EU external governance in the case of Climate Security in the Southern Mediterranean

EU external governance in the case of

Climate Security in the Southern

Mediterranean

MA Thesis in European Studies

Graduate School for Humanities

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Author: Oana Andreea Avram

Student number: 11310375

Main Supervisor: Dr J.B.M.M.Y. (Jamal) Shahin

Second Supervisor: Dr P. (Peter) Rodenburg

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Contents

Introduction ... 3

Chapter 1 - Theoretical chapter ... 6

Neorealism and power as a means ... 8

The security angle and EU external governance ... 9

The EU as an actor ... 17

Chapter 2 – The EU and its role in the global arena ... 19

Chapter 3 – The EU, a security community ... 27

Climate security – main actors ... 28

Climate security in other policy areas ... 32

Chapter 4 – Climate security in the Mediterranean ... 36

The European Neighbourhood Policy ... 39

Hierarchies and networks ... 41

Initiatives in the Mediterranean ... 45

Markets and economic development ... 49

Conclusion ... 53

References ... 56

Annex A. Interviewees ... 60

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Introduction

Climate change constitutes one of the most pressing issues in the international regime and this can be noticed by looking at the latest developments in the area. The rise in global temperatures, the increase of phenomena generated by increased temperatures as well as the numerous natural disasters attributed as a consequence of climate change urge the global leaders to deal with the problem effectively and rapidly. The entry into force of the Paris Agreement in November 2016 constitutes a major shifting point in the global approach towards climate change. The Agreement is recognized as being central to limit temperature increase and to enhance the capacity of countries to tackle with this urgent issue. The EU has proven to be a key player helping countries reach an agreement through its mechanisms of climate diplomacy. The announcement of the US President to withdraw from the Paris Agreement makes the issue even more pressing at the global level, given the size of the contribution to pollution of the US economy.

The present paper deals with the issue of climate change, however, it puts this in connection with another topic which is very current, that of security. Security as regarded in this paper is a concept which expands beyond its traditional boundaries towards new areas of study. This expansion is done through a process of securitization, which entails that the challenges which now exist are more diverse and arise from other sources. The process of securitization has emerged after the 1990s and it constituted in considering elements such as environment, climate change, migration, ethnicity, terrorism and other as security issues. By looking at climate change as a security issue, this opens up many areas for analysis that the EU uses in order to expand its area of influence. By looking at the area of climate governance and what this means in the EU, the paper will try and analyze the manner in which climate change has become a security issue therefore generating another concept for discussion, that of climate security. With a focus on the Southern Mediterranean, the paper`s research question sets out to discover to what extent does the EU externalize and export its

internal roles in the Southern Mediterranean countries in the area of climate security?

More precisely, the paper will argue that through a process of securitization the EU can expand its influence in climate change policy in the Southern Mediterranean countries, especially by keeping in mind the fact the vulnerabilities of the Mediterranean region to climate change.

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In the first chapter of the paper, the theoretical framework will be established for providing coherence to this analysis. Given the complexity of the issue, the chapter will refer to two main theoretical frameworks: these refer to securitization according to neorealist theory and EU external governance. Furthermore, the chapter will try an highlight how these two frameworks are complementary and do not exclude one another, but rather reinforce each`s explanatory power in dealing with such a complex area as climate security. By referring to EU external governance, the theory gives an insight into the mechanisms used by the EU to promote external governance, namely hierarchies, networks and markets. In order to promote these mechanisms, the EU is seen as an actor, due to its presence in the international arena, the opportunities that it has to act and its capabilities.

The second chapter provides an overview of the EUs role in the international arena of climate change by looking at the main historical interventions that the EU has had. Starting with the participation in the UNFCCC in 1992, the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Acord up until the Paris Agreement, the ups and downs of the EU as an actor will be mentioned. Furthermore, the chapter identifies the Treaty provisions for EU actorness and the main parties within the EU`s institutional framework which have important roles in climate change. The analysis of the institutions roles starts from this chapter and is based on interviews with representatives from some of the main EU institutions and bodies. In this sense, representatives from two Directorate Generals of the Commission have been interviewed as well as one representative of the European External Action Service. Identifying the main bodies and institutions with competencies in climate change will help form a basis for the in-depth analysis following in the next chapters.

