Media Coverage and Euroscepticism in Greece

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Master Thesis

Media Coverage and

Euroscepticism in Greece

MSc programme in Communication Science (Track: Political Communication)

Author: Christos Vachtsiavanos (11604468)

Supervisor: Dr. Franziska Marquart

Word Count: 5620 June 2019

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2 Abstract

During the previous years, Euroscepticism has risen across Europe and communicated both from the political right and the political left of the political spectrum. Each EU country could offer a special case of how this Euroscepticism rose or not in each country. The current paper will focus in the case of Greece, which, for more than a decade has faced a tremendous financial crisis. Media’s role in the period was not insignificant. The current master thesis will attempt to examine whether different ways of media coverage, and specifically positive and negative framing, influence the levels of Euroscepticism in the country. Also, the role of education will try to be accessed in influencing these levels. After a survey-experiment that was conducted, it was found that news framing does not affect the trust that Greek people show for the EU. However, it was found that negative framing can influence the negative attitudes of Greek people towards the EU. Also, the role of education was found prominent since it was proved that it negatively influences Eurosceptic attitudes.

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3 Introduction

In the past years, the European Union (EU) has undergone significant political and social developments that have reshaped the political map of the continent. Political parties and leaders have come and gone, and the public has been confused and unstable in its political views over the years.

Undoubtedly, the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008 after the collapse of the investment bank, Lehman Brothers (McDonald, 2016), affected the European Union as well, and especially the countries whose economies were most vulnerable. One of these countries was Greece, whose financial condition was problematic.

Greece had been following a poorly structured financial policy, which worked in favor of the public sector that had been expanding for years. In addition, the quality of the public services that the state provided to the citizens had not been in accordance with the level of money that had been streamed into the public sector through excessive increases in wages and irrational or opaque subsidies (Kotios, Galanos & Koutoulakis, 2017). As a result, the Greek public debt rose to excessively large numbers (over 110% of GDP) after 2008, something that, in addition to the massive public deficit (around 10% of GDP in 2009), needed immediate action in order to be controlled. The Greek economy was at the same time struggling for several reasons (both domestic and external) to achieve a high level of competitiveness (Lapavitsas, 2018), both for domestic and external reasons. Therefore, in late 2009 the problem was getting worse and new elections took place in Greece. However, the new elected government promised to solve the problem by increasing the wages and the benefits for public sector workers ("An emphatic win", 2009).

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As a result, the bailout programs that were imposed from 2010 onwards on Greece from EU institutions and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) caused drastic cuts and unpleasant austerity measures, which were not absolutely well-planned and structured, as the IMF later admitted (Elliott, Inman & Smith, 2013).

As a consequence, unprecedented political developments that completely changed the political landscape of the country took place in the following years. Greek citizens instantly started to express their dislike of the austerity measures. Strikes happened more and more frequently, and the rage against the political system, the EU and the IMF risen sharply, also driven by the increasing rhetoric of populism in the country. Thus, trust in the EU started to drop sharply, and Euroscepticism was there to stay. As a result, Greece is currently the country which has the lowest trust in the EU among the rest of European countries (Standard Eurobarometer 89, 2018).

Media also played their part in these developments, regarding how they covered the crisis, since they undoubtedly affected the public opinion and caused divisions in the society. A serious distinction was observed between media coverage: One group of media outlets seemed to support the implemented austerity measures and expressed the need for massive changes, while another group of media outlets thoroughly disapproved the measures and criticized whoever tried to support them, often presenting the supporters as “traitors”, in line with the populist voices in the country (Henley & Smith, 2015).

This cleavage of ideas on how the country could move forward would be proved a boomerang since it undoubtedly facilitated a sharp increase in the lack of trust on media in Greece. To illustrate, in 2018 Greece was the nation that presented the lowest trust in the media worldwide (Mitchell, Simmons, Matsa & Silver, 2018).

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Considering the abovementioned facts, the current thesis will try to assess the complex relationship between media coverage and Eurosceptic attitudes in Greece. Since the Greek crisis has played a crucial role in transforming the perceptions of Greek people about the European Union, it would be interesting to test whether media reporting on the Greek crisis related to an issue involving both the EU and Greece could affect the Greek citizens’ perceptions of the EU. Therefore, the guiding research question will be: “To

what extent does media coverage affect the Eurosceptic attitudes in Greece?”

Theoretical Background

Before investigating the possible relationship between media coverage and Eurosceptic attitudes in Greece, it is essential to outline the theoretical concepts that will be used in this study.

