BUDDHISM IN WAR
An Analysis of the Sinhalese Buddhists in the Civil War in Sri Lanka
ABSTRACT. From 1983 till 2009 Sri Lanka has been in a bloody civil war. The Sinhalese Buddhist state fought against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam who demanded a separate Tamil state within the North and the East of Sri Lanka. In this study I will examine the causes of the participation and the use of violence of the Sinhalese Buddhists in the civil war in Sri Lanka. I will argue that the colonial time, the transition to a modern state, and globalization, had a profoundly big influence on Sri Lanka that a friction between the Buddhist state and the Tamil population in the country was unavoidable. This study also includes an analysis of Sri Lanka’s political and religious history, Buddhist nationalism, and of Buddhism and violence to be able to understand the case better.
KEYWORDS. Buddhism, Sinhalese Buddhists, Buddhism and Violence, Buddhist Nationalism, Civil War, Sri Lanka, Tamil
Name: Annakee Sevenster BACHELOR THESIS
E-mail: annakee_@hotmail.com Student number: 10517987
Study: Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology Specialisation: Religion
Date: May 2016
Evaluators: Peter van Rooden Irene Strengs
1
Content
Introduction ... 2
Clearing the situation – from ancient times until the civil war ... 4
Buddhist politics and nationalism in Sri Lanka ... 8
Violence by Buddhists in Sri Lanka ... 15
Post-war conflicts ... 19
Conclusion ... 21
2
Introduction
Before 1972 it was known as Ceylon, but nowadays the island on the south of India is known as Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, which in its local language Sinhalese means ´beautiful island´, is an island of 65.000km² with over 20 million people. Sri Lanka was not safe for tourists for quite a long time. Whereas people around the world travelled easier to South East Asia because of big technological improvements, Sri Lanka was skipped by these travellers because of its ongoing civil war.
The civil war, as I will explain later on in my study, was mainly between the Sinhalese Buddhist state and a group of Tamils in the north. After Sri Lankans independence from the British, the new Sinhalese Buddhist state adapted a Buddhist nationalist policy. From then on, because the Tamils thought they were not represented well enough in the government and their policy, the tension between the state and the Tamils grew. Soon, they wanted a separate state within the island, but the government, because they wanted to protect Sri Lanka as a ‘sacred homeland’, did not want to agree with this proposal.
In Sri Lanka about 3 million of the 20 million are Tamil. These people are an ethnic group whose biggest part of their transnational population live in India. In Sri Lanka you can identify two different groups. The first group is called the Sri Lankan Tamils: these are the people who lived in Sri Lanka since the Jaffna Kingdom (1215-1624), these Tamils live mostly in the northern and the eastern regions of Sri Lanka. Another group entered Sri Lanka a bit later. This group is called the Country Tamils: they descended from the Tamil people who went from India to Sri Lanka seeking a working possibility in the Sri Lankan high lands. They entered the island around the 19th and early 20th centuries. Tamils, besides having their own language, also
differ from the Sinhalese population in religion. Most of the Tamil population are Hindu with minority populations of Muslims and Christians1.
The war lasted from 1983 till 2009. A 26 year ongoing civil war in such a small country raises a few questions. First of all, what happened before the civil war? Sri Lanka has a long history of warfare. In addition, the Portuguese, Dutch and British all ruled over the country in colonial times. The historical context of the island can clarify a lot about the Sri Lankan situation. The development of Buddhism, the role that the Tamils have had in the country, and the colonial influence in the country can lead to an explanation of the role of Buddhists in the civil war.
3 When Sri Lanka became independent, the state adapted Buddhist nationalism. This led to many frustrations on the side of the minorities. Why did the state adopt such a considerably discriminatory focus? Other ethnicities and religions had lived in the country long before colonial time. Tamils even had a part in the government since the middle of the 7th century (Silva, 1981, pp. 17-20), but during the war, and even in modern times, some extremist Buddhists argue that the Tamils do not have the right to govern (a part of) the country.
Besides the political aspect, I will examine Buddhism and its relation with violence. Buddhism has always been considered a non-violent, peaceful, and tolerant religion. How come some Buddhists, including monks, used so much violence during the civil war? Torture of prisoners, disappearances, and murders were all performed by Buddhists in the civil war. An examination on the Buddhist ethics and on the aims of different Buddhists in Sri Lanka will help clarify the goals and motivations of the people who stand behind these actions.
Now that the war is over, violence in Sri Lanka has not stopped. Buddhists are still attacking minorities, although now the focus has shifted somewhat towards Muslims. New extremist organizations came into existence after the war, and monks are actively attending protests and endorsing hate speeches. Why are these feelings of hatred towards minorities so persistent, and are the actions and feelings towards the Muslims comparable with the situation in the civil war?
In this study, I will examine all the above questions. My main question is: what were the causes of the participation and use of violence of Sinhalese Buddhists in the Sri Lankan civil war? By answering all the above questions, I eventually will have a valid conclusion about the underlying and unconscious factors that triggered these extreme emotions and the Buddhist role in the civil war. A study on this subject helps to understand Buddhism better as well as the effects of colonialism in a country. By placing the civil war within a global context, the effects of globalization to a religious and ethnic group can also be studied. To be able to answer these questions I used second hand literature. The articles and books I used were mostly qualitative studies from about 1980 till now. My study consists of journals from different disciplines; political science, religious science, history, sociology and anthropology. To be able to analyse the civil war and the current conflict, I used newspapers to find case studies within both conflicts.
4
Clearing the situation – from ancient times until the civil war
To be able to understand the role of the Buddhists in the civil war in Sri Lanka, we have to look at the whole history. Sri Lanka experienced three distinct periods which differ from each other in political and social contexts. These three periods can be defined as pre-colonialism, colonialism and post-colonialism. I will differentiate these three periods chronologically.
The first Sinhalese came to Sri Lanka from the North of India around the 6th century
B.C.. These Sinhalese were sent by King Asoka of India to bring Buddhism to Sri Lanka. Shortly after the Sinhalese entered the island, the king of Sri Lanka, Devanampiya Tissa, became a follower of the religion. This was the beginning of Sri Lanka as a ‘Sinhalese’ and ‘Buddhist’ country, whereas Buddhism and the royal authority supported each other. It was the king’s duty to protect the religion (Silva, 1981, p. 45). Civilizations around the capital Anuradhapura appeared, which later became the center of the kingdoms that followed. From the 6th century B.C. until colonial time, Sri Lanka had always been ruled over by monarchies (Ibid., p. 1815).
