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How was historical imagery used in propaganda posters of the European powers of the Second World War?
MA Thesis in History Jon Loftus
Supervisor: Bart van der Boom Universiteit Leiden
S2383616 June 2019
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Contents
Introduction - 3
Chapter One: Propaganda Theory and Methodology of Poster Analysis - 10 Chapter Two: Ancient and Medieval Conflicts – 19
Chapter Three: Early-Modern and Modern Conflicts – 32
Chapter Four: Heroes, Ethno-nationalist Representations and Historical Individuals – 52 Conclusion – 69
Bibliography- 72 Poster List – 76
Acknowledgements
Thanks to my friends and family who had to suffer me droning on about posters and the epistemic merit model for months on end. Particular thanks goes to my colleagues Heleen Wink, Anastasia Petrovskaya and Bertel Bertelsen, who translated captions from the many
languages I cannot read. Vital proof reading and advice giving was done by Kyran Penny, Christopher Bull, Caragh Thomas, Suzanne Hutchinson and Tim Loftus. Special thanks must
go to Laurie Venters, who discussed and advised on the writing of this thesis from its inception, while simultaneously completing his own. Finally, thanks to the archivists who put
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Introduction
There was a common visual lexicon of historical imagery shared by the propaganda posters of the major European powers during the Second World War, that transcended their political and historic contradictions. The United Kingdom, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union all produced propaganda posters that used historical imagery. Posters showed victory in past wars and battles, heroic leaders and imagery from the past; such as swords, shields, ancient warships and religious iconography. Although the nations producing these images were very different, they all used history and historical imagery in strikingly similar ways. There are huge differences and variation in national histories and values between these powers, and yet they still used the past in comparable ways, independently of each other. Clearly, history served as a very useful source for propaganda, because it explicitly linked the state to the national identity of the audience. This thesis will show how history was used in wartime propaganda, and compare the use of historical posters between Britain, Germany and Russia. I show that all three used similar historical motifs, images of past victories (both ancient and more recent) as well as ethno-nationalist representations of populations to persuade their citizens. There were several standard forms of historical poster, of relatively universal design and structure deployed by the three powers. Furthermore, history was chosen and utilised in similar ways. Posters were structurally alike but used different aspects of history determined by national origin, which could then also be framed in different ways, depending on ideology. The three powers posters are alike in structure, and their use of similar examples of history that exalt the national past to manipulate their citizens. They all use recognisable motifs and characters to ensure the audience can relate. Images of the past were used to appeal to citizens, encouraging action or support in the present. There are three main types. The first type is posters that referenced conflicts from the distant past, their original meanings long since faded in favour of semi-mythical ideals that could be adapted for modernity. The second type are posters that called upon wars from the early-modern period, more well remembered in contemporary culture, as well as conflicts in living public memory. The third kind are posters that used historical figures or ethno-nationalist identities, individuals from folklore or history who embodied a nations values and peoples. Despite the wide variety of characters, events and references called upon, the three nation’s historical posters display numerous similarities. I will discuss and compare how each country used these types of poster, the history they chose to use, and the different messages they tried to convey. I aim to prove that historical posters were a transnational genre of propaganda and show how history served as an ideal tool of war.
This thesis is a comparative study of historical imagery in the wartime posters of Britain, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and the ‘Germanic’ Axis-occupied territories. The Nazi regime produced historical posters in the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, using the same features seen in German, Russian and British posters. Both fascist, democratic and communist nation states fighting in the Second World War used propaganda posters with figures or events from their respective national histories to buttress civilian morale, reinforce loyalty to the state and inspire soldiers to fight. The importance of state created images to people’s national self-conception is even more pronounced during wartime. I contend historic imagery is so prevalent because shared national histories were both the most emotive themes for the public that the state can access, and national mythology was something states could claim ownership of. Furthermore, Europe’s tumultuous history provided more than enough events with
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parallels to the modern war that could be used in propaganda. These posters represent history as a tool of nation building in its most clear and prominent form.
Posters were often the most direct link between citizens and the states they live in. The importance of visual sources in this period cannot be understated: in Britain the nostalgia for wartime posters has become a cottage industry, and the infamous photograph of the ‘Times Square kiss’ is universally recognised. Discussing that famous image, Hariman and Lucaites have argued that posters and visual material were an important part of how people saw themselves and their society: “people form, maintain, and continually revise their conception of themselves as a people by looking at images in the public media.”1 Conscious of the nature of propaganda, there is often an element of subtle, if not outright manipulation of the intended audience. The purpose of these posters was to inspire a devotion to fight and inspire hatred of the enemy. My hypothesis is that posters in differing national contexts contain historic imagery because history was used to reinforce national identity, and could be easily integrated into wartime propaganda. In the posters of each country there are general themes that come through that reflect various national attitudes and approaches to propaganda. It is important to explore these national differences, as well as the distinct methodology and histories their propaganda drew upon. In understanding the phenomenon of historic posters, it is necessary to engage in why a given nation included specific historic or cultural motifs. Kathleen Ryan has shown that “understanding a culture (and its cultural products) is crucial to understanding how, or if, propaganda will work.”2 As the aim of states was to produce
effective propaganda, they looked to national historic culture, as well as the values of the public, to manipulate opinion. The broad themes present in each corpus of national posters, as well as their approach to propaganda will be briefly outlined below.
In the posters of the United Kingdom the general public were treated as errant children who had to be submitted to constant hectoring by the state. The majority of posters held in the National Archives and British Library are related to domestic life, condescending examples such as “Potato Pete says “I’m great in soup!””, ‘Take care coming out of brightly lit tube stations during the blackout’ and ‘address your letters plainly’ etcetera. As Finch has noted, propagandists’ insistence that all state produced messages conveying war information “had to be disguised as entertainment, contains an underlying philosophy that the people cannot be assumed to have even a basic level of cerebral capacity or, indeed, intellectual curiosity.”3 The Ministry of Information created and distributed huge amounts of posters during the war. Condescending they may have been, but they were of a decidedly less authoritarian tone than their counterparts in Germany and Russia. Jo Fox has shown that the British public considered perceived state infringement on the rights of the individual - freedom of opinion, speech and assembly - as tantamount to the behaviour of the Gestapo: the British public idealised freedom and liberty, as well as their vaunted parliamentary democracy.4 In a Mass Observation report from September 1941, it was reported that “there was a strong correlation
1 Robert Hariman & John L. Lucaites, “The Times Square kiss: Iconic Photography and Civic Renewal in US Public Culture.” The Journal of American History (2007) 94 (1): p. 122
2Kathleen M. Ryan, ‘Don't Miss Your Great Opportunity’: Patriotism and Propaganda in Second World War Recruitment’, Visual Studies, 27:3, (Oct 2012), p. 249
3 Lynette Finch, “The Man in the Street and Second World War Propaganda”, Journal of Australian Studies, 23:60 (1999), p.100
4 Jo Fox, “Careless Talk: Tensions within British Domestic Propaganda during the Second World War”, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 51, No. 4 (October 2012), pp. 943-48
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between ‘Britishness’ and “liberty, love of home, tolerance and justice,” which was so important to British ‘national ideology’ that Mass Observation surmised “freedom and tolerance are looked on by many people almost as a British monopoly.”5 Although the Ministry of Information produced thousands of posters set in modernity, the British created far less historical posters than Russia or Germany. This is likely because of the backlash against propaganda that resembled posters used in the last war, in which historic imagery of knights and saints was common. Vital to the British psyche in this period was the still present tragedy of the First World War, framed by the Church and State as a glorious ‘sacrifice,’ but largely remembered for the high casualties and horrendous conditions. The ‘Great War’ was still an open wound on the public consciousness, its trauma a crucial part of understanding the mind-set of the British public. As in the other nations, direct parallels both to recent history and the more distant past abound. For the United Kingdom, the major themes of their propaganda were based on the principles of ‘Britishness’- namely freedom, liberty, and popular ideals of fairness and democracy.
