Student: Gregory Jasadirana ID: 11410795
Course: Democracy and it’s challenges Teacher: Arlen Gordon
Assignment: Bachelor Thesis Draft
Titel: Democratic consolidation and the emergence of the criminalized state Suriname Date: 11-06-2019
Democratic consolidation and the emergence of the criminalized state Suriname
Abstract
In this thesis, the corrupt and criminal practices of the Republic of Suriname are associated with the prospects of democratization. Despite developments for democratic consolidation in the 1991 and the early millennium, democratization in Suriname is under threat. By appointing the former authoritarian leader Desi Bouterse, the Surinamese Republic has developed into a criminalized state. In this situation, democratic development is threatened by the prevalence of corruption and criminal activities that cause the Rule of Law to be ignored. This negative democratic development is translated through the conceptual theory of Martfeim. This theory assumes that corrupt practices by politicians form a barrier to democratization through the emergence of conflicting interests. These interests arise
because further democratic development will go against the interests of the corrupt political elite. By weakening and stagnating the Rule of Law, Desi Bouterse's regime ensures that corrupt practices and the individual enrichment of the political elite can continue to exist.
Introduction
The Republic of Suriname is a developing democracy that has been constitutionally installed since 1992. In 1975 the republic received its independence in an appointment with the former colonizer, the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Since 1980, the republic has had several turns to authoritarian regimes. The inexperience of politicians about military power and publications about corruption led to a military coup in 1980 led by Sergeant Bouterse (Singh 2008: 77-83). Many human rights violations have taken place under military rule. Under Bouterse's leadership, military murders in 1982 and a massacre of insurgents in 1986 (ibid) were committed. The military regime managed to rewrite the constitution, which was originated from the Western model, and place the entire government under military supervision (ibid). As a result of human rights violations, the international committee of jurists concluded that the Rule of Law is not being observed by the political elites (Bossuyt and Griffiths 1983: 1-11). By applying international, economic and social pressure, the democratic government was restored in 1988 (Singh 2008: 77-83). This democratic
development was of short duration because the same Bouterse committed a second coup in 1990. This coupe was simply committed by threatening the president and his ministers over the telephone and forcing him to resign (ibid). The threat of military intervention from the US, France and the Netherlands forced the regime to hold new elections in 1991 (ibid). After these elections, a coalition of three ethnic parties came to power and opposed the military regime. The coalition restored the democratic constitution by limiting the army to
administrative powers. With this new constitution, the authoritarian regime was dismantled and the democratic constitution was restored (ibid).
In the first half of the 90s, the government of Ronald Venetiaan seems to continue the democratic development in the dissolution of the authoritarian repertoires of the republic (ibid). In the second half, the party of Desi Bouterse National Democratic Party (NDP) won the free democratic elections. This party manages to form a coalition in the government and supplies President Jules Wijdenbosch. Many criticisms of the rule of law appeared under the Wijdenbosch regime (U.S. Department of State 2000: 1-12). Reports showed that the NDP politician leads a corrupt government and appointed new partisan judges (ibid). In 1997 the party founder of the NDP Desi Bouterse was convicted by a Dutch court for his role in the transnational drug smuggling (Center for a Secure Free Society 2017: 1-10). In the 1980s the son of the party leader was deprived of a diplomatic post in Brazil by his role in cocaine trading (ibid). The government of Wijdenbosch refused to extradite the NDP leader to the Netherlands despite a conviction of the Dutch court (ibid). In 2000 another criminal case was initiated concerning the political crimes of Bouterse in the 1980s (The New York Times 2011). However, the investigations from the Surinamese Public Prosecution Service were slow and difficult. At the time of progression in the criminal case and the rejection of the objections from Bouterse, the party leader presents himself as a candidate for presidency (Center for a Secure Free Society 2017: 1-10). The former military leader manages to reach a majority during the elections and is ultimately elected as
president. During his 2010 election, the president appointed his son Dino Bouterse as head of a governmental counter terrorism unit (ibid). A report states that the son of the president acted as a link between the president and transnational criminal organizations (ibid). In 2013, Dino Bouterse was arrested and later convicted by the US court of law for his role in transnational criminal activities (ibid).
A dubious development took place during the first reign of Desi Bouterse as president. In 2012, the Bouterse coalition passed an amnesty law that provided the president with immunity in criminal proceedings (Organization of American States 2012). Many criticisms appeared from the international stage that the law is contrary to the democratic rule of law. A spokesman for the European Union said that the amnesty law questions democratic development because it violates the principles of an independent judiciary (European Union 2012). The international committee of jurists also stated that the adopted amnesty law had considerably delayed the criminal proceedings of the incumbent president (International Commission of Jurists 2013). The Organization of American States also emphasized that the Surinamese state must carry out the criminal proceedings in accordance with the rule of law (Organization of American States 2012). In addition to the ongoing criminal proceedings, various sources report several legal violations of the Bouterse regime. According to a study by a Surinamese professor of social and development sciences, the Surinamese government has never been so corrupt (Buddingh 2018). In a publication of the NRC, the government of Bouterse and his family are guilty of corruption practices concerning gold concessions, fundamental rights and public procurement (ibid). The Center for a Secure and Free Society (CSFS) report goes one step further. The report states that the Surinamese government, led by Bouterse, belongs to a criminalized state (Center for a Secure Free Society 2017: 1-10). It extends the typologies of weak states and fragile states to a consolidated criminalized state. The authors state that the government of Bouterse offers support through money laundering and corruption and participates in transnationally organized crime (TOC) (ibid). The criminalized is defined as follows: A strong government that directly participates in TOC activity, benefits from it and appoints criminals in state organs (ibid).
