Getting real about the demos
Global democracy in realist political thought
Name: Bram Pullen
Student Number 10772669
Master thesis Political Science: Political Theory
Supervisor: dr. A. Afsahi
Second reader: dr. E. Rossi
University of Amsterdam: June 2020
Abstract
In this thesis, I provide a realist argument for cosmopolitan democracy. Cosmopolitan democrats have argued for a global democracy by reconceptualizing the demos on the basis of different prepolitical principles that would necessarily expand the demos globally: the all affected, the all subjected and the all inclusive principle. I demonstrate that these principles are not prepolitical, but rather are the products of a contingent path of political choices. This shows that the constitution of the demos is inherently a political process. I propose a realist approach to the issue, because realist political theory is explicitly wary of the distinctiveness of the political sphere. By the use of the first political value, legitimacy, I argue that in order for the current global authoritative order to be legitimate, there must be a form of global democracy.
Table of contents
1. Introduction 1
2. The demos as a political unit 3
2.1.The problem of constituting the demos 3
2.2.Enfranchising interests, subjects and persons 5
2.2.1. The all affected principle 6
2.2.2. The all subjected principle 7
2.2.3. The all inclusive principle 8
2.3.Political principles 9
3. Constituting the demos realistically 12
3.1.Realism: against universalism 12
3.2.Legitimacy as the first political value 15
3.3.The demos in modernity 17
4. The real demos 21
4.1.Global authority 21
4.2.Liberalism and globalization: modernity of the global sphere 24
4.3.Stretch of realism 27
5. Conclusion 30
1. Introduction
In this thesis, I provide a realist argument for global democracy. During the past two and a half decades, the idea of cosmopolitan democracy gained traction in political thought (see, for instance: Archibugi & Held 1995). Cosmopolitan democrats argue that globalization poses important challenges to modern democratic thought because it questions the modern understanding of the political community in democracy (i.e. the demos) in which the nation is assumed to have a central role (Näsström 2003, pp.810-811). Regarding the relationship between democracy and the nation as contingent and, therefore, arbitrary, political theorists have tried to reconceptualize the understanding of political community. This conceptualization would not rely on such an arbitrary connection to the nation but draws its conclusion from democratic principles itself.
Important academic contributions to this reconceptualization of the demos have identified three different ‘prepolitical’ principles that are internal to democratic theory and upon which the demos could be constituted: the all affected, the all subjected and the all inclusive principle. These three principles have in common that they lead to the conclusion that everybody in the world should be included in the demos, making democracy necessarily cosmopolitan.
My claim is that these principles are not prepolitical, but also the product of a contingent path of historical, political choices. This shows that the conceptualization of the demos is inherently a political process. In order to remain close to the political nature of the issue, I propose a realist approach. Using the first political value of legitimacy, as central to realist political thought, I constitute the demos in a way that does not rely on a prepolitical truth. Although I arrive at the same conclusion as the cosmopolitan democrats that there ought to be a global demos, my argument is different since it is derived from the illegitimacy of our current political situation (rather than an imagined ideal situation). This allows for a better assessment
our current political affairs and could motivate action against current illegitimacies of our system.
The argument is structured as follows: first, in chapter 2, I explain how, according to cosmopolitan democrats, the ‘prepolitical’ principles can constitute the global demos. Contrary to the cosmopolitan democrats, I argue that these principles are contingent products of political contestation, and, therefore, inherently political. Thus, the problem of constituting the demos is inherently a political problem. Then, in chapter 3, I show how realist political thought is able to grasp the distinctive political nature of the problem of constituting the demos. I argue that this approach is preferable over the ‘prepolitical’ approach of most cosmopolitan democrats because it can better analyze the problem at hand. Furthermore, by using the concept of legitimacy, I demonstrate the constructive properties of realist political thought which enables the constitution of the demos in the next chapter. Finally, in chapter 4, I argue that there is a global political order that stands in need of legitimation. Moreover, I argue that such legitimation can only be based on a democratic justification. Therefore, in order for the global political order to be legitimate, there must be a global demos.
2. The demos as a political unit
In this chapter, I provide an outline of the current debate on cosmopolitan democracy. First, I elaborate on the problem that arises with the constitution of the demos. I argue that, because ‘the demos’ is a self-referential concept, constituting it inherently leads to a logical conundrum. Following this, I review the three types of solutions that cosmopolitan democrats have offered to solve said problem: the all affected, the all subjected and the all inclusive principle. These principles promise to be able to constitute the demos on prepolitical grounds that are internal to democratic theory. However, as I explain in the final paragraph, these solutions fail to solve the problem at hand because they rely on modern interpretations of democracy and the nation-state that are in themselves contingent products of historical circumstances and, therewith, inherently political. This leads to the conclusion that the appropriate approach is one that recognizes the political nature of the demos.
2.1.The problem of constituting the demos
Democracy can be characterized as: “groups of people making collective decisions in a democratic way” (Goodin 2007, p.40). This minimal and – purposely – circular definition, points at two important aspects of democracy that are of interest for political theorists. The first aspect relates to what should be understood by “in a democratic way”. The debates that arise from this question concern, for instance, the democratic decision-making process or the scope of democratic decisions. Issues like these constitute “the warp and the woof of democratic theory” (ibid).
However, in this thesis, I focus on the second aspect of the definition: the groups of people that are to make collective decisions. The question of who should be part of the group that makes democratic decisions – i.e. the demos in democracy – is prior to the question of what is understood by democratic practices. After all, one first needs an actor for the action to be
performed. This interplay between actor and action shows that democratic theorists encounter a problem when trying to solve the prior question: the problem of constituting the demos1.
The problem of constituting the demos follows from the logical conundrum that for the democratic constitution of a demos, already a demarcated demos is needed to make such a decision possible. In other words: the legitimate outcome of a decision is simultaneously its precondition. The legitimacy of the demos’ authority, thus, refers to the same persons over who it is exercised, which means that the demos is a self-referential concept. This can be contrasted to, for instance, autocratic systems, wherein the legitimacy is derived from reference to an outside source (e.g. God) (Abizadeh 2012, p.867). Thus, the problem of constituting the demos follows from the fact that the demos is a self-referential entity that can only be defined by circular reasoning.