The posters of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereafter the Soviet Union or USSR) draw extensively on traditional Russian folklore and history, combined with a dual patriotic impulse for the defence of the Motherland and the Revolution of 1917. Despite the seeming contradiction between Communism and figures from the Russian past, Stalin sought to evoke heroes and state victories, adding them to the pantheon of Soviet heroes to increase the legitimacy of the regime.6 Robert Tucker has suggested that Stalin’s simultaneous position as
a revolutionary figure and a Russian national statesman allowed him to adopt figures from Russian history without contradiction of Bolshevism, because he equated “the construction of socialism with state building in a historical Russian sense.”7 The Soviet Union created far more posters than Britain or Nazi Germany, as the Bolsheviks had used posters as a tool to uplift the class consciousness of the entire population since the Revolution. The Central Committee had taken direct control of all political art in 1931 as they recognised it as a powerful political tool for influencing individuals and a means of “entering the consciousness and hearts of millions of people.”8 The total estimate for Soviet wartime posters is between 2500-3000 distinct designs, with copy runs ranging from a few hundred to half a million depending on the format. The state publishing house Iskusstvo (literally translated as ‘art’) produced 800 distinct designs from 1941-45, for a total of 34 million copies; while in Leningrad 700 designs were produced, 103 by the ‘Fighting Pencil’ (Boevoi karandash) satirical group. More than 1000 TASS Windows were produced by the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) featuring quickly made hand stencilled designs made by local artists, who could produce art responding to events and news, production of which was largely decentralised.9 The Soviets considered posters crucial to “efforts to influence people’s perceptions of the war, and what was at stake in it.”10 Iskusstvo was in charge of posters
5 Ibid, p. 948 & File Report FR 878, “What Does Britain Mean to You?” 23 September 1941, Mass Observation Archive (Sussex)
6 Kevin M. F. Platt, and David Brandenberger, Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature As Stalinist Propaganda (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 2006), p. 11
7 Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above 1928-1941 (London: W.W.Norton & Co, 1990), pp. 60 & 65
8 Brigada khudozhnikov, nos. 2-3 (1931): 1-3.
9 Mark Edele, “Paper Soldiers: The Wold of the Soldier Hero according to Soviet Wartime Posters.” Geschichte Osteuropas, (Jan 1, 1999), p. 94
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overall and oversaw the production and distribution of distinct designs across the entire Union in quick succession. Mark Edele has discussed the ‘Soldier Hero’ in Soviet posters and concluded that after disappointing early efforts using abstract themes early in the war, “artists soon learned to employ powerful and adaptable symbols.”11 These would include posters showing famous Russian victories against invaders from the West; from the thirteenth century all the way to 1917.
The Soviets made extensive use of Russian folk heroes that appealed to peasants and workers and could be easily wedded to the anti-German war effort. The implied lionisation of the Russian soldier as the legendary bogatyrs, wandering Russian hero-knights, were accompanied by posters depicting Red Army troops fearlessly advancing watched over by famous Napoleonic-era generals. In addition, legendary heroes and battles were associated with the contemporary campaigns in Western and South Russia. Victoria Bonnell has shown that imagery from Russian culture, advertising, fine art, religious and folk art, mythology and revolutionary movements were fused with contemporary ideology to create a unique and persuasive visual language.”12 Some TASS Windows and posters even depict various Russian victories through history, with notable examples being the defeat of Napoleon in 1812 and comparing him to the similarly pompous figure of Hitler. The Soviets had made great use of compelling posters during the Russian Civil War, and during the ‘Great Patriotic War’ created many posters using striking visuals, based on the pre-existing visual language of Civil War ROSTA Windows and lubok broadsheets: simple illustrated posters that since the seventeenth century had been tailored to the peasantry and urban poor who would be able to infer the messages visually.13 These lubki were often allegorical and included reference to Russian mythical figures like the bogatyr Ilya Muromets and witch-lady Baba Yaga. Ergo, Soviet posters were designed to be accessible, and therefore maximise their effectiveness. The propaganda of Nazi Germany has been heavily studied, and the vast majority was a sophisticated, multimedia barrage of anti-Semitic nationalism that boomed from loudspeakers, played in cinemas and blared from posters plastered on every available surface. Nazi propaganda presented an image of a national or people’s community, Volksgemeinschaft, that they had created by “by transcending social and class divisiveness through a new ethnic unity based on ‘true’ German values.”14 The Nazis were “scornful” of the western approach of ‘fearing the people’ and saw propaganda as a tool in the hands of the party: “the masses were raw material to be moulded to reflect the will of the leader.”15 Like
the Allies, Adolf Hitler and the German High Command believed in the power of propaganda; in Mein Kampf the Führer explains how he believed the British secured military victory in 1918 because of their effective propaganda at home- winning the war in their heads long before the collapse of the final German Kaiserschlact offensive in April 1918.16
Eugen Hadamovsky, one of Goebbels’s lieutenants in the Ministry of Information, shared this view of the effectiveness of Allied propaganda, citing the slogans of ‘Huns’, ‘Boches’,
11 Edele, “Paper Soldiers, ” p. 47 & p. 90
12 Victoria E. Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters Under Lenin and Stalin. (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1999), p. 7
13 Stephen White, The Bolshevik Poster (London: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 1-2
14 David Welch, “Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People’s Community,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 39, No. 2, Understanding Nazi Germany (April 2004), p. 213
15 Finch, “The Man in the Street,” p. 100
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bloody handprints and tortured Belgian nuns that “screamed from a hundred thousand posters pasted on the walls of cities of the enemy” as a galvanising force that ensured “the feelings of the enemy masses were lashed into a frenzy of resistance and the will to win.” 17 David Welch has shown Nazi propaganda, was based on the 18th century Romantic doctrine of völkisch, conservative nationalism based on traditional values. Welch explains that there are four major themes that re-occur in German propaganda, the first an “appeal to National unity based upon the principle ‘the community before the individual,” (Volksgemeinschaft) accompanied by emphasis on the need for racial purity, “A hatred of enemies which increasingly centred on Jews and Bolsheviks,” and finally “Charismatic leadership (Fuhrerprinzip).”18 The key thrust of Nazi propaganda was that they were defending Europe and its cultural heritage against the tyrannical British, immoral Americans, ‘degenerate’ non-whites and the barbarian communists. The Nazis drew on historic imagery for their propaganda, recalling in particular the Teutonic Knights, High German Kultur and the ancient Nordic heritage of the German people. Hitler also ensured that the pageantry of the party and military resembled that of the Roman legions, an evocation the Nazis consciously sought, most clearly at the Nuremberg Rallies. Interestingly, it is in the posters distributed in Axis Occupied Territories that have the most explicit historic motifs. Fortunately for us all, the Nazis were better at propaganda and style than they were at winning wars.