First of all, Euroscepticism as a term can be defined in multiple ways. In general, it can be presented as “hard” or “soft”. Hard Euroscepticism is “where there is a

principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived” (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p.4) while soft Euroscepticism “is where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ’national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory.” (Taggart & Szczerbiak,

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Euroscepticism can be affected by a series of factors, such as political reasons, economic reasons, media coverage and social changes. The current study focuses on the relationship between media coverage and Euroscepticism. As it has previously been proved, in countries with a negative EU budget balance (namely the difference between the contribution of the country to the EU minus the financial support of the EU to the country), like Greece, the increase of media attention to the EU leads to a rise of political Euroscepticism (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010).

In particular, the current study will try to assess Euroscepticism in Greece in relation to how positive or negative Greek media’s news framing of the European Union is. Framing information means to “select certain aspects from perceived reality and render them more significant in the communicated information than others and in such a manner so that there is an intended interpretation of the communication, moral evaluation or recommendation for evaluating the provided information” (Entman, 1993, p.52).

Previous studies have described in depth various kinds of frames, such as

advocacy and journalistic frames, substantive and procedural frames or issue-specific and generic frames, underlying the need to move from the conceptual to the operational side of framing research by making clear which are the constituent elements in each case (C. de Vreese, 2012). In the context of the current paper, it would be important to identify specific frames that can be used to describe the EU.

In the past, many different frames have been used to describe the EU, such as “common project” or “common heritage” (La Barbera, 2015). However, the current study will only focus on the effects of positive and negative framing (valence-framing) on

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political attitudes, and in particular on the views of Greek people on the EU. Due to the long economic and political crisis in Greece during the last decade, media had played an important role covering the developments in the country and possibly forming political behaviors by using more positive or negative framing. In general, studies have shown the importance of negative framing. For instance, on an experiment conducted on Dutch participants by making use of political radio speeches (Lagerwerf, Boeynaems, van Egmond-Brussee & Burgers, 2014), it was found that negative framing increased

immediate attention (Lang, Ya, et al., 2013) more than positive framing did. It would be also interesting to see whether this applies to news articles and other countries, like Greece. Also, psychological studies have shown that negative information may have stronger effects compared to positive information (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001).

In general, media have the power to both reinforce and reduce Euroscepticism depending on the way they choose to frame their messages. Undoubtedly, this media effect is based on how “strategically” the media publish their news as well as on citizens’ individual characteristics (de Vreese, 2007).

Previous research has shown that the outcome of the 2009 European

Parliamentary elections was influenced by how the media covered EU-related news. In particular, the more positive the evaluations of the EU a voter was exposed to, the less likely they were to cast a vote for a Eurosceptic party (van Spanje & de Vreese, 2014). In contrast, it has been found that negative media coverage increases Euroscepticism (van Klingeren, 2014), although this study focuses only on specific countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, France and Denmark. As a result, it would be interesting

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to investigate if this also applies to the case of Greece.

In another similar study that has been conducted in the past to test individuals’ support on EU enlargement, the frames of “risk” and “opportunity” were used (Schuck & de Vreese, 2006). In other words, in the first case, the EU process was presented as a risk for the EU while in the second one as an opportunity. The study was based on a content analysis of German media outlets, and an experiment, and it was shown that framing does affect individuals’ support on EU enlargement; Participants that were exposed to news that depicted the EU enlargement as a risk showed lower support than those to whom EU enlargement was presented as an opportunity. So it is observed the same distinction as in the positive and negative framing as well.

Different types of news media present the EU differently as well. For example, Finnish tabloid media are keener to adopt a Eurosceptic stance, rather than quality media (Herkman, 2017). As a result, when someone attempts to discover general differences in coverage and framing, he should also consider this aspect.

Based on the literature, the first hypothesis of the current academic research is:

(H1) “Individuals who are exposed to a negatively framed news article about the European Union have lower trust in the EU comparing to individuals who are exposed to a positively framed article.”

Previous research has shown that the educational level is one of the factors that affect how Eurosceptic an individual feels. In particular, lower education increases the scepticism that citizens have towards the EU (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010). Similarly, in a longitudinal study based on an observation of Eurobarometer surveys from 1973 to 2010, the impact of education on attitudes towards the EU is confirmed since it was

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found that people with lower levels of education were significantly more eurosceptical than highly educated respondents. Also, this effect has been strengthened over time (Hakhverdian, van Elsas, van der Brug & Kuhn, 2013).