The question is if this self-referential demos is indeed problematic for democratic theory. Famously, Schumpeter states that we must “leave it to every populus to define himself” (Schumpeter 2003 [1943], p.245). Exclusions from the populus may be applied on the basis of age (like in most nations), but also on economic status, religion or sex; all such decisions are a matter of opinion of the populus concerned. Schumpeter (idem, p.244) holds that “it is not relevant whether we, the observers, admit the validity of those reasons or of the practical rules by which they are made to exclude portions of the population; all that matters is that the society in question admits it”. These decisions – and the reasons behind them – are ultimately political, the only importance for democratic theory is that such decisions are made without absurdity or insincerity (idem, pp.244-245). 2
1 Dependent on approach to the issue, theorists have identified different characterizations that relate to the same
type of problem: the problem of constituting the demos, the boundary problem and the inclusion problem (see, for example: Goodin 2007; Abizadeh 2008; Song 2009). I consider the conceptualization as the problem of constituting the demos, as conceptualized by Goodin (2007), to be most adequate since it is most neutral about its possible solution: the boundary problem presupposes a boundary – physical or different – whereas the inclusion problem presupposes a specific stance – from within de demos outwards (Goodin 2007, p.40).
However, the absence of major constraints from democratic theory for the constitution of a demos could lead to arbitrary outcomes that we might not consider to be democratic. Dahl (1979, pp.111-112) points to such “absurdities to which we may be led by the absence of any criterion for determining the demos”, for instance when a small minority (like a politburo or ethnic minority) were to rule over a vast population. Such absurd outcomes would be more easily associated with autocratic leadership than with democracy. This claim is not a normative one, but descriptive: the question is not if such constitution is ‘good’, but if it is democratic (Beckman 2009, p.35). Thus, the problem of the demos being able to constitute itself, is that it could take us further from democratic theory than we might feel comfortable with – or: further than would be considered as democratic.
The possibility of undemocratic outcomes that occur when a demos is left to define itself has motivated modern political theorists to search for “principles that are internal to the standards of democracy” on the basis of which the demos can be constituted (Goodin 2007, p.47). This means that there is a search for prepolitical principles that could make the constitution of the demos possible by referring only to concepts that are internal to democratic thought. In this way, arbitrary political choices, such as the ones Schumpeter mentions, can be averted. The prepolitical, democratic, principles function as an outside source of reference for authority, in order to prevent falling into the trap of the logical conundrum of the self-referential demos. Thus, what is looked for is “the prepolitical ground that legitimizes the exercise of political power” (Abizadeh 2012. P.867). In the next paragraphs, I discuss three of these principles that are most influential in contemporary debate.
2.2.Enfranchising interests, subjects and persons
In this section, I name the three relevant principles that could possibly form the outside, prepolitical source on the basis of which the demos can be constituted: the all affected, the all
subjected and the all inclusive principle. I explain their most important characteristics, why they are perceived as “internal to the standards of democracy” and how they lead to an understanding of the global demos.
2.2.1. The all affected principle
The first principle to prepolitically constitute the demos relates to the intuitive idea that “all those people who are affected by a particular law, policy, or decision ought to have a voice in making it” (Whelan 1983, p.16). The intuitiveness of this idea is shown by the fact that it can be found at the basis of how most real-world demoi have originated. Goodin (2007, pp.47-51) explains how, historically, most real-world demoi are constituted on the basis of territory: Blut und Boden as a common signifier. Although the drawing of lines on a map is arbitrary, what matters is that “people who live in close proximity to one another are typically (if not invariably) affected by what one another does” (idem, p.48). This means that an individual’s interests are affected by the choices and actions of others around them. Therefore, the constitution of the demos on the basis of territorial proximity is an approximation of what matters: peoples’ communal interests (Arrhenius 2005, p.21).
In sum, the principle of all affected interests states that: “Everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government should have the right to participate in that government” (Dahl 1990, p.49). Although this definition seems to be rather straightforward, applying it leaves us with several issues: on the one hand, who is affected by an actual decision depends on the outcome of the decision, but the outcome, in turn, depends on who makes the decision (Goodin 2007, p.52). This indicates that there is a similar circularity as we found with the initial problem of the constitution of the demos (Whelan 1986, p.19). On the other hand, if the principle is interpreted as “whose interests are possibly affected” by a decision the meaning of ‘a decision’ expands – and with it the group that should be enfranchised (Goodin 2007, pp.53-55). This
follows from the fact that one’s interests could also be affected by a non-decision and different processes of agenda setting.
Because the interpretation as actual affected interests leaves us once again with a logical conundrum, the all affected principle bounds us to accept the possibilistic interpretation (idem, p.63). This means that “virtually everyone, regardless of spatial or indeed temporal location, should be included in the demos” (ibid). Thus, the all affected interests principle constitutes the demos in a way that enfranchises everyone in the world.
2.2.2. The all subjected principle
Another approach to the search of prepolitical principles that are internal to the standards of democratic theory is the all subjected principle. Adherents to this principle are critical of the connection between the effects on one’s interests and a right of democratic say. Proponents of the all subjected principle hold that, in the all affected principle, a moral right to participate is conflated with the democratic right: one could morally defend that a person should have a say in a decision, but this is not a necessary democratic right (Beckman 2009, p.47). Instead, they hold that the underlying democratic principle dictates that those who are ‘subject to a law’ should also be its authors (Habermas 1996, p.120).
In short, the all subjected principle states that “all those who are subject to a given governance structure have moral standing as subjects of justice in relation to it” (Fraser 2009, p.65). This principle is based on the notion of autonomy as a central democratic concept:
The democratic theory of popular sovereignty […] holds that the exercise of political power is legitimate only insofar as it is actually justified by and to the very people over whom it is exercised, in a manner consistent with viewing them as free (autonomous) and equal. (Abizadeh 2008, p.41 italics in original)
Being subject to coercion via a political decision deprives an individual of its autonomy. Therefore, according to principles internal to democratic theory, political subjects should participate in the making of these decisions (idem, pp.39-41).
