Public Discourses in the Netherlands on the Freedom of Movement in the European Union: a Q-Methodological Approach

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Movement in the European Union:

a Q-Methodological Approach

by

Lennart F. Sluis

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of

Master of Science in Public Administration

In the faculty of

Governance and Global Affairs

Leiden University

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MASTER THESIS: PUBLIC DISCOURSES IN THE

NETHERLANDS ON THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:

A Q-METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

No. of pages

74 Word count

26.187

Copyright © Lennart Sluis, July 2018

All rights reserved

Supervised by:

Ms. E.G. Kortenska

Prof. dr. B. Steunenberg

Institute of Public Administration

Faculty of Governance & Global Affairs

Turfmarkt 99

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Before you stretches my master thesis on popular discourses in the Netherlands on the Freedom of movement of persons in the European Union. This piece of work is part of the final stage of the master programme in Public Administration: International and European Governance at the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs of Leiden University in the Netherlands.

The aim of this publication is to provide the reader with insights on popular discourses that exist in the Netherlands on the much-contested topic of freedom of movement in the European Union. With the application of a research method which has not been used within the different courses taught in my master programme, it was quite the challenge to properly apply its techniques and integrate these into this study. Nevertheless, I am grateful that I have been given the chance to perform this research with the corresponding technique.

I would therefore like to express my special thanks first to my supervisors, professor Bernard Steunenberg and Ms Elitsa Kortenska, for their great insights, perspectives, academic guidance and not least important, their sense of humour. My sincere thanks also go to my fellow capstone students for helping to clarify the things related to this project in time with excellent cooperation and brainstorm sessions. Sincere gratitude is also extended to the people who voluntarily participated in this project and formed my P-set. I have really enjoyed conducting the Q-sorts and especially the follow-up interviews, in which interesting discussions followed from the outcomes of participation in the Q-study. Lastly, I should thank many individuals, friends and family members who have not been mentioned here personally, in making this academic process a success. I could not have finished this study without your supports.

Lennart Sluis July 2018

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Abstract

Public Discourses in the Netherlands on the Freedom of Movement in the European Union: A Q-Methodological Approach

(Under supervision of B. Steunenberg & E.G. Kortenska)

The right of free movement of persons is one of the main pillars of the European Union and forms a cornerstone of the European integration project. This right for European citizens to reside, travel, work and live freely in any EU member state is, however, not undisputed and with recent political developments like Brexit, it is becoming increasingly important for policy-makers to see how citizens contemplate this essential right. The goal of this study is to identify popular discourses in the Netherlands on the freedom of movement of persons in the European Union. As with any other political development in a country, and especially in countries where the political landscape has been fractured, a diversity in public viewpoints is expected. This identification will be done via the Q-methodology, a scientific method that combines several instruments and techniques and is distinguished for its ability to measure subjectivity of individuals. Respondents are asked to rank a collection of statements associated with the freedom of movement from very much agree to complete disagree. It is of vital importance to note that the study is not about the individual, but about an individuals’ subjective point of view. Resulting from sorts (interviews in Q-methodological setting), four types of discourses can be identified among the 18 theoretical relevant subjects (the P-set). These discourses vary from a very strong, pro-European sentiment, to rather Eurosceptic viewpoints that even include a possible withdrawal from the Netherlands from the European Union, a Nexit. Concluding from this study, the main discourse among the subjects consists foremost of a positive tone-of-voice towards the European project, although there are several challenges for policy-makers that lie ahead.

Keywords: Q-methodology, popular discourses, freedom of movement, European integration, Schengen, the Netherlands, European Union

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Brexit Prospective withdrawal from the United Kingdom from the European Union

CEEC Central and Eastern European Country EC European Commission

ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EEA European Economic Area

EP European Parliament EU European Union

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Nexit Potential withdrawal from the Netherlands from the European Union

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development SIS Schengen Information System

TEU Treaty on the European Union

TFEU Treaty on the functioning of the European Union

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Introduction

The freedom of movement of is one of the main pillars of the European Union (EU). The right to reside, travel, work and live free in every single member state of the EU is an important cornerstone of the European integration project. In recent years however, the topic has become one of the most contested ones in relation to the Brexit and other political debates. As with any other contested topic, there are several discourses among societies on the freedom of movement of persons in the European Union. With the enlargement of the EU and recent economic and social crises that the EU has faced, freedom of movement is an issue on which mixed types of viewpoints exist, both negative and positive (Damay & Mercenier, 2016). The goal of this master thesis is to discover what types of discourse exist on the freedom of movement in the Netherlands, one of the member states of the EU. National discourses are important for decision-makers because they portray the viewpoints of citizens and are therefore an important source for policy-making. Differences in implementation of EU law, transposition of European directives and the actual application of the rules depends for a large extent on what these discourses are and how they are expanded in society.

The freedom of movement is relevant to European citizens in diverging extents. For citizens that live in Eastern Europe, it means the possibility to travel to West Europe, something which was forbidden during the period of the communist regime (Popa, 2016). For citizens living in other parts of Europe, the freedom of movement might feel like a burden, since it opens the gates for economic migrants and criminality benefits from the same freedom as well. In the labour market, the freedom of movement brings along positive aspects, like labour migration flourishing as a stability mechanism for EU countries. A downside of the freedom of movement in the labour market is that people fear to lose their jobs as a result of growing numbers of labour migrants from Central and East European countries (CEECs) (Rooduijn, Tselms, & Parlevliet, 2017). Throughout this thesis, it will become clear what types of discourse are identified among the Dutch respondents selected for this study towards the freedom of movement in the EU. To challenge this inquiry, I have developed the following research question:

“What popular discourses can be identified in the Netherlands on the freedom of movement in the European Union?”

I will try and answer this question with the support of several sub-questions. These include: 1) What types of discourse on the freedom of movement are construed in the academic

literature?

2) What type of discourses can be found in the representative sample for this study? 3) Can these discourses be related back to the literature?

4) What are the implications of the identified discourses?

