Public Sector Innovation in Times of Crisis:
Two Approaches
Emre Şentürk
Master Thesis
Leiden University
Public Administration: Public Management
I.
Introduction
1 – 3
II.
Theoretical Framework
3 – 14
II.1 Strategic Planning 4
II.2 Innovation – Some Defining Properties 4 – 9 II.2.1 Factors Influencing the Adoption of Innovation 8 – 9
II.3 Crises and Organisations 9 – 14
III.
Methodological Considerations
14 – 19
IV.
Analysis
19 – 33
IV.1 Strategic Planning in the Coast Guard 19 – 21 IV.2 The Sociological Institutionalist Account 21 – 29
IV.3 The Rational Choice Account 29 – 33
V.
Discussion and Conclusion
33 – 37
V.1 Limitations 35
V.2 Practical Implications 36
V.3 Agenda for Future Research 36 – 27
Abstract: There is a vivid debate between sociological institutionalists and rational choice
theorists about organisational behaviour. In the context of public sector innovation, the questions posed, often concern the factors that lead public organisations to innovate. In this work, the two approaches will be applied to the case of innovation in the Coast Guard Command during the Syrian humanitarian crisis, examining which approach explains the adoption of strategic planning in times of crisis better.
Keywords: Innovation, Strategic Planning, Sociological Institutionalism, Rational Choice
Theory, Turkey
I.
Introduction
Although there is a considerable bulk of emerging literature on innovation in the private sector, and also increasingly about innovation in the public sector, there are gaps about the factors that lead to the implementation of innovations (Ramli et al., 2017). However, there is a lot of work on the influence of crises on organisations and organisational change, although most of this work is not conducted with a connection to the literature on innovation.
This text focuses on a specific form of innovation within the broader public sector domain, namely the adoption of strategic planning of the Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Sahil Güvenlik
Komutanlığı (hereinafter I will use the English translation: Coast Guard Command of the Republic of Turkey or simply Coast Guard Command) during the Syrian humanitarian crisis
2013. Specifically, I will examine which theory can better explain the adoption of strategic planning as result of the crisis, by analysing the case from a sociological institutionalist and rational choice perspective and comparing these two explanatory approaches. The aim of this study is to find out more about the influence of crises on innovation in public sector organisations.
A strategic plan is a document that designates a specific policy agenda and serves as a roadmap or an action plan of an organisation over a designated period of time (Berry, 1994; Bryson, 1988). Strategic planning facilitates the management of organisations, teams and individuals. It provides a clear direction and, hence, help to counteract the dynamics of goal displacement (Bryson, 1988). Strategic planning is treated as an innovation in this study, because although these kinds of plans exist in many organisations now, the adoption of those plans is an act that was only performed by the Ministry of Development. This ministry, starting from 1963 onwards, continuously publishes periodical development plans for the following
2
four years. It is only after 2003, that the adoption of strategic planning became mandatory for all public and local administrative authorities under law 5018, part III, art. 9. Due to national security considerations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, the General Secretariat of the Security Council, National Intelligence Agency, the Gendarmerie General Command and the Coast Guard Command are exempted from this provision under the 2006 adopted guideline: Kamu İdarelerinde Stratejik Planlamaya İlişkin Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında
Yönetmelik. Interestingly, however, although the Gendarmerie General Command and the
Coast Guard Command are relatively similar in their organisational tasks, the Gendarmerie did not adopt strategic planning, while the Coast Guard voluntarily did. In line with the definition by Demircioğlu and Audretsch (2017)1 innovations do not require to be wholly new, but rather
merely new to the specific organisation that is examined. Therefore, the adoption of strategic planning is an innovation to the Coast Guard Command.
This work is concerned with how the Syrian humanitarian crisis might have influenced the adoption of strategic planning in the Coast Guard, by comparing two theoretical approaches that can account for how the crisis could have influenced the adoption. In other words, I will examine whether sociological institutionalism or rational choice theory can better account for the adoption of strategic planning by the Coast Guard Command during the Syrian humanitarian crisis.
The case of innovation in the public sector is an especially interesting and suitable case, because there is a broad academic debate about innovation in the private sector in Turkey, while innovation in the Turkish public sector has received less attention, making it a yet understudied sub-field of innovation literature in Turkey. Additionally, the focus on the Turkish defence authority in that specific regard can be a good point of departure for future studies on innovations in the public sector, because, although a case-study, it provides new insights into how crises or external shocks influence the adoption of public sector innovation that may be also be applicable to other governmental agencies.
From another theoretical perspective, this work adds to the academic debate about the explanatory strength of sociological institutionalism and rational choice theory. Especially, in consideration of the ways this specific crisis influenced the Coast Guard Command the two theories pose a good framework and the insights gained in this work might hold the potential for future research on crises and innovation to build on the mechanisms outlined in this work.
This is based on the assumption that we do not exactly know how crises influence innovativeness in public organisations. Leaning on the points above, this work is focusing on the following research question:
Which theoretical approach, sociological institutionalism or rational choice theory, can better explain the influence of the Syrian humanitarian crisis on the adoption of strategic planning in the Turkish Coast Guard Command?
In the following part, the core concepts of this work will be examined more closely. First, the term strategic planning needs further elaboration and definition. Then, I will look at already examined factors in the literature that influence the implementation of innovations in the existing academic debate and also how innovation is defined in the first place. Starting with considerations leaning on the established framework developed by Berry (1994) on the adoption of strategic planning. Moreover, the term crisis is described in greater detail. On the relation between crisis and strategic planning, I pose two hypotheses; each for one of the theories. These hypotheses will be, then, tested in a qualitative analysis in the main part. The hypotheses are used to break the main assumptions of the theories down to two separate mechanisms, which makes the analysis more streamlined.
After establishing this theoretical framework, the focus will shift to my methodological choices, which will be explained in further depth. This work is a qualitative analysis of the influence of the Syrian humanitarian crisis on the adoption of strategic planning in the Coast Guard Command from two theoretical perspectives. Further methods on data collection and inference will be addressed in detail in the methodological section.
In the main part, the Coast Guard Command will be analysed in the light how the Syrian humanitarian crisis influenced the Coast Guard and its organisational circumstances, its tasks and responsibilities and how it could be linked to the implementation of strategic planning.
II.
Theoretical Framework
In the previous part, I outlined the general structure of this work. Turning to the theoretical framework, it is composed of strategic planning and innovation on the one hand and sociological institutionalism and rational choice theory on the other. The concept of crisis and its connection to the two theoretical streams will receive special attention in that regard. The following part is concerned with exploring these concepts and establishing a definitional and theoretical basis that will be used in the analysis later.