In the ‘Germanic’ Occupied Territories the Waffen-SS, the military branch of the SS which fielded troops and tanks in battle, made use of a set template for many recruitment posters. In the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, the Germans produced strikingly similar historic posters calling for recruits to fight in the Waffen-SS. Relying on historic figures from the respective nation’s history, they linked these figures to the Nazis current fight against Bolshevism. In France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, posters were produced featuring French and Belgian Crusaders, the Dutch Admiral de Ruyter, Danish and Norse Viking warriors and Longships. In each case, the figures they depicted served some ideological link in a way that can be read in favour of Nazism. Normally the figures depicted are military heroes or ethno-nationalist identities, representations of a nations people, such as Vikings for the Norwegians and strapping blond farmers for the Germans. Since this propaganda is imposed upon the population by a foreign power, and perhaps due to the immoral nature of the Nazi regime, it is coercive and duplicitous in a way that other posters intended for a native audience are not. Quantifying the duplicitous element in these and other posters can be accomplished through application of Sheryl Tuttle Ross’ epistemic merit model, which will be discussed in chapter one along with other quantifying methods.
In terms of historiography, this exact phenomena of historical posters in the Second World War has been overlooked by historians. Posters were not available till national museums collated them, and they were not meant to last ‘in the wild;’ most examples were pasted over or washed away by the weather. Early Bolshevik posters of 1918-21 were collected and discussed by Stephen White in The Bolshevik Poster (1988). Within, he first posits that Soviet Propaganda drew on folklore and allegorical figures to appeal to the politically fractious Russian population. Joseph Darracott and Belinda Loftus, at the behest of Noble Frankland, the director of the Imperial War Museum in London, catalogued some of the most
17 Eugen Hadamovsky: Propaganda and National Power, trans. Randall Bytwerk (Calvin College German Propaganda Archive, 2007), p. 13
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interesting and representative samples of mostly British war posters in the aptly named Second World War Posters (1972). This marked the start of museums beginning to catalogue their posters and organise them for access by researchers. As these posters were never designed to last a long time in the field, the only examples that existed where those acquired by museums or private collections. Serious study of posters thus did not begin till the late 1970s, when it was feasible to study national collections for the first time. Richard Chambers discussed the role of posters specifically in “Art and Propaganda in an Age of War: The Role of Posters” (1983), in which he delineated three main themes of war posters. Namely: appeals to patriotism and valour to encourage recruitment; appeals to civilian oriented activities, that emphasize the importance of civilian production to military victory, and; appeals to fear, often using ‘horror and atrocity’ images designed to foster hatred and fear of the enemy in the viewer.19 The historical posters in this corpus display all three of these themes.
Historian of Stalinism Sheila Fitzpatrick in “War and Society in Soviet Context: Soviet Labour before, during, and after World War II”, (1989) wrote that the German invasion forced the Soviets to abandon their class-based discourse and instead utilised broad polyvalent icons to appeal to their population. Mark Edele wrote on Soviet Propaganda in “Paper Soldiers”, (1999) discussing the creation of soldier heroes and the utilisation of historical figures, explaining how these posters attempted to influence Russian views. Victoria Bonnell wrote on Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin (1999), discussing the adoption of polyvalent symbols, as well as classifying posters as documents of government intent, a useful conceptualisation for the analysis of historical posters. Sheryl Tuttle Ross provided a model for analysing the manipulative element of propaganda posters in “Understanding Propaganda: The Epistemic Merit Model and Its Application to Art.” (2002) Grace-Ellen McCrann wrote “Government Wartime Propaganda Posters: Communicators of Public Policy” (2009), that traced the development of posters from the pointillism of Georges Seurat, to the simplified art of Toulouse-Lautrec, to nationalist Czech artist Alphonse Mucha, through to the visually dynamic posters of the wars. Jo Fox wrote on the propaganda war in the Cambridge History of The Second World War (2015) compared the different propaganda agencies and specific features of public attitudes to it, providing insight into similarities and differences between the combatant powers. She noted key developments before the war, such as Britain and the United States’ aversion to propaganda after the lies of the Great War, while Germany took the opposite lesson, and the Soviets sought to use propaganda to bridge the gap between their diverse ranks of citizens. These works represent a general overview of propaganda posters during the war.
In these historical posters, there are four main categories by which they can be organised. Half the posters reference past battles and wars, while the other half reference specific individuals or invoke ethno-nationalist identities. Past conflicts can be split into two chronological periods; posters depicting Ancient and Medieval wars, such as the Crusades, or invoking Roman military might; and those referencing early modern and modern conflicts such as the Seven Years War, Napoleonic Wars and the First World War, fresh in the memory of the populations of the 1940s. Posters referencing individuals either reference historical figures like Alexander Nevsky, Lord Nelson, or Michiel De Ruyter, while posters using ethno-nationalist identities call on mythology as diverse as the Old Norse and the
19 Lieutenant Richard Chambers, “Art and Propaganda in an Age of War: The Role of Posters.” Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, 13(4): (1983), p. 54
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Ancient Greeks, and utilise figures such as Vikings, Medieval Knights, Teutonic Crusaders or Bogatyrs. These themes; ancient and medieval conflicts, early-modern and modern conflicts, historical individuals and ethno-nationalist depictions are how this thesis will be structured to ensure comparison between countries.