Through the reference at the actorness framework and that of securitization, this chapter will try and show how the EU can be thought of as a security community which is constructed in a very peculiar way and promotes security in the Mediterranean region, through this multiplicity of securitization that takes place. The analysis will go further with identifying specifically which are the actors that deal with climate security in the Southern Mediterranean and what are their particular roles. After identifying these actors the following section will look at the relation between other policy areas in the Southern Mediterranean and their relationship with climate security.

The fourth and final chapter of this thesis will constitute the most substantial part of analysis. This means that the focus will be on the Southern Mediterranean region and the

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extent to which the EU promotes its external governance through hierarchies, networks and markets in the area of climate security. In order for the analysis to be more comprehensive, the frameworks of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for Mediterranean will be taken into account in the analysis.

The conclusion will constitute a summary of the main findings of the analysis and the key points which were dealt with throughout the thesis.

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Chapter 1 - Theoretical chapter

The theoretical chapter of this paper addresses several theoretical frameworks which will be further used in the analysis of the manner in which climate governance unfolds at the international level and at the regional level. Having set to map and explain the EU behavior in the global arena of climate governance and in the regional arena of the same policy sector, I will touch upon two main theoretical frameworks, namely the neorealist framework of Barry Buzan (Buzan et. al. 1998) and Sandra Lavenex`s (Lavenex 2004) EU external governance. However, before going into details on the selected theoretical frameworks, in order to provide coherence and consistency to the concepts, I will start by explaining what the term `governance` refers to and how this came to be adjacent to `climate`, therefore creating the policy sector of climate governance. After an overview on climate governance and what it means in the EU, I will further explain what the main features of neorealism are and their explanatory value. In order to make the passage from the neorealist framework to the one of EU external governance, the chapter will address the concept of `security`, as it was theorized by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (Buzan et. al. 1998). Furthermore, following the redefinition of the concept of security that I will address in this chapter, I will discuss on what are security communities. Also I will discuss on why the EU can be considered as a security community due to the integration process and by replacing anarchy with hierarchy, between the EU MS.

In continuation, my chapter will claim that the EU can be considered an actor on the international scene due to its actorness, capacity and capabilities (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). The EU`s legal personality gives it the status of an actor from the perspective of international law and in terms of political will, the EU has manifested its willingness and capability to act in various area in the international system, particularly in the climate governance area in the last two decades. Therefore, the main features of these concepts will be addressed and assessed in order to provide for a sound basis of the following chapters which will focus on the analysis.

The objective of this chapter is to present the two theoretical frameworks, which, I will further demonstrate in the following chapters do not exclude each other, but rather complement each other because each of them deals with a particular level of analysis, namely neorealism deals with how the EU acts on the international arena and external governance

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deals with how the EU acts at the regional level. Since the main purpose of the thesis is to map and establish what is the role of the EU at the global level and at the regional level, I will plead for the idea that there is not one explanatory framework which could assess this role but there are two explanatory frameworks. This idea of two frameworks is supported by the fact that the EU has different approaches for the global level and for the regional level. What these two frameworks have in common is the fact that they both deal with the EU as an actor, more specifically as a `security community`. In the international arena of climate governance, the EU has an important role, however it can be characterized as a single voice speaking through multiple mouths (Delreux 2014, 1021), namely a common position but more actors speaking: the EU and the MS, whereas at the regional level the patterns of interaction differ and the discourse on climate governance takes on a clearer security approach. This chapter will present the two main theoretical frameworks, without treating them complementary of exclusionary, but rather emphasizing each one`s explanatory value.