At the same time, as it is already known, Eurosceptic attitudes could be measured, among other ways, by estimating, for example, how European does a citizen feel, how much does he afraid of the European Union or if the European flag means a lot to him (Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas & de Vreese, 2011). European identity measures have been repeatedly connected to Eurosceptic attitudes in previous research, since they are a basic element of political community and a regulator of Euroscepticism in general (Weßels, 2007). Also, european identity isrconnected to many other elements of political behavior (Verhaegen, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2015). As a result, apart from trust,

European attitudes and identity are a factor which determines how Eurosceptic someone is and they can be examined as an individual factor.

Furthermore, for the current research, the impact of the economic crisis on these developments should not be ignored. Austerity does not only affect citizens’ attitudes towards national institutions or political participation but also the way they perceive the EU as a political entity. Again, educational level differentiates between low and high educated individuals (Teney, 2016).

Taking these facts into consideration, the second hypothesis under investigation is: (H2) “The European attitudes of individuals are influencing positively when their

education level is increasing, regardless of how positive or negative towards the EU is the news article that they are exposed to.”

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10 Methods

An online experiment was conducted to address the issue of Euroscepticism in relation to the media coverage in Greece. The survey was administered through Qualtrics Software, and participants were invited through social media or direct messages in the researcher’s personal network. The survey was active for two weeks, from May 24th to June 7th, 2019. The sample shows a fair distribution of key demographic variables similar to the Greek population. The sample consisted of 58 men and 42 women of all age groups. The respondents were politically interested (M = 7.07, SD = 2.28), mainly college graduates (41.2%) and master/Ph.D. graduates (34.4%), self-placed mostly on centre and centre-right of the political spectrum (M = 6.05, SD = 1.52).

The target regarding the number of participants was initially set to approximately 150 persons (50 in each group). Eventually, 163 respondents filled out the online

questionnaire. However, it was decided that respondents with the same IP address (21 responses) as well as respondents that completed the survey too fast (in less than 3 minutes) or too slow (in more than 2 hours) should be excluded from the final dataset (11 responses in total). As a result, the total number of respondents is 131 Greek citizens with a right to vote (18 years or older) who are almost equally represented in each

experimental condition (47 responses for the original article and 42 for both the negative and the positive article).

For the experiment, a one-factorial experimental design was used, with one control condition and two experimental conditions. The control condition was a neutrally framed original news article from Kathimerini.gr, a popular but also quality Greek news website/newspaper. The same news article was manipulated to reflect a positive and a

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negative frame respectively, and it was related to the European Union. The title of the original article was “EU officials criticize government policy mix”, published on the 25th

of April, 2009, in the English online edition. The positively manipulated article was titled “EU welcomes recent government policies” and the negatively manipulated articled was titled “EU officials strongly condemn government policy mix”. The facts of the original article did not change. However, the tone of each of the manipulated articles changed depending on the condition, with some facts or comments added in each case as well. In the positive article, the EU was presented praising Greece while in the negative article EU was presented criticizing strongly the country and the government (See Appendix). When a respondent entered the survey, he was first read the factsheet and then agreed on an informed consent, before randomly assigned to one of the three

experimental conditions of the survey. Thus, the respondent was initially asked to read one of the three articles (a minimum of 20 seconds was given as a reading time before which the respondent could not continue the survey). After reading the article, he/she was asked to evaluate on a 7-point scale, first, how positive or negative it was about the European Union and, second, how reliable it was.

Then, the dependent variables of the research were introduced, namely the level of trust for the European Union and the attitudes towards the EU. In detail, taking as an example various previous surveys that are being used each year by the Eurobarometer surveys (Standard Eurobarometer 89, 2018), three items were used to measure the variable of trust on a 10-point scale, namely “how much do you trust the European Union” (M = 5.42, SD = 2.46), “how much do you trust the European Parliament” (M = 5.44, SD = 2.39) and “how much do you trust the European Commission” (M = 5.01, SD

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= 2.32). Testing these three items, measuring the overall trust, as one factor presents a reliable result (Alpha = .95).

Similarly, taking in consideration previous research (Boomgaarden et al., 2011), seven items were used to measure on a 7-point scale citizens’ attitudes towards the EU, namely “I am afraid of the European Union” (M = 3.08, SD = 1.63), “I feel threatened by the European Union” (M = 2.95, SD = 1.58), “I am angry about the European Union” (M = 3.91, SD = 1.76), “My voice counts in the European Union” (M = 3.50, SD = 1.71) (Standard Eurobarometer 89, 2018), “The European Union poses a threat to the Greek identity and culture” (M = 3.08, SD = 1.73), “Europeans share a common tradition, culture and history” (M = 4.11, SD = 1.74), “The European flag means a lot to me” (M = 4.12, SD = 1.76) and “I am proud to be a European citizen” (M = 5.02, SD = 1.50). Testing these eight items, measuring the attitudes towards the EU, as one factor presents a reliable result (Alpha = .87).