The corrupt political developments in Suriname raises questions about the further democratization of Suriname. The scientific literature states that Suriname has been stripped of the authoritarian regime since 1991 (Singh 2008: 77-83). According to the
literature the republic is known as being the most geographically culturally isolated countries in South America (Center for a Secure Free Society 2017: 1-10). The republic of Suriname also is the smallest and least populated country in South America. These country specific variables has characterized the republic of Suriname as a most likely case in which
democratic development could be successful (Veenendaal 2019: 5-18). However, the scientific literature lacks the sensitivity to the extent to which Surinamese democracy has been able to consolidate. Studies on democratic consolidation describe important conditions for when democracy is deeply rooted and therefore consolidated. According to the authors, a democracy consolidates as soon as the complex system of institutions, rules, encouraging and discouraging incentives is accepted as the absolute system (Linz and Stepan 1996: 15). The authors distinguish three factors that are required to achieve this condition: a change in political behavior in which no substantial political actor tries to reject the democratic regime (ibid); a change in the attitude of citizens is also required with which they strive for political change from the democratic process at all times (ibid). Finally, a binding constitution is important, which states that all political players conform to the independent judicial democratic norms for conflict resolution (ibid).
O'Donnell considers the degree of institutionalization of political players and organizations as an important requirement (O'Donnell 1996: 41). Thomas and Hrebrenar state that this degree of institutionalization is achieved when civil society becomes increasingly independent (Thomas and Hrebenar 2008: 6-7). Diamond also states that consolidation should not only be seen as a static condition but as a process that takes place continuously (Diamond 1999: 65-66). It is not just a process that only transforms society. According to Diamond, consolidation is a process that takes place at three levels of political elite: political parties, interest groups and civil society (ibid). Full consolidation is achieved in this process if all substantial political actors at all levels view the democratic regime as correct and appropriate. This means that the political actors have no better alternative to the democratic system (ibid).
According to Johnson's research, underlying problems of democratic consolidation manifest in various phenomena of large-scale corruption (Johnson 2000: 1-33). In this thesis, I will investigate the extent to which the damaged Rule of law, corruption and criminalized state of Suriname constitutes barriers to democratic consolidation. This thesis will carry out a conceptual analysis following the Svolik democratization approach. Based on Svolik's research, it was previously assumed that the degree of economic development, executive government institutions, and authoritarian past will determine the democratic consolidation of states (Svolik 2008: 153-166). For this purpose, the concept of martfeim by
Nicolescu-Waggonner (2011) will be used to analyze the effects of corruption on democratization (Nicolescu-Waggonner 2011: 1-10). This concept consists of the initials of the following aspects of political corruption practices: politicians maintaining freedom through intervention in the judiciary and insufficient reform in democratic enforcement mechanisms (ibid). In this thesis, therefore, the concepts of martfeim, rule of law and democratic consolidation will be linked to the Suriname case. The main question posed in this thesis is: to what extent is corruption under the Desi Bouterse regime a barrier to democratic consolidation in the Republic of Suriname?
In the next paragraph, the theoretical framework will be elaborated with an
explanation of the concepts of democratic consolidation, rule of law and political corruption. Following the theoretical frame framework, the methodology of this thesis will be explained. Hereafter the analysis will be given of the secondary literature on democratic development under the regime of Desi Bouterse. This analysis will also explore the functioning of the executive government bodies. Finally, this analysis will make a link with crucial
developments in Suriname during the authoritarian regime. This thesis will conclude with a conclusion in which an answer to the main question is formulated. Connected to this conclusion, the scope of this thesis will be reflected by means of a discussion.
Theoretical framework
A great deal of scientific literature addresses the issue of why democratizing countries are stagnating in development. These so-called new democracies are somewhat praised for the democratic potential of their developments (Nicolescu-Waggonner 2019: 1-22). However, other investigations have shown that these countries perpetuate corrupt practices that are unpunished or tolerated by the incumbent legislative bodies (ibid). According to Nicolescu-Waggonner, Party financing is paid for by illegally obtained government contracts. Politicians and representatives of democratic development are active in this to suspend the democratic reforms of democratic enforcement mechanisms (ibid). The corrupt politicians stop these developments to leave open the possibility of exerting influence on the judiciary (Nicolescu-Waggonner 2011: 1-22). The aforementioned corrupt practices allow politicians, through their appointed bureaucracy together with judges and business partners, to support their careers in illegal ways and create structural conflicts of interest (ibid). On the one hand,
these politicians carry the responsibility for successfully creating, reforming and enforcing the law to guarantee the democratic principle of Rule of Law. On the other hand, these politicians have an interest in being free in their corrupt practices in which they enrich themselves (ibid). At this interface of conflicts of interest lies the point at which the reforms for democratic consolidation are encountered (ibid). In this thesis, the western principles of liberal constitutional democracy will be used as a benchmark for valuing the democratization of Suriname. The assumption herein is that the status of liberal constitutional democracy is considered a desirable development (ibid). The purpose of this is to contribute to the democratization in Suriname that started in 1991.