Climate governance is defined in the realm of the international climate regime,

which is constituted from frameworks such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the related legal documents (Okereke et al. 2009, 58). In the international climate regime, there are not only nation states having influence and taking actions, but also non-nation-state actors (NNSAs). The actors referred to as NNSA are actors operating at local, regional, national and international levels. The literature on the governance of climate change has focused mainly on the creation and implementation of the international climate regime. The governance perspective in regards to international climate regime assesses the importance of other actors in this area, which are not ``endowed with formal authority`` (Okereke et al. 2009, 60), actors such as ``international organizations, global social movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), transnational scientific networks, business organizations, multinational corporations and other forms of private authority`` (Okereke et al. 2009, 60). The involvement of NNSAs has been observed to recently go `beyond the regime` (Okereke et al. 2009, 58), meaning a development of parallel initiatives of these NNSAs. This brings the need for clarification of certain main aspects on their role and their involvement especially in relation to: ``(1) the nature of power in global governance, (2) the relationship between public and private authority, (3) the dynamics between structure and agency; and (4) the rationalities and actual processes of governance`` (Okereke et al. 2009, 59).

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Regarding EU governance in relation to its neighbors, the EU narrative has been varied: it has referred to inclusion and neighbourhood but also to borders and securitization (van Houtum 2010, 958). Even though the securitization aspect has been less used, the EU is becoming more and more concerned with new security issues. Therefore, building a policy coherent for EU neighbors is one of the most important objectives when dealing with security in the region, especially since the EU is trying to create more of an attraction towards integration than a fear of exclusion (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, 185).

Neorealism and power as a means

Realism as a theory of international relations starts with assumptions related to human nature which is in permanent search for domination. Realism is concerned with concepts such as power, fear, anarchy which are inherently human and are reflected in the institutions that humans build. Neorealism is constituted from two main categories, namely defensive neorealism and offensive neorealism, which are focused on providing systemic explanations and move further from realism exactly through this aspect.

One of the most important authors dealing with neorealism is Waltz, which claims that the international system is made of structures and units who interact and function anarchically (Waltz 1990, 21-37). The states which are in the international system are therefore in a relation of coordination with other states in the system, but in a relation of subordination internally, meaning in fact that their actions are determined by power and poles of power. Waltz claims that a state is in a natural state of war and is dominated by a desire for power and no order can be a guarantee that violence will not be used. In its internal affairs, the state is having a type of legitimate monopoly of using force whereas, at the international level, there is no legitimacy for using force by a government, therefore the dynamic is guided by a principle of self-help. In the international system, states are defined as being similar in terms of functions but different in terms of capabilities and each will desire to maximize its own well-being. Security on the external plan is the ultimate purpose of a state and power is seen as a means to achieve this, the main purpose being maintaining its position in the international system. Power in this case is regarded as a means and is defined in terms of capabilities and not in terms of the results that a state can have. A state having power in this sense refers to a state having capabilities which are subsumed to the concept of power. By

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looking at power through these lenses one can notice that power is therefore not defined at the level of a unity, but at the system level, and as a relational concept, one that can be defined only by relating to other actors which have power.

In the realist view, the concept of security is referring to a lack of threat towards a state. The internal and external area of analysis both report to the concept of security differently: on the internal domain, the state ensures the security of its individuals and on the external domain, the state protects the values and interests it deems important. This is where the discussion leads to the idea of `the security dilemma`, which is considered to be at the core of security studies. A security dilemma therefore refers to an existential condition of uncertainty which characterizes all human relations (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 134). Even in situations when cooperation is achieved, an actor can never be certain of the other one`s actions and intentions.

However, looking at the state in these traditional terms has proven to be a limitation for the modern day challenges, and there came a need to surpass these debate through an expansion of what `security` means. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR actually brought into discussion new types of threats, conflicts at the sub-state level, and social, environmental and economic issues. In redefining this meaning of security, Buzan, Waever and Wilde (Buzan et. al. 1998) claim that there are five levels of analysis one must take into consideration: the international system, international subsystems, units, subunits and individuals, however actors from these levels can intertwine and act on various levels. Adopting a more expanded security agenda assumes that the sectors in which actors interact are also more diverse: political, economic, social and environmental. Governments and international organization interact along with environmental and social organizations as well as civil society actors and markets. Therefore, by referring to more sectors, the nature of threats becomes even more varied.