Throughout the report, I will face several concerns and viewpoints regarding the perception of citizens on the free movement of persons in the EU. These could include whether they perceive increasing levels of labour migration as a threat, or there might be a noteworthy and rather positive sentiment towards the European integration project. This research project contributes to the academic field by providing discourses that reflect the viewpoints of my group of respondents, all theoretical relevant to the topic, which might have implications for the Dutch society as a whole.

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These discourses might, in turn, be useful for policy-makers when deciding on prioritising their political agenda and additional steps in public policy-making.

The methodological approach that will be used in order to arrive at clear answers to the abovementioned research questions, is the Q-methodology. Q-methodology is a scientific approach for measuring human subjectivity (Brown, 1993). Where the goal of my research is to reveal public discourse, it is important to examine the popular views that exist on the topics related to the freedom of movement. The Q-methodology, combining qualitative with quantitative tools, provides a foundation for the systematic study of viewpoints, beliefs, opinions and attitudes of individuals towards a certain topic. This is done via a process of ranking statements from an individual’s point of view called the Q-sort. The outcomes of the Q-sort are subject to a statistical analysis, beneficial for a check of significance and interpreted to control for their implications on free movement of persons. Deriving from this factor analysis, certain discourses will be identified. The discourses are clusters of subjectivity and represent operant categories (Van Exel & de Graaf, 2005).

I expect the identified discourses in the Netherlands to be of a diverse nature, this entails flowing from rather positive viewpoints towards European integration and freedom of movement to somewhat more negative viewpoints. Looking at the growing fragmentation of the Dutch political landscape and presence of popular, Eurosceptic parties like the Freedom Party (PVV), Forum of Democracy (FvD) and in recent past the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), I anticipate a balanced outcome of viewpoints (Mudde, 2004). Since the respondents are selected on basis of their theoretical relevance and are a representative sample of the viewpoints they carry along, this balance between Euroscepticism and pro-European sentiment is expected. Furthermore, I expect migratory aspects of European integration and the perceptions towards it also to be influential in Dutch discourses on the freedom of movement. The issue has become more salient over the years and growing numbers of people have explicit perspectives on the different aspects of asylum procedures. Various viewpoints also prevail towards the different attitudes of East European countries and the way in which they oppose to a European approach for solving migration problems. Finally, I expect the individual characteristics and the corresponding normative ideas of my respondents towards the freedom of movement policy to be significant for the outcomes. Where personal economic prospects are influential for citizens in relation to their support for European integration, I expect levels of education among the respondents to have a key role in the identified discourses. People who feel more confident towards their economic future, tend to be positive towards European integration, where people who are more insecure about their economic prospects would lean more towards Euroscepticism (Hooghe & Marks, 2005).

Where the freedom of movement provides citizens with possibilities for a richer and better life elsewhere, there tends to be a perception of winners and losers of this policy. It is like a liberating force for mobile people but influenced by the supply and demand of lower-skilled labour force, and therefore could be perceived as a threat to less mobile people and lower-skilled citizens (De Witte, 2016). It is thus expected that there is a broad spectrum of viewpoints based on normative ideas on the free movement policy.

This thesis is structured as follows: I will start with a comprehensive introduction to the main theoretical concept of the study, which is the free movement of persons in the European Union. I will examine the concept; how it developed over the years, what are it criticisms and how it plays a

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role in the daily lives of European citizens. A subsection of freedom of movement is dedicated to the specific case of free movement and its perceptions in the Netherlands, where it could be a somewhat contested topic (Livingstone, 2017). I will extensively review how the freedom of movement has evolved, what role it has in society, and with which challenges policy makers have to deal with.

Having provided the clear link between free movement and public discourses on it, I will elaborate on the theoretical framework that I have built for the academic concepts related to this study. The main implications for European integration, public support for European integration, the Schengen agreement and the transposition of European directives will be highlighted before I am able to answer the first sub research question, which relates to what type of discourses can be discovered in the current academic literature. Subsequently, I will explain how the Q-methodology is used for this research and what its main implications are for scientific studies. This will be done in the chapter labelled ‘Methodology’. Following from the methodology chapter, it is time for the analysis of the research. After this statistical analysis, with support of a computer program on which I will deliberate more at a later stage, it is time for analysing my results and dedicate time to the analytical and interpretative part of the research. Here, I will describe how the factors, deriving from the statistical analysis, relate to certain statements and how individuals might score on the different statements. Extracting from these factors, I can identify the existing discourses in the group of respondents. In the final chapter, I will conclude the thesis with a thorough discussion of the results, construct answers to the research questions and provide the reader with recommendations for future research.

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Free movement of persons in the European Union

The free movement of people in the EU covers the rights to enter and move about, reside and leave the territorial vicinity of any EU member state. This includes the right to stay in a member state to work and, under certain conditions, stay there after their work is done (Delivet, 2014). The freedom of movement is one of the fundamental principles of European integration and constitutes the essential four freedoms of the EU (Delivet, 2014; Vasilopoulou & Talving, 2017; Verschueren, 2011, 2015a). Others claim that free movement within EU territory is one of the most important rights of citizens of countries that have joined either the EU or the European Economic Area (EEA) (Magureanu, 2011). Within the institutional setting of the EU, the freedom of movement is undoubtedly connected to the setting-up of the single internal market. It was the Treaty of Rome (1957) that set the ambition of developing a Common Market, which comprises the free movement of goods, people, services and capital (Delivet, 2014).

As such, the concept of freedom of movement finds constitutional backup in the treaties of the EU. It is the Maastricht Treaty (1992) that clarifies the freedom of movement with the following understanding: “Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of

the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect” (European Communities, 1992, p. 15). The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the

European Union (2000) claims that the EU “seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development and ensures free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and the freedom of establishment” (European Commission, 2000, p. 8). From the same charter, Article 45 constitutes the ‘Freedom of movement and of residence’, explaining that every citizen of the EU has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States of the EU and that the freedom of movement may be acknowledged in accordance with the Treaty to nationals of other, ‘third’, countries who are legally residing in the territory of a Member State.