More recent studies show that the new democracies have barely achieved democratic rule of law or constitutional liberalism. Although these countries maintain democratic procedural elements such as free and fair elections, separation of powers or independent judges are absent (Diamond 1997: 20-38). It appears that predictable uniform applications of the democratic legal order and their enforcement are frequently lacking in the new democracies. The democratic institutions are therefore present, but the principle of a democratic constitutional state, which is the legal basis of a democratic state, is still absent (Ibid). On the basis of the democratic institutions, residents can be seen as citizens with political rights. However, due to the lack of legal bases, these states cannot guarantee protected civil liberties (ibid). Although constitutional liberalism is a requirement for the democratic development of the country, the reverse cannot be substantiated. It is not clear whether democratic institutions can lead to constitutional liberalism on their own. The reason for this is the publications that report on violations and formal elimination of the Rule of Law in these countries (ibid). Democratic consolidation is seen as a process in which all layers of society, both mass, and elite, accept democratic principles and procedures and the absolute system for conflict resolution (O'Donnell 1996: 41) (Diamond 1999: 65-66); Linz and Stepan 1996: 15) (Thomas and Hrebenar 2008: 6-7). However, these new democratic
member states are struggling with the problems posed for democratic consolidation. To solve this problem, scientists prescribe the establishment of good democratic institutions (Thomas and Hrebenar 2008: 1-9). Due to the stated deficit, reforms for these democratic institutions appear more difficult than assumed. The conflict of interest of corrupt politicians is a factor that hasn’t been adequately defined (Nicolescu-Waggonner 2011: 1-22). The
related implications for the rule of law and the democratic constitutional state mean that corruption can be seen as a real barrier to democratic consolidation.
Nicolescu-Waggonner uses a new concept to indicate these conflicts of interest. Combining this through the core initials of the conflict of interest brings the author to the concept of martfeim. The initials represent the following aspects of this concept: maintaining freedom through intervention in the judiciary and insufficient reform in democratic
enforcement mechanisms (ibid). These aspects translate to the corrupt practices in which politicians secure their freedom by unbounding themselves from the law. These politicians also intervene in the judiciary and uses these interventions to postpone or weaken law enforcement mechanisms (ibid). The concept is used to indicate the phenomenon of corruption and also its practice. The concept includes a dilemma of interest in which
politicians are faced with the choice of releasing themselves from the law or maintaining the democratic principle of rule of law (ibid). Political campaigns of the politician can be funded with illegally obtained means. In order to be able to fund the campaigns and to maintain political power, or to remain unpunished for illegal practices, they can abuse public contracts (ibid). They can do this by putting state spending in their own companies or companies of direct business friends. This phenomenon can occur from the individual actions of the politicians or from the organization of the political parties (ibid). The politicians can also manipulate the price of government contracts. This can be used to smuggle unregistered money to the bank account of the politicians. This points to money laundering practices in which several controversial companies are deployed (ibid). The officials who distribute the treasury are often appointed politically and must act in the interests of the politicians. Because the practices are illegal, politicians can use everything to protect their freedom (ibid). They can intervene in the legal process to receive favorable decisions. As a result, corrupt politicians avoid criminal proceedings or any form of retaliation. These practices can occur at different levels such as, police and judges (ibid). These practices reinforce the problem of the required democratic legal order and thereby disrupt further incentives to reform the system (ibid).
A large part of the institutional blueprints is incorrect, difficult to apply or even absent. The politicians who can implement this change also exclude development (ibid). The final outcome of this is that the liberties and rights of citizens cannot be protected or
guaranteed. This whole process of conflicting interests of corrupt politicians and democratic consolidation is referred to as the concept of martfeim (ibid). Another element of this concept focuses on the possibility of establishing a constitutional state. An important requirement for this is that the business community is protected by private property and that the commitments are insured through contact enforcement (ibid). However, this fails if the Rule of Law is not achieved, because a failing legal system means that property can be stolen spontaneously (ibid). Pressure and support from abroad to stimulate reform for a constitutional state do not seem to work for the time being (Ibid). Nor does pressure from a civil society seem decisive enough to trigger these reforms through collective action
problems (ibid). In this thesis, Nicolescu-Waggonner's (2019) corruption approach will be used to conceptually analyze the process of democratic consolidation. The article offers an approach that characterizes a defined political interest and links it to the principle of the democratic constitutional state (Nicolescu-Waggonner 2019: 1-22). The author identifies the concrete praxis that arises because of the absence of democratic reforming. This is
associated with illegal practices such as the obscuring of public middle sections for private gain (ibid).