The first dynasty of the Anuradhapura Kingdom ruled from 137 B.C. Halfway through the 7th century, Tamils, originally from the south of India, had their participation in the state, although their power was soon reduced (Ibid.: 17-20). The king saw it as a sacred duty to support and maintain the monasteries. Theravada Buddhism was the main Buddhism in Sri Lanka in that time but it was not the only religion present in the country. Because of this, aspects of Mahayanism, and later also Hinduism and Christianity, had its influences on Theravada tradition (Ibid., p.45).
From circa 1250 till the fifteenth century the Sinhalese Kingdom experienced pressure from other ethnic groups. This resulted in a restless time and changes in power structures. During the mid-13th century the Tamils that lived in the north expanded their territory and
pressed the Sinhalese into the central mountains and further to the south (Ibid., p. 82). At the end of the 14th century, the Chinese organized invasions that threatened the Sinhalese kingdom. At 1411 the king Parakramabahu VI came to rule Sri Lanka. He was the first Sinhalese king to bring the whole island under his control, and the last ever to do so. By the middle of the 15th century, the Jaffna kingdom was under Sinhalese rule. Though around 1500, Jaffna successfully became an independent kingdom that developed a Hindu culture (Ibid., pp. 84-90).
In the 14th century Buddhism gained pressure from Hinduism and in the 15th century worshipping deities from Mahayanist and Hindu tradition became part of Buddhism. After the death of Parakramabahu VI, the nobility of the king with the Buddhists decreased, and the elite
5 of Sinhalese society were becoming increasingly made up of the Hindu populations. Although in Sri Lanka itself Buddhism had troubles, oversea Sri Lanka was seen as the home of Theravada Buddhism. Because Buddhism disappeared in India, the country were Buddhism originally flourished, Sri Lanka was viewed as the holy land of Buddhism by Buddhists in countries like Burma, Thailand and Cambodia (Ibid., pp. 92-94).
The beginning of the 15th century marks the start of the era of colonialism when the Portuguese had their first contact with the country. In the hundred years after that, the Portuguese tried to get control of different regions in Sri Lanka, but not without opposition. Eventually, however, in 1591 a Portuguese king was placed on the throne of the Jaffna Kingdom in the North of Sri Lanka (Ibid., pp. 100-102). The Portuguese brought Roman Catholicism into the country, and destroyed Buddhist and Hindu temples. In 1637 Sri Lanka got help from the Dutch to destroy the Portuguese, but instead giving back the land to the natives, the Dutch kept control. Parts remained in the hands of Portugal or the natives. Eventually, little by little, the Dutch won more land (Ibid., pp. 119-123).
The Dutch and Portuguese took over the indigenous administrative structure and adapted it for their own purposes. The original system of the Sinhalese headman, mostly based on a caste system, was very complex. The Portuguese reduced this complexity to ease their rule (Ibid., pp. 188-190). Besides that, the whole caste system changed in order. The Europeans were focused on the progress of industry and trade so it was therefore clever to work together with some ethnic or cultural groups of the island. In Sri Lanka, the Portuguese had different interests within trade than the Dutch or the English. Because of this, every new colonialist group differed in what collaboration, and what group, they were specially focused on. In addition, it was not smart for the Dutch to want to work together with the ethnic or cultural group that had been the most loyal to the Portuguese. With reducing the power of these groups and increasing the power of a group lower on the social ladder, the chance of opposition or revolt by the elite could be reduced. With this tactic the social hierarchy in Sri Lanka changed over time; some of the all-time elites had to take a step back, and other historically weak groups finally had the chance to rise on the social ladder.
The conquests of the Dutch and Portuguese, like other European conquests in that time, were in that way different from other big conquests that appeared in other times. Most conquests are focused to obtain a political realm, but in the time of colonialism the Europeans were more focused on industry and trade. The conquest was made possible not by military orientation but by economic and technological superiority. Because of a time of instability in the country, it was easy for the Europeans to obtain the power in their colonies (Gellner, 1994, p. 61).
6 During Dutch colonial time, the Dutch changed the main religion from Roman Catholicism (that was imposed by the Portuguese) to Calvinism (Silva, 1981, p. 190). For fear of offending the Kandyan ruler, they assailed Muslims and Hindus and not Buddhists. Because there was more religious freedom than in the time with the Portuguese (Ibid., p. 196), there came space for a resurgence of Buddhism in the Kandyan kingdom (Ibid., p. 199). This kingdom became the ‘sole surviving link in the age-long connection between Sinhalese power and the Buddhist religion’ (Ibid., p. 201). Buddhists in that time focused on the restoration of important religious buildings, and reasserted the primacy of Buddhist symbols and practices over those of Hinduism (Ibid., p. 202-206).
Starting 1796, the British began to rule over Sri Lanka (Ibid., pp. 184-187- 210), and asserted dominance by being the first colonial power that could scare away the Kandyan king. In the eyes of the Kandyans, there was a sacred link with Buddhism and the state, which was therefore worth maintaining and continued to be a high priority (Ibid., p. 231). The British promised to maintain and protect the religion, but it was not taken seriously. This feeling of losing the indigenous monarchy and its traditions was felt strongly by the Sinhalese Buddhists and a new strong political force for Buddhist nationalism came into existence (Ibid., p. 232). In 1833 English was made the official language and the administration was reformed (Ibid., p. 262). In the late 1830’s, Lord Glenelg decided that conversion to Christianity would be a high point on the agenda. A reaction on this policy came in 1848 when there was a ‘rebellion’ against the British rulers in the Kandyan areas. After that, the social policy towards Buddhism changed (Ibid., p. 315). Also during this time the native headman, Kandyan chiefs, and the emerging native élite demanded their share of political power in the country (Ibid., p. 316). In the 1870s Buddhism was beginning to regain more importance. ‘The Buddhist revival proved a spur to the growth of national consciousness and the recovery of national pride’ (Ibid., p. 325). Later on reformers of the indigenous society formed political associations with a nationalist character (Ibid., p. 339). Hinduism also had their own revival in the north of Sri Lanka. Hindu customs and culture penetrated the Tamil society in this area, made possible by the successful education system (Ibid., pp. 351-353).