The all subjected principle is more restricted than the all affected principle because it qualifies “what should count as relevant affectedness” (Siller 2012, p.21). Nevertheless, the two principles yield the same conclusions regarding who to enfranchise (Abizadeh 2008, p.45-48). Applying the all subjected principle must lead to the conclusion that the demos is in principle unbounded because the decision about the drawing of a boundary is authoritative over the groups on both sides of that boundary: both inside and outside. This means that, according to the all subjected principle, both (perceived) members and nonmembers should have a say in the boundary-drawing decisions and they are, therefore, both part of the same demos (ibid). Thus, like the all affected principle, the all subjected principle demands a vast expansion of the demos from the national to the global sphere.
2.2.3. The all inclusive principle
The third approach to the problem of constituting the demos is similar to the all subjected principle. The main difference between the two approaches is that the third approach diverges from the notion of citizenship: “persons, not citizens, are the proper subjects of political morality” (Song 2009, p.613 italics in original). In this view, humanity is the prepolitical ground for the legitimacy of the demos (Abizadeh 2012, p.880) and, therefore, the political community should include all living human beings (Näsström 2003, p.822). The underlying principle of this approach is called the “all inclusive principle”.
The all inclusive principle is more stringent than the all subjected principle because the protopolitical grounds are based on the idea of humanity as a whole, rather than just the principles internal to democratic theory. This means that the all inclusive principle regards all
humanity as part of the political community, regardless of their interests or location (Bartelson 2008, p.170). Thus, the all inclusive principle constitutes the demos in a way that enfranchises everyone in the world.
In sum, theorists have identified three important principles that could be able to prepolitically constitute the demos: the all affected, all subjected and all inclusive principle. Although the three principles have slight differences, all three require a vast expansion of the demos – effectively enfranchising the whole world. In a world that is increasingly globalized, this conclusion appears to be morally desirable and the three principles can help provide arguments for why this is the case. However, as I will show in the next paragraph, none of the three principles is able to provide a prepolitical argument for the constitution of the demos because they are all contingent products of historical circumstances.
2.3.Political principles
The three principles, as mentioned above, promise to be able to prepolitically constitute the demos. This means that, rather than in arbitrary and political choices, the principles would be grounded in terms that are internal to democratic theory. However, as I explain in this paragraph, the principles are themselves contingent products of a historical path of political choices. I demonstrate this by highlighting two important assumptions that underlie the arguments of cosmopolitan democrats: the modern interpretation of democracy and the value of humanity. I argue that these considerations call for a recalibration of the issue wherein the role of politics ought to be given centerstage again.
The first problem is that “democracy” is a contested concept and its meaning changes over time. For instance, the leading conviction that the subjects of a rule should also be its authors – as the all subjected principle considers to be intrinsically democratic – is a relatively modern interpretation (Näsström 2011, pp.120-121). The idea of self-rule was not present in
Ancient Athens, where there was a clear distinction between the oikos and the demos – with democracy only associated with the latter part of the distinction (Sartori 1987, p.278). There, enfranchising people that were associated with the oikos but were subject to the rules of the Athenian democracy – for example, women and slaves – would be considered as undermining democracy. The enfranchisement of these groups of people has been a process marked with political contestation and, nowadays, we would not accept the same distinction as previous generations did: “modern men want another democracy, in the sense that their ideal is not at all the same as that of the Greeks” (idem, p.279). The importance of this contrast is that the notion of democracy is subject to change and dependent on current ways of thought. Therefore, asserting that a principle is “internal to democratic theory” is not a prepolitical truth. It is merely a claim about how our ideas have been shaped until now.
Moreover, the argument of democratic thought as a contingent product of historical political contestation can be fortified by looking at modern interpretations of the concept. The all affected principle fits well with a conception of democracy as distribution of power, but it is ill fitted with other democratic conceptions, like epistemic democracy (Arrhenius 2005, pp.26-27). In the epistemic conception, the likelihood of a voter to get the right answer is of greater importance than its affectedness (ibid). This shows that the principle is not a prepolitical one – prior to any political contestation – but, instead, the very product of such contestation over prevailing conceptions of democracy.
The second problem of the proposed prepolitical principles concerns the way they value humanity as a prepolitical concept. The reference to humanity – as most overt in the all inclusive principle, but implied in all three principles – is not neutral. The main problem with the concept of humanity is that it is a very abstract one and, without specification, it is unclear in what situations it would fit (Fraser 2009, p.64). An example of this unclarity can be found when one considers a temporal aspect to the question: does “humanity” only refer to persons here and
now or is it more expansive? If the universalistic, expansive interpretation is taken, one could argue that future generations should also be included in the demos. After all: future generations will also be subjected to (Beckman 2009, pp.170-174) and affected by (Heyward 2008) decisions that we now take.3 Moreover, it is unclear what the prepolitical ground is that limits the right of political participation to humanity: animals and technology are also subjected to human rule but are not granted the right to participate. Nevertheless, there is ample discussion on this topic (see for example: Teubner 2006; Donaldson & Kymlicka 2011). This shows that humanity “is but one boundary claim among others in the conflict on the proper boundaries of the people” (Näsström 2011, p.129).
In conclusion, I have argued that the constitution of the demos leaves us with a logic conundrum and possible outcomes that are not democratic. Democratic theorists have tried to solve these problems by referring to different prepolitical principles. However, as I have demonstrated, the three principles put forward rely on assumptions that follow from a process of historical contestation. This failure to prepolitically constitute the demos allows us to see the problem of constituting the demos for what it really is: an inherent political problem. In the next chapter, I argue for a different approach to the problem that acknowledges the political nature of the constitution of the demos and that is still able to reach the outcome of a global democracy: realist political thought.