I have sourced images of posters from verified repositories on the internet, mainly national museum collections or scattered across the web then checked against official repositories, as well as several published collections. I collated posters that contain clear historical imagery, and organised them into common themes within the chapters to analyse and compare the use of history by these nations. To ensure accuracy, I have only included posters for analysis that I have confirmed the provenance of beyond reasonable doubt; through the production date, artist and museum reference. British war historian and head of the Imperial War Museum in the 1970s, Noble Frankland was aware of the trend of historic posters in the collections of the Imperial War Museum but noted the methodological difficulties of studying large quantities of posters that are not organised or collected together in one database.20 The internet now
allows this kind of comparative research of sources located in different countries, which would have been extremely arduous to achieve in the past. As such, this is the first comprehensive, comparative study of historical posters in the Second World War. In gathering posters for this study I have pored over thousands of examples from various countries, only selecting posters with historical imagery. This thesis is not an exhaustive catalogue, instead I have selected examples of historical posters that are representative of the genre. Of my sample of approximately 150 posters, I have selected 56 examples that best illustrate the key features, themes and motifs of this genre of posters, as well as represent the chronological spread of the events referenced.
The first chapter shall discuss propaganda theory, its development in the interwar period and propose a model for analysing historical posters. The following chapters are organised thematically so as to facilitate comparison. Chapter Two focuses on posters calling on past conflicts and military motifs from ancient mythology to the early medieval period. Chapter Three discusses posters using early modern and modern wars, including the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. Chapter Four will examine posters that include historical figures and ethno-nationalist identities. This thesis demonstrates how the British, Germans and Russians all used very similar forms of historical poster, that they each populated them with images from their national past, and attempted to influence their populations with comparable themes and techniques.
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Chapter 1- Propaganda Theory and Methodology of Poster Analysis
This chapter outlines propaganda theory regarding political posters and how they work. It will discuss the common features employed in historical posters, and why nations chose to use them. I will then explain the mechanics of persuasion, the theory of how propaganda manipulated its audiences, as well as how propaganda theory in the inter-war period developed and influenced the major powers. I will then discuss definitions of propaganda determining the key features. Finally, I explain an analytical model for analysing historical posters, that focuses on the intended goals of their producers and how these posters tried to manipulate their viewers.
Posters were a potent tool in the arsenal of state propaganda ministries. Propaganda historian James Aulich described the political poster as the “exemplary modern medium [that] appeals to the most modern of phenomena, the masses.”21 They could be distributed widely across territories and provided an easily accessible message to audiences regardless of literacy. Victoria Bonnell, distinguished historian of Soviet political posters, has noted that in times of war and limited supplies of ink and paper, publicly displayed political posters offered a more effective medium of reaching a large audience than newspapers.22 The visual dynamism that artists could create in these posters served to catch attention and reinforce their message. Kathleen Ryan has argued that two dimensional worlds of the poster “offered the simplest and most elegant manifestation of the notion that it was a patriotic duty to serve,” which can be clearly seen in historical posters.23 Wartime propaganda was utilised primarily to convince
people to either enlist and fight, or to support the war effort by other means. Thus, we can assume every historic detail included in a poster is there to serve the purpose of building citizen support for the war effort. As Lynette Finch shows, “the main task of the propagandists was to convince civilians that the war was their war and that survival depended upon victory.”24 This may seem obvious, but it is important for understanding why artists might have used certain historic themes or imagery, as their goal was always to influence the viewer of the validity of the war effort. The First World War had seen the end of small professionalised armies and the advent of total war, with civilians in the firing line as nations committed their entire economy and society against one another.25 As Finch summarised, during the twentieth century “wars have been between nations and not between armies.”26 The Second World War saw even more civilians directly affected by the war: by invasion and occupation, strategic bombing, rationing and enlistment into the armed forces or war production industries. The increase of civilian involvement in the war effort ensured that governments strived to influence them. Accordingly, as Terence Qualter explains, this increased involvement sparked a need to create a personal interest in the outcome of the war for civilians, in the form of national identity; “with the nation at war, appeals to national pride
21 James Aulich, War Posters: Weapons of Mass Communication (London, New York: Thames and Hudson, 2011), p. 11
22 Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters Under Lenin and Stalin, p. 5 23 Ryan, “Patriotism and Propaganda in Second World War Recruitment,’ p. 259
24 Finch, “The Man in the Street and Second World War Propaganda”, Journal of Australian Studies, 23:60, 1999. p. 96
25 Michael Howard, “Total War in the Twentieth Century: Participation and Consensus in the Second World War,” War and Society. A Yearbook of Military History I (1975), pp. 216-226
26 Lynette Finch, “Psychological Propaganda: The War of Ideas During the First Half of the Twentieth Century”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 26, No. 3, (Spring 2000), p.372
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and loyalty took on a new and deeper meaning.”27 Clearly the propagandist’s role was one of a manipulator of opinion, with national history a widely applicable tool for influencing populations.
Historical Posters
The state, British, Nazi or Soviet, demanded loyalty from their citizens and a willingness to risk one’s life or work as hard as possible for the war effort. People are much more likely to cooperate in this manner if they truly believe in the cause, and that the war is worth fighting for. To do this, propagandists filled their work with symbols and imagery from popular history that their citizens would recognise and identify with. Victoria Bonnell has argued that to be effective, political art required the artists to “speak the language” of the intended audience, using symbols, imagery and styles of representation they would understand.28
Posters aimed to “inform, instruct, or suggest new ways of looking at the war” by presenting an easy to comprehend message or idea with an appeal that was emotional rather than rational.29 Using familiar imagery and cultural symbols, posters were designed to draw in and engage with their audiences. History was a natural choice for this format. Available to be called on by the state, as successors to the past, and shared with the general population; history functioned as a mutual framework in which to articulate the importance of the war effort. Grace-Ellen McCrann has explained that for persuasion by propaganda to succeed there must be a level of “social interactivity” between the producer and audience. This is because “persuasion, by its very definition, needs two parties to succeed and a socio-cultural context within which the message or symbol will be understood.”30 Non-historical posters call on a wide range of features, such as British red London buses, that would connect the viewers experience to the scene depicted in the poster, thus increasing the chance that the viewer would accept and act on the posters message. Political Theorist Murray Edelman has asserted that during time of crisis countries are likely to turn to nostalgic depictions of better times gone by.31
In historical posters, images of historic soldiers, heroes, swords and shields, galleons, mounted knights as well as Crusaders, Romans, Bogatyrs and Vikings crop up. They portrayed important, canonised historic events in visually dynamic ways and showed people from the past fighting for or acting in the interests of their nations. The implication for a viewer was clear: your ancestors did their bit, what are you going to do? Images of national history could directly engage with a viewer’s personal life, as the history depicted would belong to them and be part of their national identity. This was obviously not the case for every viewer of every poster, and the ‘history’ depicted may have veered far from the truth of events. Max Weber’s term “imagined uniformity,” describes political artworks that used folk motifs, history or myths were not necessarily reflections of historical fact, but a symbolic construction of a new shared culture to unify behind.32 However, the widespread use of historical imagery in posters is a testament to how effective such motifs were at engaging
27 Terance H. Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 54 28 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, p. 7
29 Lt. Chambers, “Art and Propaganda in an Age of War: The Role of Posters,” p. 54
30 Grace-Ellen McCrann, “Government Wartime Propaganda Posters: Communicators of Public Policy,” Behavioural & Social Sciences Librarian, 28:53-73, (2009), p. 55
31 Murray Edelman, From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political Conceptions (University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 31
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audiences. Thus we see posters call on three groups of historic motifs; Semi-mythical events from the ancient past or early medieval period; conflicts from the sixteenth to the twentieth century, in relatively recent history, which people had a closer connection to,; and historical individuals, mythical heroes and ethno-nationalist identities who embodied a nations spirit and people.