The principle of free movement is laid down in three EU secondary law instruments. In her analysis on the relationship between the principle of free movement of workers and these instruments, Verschueren (2011) finds several legal challenges in which these instruments contradict each other. I will now explore how these different sources of secondary EU law guarantee the freedom of movement. First, there is a regulation which main contents describe that workers from the European member states have the right to apply for a job in another member state. Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 of the Council of the EU puts special emphasis on the right on equal treatment that these workers have in another member state. These rights include, but are not limited to, wage and employment conditions, and they also ensure social security. Secondly, there is EU social security coordination. The EU treaties provide an important coordinating role for the European legislator - the European Parliament, national parliaments and the Council of Ministers - with the aim of ensuring that the exercise of free movement would not lead to a loss of social security rights. A loss of social security rights would “constitute an obstacle to the freedom of movement” (Verschueren, 2011, p. 288). Thirdly, measures related to free movement of persons migrating within the EU are bundled in Directive 2004/38/EC which is concluded by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU on 29 April 2004. The Directive declares that every citizen of the EU has the right to travel to another member state freely and to reside or stay there for a short period of three months without having to register in the municipality he or she is currently

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staying. Under this Directive, European citizens are not obliged to obtain any type of visa, have a work permit or possess sufficient resources when crossing the border of EU countries (European Parliament & European Council, 2004).

Freedom of movement closely relates to the concept of European citizenship, which is also introduced in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), that states every person that holds the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the EU. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (2010) continues on this with describing citizenship of the Union as additional, and not a replacement for national citizenship. In the literature, this relationship is described as a ‘virtuous circle’, but free movement is not always able to bring citizens closer to the EU.

Damay and Mercenier (2016) argue that, in the context of widening European integration - a concept on which I will deliberate later - the freedom of movement is a very contradictory issue among European citizens, both on the negative and positive side of the public opinion spectrum. Where harmonisation between member states can improve interstate interaction between individuals, free movement is able to contribute to the feelings of belonging to the European community (Damay & Mercenier, 2016). As such, the freedom of movement can be considered an explanatory variable for describing the extent of support for European integration and for the EU as a whole. The same authors explain that free movement and its implications for migration are often used by their respondents to refer to the negative outcomes of European integration, where the European Commission (EC) claims that people would feel closer to the EU when they are more familiar with the corresponding rights. People that do not profit from the right of free movement are also European citizens and therefore this right is not attractive to all Europeans. This relates back to the utilitarian self-interest aspect of public opinion on free movement, those citizens that do not use and profit of it, tend to relate more negatively towards it (Damay & Mercenier, 2016; Vasilopoulou & Talving, 2017).

The main advantages of the free movement can be summarised as follows. The internal market of the EU with its freedom of movement brings significant economic benefits to member states, increases international cooperation and speeds up commercial relationships. Transport of goods is much faster and cheaper, tourism benefited greatly, and labour shortages have decreased. This is a result of the fact that EU citizens are able to find cross-border income advantages or better suiting job profiles elsewhere. (Popa, 2016). Furthermore, labour migration has become an important element of EU policy-making, where countries do not have their own monetary policy with the introduction of the European Monetary Union (EMU) (Rooduijn et al., 2017). Kahanec and Zimmerrmann (2014) conclude on this: “free movement is an asset that the EU needs to nurture as a means of adjusting to structural asymmetries as well as to short-run shocks across EU member states” (Kahanec & Zimmermann, 2014, p. 1) Millions of European citizens have chosen to work or live in another EU member state as a result of free movement and they enjoy the same social protection and civic rights as they would in their country of origin. Students in the EU can participate in the Erasmus programme, which involved more than 3 million students in 2013 (Delivet, 2014). The programme enables students to broaden their horizons in another EU member state and enrich their intellectual expansion. On a day-to-day basis, several tens of thousands EU citizens who are active in border employment, enjoy the benefits that the freedom of movement brings along.

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Challenges to freedom of movement

The freedom of movement has thus brought certain advantages to Europe, but it has also led to decreasing wages in new EU countries, skill shortages and the risk of brain drain (Kahanec & Zimmermann, 2010; Zaiceva, 2014). Other downsides of an enlarged EU in relation to the freedom of workers are; the lack of full integration of labour migrants into their host labour markets and their corresponding institutions, and dissatisfaction of migrants with their new situation (Kahanec & Zimmermann, 2014).

Independent of work-related issues that hampered the dynamics of free movement, Delivet (2014) finds four types of obstacles to free movement of persons in the EU;

a) The downturn in the logic of the Internal market: It is found1_{that the majority of Europeans} thought of the Single Market merely as a tool for big companies and that the privileges of free movement were not that much of a privilege to all citizens.

b) The effects of the economic and financial crisis. The impact of the crises on the Single Market is quite significant. Due to the internal market and freedom of movement, an increase in youth unemployment is displayed and the divergence between North and South and East Europe has become worse (Delivet, 2014).

c) Concerns about migratory flows. Freedom of movement led to concerns by different groups of people. Inhumane situations in refugee centres near the coast of Lampedusa and dramatic accidents with people trying to cross the Mediterranean led to problems with the management of Europe’s external borders. This eventually led to the re-introduction of internal border checks. Furthermore, with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the internal market, sounds arise for better management of the free movement of workers.

d) Fears of social dumping. Concerns arise over the misuse by companies that compete over the heads of their employees. Might eventually lead to unfair competition of social norms between member states (Verschueren, 2015b). These companies aim to employ the cheapest workers throughout the EU, in a way in which they pay fewer wages and benefit fully from the bad labour conditions that their employees have to face (FNV, 2016).

Related to the first obstacle highlighted here, it is argued that the freedom of movement is part of the ambiguity of European policy goals. Where on the one hand the EU aims for fighting poverty, on the other it wants to guarantee free movement of persons and equal treatment. This entails that free movement can be impossible for people that do not enjoy enough material resources. Where the fight against poverty is one of the central policy objectives of the EU, it becomes problematic when this clashes with the freedom of movement, since it is argued that sufficient resources are necessary to enjoy full free movement (Verschueren, 2015a). People that are economically inactive might not benefit from this policy. This argument is in line with findings of Vasilopoulou and Talving (2017), that imply that citizens who are more likely to directly benefit from the possibilities of the freedom of movement are more likely to express their support to the policy. People that are economically less active, tend to express lower support for the possibility of free movement

1_{Special Eurobarometer 363 shows that 62% of European citizens felt that the Single Market was merely}

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(Vasilopoulou & Talving, 2017). I will now dive a little further in the specific case at hand, the Netherlands. How has the freedom of movement evolved here, what are the challenges and what types of Dutch perceptions exist on the topic?