The security angle and EU external governance

To move further to the second main theoretical perspective of the thesis, this chapter will first need to explain what `security` means and how new developments on the international scene have led to an expansion of the meaning of security. Traditionally, in a realist approach, security refers to lack of threats (Ungureanu and Miroiu 2006, 180) a

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concept which is being analyzed at two different levels: internal, where the state has a monopoly on a legitimate power and external, from which the state protects its citizens. In the internal arena, the state ensures the security of individuals, whereas in the external arena the state protects the values and interests it considers to be important. Defining interests and values takes place according to the manner in which decision-makers identify threats (Wolfers 1952, 488) and their perceptions. Given the subjective nature of perceptions and the want for security, misunderstood perceptions can lead to a situation in which a security dilemma manifests (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 134). This security dilemma is at the center of security studies from a realist perspective. However, the need to overcome this dilemma brought about a need to expand the concept of security and give it new meaning since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR brought to light new threats, of a different nature.

This redefinition of security assumes the existence of several levels of analysis (Buzan et. al. 1998, 20): the international level, international subsystems and units which are actors comprised of various sub-groups, organizations, communities, individuals. These actors interact on various areas such as the military area, which entails the existence of coercion, the political area, build around the idea of authority and legitimacy, the economic area, the social area consisting in identities and the environmental area, which is related to interactions between man and nature. When discussing security and threats, the process of securitization refers to an issue that goes outside the rigors of a political procedure. An issue therefore can become a matter of security when it is presented as an existential threat and the securitization therefore becomes a subjective, socially constructed issue (Buzan et. al. 1998, 54). In order for an issue to be securitized, it has to be accepted by the public as such, therefore, the process of securitization has three elements: an existential threat, urgent measures and effects of breaking the rules of interactions. Securitization becomes a speech act performed by an actor with a certain position, which uses specific procedures about an issue whose threat seems credible. Moving an issue from the normal arena of security to the `extraordinary` one can signal an incapacity of dealing with the problem in the normal political arena (Waever 1995).

When discussing about security and its new meaning it is also important to mention the concept of `security communities` (Adler and Barnett 1998, 3). Karl Deutsch is the one first using the terms of security communities and this means that integration from this point

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of view refers to the existence of a sense of community between persons from a territory which have institutions and expect trust from each other. This means that the community puts its trust in institutions to solve problems peacefully. Adler and Barnett claim that states which are in a security community are not only in a stable order, but also in a stable peace and there is a culture of belonging between the members. Therefore, it matters who is inside the community and who is outside it. In the framework of these security communities the concept of security expands its old meaning and adopts new aspects which are mentioned in the previous paragraphs. These two authors focus on what is called a pluralist community security, which are defined as a transnational region made from sovereign states, in which people trust and expect peaceful change (Adler and Barnett 1998, 30). In these security communities emerge the so-called regional security complexes, which are analyzing mutual relationships and claim that interdependence usually appears between regional groups, situated between the local and global level. The emergence of a security community does not mean that security problems disappear, but it means that these are aggregated and a securitization takes place at a collective level.

The EU, through building institutions, manages to surpass some traditional questions about anarchy inside the EU and it builds a capacity exactly through the creation of institutions which are behaving like an actor. The EU, through its institutions has taken the integration process further than any other organization, however it does not exist like a state, neither does it abolish the old order. The securitization process after the 1990s has constituted in adding up elements such as: environment, immigrants, ethnicity, terrorism etc. Therefore Europe should not return to its old continental conflicts and through this, even the process of integration in itself is invested with a security feature. The multitude of securitization processes which takes place in the European Union constitutes a proof of the fact that the state loses its role as a securitizing actor and a network of connections is created where the European discourse if predominant (Buzan et. al. 1998, 363). This framework assumes that the EU function like a structure of the type center-periphery, where Western Europe is the center and Eastern Europe is the periphery. Therefore, there is a certain `dependency` of the East and in the same time an increase in political, economic and social standards, the Eastern states having to deal with their problems in order to rise up to EU standards.