Around two thirds of the posters in this sample utilise imagery from past conflicts, ranging from myths, to medieval conflicts, early modern all the way to the Russian Civil War. Historical battles and wars were used in posters to frame the Second World War as a worthy cause. States could claim legitimacy from the past by referencing history that their citizens would know and identify with. State authority and the weight of the past were twined together to encourage support for the war effort. Rather than an international conflict over the fate of Europe, the war became an extension of national history. Presenting the War in the same image as historical conflicts, mythical heroes or individuals, these posters implied that the contemporary war effort was a direct continuation of a nation’s past conflicts. These past conflicts were obviously seen as necessary or vitally important battles and victories, since they were part of national stories and heritage. The placing of the Second World War within this framework of national histories was intended to legitimise the modern conflict as a continuation of the worthy causes of the past. This invoked a given citizen reader’s national identity and their duty to fight and/or support the war effort. In essence, historical posters were used by Britain, Germany and Russia to convince their peoples that the modern war was a legitimate continuation of the past, and thus required their patriotic support.
Mechanics of Persuasion
The mechanics of persuasion are the processes by which propaganda attempts to influence audiences. After the end of the First World War, intellectuals suggested that propaganda functioned by subtly altering audience’s perception of reality. Writing in 1922, American political journalist Walter Lippmann in Public Opinion posited the existence of ‘pseudo-environments’, a psychological term to explain the capability of the media and states during the First World War at influencing the public. Lippmann argued that our world was too large, complex and varied for humans to fully understand, as “we are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety.”33 Instead, humans carry pictures in our heads, or ‘stereotypes’- a term Lippmann coined - based on a mix between one’s genetic psychology and material conditions. These form a model based on our own experiences, prejudices and attitudes, as well as the impositions of the environment we live in. Australian historian Lynette Finch, writing on psychological propaganda, showed that these pictures determined how individuals perceived their world and is what they referred to when forming an opinion on information they encountered.34 These stereotypes form a pseudo-environment that becomes a lens through which humans perceive and rationalise the world, informing their decisions and attitudes. Lippmann determined that the condition of modernity, with the power of mass media and the vast scale of human society created a layer of interpretation and values between the individual and their environment: “to that pseudo-environment his behaviour is a response.”35 The aim of propaganda is to manipulate opinions and thus behaviour. Since behaviour is based on these pseudo-environments, propaganda seeks to influence individuals
33 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998 [1922]), p. 16 34 Finch, “Psychological Propaganda,” p. 370
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by changing their pseudo-environment itself. In light of Lippmann’s influence, Finch maintains that propaganda aims to supplant individuals own pre-existing opinions and beliefs, as it needs to create a new pseudo-environment through which people will form their responses to warfare.36 These environments can be persuasive but only as long as they are not undermined.
In post-war America, Lippmann was writing in an environment of widespread anger and distrust of state messages, after wartime propaganda proclaiming German atrocities in Belgium were proven to be false. The effect of First World War propaganda on the Second was varied by nation. In Germany, the assumption was that effective propaganda was needed to whip civilians up into a frenzy against the British and Russians, as the British had done against the Germans in the first War. The 1915 Bryce Report, a particularly vitriolic document detailing alleged atrocities by the German Army, was accepted in the US as authoritative owing to the high standing of its author Lord Bryce. The report was a major factor in persuading US public opinion in favour of intervention in France. To the vexation of many, it was proven to be falsified after the war, a fabrication designed to convince the public of the necessity of the war. The shock that many Americans had lost loved ones and sacrificed their time and health, all on the merit of lies caused a backlash of cynicism against propaganda so severe that many Nazi propagandists had a higher opinion of Western posters than their Allied counterparts did.37 This constituted a ‘break in the fictitious world’ established by US propaganda during the war, that presented the Germans as barbarians hell-bent on conquest. This break, seen in Britain as well as the United States, manifested in a cynical attitude towards modern warfare and near hostility towards propaganda images that seemed duplicitous. In the inter-war period, the British considered the widespread cynical attitude to propaganda so severe that the effectiveness of posters may have been permanently crippled. In all cases of posters, but particularly this group that utilised historical imagery and linked it to the War, propagandists aimed to influence their citizens by introducing these rehabilitating images into the public environment. Audiences viewing these images that serve to legitimise and historicize the present through the past will, in theory, perceive the world through an altered pseudo-environment more favourable to the war.
The mechanics of persuasion are worth exploring, as they reveal why images of battles were thought to be effective propaganda. The state produced images that situated the Second World War as a continuation of national struggles in the past, depicting it as a continuation of the country’s struggle to survive against its ancient enemies. Historical posters achieved this through thematically similar images of victories, great military leaders and heroes. Frank Kampfer has noted that different nations also used similar visual techniques, such as treating the left and right sides of the poster frame as east and west, allowing the placement and direction of images to reflect European geography.38 For example, in Nazi anti-Soviet posters the heroes face the right, the east, to oppose Russia. In Soviet posters the heroes charge towards the left, the west, to face their ancestral opponents. The propagandist’s aim was to turn a citizen’s natural affinity for his or her country into support of the war effort. The proliferation of posters in public spaces created a new pseudo-environment in which the war
36 Finch, “Psychological Propaganda,” p. 370 37 Ibid, p. 380
38 Frank Kampfer, "De Rote Keil," das politische Plakat: Theorie und Geschicte (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1985), p. 86
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was construed as a worthy battle for national freedom and defence of traditional values and the homeland. This framework compelled the audience to action by making the war the cause of the nation, for which every citizen was a part of. Appealing to historic nationalism was a necessary step, as Finch points out, as international wars that involve fighting in defence or support of another country “require a more abstract theme than self-preservation or protection of one’s own private property” to motivate troops.39 Past victories inspired thoughts of national glory and heroism. Propaganda positioned the Second World War as a conflict of significance on par with semi-mythologised conflicts and battles from the past. This lent the modern conflict the legitimacy of history, as well as encouraging patriotic individuals to assist the state in ensuring victory in the present. In addition, the association of distinctly national historic events with the present could serve as a unifying force. McCrann, explaining how posters communicate public policy, said that propaganda posters used shared symbolism to frame goals and delineate groups between us and them.40 This is evident in the posters analysed in this chapter. In comparing the present conflict to past battles from the national canon, propagandists present themes of continuity and a universal heritage that can be claimed by ‘us’, instilling national unity and cohesion, as well as simultaneously excluding ‘them.’ Invoking past battles to position the War as a continuation of national history could inspire soldiers to fight harder, civilians to unite behind the war effort and give greater meaning to the conflict.