One man, D. S. Senanayake, dominated the transfer of power from Britain to Sri Lanka itself. Through an electoral process the power slowly got back into Sinhalese hands. Senanayake went against the current opinion of Sri Lanka to obtain a Sinhalese and Buddhist state, as his goal was a multi-religious and multi-racial secular state (Ibid., p. 449). Eventually Sri Lanka gained its independence in 1948 and the era of post-colonialism started. Tamils had been in the State Council already since 1934 (Ibid., p. 490), but against Senanayake’s will, the
7 Sinhalese-Buddhist majority was beginning to uphold its national dominance. The religion was brought back into the politics, and in the beginning of the 1950s, the state decided to make Sinhalese the country’s official language. With this decision the government lost the support of the Tamils, and tension between the Sinhalese and the Tamils grew (Ibid., p. 501).
The UNP (United National Party) and SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) became the island’s main parties under which all the other governments have been formed after the independency. These two parties embraced the concept of Buddhist nationalism. The adoption of the new constitution in 1972 reflected the new balance of forces: the dominance of the Sinhalese and Buddhists in Sri Lankan politics. In this constitution, Sri Lanka promised to give Buddhism special status with a duty of the state to protect it. The Tamils claimed that this was an act of discrimination. Opposition by the Tamils was brought and a quest for separatism began. Because some of the Tamils in Sri Lanka felt poorly represented, an extremist ethnic movement developed: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Tamil quest for separatism was a reaction to the growing nationalism in the country, with racist notions of Sinhalese Buddhist super ordination and Tamil subordination (DeVotta, 2014, pp. 140-141) (Silva, 1981, pp. 550-552).
Different oppositions were brought, and different constitutions were made by both parties over a period of time. The Prime Minister at that time, Mr. Jayewardene, wanted to propose a second parliament so the Tamils would have more power. 2 ‘Peace talks’ went on in
Sri Lanka, while the government and Tamils both strengthened their forces. 3 The Tamils
became more frustrated with the situation when some political concessions were stopped by Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists. In 1956, 1958 and 1977 gangs of mainly Sinhalese Buddhists, supported by the state, rioted against Tamils. More than 1000 people, mostly Tamils, were killed. Monks participated in the protests and riots too. This all led to the start of the civil war in July 1983 (Weiberg-Salzmann, 2014, p. 293).
The LTTE led the Tamil population and demanded a separate state in the North and East provinces of the island. The civil war waged for 26 years: from 1983 to 2009. India tried to mediate the conflict several times, but often this had a reverse effect. In the last decade of the 20th century there were attempts for a peaceful resolution of the civil war. A new polity was established that ensured the Tamils’ right of participation within the government and the state, but big protests made the state reconsider and eventually cancel the polity. The Tamils also did not behave tolerantly during this time, and in 1995 Tamil guerrillas executed an attack on the
2 The New York Times, Tiger Hunting in Sri Lanka, 09/04/1983
8 holy and valuable Temple of the Tooth in Kandy. The government opted a ‘war of peace’, where violence was legitimized as an instrument to obtain peace (Ibid., pp. 294-296).
In 2002, a ceasefire was obtained during peace talks that Prime Minister Wickremasinghe (UNP) had with the Tamil guerrillas. A majority of the monks were still not approving any compensation towards the Tamils, and later on argued that they were the only one suitable to lead the country. These monks denied that there was an ‘ethnic conflict’ but instead said that there was a problem concerning terrorism in Sri Lanka. Not only did the monks attack Muslims: between 2003 and 2006 extremist Buddhist monks also attacked Christian churches, claiming they executed ‘unethical conversions’ by promising the people help and support if they joined the Christian church (Ibid., pp. 297-300). In 2008 the civil war officially started again when the government revoked the ceasefire agreement and sent armed forces to parts of the country where the Tamil guerrillas were the most active. In 2009 the power of the Tamil reduced dramatically and the Buddhists won the war. Since then the government has not done a lot effort on the integration of the Tamils back into the society (Ibid., pp. 303-304).
Buddhist politics and nationalism in Sri Lanka
Religion provides meaning and goals for an individual’s life and norms and unity for a society. Because of religious and spiritual goals, people are more likely to obtain a feeling of fulfilment and a meaningful and purposeful life. It brings a person harmony (Emmons, 2005). Religions also provide a framework for the ideal society or world. Unlike Islam, Buddhism’s first goal is not to strive for a Buddhist state or world by conversion. Buddhism’s texts have advice for good governance and the right personal, ideological and political direction. The Buddha has given rules for good government, known as Dasa Raja Dharma. The rules are as follows:
1) be liberal and avoid selfishness, 2) maintain a high moral character,
3) be prepared to sacrifice one's own pleasure for the well-being of the subjects 4) be honest and maintain absolute integrity,
5) be kind and gentle,
6) lead a simple life for the subjects to emulate, 7) be free from hatred of any kind,
8) exercise non-violence, 9) practise patience, and
9 10) respect public opinion to promote peace and harmony.4
The Buddha, according to the Dasa Raja Dharma, gave advice for good governance. In Buddhism you have to be peaceful from the inside, but a Buddhist also has to strive for a peaceful society, and so Buddhism has a political side already in the basis.
Sri Lanka was a colonialized country. In the transition to be independent, parts of the old system lingered on and parts of the new system were influenced by what the colonialists had brought. The British left Sri Lanka with a modern state and so a democratic political system. A democratic system is based on norms of equality, but these norms tended to delegitimize previous hierarchical structures. First, some ethnic or cultural groups had more power than others (either because of the ties they had with the colonialists or because of caste structures that existed before colonial time). After a democratic system is introduced though, all ethnic and cultural groups should, in practice, be equal. Because the majority of the country was Sinhalese Buddhists, the Tamil elites were pushed more to the background. Catarina Kinnvall, a professor at the Department of Political Science at the Lund University, argues that there are two basic consequences of a new political system: 1) “Old ways of getting things done are eliminated, which tends to leave behind only uncertainty”; and 2) “the structures that identified the community and bound it together are also being eliminated, which has a disintegrative effect” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 743). This democratic system was new and so left the people of Sri Lanka, especially the ones who were not sure of their power anymore, with uncertainty. This uncertainty can have a disintegrative effect. On the other side, it gave some people the opportunity to be part of the ruling elite whereas previously they never would have had a chance. As I will make clear in the rest of my study, this new political system was part of the reason Sri Lanka later became involved in a long, bloody civil war.