3 A similar argument could be made for past generations. From a Burkean point of view, we have a ‘partnership’
(or contract) with previous generations to preserve and build on their accomplishments (Burke 1999 [1790], pp.95-97). If we decide upon radical change, like in revolutions, we unilaterally end such contract with our predecessors. This means that we subject our past generations to our decision without them allowing a say in it, meaning that such decision could be undemocratic according to the all subjected principle. Although it would not be unreasonable to consider such argumentation as a reductio ad absurdum, it does point at the political nature of
3. Constituting the demos realistically
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the problem of constituting the demos is an inherently political problem for which a prepolitical solution is not possible. In this chapter, I argue that a realist approach to the problem is able to stay true to its political nature and that such an approach is, therefore, preferable. First, I conceptualize the defining characteristics of realist political thought. Then, I demonstrate why a realist approach is able to constitute the demos. I finish by listing the benefits that this approach has compared to the principles discussed in the previous section.
3.1.Realism: against universalism
The term ‘realism’ has been used to describe a wide plethora of thinkers and ideas (Scheuerman 2011, pp.5-9). Although its specific origins are debated, it can be said that modern English-language realist theory stems from a critical and empirical minded approach to international relations and, specifically, international law. Its most influential proponents are mid-twentieth century scholars as E. H. Carr, H. J. Morgenthau, and R. Niebuhr (ibid). However, the ideas of realism can be traced back to the works of Machiavelli, Hobbes and even Thucydides (Hall 2017, pp.284-285). In recent years, realist political thought gained traction through the work of Cambridge associated writers, such as Raymond Geuss and Bernard Williams (Runciman 2012, p.62).
Realists take issue with the moralistic “ethics-first” view of political thought (Geuss 2008, p.9). The problem with this liberal approach of political theory as applied ethics is that it erroneously looks for moral recommendations “from outside politics” to solve what are in fact distinctively political questions (Hall 2017, p.284; see also: Philp 2007). The approach to political questions as philosophical matters that can be solved by agreement that is prior to politics fails to appreciate why there is such a thing as politics in the first place (Sleat 2011,
p.473). Reasoning from a Hobbesian perception of politics, realists argue that if ethics and morality could indeed effectively regulate behavior in political communities, politics would become obsolete:
We need politics in part precisely because of the ubiquity of moral disagreements about what we collectively should do, the ends to which political power should be put, and the moral principles and values that should underpin and regulate our shared political association. (Rossi & Sleat 2014, p.691)
Thus, realists stress the “distinctiveness and autonomy of the political from other spheres of human life” (Sleat 2011, p.471-473). Instead of agreement over fundamental, moral principles, this political sphere is characterized by conflict and disagreement: “politics takes place in the face of inevitable disagreement, and, indeed, it is best understood as the functional response to that disagreement” (Stears 2007, p.545. Italics in original). By making disagreement central to politics, some realists have concluded that the “ethics-first” approach is not a theory of politics at all:
By seeking to provide philosophical justifications for political institutions, practices, or principles of justice that all persons could or should accept, liberal political theorists are trying to settle political disputes once and for all and, in doing so, miss the fact that conflict and disagreement about those very things, the most basic and fundamental issues of politics, are a precondition of the political itself. (Sleat 2011, p.473)
Here, it is important to note that realism is not essentially anti moralistic, nor that it is synonymous to amoral political rule (or: Realpolitik). The issue lies with the role that moralism assumes over the political sphere, but not with moralism per se. For realists, there is value in morals: influential realist scholars, such as Morgenthau and Niebuhr, attributed an important role to ethics and morality (as an inherent characteristic of human nature) within politics
(Scheuerman 2011, pp.19-25). Moreover, current debate among realists concerns the role of moralism in political theory in relation to the question of legitimacy (see: Sleat 2014). The moralism that, among others, Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Sleat refer to, is a political value from within politics; not a prepolitical universal truth that is applied over the political sphere.4 The problem, thus, lies with the universalistic character of moralism in liberal political theory.
The aversion against the universalist stance of “ethics-first” political theory follows from the realist argument that political theory should start “from where a given political community is” (Galston 2010, pp.395-396). This means that its arguments must be grounded in a sense of the actual world as it is: “political theory is the theory of what to do about what is there, not the theory of what, were we God, we would have brought about or merely what we, while not being God, would greatly prefer” (Dunn 1980, p.291). The fact that political theory is grounded in the actual world means that its prescriptions will necessarily be contingent on this world (Hall 2017, pp.295-296): “politics is historically located: it has to do with humans interacting in institutional contexts that change over time, and the study of politics must reflect this fact” (Geuss 2008, p.13).5
Thus, the aversion against the moralistic character of liberal thought follows from the understanding of politics as a product of contestation with contingent results that are historically located. Here, it becomes visible how a realist approach might fit the problem of constituting the demos: in chapter 2, I demonstrated how the constitution of the demos is an inherently political problem that is characterized by moral contestation. Realist political thought can be instrumental to understanding the political nature of this problem and could critically assess the abovementioned cosmopolitan contributions to the problem. However, so far, realism has not
4 I return to this matter in section 3.3.
5 The fact that realist political theory is grounded in the actual world does not make it synonymous to liberal
non-ideal theory (that shares this characteristic). Non-non-ideal theory is concerned with feasibility constraints from the actual world for its utopian ideal. On the other hand, realis thinkers reject such overarching, independent ideal and investigate the actual world to understand the sources of our distinctive political normativity (Rossi & Sleat 2014,
been able to point at a possible solution for the problem. In the next paragraph, I elaborate on the constructive elements of realist political thought, in order to construct the demos in a realistic way in chapter 4.
3.2.Legitimacy as the first political virtue
In order to be able to offer a solution to the problem of constituting the demos, realist political theory must transcend the critical stance that I demonstrated above. Although often overshadowed by this critical nature, realist political thought does have more constructive elements (Hall 2017, p.284). These constructive – or normative – elements follow from realists’ conceptualization of legitimacy. Following their appreciation of politics as a distinct sphere of human life, realists argue that we should prioritize the concept of legitimacy over moral ideals (such as justice) because this concept is able to explain why we need politics in the first place (see, for example: Rossi 2012, p.157; Sleat 2016a, p.33).