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II.1 Strategic planning
At the heart of this work, is the voluntary adoption of strategic planning (or strategic plans; used interchangeably) by the Coast Guard Command. Naturally, it is important to get a better understanding of what strategic planning is. Luckily, there is an established and agreed scholarly understanding of the concept of strategic planning (Boyne and Gould-Williams, 2003; Shrader et al., 1989). Bryson (1988) described strategic planning to be a tool for organisations to respond to their changing environment and it is a much-cited work in the strategic planning and planning literature. Further, he identifies that strategic planning usually includes an organisation´s mission, vision, decisions on costs, financing, products and/or services and organisational structure and design (1988). Adding to that work, Berry (1994) classifies four dimensions to strategic planning in detail:
“(1) a clear statement of the organization's mission; (2) the identification of the agency's external constituencies or stakeholders, and the determination of their assessment of the agency's purposes and operations; (3) the delineation of the agency's strategic goals and objectives, typically in a 3- to 5-year plan; and (4) the development of strategies to achieve them.”
This framework is useful to assess whether a document within an organisation qualifies as a strategic plan or not. Another important aspect brought forth by Poister (2010, p. 247), is that strategic plans aim “to promote strategic thinking, acting, and learning on an ongoing basis”. While strategic planning is becoming more and more common practise in the public sectors, some organisations have still not implemented strategic plans (Poister, 2010). A detailed application of this framework on the case at hand will follow in the analytical part, along with a general outline of the strategic plan of the Coast Guard, in order to build an understanding about this specific plan.
II.2 Innovation – Some Defining Properties
Unlike many other concepts that we use in social sciences, there is much consensus on what the concept of innovation entails. Although there are definitional differences in the focus and emphasis on specific parts of innovation, most authors agree that the concept of innovation designates a process that is producing new working mechanisms, products, ideas etc., which are also implemented (Bloch and Bugge, 2013; Demircioğlu and Audretsch, 2017; Ramli et al.,
2017; Bartlett and Dibben, 2002). For the purpose of this work, I will use the definition by Bloch (2011):
“An innovation is the implementation of a significant change in the way your organisation operates or in the products it provides. Innovations comprise new or significant changes to services and goods, operational processes, organisational methods, or the way your organisation communicates with users.”
The word ‘innovation’ originally stems from the Latin word innovationem, which is the subject of the two words in, which means ‘into’, and novus, meaning ‘new’. The literal meaning of innovation as ‘into something new’ is unchanged until this day and even expanded into non-roman languages such as Turkish.2 In addition to innovations merely being new, these
innovations do not necessarily need to be developed by the organisation that is adopting them, but they primarily have to be new to the organisation that is adopting them (Demircioğlu and Audretsch, 2017).
Looking at the individual components of innovations, the literature identified that innovations are first and foremost no coincidental phenomena. Therefore, I would like to point out that innovations are outcomes of deliberate processes. This becomes clearer when we see that innovations are based on individual motivation of the employees and the management and leadership of organisations (Demircioğlu and Audretsch, 2017). Demircioğlu and Audretsch (2017, p. 1682) found out that “space, openness, and deregulation are key components that allow public sector employees to experiment and innovate”. Experimentation is important in regard to intrinsic motivation, because it “is posited to spur innovative activity, because employees prefer to feel that they have control over their actions” (2017, p. 1682). This intrinsic dimension of innovation points to a proactive and conscious nature of the concept. To see this more clearly, in contrast to creativity, innovation is based on competence and leadership (Moussa et al., 2018). These are attributes are distinct from creativity, because they imply the element of implementation and that the action aims to fulfil a specific goal, which does not need to be the case with creativity. Therefore, this is an important aspect that needs consideration when discussing innovation in this context, because strategic planning is also a deliberative planning and developing exercise. Accordingly, innovation is an intentional process to attain specific goals that are previously identified, which is an important characteristic of distinction, as opposed to other forms of change, which can be caused by ‘organisational’ or ‘environmental’ creep (Dunphy and Stace, 1988).
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As outlined before, innovations are outcomes of deliberate and intended processes. Hence, innovations aim to produce specific effects (Bloch and Bugge, 2013). Because there are different organisational goals that can be pursued, it is suggested that there are different types of innovations that aim to fulfil those goals. According to Bloch and Bugge (2013), there are not only different types of innovation, but especially innovation in the public sector context is distinctly different from private sector innovation. They have identified six different types of public sector innovation: service innovation, service delivery innovation, administrative and organisational innovation, conceptual innovation, policy innovation, systemic innovation. Service and service delivery innovation are concerned with the public services themselves; while the service innovation entails innovations that introduce new services, the service delivery innovation is concerned with innovation in ways that services are delivered (2013). Conceptual innovations change the normative perception of the organisation, such as introducing new guiding principles or codes of conduct (2013). Turning to policy innovations, these are innovations that aim at changes in policy, including large reforms (2013). Further, changes in the way the organisation interacts with its environment – mainly with other organisations – are designated as systemic innovations (2013). Finally, and most relevant for this study, administrative and organisational innovations “introduc[e] new organisational principles for the production and delivery of service products” (2013, p. 137). In order to provide a clearer overview, the discussed types of innovation are provided in table 1.
Table 1
Bloch and Bugge de Vries et al. Walker
Service Innovation Product and Service
Innovation Product Innovation
Service Delivery Innovation
Administrative and Organisational Innovation Process Innovation - Administrative Process Innovation - Technological Process Innovation Process Innovation
Policy Innovation Governance Innovation
Conceptual Innovation Conceptual Innovation
Some of these classifications also recur in a literature review of 181 studies examining innovation in the public sector, conducted by de Vries et al. (2016). The authors identified four broader types of innovation: process innovation, product or service innovation, governance innovation, conceptual innovation (de Vries et al., 2016). The first type – process innovation – makes a distinction between administrative process and technological process innovation; while administrative process innovation aims to produce improvements in how the organisation works. Technological process innovation is concerned with improving the tools used for carrying out tasks. Except for governance innovation, the three types identified by de Vries et al. overlap with the terms that were introduced by Bloch and Bugge. Governance innovation, however, has been classified as the “development of new forms and processes to address specific societal problems” (de Vries et al., 2016, p. 153). These categorisations have some overlaps with a more general categorisation used by Walker (2006), who identified only three types of innovation: product, process and ancillary. Walker’s product innovation is similar to the product and service innovation by de Vries et al. (2016), and the service and service delivery innovation by Bloch and Bugge (2013). Walker’s process innovation is similar to process innovation and governance innovation by de Vries et al., while it is also similar to Bloch and Bugge´s administrative and organisational innovation and policy innovation. Ancillary innovations are distinct, because “the successful adoption of ancillary innovations is dependent on factors outside of the organisation´s control” (Walker, 2006, p. 314). These innovations are basically all innovations that reach beyond the organisation and is concerned with external parties. While under the framework of Bloch and Bugge (2013) strategic planning would rather fall under administrative and organisational innovation, it would fall somewhat between administrative process and governance innovation within the de Vries framework. Basically, this only a definitional difference, because all the types somewhat refer to innovations that aim to facilitate the management of the organisation. For the purpose of this work and for the sake of clarity, I will rather place strategic planning in the category of process innovation by Walker, because it is more inclusive.