To get most of the Sri Lankans on their side and change the uncertainty to stability, the new state adapted a religious ideology to rule the country. As I said before, after Sri Lanka became independent in 1948, two main parties came to rule; the UNP and the SLFP, who embraced a Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalism (DeVotta, 2014, p. 140). The question arises why the government that ruled right after the independency adopted a religious nationalist view. Some well-known theories consider nationalism as something secular. So did Benedict Anderson in his book Imagined Communities (Anderson, 2003). In this book he considers
4 K. Sri Dhammananda Maha Thera in Buddhism and Politics in What Buddhists Believe on
10 nationalism as an outcome of print-capitalism5. He calls on three main reasons for the rising of
the nations. The first one, which is not relevant for my study, is that there came a simultaneous notion of time, instead of the cosmological. This was made possible by the print capitalism. The other two reasons have to do with religion: 1) according to Anderson the nation came up because religion became less and less legitimate, and 2) because the sacral monarchy lost legitimacy due to the religion losing legitimacy (and the royal house was always bonded with the state religion). So according to Anderson, nationalism takes the place of religion, and therefore nationalism is secular. Whereas in Europe this may have been the case in most places, such as Africa and Asia this argument does not seem legitimate. In Tibet for example there is also a strong religious nationalism and we see the same in Burma, Thailand and Sri Lanka (Kolas, 1996).
The answer of my previous question may lie in a theory that says that the religious nationalist direction is the counter reaction towards its own historical context. Sri Lanka had been colonized for the last couple of hundred years. Colonialists from the West had always told the Sinhalese and other minority groups that lived in the country at that time how to live their lives, what law system to use, and what language to speak. Colonialism, as part of globalization, can make the civilians of a country unsure of who they are or where they come from. In these times of uncertainty and threatened self-identity, any collective identity is attractive to give back a feeling of security. According to Kinnvall, nationalism and religion are ‘two such causes of “identity-signifiers” that are more likely than other identity constructions to provide answers to those in need’ (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 742).
To recapitulate Kinnvall, in a situation of identity crisis in a country, the people are attracted to adopt an identity that focuses on their nation or on their religion. By adopting such a direction as a state, the largest part of the country will feel safe and at rest and, more importantly, will not revolt – at least the people who feel they belong with this direction. This theory though does not indicate to a sort of ‘natural’ reaction on Sri Lanka’s history that determines a nationalist direction. Because a new democratic system was introduced, adopting a nationalist ideology can be a way of these Buddhists to get a lot of followers and approval from the country and to be able to gain power and eventually rule the country. As I argued
5 Print-capitalism, according to Anderson, explains the rising of the nations in Europe. The nation is an imagined
community, and is possible to imagine because of the printing press. Around 1500 it became possible to print in
large quantities. This literature was printed in vernaculars, instead of exclusive script languages. Because of this, people that lived further away from each other and had other dialects, now where able to understand people in a larger environment. This made possible a brotherhood of people that had possibly never even seen each other (Anderson, 2003).
11 before, with the transition towards a modern state, the harsh hierarchy of social groups had to change to a system where all groups are even to each other. This meant not only that the elites were unsure of their powerful seats in the country, but also that positions in the government were opened up to citizens lower on the previous social ladder. The activist Buddhists made use of the situation and, by focussing on the ethnicity and religion of a big group of possible followers, they were able to influence their country’s decisions (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995, p. 7). In line with this, there are other theories that fit the Sri Lankan situation and so can help to understand the case better.
Religious nationalism did not occur only in Sri Lanka. In the era of post-colonialism, religion became crucial in the transformation of the public spheres in other postcolonial nation-states too, and many of the leading parties and political organizations mobilized people around religious issues (Van der Veer, 2002, pp. 173-174). Anthony D. Smith, a professor on Nationalism and Ethnicity studies, argues that in nationalism there is a particular form of ‘political religion’. A tension with the traditional religion, in the case of my study Buddhism, leads to the politicisation of the religion. In Sri Lanka there existed a tension with the main religion because, as said above, the Western rulers of the last couple of hundred years did not give a lot attention to their religion and cultural values, so a tension arose existing of the fair of losing parts of the rituals or ethics of their religion (Smith, 2000).
The nation, according to Smith, can be called a “sacred communion of citizens”. The sacred properties, like in Sri Lanka the Tooth’s relic and Adam’s Peak, ‘help to create cohesive national identities and engender a sense of national self-confidence and exclusivity’ (Ibid., p. 792). Smith cites Elie Kedouri in his study. He argues that nationalism is ‘a doctrine of secular self-determination’. Kedouri argues that there is a continuing importance of religion in the new states of Africa and Asia. By the use of religious traditions and ethnic customs the nationalist leaders gave the masses ‘new politicised and nationalist purpose and legitimating the use of force and terror. In this way, nationalism allied itself with ‘religion’, and made use of its emotional repertoire for its own destructive ends’ (Ibid., 2000, p. 793). In line with my previous argument, according to Smith’s and Kedouri’s theory, the use of religion within the Sri Lanka’s new state was not per se a natural reaction on the unrest in the country, but could be a tactic of the upcoming elite to give the citizens purpose again and legitimize the use of violence.
A more statistical study has also been done on religion, nationalism and warfare. In the Journal of Peace Research, quantitative research was been published in 2004. In the research, two datasets were used to analyse religious nationalism and conflict. Since the 1980’s religious nationalist ethnic groups have been more violent in conflicts than the non-religious nationalist
12 ethnic groups. Religion plays a more important role in conflicts than it has ever played (Fox, 2004, p. 715). This study examined that religion is not the only influence in the conflict. Religious factors only come into play, Fox argues, ‘unless nationalism, in the form of separatism, is already present in the conflict’. It is nationalism that lies at the basis of the conflict, but the religion is a big exacerbating factor (Ibid., 2004, p. 728). Also with most conflicts it was a threat consisting of rivals or state authorities that eventually caused the wars (Smith, 2000, p. 795), as can also be seen in Sri Lanka’s case.
Interesting to look at, and vital for context when doing anthropological research nowadays, are the effects of globalization. Does Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka have anything to do with Buddhist groups elsewhere in the world? They may have been inspired by neighbouring countries that aimed at Buddhist nationalism first or, the Buddhists felt their fellow Buddhists in other countries were being threatened or reduced, and so they may have been afraid their religion would disappear on a worldwide level.