To understand the explanatory force of the concept of legitimacy for the political sphere, one must start with the notion of primitive freedom, which signifies the “idea of being unobstructed in doing what you want by some form of humanly imposed coercion” (Williams 2005, p.79). In itself, this notion is not a political value, but rather a proto-political concept6 that is prior to any (political) conceptualization:
No one can intelligibly make a claim against others simply on the ground that the activities of those others restrict his primitive freedom, or that the extension of his primitive freedom requires action by them. At best, that is the start of a quarrel, not a claim to its solution. (Williams 2005, p.83)
6 The term proto-political is Williams’. Although the meaning of ‘proto’ is technically different from the meaning
of ‘pre’, I use prepolitical and proto-political interchangeably. I consider both adjectives as signifying a situation that is prior to political contestation (for both, the opposite is something that is political or the product of political
Although the concept of primitive freedom itself is prepolitical, it “points us in the direction of politics” (Hall 2017, p.287). This becomes clear when it is considered what happens when one’s primitive freedom is restricted by intentional actions of others. This restriction will spark a reaction that is often characterized by resentment and that leads to conflict (Williams 2005, pp.82-83). In order to prevent escalation of the conflictual situation and maintain order and stability, an authoritative source is empowered with coercive power to enforce decisions about whose and what kind of freedom ought to be prioritized. Along with the existence of this authoritative power, questions of legitimation arise and it is this type of questions that mark the existence of the political (ibid).
These questions of legitimation – or in Williams’ (2005, p.4) words: the Basic Legitimation Demand (BLD) – mark the existence of the political, because they are able to distinguish politics from mere domination. This follows from the axiom that might does not imply right:
Those that claim the right to rule over others, and not merely the ability, must be able to present the order as a form of political authority, which will mean that they must be able to offer a justification for their rule on grounds that those subject to it will be able to recognize as meaningful and intelligible. (Sleat 2015, p.248. emphasis added)
Thus, the demand for legitimacy is inherent to there being such a thing as politics in the first place (ibid; Williams 2005, p.5). That the BLD and the political are linked is important for the problem of constituting the demos: in chapter 2, I demonstrated that the problem of constituting of the demos is inherently a political problem for which a prepolitical solution is not possible. The morality of the BLD is not derived from a morality that is prior to politics (like the abovementioned three principles), rather it is embedded in the political practice itself. This is important, because now, with the concept of legitimacy, there is a normative concept that can be used to evaluate the exercise of power without reference to a prepolitical morality,
meaning that it might be able to constitute the demos in a way that stays true to its political nature.
How then, is it possible to determine if authority is legitimate? An authority is legitimate if the BLD is met. The BLD is met when an authoritative order offers an acceptable justification of its power to each subject (Williams 2005, pp.4-6). An acceptable justification means that its moral commitments “make sense” (MS, as Williams puts it [idem, p.10]) as authoritative to its subjects (Rossi & Sleat 2014, p.693). Because the justification by the authoritative order is owed to its subjects, the legitimation of power is always context dependent: “now and around here”, liberalism might be the only appropriate justification, but there also have been times and places where non-liberal legitimate orders could have existed (ibid; Williams 2005, p.5). For instance, in former royalist or theocratic societies, legitimacy was derived from a justification on the basis of lineage or god (Abizadeh 2012, p.867).
In sum, realist political thinkers argue that legitimacy, and not justice, must be the primary political value. Legitimacy is a political concept, “because it is inherent in there being a practice of politics” (Sleat 2015, p.252). Because the BLD derives its normativity from the practice of politics itself, it is able to approach the problem of constituting the demos in a way that stays true to the political nature of the problem. In the next paragraph, I show how it is possible to go from assessing the legitimacy of a political order towards the construction of a demos.
3.3.The demos in modernity
Now that I have stipulated the characteristics of realist political thought, the framework can be applied to the problem of constituting the demos.
As I argued in chapter 2, the problem of constituting the demos is an inherently political problem. This follows from the fact that the demos is a self-referential entity that cannot be
justified by a prepolitical morality. The realist framework fits this problem perfectly because, as demonstrated in paragraph 3.1, it rejects the possibility of a prepolitical morality that is executed over the political sphere. Thus, realist political thought is able to appreciate the distinctive political nature of the problem. The concept of legitimacy, furthermore, is able to help constitute a demos in a way that appreciates the political nature of the issue, because this concept draws its normativity from the practice of politics itself. It is a necessary condition for the exercise of political power that it is legitimized to its subjects in a way that makes sense to them: if power is not legitimate, this is coercion – which people are entitled to reject (Jubb 2015, p.689).
Taking the concept of legitimacy – instead of a prepolitical value of what a demos ought to be – as central to the solution for the problem of constituting the demos, means that the problem must be approached from the opposite direction. The contributions by democratic theorists, as demonstrated in chapter 2, took a top-down approach by reasoning from a universal, moral understanding of legitimacy towards a specific constitution of the demos (i.e. everyone in the world). Instead, by grounding its arguments in a sense of the actual (recall paragraph 3.1), the realist framework requires a more bottom-up approach. Following the realist approach, one must start “from where a given political community is” and see if a specific authority makes sense to the subjects in that political community.