But why do organisations innovate in the first place? Earlier, I pointed out that innovations aim to address certain issues and increase some variable within the organisation. Organisational studies have, indeed, shown that innovation contributes to organisational performance (Demircioğlu and Audretsch, 2017; Ramli et al., 2017). However, de Vries at al. found out that 35% of the examined studies did not specify a specific goal for the innovations examined. The studies that identified a specific goal or several goals of innovation mostly looked at the influence of innovation on outcomes like effectiveness and efficiency (tackling societal
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problems or increasing customer satisfaction rank below the two); aspects that are core values of New Public Management (NPM; de Vries et al., 2016). For this study, the identification of the goals in strategic planning processes is an important part, because this study will look at the external factors of the organisations at hand, in order to find out which of these factors created the need (or not) to tackle a specific problem. In other words, innovations have different outcomes and there are reasons why specific outcomes are desired by an organisation.
II.2.1 Factors Influencing the Adoption of Innovation
Now that an understanding of the nature of innovation in general and its different types and goals have been presented, it will be discussed which factors influence the adoption of strategic planning. These factors are generally divided into drivers and barriers to innovation. I solely focus on the drivers, because the focus is on the adoption and not the failure of adoption of strategic plans.3 Although many authors use different categorisations, drivers to innovation in
public organisations are generally divided into internal and external factors, while each of the respective category has specific sub-categories (de Vries et al, 2016; Demircioğlu and Audretsch, 2017; Glor, 2017; Ramli et al., 2017). Glor (2017), for example, explicitly divided these factors according to their internal or external nature. She points out that the internal factors are characteristics that can be found within the organisation, such as individual motivation or organisational culture. External factors are related to the environment, such as nature of the government, political environment, stakeholders etc. According to the literature review by de Vries et al. (2016), most authors, however, emphasised the abundance of resources and the
nature of leadership as the main variables influencing adoption of innovations, while followed
by risk averseness/willingness to learn and incentives/rewards. Only 8% of the examined studies, respectively, looked at conflict and organisational structures (2016).
A useful addition to the factors influencing innovation and particularly zooming in on strategic planning, is the framework by Frances S. Berry (1994). It gives one insight into the factors influencing the adoption of strategic planning. She developed four explanations of possible factors that influenced the adoption of strategic planning, analysing agencies in the North American context. First, her agency resource explanation holds that abundant resources and organisational size will have particularly positive effects on the adoption of innovations and the adoption of strategic planning. This finding is also supported by Demircioğlu and
3 Note, that the failure of adoption is not the same as non-adoption. The failure of adoption necessarily includes a process in
which the adoption was a clearly identified option within several options of organisational action. The failure is mostly due to barriers to the adoption. In contrast, non-adoption does not necessarily include that the adoption was ever considered to be a viable option, thus it does not necessarily need to be subject to barriers.
Audretsch (2017). Secondly, the agency leadership cycle explanation holds that “in the gubernatorial administration cycle, agencies are most likely to adopt strategic planning in the year after a new governor is elected, second most likely in the year immediately after a governor is re-elected, and least likely in the year of a gubernatorial election” (Berry, 1994, p. 324). This explanation, however, will be irrelevant for this study, because it is derived from a different political context (analysis conducted on a federal level). Berry´s third explanation is the agency
orientation explanation, which assumes that organisations that work closely with the private
sector and with services that are directly delivered to citizens, the likelihood of adoption of strategic plans increases. Finally, there is the regional diffusion explanation, which holds that the adoption of strategic plans in similar organisations in neighbouring states in a federal system are increasing the likelihood of adoption of strategic plans in the organisation that we look at. All these explanations are based on the assumption that the environment is relatively stable and constant. However, this is not always the case. Crises, caused by political changes, economic and social obstacles and constraints, can occur and influence organisations. This factor is not accounted for in Berry´s work on strategic planning. In the following, crises will be discussed, how they related to organisational change and how this change is viewed from sociological institutionalism on the one hand, and rational choice theory on the other.
II.3 Crises and Organisations
Crises on the organisational level are significant changes of internal rules, norms and routines which are harmful to the functioning of the organisational performance and goal achievement. They are “situations that affect […] a number of aspects of an organisation and its environment” (Hill, 2011, p. 21). Further, they are unexpected events that harm organisational resources and can threaten an organisation´s reputation (2011). Because of the disruptive nature of a crisis, organisations need to form responses to new demands created by a crisis situation. Referring to our knowledge about innovation in the private sector, we know that there are two main streams of thought on how crises affect innovativeness. The first, is the
cyclical view, which posits that an organisation is more innovative when it is in the rising or
peaking time of its conjuncture cycle (Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011). The other view, the
counter-cyclical view, contests the cyclical view and argues that an organisation in recession is
more innovative, because it reacts to its worsening situation (2011). These views are, however, derived from the private sector and, therefore, primarily based on reactions to economic crises. Therefore, a more inclusive point of departure referring to crisis phenomena would be
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organisations´ actions can be explained in the light of their environment (Buhari-Gülmez, 2010; Stein, 1997; Granovetter, 1985; Zafirovski, 2004). This is useful when considering how organisations react to crises, depending on the nature of the crisis; an economic crisis will rather affect the budget, while a corruption scandal will be more likely to affect an organisation’s reputation. According to this theory, organisations´ actions are influenced by its environment, as well as the environment is influenced by those very actions of the organisation (Zafirovski, 2004). Senge, for example, points out that organisations are “embedded in a variety of social-institutional influences stemming from different spheres of society” (2013, p. 78). These influences include political, economic and cultural influences. Further, Senge indicates that new institutionalism includes an implicit critique of theoretical approaches that try to make sense of organisational behaviour by merely focusing on the economic factors that influence organisations (2013). In the words of Alasuutari (2015, p. 163), “the institutional setup of society constitutes actors, providing them with the ‘frames of meaning’ that guide their action”. Therefore, new institutionalism departs from a purely economic explanation of organisational behaviour and draws attention to political and cultural factors that shape organisational action.