Freedom of movement in the Netherlands

When the EU finalised their process of enlargement in 2004, with the accession of ten member states, there was a tendency for a mass increase of labour migrants and other consequences, perceived as negative, for the Dutch labour market (De Mooij & Roodenburg, 2004). An estimation from the time shortly after the accession of these countries shows the effects of free movement on the Dutch labour market and highlights three ways of how transition periods can influence the destination of labour migrants. The first displays an increase in labour migration flows to countries where a liberal admission regime is in place, and thus an increase for the Netherlands was expected. The second approach demonstrates that migrants are able to wait a little longer before migrating to their country of preference, this provides a mitigating effect for the migration flow towards the Netherlands. The final explanation for transition periods having influence on the destiny of labour migrants is that migrants are able to reach their country of preferences via other ‘channels’ (De Mooij & Roodenburg, 2004).

When freedom of movement of persons in the new member states was enforced in 2007, there was a strong increase in the number of East European employees in the Netherlands. These employees were mainly Polish and had financial incentives to accept a job more sooner than native citizens. The latter is because of the fact that Polish employees possessed a less favourable position in relation to social security benefits on the labour market, and therefore they tend to accept jobs promptly (Corpeleijn, 2009; De Mooij & Roodenburg, 2004). Relating to the effects of immigration in the Netherlands on the long term, de Mooij and Roodenburg (2004) conclude that immigration could lead to divergence of incomes between Dutch residents. When the migratory flow of immigrants that have enjoyed low or no education increases, then low educated residents would perceive this flow as a direct threat to their job security. The effect of such a flow on the income of higher educated people tends to be more positive (De Mooij & Roodenburg, 2004). The same argument can be found in another study called the ‘Winners and losers of the free movement in the EU’, which claims that it can be assumed that scientific educated people fear and perceive fewer or no competition from labour migrants, where lower educated people do perceive this fear (Rooduijn et al., 2017). Dutch politicians and policy makers could contribute here to a great extent by portraying the advantages of free movement instead of going along with the discourse that labour migration has mainly negative implications. It can be summarised as that when issue salience on free movement is increased in the Netherlands, the support would increase, and more people would perceive the concept as a ‘good thing’.

Having introduced the topic of the freedom of movement of persons within the EU, its advantages, challenges and public implications, it is time to see how the literature evolves around the topic. Free movement of persons is one of the cornerstones of European integration and therefore it is important to gain an understanding of this ‘umbrella’ concept and its implications for public support. The focus on these theoretical implications for integration, implementation of legal aspects, the Schengen acquis in combination with the literature on the free movement of persons

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provides a strong building block for the goal of this thesis, identifying public discourses on this topic.

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Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, the most important theoretical features of the thesis will be written down. The freedom of movement, one of the four core freedoms of the European Union, forms a cornerstone of the process of European integration (Verschueren, 2011). Considering the fact that the right for the freedom of movement is not a right that stands on its own, the horizon of this theoretical framework is somewhat extended and therefore takes into account the broader processes of European integration as well. The main implications, classic theories and criticisms of European integration are presented and I will thoroughly link it to public opinion, since public opinion has a significant repercussion on European integration (Pietsch & Clark, 2015). This section ends by the implications of European integration and its expected outcomes for the Netherlands.

Following hereupon, I will provide some key characteristics and literature on the Schengen agreement, the border system with the principle objective of abolishing border controls within the Schengen’ associated member states (Cornelisse, 2014). After starting with general implications on the agreement, I will take a look at its drawbacks described by several scholars and to what extent this agreement contributes to the way that people look at European integration in general, and more specifically to what extent it relates to the freedom of movement of people in Europe. Before I come to a concluding remark on this chapter, I will shed light on the theoretical aspects of the implementation of European Union directives, how this relates to the freedom of movement and how it is done in the Netherlands and with which challenges it has to deal. This augmentation to the literature review is relevant to this thesis, because the heaviness of EU directives needs to be taken into account when the importance of them is analysed (Dijkstra, Steunenberg, & Voermans, 2004). Next to this, the speed and obstacles of transposition of directives may provide key insights in how citizens of a member state perceive Europe; as a burden or as an opportunity. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The idea of a united Europe, which is ultimately linked to a peaceful continent with an outspoken wish to make wars impossible, is already an old one. In recent human history, many attempts to unify Europe have failed through multiple wars between France and Germany and the rise of nationalism. After World War I, the map of Europe is characterised by treaties based on peace and prosperity (Dujardin, 2007; Haas, 1961). Scholarship on European integration mainly focuses on the implications this concept has had for a post-World War II Europe. However, the importance of WWI in the history of European integration has been understated to a great extent. As Stevenson (2012) states; before the start of the World War, there were little situations known in which economic integration has led to comparable political integration. After the German animosity broke out, several bi- and multilateral allied agreements surged on the European map. The European wartime experiences at the beginning of the 20th_{century helped to shape the later process} of European integration (Stevenson, 2012).

But what entails this process of European integration exactly and why would states and their citizens decide to join in these prospects for unification? For answering this question, I build on the theoretical outlines of a book by Martin Dedman (1996), in which he provides a comprehensive overview of the history of European integration. Integration is the process in which domestic

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political actors are “persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities to a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1961, p. 367). Integration thus relates to operating on the basis of a supranational organisation, where in opposition, interdependence relates to “a group of national governments that operate together in certain policy areas, agreements are made based on mutual co-operation” (Dedman, 1996, p. 7). The main difference is that interdependent organisations, for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) do not interfere with decision-making in their member states, and they possess little to no power to impose sanctions on them. In integration process, member states will transfer a certain amount of their sovereignty, including policy-making and other competences, to the supranational organisation. After reading this conceptualisation of integration, one might seriously doubt the advantages of dedicating a state to integration. Therefore, Milward and Sørensen (1993) provide three main advantages of European integration;

1) It ensures a guarantee for continuous adherence to treaties due to the irreversible character of the latter.