In addition, two more questions asked whether the possible Euroscepticism that Greek citizens may have is hard or soft, as it was defined in the theoretical section of this study. The questions were: “Do you want Greece to continue being a member of the EU?” (M = 1.12, SD = 0.39) and “Do you want Greece to continue being a member of the Eurozone?” (M= 1.28, SD = 0.60), both answered on a 3-point scale with possible answers “Yes”, “No” and “Do not Know”.

Finally, some previously presented control variables added as final questions, namely the gender, age, educational level, political ideology, and political interest of the respondents. The educational level which will also be used to answer the second

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school graduate”, “High school graduate”, “College graduate” and “Master/Ph.D. graduate”.

At the end of the survey, respondents read a debriefing corresponding to the stimulus they were exposed to, as well as the original link of the news article (See Appendix).

Results

Before presenting the results of the study, a manipulation check was conducted by making use of the two items that were asked after the exposure to the three experimental conditions of the study. After conducting two one-way Anova tests, it is proven that the manipulation check was fairly successful.

First of all, most of the respondents appeared to describe each stimulus as it was expected to. Concerning the three groups of stimuli, the group sizes are consisted of 42 observations in positive and negative stimuli and 46 observations in original stimuli. Thus, the requirement of equal group size is initially met. However, the output of homogeneity of variances shows that the Levene’s test is significant, F (2, 127) = 3.374, p = .037. Therefore, equal variances in the population cannot be assumed and the results should be interpreted with caution. The output of the Anova shows that there is a

significant, very large effect of the stimuli on the citizens’ perceptions regarding the article about the EU, F (2, 129) = 52.924, η² < .45, p < .001. In general, the positive stimulus was described as positive (M = 5.36, SD = 1.32) and the negative as negative (M = 2.14, SD = 1.28), while the original article (M = 3.28, SD = 1.70), it was considered

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slightly more negative than positive. Last but not least, the post-hoc test shows that all the differences between the different kinds of stimuli are significant.

Furthermore, most of the respondents, regardless of the type of stimulus, did not describe the article that they read as unreliable. Also, the output of homogeneity of variances shows that the Levene’s test is significant, F (2, 127) = 3.374, p = .927. Therefore, equal variances in the population can be assumed. The output of the Anova shows that there is an insignificant, small effect of the stimuli on the citizens’ perceptions regarding the reliability of the article that they read, F (2, 129) = 1.319, η² < .02, p < .271. In general, the respondents considered the positive (M = 4.57, SD = 1.76), the negative (M = 5.10, SD = 1.81) and the original article (M = 5.09, SD = 1.26), as almost equally reliable. The post-hoc test also shows that all the differences between the different kinds of stimuli are insignificant.

In the current study, Greek citizens were initially asked about their level of trust in the European Union, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. Since all three items concern trust issues on an EU level, it is assumed that there is an

association between them, and a principal axis factor analysis was conducted using the three variables of trust. The oblique rotation (oblimin) is preferred since it is assumed that there is a relationship between the possible factors.

The sample size of 130 observations is acceptable (KMO = .77), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is significant (p < .001). The output shows that the three items consist of one component with Eigenvalue above 1 (Factor 1 = eigenvalue 2.77) and the scree plot depicts a clear inflexion point. This factor explains a total variance of 90.89% in the data. The three items all correlate positively with strong associations and present factor

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loadings of at least .90. Finally, the reliability test indicates that the factor is reliable since it presents a Chronbach’s Alpha of .95.

Afterwards, the respondents were asked about their attitudes towards the European Union, and it is assumed that there is an association between the eight items that measure this construct. Therefore, a principal axis factor analysis was conducted using the eight variables that measure the attitudes towards the EU. The oblique rotation (oblimin) is preferred since it is assumed that there is a relationship between the factors. The sample size of 129 observations is acceptable (KMO = .84), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is significant (p < .001). The output shows that the eight items consist of two components with Eigenvalues above 1 (Factor 1 = eigenvalue 4.30, Factor 2 = eigenvalue 1.15), and the scree plot depicts a clear inflexion point. These two factors explain a total variance of 68.20% in the data.