According to Stephen C. Berkwitz, Buddhist nationalism can be seen as “an effort to resist the intrusion of globalizing forces into local religious and cultural heritage. […] Buddhist nationalism is largely a discursive formation that affirms an essential relationship between Buddhism and nation over against external forces that threaten their existence” (Berkwitz, 2008, p. 73). As said above, some Sinhalese felt as if the British did not pay enough attention to their local traditions. A counter-reaction followed and Buddhist nationalists stood up and strived for a “Buddhist democracy to protect the ‘Buddhist way of life’”. As it has already long time been argued that globalization is nothing new (Wolf, 1982), Sinhalese nationalism (as an reaction on globalization) is not either. Already since the third century BCE extreme Sinhalese or Buddhist nationalism flourished in times of an identity crises. In these early years this went along with violence. Harsh political action was necessary in the preservation and revival of both the nation and the religion (Berkwitz, 2008, pp. 74-75).
Besides the Western ideas threatening the host country’s identity, other globalization factors can also influence Buddhist nationalism. One example of this is transnational Buddhist networks. Sacred Buddhist places are spread over different countries in Asia, so in pilgrimages different transnational networks will be built up. When analysing pilgrimages, in building up networks it is generally not the geographical part of someone’s identity that matters (Geary, 2014, p. 648 + 653 + 692). In India you can find the Bodh Gaya, a Buddhist sacred place where it is said that the Buddha became enlightened. Buddhists from all over Asia went to this sacred place on a pilgrimage and some stayed. Today, different nationalities live together in that area of India. This sacred place has strengthened the ties of Indian Buddhists with (among other
13 countries) Thailand, Burma and Sri Lanka after India’s independency from the British Empire (Geary, 2014).
India, with the Bodh Gaya as ‘the navel of the earth’, has developed an international Buddhist network, inter alia with Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka also has sacred Buddhist places where many Buddhists (and non-Buddhists) from all over the world go to at least once in their lives; Adam’s Peak and the Temple of the Tooth. As does the Bodh Gaya in India, these sacred places in Sri Lanka will be a central factor for a strong transnational Buddhist identity. Currently, there is not a lot of research on the effect of the mountain or the temple on the transnational networks of the Sri Lankan Buddhists, but it would be valuable to discover more about it. The extreme Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka can be a result of a strong transnational network, because with that network Buddhists get mental support from Buddhists in other countries. This may help to explain the long and extreme civil war in Sri Lanka.
Some Sri Lankan Buddhists see their island as a sacred place of where they, Sinhalese and Buddhists, have the right to live and to rule. Not only do they consider Adam’s Peak and the Tooth’s Relic as sacred for their country and religion, their country itself is a sacred place to their race and religion. The ‘idea of a sacred homeland’ can ‘excite ethnic antagonisms and intensify national conflict’. These conflicts can thereafter lead to a propensity to hold on or ascertaining the borders of the sacred homeland. This will help against disturbing the order by alien influences. This, in the case of Sri Lanka, encourages conflict. They had rivals in their sacred island before: the Sinhalese felt betrayed by their British rulers, who had earlier promised to protect local Buddhist traditions. At this time, Sinhalese nationalists began campaigning to promote the religion. The Europeans became the “others”, foreign factors threatening the local values (Berkwitz, 2008, p. 74), and the new government protected their culture which was the only ‘pure’ thing they had left. After the new government was settled and Sri Lanka became a Buddhist nationalist society with a sacred land that had to be protected, the Tamils became the new “others” that threatened the property and the religion. Due to this, Buddhist nationalism revived (Smith, 2000, p. 812).
To move on with the effects of globalization, one other effect is that people around the world know what happens on the other side of the earth. In case of the Sinhalese Buddhists, they know that their religion is disappearing in countries that used to be fully Buddhist. They feel threatened in their own country because they are afraid that Sri Lanka will succumb to this as well. Buddhists monks in Sri Lanka were ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their country, their race and their religion. Although they may be a majority in their own country,
14 they are a minority in the world (Jerryson, 2015, p. 144). This sense of being pushed more to the background can result in a activist stance which seeks to protect the culture and religion.
Something similar to the rise of Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka happened within Islamic countries. Countries where the majority of the people are Muslim have been ruled over in the past by Westerners as well. Paul Aarts did research on political Islam, and he argues that political Islam is a product of the globalizing world (Aarts, 2001, p. 81). First, in the 19th century Western domination resulted in a counter reaction existing of Islamic nationalism. This often went together with Islamic modernism because Muslims felt attracted by some of the aspects of modernity. The new Islamism went violent and more political than religious, which Aarts called a ‘frustrated modernity’. Leaders promised the citizens the same progress as Western modernity, but they failed. The political Islam is a way for the Muslims to strive for better days. According to Aarts, one of the reasons that religion was an outcome for the population is because of ‘culture’ was, unlike politics and the economy, the one thing that Islamists had left that was not already modernized. From here on, the desire for an Islamic state grew (Ibid., 2001, pp. 83-87). For Sri Lanka the situation was the same. Both politics and the economy were modernized, so the upcoming elite only had the option to grab back their culture and Buddhism. Whereas this could have parallels with a ‘frustrated modernity’ as mentioned by Aarts, I would not consider this the same for Sri Lanka because there seems to be less hatred towards the West than what Aarts described in Islamic regions.
Buddhist kingdoms have existed already for a long time in Sri Lanka, however after a long time of colonialism the Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka caused tensions between the different ethnicities. Buddhist nationalism was, among other things, a way to resist external threats in Sri Lanka and a way to stand up against the disappearance of Buddhism in the world. The religious-nationalist state developed in this way because the Sinhalese Buddhist state felt like they had to reassert their own culture, as in the past the British did not pay enough attention to it. For some Buddhists this was their way to reach the top. Also notable to this idea is the concept originating in psychiatry: historical trauma. Historical trauma is a phenomenon that is described as a ‘complex, collective, cumulative, and intergenerational psychosocial impact that resulted from the depredations of past colonial time. When an individual or group of individuals suffer from a historical trauma, they may, according to some research; best be ‘treated’ by pushing the people to participate in traditional cultural practices (Gone, 2013). The activist Sinhalese Buddhists see their ‘historical trauma’ as being suppressed for a long time, not being able to rule ´their own´ country or exercise their religion. Although some Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka may not have experienced or felt it this way, by being told that the Sinhalese
15 Buddhists experienced a traumatic era, the trauma will actually be experienced. A ´cure´ of or a justified reaction to this trauma according the activist Sinhalese Buddhists and parallel with the psychiatrist theory, is to grab back to the pure religion and culture. In this way the historical trauma is used and sometimes even fabricated by the Sinhalese Buddhists to be sure of agreement of their actions by the civilians.