An important role, in connection with sociological institutionalism, plays the concept of legitimacy. The principle of organisational legitimacy is based on the assumption that organisations need to operate within the boundaries of accepted societal norms and rules (Adams, 2018; Stein, 1997; Zafirovski, 2004). Moreover, organisations, that perceive themselves as being conform with societal norms, are expected to have an interest in actively promoting an image of a legitimate organisation (Deegan, 2002; Guthrie et al., 2006). In economic theory, this notion is based on the assumption that a firm´s legitimacy constitutes a “moral and legal claim” of their competence “to do things better than their competitors” (Stinchcombe, 1997, p. 4). For public organisations, legitimacy is an inherent precondition for their survival, because most of them either derive their power from, or provide their services/products to, society, or do both (Guthrie et al., 2006). In other words, legitimacy is often also translated as the right to rule (Adams, 2018). However, Adams (2018) also points out that not every organisation has ruling authority or function; he, therefore, extends the understanding of legitimacy to the right to function, which basically includes that there is agreement about the functioning of an organisation and that this functioning fits in the accepted and desired normative framework of society. An organisation, that is perceived to be illegitimate, has basically lost the society´s members confidence in its organisational role, or, in other words, has broken the contract, due to infringement of the normative rules of society. If an organisation is perceived to be illegitimate, it either loses its power of action, its clients,
or both; and, accordingly, the right to rule. Stinchcombe (1997, p. 4), therefore, “emphasise[s] especially the commitment of a firm to be competent in the future to carry out the activities specified in the contract”.
But who are those ‘clients’ exactly? What is meant by ‘society’? Every organisation is embedded into a framework of interaction with other actors. This is inherently so, because every organisation has a purpose and consists of more than one person. On the most basic level, these people interact only among themselves. However, public sector organisations interact with a variety of other organisations, interest groups and other audiences; we call those actors
stakeholders. For example, a ministry of foreign affairs has a manifold of stakeholders:
embassies, the central government, its staff, other ministries, foreign governments, the broader public, media and so on. All these stakeholders have an interest that the ministry functions in a specific way. In turn, the ministry has also an interest in a specific functioning of those actors towards itself, which is summarised under the term stakeholder legitimacy (Mahadeo et al, 2011; Olsen, 2017; Santana, 2011). On a very basic level, all actors expect the others to operate within a general framework of normative rules (Mahadeo et al., 2011). However, not all stakeholders are equally important to an organisation (Santana, 2011). Turning back to the example of the foreign ministry, it is reasonable to assume that the legitimacy derived from the own central government is more important that the legitimacy derived from foreign governments that the ministry interacts with. In the literature, this situation is commonly referred to as stakeholder salience, which designates that some stakeholders are more important to an organisation than others (Mitchell et al., 1997; Santana, 2011). Combining stakeholder salience with stakeholder legitimacy, one can assume that organisations have an interest in being seen as a legitimate organisation by its most important stakeholders, in order to maintain their right to function. Although organisations ideally would like to be viewed as legitimate by all of their stakeholders, some stakeholders´ views may not have crucial effects on the organisation´s legitimacy and reputation. In our example of the foreign ministry (country X), let us assume that the most important countries for this ministry are C, B and E and that the home country has only very little relations with country A and bad relations with country W. Accordingly, the views of A and W are of little or no interest to X, because their relationship is marginal in the first place; it would be good, if they perceive X as a legitimate actor, but not viewing it so would not endanger the ministry´s survival. On the other hand, considering C, B and E to be crucial actors for X, we can expect that X tries to act in a way that it is perceived to be legitimate by C, B and E. In other words, the more important a stakeholder is to an organisation, the more the organisation actively tries to be viewed as a legitimate actor (Mitchell
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et al., 1997).
In times of crisis, it is reasonable to think that an organisation´s legitimacy might be endangered by the crisis. From a sociological institutionalist perspective, this can stem from the societal perception that the organisation is not capable of properly dealing with the crisis. More specifically, the stakeholders might be worried about their ‘stake’ in the organisation. This stake does not necessarily always have to be economic, but can be moral, normative, cognitive, social or cultural as well. This might produce pressures on the organisation to not only tackle the crisis, but also to form a response to its stakeholders in an attempt to maintain its organisational legitimacy. Effectively, the organisation tries to convince its stakeholders that their stake in the organisation is safe from negative effects of the crisis and will be maintained. Therefore, one could expect that adopting strategic planning is one possible way to address this problem. Being far from the only possible response to a crisis, adopting strategic planning is certainly one way to show stakeholders that the organisation has a structured longer term approach and desires and anticipates future improvements. Consequently, it is reasonable to hypothesise that if a crisis endangers an organisation´s legitimacy, strategic planning can be a crisis response to the organisation´s stakeholders. Based on this review, I pose the following hypothesis from a sociological institutionalist perspective.
H1: Crises that endanger an organisation´s legitimacy increase the likelihood of adopting
strategic planning.
Often put in contrast to new institutionalism, there is the widely-known rational choice
theory. This theoretical paradigm assumes that organisations´ actions are driven by
considerations of utility maximisation (Herrnstein, 1990; Ostrom, 1991; Harsanyi, 1977). This means that an organisation´s actions are reflections of how the organisation perceives its environment and internal resources and shapes its decision in a fashion that helps the organisation to maximise its goals. The theory is based on the main assumption that behaviour is driven by utility-maximisation considerations (Herrnstein, 1990). This means that human behaviour (including organisational behaviour) is the outcome of considering which course of action might serve the own interests best. A downside that is associated with this approach is that the rational choice tradition excludes significant non-economic factors and assesses the actions of organisations and individuals solely in the light of its economic utility, effectively disregarding the importance of social influences, such as legitimacy, accountability, politics etc. (Nee, 1998; Zafirovski, 2004). However, this does not necessarily nullify the explanatory power of rational choice theory. According to Herrnstein (1990), rational choice theory is a
useful approach to explain behaviour, because the theory provides an account for why a specific choice was made. However, this approach is not so limited that actions will strictly only be evaluated on the basis of their economic utility. Often, rational choice theory is adopted to account for decisions taken within an organisation, which are not directly linked with economic benefits (Green and Fox, 2007). For example, if an organisation decides to update its communication technology, it does so, probably because it wants to improve the functioning of the organisation, because the technology would help to increase the organisation´s work capacity. This improved functioning and higher capacity might lead to higher output and/or efficiency, and thus also economic benefits, but the decision affects the organisation´s functioning first. Consequently, the choice of adopting strategic planning could be explained by utilising the rational choice approach. The argument would then posit that the adoption of strategic planning is a plausible choice by the organisation during the course of the crisis, in order to effectively and efficiently carry out its tasks. This might become necessary, in the case of a sudden increase in tasks in certain areas of activity within the organisation. In order to manage, organise and plan the approach towards this increase in workload, the adoption of strategic planning might be a feasible option and response. This assumption is based on the systematic nature and the administrative benefits of strategic planning that were outlined earlier (Bryson, 1988). Although the rational choice literature generally does not explicitly state workload considerations as being part of this approach, the mechanistic nature of workload, as opposed to social factors like diversity or environment, indicates that it can be categorised as a rational choice factor; at the very least, this argument excludes the possibility that workload is a considerable factor in sociological institutionalism.
