contagious. This idea of contagiousness is true insofar that members of the dominant group who break the taboo of
interaction with the lower group(s), run risk of being excluded and stigmatised (ibid.: 19,22). This I experienced personally in form of ridicule in school when people came to know about my contact with people from Neuperlach and Hasnbergl.
The internalisation of the outsider's position as inherently and naturally inferior can be partially traced back to the fact that the outsider group often does not know and understand why they are being excluded from the interaction with the 'established'/ mainstream society, and why they are said to be and positioned as “worth” less (ibid.: 14). The constructed 'other' is said to be naturally different and inferior due to factors beyond societies control: god, nature, culture, and the similar. This naturalisation a further mechanism of the powerful to escape being held responsible for the inferior position of the 'others' (ibid.: 32-33). An example would be the social position of people with a darker skin colour in especially the Western world (even more so when looking from a historical angle), or the current situation of Muslims around the world: Islam is often marked off
as violating human and civil rights established in Western countries.19 20
The 'established' groups in the Western countries (established here meaning nothing more than being located at a certain place for a longer time and not deviating from the established norms) defend 'their' group, 'their' place, 'their' coherence, against those individuals and groups who have the potential to disrupt their fantasy of group-coherence and superiority (Elias 1993: 18). What are the consequences of this?
Street Culture as Resistance?
Elias hints at why outcast youngsters, especially those of later generations, frequently act out in public, in the presence of members of the discriminating group, exactly the negative behaviour which the 'established' say is characteristic of them. For one, the image of one's group has profound influence on the image individuals have of themselves; many youngsters might thus be insecure about how to see themselves (Elias 1993: 44,54). But furthermore, the assumed “natural character” of a stigmatised group, based on which it is excluded, often has not much to do with the identity and behaviour of the majority of members of an homogenised 'outcast' group. Reproducing the behaviour which is expected is rather a way of showing resistance by confronting members of the established group with behaviour they fear most. Since there is no obvious reason in the eyes of the marginalised youth for why they are being excluded and stigmatised, the obedience to 'established' norms and values might not be perceived as leading to inclusion anyway (ibid.: 216). This is also
19 Blog 'Islam versus Europe: Where Islam spreads, Freedom dies', http://islamversuseurope.blogspot.nl/ , accessed
11/05/2013
20 Belgian politician risks Muslim backlash after using teenage daughter dressed in burka and bikini for campaign
against Islam, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2095862/Belgian-Vlaams-Belang-risks-Muslim-backlash- picture-daughter-burka-bikini.html, accessed 11/05/2013
what friends of mine in Neuperlach frequently mentioned: in most people's eyes we are Assis, they are not willing to be convinced of the contrary anyways, so we might as well behave in line with
their expectations, not care about what others think, and thereby also make fun of them. 21
Popular culture thus has a big influence on the identity formation of youngsters as well. Not only music artists are playing a role here, but also movies and the characters therein. I asked my friends to list their favourite movies of all time. One movie which was named by almost every single one of them was Goodfellas. I watched the trailer on Youtube and looked at the comments. 'Best movie ever made.' is what I read the most. I clicked at the profile of various boys on Facebook, and together with Menace II Society, Blood in Blood out, and The Godfather, it seemed to be one of the favourites of quite a number of guys. What all these movies have in common is that they tell stories of loyalty, respect and the quest for money and a “better” life. Respect comes with money, power and aggressive dominance. So does loyalty. The money is achieved in non-legal ways, and it is quick money, and a lot of money. In this song Big Dreams Gangster the German rapper Fard describes how Hollywood movies and American Hiphop influenced him:
"Goodfellas" lehrte mich: Du darfst keinem trau'n Lehrer fanden uns und erzählten uns von Spartakus Doch uns're Gegend war wie "Donnie Brasco" jeden Tag Nicht Ivan Drago, auch nicht Rambo
Al Pacino, Marlon Brando.22
These movies do not only represent a certain lifestyle, but also ideals of masculinity and goals in life as well as ways to achieve them. Ennis comments that a 'transhistorical analysis of the gangster genre reveals not only that the gangster changes in response to new or reemerging worries in the wider culture about masculinity and race, but that the gangster is always an ethnic or racialized
character whose appeal is in some way due to his experience of loss or lack.'23
The above paragraphs indicate how complex the interplay of various factors influencing an individuals' perception of self and other is. Humans are strongly determined by their social surrounding, but this does not account for all factors of a person's personality. However, the perception and image of self and other is strongly influenced by other's opinions, as well as by
21 Immigranten – Nate57, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4uVO3wXR2rM, accessed 16/05/2013 22 Big Dreams Gangster – Fard, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hc6vRsXM8cM, accessed 11/05/2013 23 Melodramas of Ethnicity and Masculinity: Transformations of Late Twentieth Century Gangster Films – Larissa
Ennis (2012),
https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/12333/Ennis_oregon_0171A_10300.pdf? sequence=1, accessed 11/05/2013
popular culture. An internalisation of images of inferiority has consequences concerning the image of the self, one's group, and “the other” in society. Bearing stigmas further complicates being accepted by 'established' groups of society. In reaction to this, there seems to have formed a certain street culture, or multiple varieties of it, providing certain norms and values for the youth, especially impoverished young men. A possible definition of urban street culture would be:
[A] complex and conflictual web of beliefs, symbols, modes of interaction, values, and ideologies that have emerged in opposition to exclusion from mainstream society. Street culture offers an alternative forum for autonomous personal dignity. (…) This “street culture of resistance” is not a coherent, conscious universe of political opposition but rather, a spontaneous set of rebellious practices that in the long term have emerged as an oppositional style. (…) Contradictorily … the street culture of resistance is predicated on the destruction of its participants and the community harboring them (Bourgois 2010 [1993]: 8-9).