The activists Sinhalese Buddhists may really have suffered individually from a historical trauma and felt an urge to relive their culture and religion but many Buddhists in Sri Lanka would not have experienced the trauma if their activists did not reinforce the idea (and even then some still do not experience a trauma). Therefore, as I argued before, it could be a clever tactic of these Buddhists to justify their actions and ideology and get many followers to legitimize their way of ruling the country.
I examined this case from a broad socio- political aspect. Some structural factors like the colonial time, the transition to a democratic state, and globalization had its role in shaping the conflict between the Buddhists and the Tamils. The activist Sinhalese Buddhists themselves had also played their part. By imposing Buddhist nationalism in the country, and tactically legitimizing their ideology and their violence, their power increased and, for the Tamils, created a reason to revolt.
Violence by Buddhists in Sri Lanka
“[This is] the famous case of the Sri Laṅkan King Duṭṭhagāmaṇi. According to the Mahāvaṃsa, he marched to battle against the Tamils with a relic in his spear and a great company of monks, not for the sake of conquest, but to establish the dharma of the Saṃbuddha. Seeing that he took no joy in the bloody victory, eight arahants flew through the air to comfort him. They reassure him that having killed millions will be no obstruction to his entry into heaven, because his non-Buddhist war victims were accounted as being no more than animals (Jenkins, 2012, p. 307).
Hatred is never appeased by hatred in this world; by non-hatred alone is hatred appeased. This is an Eternal law.6
Buddhism is known as a non-violent religion. The general image of a monk is an image of a man that smiles and looks content, not one of a man with an automatic gun. Buddhism strives for peace and happiness, whereas you always have to take more account of others instead of thinking about what would be a positive outcome for yourself. Despite this, as seen in the example from before of the Sri Lankan King Dutthagāmani and in the civil war in Sri Lanka,
16 violence is used by inspirational figures and well known Buddhist leaders against ethnic or religious ‘others’. To understand the use of violence of the Buddhists in Sri Lanka, I first will examine the Buddhist ethics on violence. In this section I will focus on the work of Stephen Jenkins, On the Auspiciousness of Compassionate Violence (2012). The article was published in a journal that is not one of the best sociological journals I could use, but because it is a journal of Buddhist studies and for this part I need a study on the facts within the ethics, I can use this article as a basis for my further examinations on Buddhist violence in Sri Lanka.
Buddhist ethics all have to do with Karma. Karma is a concept in Buddhism were all the actions of a person in their life are taken together and will determine what will happen to you next in this life or the next one. For that reason it is very important for a Buddhist to always do the morally right thing, to be sure to have a ‘clean’ karma. When it comes to violence, the ethics in Buddhism deviate from the ethics or law in the West at different points. Important to acknowledge though is that there is not one clear way of thinking about violence within Buddhism. Different ideas can be derived from different Buddhist texts or important thinkers within Buddhism itself. There is one general agreement: “compassionate violence can be an auspicious merit-making opportunity without negative karmic consequences” (Ibid., p. 300).
Different explanations legitimate this statement. First of all, it is important that when you kill somebody (or do somebody harm) your own state of mind and the state of mind of the victim is either auspicious or neutral to keep a clean karma. Only when one’s mind is inauspicious it will have negative karmic consequences. One who has an auspicious or neutral mind when performing the violent action does not undertake a crime in Buddhism (Ibid., pp. 303-304). Therefore, it is the intention for performing a violent action that is vitally important. Some actions can hurt someone but will help them in the end: for example when a doctor has to relocate a shoulder. When doing this, the doctor has to pull someone’s arm which will, at the moment, cause him even more pain than he had before. So a physical violent action can be nonviolent in its intention (Ibid., 2012, p. 311).
In Buddhism the right thing to do is always what is better for others, more than what is better for only yourself (the best would be of course what is best for others and for yourself). The Dalai Lama endorsed that Osama bin Laden was killed, because by killing Osama bin Laden himself you prevent a lot other persons to be killed. This act can so be seen as ‘violence on a physical level’, but is ‘essentially nonviolence’7.‘Killing the morally hopeless, icchãntika,
will give you less karmic consequences than with killing an ant. In any case, the more morally
17 depraved or potentially harmful a person is, the less karmic demerit there is in killing them’ (Ibid., 2012, p. 307).
Violence is an act and has to be seen apart from its moral character, and compassion can lead a person to decide whether he can or has to hurt somebody when it has practical benefit. Killing without compassion is profoundly bad for someone’s karma that he is even better off to be killed. So if you are helping the intentional murderer by killing him, and some Buddhists are convinced that the Tamil Tigers have vicious, non-compassionate minds when performing their crimes, these Tamils are, according to some intellectuals in Buddhist ethics, better off to be killed themselves (Ibid., pp. 312-313, 316).
To conclude the above part on Buddhist ethics, there exists a great commitment to nonviolence in Buddhism. However, an act that can harm somebody is not violent in and of itself. The state of mind, the intention or the goal, the helpfulness to others and the moral status of the victim all matter to judge if a violent act is appropriate. These ethics help to understand the civil war in Sri Lanka better. The view of Buddhists as always nonviolent is a western fantasy, and the real monks can better be seen as peace warriors, violent in the name of Buddha. The interpretation of Pãli texts or the Mahãvamsa leads to the conclusion that violence can be legitimate in some cases according to Buddhism. Steve Collins (1998), as cited in Harris (2001, pp. 206-207), argues that two ‘modes of dhamma’ can be found in the Pãli Canon. ‘In the first the ‘assessment of violence is context-dependent and negotiable’. In the second, an ethic of absolute values, the assessment is ‘context-independent and non-negotiable’’. Collins also argues that rather than saying what is wrong in itself, the Buddha is more likely to point to general principles of Buddhist ethics.