As a response to this increased workload, strategic planning might be a feasible solution, since it is positively related to organisational effectiveness (Poister, 2010). It can help to help to analyse the current situation and identify possible shortcomings and new solutions. At the same time, it sets out a plan over a longer period of time to cope with increasing workload and point out targets for the future to achieve a more efficient functioning (Byrson, 1988). The identification of problems and the development of strategies to tackle these problems would be decisions that would fall under the rational choice approach. Thus, under the umbrella of rational choice theory I argue that crises produce the need for effective and efficient functioning. Consequently, strategic planning is one option that an organisation can resort to, in order to achieve these aspects during and after a crisis and become more resilient against future crises.
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H2: Crises that increase the workload of an organisation increase the likelihood of
adopting strategic planning.
III. Methodological Considerations
In this work, I compare the explanatory approaches of sociological institutionalism and rational choice theory in the light of their respective capacity to explain how crises influence the innovativeness of public sector organisations. Therefore, I had to select an organisation that has adopted an innovation during the time of a crisis. As mentioned earlier at various points of this study, I am going to examine the case of the Coast Guard Command, which adopted strategic planning for the first time in 2014. The year of adoption correlates with increased irregular maritime movement of victims of the Syrian humanitarian crisis within the whole Mediterranean Sea, including the Turkish Aegean Sea (UNHCR, 2018). Based on these developments, the dependent variable is the adoption of strategic planning by the Coast Guard Command, while the independent is the Syrian humanitarian crisis. This work, however, establishes the link between the two variables via a mediation analysis in which the mechanism will be explained by analysing the events from two different theoretical perspectives.
As regards the case selection, the Coast Guard qualifies as a case in this framework, because the adoption of strategic planning was common practise in the Ministry for Development (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı), which published so-called development plans, which are highly similar to strategic plans, but this practise was only picked up by other Ministries from 2003 onwards after law no. 5018 on management guidelines for public and local administrative authorities was implemented, which made the adoption of strategic planning mandatory for all public organisations. However in June 2006, the law was updated, including an exemption for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, the General Secretariat of the Security Council, National Intelligence Agency, the Gendarmerie General Command and the Coast Guard Command. They all were exempted from this rule, due to national security considerations, which take precedence over transparency considerations in Turkish legislation (Kamu İdarelerinde Stratejik Planlamaya İlişkin Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmelik, 2006). This does not only mean that strategic planning is an innovation in this case, but also that one can assume that there must have been some overriding reason for the Coast Guard to adopt strategic planning, because of the exemption. I hypothesise that the Syrian humanitarian crisis caused this adoption. In order to find out how this happened, I utilise two different theories to analyse the mechanism through which the crisis may have influenced the adoption.
This study is conducted within the framework of the single case study design. However, in contrast to merely describing the case of the Coast Guard Command adopting strategic planning, the analysis a multidimensional one. First and foremost, the analysis is aimed to provide insight into the relationship between crises and innovation in the public sector. In order to do that, I will analyse the effects of the Syrian humanitarian crisis on the Coast Guard Command and link the voluntary adoption of strategic planning to this crisis by conducting a qualitative analysis, based on the two theoretical approaches. The single case study design of this work is a suitable design, because the work is concerned with the mechanism through which the Syrian humanitarian crisis influenced the Coast Guard Command. Although this research design has the downside of limited external validity, the internal validity is high (see Toshkov, 2016). This is especially useful to identify mechanisms, which is ultimately the aim of this study. Therefore, the analysis will focus on explaining this case in depth, comparing the two theoretical approaches and their analytical power in this case.
It was mentioned before that this work utilises two competing theories in the analysis. The reason for this is twofold: first, analysing the case in the light of sociological institutionalism on the one hand, and rational choice theory on the other, is a useful tool and suitable framework to establish whether the crisis can be expected to have any effect on the adoption of strategic planning in the first place. The theories are, therefore, important to understand whether there is a relationship or not and channel the hypotheses that were discussed before. Secondly, the theories simultaneously are expected to be capable of giving an account of how the relationship between the crisis and the adoption of strategic planning works. In other words, I do not only argue that the Syrian humanitarian crisis led to the adoption of strategic planning in the Coast Guard Command, but mainly give an account on how this may have happened, based on the two theoretical approaches. By using the theories, I aim to be able to make broader assumptions on how crises might influence (which also includes the possibility that there is no influence at all) the adoption of l strategic planning as public sector innovation. Again, since case studies have limited generalisability, these hints on other cases serve merely as points of departure for future studies.
Before starting with the analysis of the hypotheses, I will briefly summarise the strategic plan and whether it qualifies as such using the framework by Berry. This step is important to get a better understanding of what this plan is about, how it is constructed and what the relevant aspects of this plan are.