Such destruction of its participants is exemplified well in the various kinds of risk-behaviours young marginalised men engage in. This is in line with the argument that marginalisation correlates positively with risk behaviour, especially in young men. Jansz (2000) lists four focal attributes of contemporary masculinity, namely autonomy, achievement, aggression, and stoicism. He argues that the stoic attribute amounts to a strict control of pain, grief, and vulnerable feelings; stoicism generally leads to restrictive emotionality (166-167). This, he says, is dysfunctional because it has a negative impact on men's health (ibid.: 166-167). Furthermore, social and institutional structures help to sustain and reproduce men's health risks and the social construction of men as the stronger sex (Courtenay 2000: 1385). Here the problematic consequences of the interplay of various processes of marginalisation and identity formation become clear. Considering the factors mentioned above, it also resembles the argument that self destructive behaviour is often the consequence of emotional instability and insecurity concerning one's identity (Hammarström 1994). Drinking alcohol, smoking cigarettes, taking drugs, engaging in aggressive or violent behaviour and taking part in illicit businesses would be examples of such unhealthy behaviours (Thom 2003). I experienced all of those with male friends of mine from such neighbourhoods.
Instead of working poorly paid extra jobs, quite a few of the boys I know sell drugs, and that
is also a theme frequently recurring in songs.24 Such activities are not necessarily happening all the
time, but every now and then when they find a good connection and need some more money. They
first see the older guys doing it, then later they adopt the practice.25 26 Money thus simultaneously
fulfils the function of creating distance between people and objects and then provides the means to overcome that distance (Simmel in Erikson 2002 [1993]: 175/176). A theme recurring in conversations with my friends and in songs is the wish for a better situation for themselves, their family, and their friends. The role of the provider extends (future) wife and kids in this case; I often heard someone saying that if he had money, he would buy his mother/parents a nice house
somewhere and offer relief to her problems; and a nice car or similar for himself. 27
Many leave school early and start working. Despite the fact that most do consider themselves smart, they have internalised the public discourse which presents them most frequently as limited in their capacities. They place high value on schooling and a proper lifestyle, sobriety is valued, but often neither is really strived for. It seems that they internalise the position given to them by society, act it out, most visibly in public. But they are conscious of their situation, at least partly, and this knowledge about their position in society often seems to function as an excuse for “bad” behaviour or failures. It is as Freire said, being conscious about one situation does not lead to freedom; only together with reflective action can change be achieved (Freire 2008 [1968]: 36). A friend of mine from Neuperlach, for example, expressed his discontent with his current working situation, saying that he had done too many “shitty” jobs already. He said he wants to try to build up his own taxi-business now, and if that would not work, 'fuck it, then I have really tried the legal way to get my money, then I'll just sell coke.' Another friend of mine told me about how, when he was younger (he is now 23) he used to sell drugs in Amsterdam to make some money; often he would also sell fake drugs in fear of being caught by the police.