The ‘war of peace’ in Sri Lanka was justified by some Buddhists, but opposed by others with a different approach. Not every Buddhist thought being violent in the war would be the best solution or even legitimate according to Buddhist principles. Both approaches though ‘uphold the need to oppose racism, communalism and oppression of the innocent. Both also laud the importance of all races in Sri Lanka living together in harmony’ (Ibid., p. 199). The right path to this goal was seen different by both sides. Different parties came to in existence in the last decades before and in the war. On the one side there, inter alia, was NMAT (National Movement Against Terrorism), NMAT argues that there is no ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, but only a terrorist problem: the Tamil Tigers. The only way to obtain peace is by suppressing the Tamils militarily. NMAT and parties that share agreement with them are against any peace talks with the Tamils, but they did not receive a lot support from the government (Ibid., pp. 200-202). There is a lot of scientific literature or information in the media that examined the violent
18 approach of the Buddhists in Sri Lanka, but very little literature that tells us more about the other approach to the war where Buddhists are against the war. One of the things monks on this side strive for is an inter-religious and inter-ethnic harmony in the country. They also do want to negotiate with the Tamils. Buddhists monks on this side of the approach to the war argue that all people should have the same rights, that all teachings and all religions should be respected and that all should be equal. According to them Buddha always brought peace so that is what they should do now (Ibid., p. 208).
“According to the teachings of Buddhism it is never possible to win people through war. War can only win territory. On principle, Buddhism rejects war as a means of achieving anything. Buddhism should certainly challenge the kind of ethnic conflict going on here.” (an interviewed monk, Harris 1998:113 as cited in Harris, 2001: 203)
Organizations which agreed with this statement became active around the 1980s. These organizations thought that no one should be killed in the interests of national unity, and that the rights of the Tamils should be respected, however they also rejected the call for a separate state. Both approaches towards the war are legitimated by the different interpretations of the Pãli texts. Harris argues that these different perspectives from which to view the conflict can be explained by the recent past of the British colonial period.
The approach where the Buddhists are tolerant to the Tamils, explains Harris, is a lineage to the attitude during the colonial time when Buddhists were open to learn about Christianity. Monks went to churches and agreed that all that was said there was good. In this time it was a Buddhist characteristic to be open to all that was religious, though in the nineteenth century another stream of thoughts grew among the monks. ‘A competitive, confrontational set [of attitudes] , adapted from Christian patterns of interaction, sharpened an moulded by the experience of humiliation and betrayal’ (Ibid., p. 211). When members of the Buddhist monastery realised that their colonial rulers did not take their religion into account enough, they started to send petitions to the government. The British did not comply with the requirements of the Buddhists, and here the tolerant Buddhism changed towards an energetic self-defence in the face of aggression (Ibid., p. 212). With this, their own philosophy of being able to be open and tolerant to all religions was underestimated by the British themselves, and that embittered the Buddhists. This feeling, the threat on their religion and race, lingered on according to Harris. Where historically India always had been the significant ‘other’ for Sri Lankans, in colonial rule the Christian became the new ‘other’. Harris argues that the attitude towards the Christians
19 during that time is aligned with the attitude towards the Tamils during the war. The key concepts of this repeated pattern are ‘humiliation, betrayal and compensation’ (Ibid., p. 209).
As I also argued in the paragraph about Buddhist politics and nationalism, the Buddhists who are active in the war feel that they have to do something against the threat to the Sinhala identity, Buddhism and the ‘sacred homeland’, from the Tamil Tigers. An examination of the Pãli texts will lead to the conclusion that a justification for the use of defensive violence when wanting to protect either the religion or the culture can be found (Harris, 2001; Jenkins, 2012). Buddhist ethics, even though generally seen as non-violent, do not prohibit violent actions. Monks can retain their good Karma and still carry out violent actions, because they are not ‘violent in intention’, however not every Buddhist in Sri Lanka agreed with the performance of these actions during the civil war.
Post-war conflicts
A train that went from Jaffna to the capital Colombo, did not operate for 24 years. When it did ride again, Sinhalese people went to the north for the first time in a very long time.
“But conversations on board the train made it clear that a psychological gulf still separates Sri Lanka’s northerners from its southerners. Visitors from the south, in many cases, are full of sincere pride about what the government has brought to the north — peace, they say, and economic development. For many Tamils in the north, though, the relief of peacetime is mixed with darker feelings of defeat and humiliation. And the restoration of train service does not ensure that these groups are speaking to each other.” 8
“Sinhalese vacationers sprawl out in the course of the journey, beating drums and singing bayila, the folk songs left behind by Portuguese settlers. […]The Tamil passengers are not singing. They are edgy, perhaps because the train is packed with government soldiers, returning to their posts after home leave.” 9
The example above shows that with the ending of the war, the separation between the Sinhalese and the Tamils stayed intact. One of the ethnic groups in the country had won, but there was no such thing as a political agreement. After the ceasefire agreement in 2002 between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, not all violence stopped. Buddhists and Tamils kept on attacking each other, and more recently Muslims mingled in the conflict also striving for an ideal state-to-come Muslim homeland. Though a ceasefire was signed, the hatred renewed (Korf, 2006, pp. 279-281).
8 The New York Times, Post-war Sri Lanka’s Awkward Peace, 12/28/2014
20 In 2009 the fighting came to an end with the defeat of the extremist Tamils, but instead of the Tamils the Muslims became the new target. The sense that the Sri Lankan nation should be unified and that Buddhism is under threat kept living on even after the civil war was over. Globalization may take its part in this situation too: people believe radical Islam to be at the centre of all the violence in the world today. If Muslims are going to get tough and violent to strive for a more Islamic world, the Buddhists may better follow the violent trend to be able to protect Sri Lanka from the Islamic influences10. Again in this situation, although Buddhists are not a minority in Sri Lanka, they know that they are in the world.