Propaganda was perceived to be a form of dishonest manipulation. Harold Lasswell, an American communications theorist and scientist, published in 1927 Propaganda Technique in World War I, capturing the key features of the recent wartime propaganda campaigns. His text was eagerly received and considered an authoritative insight on propaganda that informed the techniques applied by the Germans in the 1930s. Lasswell defined propaganda as “the management of opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion rather than by altering other conditions in the environment or in the organism.41” As Finch elegantly summarises, this amounts to “changing the popular perception of the situation without altering its material conditions.”42 Altering perceptions could stem from convincing people that their opponents were truly evil, or that the future of their country was at stake and needed defending, usually through encouraging national pride. By 1939, propaganda had become a crucial component of modern warfare and was vital to the pursuit of victory. Bertrand Russell, a committed pacifist, elucidated the civilian disposition needed for modern conflict, noting that “a nation cannot succeed in a modern war unless most people are willing to suffer hardship and many people willing to die,” and that this willingness can only be produced by convincing their subjects “that the war is about something…so important…as to be worthy of martyrdom.” 43 Clearly, propaganda was considered a very important aspect of a state’s relationship or control over its citizens.
39 Finch, “Psychological Propaganda.” p. 377
40 McCrann, “Government Wartime Propaganda Posters,” p. 61
41 Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in World War I (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1971 [1927]) p. 34
42 Finch, “Psychological Propaganda,” p. 368
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Definitions and Methodology
Kenneth A. Bird, the British wartime propaganda artist known as Fougasse, wrote that he considered “everything stuck up with the object of persuading the passer-by for the common good’’ a propaganda poster.44 Richard Chambers has described posters as “a means of maintaining political and social cohesion, and maintaining morale and enthusiasm for the war,” but this definition leaves propaganda somewhat de-fanged.45 Clearly, there is an element of manipulation or even an implicit threat to the message of these posters. In historical posters, the viewer is told by inference to take part in the war effort like their ancestors or be outside the national community. Michael Balfour, who served in the British High Command during the war, points out that authority of the state and ubiquity of posters meant that propaganda could create a highly emotive atmosphere and “invest its favoured interpretations with such prestige” that barely anyone will consider an alternative.46 In such an environment, invalid claims from a position of authority are even less likely to be challenged. Scholars generally agree that persuasion is the key feature of propaganda. Examining Nazi propaganda, the historian David Welch has argued that the state sought to instruct its people through relentless indoctrination as to why they must offer their loyalty and support.47 To understand the reasoning behind historical posters, we must understand the aims of propaganda and how nations looked to achieve this. Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell held that propaganda is “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.’’48 McCrann suggested that it is the use of persuasive techniques using imagery, messages and wording to convince audiences that the view articulated by the poster is the correct view, and “should be adopted, believed or acted upon by the target audience.’’49 So far, something could be described as propaganda if it is a determined effort to persuade a group by a socio-political organisation or cause. While this is not incorrect, it is vague, and could describe a number of documents or even advertising.
Sheryl Tuttle Ross’s Epistemic Merit Model provides a definition that clearly delineates the key features of propaganda. Ross states that a message must meet four conditions to be propaganda: 1) the intention to persuade; 2) it was sent on behalf of a socio-political organisation or cause with committed ideological positions; 3) directed towards a socially significant group of people; and 4) it is epistemically defective. A message is epistemically defective if its content, as well as conceptual schema and morality “is false, inappropriate or connected to other beliefs in ways that are inapt, misleading, or unwarranted: false statements, bad arguments, immoral commands etc.’’50 The epistemic merit model qualifies that the manipulative element of propaganda that are not lies per se, but are connecting beliefs together in unwarranted ways. Furthermore, many of these poster captions do not contain truth values, and epistemic defectiveness is able to quantify these as well as
44 Kenneth A. Bird, “Propaganda Posters” in A.P. Harper, A School of Purposes: A Collection of Fougasse Posters, 1939-45 (London: Meuthen, 1946), p. 9
45 Lt. Chambers, “The Role of Posters,” p. 54
46 Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 1939-1945: Organisation, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 422
47 Welch, “Volksgemeinschaft,” p. 218
48 Garth S. Jowett & Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999), p. 6 49 McCrann, “Government Wartime Propaganda Posters,” p. 53
50 Sheryl Tuttle Ross, ‘Understanding Propaganda: The Epistemic Merit Model and Its Application to Art.’ The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring, 2002), p. 23
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commands and conceptual frameworks, which are outside ‘true or false.’ Tuttle Ross points out that a propagandist is unlikely to lie outright, as they themselves believe the story they are selling, but instead they twist reality to convince the audience of their intent. Epistemic deficiency is when beliefs are connected to one another erroneously in an attempt to mislead the audience into believing or accepting the propagandist’s assertions. The two posters below both conflate historical figures with the modern war effort, and Tuttle Ross’s model allows us to determine how these posters were designed to manipulate viewers.