2) It provides exclusiveness as an integrated body and the ‘acquis communautaire’ character of the organisation’s rules.

3) It introduces a new legal system and framework to regulate power, rights and obligations. The law-abiding character of these organisations.

Where the scope and the intensity of EU policy-making has increased in the post-WWII period and the European single market has completed, it can be concluded that treaties and agreements like the Single European Act (1968)2_{and the Maastricht Treaty (1993)}3_{can be identified as} landmarks in the process of European integration (Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996). Providing merely advantages of integration for states does not answer the question why European states signed the treaties for setting up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and founded the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, and eventually signed the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) in Maastricht in 1993. In explaining European integration, I therefore build on three categorisations of theories. I start with the categorisation by Dedman (1996) and his three schools of thought on European integration.

Orthodox, federalist or historical attribution to European integration?

The first school of thought relates to an orthodox explanation which is not linked to historical outcomes, but merely to political science. Its key argument is that the rise of international networks consisting of multiple global organisations after WWII is the result of growing complexities on the international stage. The consequence is that individual member states do not possess the capacity anymore to object against collective decision-making. Once the process of European integration has started, it will increment its way through Europe, gaining power through its collective gains and eventually this will lead to a Federal United States of Europe (Dedman, 1996). This theory however, does not consider the fact that the main competences of decision-making still lie within

2 The Single European Act (1968) established the principle Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and was

responsible for an increase in the capacities and powers of the European Parliament

3_{The Maastricht Treaty (1993) provided a greater extension of the capacities of EU competencies, continued}

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the jurisdiction of national governments cooperating with each other within the EU, and therefore lacks in practical outcomes in the last twenty years.

Secondly, and mainly based on the studies done by Walter Lipgens (1982), European integration is linked to the ideas, growth and influence of European federalist movements. Lipgens argues that Euro-federalism is a logical consequence of WWII and based on ideologies by resistance movements (Lipgens, 1982). Although his explanation seems to be logical to accept, it does not take into account certain pieces of archival evidence where national governments report on their objectives for policy-making and supporting decisions. From this evidence it becomes clear that none of the reasons for the nation states signing the European treaties includes federation motives (Dedman, 1996).

This brings me to the third school of thought, which implies a merely historical explanation of European integration. The main argument here is that a supranational organisation is set up as a result of preferences and interests of nation states, and that this has nothing to do with Europe becoming a federal state. This is in line with Milward (1999), who claims that European integration only occurs and only works when there is a fundamental need by nation states, thus there being no active hostility between integration and the nation state (Milward, 1999). The school of thought also emphasises the role of time in development of European integration, which others would describe as ‘historical institutionalism’. It is historical since it is taking into account the political development as a process that evolves over time and it is intuitionalist because it argues that many of these political developments are integrated in institutions (Pierson, 1996). In historical institutionalism, actors will strive for maximising their interests and focus their institutional and policy reforms on outcomes that are favourable to them. Time horizons of political actors play a crucial role in determining the value that these actors assign to their preferences. Temporal aspects of politics thus need to be considered extensively when examining European integration.

Multi-level governance vs. state-centric governance

Another categorisation of European integration is the distinction between two models of EU governance, multi-level governance and state-centric governance. A presumption based on the three advantages of European integration mentioned before (see page 10), is that European integration is challenging the autonomy of the nation-states, in other words, state sovereignty is limited by EU membership. This premise is part of state-centric governance theorists who claim that European integration is driven by bargaining among member states and that policy outcomes are results from the interests of states. In this model, states are perceived as the main decision-makers; a role in which they delegate limited sovereignty to supranational organisations. State-centrists claim that policy-making at EU level is done by negotiations between member states executives and that the supranational organisation, the EU, serves the goals of these executives (Marks et al., 1996). Opposing this view is the multi-level governance theory, which claims that European integration is a “polity creating process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government – subnational, national, and supranational” (Marks et al., 1996, p. 342). The multi-level governance model is built on three sentiments, firstly it argues that competencies in decision-making processes are shared by political actors branched in the political landscape at different levels rather than monopolised by mere state executives. Secondly, this form of decision-making at different levels implies a loss of sovereignty and control for the

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nation states. Policy-making aimed at EU level has a ‘zero-sum’ character; it involves gains, but also losses at the individual level. This frames the classic sentiment of the whole is more than the sum of its parts, but it entails significant losses of control by member states (Marks et al., 1996). The third notion relates to the interconnectional character of political arenas rather than their fixed character. Multi-level governance theory claims that political actors, mainly subnational ones, operate in different levels of the political stage. As a result, transnational associations are created in the process (Marks et al., 1996, p. 346). Where the state-centric model of European governance is characterised by a disengagement between domestic and international politics, the multi-level governance model argues that states form a crucial aspect of the EU, but their collaboration in multiple levels of governance is more important than their individual enterprises.

Classic theories on European integration

The final categorisation builds on the classic theoretical views on European integration. This categorisation consists of three mainstream theories in the literature, knowing; intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, and postfunctionalism. Intergovernmentalism emphasises the role that the nation state has in the process of integration. Its argument here is that the nation state is not becoming outmoded by the process of European integration. In intergovernmentalism, the member states are the primary actors who become stronger through the process of pooling their sovereignty (Hatton, 2015). When member states have shared goals and interests, integration is a process that develops rapidly, but when preferences diverge this leads to periods of slower integration.

Neofunctionalism emerges most from the work of Haas (1958), and its core emphasis lies on actors’ interests and their interaction, and more priority is given to the process than to the outcomes (Haas, 1958). A second assumption in neofunctionalism is that politics is a group-based activity and that the state is subject to the competing demands of all the groups that are involved in integration processes (Rosamond, 2000). Neofunctionalists believe that politicisation, a concept I will explain in a while, would contribute to a great extent because it would lead to more engagement of national governments in integration.