In respect to non-member states, they perceive the EU as a source of stability and prosperity, but also as something inconvenient, since there is the possibility of EU

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mechanisms being adopted in those non-member states (Buzan et. al. 1998, 353). This adoption of EU mechanisms may not always be desired and seen as a source of prosperity. The regional and global levels intertwine in a very unique way in the EU, especially because of its unique character. Moving security issues from intraregional level to interregional level and perhaps even global points towards the EU is headed for being a global actor and at the same time MS still have the attributes of actors on the international stage.

In this redefined concept of security, power can refer to many aspects. In this sense, the chapter will address the concept of power in the context of interdependence (Keohane and Nye 2012, 15). Interdependence here means simply reciprocal dependence and actors determining and influencing each other. Power can mean power over results, control over resources or the potential of influencing resources which means interdependence in itself can constitute a source of power. Power as interdependence is defined through the terms of sensitivity and vulnerability (Keohane and Nye 2012, 15). The sensitivity of a state towards another refers to the fact that changes which occur in one state will influence the other. The vulnerability of a state entails that the relationship between the two states can be manipulated as a strategic advantage. Complex interdependence entails that the resources of power are expanded to the type of relationship between actors. Economic interdependence, transnational actors, information, all become relevant when one discusses power in the context of complex interdependence. These perceptions of interdependence and threat are extremely

relevant when discussion about EU `external governance`. The theoretical perspective of

external governance had a starting point in the analysis of the initiative for a `Wider Europe` launched in 2003 which focused on how to strengthen the relations with the EU neighboring countries that do not have the perspective of membership. The communication on Wider Europe stated the following:

Over the coming decade and beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbors.

(Communication on Wider Europe 2003, 3)

The extension of the concept of governance beyond the EU is a rather new phenomenon which implies a differentiation of the EU`s role in the international area and this can be applied to all neighboring countries of the EU (Lavenex 2004, 683). The external

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governance approach entails an attempt to expand the legal boundary of the EU, however with a limited opening for the institutional boundary. The logic behind this approach is one of inclusion and in which internal goals and foreign policy come together, meaning that internal politics gain an external dimension. When we discuss external governance, the idea of boundaries has to be approached, however, mostly in terms of institutional and legal boundary outside the circle of MS (Lavenex 2004, 683). In this respect, external governance takes place when parts of the aquis communautaire are expanded to non-member states through different types of relatively stable associations such as quasi-membership in the case of EEA and bilateral treaties, accession associations, neighbourhood associations such as the case of the Mediterranean and the Eastern neighbourhood, development cooperation such is the case of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and transatlantic cooperation with the USA and Canada (Lavenex 2004, 683).

The theory deals with two dimensions that are very relevant for the behavior of the EU: perception of interdependence and the institutional roles and capacities. The perception of interdependence is related to power as interdependence (Keohane and Nye 2012), which is related to the EU`s self-understanding as a security community. This is also observed in the 2003 European Security Strategy, which addresses the new definition of security. The interdependence in certain policy fields and the perception of itself as a security community follows with the assumption that the EU will try and expand its sphere of influence in certain areas where sensitivity and vulnerability are identified to arise from developments in third countries. The institutional roles and capacities of the EU are relevant for the assumption of the EU having responsibilities in the area and also the institutional competence to act in external relations (Lavenex 2004, 687). In the case of environmental policy, the Single European Act in 1987, the EU sixth environmental action programme 2001 – 2010, the European Environmental Agency (EEA) reports in 2002 all point towards a securitization of environmental concerns which are integrated in the aspects of the Community`s external relations (Lavenex 2004, 691).