The article attempts to relate the activity of political corruption to the negative democratic outcome. Under this outcome, the structural lack of law enforcement is viewed from the rule of law (ibid). With this, the author attempts to solve the conceptual problems of corruption in the public administration literature. This literature mostly states that corruption and the violation of the Rule of law are determined by respect for citizens and state institutions (ibid). The distinction between these phenomena is not thoroughly explained in this literature and Nicolescu-Waggonner states that they are generally used interchangeably. For these reasons, the author creates a causal ranking of aspects that are associated with corruption and the absence of the rule of law (ibid). In the building of democratic institutions, the political elite with corrupt behaviors fundamentally precedes the creation of institutions. The reason for this is that the political elite must ensure effective enforcement of laws (ibid). To combat corruption, crucial reforms are identified from the developed liberal constitutional democracies (ibid). Due to the lack of these crucial reforms, the legal system in the new democracies cannot be applied in a predictable and uniform manner (ibid). The reforms are listed as follows: reform of the civil service; independent,
well-funded, efficient anti-corruption agencies; supervisory authorities to audit asset declarations by government officials and statements on party financing; reform of the electoral law; depoliticization of the judiciary; whistleblower protection; lobby regulations; overview of public procurement; confiscation of illegally obtained and unjustified wealth (ibid). Corruption consists of the behavior in which entrusted political powers are abused. At the same time, a lack of Rule of Law presupposes more than just the absence of corruption. The Rule of law maintains the ability of the legal system to ensure consistent and uniform application of the law (ibid). Negative consequences of a malfunctioning rule of law are discrimination, economic inefficiency, lack of resources, lack of education and privileged executive power (ibid). By characterizing the causal chain of institutional establishment, Nicolescu-Waggonner shows the difference between the behavior of corrupt officials and their direct consequences for the quality of the entire legal system (ibid).
The concept of martfeim can thus help to illustrate the effect of the rule of law, political corruption and democratic consolidation (ibid). A footnote to this theory is that it starts from the assumption that political elites normally have the capacity to implement democratic reforms. This means that political corruption disrupts the democratic
consolidation process because it violates the necessary principles of the rule of law (ibid). The concept of marfeim therefore defines a specific form of corruption. This is the
misappropriation of public funds for private profit that goes hand in hand with the conflict of interest of the political elite (ibid). Four main characteristics can be distinguished for the Rule of Law concept. These characteristics include the separation of powers, predictability of the legal system, independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and universal protection of civil rights and freedoms by law (ibid). For the concept of democracy, four main
characteristics can also be distinguished from the definition of O'Donnell (1996) and a component from the definition of Linz and Stepan (1996). According to O'Donnell, the concept of democracy consists of two procedural characteristics namely: free and fair elections that universally encompass all residents. The other two characteristics are about the state characteristics (O'Donnel 1996 30-41). The state requires a legal system to
guarantee the rights and freedoms where no one is above the law (ibid). In this the engine of a modern, consolidated democracy is added: namely the civil society that can operate from free association and communication (Thomas and Hrebenar 2008: 1-9).
The obscuring of public funds for private gain, in particular through the illegal awarding of government contracts, is the form of corruption discussed in this thesis. This thesis will focus on three types of conflicts of interest with martfeim effects (Nicolescu-Waggonner 2019: 1-22). The first effect is when the politician is an owner or shareholder of a company that maintains contracts with the state and holds a public office (ibid). The second effect of a conflict of interest occurs when a politician receives compensation through beneficiaries who have close ties with the politicians. The public contracts are obtained because of the influence of this politician in the permit procedure (ibid). The third effect points to the inherent conflict of interest created by the politician's interest in
remaining freedom from the law. This is based on a dilemma assuming that the politicians illegally manipulate government spending (ibid). On the other hand, politicians have a duty to guarantee the rights and freedoms of citizens. The politicians in these conflicts of interest are individuals with legislative powers to reform the law (ibid). This theory assumes a rational actor model. The politicians do not in any situation weigh the importance of others over their own (ibid). From the concept of martfeim it is the interest of the rational politician who is to win elections, to earn campaign money and not to be punished for illegal practices (ibid). From a system that has no rule of law, the corrupt politician will acquire money through illegal practices (ibid). The result is that the reward for not reforming is higher than the reform for democratic principles. In this conceptual framework, certain core democratic values from advanced democracies are used as a benchmark for democratization in
Suriname (ibid). These democracies are characterized by the predictable application of laws and the certainty of contract enforcement, which forms the core of the Rule of Law (ibid).