Postfunctionalism builds from the key notion that European integration has become politicised, and this political conflict engages ‘communal identities’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Politicisation of the EU is defined here in three dimensions: firstly, it links directly to an increase in issue salience of European affairs. Secondly, there is an increasing level of polarisation in the EU, as well as in its policies and institutions. Thirdly, actors in the various public levels are more mobile and able to expand themselves (Börzel & Risse, 2017, p. 3; Kriesi, 2016). Politicisation also leads to a stronger awareness of EU affairs, where citizens are becoming more concerned with the outcomes of EU policy and with developments of the European integration project (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Schimmelfennig, Leuffen, & Rittberger, 2015). The building blocks of multi-level governance are important in postfunctionalism, and together with identity it is decisive for governance in general, but mainly for European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Central claim of the theory is that in order to understand the course of European integration, in contrary to both intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, the key is to study beyond the economic aspects of

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the actors. This transformation in the political spectrum of European integration in the 90s4_links directly to a change in ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’, where the role of public opinion becomes more important (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Hooghe & Marks, 2009). With European integration becoming more an issue of the public, it becomes more politicised and therefore, an adjustment in how European integration should be approached is needed. Having said this, it is time to see how possible support for European integration has evolved and to what extent national identity has its share in this evolution.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Public support for the European project and evolution of its institutions has always been a key object of study. With the growing importance of public opinion and increased politicisation of European integration, its role in shaping the character of the EU is not to be underestimated (Down & Wilson, 2013). I start this subsection with summarising the key arguments on theories on public support for European integration conducted by Matthew Gabel (1998), a key scholar when it comes to integration studies. He provides five explanations that offer a theoretical basis for prediction and explanation, and thus supplies this thesis with functional contributions to European integration studies. The first theory relates to cognitive mobilisation and can be defined with the following explanation; an individual who is more familiar with European integration and is aware of certain (dis)advantages, tends to be more positive towards the topic. This individual does not perceive integration as a threat because he or she possesses enough information on the topic to realise that integration could bring along positive aspects. Secondly, Gabel (1998) elaborates on the role of political values in support for European integration. Political attitudes of European citizens are conditioned by socioeconomic circumstances. These circumstances consist of certain values and attitudes, including “national identity, that tend to persist over an adult’s lifetime” (Gabel, 1998, p. 336). Included in this theory, it is argued that demographic factors like education and partisanship need to be included in analysis for public support for European integration. Thirdly, the theory describes different perceptions of EU citizens in distinct socioeconomic situations on relative gains and losses of integrative policy. This theory is defined as utilitarian

appraisals of integrative policy and links public support to welfare gains deriving from integrative policy

(Palmer & Gabel, 1995). Relating to this, Gomez (2015) finds that in time of crisis, mainly economic conditions like unemployment and economic growth that correlate with both higher and lower support for the EU. People in less economic wealthy countries tend to blame the EU for not being able to manage economic crises (Gomez, 2015). The fourth theory on support for European integration is characterised by class partisanship, which relates to the reflection of a party on the citizen who supports that party. The party shapes the attitudes of its constituency towards European integration.

Looking at policy preferences and viewpoints on European integration, De Vries and Edwards (2009) see negative attitudes towards European integration on both extreme sides of the political spectrum. On the left, where left-wing extremist parties tend to oppose to the neoliberal character of the European project and argue that the EU has merely negative economic consequences. On the right, where Eurosceptic right-wing parties claim massive losses in national sovereignty (De

4_{See Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), Since the Maastricht Treaty, politicisation of European integration has}

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Vries & Edwards, 2009). Where preferences for a political party or a political ideology, as part of national identity might play a role in public support for European integration, I dive a little further in the role of national identity later in this subsection. The final theory for explaining public support for European integration links support for government to public support. This relates to a ‘two-level game’ that policy makers play in order to get their domestic constituency’s trust and at the same time, make sure to get optimal gains in the European or international setting (Putnam, 1988). If there is a pro-European government in place and citizens tend to be supportive to their current government, consequently public support for European integration will increase.

Broadening vs. deepening

As can be assumed from the recent Brexit referendum, but also on referenda on the European constitution, it cannot be said that all Europeans are positive towards either the EU or the process of European integration. When analysing public attitudes towards European integration, several approaches are possible. I distinguish public support for European integration on two aspects; broadening versus deepening integration (Hobolt, Karp, & Bowler, 2014; Karp & Bowler, 2006). The former implies a geographical enlargement of the Union, which relates closely to the process of building the so-called ‘ever wider union’. In practice, this enlargement of the EU involves more Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) getting access to the internal market and ultimately becoming member of the EU. The latter relates to further integration (ever-closer union) into existing policy areas, like enhanced cooperation between member states and integrating other aspects than politics into the European community. Research shows that, in general, the public attitude towards integration favours the deepening aspect of the integration process (Dimitrova & Kortenska, 2017; Hobolt et al., 2014). This is because many Europeans fear that an ‘ever-wider EU’ would lead to an unmanageable and very costly scene for the future of Europe. The majority of Europeans maintain that in order to solve some policy problems, European solutions are more effective than national ones. To illustrate this, support for a common European policy on migration is very high (Börzel & Risse, 2017).

Support for ‘broadening’ Europeanisation

There might be several other reasons for citizens to be optimistic towards European integration on the one hand, and pessimistic on the other. Karp and Bowler (2006) identify three sets of explanations on why people would or would not support the broadening aspects of the European integration project. Their first explanation focuses on citizens’ European orientations, in which people who express doubts on European integration possess a stronger sense of national identity, because they lack European integration sentiments. On the other hand, when these citizens are clear on their orientation towards Europe, the odds of becoming more optimistic towards enlargement are increasing correspondingly. It is a matter of subjective viewpoints and perception by Europeans; who is seen as European, the indigenous citizen or the new entrants? (Karp & Bowler, 2006, p. 371). The second explanation is based on instrumental self-interest, where the main claim is that material conditions form the main belief for opposing to EU enlargement, where the fear rises that new entrants to the European market will take away jobs or social security benefits. Interpretations from this explanation are mainly based on what type of countries are considered in the analysis; in wealthy countries, citizens tend to be more acceptive towards