The utility of the epistemic merit model can be seen through comparison of a historic Waffen-SS poster to a structurally similar Russian one, both produced in 1943. Figure 1.1 ‘Show you are a true Dutchman’ is a recruitment poster for the Waffen-SS in the Occupied Netherlands, approved and distributed by the Nazi regime. Fig. 1.2 ‘For the Sake of the Motherland, Forward Bogatyrs!’ is a Soviet poster encouraging heroism in Red Army soldiers. Both feature historical figures from the respective national pasts of the Netherlands and Russia; famed Admiral Michiel de Ruyter and a semi-mythical bogatyr (knight-errant), likely Ilya Muromets. Both these figures are often invoked in the spirit of patriotism, although in this case it is a foreign invader-the Nazis- and the nominally internationalist Communist Party who are invoking these images. The association of de Ruyter, a Dutch national hero, with fighting Bolshevism is clearly ahistorical and what Tuttle Ross would describe as ‘epistemically defective.’ There are no truth-value statements in ‘Show you are a true Dutchman, Up-against Bolshevism! Join the Waffen-SS;’ ergo there are no lies per se. Ross’s model allows us to determine that the Nazis conflated historical figures with their war effort to recruit new European troops. In this case, the poster associates de Ruyter, an Admiral from the seventeenth century, with the Nazi fight against ‘Bolshevism’, between which there is little historical connection beyond military conflict in a general sense. It is therefore epistemically defective because it aims to conflate Dutch history with anti-Communism, which incorrectly leads the audience to believe that true Dutch patriotism is joining the Waffen-SS to fight the Soviets. Therefore, as de Ruyter did not fight communism, and we judge the Nazi world view to be false or immoral, this poster is epistemically defective propaganda despite the lack of verifiable ‘lies’ or untruths. In contrast, the Bogatyrs of Russian legend were often engaged in the defence of their homeland, so their enlistment in propaganda is hardly as bemusing as De Ruyter’s. The Russian example is still defective to a smaller degree, as the inclusion of a mythical hero, as well as SVT-40 Rifles and a PPSHE-41 Submachinegun imply that Red Army soldiers would be treated with honour, respect and would be well equipped. Famously lacking so many rifles they had to share between two, before mid-1943, Red troops would likely have laughed at the idea that they were portrayed as knights in shining armour with shiny new weapons. Any recruit to the Red Army convinced by the posters showing fearless Communists armed to the teeth obliterating terrified Germans would soon find that in fact, the posters implied a far easier time than was to be had than reality. In many of these cases, there is a simple conflation of the imagined community of the historical nation with the State’s modern imperative to fight the World War. This manifests as depictions of historical battles, individuals or ethno-nationalist depictions that represent a historic ‘people’, which show them supporting or fighting in past wars. These posters thus present an imperative that the viewer’s nation has historically fulfilled its patriotic duty to fight for or assist the state, and that he or she must do the same in the present.
17 Figure 1.1: ‘Show you are a true Dutchman, Up-Against Bolshevism! Join the
Waffen SS.’S,1943, GVN AG-00348A Figure 1.2:‘For the sake of the Motherland, Forward Bogatyrs!’,Irakly
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To analyse historical posters, I have utilised a methodology that combines the epistemic merit model with Victoria Bonnell’s treatment of propaganda posters as historical documents that reveal state tactics of persuasion and use of cultural references. Bonnell regards posters as sources for official discourse akin to speeches, that are used to “to map out the repertoire of references available in contemporary culture and suggest some possible interpretations,” and attempts to infer the aims of the officials and artists who designed it.51 Ross’ Epistemic Merit model is extremely useful for analysing visual propaganda. By determining which components are epistemically defective, we can ascertain which part of a historical poster is designed to manipulate its viewers. Although the passage of time has ensured civilian reactions to these artworks has been lost to history, Bonnell’s method allows meaningful discussion of the significance of the symbols and imagery used. By using Ross’ epistemic merit model to determine how historical motifs were intended to manipulate the audience, Bonnell’s method can then be employed to determine why. The following three chapters are organised thematically and discuss the common artistic features and historic tropes that
appeared in British, Soviet and Nazi posters.
51 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, p. 11
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Chapter Two: “May the Courageous Example of our Great Predecessors Inspire You in this War!” Ancient and Medieval Conflicts
Posters referencing historic battles or wars are perhaps the most direct use of the past in service of propaganda. Across Europe, posters proclaimed parallels between the Second World War and much older European conflicts from across the previous millennium. this chapter is focused on the chronologically earliest wars and battles utilised in posters, imagery of Imperial Rome and Early-Medieval conflict from before 1500. The Nazis consciously adopted symbols used by the Roman Army, and they and Britain aimed to present their respective war efforts as crusades to defend or liberate Europe. All three referenced Hellenistic mythology, depicting either Greek goddesses or mythical heroes and beasts. The Nazi and Soviet authorities both called on the Northern Crusades on the 13th century as examples of their respective national victories. The three powers used these conflicts and symbols from the distant past to assert that the modern war was as important in the present as many of these foundational conflicts were in the past. In the case of Rome and the Crusades, historical posters presented the war as a continuation of these noble military traditions; either in the defence of ‘European’ or Christian values or a campaign to best evil. This chapter shall discuss posters that reference Roman and Hellenic imagery, the Crusades, and other Early Medieval conflicts.
The Nazis evoked Roman martial culture, adopting symbolism from the Roman Army and borrowing potent imagery such as the swastika from history. This was a conscious attempt by the Nazis to associate themselves with a ‘European’ tradition, as well as the perceived military invincibility of Rome. Three posters demonstrate the Roman Army origins of the Party eagle and Swastika banners, while this example from O Ang shows how the Germans framed the war as a defence of European civilisation and virtues. The Ministry of Propaganda played fast and loose with historical detail, co-opting the imagery of Roman Imperial power that had traditionally been opposed to Germanic peoples. It is a strange twist that the banners of the legions that faced eastwards across the Rhine in the ancient past were turned into the most recognisable symbol of the Nazi regime. As can be seen in Richter’s 1938 poster advertising an NSDAP Rally in Pomerania, the Nazis used pictorial representations of their banners to ensure that the emotive power of their rallies were echoed in public spaces. This is classic totalitarianism: the ubiquitous swastika, eagles and banners serve to convince the onlooker that Germany is under total domination of the Nazis by placing their visual insignia in public places, and thus the mind of the audience. The eagle introduced by Hitler to Nazi imagery was a deliberate exhortation of the Roman Army’s signa militaria: the silver or gold eagle – aquila- that “embodied the spirit of the legion and was the object of religious veneration.”52 The aquila was normally atop the signa militaria. Great shame would fall on a legion that lost its standard. These signa militaria would be carried in the front ranks and were treated with the kind of veneration national flags in medieval and early modern armies were, with Roman legionaries taking great risk to retrieve them if they fell into enemy hands. The connection between the Roman Empire and fascism was historically tenuous: Caesar may have been a tyrant, but he was no fascist. The Roman Empire had a huge cultural legacy and left ruins scattered across Europe, so naturally propaganda aimed to tie Nazism to the
52 Signa Militaria, in Simon Hornblower, Anthony Spanworth and Esther Eidinow (eds.) The Oxford Classical Dictionary (4. Ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)
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Figure 2.1: Pomeranian District Rally of the NSDAP. Max E Richter,.