The concept martfeim runs synchronously with the unified normative framework for political corruption as stated by Ceva and Ferretti (2017). The auteurs discusses both neo-republican and liberal approaches of political corruption (Ceva and Ferretti 2017a: 1-10) In their unified conception of political corruption the auteurs define political corruption as followed:”political corruption occurs when a public official, entrusted with the public power either to make or to implement public rules, makes a distorted use of that power, and bends those rules for the pursuit of a surreptitious agenda (idem: 8)”. This definition demarcates both individual as institutional instances of political corruption such as clientelism and campaign private finance (idem: 1-10). The authors state that from a normative standpoint
that political corruption violates the commitment to public justification of public action that undergirds the rationale of the public order in a democratic system (ibid). The authors argue how political corruption goes against liberal democratic norms in the implementation of public rules. The article from Ceva and Ferretti states that political officials are entrusted with a public function within public rules and institutions that constitute liberal democratic order and have boundaries in which the public officials ought to exercise their power (Ceva and Ferretti 2018: 1-16). Because of the surreptitious of political corruption goes against this public order of public rules, institutions and boundaries (ibid).
Methodology
In this thesis, it was decided to use a case study design (Halperin and Heath 2017: 205-218). This was chosen because this thesis attempts to contribute to the theories about democratic consolidation in developing democracies. It has been mentioned earlier in the theoretical framework that the concepts used appear to be controversial and difficult to embed. Studies on democratic consolidation also appear to point to context-bound aspects that are decisive for democratic consolidation (Johnson 2000: 1-33). Johnson's research concludes that large-scale corruption often affects the underlying aspects of democratic consolidation. This emphasizes the complexity of investigating the effect of corruption on democratic
consolidation (ibid). In Svolik's research, too, no clear indicators of democratic consolidation were found (Svolik 2008: 153-166). The author states that context-bound economic
developments, the quality of executive bodies and the authoritarian past of developing democracies determine the success or failure of consolidation (Svolik 2008: 153-166). This again implies that the importance of case study into the phenomenon of democratic consolidation can contribute. In this thesis, therefore, a single case study was chosen in which democratization in Suriname was selected under the regime of Desi Bouterse
(Halperin and Heath 2017: 205-218). This study attempts to supplement existing studies on democratization in Latin American countries. The selection of the Republic of Suriname can contribute because the Republic of Suriname differs substantially from the countries in Latin America on a number of points (Center for a Secure Free Society 2017: 1-10). Firstly, the Republic of Suriname is one of the few countries in South America that does not have a Latin
language as its official language (ibid). Secondly, the number of inhabitants and the size of the country make the Republic of Suriname the smallest country in South America (ibid). An argument that will explain these aspects that the Republic has experienced an incomparable development from the historical context. The Republic of Suriname, for example, is the last state in South America that became dependent on colonial powers (ibid).
The relatively late democratic development in the Republic of Suriname characterizes Suriname as a most differences case in comparison to other cases in South-America
(Halperin and Heath 2017: 205-218). However, the relatively small size of the population of the Republic makes the case a most likely case for the progress of democratic development (Veenendaal 2019: 5-18). The exceptional aspects of the country are also emphasized in the report that states that the Republic has been developed into an institutionalized criminalized state (Center for a Secure Free Society 2017: 1-10). This again makes the case interesting to investigate how the specific characteristics of the country relate to the development of democratic consolidation. For these reasons, an intensive study of democratic development is justified in the single case of Suriname. A critical remark I make in this regard is that it is rather difficult to find reliable sources that report on the country's corrupt practices. The sources that report on this can in no way be called neutral. This means that the objectivity of these sources remains an open discussion in this thesis. However, the purpose of this thesis is not to make a normative judgment about this. This thesis attempts to contribute to the expansion of the concept of democratic consolidation. By applying the new theories about the concept of corruption, new insights may be gained. Secondary literature will be used to link the concepts to developments under the Desi Bouterse regime (Halperin and Heath 2017: 328-331). This was chosen because data on corruption is practically difficult to acquire. For this reason, sources from the republic will be used as well as sources from other
countries. This thesis will have a descriptive character because the theories used have not been developed to test the theories in an explanatory manner. This is justified because the aim of this thesis is primarily theory-creating. The analysis will explore the secondary literature on corruption cases in Suriname. They will then be brought into the broader context of the conceptual explanation. From this analysis, this thesis will try to answer the descriptive main question: to what extent is corruption under the regime of Desi Bouterse a barrier to democratic consolidation in the Republic of Suriname?
Analysis
Corruption in Suriname is seen as a major problem encountered in the public and private sectors (GAN Integrity 2016). Notable forms of corruption can be found mainly in dubious public procurement. For example, permits are obtained in corrupt ways and corruption can also be found in customs controls (ibid). The Republic of Suriname has hardly any legal basis to fight corruption. Although the possibilities for this are being discussed in parliament, concrete legislative proposals are not forthcoming (ibid). This means that corruption and its safeguarding will be increased for the time being (ibid). For example, the republic is not yet participating in the anti-corruption convention of the United Nations. However, Suriname has ratified the Inter-American treaty against corruption. From the judicial system,
corruption appears to play a major role (ibid). The report shows that bribes can be paid to get a favorable court decision (ibid). The unresolved case of the December murders where Desi Bouterse has been designated as the main suspect is also seen as an issue that
questions the independence of the judiciary (ibid). In this case, the public prosecutor
demanded 20 years in prison against the president after forensic investigation. However, the Surinamese court of justice has so far failed to rule on this (Organization of American States 2012). Following the criminal proceedings, the President and his government coalition also adopted an amnesty law that exempted the President of the 1982 murders from criminal proceedings (ibid). Various domestic and foreign organizations have criticized this
(International Commission of Jurists 2013); (European Union 2012); (Amnesty International 2014). The adopted law would be contrary to international norms regarding the democratic Rule of law. Both the European Union and the international committee of lawyers conclude that it goes against the principles of Rule of Law (ibid). Non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also share these positions (Human Rights Watch 2012); (Amnesty International 2014). Domestic interest groups also set up a
committee in response to this controversial Amnesty Act. The Committee on the
Conservation of the Democratic Rule of Law in Suriname has announced that it rejects the controversial amnesty law in order to prevent relapse into authoritarian regime (Stichting 8 December 1982 2019).