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In the following analysis, I will test the proposed hypotheses from above within a qualitative analysis. Starting with H1, it is first and foremost important to establish what the Coast Guard´s normative framework consists of and further whether the Syrian humanitarian crisis influenced the Coast Guard in a way that its organisational legitimacy became threatened by the crisis. I have pointed out earlier that an organisation´s legitimacy is dependent on the society´s perception of the organisation. More precisely, the precondition for legitimacy is the adherence to societal norms and rules (Adams, 2018). Therefore, different legal sources will be examined that lay out the organisation´s normative boundaries. Secondly, I also pointed out that there are different stakeholders of public organisations. Methodologically, it is, thus, necessary to single out which stakeholders´ perspective on the Coast Guard are relevant to examine the Coast Guard´s legitimacy. Here, I have singled out two important stakeholders: the Coast Guard´s staff and the media. First, the staff´s perspective on the organisation is examined, in order to establish whether the Coast G uard´s personnel perceives its organisation as a legitimate organisation; or in other words, whether the personnel believes the organisation is in line with accepted norms. In order to do that, I will use survey data from the strategic plan itself, since it is the only available data about the personnel in the Coast Guard. Another important part is why the staff is examined as an important stakeholder of the organisation. My argumentation for this choice is based on the normative aspect of the Coast Guard´s tasks. Since the organisation is concerned with law enforcement and rescue missions, while being also representative of the Turkish state in the seas, it is reasonable to assume that the staff needs to hold a favourable view on its organisation in terms of legitimacy. To make this more clear, let us think about a corrupt organisation. In such an organisation, there will certainly be some supporters of corruption; otherwise it would not happen. However, as we know from public service
motivation, employees in the public sector are much more intrinsically motivated and
emphasise normative aspects of their work (Bozeman and Su, 2014; Andersen and Pedersen, 2012). In such a corrupt organisation, those employees can be expected to be dissatisfied with its organisation´s conduct. Consequently, the organisation might have to fear whistle-blowers and reduced performance, due to a lack of motivation, which is caused by a lack of legitimacy. Certainly, this is an extreme example, but it makes clear that internal legitimacy from the side of the personnel is an important factor for any public organisation. In addition to that, I analyse the effect of the Syrian humanitarian crisis on the internal legitimacy of the Coast Guard Command. This means that in a crisis the organisation can be expected to be more dependent on its staff´s favourable view, in order to maintain functioning and retain the right to function.
The next part of the analysis focuses on how the Coast Guard was treated in public discourse before the crisis (until 03/2011) and compare it with the discourse from the beginning of the crisis until the adoption of the strategic plan (04/2011-12/2014), in order to examine an aspect of the Coast Guard´s external legitimacy, meaning how actors outside of the organisation viewed the Coast Guard before and during the crisis. The advantage of this approach is that it would be able to show a change in the perception of the Coast Guard by the media in terms of the Coast Guard´s external legitimacy. Especially the media, in this case, is an interesting aspect to look at in terms of legitimacy, because of the destructive effects of the crisis on human lives. Because the crisis effected so many people in such a dramatic way, it can be assumed that the general public expects responsible actors to act in a way that reduces harm and help in any way possible; especially in a collectivist society like the Turkish one. The media acts as a channel of information on the crisis. This is also further emphasised by the normative framework the Coast Guard operates in, which will be further elaborated on in the empirical part. Consequently, the media´s position is strategically important for the Coast Guard Command, because one can expect the organisation to encounter external legitimacy problems, if the media portrays them in a bad light or criticises the Coast Guard´s performance. Adopting strategic planning can, then, be a useful tool to show competence, proper organisation and the organisation´s proactive conduct within the normative framework.
For the first part of the analysis of H1, a qualitative analysis of the strategic plan is conducted that aims at understanding how the organisation is perceived by its personnel. Because the only available data on the staff´s views is in the strategic plan itself, the analysis needs to take into account that the organisation also might have an interest in not publishing overly unfavourable views or that the participants in the surveys might were reluctant to fully express unfavourable opinions. Accordingly, if the analysis shows relatively neutral and diplomatic statements on the Coast Guard, one can assume that there might be indeed an internal legitimacy problem for the Coast Guard. However, it might also be that there is criticism, but the general results show satisfaction with the organisation, which would then mean that there are most likely no internal legitimacy problems. I base this argument on the assumption that an organisation that faces criticism, by addressing it in its strategic planning, has a more attentive and constructive organisational climate, which is an attribute that is absent when internal legitimacy problems are present.
Turning to the second part of the analysis of H1, the analysis is a qualitative discourse analysis and divided into two periods, which is important to find out whether there is a negative change in the legitimacy perception, and if so, whether this change is caused by the effects of
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the Syrian humanitarian crisis. If there is no such change and there is a constantly low legitimacy perception, the analysis would also include whether the crisis was the trigger for the adoption of strategic planning. If there is a constantly high legitimacy throughout the two periods, then the H1 can be refuted.
In order to find that out, I will look at two national newspaper sources (Sabah and Hürriyet) and analyse how the Coast Guard Command is portrayed in the two periods. The two newspapers are selected on the basis of their circulation. These newspapers are at the top of Turkish newspapers with both having a circulation over 300.000 newspapers a day (Günaydın Aliağa, 2018). Accordingly, analysing how these newspapers have portrayed the Coast Guard Command can give a sustainable reflection whether the organisation suffered from legitimacy issues. The analysis for H1 will, therefore, be conducted within the framework of a discourse analysis. This qualitative method is concerned with “examining the way knowledge is produced within different discourses and the performances, linguistic styles and rhetorical devices used in particular accounts” (Snape and Spencer, 2003, p. 12). When looking at the objectives of the analysis of H1, this approach can help to elucidate the issue of legitimacy of the Coast Guard through the discourse about the organisation. Due to the nature of the concept of legitimacy, which draws on the perception of the public on the organisation, the discourse analysis can establish whether the newspaper articles framed the organisation in a good, neutral or bad light. A more solid way to analyse H1 would be the utilisation of long-term survey and/or interview data from a broad population about the opinion on the Coast Guard. Due to time and financial constraints of this work (and the fact that there is no data available from the time before the crisis), I decided to examine the issue by means of the discourse analysis.
Depending on the findings, I will then examine whether the Coast Guard´s strategic plan is addressing the problem of legitimacy (if there is one), or whether the content of the plan is unrelated to the development of public discourse on the Coast Guard. Only if the strategic plan is related to the legitimacy problems – if there are any – of the Coast Guard, H1 can be sustained. If there are no legitimacy-threatening discourses, neither before, nor during the crisis, then H1 cannot be sustained. If there are legitimacy-threatening discourses, but the content of the strategic plan fails to address them, or is in any other way unrelated to the legitimacy problems, then H1 can also not be sustained.