The EU rules expand to third countries through both regulatory and organizational mechanisms. The regulatory mechanisms refer to EU rules and policies that apply to third states and the organizational mechanisms refer to networks and policy-making organizations which expand beyond EU borders. This type of external governance works through three

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basic institutional forms, namely hierarchies, networks and markets, which provide opportunities and constraints in the relationship between actors.

Hierarchies in this case are noticed at the sectoral level through rules which are legally binding by supranational law. The emphasis on sectoral level is important here, because in this type of governance, rules that are strongly integrated in a particular sector are the ones being enforced externally as well. This is the example of the European Economic Area (EEA), however also the ENP manifests some of these features. For example, there are precise rules and formal procedures as well as mechanisms of monitoring and sanctioning which are exercised through conditionality and external incentives (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 797). Networks are the second institutionalized forms, which refers to situations where actors are equal in institutional terms. However, it has to be mentioned that this does not mean that there are no asymmetries in power. These networks work on instruments which are mutually agreed upon and refer more to procedures and patterns of interaction, negotiations. This can also be referred to as policy-making without legislating (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 798) and it usually takes place in agencies, committees or policy networks. The actors participating in these networks are experts and usually they do not have political affiliation. In the case of external governance, networks function more through a coordination of national rules such as for example is the case of Joint Committee in the EEA of the ENP Action Plans (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 798). The network approach is opposed to the hierarchical approach through its types of interactions and actors participating, as well as mechanisms. The third institutional form of governance is the market, which functions on the mechanisms of competition. In the EU, the principle of mutual recognition means that according to the consumer`s demand, the products and services which are most competitive are the ones that prevail, and this principle leads to a situation where legislations are approximated and adapted to the EU regulatory framework. This also happens due to competitive pressure. In markets, there are negative and positive externalities which can occur for all actors participating in the market: societal actors, governments etc.

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Table 1. Modes of external governance

Source: Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 800

Effectiveness, which is the extent to which EU norms have been transferred effectively to third countries is measured through the levels of rule selection, rule adoption in domestic legislation and rule application in practice (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 800). Rule selection refers to whether or not the EU norms are the ones selected by third country as a point of reference and whether or not EU rules dominate the agreements. Rule adoption refers to the idea of EU norms being transposed into the domestic legislation of third countries. The third level of analysis, referring to rule application means that the adoption of rules into domestic legislation does not necessarily mean that the rules are applied.

The effectiveness of EU external governance can be approached from three different perspectives, namely an institutionalist perspective, a power-based perspective and a domestic perspective. Therefore, the institutionalist explanation claims that the EU policies and rules are transmitted through institutions and that they reflect externally the internal structure and processes of policy-making. Furthermore, the effectiveness of rules transmission increases with the legalization or legitimacy of institutions as well as their quality (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 802). The power-based perspective claims that EU external governance is dependent on the EU`s power and interdependence with the third countries (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 803) as well as relative to other global actors, such as US, UN, Russia etc. In this level of analysis, the degree of interdependence and the power symmetries or asymmetries are highly relevant for the transmission of rules through external governance. These two perspectives reach the conclusion that the hierarchical mode of governance is the most effective one (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 804), however the reasons for its success are different: the institutionalist perspective gives credit to high

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legitimacy and legalization while the power based perspective gives credit to EU power. The third perspective, that of domestic structure, focuses on the third country`s governance. This means that the EU external governance will be shaped as the third country`s domestic governance, according to the functional necessities or resonance. This will lead to a situation of norms being accepted more easily, because they resonate more with the domestic governance model.