The consequence of this bottom-up normative approach, is that ‘democracy’ – and, thus, a demos – is no longer a necessary legitimation of authority. There have been, and there might still be, legitimate orders that are not democratic (Williams 2005, p.4). Thus, at first sight, the context-dependent legitimacy of the realist theoretical framework appears to be far from being able to give an argument for global democracy. However, Williams (2005, p.8) argues that, “now and around here”, the only acceptable justification for authority includes a liberal solution. Modern justifications of social and political orders have become more demanding and
these justifications only make sense if they treat the order as a human construction (Jubb 2015a, p.685). This means that the former hierarchic systems, like the abovementioned theocratic and royalist orders, are no longer valid. Thus, a modern political order can only be legitimate if there is an account of democracy and political participation (Williams 2005, p.15).7
For the problem of constituting the demos, the democratic condition for legitimacy in modern orders presents a progressive project (idem, p.17). It is now possible to assess if an authority is legitimate by examining if there are possibilities of political participation (given that said authority is a modern authority). If the authority is not democratic, it is illegitimate and it makes sense to call for democratic reform. In other words: if there is a modern political order, there must be a corresponding demos.8
Thus, the demos in realist political thought is constituted by an assessment of authoritative order. For this order to be legitimate, it must make sense to its subjects and, in modernity, this means that it must be democratic. In other words: the demos is constructed by making sense of authority. A benefit of this approach to the constitution of the demos is that it remains tightly connected to the intuitive idea of the self-referential demos that we “must leave it to every populus to define himself” as vocalized by Schumpeter (2003 [1945], p.245). A group of people can define itself as a demos if this is necessary in order to make sense of the authoritative power that is exercised over them.
7 The centrality of liberalism in realist political theory is debated. Most importantly, Geuss (2008) has a more
critical understanding of realism that is hostile to liberal endorsement. Also, Mouffe (2005), in her realist conceptualization of democracy that takes the ubiquity of conflict as a central characteristic, famously rejects liberal politics altogether because it strives too much to rational consensus. This shows that realism itself is not a substantive political position (Rossi & Sleat 2014, p.695). However, the point here is that, now and around here, democracy is the only legitimate justification for the use of political power. Which kind of democracy this might be – liberal, agonistic, other – I consider to be beyond the scope of this thesis.
8 Although such interpretation of the concept of modernity might seem to be presupposing a form of consensus
that realists reject, it appears to be roughly right about the democratic requirements in North Atlantic states (Jubb 2015b, pp.922-923. However, it is unclear what the specific meaning of modernity entails and if it can be applied to other political situations than said North Atlantic democracies (Jubb 2015a, p.686). I return to this matter in
In conclusion, realist political theory is able to constitute the demos in a way that acknowledges the political nature of the issue. By its use of the concept of legitimacy – that derives its normativity from within the exercise of political power – it is able to critically assess political authority. Furthermore, if this authority is modern, it means that it needs a justification that is based on the possibility of political participation. In the next chapter, I show what this assessment of authority implies for global democracy.
4. The real demos
So far, I have argued that: (1) constructive realist political thought prescribes that it is a necessary condition for the exercise of political power that it is legitimized to its subjects. What distinguishes a legitimate order from an illegitimate order, is that the explanation of the order’s authority is presented in a way that makes sense (MS) to its subjects. And that: (2) in modernity, a necessary condition for an order to MS is that it provides a possibility for the subjects to participate in the exercise of political rule. In this chapter, I argue that there is a global political order that raises a global Basic Legitimation Demand (BLD). Moreover, I argue that this order is modern. Following premises (1) and (2), this means that for this order to be legitimate, there must be a form of global participation. Thus: because there is global authority, there must be a global demos.
4.1.Global authority
First, I consider the primary question, concerning whether there is such a thing as global authority. Is there an authority that assumes the right to rule and secures order and stability?
To determine if global authority is exercised, it is useful to examine the role and form that power has in the international sphere. Although power is a central concept in realist political thought, realists disagree about how to define it (Schmidt 2005, p.547). In recent contributions, there is a tendency among realists to define power in terms of material resources and associate it predominantly with military force (idem, p.548). However, progressive realists, such as abovementioned Morgenthau and Carr, had a broader understanding of power that did not only stem from economic or military sources, but had also less-tangible sources, such as “power over opinion” (Scheuerman 2011, p.18). Nevertheless, it suffices here to investigate only the
narrower understanding of power as derived from tangible resources over which there is, broadly speaking, consensus.9
Technological developments of the past century have caused a rise in global military power. Innovations, like the nuclear bomb, made large states incredibly powerful, exceeding their power to global proportions (Scheuerman 2011, pp.61-63. See also: Herz 1959; Carr 1968 [1945]). For a state, harnessing atomic power means that its attacks are practically indefensible for other states: one press of a button could mean the complete annihilation of a society. Moreover, even just the psychological effect of the possibility of deploying nuclear weaponry could be used as a source of power (Scheuerman 2011, pp.61-63).
This rise in global military power means two things: first, the perceived power equilibrium between legally equal states in an international anarchy is no longer a convincing explanation of the international sphere (ibid). Larger states could exercise power over smaller states, which are, therefore, losing their independence. Second, the territorial state is no longer able to secure order and stability for its citizens; states, even the larger states, have no means to protect their citizens against the new and devastating sources of military power – which also shows a loss of independence (ibid). Thus, in the international sphere, states have become dependent on one another to secure order and stability for their citizens: instead of independence, the new situation is characterized by interdependence.
Apart from military developments, other material sources of power have also shifted to the global sphere. In the evolution of our capitalist society, power has rested progressively in the hands of the owners of the means of production (idem, p.31. See also: Niebuhr 1934, p.235). The expansion of capitalism in the global sphere made this economic power expand along with it, and so making it an increasingly relevant source of power. Now, economic power has become the most significant source of power in the world, making political power subservient under it
(ibid). This follows from the fact that economic globalization is undermining the status of the state as the “linchpin of global political economy” (Scheuerman 2011, p.54). Economic globalization is marked by its disentanglement from territorial loci and a high degree of social interconnectedness in high-speed social networks. The narrow institutional confines of the nation state are inadequate to deal with this global economic force that makes everybody in the world interdependent of each other (idem, pp.54-55). Thus, like military power, economic power has created an international sphere that is characterized by interdependence.