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newcomers than poorer countries. The final explanation on support for broadening European integration relates to the increasing importance of the EU institutions. This explanation consists of concerns or thoughts on the effectiveness of the official institutions of the EU, which links to public dissatisfaction with the institutional framework and perceived lack of democratic processes in EU policy-making (Karp & Bowler, 2006). The main argument here is that the EU is not able to be responsive to the demands by its citizens. European orientation, instrumental self-interest and public dissatisfaction with the institutional framework of the EU might be factors that have implications for public discourses on the freedom of movement and European integration. Therefore, the expectations of this research relate to these three aspects. In line with the argument made by the authors above, is its expected that the EU is accused for not being able to be responsive to the demands by its citizens, material conditions oppose to European integration and citizens’ orientations towards Europe

The role of national identities

National identity is a major topic in the area of social science studies and has been studied extensively (Dowley & Silver, 2000; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Kriesi, Armingeon, & Siegrist, 1999; Lilli & Diehl, 1999; Smith, 1992). National identity is built upon three conceptualisations. The first conceptualisation defines national identity as a bond between citizen and nation state. The stronger this bond is, the less likely this citizen shall approve policy measures that will decrease the sovereignty of his nation state. A second conceptualisation is based on the territorial attachment of individuals. The terminal community is the “highest political unit to which individuals feel they owe allegiance to” (Carey, 2002, p. 291). This entails people with faith in European integration and in the European identity perceive the EU as the terminal community and tend to be more positive towards the EU as political actor responsible for decisions regarding public policy. On the other hand, citizens who do not experience any European identity as such, will perceive the nation state or even a lower entity as their terminal or identifiable community. When this is the case, these citizens perceive the EU as an unjustly actor with no means to oversee their rights and make their decisions (Carey, 2002). The final conceptualisation of national identity is linked to recognised threat from other cultures (McLaren, 2002). Deriving from nationalistic feelings, an increasing antipathy towards other cultures tend to be dominant in some nation states. These citizens might feel that the authenticity of their own nation is jeopardized by European integration. When this happens, these people are expected to be more negatively oriented towards the European Union.

Support for European integration in the Netherlands

The Netherlands have experienced highly developed social policies in the second part of the 20th century. Attitudes towards immigration here tend to be more negative for a couple of reasons. First of all, the tone-of-voice and direction of national relations and public policy was rather social and thus harmonious during the economic impasse of in the 1980s. This implied non-citizens gaining voting rights, and labour migrants from Turkey and Morocco gaining places in electoral offices (Pietsch & Clark, 2015). Secondly, because new subsidies and other measures of social protection were provided to new migrants, Dutch citizens felt subordinated and tend to blame immigration policies. The third reason is the propagation of anti-immigration sentiment and corresponding far-right political parties such as Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) and the Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert

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Wilders. The latter is both anti-Islam and anti-immigrant. Due to the upscale of these political tendencies, migrants feel strangled between host societies – the native Dutch values and values of newcomers from various places. They have become caught in the public debate as a result of the collision of the diverging values. The Dutch negative tendency is in line withs to general European citizens’ lower level of public support for European integration, especially when it comes to responses to new migratory flows at its external borders (Pietsch & Clark, 2015).

When the larger part of a society is not transnationally active and takes advantage of the four freedoms of the EU, people from that share of society tend to feel more deprived and express increasingly negative feelings towards European integration (Westle, 2016). This corresponds to the findings of Rooduijn et al. (2017), who argue that people who are more active on transnational level, meaning utilising their possibility for residing freely in the EU, on both work and leisure, tend to be more positive towards the freedom of movement, and towards European integration in general. Subsequently to this argument is the claim on the differences in education and support for political elite. Citizens with relatively lower educational level, or with less trust in the political elite, tend to have less faith in the freedom of movement of labour and persons in the EU (Rooduijn et al., 2017, p. 70). Furthermore, they highlight that age comes in at high influence. Youth and seniors show more positive perceptions than adults do. In this context, youth are defined as individuals with age from 25 years or younger. Adults are individuals with an age in the range from 26 to 55 years old. Seniors are defined as individuals with an age of higher than 55. They claim that this is because of the distance between these groups towards the labour market, where adults have more direct possibility of competitional feelings corresponding to free movement. This argument is in line with the statement that different normative ideas on European integration policies are influenced by the demand and supply of lower-skilled labour force (De Witte, 2016). When there is a situation in which the demand for lower-skilled workers is large, than indigenous citizens would not perceive it as a possible threat that labour migrants accept these jobs. However, when there is a situation in which there is a lower demand for those work forces, these citizens might perceive labour migration as a threat to their own economic prospects.

In sum, public opinion on European integration in the Netherlands is depending to a large extent on utilitarian self-interests as well as the fact that people with a more cosmopolitan view perceive more advantages in the European integration project. People who are not well-informed about, or do not have the possibilities to gain necessary information on European integration could also possess an irrational fear towards it, with the perceived risk of losing their domestic culture to the European identity. Dutch citizens with managerial skills, higher education, confident feelings towards their economic future or the possibility to travel foster a more positive view on the policies regarding European mobility rights, such as the right to reside freely in any EU member state (Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Vasilopoulou & Talving, 2017). Challenges lie thus in hands of policy-makers, to make European integration policies more salient, more accessible, and more beneficial for all European citizens. Increasing knowledge on support for European integration might help policy makers to increase the legitimacy of the EU. Therefore, public support for the integration project is essential for the future of the Union.

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THE SCHENGEN AGREEMENT AND ITS CRITICS

In the town of Schengen, Luxembourg in June 1985, five EU countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) signed an agreement that abolished internal border controls and made the Schengen area a guarantee for unrestricted travel within a territory of, today, 25 countries, with over 400 million citizens (European Commission, 2016a). For a comprehensive overview of the Schengen countries see Figure 1. Since the Schengen area relates to free travel, and has a highly symbolic dimension of integration (Cornelisse, 2014), it is relevant to this thesis to the extent that people might place Schengen in the same category with the freedom of movement. The Schengen area refers also to an area with a common external border and an area in which safety of its citizens is secured through; increased police cooperation, cross-border surveillance, establishment of joint police centres and teams and the introduction of the Schengen Information System (SIS). The SIS is an operating system that ensures mutual operational assistance and the direct exchange of information between cooperating member states and their police forces (European Commission, 2016a; Popa, 2016).