Looking at the pattern matrix, a distinction can be made between the four items that have a negative affection and the four items that have a positive one, so they appear to consist of two distinct factors. In the first factor, the variable “I feel threatened by the European Union” presents the biggest factor loading which equals to .93, and in the second factor the variable “the European flag means a lot to me” has a factor loading of -.95. Finally, reliability tests indicate that both factors are reliable since they present a Chronbach’s Alpha of .86 and a Chronbach’s Alpha of .81 respectively.

To test H1, a multiple regression analysis was conducted. The model was significant, F (7, 197.646) = 7.47, p < .001 and, as a result, it can be used to predict the levels of trust of Greek citizens in the EU. In general, positive or negative experimental treatments, gender, age, educational level, ideology and political interest explain 26.3%

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of the variation in the population in the levels of trust for the EU (adj. R² = .263). In particular, the positive treatment condition in relation to the neutral one has an

insignificant, negative, and moderate association with overall trust in the EU, b = -.607, t = -1.43, p = .156, 95% CI [-1.45, 0.24], and the negative treatment condition in relation to the neutral condition has an insignificant, negative, but strong association with overall EU trust, b = -.808, t = -1.90, p = .060, 95% CI [-1.65, 0.03]. All in all, only education seems to have a significant, positive, and very strong association with the trust in the EU, b = 1.04, t = 4.73, p < .001, 95% [0.61, 1.48]. Finally, the assumptions of

multicollinearity and homoscedasticity were met for all variables (VIF < 10, tolerance > 0.2). H1 was predicting an effect of the different stimuli on the levels of EU trust. Therefore is rejected.

To test H2, two multiple regression analyses were conducted, according to the results of the factor analysis above, which indicated two distinct factors regarding the negative and positive attitudes towards the EU.

First, the negative attitudes were investigated. The multiple regression model was significant, F (7, 48.620) = 4.26, p < .001 and, as a result, it can be successfully used to predict the negative attitudes of the Greek citizens towards the EU. In general, positive or negative experimental treatments, gender, age, educational level, ideology and political interest explain 20% of the variation in the population in the negative attitudes towards the EU (adj. R² = .200). In particular, education has a significant, negative, and moderate association with the negative attitudes towards the EU, b = -.465, t = 3.20, p = .002, 95% CI [-0.75, -0.18]. Specifically, for each additional increase of educational level, citizens’ negative attitudes towards the EU decrease by 47%. The positive treatment condition in

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relation to the neutral one has an insignificant, positive and moderate association with negative attitudes towards the EU, b = .420, t = 1.50, p = .137, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.98], but the negative treatment condition in relation to the neutral condition has a significant, positive and strong association with the negative EU attitudes, b = .812, t = 2.90, p = .005, 95% CI [0.26, 1.37]. In other words, as the news framing gets more negative, the citizens’ attitudes towards the EU become more negative as well. Finally, political interest also has a significant, negative, but weak association with the negative EU attitudes, b = -.173, t = -3.18, p = .002, 95% [-0.28, -0.07]. Specifically, for each additional increase of political interest, citizens’ negative attitudes towards the EU decrease by 17.3%. Last but not least, the assumptions of multicollinearity and homoscedasticity were met for all variables (VIF < 10, tolerance > 0.2). H2 was predicting that, regardless the news framing, education positively affects the European feeling of citizens. Regarding the negative attitudes towards the EU, and despite the fact that negative news framing strongly affects negative EU attitudes, education positively affects the European feeling since it decreases the negative EU attitudes. Thus, the first part of H2 is confirmed.

Furthermore, positive attitudes were investigated. The multiple regression model was significant, F (7, 54.708) = 5.60, p < .001 and, as a result, it can be successfully used to predict the positive attitudes of Greek citizens towards the EU. In general, positive or negative experimental treatments, gender, age, educational level, ideology and political interest explain 24.8% of the variation in the population in the negative attitudes towards the EU (adj. R² = .248). In particular, education has again a significant, positive and moderate to strong association with positive attitudes towards the EU, b = .639, t = 4.75,

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p < .001, 95% CI [0.37, 0.91]. Specifically, for each additional increase of educational level, citizens’ positive attitudes towards the EU increase by 64%. The positive treatment condition in relation to the neutral one has an insignificant, negative and very weak association with positive attitudes towards the EU, b = -.043, t = -0.17, p = .869, 95% CI [-0.56, 0.47], and the negative treatment condition in relation to the neutral condition also has an insignificant, negative and moderate association with the positive EU attitudes, b = -.451, t = -1.74, p = .085, 95% CI [-0.97, 0.06]. Finally, political interest has a

significant, positive, but weak association with the positive EU attitudes, b = .148, t = 2.95, p = .004, 95% [0.05, -0.25]. In other words, for each additional increase of political interest, citizens’ positive attitudes towards the EU increase by 14.8%. The assumptions of multicollinearity and homoscedasticity were met for all variables (VIF < 10, tolerance > 0.2 ). H2 was predicting that, regardless the news framing, education positively affects the European feeling of citizens. Regarding the positive attitudes towards the EU,

education positively affects the European feeling, since it increases the positive EU attitudes. Thus, the second part of H2 is also confirmed.