That there is global military and economic power, is not to say that there necessarily is global authority. However, the globalization of the sources of power has occurred simultaneously with the building of international institutions that regulate these forms of power, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Sleat 2016b, p.178). These institutions are a form of global governance, with operating political networks that point at the existence of global politics, and, therefore, global authority (ibid). However, this global political order is different from that of the state, because the global order lacks the monopoly of the use of force. Moreover, the global order is more fragmented than traditional orders (i.e. states), with different arenas of political decision-making (Zürn & Stephen 2010, p.93).
Although, by absence of the monopoly on the use of legitimate force, the international order lacks the de facto ability to rule, it does claim the de jure authority over the global community (Sleat 2016b, pp.178-179). For instance, the UN claims authority over states and considers its resolutions as legally binding. Moreover, international agreements, like WTO and NAFTA, are legally binding, making their authority enforceable by local courts and reducing the sovereignty of the state (McBride 2003, pp.254-255). Also, institutions, like the ICC, explicitly claim the right to persecute and sentence individuals for perceived criminal actions (Sleat 2016b, p.179-180). These claims of authority over states and individuals make it clear
that the BLD does arise in the global sphere, albeit in different forms and in relation to different institutions (ibid).
Thus, along with the expansion of the sources of power to the international sphere, authority has also expanded globally. The global political order is characterized by interdependence of states, individuals and different international institutions. Despite this unconventional form of authority, these globally operating institutions cause the BLD to arise at the global level. In the next paragraph, I show how the BLD can be met in global politics.
4.2.Liberalism and globalization: modernity of the global sphere
Now that I demonstrated that the BLD arises at the global level, I explore how this global BLD can be met. In this paragraph, I argue that for the BLD to be met, there must be global means for political participation. Thus, for the BLD to be met, the demos must be expanded globally. In paragraph 3.3, I demonstrated that, in modernity, the only justification of authority that makes sense is a liberal justification that is based on political participation, i.e. democracy. Although this statement seems to present a relatively straightforward answer to the question of the BLD in the global sphere, reality is more complex. The problem is that the precise scope of the concept of modernity remains unclear:
Both the temporal and the geographical boundaries of modernity have to be drawn very tightly to capture only states whose populations will not accept them unless they are liberal. […] Williams’s account must be more parochial than it seems to claim. (Jubb 2015a, p.686)
In other words, the problem with the concept of modernity is that, at first sight, it appears to present a circular argument: an authority is modern, because it has a liberal response to the BLD; an authority has a liberal response to the BLD, because it is modern. This means that the concept of modernity is almost synonymous with liberalism, meaning that it is only useful in situations where liberalism is already the prevailing paradigm: in North Atlantic democracies
modernity is a fitting analytical tool, but it has less explanatory power in other situations where the BLD is raised, like different states with, for instance, theocratic societies. Therefore, the justifications of modernity might only be fitting in western societies.
However, many argue that, in recent times, “the principles and justifications for legitimacy of political orders in general converge globally” (Zürn & Stephen 2010, p.95).10 This phenomenon can be explained by taking a closer look into the sources of legitimating principles. Legitimating sources rest on a set of shared beliefs among subjects, that concerns what counts as an acceptable justification of an authority (idem, p.93). It makes sense that these shared beliefs “vary immensely among space, time and different types of authority” (ibid. See also: Beetham 1991, chapter 3). Nonetheless, these beliefs can be influenced and are subject to change.
In paragraph 4.1, I demonstrated that progressive realists, like Morgenthau and Carr, have a broader understanding of power that also includes a form of “power over opinion”. Such power over opinion can be understood in terms of the third dimension of power as conceptualized by Lukes (2005 [1974], p.27): “A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants.” This understanding of power offers a deeper understanding of its mechanism by not merely focusing on individual actors, but also considering the weight of institutions and political systems (idem, p.40).
This conception of power over opinion explains how it is possible that the principles and justifications for legitimacy converge globally and why they converge into a liberal understanding of the matter. The institutions and political systems that form the global authority and generate the global BLD, are, as demonstrated in the previous paragraph, mainly a product of the globalization of (economic) power. This globalization of economic power started well
before the First World War when national economies were transformed into a global liberal economy. Since then, (neo)liberalism has been the driving force behind the globalization of affairs: “modern capitalism and technology had generated an intermeshed economic and social universe” (Scheuerman 2011, p.71). Therefore, the institutions that stand in demand of legitimation are a product of (economic) liberalism.
The liberal character of our global institutions, moreover, is fortified by the hegemonic influence of the United States that reinforces its liberal ideology in the global sphere (Archibugi 2004, pp.454-455). Although the current hegemonical position of the United States is debated, through recent history it has been highly influential in advancing an agenda of universal liberalism (Nye Jr. 2019, pp.68-71). Furthermore, its economic power may be declining in the face of other states, such as China, in terms of soft power – or power over opinion – the United States (together with other liberal states) still dominates the international ranks (idem, p.73; Portland Consultancy 2019, p.37).
Thus, liberalism is in this day and age the dominant paradigm: the global political system, with its global authoritative institutions, is liberal.11 This global hegemonic discourse of liberalism, moreover, is likely to influence the shared beliefs that people have about what counts as a reasonable justification of authority. Considering how this political system and its political institutions shape the beliefs of the people over which it is authoritative, leads to the inevitable conclusion that this modern (liberal) political order, necessarily needs a liberal response to the BLD.
In conclusion, I have argued that there is a global authority that generates the BLD and that this authority is modern (i.e. liberal). Because this authority is generated on the basis of a liberal, hegemonic discourse, its subjects demand a liberal response to the BLD. This means that, in order for the global authority to be legitimate, its response must entail a form of
democracy. What exact form of democracy this must be, is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, which exact form of democracy is primarily a question that can only be solved through politics. Nevertheless, it is essential that the response is liberal, meaning that it includes a form of participation, accountability, and public debate (Zürn & Stephen 2010, p.94). The implication of this is clear: for the global political order to be legitimate, the demos must be expanded globally.