Seen the fact that many young men seem to see themselves as compelled to engage in extra- legal businesses in order to make money, and frequently engage in violence as an unconscious consequence of the structural, symbolic and normalised violence they have been confronted for
years already, contact with the police is frequently inevitable.28
There is a lot of police control in many working-class neighbourhoods; especially male youths are stopped and checked by the police regularly, in the evening even more so than during the day. Since the boys spend a lot of time together and the friend groups are often quite big, you can see groups of youths, mostly boys, hanging out outside in every weather. I have noticed that the officers are especially drawn to such
25 Nur die Starken überleben – Nate57 ft. Telly Tellz, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gVfiquHoIQQ, accessed
10/05/2013
26 Hilf dir Selber – Fard, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6SXfEtsMA4o, accessed 16/05/2013
27 Träume – Nate57 ft. Telly Tellz, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hpCdGxge0U, accessed 10/05/2013
28
Besuchstag - Celo & Abdi feat. Veysel & Xatar, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6FqlENf1jZc, accessed 24/04/2013
groups, most clearly those members who represent their adherence to their group in the form of optic markers. This is in line with the idea that phylogenic stigmata and blemishes of place are at work here, contributing to the marginalisation of groups of people. Many times, police control or even only a critical look from an officer, has been perceived as discrimination and led to discussions about their position in society and their feeling that others underestimate them, disrespect them or despise them for their origin – not necessarily related to race or ethnicity, but rather to their social context, their location in the city as well as in society.
There are also clearly vindicationist elements in their speech and behaviour. The term refers to the believe that one's group is undervalued by the broader society. Vindicationism functions to motivate potential followers of the movement while simultaneously scolding the dominant group for failing to appreciate the admirable character and qualities of the people for whom the movement is advocating (Gilroy 2012: 5). This I could find back in statements on the moral superiority of oppressed groups as opposed to the moral decay, egoism and individualism of members of mainstream society.
The opposition to mainstream culture is not only expressed in behaviour, music and videos. Optical markers are an important component, especially in adolescence. The boys pay a lot of attention to the clothes they buy, especially the label. Picaldi jeans, for example, came to be known in the whole of Munich as being part of the style of lower-class young men. Also I quite frequently heard and still hear people talking of outlet-sales they went to, where clothes from expensive labels à la Ralph Lauren are sold for sometimes only 20 percent of the official retail price. Of further importance might also be for example the hair style, the beard or the perfume. Most of my friends in
Neuperlach and other districts of marginality place greater value on body hygiene, physicality and a
neat appearance than other people I know from middle-class families. Paradoxically, while they value the societal norm to take care of oneself, to clean and train the body, to individually shape it and control it – neatly – they actually mark themselves off as different. I often hear people say things like 'Well, maybe, if he does not have so much money, he should not buy clothes from labels.' or other remarks about the “ridiculousness”, “simplicity”, or ineffectiveness of such emphasis on physical self-care and cleanliness. The emphasis on appearance might also be seen as an act of resistance against being portrayed as living in a filthy, demoralised community, which presents an act of establishing self-worth while being structurally excluded from being an active member of mainstream society (Bourgois 2010 [1993]: 158-162). It also plays into the emphasis on physicality in trying to present a dominant masculine identity.
However, conspicuous consumption can actually be seen universal in an economy that fetishises material goods and services (ibid.: 91). In his book Darker than Blue Gilroy gives
examples for consumer citizenship, which indicates that in present times, especially in the West, there is a need to buy into citizenship, into full participation in society, the market and commodity production. An example would be the possession of a car as being perceived of as conducive to consumer freedom and free mobilization (Gilroy 2012: 24). This can be illustrated by comments of my friend who says that although there is more to life than money, you need money to make a life. Almost all songs listed so far also refer to the need for money for a better life and to solve problems. Individuals try to express themselves and show off a certain status with the help of commodities. More generally, it might be seen as a universal phenomenon that especially during puberty humans tend to explore different lifestyles and trends in their process of identity-formation and growing up. It is further more a common argument that popular culture can heavily influence identity formation and body politics. Guadeloupe calls this phenomenon the religion of the urban
cool, by which he intends to capture the sacralised and idolised status of popular culture artists,
especially Black Atlantic superstars, and especially the imitation of those idols, the wealth and consumption of which are perceived to be lending respectability to youth in urban multicultural settings (2010: 4).
The internalisation of their marginalisation, coupled with the resistance to it and the negotiation of a masculine identity thus leads such young men to behave in ways which are unhealthy and counterproductive for an integration into mainstream society. Frequent contact with the police, or even incarceration, makes it even more difficult to find good schooling or a good job. The boys are thus actively contributing to their position in society. In order to tackle this, however, structural constraints need to be recognised. To get a better understanding of this and the interplay of structure and agency in processes of marginalisation and identity formation, I will elaborate further on the idea of autonomous, rational and responsible actors which determines citizenship in the contemporary times.