Discussion

The current experimental study attempted to address the relationship between media coverage and the levels of Euroscepticism in Greece. As it had been presented in the theory section, news framing has been proven to influence citizens’ perceptions on many political issues, and Eurosceptic attitudes could not be an exception (van Klingeren, 2014).

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It was assumed that news framing affects peoples’ trust in the European Union and that individuals who are exposed to a negatively framed news article about the

European Union have lower trust in the EU compared to individuals who are exposed to a positively framed article.

In the current research, this assumption was not proven. The levels of trust among the three groups of articles (original, positive and negative) were almost identical. As a result, the first hypothesis (H1) of this study was not confirmed. In fact, a small

“boomerang effect” was observed, since the respondents who were exposed to the positively framed news article presented the lowest trust score among the groups. This can be attributed also to the specific demographics and special characteristics of the sample. The news article was published in a quality and popular newspaper which is mostly read by citizens who are places on the centre-right of the political spectrum though. Taking into consideration the fact that the positive article was talking about an issue related to the EU who was actually praising the Greek government (which is placed on the political left) and Greece in general, it is not strange that many respondents judged the article through their own ideological or political prism. Thus, this might slightly affect their trust on the EU on the next questions.

Moreover, it was hypothesized that the higher the educational level of individuals, the more European they feel, and as a result, their EU attitude is improving, and vice versa (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010). It was also said that, in this case, the news framing does not play an important role in influencing this tendency.

The results show that education strongly affects how European someone feels: As someone gets more educated, his/her negative attitude towards the EU is limiting, while

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positive attitudes towards the EU significantly increase. In this tendency, it was noticed that news framing could be only an important factor for the negative EU attitudes as it was proven that negative news framing strongly affects negative EU attitudes. On the contrary, it was shown that the role of news framing for positive EU attitudes is not significant. Therefore, the second hypothesis of the study confirms the determinant role of education in affecting Eurosceptic attitudes, while the role of news framing is proven an important factor mostly when it is negative. As it was found in other studies though (Lagerwerf, Boeynaems, van Egmond-Brussee & Burgers, 2015), negative framing increases immediate attention more than positive framing do. This finding could also answer on why media, instead of focusing on positive news, are so often focused on negative developments, on criticizing or on building up tensions. Thus, valence framing is proven sometimes one-sided since negativity seems to be more “effective” that positivity.

In general, education, as it had been already proven (Hakhverdian, van Elsas, van der Brug & Kuhn, 2013) is one of the most determinant factors in defining citizens’ views towards the EU and it also strongly influences the trust that people show in the European Union. Political interest is another factor that positively influences the attitudes towards the EU and it would be interesting to investigate in the future how this interest is obtained (through TV, radio, social media, friends) and how it can explain the propensity to vote for specific political parties, taking into consideration political ideology as well. Furthermore, regarding the education, it would be interesting to investigate not only the difference between the levels of educations but also between different types of

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21 Limitations & Conclusion

The current academic study that took place in a 3-month period attempted to offer answers on a European issue, such as Euroscepticism, in a country of 11 million people, such as Greece.

Therefore, despite the fact that there were clear inferences out of this

experimental study, the results are not easy to be generalized to the whole population due mostly to the sample size, the nature of the experiment and the speculations that are being made in this kind of experiments. To illustrate, this study used one news article with each specific characteristics (size, different actors, political and economic developments in it, publishing time) of one newspaper with its own characteristics as well (popularity, ideology, reliability) and through a manipulation attempted to make conclusions about a very complex issue, such as Euroscepticism, in a country which, in the last decade, had been in tremendous political and economic turmoil.

The Greek case by itself has particularities that do not allow any generalization to be done. Greece is a country which has undergone a severe financial crisis, the

repercussions of which are still visible, a country with the highest unemployment rate in the EU, with one of the lowest trust rates in the media, and with populistic parties that gambled politically in order to win power, elections, and parliamentary seats. As a result, the one should be careful in generalizing the results of this study to a pan-European level.