4.3.Stretch of realism
Some might argue that in my argument for a global demos, I have stretched the concepts of realism too far. Realism is commonly depicted as institutionally conservative and realists are accused of a dogmatic stance towards international anarchy, making them opposed to international reform (Scheuerman 2011, pp.1-3). Indeed, some realists have argued that global institutional reform is infeasible, or even a form of pure utopia (Archibuchi 2004, p.453. See also: Zolo 1997; Chandler 2003).
The issue that some realists take with the idea of global reform follows from its radical pluralistic stance. In paragraph 3.1, I demonstrated that realists take the ubiquity of conflict as a central and defining property of politics. Mouffe (2005), for instance, uses this understanding of politics to endorse an agonistic conception of democracy that is defined by a democratic struggle for hegemonic power (Rossi & Sleat 2014, p.695). In this conception of democracy, the construction of the demos is also subject to political contestation: the demos is defined by contrasting an ‘in’ group (us) against an ‘out’ group (them), making a global demos virtually impossible (Mouffe 2005, pp.44-55). 12 Thus, the question remains if pluralism is compatible
12 Although it is unclear why this out-group cannot be an imagined group (e.g. the Martians). Moreover, Mouffe
(2005, pp.44-45) herself falls back on a strain of universalist liberalism, by declaring that reference to ‘human rights’ could help a people to make claims about possible inadequate boundary drawing. Despite these considerations, here it suffices that, by valuing conflict as essential to democratic politics, Mouffe is inherently
with a global democratic order or if realists are right by prioritizing the state as the linchpin of political power.
However, not all realists agree that the state is necessarily – and will always be – the primal locus of political power. It is possible to perceive the state as a contingent product of historical circumstances that can be subject to change. For instance, Morgenthau argues: “that the traditional nation state is obsolescent in view of the technological and military conditions of the contemporary world is obvious” (1954 [1950], p.313. Quoted in: Scheuerman 2011, p.39). Moreover, not only did the twentieth century progressive realists notice the decay of the nation state and the increasing importance of a form of global politics, they explicitly argued for global reform. For them, postnational reform was possible, precisely because the abovementioned globalization of economic and military power laid the foundations for a world society (or community) (Scheuerman 2011, pp.68-70).
The global reformist ideas of progressive twentieth century realists lead them to advocate for a world state. At first sight, such advocation for a global state might seem to be in contradiction with the radical pluralist nature of realist political thought. However, instead of a unified state, realists argued for a federal order, which they saw as superior:
In contrast to homogenizing tendencies widespread [in unitary states], federalism offered, tried and tested institutional mechanisms for responsibly tackling the exigencies of political and social life on a pluralistic and heterogeneous planet. (idem, p.70)
So, for realists, a federation would be compatible with a pluralistic society. This follows from the fact that, in a federation, it would be possible to differentiate the appropriate moral consensus, with “denser ethical considerations being deployed at more local levels, and ‘thinner’, more procedural, notions applying at higher levels” (Williams 2005, p.50). Thus, pluralism could prevail on the global level, while in smaller communities, where people live in proximity, consensus could be the predominant political situation.
Despite the ‘thinner’ ethical considerations applied at the federal level, realists explicitly hoped that the future global order would take a liberal, democratic form (Scheuerman 2011, p.103). It is striking that this idea of a global democratic federation resonates with theorists along the political spectrum. The twentieth century progressive realists were predominantly left-wing oriented theorists in favor of socialist reform (idem, pp.10-12). On the other side of the political spectrum, neoliberals, such as Henry Simons, also advocated for a global pluralistic federation with a regulating, legal framework at the higher level and vibrant democratic contestation at the local level (1948, pp.12-13; 17-18). Apparently, a global democratic federation does make sense to people from a wide range of political convictions.
In sum, I have argued that a global demos is compatible with a pluralistic global order. Although a global federation might be a convincing practical consequence of my argument for a global demos, it lies beyond the scope of this thesis to give practical substance to the global demos. The mere point here is that there is global authority, and in order for it to be legitimate, there must be a global demos. This demos might be a decentralized demos (as a public of publics. See: Bohman 2005, 297-299) operating in a federal world state, or it could take other forms. Eventually, how the global demos takes shape is a political decision that is for the global demos itself to decide upon.
5. Conclusion
In this thesis, I have made a realist argument for a global demos. Realist political thought acknowledges the autonomy of the political sphere, making it suitable for the inherently political nature of the problem of constituting the demos. Moreover, the concept of legitimacy as the primary political value, makes it possible to construct the demos in a realist way: because there is a global political order that stands in need of legitimation, and because this order is modern, the only legitimate outcome is that there is a global demos.
What the exact form of the global demos must be, is not the goal of this thesis. I have argued that a possibility would be the form of a public of publics in a federal world state, but the actual construction is a political decision that needs to be made through a political process. The strong suit of this approach in regards to the problem of the constitution of the demos is that it remains close to the intuitive idea that we must leave it to every populus to define itself (as longs as this is done without insincerity or absurdity that does not make sense). Moreover, it also lies beyond the scope of this thesis to identify what form of democracy the global demos must engage in, but it was never my intention to conceptualize a democratic procedure. Recall from chapter 2, that I am only considering the first part of the definition of democracy as: groups of people making collective decisions in a democratic way.
However, I did achieve my initial goal of conceptualizing the demos in a way that derives its premises from the actual world. I provided a realist conception about who should be the authors of modern rule: everyone in the world ought to have a claim for democratic participation. Further research could specify how to mitigate these democratic claims in the global sphere.
Moreover, the realist argument for global democracy could fortify the arguments of cosmopolitan democrats by asserting that a global democracy is not only an ideal that we should morally strive for, but also an important step towards a more legitimate global order.
additionally, by taking a realist approach, theorists might be better able to explain why people from different moral backgrounds, with different belief systems, would comply with the liberal idea of global democracy. Thus: although realist and liberal political thought sometimes appear to be each other’s adversary, both theoretical traditions could benefit from each other’s intellectual achievements. Liberal theory is able to describe an ideal point on the horizon that we should strive for; realism can be an instrument to describe why we should have already reached that point.
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