In a number of cases, it is therefore clear that the judicial system is influenced by political interveners. However, this is not perceived by the business community as a
systematic barrier (GAN Integrity 2016). However, it is stated that a shortage of judges leads to legal proceedings being relatively slow. With an average of 1715 days per legal procedure, the Surinamese legal system is the slowest legal system in the world (ibid). This means that the business community experiences the judicial system as inefficient in the field of conflict resolution and legal proceedings (ibid). Suriname is not participating in the treaty on formal conflict resolution between states and nationals of other states. In general, there are no significant cases of corruption in the police or army (ibid). For the time being, the police appear to play a good role in maintaining order. Although the crime figures are described as harmful to the business community (ibid). Yet civil authorities seem to be in control of the police and the army. Allegations that suggest that corruption occurs among these bodies are investigated and tried on a normal basis (ibid). Reports show some cases where corruption cases remain unpunished. Corruption practices remain an existing risk in the public services of the Republic of Suriname (ibid). A report indicates that bribes and additional payments are required in the public service application. In addition, the application for permits and their requirements takes place in a fairly impractical procedure (ibid). Starting a business takes on average 84 days, which is almost three times as much as the regional standard in South America. No objective cases of corruption can be found for the enforcement of property rights (ibid). However, the transparency of land ownership is very poor. There is no land ownership registration that is accessible to citizens (ibid). There is also no initiative from the government to register or control land properties. This makes registering property in Suriname a fairly expensive and time-consuming process. On average it takes 220 days to apply for a building permit, which is again relatively high compared to other states in South America (ibid).
From the sources, the tax system in Suriname appears to be a moderate risk. It is reported that the payments of bribes occur in the annual tax transfer (ibid). Although the tax system is relatively fast, the tax rates are also lower than in the rest of the South American region. Nevertheless, the tax system taxes a large part of the business, while a large part of the inhabitants does not contribute to the transfer of income tax (ibid). The latter
inhabitants abuse the insufficient enforcement laws to evade taxes. This means that fair competition in business is threatened. A high risk of corruption applies to the customs administration. This is evident from the reports that report that bribery occurs frequently for
the import and export of goods (ibid). However, the Surinamese government has implemented a new system of customs registration, which makes import and export
transport easier (ibid). The lack of anti-corruption measures and transparency would be the cause of an increase in drug trafficking and human trafficking (ibid). A high risk of corruption is reported on tenders from the Surinamese government. Government funds and public participation in policy and government contracts are often distributed among affiliated companies and individuals of politicians (ibid). Furthermore, irregular payments for permits and public procurement are common in the republic. Like other examples mentioned, the lack of transparency means that public procurement can hardly be controlled (ibid). In the natural gold mining sector, there is also a high risk of corruption. Gold mining is the most important export product for the Republic of Suriname. However, the lack of regulations on gold mining results in an unregistered informal economy (ibid). Illegal gold mining is
responsible for two-thirds of the national gold exports. However, this illegal gold mining is not maintained by the Surinamese government. This means that transparency and lack of control from the government lead to large-scale corruption with environmental damage that threatens public health (ibid).
The legislature in Suriname fails to enforce anti-corruption legislation. The Ministry of Justice and Police is responsible for combating corruption (ibid). However, they cannot intervene because the legislation provides no basis for this. The only legal basis on which Suriname could act against corruption is laid down in the Penal Code (ibid). These laws are also outdated and new draft laws for this are not discussed in the national parliament (ibid). The Surinamese government also obliges the companies in Suriname not to carry out
internal controls on government policy. This allows foreign companies and investors to get involved in corruption scandals (ibid). Examples of these scandals are the obtainments of goldmining concessions that will be elaborated in the next paragraph. There is also no legislation obliging government officials to perform financial disclosure of policies (ibid). For civil society, there are a number of rights and freedoms that are generally accepted from the constitution. These rights can be found in the fundamental rights of freedom of expression, press, and assembly (ibid). However, the law limits these rights with a form of censorship. For example, expressing hatred, hostility or contempt towards the government is
seven years' imprisonment is prescribed by law (ibid). Positive reports are generally made about freedom of the media. The Republic of Suriname has a diverse media landscape consisting of different organizations. The publications of these media organizations are experienced as being free from government interference (ibid). The fundamental right to freedom of association is also present in Suriname and is generally respected. For example, various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) report that they can operate freely from the government without interference (ibid). They also generally maintain positive relationships with government officials. However, the responsiveness of the government to the reports of this NGO remains an open discussion (ibid). It can be said that the NGOs and the media are nevertheless bound by the degree of censorship that is legally determined. As a result, it can be stated that media and civil society are limited in expressing criticism against the
government (ibid).