However, more research could shed a light on how media affect European

attitudes and what is the role of framing theory in this. Is negativity and negative framing the only solution or could it be a new era of journalism, mostly through online platforms, which can alter the equation? Finally, which individual gains more at the end of the day:

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A well-informed citizen who at the same time is exposed to this wave of media negativity or a well-educated one who limits his media exposure?

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23 Appendix 1

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24 Stimulus (Positive)

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25 Stimulus (Negative)

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26 Factsheet

Dear participants,

With this letter, I would like to invite you to participate in a research study to be conducted under the auspices of the Graduate School of Communication, a part of the University of Amsterdam.

The study for which I am requesting your cooperation investigates the relationship between the European Union and Greece through the eyes of the Greek citizens. In the online survey, you will be requested to read a brief article related to the European Union. In addition, several questions will be asked about your attitudes towards the EU. Only Greek citizens who have a right to vote may participate in the study. The goal of this research is to investigate whether the media coverage affects Eurosceptic attitudes.

The study will take about 5 minutes. As this research is being carried out under the responsibility of the ASCoR, University of Amsterdam, we can guarantee that:

1) Your anonymity will be safeguarded, and that your personal information will not be passed on to third parties under any conditions, unless you first give your express permission for this.

2) You can refuse to participate in the research or cut short your participation without having to give a reason for doing so. You also have up to 7 days after participating to withdraw your permission to allow your answers or data to be used in the research.

3) Participating in the research will not entail your being subjected to any appreciable risk or discomfort, and you will not be exposed to any explicitly offensive material.

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4) No later than five months after the conclusion of the research, we will be able to provide you with a research report that explains the general results of the research.

For more information about the research and the invitation to participate, you are welcome to contact the project leader, Mr. Christos Vachtsiavanos, at any time (email:

christosvach@gmail.com, tel: +31649999491)

Should you have any complaints or comments about the course of the research and the procedures it involves as a consequence of your participation in this research, you can contact the designated member of the Ethics Committee representing ASCoR, at the following address: ASCoR Secretariat, Ethics Committee, University of Amsterdam, Postbus 15793, 1001 NG Amsterdam; 020‐525 3680; ascor‐secr‐fmg@uva.nl. Any complaints or comments will be treated in the strictest confidence.

We hope that we have provided you with sufficient information. We would like to take this opportunity to thank you in advance for your assistance with this research, which we greatly appreciate.

Kind regards,

Christos Vachtsiavanos

Informed consent

I hereby declare that I have been informed in a clear manner about the nature and method of the research, as described in the factsheet of this study.

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I agree, fully and voluntarily, to participate in this research study. With this, I retain the right to withdraw my consent, without having to give a reason for doing so. I am aware that I may halt my participation in this study at any time.

If my research results are used in scientific publications or are made public in another way, this will be done such a way that my anonymity is completely safeguarded. My personal data will not be passed on to third parties without my express permission.

If I wish to receive more information about the research, either now or in future, I can contact the project leader, Mr. Christos Vachtsiavanos, at any time (email:

christosvach@gmail.com, tel: +31649999491) Should I have any complaints about this research, I can contact the designated member of the Ethics Committee representing the ASCoR, at the following address: ASCoR secretariat, Ethics Committee, University of Amsterdam, Postbus 15793, 1001 NG Amsterdam; 020‐525 3680; ascor‐secr‐

fmg@uva.nl.

√ I understand the text presented above, and I agree to participate in the research study.

X I do not want to participate.

Debriefing (original article)

Dear Participant,

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Please click “Finish” below to register your answers once you have read the following information.

The questions you just answered were part of a study that investigates weather media coverage in Greece affects the Eurosceptic attitudes of the Greek citizens. As a

participant of this study, you were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions of the study.

The article you read was an original article regarding an issue related to the Greek crisis. In other versions of this questionnaire, other respondents were exposed to a negatively and a positively framed fictional article.

This setup allows me to investigate whether there are possible differences between the three groups regarding their attitudes about the European Union. News framing is expected to influence the participants’ views on the EU, depending on how positive or negative it might be.

You can find the whole article here:

http://www.ekathimerini.com/239900/article/ekathimerini/news/eu-officials-criticize-government-policy-mix

The responses collected from you in this study remain confidential; I do not collect any identifying information, and I will not share your personal information with any third party. To help protect your confidentiality, the stored information will not contain information that will identify you, and all the data will be analysed collectively. Should you have any questions or concerns about this research, you can contact the project

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leader, Mr. Christos Vachtsiavanos, at any time (email: christosvach@gmail.com, tel: +31649999491).