Figure 1: Overview of the Schengen countries. Including the countries that are currently EU member but do not belong to the Schengen area (Romania, Bulgaria, United Kingdom, Croatia, Ireland and Cyprus).

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Critics describe Schengen as “an intergovernmental convention among consenting EU member states that lays down common rules for customs, via, asylum, police, and border control” (Tesser, 2013, p. 184). The reason for setting up an area without internal borders is an instrument for creating a ‘Schengenland’ or evolving the EU into a ‘Europe of the regions’. Residing in this ‘critic’ corner, I will highlight some of the main drawbacks of the Schengen system as brought up in the literature. Tesser (2013) argues that the promotion of liberal values in the Schengen area is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the system is rather flexible for members of the EU but not for newcomers that had to adopt their national structure to the Schengen system. Where the requirement of adopting the Schengen’ border contradicts with the liberal principles which the EU wants to cultivate in Central and Eastern Europe, this is not something wanted for. The second problem lies with the fact that Schengen imitates in a certain way the Soviet-era border regime, and is therefore not per se a better solution for border management (Tesser, 2013). In the end, Schengen’s wish for Europe of the regions would only lead to tightened borders along the external eastern border and would “ultimately only be militating against the broader acceptance of liberal values” (Tesser, 2013, p. 202). Cornelisse (2014) argues that Schengen is portrayed by a “multilevel, profound mismatch between the various ways of politically legitimating the integration agenda, and between legitimation and political and legal practice”, and that as long as this is the case, the agreement will be vulnerable to crises (Cornelisse, 2014, p. 743). From her analysis, it becomes clear that the Schengen system is in the first place not able to deal with ‘asymmetric shocks’ and ‘structural imbalances’. With the former concept the author describes shocks that affect only a few member states but not all, and with the latter imbalances are implied within the geographical location of the member states. Where not all of the member states of the Schengen agreement have external borders, and thus not all member states need to guard them against unwanted immigration, the system is ‘structural unequal’ (Cornelisse, 2014).

Given the argumentation made above in combination with a threat to Europe’s stability, security, and order, some European officials have proposed a suspension of the Schengen agreement for at least two years. This suspension entails a strong and clear signal towards the proponents of European integration that the project is about to fall (Popa, 2016). The EC has estimated that the expense of such a suspension would cost the member states between 5 and 18 billion euros per year and that the complete collapse of Schengen would cost even 28 billion euros more. These expenses cover among other things; transports costs, increased equipment and personnel for controlling the borders again, losses in time and in different sectors of work. Summing up, the suspension of the Schengen agreement, even if it is for the short-term, would be very costly and is therefore not wanted (European Commission, 2016b). I should thus try and take a brighter look to what benefits Schengen might bring along. This can be done with the support of a study conducted by Davis and Gift (2014) on the positive effects of the Schengen agreement on European trade. They argue that immigration has improved cross border trading for at least three reasons. First of all, immigrants bring certain preferences for goods along from their country of origin. This would lead to an increased demand for products that are similar to their taste or preference. Secondly, newcomers possess the possibility of networking with low-cost producers abroad, meaning that immigrants can use their knowledge to produce cheaper, but higher quality. The final reason for immigrants in the Schengen area having a positive impact on European trade is that their presence lowers the risks that are associated with buying and selling abroad (Davis & Gift, 2014). Because immigrants remain connected to their social networks in their country of

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origin, they keep the possibility to put pressure on producers abroad, and therefore lower the risks for European trade companies. Subsequently, it is hypothesised that amplified labour migration flows between member states of the Schengen agreement should be able to strengthen trade relations and eventually enforce European economic integration. They conclude that “the world’s largest free labour compact has a positive influence on European integration through trade” (Davis & Gift, 2014, p. 1542).

Schengen thus not bring along mere negative implications for Europe, but it certainly has its drawbacks. These drawbacks should be taken into consideration when thinking about the future of European integration and in special, that of the freedom of movement. Because Schengen is contested on both sides in the literature, it is included in the Q-sample, on which I will elaborate more in the methodology section.

TRANSPOSITION OF EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES

In this final subsection of the theoretical framework, I will shortly introduce the ways in which European directives are transposed. The transposition of directives is an important aspect of this study since it displays the influence of European law on Dutch legislation (Bovens & Yesilkagit, 2005). Subsequently, the transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC shall be analysed, which contains the main components of free movement of workers. After that, a more comprehensive part will be dedicated to how the transposition of these directives is going in the Netherlands, since this is most relevant to the thesis. Transposition of European directives in the Netherlands is especially relevant, since they are known for being very slow in transposing, and debates have risen for faster transposition (Bovens & Yesilkagit, 2005; Steunenberg & Voermans, 2006).

European directives can be transposed by using several instruments and techniques. The fluctuations between types of instruments and techniques can differ throughout European countries since this is depending to a great extent on the constitutional system of a country. There are three types of instruments distinguished in the literature (Steunenberg & Voermans, 2006). The first instrument entails transposition through reference or direct effect, which means that the Member States are free to choose which method to use but that the chosen method must be accordingly in line with the main goal of the directive. The second instrument includes package laws and omnibus laws. Package law entails a bundle of directives which are transposed into the national system at the same time, but after the original deadline has passed. Package laws are symbolised through their emergency measure character and expectation concentrates around the fact that through bundling directives, the transposition speed will be sharply increased (Steunenberg & Kaeding, 2009). Omnibus law also entails transposition of multiple directives at the same time, but differs from package law in the sense that omnibus laws are not identified through an emergency measure character, but are simply part of some national transposition systems, like in France and Italy (Steunenberg & Voermans, 2006). The third instrument used by national legal orders are delegation structures, which imply that EU directives are delegated within the legislative system to avoid time-consuming procedures through an Act of Parliament. In the Netherlands, more than 85% of the transposed directives is not going via such an Act (Bovens & Yesilkagit, 2005). Regarding techniques for transposing directives, two techniques can be considered by national legislative systems; the copy-out technique and the re-wording technique. In copying out a directive, a legislative system stays as close to the original text of the directive when transposing it