Turning to H2, a rational choice perspective is adopted to examine the adoption of strategic planning. Here, the mechanism via which the hypothesised relationship is examined is the workload of the Coast Guard Command. Accordingly, it is crucial to establish whether there
was an increase in the workload of the Coast Guard that preceded the adoption of the strategic plan. Further, it needs to be established whether the increase – if there is one – is caused by the Syrian humanitarian crisis, or is just a coincidental phenomenon. Therefore, I examine various sources, in order to find out whether the Coast Guard had to face an increased number of tasks and whether they were caused by the crisis. These sources will include the strategic plan itself, but also external sources, which are useful to analyse whether the crisis caused increased activity within the areas the Coast Guard is responsible for. If there is no increase in tasks, caused by the Syrian humanitarian crisis, for the Coast Guard Command immediately before the adoption of the strategic plan in 2014, then H2 cannot be sustained. However, if there is the hypothesised increase that is caused by the crisis, then the analysis enters a second stage.
Since the Coast Guard is responsible for a variety of tasks (law no. 2692), it is important which tasks increased due to the emergence of the crisis. For example, if there is a significant increase in fishing without license, but the main effect of the Syrian humanitarian crisis on the Aegean Sea is irregular and unsafe refugee movement, then it cannot be sustained that the crisis caused the increase, thus, making H2 unsustainable. Accordingly, it is important to find out which areas of the Coast Guard´s responsibilities were affected and how. Then, the strategic plan is examined in the light whether it explicitly addresses these tasks and identifies the increase as a problem to the organisation. If it does, then our confidence in H2 increases, because the strategic plan, then, can be considered as a response to the effects of the crisis. However, if the strategic plan fails to address the increase of tasks related to the crisis, then H2 cannot be sustained.
IV. Analysis
IV.1 Strategic Planning in the Coast Guard
The Coast Guard of the Turkish Republic is one of the few organisations that is exempted from law no. 5018 on strategic planning in administrative organisations. The reason for this are national security concerns, due to the tasks that the Coast Guard performs. Equally, other security organisations, like the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) or the Gendarmerie General Command, are also exempted from developing and publishing strategic plans (law no. 5018). However, in 2013, the Coast Guard Command started with the development of such a plan and published it in 2014 for the period between 2015-2019. This decision comes 10 year after the adoption of law no. 5018,
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which binds all other public organisations to adopt strategic planning and this date coincides with a larger societal phenomenon that also affected the Coast Guard: the Syrian humanitarian crisis. In the introduction of this plan, it is stated that the reason for this decision is based on the desire to increase the functionality of the organisation (Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığı, 2014). Further, it is also pointed out that the rise of New Public Management has shown that strategic planning and management has positive effects on organisations and that modern times make these plans inevitable aspects of successful organisations (2014). In the following, I will analyse whether there is not another important factor for the adoption of this plan, namely the Syrian humanitarian crisis. However, it is useful to get a more detailed view on what this specific plan entails and whether it qualifies as a strategic plan in the first place. To find that out, I will utilise the framework of Berry, which was outlined before and entails 4 aspects that a strategic plan must fulfil: “(1) a clear statement of the organization's mission; (2) the identification of the agency's external constituencies or stakeholders, and the determination of their assessment of the agency's purposes and operations; (3) the delineation of the agency's strategic goals and objectives, typically in a 3- to 5-year plan; and (4) the development of strategies to achieve them” (Berry, 1994).
The strategic plan of the Coast Guard is divided into 3 main parts. The first part, Durum
Analizi, is concerned with the analysis of the, then, current status of the organisation.
Included in this analysis, there is an overview of the organisation´s history, followed by a detailed description of its tasks, actions and legal framework it is embedded in. Next, there are comprehensive analyses of the equipment, fleet, technology, personnel, finances and logistics of the organisation. Further, the first part also includes an analysis of the organisation´s environment and stakeholders. Throughout this comprehensive part, the analysis follows a strict pattern of stating the current status within one topic and then what is missing to improve functioning in the future. Summarising, this part identifies a general trend that the Coast Guard was able to cope with its tasks until now, but is anticipating future developments, which will require action to cope with the challenges of the future. This includes increasing the fleet, as well as renewing communication technologies, but also increasing networking and cross-institutional and international cooperation (2014). The second part, Geleceğe Bakış, means ‘future outlook’ and is concerned with concretely outlining the future plans of the Coast Guard. Starting off with an overview over the organisation´s mission, vision and core values, the following parts identify 11 strategic goals that help to fulfil the mission and vision, while incorporating the core
values. As the organisation´s mission, there is the duty to provide for maritime security, further the country´s national interests in the sea and to protect the environment and natural resources in the seas (2014). Regarding the vision, it is stated that the Coast Guard wants to be the first organisation that comes to mind when it comes to the topic of the sea, and also to be seen as a respected and responsible organisation (2014). Some of the organisation´s core values are: respect to ethic core values, human rights, superiority of the law, accountability and transparency (2014).
The last part of the strategic plan is a rather short one and summarises the methods used for this strategic plan and how future observations in performance will be evaluated.
In this short overview, it is already visible that the first point of Berry´s framework is present in this strategic plan, because there is a clear statement of the Coast Guard´s mission in this plan. Further, there is also a whole part devoted to the internal and external stakeholders of the Coast Guard, which would constitute the second point of the framework. Here, the Coast Guard´s staff is identified as the internal stakeholders to the organisation, while the ministry of internal affairs, citizens and other public and private organisations constitute the external stakeholder perspective (2014). Turning to the third point, the strategic plans also fulfils this requirement, because there are 11 strategic goals, which are aimed to be achieved between 2015 and 2019. Finally, there are detailed targets outlined in the last part that need to be achieved, in order to reach the main strategic goals (2014). For example, strategic goal 3 states that the Coast Guard wants to increase its efficiency in search and rescue operations (2014). Below, there are 12 targets enlisted, like adding one mid-sized helicopter to the fleet, that need to be achieved to reach this efficiency (2014). Thus, the fourth point of Berry´s framework is also addressed and therefore the document by the Coast Guard qualifies as a strategic plan from an academic point of view as well. Next, the two theories will be applied to analyse both the strategic plan and external sources, in order to find out whether the Syrian humanitarian crisis played a role in the adoption of the strategic plan.