I wish you a pleasant day!

I have read and understood the above information

Debriefing (Positive article)

Dear Participant,

Thank you for participating in this study.

The article you read positively framed the European Union regarding an issue related to the Greek crisis. In another version of this questionnaire, other respondents were exposed to a negatively framed article accordingly and others to the original article.

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The article you read was fictional, and created exclusively for the purpose of this particular study.

You can find the original article here:

The responses collected from you in this study remain confidential; I do not collect any identifying information, and I will not share your personal information with any third party. To help protect your confidentiality, the stored information will not contain information that will identify you, and all the data will be analysed collectively. Should you have any questions or concerns about this research, you can contact the project leader, Mr. Christos Vachtsiavanos, at any time (email: christosvach@gmail.com, tel: +31649999491).

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32 Debriefing (Negative Article)

Dear Participant,

Thank you for participating in this study.

The article you read negatively framed the European Union regarding an issue related to the Greek crisis. In another version of this questionnaire, other respondents were exposed to a positively framed article accordingly and others to the original article.

The article you read was fictional, and created exclusively for the purpose of this particular study.

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The responses collected from you in this study remain confidential; I do not collect any identifying information, and I will not share your personal information with any third party. To help protect your confidentiality, the stored information will not contain information that will identify you, and all the data will be analysed collectively. Should you have any questions or concerns about this research, you can contact the project leader, Mr. Christos Vachtsiavanos, at any time (email: christosvach@gmail.com, tel: +31649999491).

I have read and understood the above information

Questionnaire

1. Please read the short article below and then respond to the following questions… 2. On a scale from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive), how would you describe the

way that the news article that you read presented the EU?

3. On a scale from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high) how credible is the article that you read?

4. On a scale from 1 to 10, how much do you trust: the European Union?

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34 the European Commission?

the European Parliament?

5. On a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree), what do you believe of the following statements:

I am afraid of the European Union I feel threatened by the European Union I am angry about the European Union My voice counts in the European Union

The European Union poses a threat to the Greek identity and culture Europeans share a common tradition, culture and history

The European flag means a lot to me I am proud to be a European citizen

6. Do you want Greece to continue being a member of the EU? (Yes, No, Don’t know)

7. Do you want Greece to continue being a member of the Eurozone (Yes, No, Don’t Know)

8. Some final questions: What is your gender? (male/female) 9. What is your age?

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10. What is your level of education? (elementary school graduate, high school graduate, college graduate , master degree/PhD diploma graduate)

11. On an ideology scale from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right), where would you place yourself?

12. On a scale from 1(very low) to 10 (very high), what is your interest in politics in general?

Appendix 2

Table 1: Pattern Matrix

Factor 1 Factor 2 I feel threatened by the

European Union

.928

I am afraid of the European Union

.844

I am angry about the European Union

.683

The European Union poses a threat to the Greek identity and culture

.627

The European flag means a lot to me

.950

I am proud to be a European citizen

.754

Europeans share a common tradition, culture and history

.598

My voice counts in the European Union

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36 Table 2: Determinants of Trust towards the EU

Model P Values Constant -1.214 (1.195) .312 Positive Treatment -0.607 (0.426) .156 Negative Treatment -0.808 (0.425) .060 Gender 0.567 (0.361) .119 Age 0.001 (0.013) .966 Education 1.043 (0.220) .000 Ideology 0.229 (0.121) .062 Political Interest 0.304 (0.083) .000

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses

Table 3: Determinants of Negative EU Attitudes

Model P Values Constant 5.669 (0.789) ,000 Positive Treatment 0.420 (0.281) .137 Negative Treatment 0.812 (0.281) .005 Gender -0.391 (0.238) .103 Age 0.003 (0.008) .761 Education -0.465 (0.145) .002 Ideology -0.009 (0.080) .910 Political Interest -0.173 (0.054) .002

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37 Table 4: Determinants of Positive EU Attitudes

Unstandardized B P Values Constant 0.505 (0.730) ,490 Positive Treatment -0.043 (0.260) ,869 Negative Treatment -0.451 (0.260) .085 Gender 0.219 (0.220) .321 Age 0.010 (0.008) .223 Education 0.639 (0.135) .000 Ideology 0.055 (0.074) .459 Political Interest 0.148 (0.050) .004

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses

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