More recent reports of corruption indicate new heights of corruption under the regime of Desi Bouterse. In a study by the Dutch NRC Handelsblad, a professor from the Surinamese university Anton de Kom and chairman of the Surinamese association of
economists and other sources were interviewed (Buddingh 2018). This research shows that under the Bouterse regime the Surinamese government is often guilty of corruption in the form of gold concessions, landowner rights, government contracts, and bribes. One of these cases involves the drug cartel of Guyanese criminal Roger Khan (ibid). Added to this, CSFS concludes that the Bouterse government actively participates, participates in transnational criminal organizations (Center for a Secure Free Society 2017: 1-10). It states that the
government under Bouterse mainly uses illegal gold mining in money laundering practices of transnational criminal organizations (Center for a Secure Free Society 2017: 1-10). The TOC activity mentioned concerned the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), drug cartels from Guyana, Venezuela, Bolivia and Brazil (Center for a Secure Free Society 2017: 1-10). In the NRC investigation, the Dubois case versus the Surinamese state and Douglas is mentioned (Buddingh 2018). As a Surinamese citizen, Dubois had a piece of land from the Surinamese state for rent on which her houses were built. Two days after the elections won by Desi Bouterse, a minister of the NDP issued a controversial decision (ibid). In this decision, the piece of land rented to Dubois was given to Douglas as the property. Douglas appeared to be a convicted drug criminal who has worked as an intermediary between Desi Bouterse
and the convicted drug criminal Roger Khan (ibid). Sources show that NDP politicians, together with Douglas, inspected the lands months prior to the decision. According to the Surinamese professor Schalkwijk, corruption has never been greater in Suriname than under the new regime of Bouterse (ibid). The Professor states that this poses a threat to
democracy because the government has turned into a kleptocracy. According to Schalkwijk, this corruption takes place in the granting of gold concessions, landownership and
government contracts (ibid). Schalkwijk states that these contracts obscure millions of euros for citizens or family members who maintain good relations with the president and other politicians of his party. These politicians also enrich themselves with the misappropriation of funds from the state funds (ibid).
A major corruption case concerning the granting of gold concessions and property rights is the case concerning Tranquillo NV (ibid). The company received a 5000-hectare gold concession from the government after just six months of its establishment. The director and manager of the company appear to be a close friend and foster child of President Desi Bouterse (ibid). In 2014, the gold concessions appear to contain an area in which a Canadian company had already been granted exploitation rights. A minister indicated that it would be an official error, but it did not come to a political solution (ibid). Two years later the
company Tranquillo NV appears. to have returned the gold concession through a new state-owned enterprise called NV1 (ibid). From publications, it appears that Tranquillo NV. has been compensated by the state-owned company with a million dollar agreement in addition to the new gold concession (ibid). This scandal illustrates how the people who have close ties with the president get money channeled from the state funds. In similar circumstances, another corruption scandal concerning the granting of gold concessions came to light (ibid). In 2013, the Surinamese government set aside a number of territories to subsequently win gold with American companies (ibid). Just before the procedure, the government of
Bouterse granted dozens of gold concessions of thousands of hectares to private individuals who maintained good personal relationships with politicians (ibid). After criticism from the Surinamese parliament, the president published a complete list of the companies to whom the concessions had been granted. Among the beneficiaries were the lawyer of Bouterse, friendly entrepreneurs, director of the ministry of natural resources and an activist who was active the NDP (ibid). Parliamentarian Brunswijk also received a handful of concessions. In
the first reign of Desi Bouterse, the parliamentarian was still part of the NDP's coalition (ibid).
Another notable corruption case is that of the minister of public works and party member of NDP Ramon Abrahams. A publication from a Surinamese magazine in 2013 describes the corrupt practices of the minister in which 80 million has been misappropriated from the state treasury (ibid). The minister awarded government contracts to only NDP sympathizers and raised the contract prices by up to 25 percent. The increased amount was then often delivered in cash to officials under the Ministry of Abraham (ibid). These bribes came in the name of the state treasury because the money paid in cash remained
unregistered and the contractors were repaid with a delay. The darkening of the 80 million from the state treasury is associated with the minister's own enrichment (ibid). It is known from the trade register that the Abrahams established a construction and raw materials company shortly after his appointment. It is also known that the minister has established a helicopter company of which no substantial competition can be found in Suriname (ibid). The minister also had hundreds of computers delivered to his ministry through his son's company. Shortly before the publication of the Surinamese magazine, Abrahams was dismissed honorably as a minister by President Bouterse. Despite the resignation as a minister, Abrahams remained vice-president for the NDP and campaign leader for Desi Bouterse (ibid). It is known that Ramon Abrahams had a close relationship with the president since the military coup of 1980.