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legacy of Rome. The Nazis chose to adopt Roman imagery in a way that embodied vague, nationalist ideals of military prowess and European cultural heritage. Seeking to rekindle Germany’s Imperial Glory, Hitler gifted the Wehrmacht four standards bearing golden eagles, consciously modelled on Roman aquila, that he had designed himself to symbolise victory, after having read in an Anti-Semitic dictionary that Eagles were the ‘Aryans’ of the animal world.53 Darracott and Loftus discuss the origins of the Party Eagle seen in Richter’s poster, stating that it was distinct from the Imperial Eagle, that had become purely a nationalist symbol under Weimar. For the Roman Army, their aquila represented both their esprit de corps- the connection and close relationship between legionnaires, as well as symbolising the genii, the many intangible semi-divine spirits and forces that account for everyone and everything.54 This made the standards more than just battle flags, but sacralised ritual objects,
which Roman camps were built around, the genii functioning as semi-divine intermediaries. Hitler’s erroneous use of them was to encourage loyalty and self-confidence in Germany’s ranks, a conscious effort to channel a sense of Imperial grandeur that many Germans had felt was lost in 1918. In his 2015 PhD thesis Benjamin Greet has noted the ‘larger symbolic language’ around Eagles in the Mediterranean. Ancient Rome’s adoption of the aquila standards and eagle coinage served to express itself as a ‘strong state, which entailed “attacking its enemies like an eagle hunting its prey” while also associating with the ancient Hellenistic Kingdoms.55 This association served to heighten perceptions of Roman power, and the aquila’s subsequent adoption centuries later by the Nazis was a similar attempt to associate the awe and respect of ancient military prowess with their regime.
Mythology was used in German Occupied territories, as it presented a visual language that could be understood across Europe. The Nazi message was that they were the defenders of European civilisation and its culture from the Communist barbarians, the imperialist British, and the despised Americans. As spurious as those claims may be in reality, it is exactly the message being articulated in O Ang’s poster “Europe defends its 3000-year-old culture against Bolshevism.” Here we can see the impression Nazi propagandists aimed to convey of Germany as the defender of Europe and European values. Europa is depicted in Hellenistic dress, wielding a spear and shield, stylistically evoking the Greek/Roman Goddess of Wisdom, Athena or Minerva. This aesthetic reference to Ancient Greece and Rome implies that the clearly Bolshevik Red hordes at her feet are barbarians come to attack Europe. The Reds march towards Europa from the right side of the poster, representing the inexorable Soviet advance westwards. This could also be a tentative allusion to the Greek City-States victory over the Persian King Xerxes in the 5th Century BC, involving the famous stand at Thermopylae of 300 Spartans and decisive Greek naval victory at Salamis. The poster thus presents German/Europa’s victory over the Bolsheviks as historically inevitable. These posters which present Nazi Germany as defenders of Europe are clearly epistemically defective, as they falsely equate German military goals with the interests of the European culture and nations that were conquered by force. Tuttle Ross’ model clarifies that the Nazi regime had to rely on this semi-mythologised version of Europe needing defence, as it was
53Joseph Darracott & Belinda Loftus, Second World War Posters (London: Imperial War Museum, 1972), p. 51 54 Rose, H. Ancient Roman Religion (London: Hutchinson University Library) & Speidel, M. P. 1978a. “The Cult of the Genii in the Roman Army and a New Military Deity.” ANRW II.16.2, pp. 1542-1555
55 Benjamin James Robert Greet, The Roman Eagle: A Symbol and its Evolution (University of Leeds: PHD Thesis, September 2015), p. 72
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Figure 2.3: Let’s Kill the Hydra! Sarkisyan, P, TASS
Window 1211, 5 May 1945. IWM PST 5295 [USSR] Figure 2.4: England Expects National Service. Bacon, Cyril W. 1939, IWM PST 13959 [UK]
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the only appeal to non- German nationalism that assisted the German war effort rather than being implicitly opposed to it.
The Soviets also referred to classical Greek myths. Sarkisyan and Lebedev’s “Let’s Kill the Hydra” shows a German many headed hydra being decapitated by an Allied sword, wielded by a Herculean hand marked with the flags of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. The many heads of the snake represent the millions of men mobilized by the Nazis, and the pile of skulls their many victims. This TASS window was created on the 5th May 1945, only two days before Nazi Germany’s surrender: Hitler was dead, the Red Army was in Berlin and the aim was to mop up any resistance from the remnants of the German force. The top caption is a quote from the Crimean Conference of February 1945, referring to the need to destroy the German High Command, while the writer Lebedev below provided a “jaunty verse” that emphasised for normal citizens the snake-like villainy of the fascists, and why they must be destroyed. The design of this poster emphasised the gargantuan effort that had gone into defeating the Nazi monster. Hercules’ strength came from Allied unity, represented by the flags on the mighty arms sleeve. Mythology was used when it was applicable to the situation the artist wished to convey and would be easily understood by audiences. The British produced few historical posters that reference ethno-nationalist identities or mythical figures, and those they did espoused ‘British values.’ Cyril W. Bacon’s 1939 poster, “England Expects National Service” shows Britannia, a representation of Britain, wearing Hellenistic robes, wielding a spear and shield, with an Ancient Greek helmet resting on her head. In the foreground, the various roles of National Service; soldiers, firefighters, policemen and nurses etc. The Hellenistic figure with a Union Flag on her shield is a use of mythology imagery similar to that used by the Nazis and Soviets. Greek myth was all-encompassing, and as the embodiment of democracy and European classical history, was a natural choice for use in propaganda.
‘Crusading’ as a theme was far more prominent in speeches than Allied posters. Mike Horswell has shown that while crusading language permeated the upper echelons of Allied command and politics, there is little to suggest more than a ‘surface level’ of understanding and engagement with crusading or the crusades. General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe even titled his memoir of events Crusade in Europe. As Horswell shows, this constituted use of the ‘Crusades’ in a ‘diffuse and metaphorical manner’ that reflected contemporary elite attitudes to the war rather than historical literacy.56 It is odd then,
that the British poster design Join the Crusade, utilised powerful imagery in the form of a British Union Flag topped by a burning cross. Visually the image is striking; it invokes both national feeling through the flag and the powerful symbolism of a cross in flames. This combination represents Britain’s symbolic leadership of both the war effort and ‘Christendom,’ evoking pan-European crusader armies as well as modern Christian unity. In the West, ‘the Crusades’ tended to refer to the military expeditions to the Holy Land, ordered by Pope Urban II in 1095 to recapture Jerusalem from Islam. The First Crusade managed to cross Asia Minor largely on foot, defeated several Turkish Seljuk armies in the field, then besieged and conquered the ancient cities of the Holy Land, including Nicaea,
56 Michael John Horswell, The Rise and Fall of British Crusader Medievalism, c.1825-1945 (Royal Holloway University of London: PhD Thesis, 2016), p. 256
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Figure 2.5: Join the Crusade: National Savings Certificates. Unknown, 1940-45 IWM PST 15624 [UK]
Figure 2.6: Germany’s European Broadcast. Werner von Axster-Heudtlass, 1943. BND Plak 003-002-044