‘Led by monks, members of the Bodu Bala Sena – The Buddhist Brigade – hold rallies, call for direct action and the boycotting of Muslim businesses, and rail against the size of Muslim families’ 11
But why are these feelings of ethnic antagonism so persistent? Benedict Korf argues that “rogue others” have been internalized in political discourse in Sri Lanka. Every group, Sinhalese, Muslims and Tamils point at the other as an obstacle for obtaining a “pure” state-to-come. The “pure” here means ethnic homogeneity. Rogues are rationalizing deeper rooted fears (Ibid., pp. 294 - 295) and, when looking at Sri Lanka, the history of ongoing wars between different ethnic and religious groups makes the sense of an ethnic antagonist not simply cease when a ceasefire is agreed upon. This interview characterizes the ongoing sense of threat and the duty to safe the Sinhala Buddhist race and religion:
“We [Sinhala Buddhists] have two major political parties and [thus the] Sinhalese are divided. As a result the Muslims always joint with one party and then [get to] join in governing the country. Muslims always do that – they get the advantage of being a minority …. We want the Sinhalese united and a Sinhalese government. We want protection; we were protecting Theravada Buddhism for the last 2,300 years. Today, Theravada Buddhism is in the West and in Sri Lanka. But this not last; the Sinhala race may be around for only the next 40 years. This has happened in Malaysia – not Myanmar, Myanmar is still Buddhist – But in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. The same thing will happen here.” (Jerryson, 2015, p. 144)12
Even after the war, new extremist groups came into existence. The Buddhist Power Force (by its Sinhalese initials BBS), were more violent and racist than any organization up to
10 “ “
11 Why are Buddhist monks attacking Muslims? by Alan Strathern of Oxford University, 05/01/2013,
www.bbc.co.uk/news
12 Personal communication of Professor Jerryson and Mister Dilantha member of the BBS, on 25 June, 2014 at the Bodu Bala Sena’s headquarters in Colombo, Sri Lanka
21 that point in the war. They are even mentioned on a website that tracks terrorism. On http//:www.trackingterrorism.org the Buddhist organization is described as an organization that ‘seeks the enforcement of Buddhist predominance in Sri Lanka’. The group considers the minority ethnic and religious groups in Sri Lanka as a threat on Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese-Buddhist identity. According this website, the Buddhist group uses armed assault, and mainly attacks infrastructure13. This special case is an example of how the situation in Sri Lanka developed after the war:
“When I met Watareka Vijitha Thero in early 2014 in a suburb of Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital, he had been in hiding for nearly five months. The gentle-voiced monk had spoken out against anti-Muslim fearmongering by a hard-line group called the Buddhist Power Force, known by its Sinhalese initials B.B.S.
Mr. Vijitha’s car was attacked in retaliation, and he narrowly escaped. “What does it mean for Buddhism if those that speak for communal harmony have to hide in fear?” he asked me. “What does it mean for my country that the government lets these lawless thugs have a free run?”
Six months later, Mr. Vijitha was found on a road near Colombo stripped naked and bloody, his hands and legs bound. The B.B.S. denied involvement. When the monk filed a complaint, the police threw him in jail for 12 days on charges of self-inflicted violence — a warning to others who dared to criticize hard-line Buddhists.”14
The motivations of the violence in the post-war era in Sri Lanka seem like the motivations that caused the civil war. The feelings of a threat on the religion and the identity stay persistent. The civil war ended because the power of the Tamil Tigers reduced dramatically and they lost because their option of continuing the war was not there anymore. Because there was still no agreement, Buddhists are still wary of the place of Sri Lanka as a sacred homeland and the home of Buddhism in the world. Therefore I consider it very unlikely for the violent actions to stop anytime soon.
Conclusion
In my study I examined the causes of the participation and the use of violence of the Sinhalese Buddhists in the civil war in Sri Lanka. The conflict between the two major ethnicities in Sri Lanka that first started with peace talks, constitutions, and oppositions, ended up in a 26 years long bloody warfare. The war did not end because a solution was found to the problem, but because the Sinhalese Buddhists overcame the Tamil guerrillas. The separation between the two major ethnicities in Sri Lanka still stands.
13 http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/bodu-bala-sena 14 The New York times, Sri Lanka’s Violent Buddhist, 01/02/15
22 There are different causes that effected the situation in Sri Lanka. The main thing that kept coming back during my study was the effect of colonial powers in Sri Lanka. Of these powers, the British colonial time period seemed to be the catalyst. First of all, as Kinnvall (2004) argued, the new democratic system since independence caused uncertainty and disintegration in the country. Tamil elites were not represented well in the new government and their power was reduced; especially when the ruling parties adapted a Buddhist nationalist policy. According to Kinnvall, religion and ethnicity are attractive to strive for when a country, after long colonial ruling, experiences an identity crisis. In this way they relived their identity by holding on to their culture, the one thing that was not modernized or Westernized by their Western colonial leaders. Not to forget, this is not only a reaction to uncertainty, but also a tactic of the Buddhists’ new ruling elite to get approval of the majority of the country to rule. The transition to a modern state made it possible for the first not so powerful Buddhists of Sri Lanka to reach the top.
Another reason for this Buddhist nationalism is that in this way, the Buddhists in Sri Lanka stood strong against external threats. Not only other religions or ethnicities threatened the existence of the Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka, the Buddhists also had the idea that Buddhism was disappearing worldwide. Monks saw it as their duty to protect Sri Lanka against the disappearance of the religion. Buddhists outside Sri Lanka also see Sri Lanka as the sacred homeland of the Buddhists, so transnational Buddhist networks may provide support too for the Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka. Unfortunately not a lot research has been done on Buddhist transnational networks.
The Buddhists ethics too do not hold back the monks from violent actions. Because according to some interpretations of the sacred texts, when the state of mind, the intention or the goal, the helpfulness to others and the moral status of the victim are all ‘good’, a violent action, including killing, may not have bad karmic consequences and so is legitimate. However, not every Buddhist in Sri Lanka agrees with the violence. These Buddhists argue that the violence should have stopped long before, and that the Tamils and the state should talk with each other to come to a peaceful solution. However, these Buddhists also were not willing to agree with a separate state. Both approaches can also be seen as an effect of the British colonial time. The attitude towards the ethnical ‘other’ was the same in the civil war as in the colonial time. Even after the civil war this attitude has remained.
The Sinhalese Buddhists who were active in the warfare may have suffered from a collective historical trauma. The colonial past influenced the way of thinking and the way of acting of the Buddhists so profoundly, that that they became persistent about the idea that their
23 religion, ethnicity and country should be protected in all cases against all alien influences and infiltrations. This idea is observed during colonial time, after colonial time in the civil war, and in the post-war period too. On behalf of that, these activist Buddhists may have made and used the historical trauma to convince all of the Sinhalese Buddhists that what they argued was right. The Buddhists ruling elite were so obstinate that the tensions with ethnic and religious minorities in the country raised so high that Tamil rebels revolted and a civil war where both parties would not give up on their ultimate goal began.
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