The Problem with Rational, Autonomous Actors and Personal Responsibility
Modernity and neoliberal practices and ideas are accompanied by a strong focus on the autonomy of every human being, on the rationality of human's behaviours, and on the personal responsibility every individual has for his or her choices and actions. The use of these notions makes sense in the neoliberal context of our time in which personal freedom, human and civil rights, and the right to consume are central. As individuals who make choices and who influence social structures with our actions, concepts of autonomy and personal responsibility make it possible to control the otherwise uncontrollable. The idea that humans are rational actors stems from economic modes of thinking
and might guide morality. Wacquant argues that these notions are a necessary characteristic of a strong neoliberal state, which is based on a strong market, workfare and prisonfare. “Individual responsibility” is the glue tying it all together; the ideal neoliberal state is thus officially not
responsible for the situation of it's citizens.29 However, all of these notions can also cause many
problems for the individual as well as for the group, especially concerning the perception of self and others. The neoliberal ideas of the rational, autonomous actor who is always personally responsible for the result of actions is contributing to the general perception that “that's just the way they are” because certain people or groups of people behave in a certain way.
In this morality, which is the base of the current neoliberal paradigm, marginality and poverty are thus regularly portrayed as being the product of individual choice; the consequences of those choices are a matter of individual responsibility (Mol 2008: 92-95). I want to argue that in policy, academic and public discourse there is the need to move away from this emphasis on autonomy and personal responsibility. Elias highlights the difficulties connected to the contemporary idea of a supposed rationality of the behaviour of human beings as well as groups, and on a supposed autonomy of human beings. These notions, he says, hide the (increasing) interconnectedness and interdependency of human beings, as well as the emotionality and thus often times irrationality of behaviour. Humans live together in families, communities and societies. As such, they are inherently social and interdependent. In European societies and in line with modern ideas, however, the self is generally conceived of as an independent actor, integrated in society but sovereign (Eriksen 2010 [1995]: 58). In order to survive in societies, they depend on a number of shared social conventions or implicit rules for behaviour, which are learned in the socialisation- process at home and at school. Public schools often ask specific skills, such as sitting still and controlling oneself from a young age on, and obeying to teachers and other persons with authority over the pupils. Many of such social conventions may be of use insofar as that they structure our living together; however, often they are being taken for granted, perceived as natural, which is deeply problematic. Social identity in this way can be used as a political instrument, which has problematic consequences for the perception of the self and the other (Elias 1993: 34-35). Blaming and criticising, increasing police force and sending to jail, neatly penalising every mistake, all this, I argue, does not help the problem faced with and by especially male youth in marginalised neighbourhoods in cities around the world. On the contrary, it negatively affects feelings of self- worth and functionality within the mainstream society (Stephen and Squires 2004: 352).
29 Urban Marginality and the State – Loïc Wacquant, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JPAguOSA2E, accessed
Emphasising the potential of social capital and individuals' capacity to 'bonding, bridging and linking social capital to escape poverty is furthermore dangerous since such behaviour is based on the neoliberal ideas of the rational actor whose achievement is independent from structural factors and who is personally responsible for his choices. This easily leads to victim-blaming.' (Cleaver 2005: 894).
Stephen and Squires add that such assigning dangerousness to certain social identities furthermore neutralise the liberal vision of equality before the law. This further reinforces processes of marginalisation and constructions of otherness, and blurs boundaries between moral judgement and legal activities (Stephen and Squires 2004: 352-353).
A further issue the question of responsibility; this is a double-edged sword. For one, as established above, it is a necessary tool in neoliberal, capitalist societies. On the other hand, the focus on individuals taking responsibility for the consequences of their choices is problematic, since this view ignores structural factors. Also, it limits feelings of responsibility for one's own actions to an individual's personal life; this might be extended to one's immediate surrounding. However, it does not allow for a feeling of responsibility for processes in society and consequently for the fate of others. In line with this, families are often made responsible for all aspects of the socialisation of their children; the attention is in this way directed away from influential factors such as geographical factors, community disorganisation, social exclusion, issues of poverty, family distress, truancy and school exclusion, drug dependency, and the similar (ibid.: 353). Often 'established' members of society do not take responsibility for the consequences of their behaviour for 'outsiders', for those who are not part of their social group. Instead of realising that they are contributing to the marginalisation of some individuals and groups decisively by basing their morality on their in-group and established stereotypes, most societal 'insiders' I know are comfortable with blaming the individual. In public discourse, in the media, and in policy, what I see is a distancing oneself from the problems in one's surrounding and blaming it on an external source, an other. 'They do not want to integrate.', 'Well then they should work harder.', or other sentences indicating lazy and/or demoralised individuals are frequent utterances. I argue that a shift in thinking about those notions is necessary in order to change the situation. It might be that the upper layers of the capitalist system do not care much about, or even support, the reinforcement of urban marginality and poverty; but delinquency and a parallel underground economy, which can be fostered by conditions of extreme social exclusion, will not contribute to the capitalist system of accumulation.