IV.2 The Sociological Institutionalist Account
The Coast Guard Command is concerned with a variety of tasks, of which all are enlisted and manifested in law no. 2692. These include among others, control of fishery and the preservation of maritime life, prevent smuggling and the infraction of the right of the 3 miles’ coastal zone, detect pollution and to counteract irregular migration. This law establishes the
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founding of the Coast Guard, its tasks, responsibilities and legal structure. Being bound to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in peacetime and under the command of the Naval Forces in wartime, the Coast Guard is concerned with civil and economic missions of securing, regulating and controlling the Turkish seas (law no. 2692). However, there is not only a very clear distinction of what falls under the responsibilities of the Coast Guard, but also how these responsibilities should be carried out; thus, also establishing the normative boundaries of this organisation. Among others, these activities include the control of irregular migration movements and the search and rescue of people that were involved in maritime incidents (law no. 2692, art. 4[E-G]); this part is the most relevant in the case of the Syrian humanitarian crisis. Further, article 4(F) stresses the Coast Guard´s obligation to act within the framework of the United Nations outlined in the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (IMO, 1979; International Maritime Organisation). Member states to this convention are bound by detailed and strict guidelines on the operational procedures for maritime rescue actions. For example, at various points in the convention it is stated that the search and rescue efforts shall be conducted with utmost effort and consideration for human lives, (e.g. art. 2.1.9. – 2.1.10 or art. 3.1.2.). Although the convention is technical in nature, the procedures outlined in the document clearly aim at improving search and rescue operations, in order to save people involved in maritime accidents more effectively (IMO, 1979). The full and unconditional incorporation of this convention indicates that the government´s alignment with the values of the United Nations as regards the matter of maritime safety. This can be supported by the fact that Turkey challenged reservations proposed by Greece, contesting that the reservations would be “incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention”, effectively defending the values incorporated in the convention (IMO, p. 185).
Another legal source that describes a part of the normative framework for the operations of the Coast Guard is law no. 4922, which is the law on maritime life and goods protection. Especially part III of this law is concerned with the rescue of life in the seas. Regardless of the nature of the vessel, every captain and every crew is obliged to put his or her utmost effort into helping and rescuing people that experience any sort of maritime struggles (law no. 4922, part III, art. 14). Further, article 15 specifies that a captain who sees or hears an emergency signal is obliged to directly approach the vessel and/or people in need with full speed, given this manoeuvre is possible or does not endanger the own vessel and crew. Combining these three legal sources, it can be sustained that the normative framework heavily emphasises the regard for human life. The sources show that rescue operations have high priority for the Coast Guard, because it is embedded into this normative framework by law and by the nature of its tasks.
This is also further emphasised in the strategic plan itself. Here, the second part of the strategic plan explicitly states that ethic considerations and the respect for human rights are one of the core values enlisted second and third, directly behind the respect for the principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığı, 2014). This shows a high regard for those values and constitute a substantive part of the organisation´s normative framework. Moreover, these values are followed on the list by the superiority of law, accountability, transparency, integrity, responsibility, professionalism and discipline (2014). Also the Coast Guard´s vision is mainly about being perceived as a reputable organisation in the seas, which shows high attentiveness for the organisation´s image (2014). Accordingly, there is a clear normative framework for the organisation to operate within and a clear intrinsic motivation to act in line with those principles, norms and values.
Now that there is an understanding about what constitutes the Coast Guard´s normative framework, it is important to analyse whether the its legitimacy has become threatened in course of the Syrian humanitarian crisis. Before I turn to the analysis of the external legitimacy from the side of the media, the first part of the analysis is concerned with the internal legitimacy perception by the Coast Guard´s personnel. As mentioned earlier, I use the survey data in the strategic plan to analyse this aspect of the Coast Guard´s legitimacy.
The stakeholder analysis in the strategic plan starts with the analysis of the internal stakeholders, which are identified to be the most important part of the Coast Guard (2014). Further, the internal stakeholders are also explicitly defined as being the personnel of the Coast Guard (2014). Next, the survey results are summarised under several points. Placed first and recurring at various other points as well, the results seem to show that the staff perceives the workload to be too high (“Gemilerdeki görev yoğunluğunun ve personel görev yükünün çok fazla olduğu”, 2014, p. 81). In connection with that, the Coast Guard is also perceived to be underequipped and that the personnel are not sufficiently trained (2014). As regards the aspect of insufficient training, the strategic plan states that it was suggested by various people that an e-training portal should be set up (2014). The aspect of training is one of the first that might indicate internal legitimacy problems, because it may make the people feel overwhelmed and unprepared and then cause dissatisfaction with the organisation. Another immaterial point that is mentioned is that the personnel feels that their work and effort are not sufficiently recognised and respected by the organisation (2014). Leaning on public service motivation, one can expect that the organisation will perform worse, if the staff feels like its work is not appreciated enough (2014). However, this does not necessarily mean that the staff thinks that the Coast Guard is
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illegitimate, but it shows at least a partial dissatisfaction, which could hint legitimacy problems. One should also be aware that the respondents to the survey might have refrained from adopting more critical stances towards their organisation and/or the strategic plan might not inhibit more critical voices.
But there is more information. Next, there is a list of the most important tasks of the Coast Guard according to the respondents. Ranking first and third respectively, search and rescue operations and irregular migration operations seem to have central roles within the organisation (2014). However, looking at the next list, which ranks tasks according to what should be prioritised more, search and rescue again comes first and irregular migration ranks fourth (2014). This could mean that the personnel feel like the Coast Guard is not prioritising the organisation´s most important tasks enough. Here, an internal legitimacy problem becomes more likely, because when the staff of an organisation thinks that the priorities within the organisation are not set right, there might be scepticism towards the ability to properly manage the organisation. Hence, when the ability to function is questioned, then the right to function eventually can also be questioned. Accordingly, it is important to understand to what degree the respondents think in that way. From the lists alone it is not clear whether there is a big or a small or only a marginal problem at hand. In order to find that out, one can find survey results to the questions about the respective task areas and whether the respondents think that the Coast Guard is doing a good job within the respective areas. As regards the areas of interest for this work, namely search and rescue and irregular migration, the results show that these areas scored slightly under 4 points out of 5, while 3,5+ points are the margin that the Coast Guard itself marked as being satisfactory (2014). Therefore, the assumption above can be rejected. The criticism above can then be rather understood as proactive improvements for the future, rather than reactionary.
This finding is also in line with the general impression of the section, which is that the fundamental things function properly in the Coast Guard, but it could also be better. This becomes clearer when we compare graphs 63 and 64. Graph 63 depicts survey results of questions about the organisational structure and activities of the Coast Guard. In this graph, all the statements that scored over the 3,5 points mark. Among the results that scored high, are statements like: “the Coast Guard is a transparent organisation”, “it is an independent organisation”, “the organisation has a good reputation” (2014). This indicates that the Coast Guard is operating within its normative framework and has a solid normative foundation. As pointed out earlier, the search and rescue operations and operations concerning irregular migration are perceived to be satisfactorily executed, which constitute a substantial part of the