According to a parliamentarian, these corrupt public procurement practices are strategies to increase the electoral support of NDP (ibid). The way in which these
assignments are granted means that entrepreneurs and employers are forced to support the NDP in order to be able to claim public contracts. The corruption practices get resistance mainly through the political opposition parties. A relevant case in this regard concerns the purchase of an asphalting installation from a local entrepreneur (ibid). A parliamentarian from the opposition showed that the purchase of the asphalt installation through the
original producer would cost less than half the agreed amount. Because of this criticism from the parliamentarian, the transaction for the asphalting installation was eventually canceled (ibid). In another case, the supervisory board of the state energy company EBS dismissed the director of the state company, a former NDP minister for corruption (ibid). However,
President Bouterse restored the NDP politician to his office and let the members of the council step down. A report from the Ministry of Education also points out a corruption scandal concerning the meal provision of after-school care (ibid). In this case,
parliamentarians have provided meal services for years through catering companies of parliamentarians. In this, therefore, expenditure from the Ministry of Education is obscured by these parliamentarians. Despite suggestions for further investigations to institute criminal proceedings, they have not been provided (ibid).
The aforementioned cases in the analysis revealed that corrupt practices of politicians under the regime of Desi Bouterse damage the principle of Rule of Law. This is due to the fact that contract enforcement from the legal system is hardly achieved. As mentioned above, this principle is a requirement for achieving democratic consolidation. It also emerges that the Surinamese republic has a shortage of legal grounds to tackle
corruption. Although politicians and the publications do indicate that reforms are needed for this, they are therefore not forthcoming. Due to the self-enriching nature of corruption cases, the concept of martfeim emerges. Politicians indeed seem to encounter a dilemma in terms of interests. On the one hand, reforms to guarantee the rule of law will result in their corrupt practices no longer being safeguarded. However, they do have a political duty to implement adequate reforms to ensure contract enforcement. The violation of the Rule of law comes to a head in the criminal proceedings of the president. The president has successfully managed to free himself from the prosecution of committed murders. The resignation of the supervisory board in the state energy company is also a high point. The president has intervened directly by restoring his corrupt official and releasing opponents of his corrupt practices. The gold concession scandals, public procurement, and bribe also point to the concept of martfeim. The NDP politicians also implement practices in which state money is obscured to enrich themselves or close friends. These practices violate the Rule of law principle and threaten the ability of the Surinamese government to enforce contracts and property rights of citizens. The role of the Bouterse government in the TOC gives a new depth point for democratic consolidation. Both the CSFS report and the professor's interview state that Suriname can be characterized as a kleptocracy or a criminalized state. This is currently the label where corruption in a country can stop the democratic values of consolidation.
Conclusion
In this conclusion the thesis will be concluded by answering the following main question: to what extent does corruption under the regime of Desi Bouterse form a barrier to democratic consolidation in the Republic of Suriname? To answer this question, important high points from the theories and analysis are leading. As mentioned earlier, the theoretical framework has primarily identified violations of the democratic rule of law that goes hand in hand with corrupt as a barrier to democratic consolidation. With the concept of martfeim, further insights are obtained to analyze the way in which democratic developments from the political elites are interrupted by conflicts of interest. The analysis mainly shows that corruption practices concerning gold concessions, government procurement and bribes contain many aspects of the martfeim concept. The aforementioned corruption scandals are to a certain extent based on self-enrichment and the promotion of close ties between
politicians. In this respect, the principles of Rule of Law are, in a sense, violated by the lack of contract enforcement by the judiciary.
Despite the fact that multiple sources are proposing anti-corruption reforms from the legislature and the judiciary, these reforms are not forthcoming. From the point of view of politicians and their role in the corruption scandals, this mainly points to the concept of martfeim. This is based on the fact that reforms would lead to the politicians involved being no longer safeguarded in their corrupt practices. It is therefore not in the interest of
politicians to implement contract enforcement reforms, which is, to a certain extent, required for democratic consolidation. The corrupt practices under the Bouterse regime therefore form a real barrier to consolidate democratically through the set concepts. The country also threatens to fall into a kleptocracy or criminalized state as stated by the CSFS and professor Schalkwijk.
The conceptual nature of this thesis means that it is limited in its position. For
example, the sources used in this thesis are not neutral, which raises objectivity. However, it is true that objective data concerning corruption practices can hardly be obtained in an objective manner. For these reasons, this thesis accepts the lack of objective data. A substantial attempt has been made with the concepts used in this thesis to gain further insight into the barriers to democratic consolidation in developing democracies. By studying an exceptional case more closely, this thesis attempts to contribute to this. This thesis will
therefore also make the suggestion to investigate further investigations into corruption and the role of transnational criminal organization. The recommended research design for this is a comparative research design with other countries in Latin America. This thesis will
preferably state that nearby countries such as Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia and Brazil can lead to interesting insights.
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