Building on EU external governance, Lavenex (Lavenex 2014) constructs a framework of analysis which is centered on the idea of the EU as a functionalist extension. The EU is often perceived as being a hybrid polity, in terms of vertical (multi-level) as well as horizontal (sectoral) interactions. This type of conceptualization of the EU reveals a tension between a desire to unify as an international actor (on the vertical axis) and the reality of sectoral regimes which have different characteristics, functions and are in a certain way slightly connected to the foreign policy (Lavenex 2014, 887). This view upon the EU differentiates between the EU`s `common external actorness and the external relations of specific sectoral regimes` (Lavenex 2014, 888) which is identified as being correspondent to the differentiation between Type I and Type II of multi-level governance (MLG).

The idea of projecting internal rules outside the borders of the EU, claims Lavenex (Lavenex 2014), can take place both in Type I and in Type II of MLG, however differently, depending on the mechanism utilized. In this sense, these are several elements on which the analysis of the `functionalist extension` is build, such as: the source of the rule projection (which can be direct intentional political administrative action or indirect socio-economic forces), the mechanisms of projecting rules (which can be both instrumental and normative) both of which can generate various structures of interaction and different types of power (Lavenex 2014, 889).

Table 2. Mechanisms of functionalist extension

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The table presented is a summary of the elements mentioned above and the types of interactions, mechanisms and power which correspond to each category of MLG. The first type, based on hierarchical relations, assumes the existence of conditionality and legal order and refers to a type of actor which is unified in its foreign policy and can exert coercive power over non-member states, which is the case of the EFTA countries (Lavenex 2014, 890). In the second type of network structure, the EU rules are transmitted through other processes, due to a different type of power the EU has, which forces it to use other mechanisms such as learning and socialization. These two types correspond to a direct political and administrative projection of EU rules. However, EU rules are not only transmitted like that, but also indirectly, through mechanisms such as emulation and competition. In case of emulation, third countries adopt of align with EU rules `because they perceive them as legitimate of normatively superior` (Lavenex 2014, 891). In the case of competition, states align with EU rules to avoid negative externalities and high costs (Lavenex 2014, 891). This functionalist extension of the EU has become a source of international influence (Lavenex 2014, 898) and it works more through subtle mechanisms based on interdependence and trans-governmental networks.

Having gone through the main theoretical approaches which will provide as the basis for the continuation of this thesis, this chapter provides the main concepts for mapping the

role of the EU both in the international arena of climate governance, as well in the

regional arena of climate governance, particularly in the Mediterranean, which is classified as being one of the most vulnerable regions in the world (WMO International Panel on Climate Change 2007).

The EU as an actor

Since the construction of the European Community, the EU has gone through numerous changes, expansions of territory as well as of competencies. Considering the EU as an actor has to be analyzed both in terms of internal characteristics as well as external ones. Bretherton and Vogler analyze the EU in both of these areas. The actor, in international relations, is synonymous with the units that constitute the international system, therefore an actor is an entity which is capable of formulating goals, making decisions, therefore take action to achieve an objective (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 15). The focus is put on

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autonomy and the role the EU gets from the behavior of MS and third states. The EU is defined as an actor in relation to its capabilities, its political arrangements, both internal and external (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 17). In order to emphasize the importance of structural factors, the concepts of opportunity, presence and capability are being used to assess the EU as an actor. Opportunity refers to the structural factors in the international system that both constrain and provide opportunities to an actor. When discussion climate governance, the behavior of the US during the Kyoto negotiations can be provided as an example of opportunity for the EU to take the lead. The EU`s identity and unique character, the attraction that EU values have as well as the credibility that third countries invest in the EU are also indicators of the EU`s importance in international relations. The capability to act, to formulate policies and mechanisms are determined by a common understanding of what EU values are and collective and legitimate arrangements. The ability to formulate policies and establish directions of action is being reflected through the use of instruments such as: diplomacy, markets, various policies (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 28). Therefore, the framework in which the interactions take place, the influence of the EU externally and the ability to implement policies as well as regulatory frameworks (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 29) are what shape the EU as an actor.

From a legal perspective, an actor must have a legal personality, which gives it a right to participate and be responsible towards other actors. In this sense, 2004 saw the starting date for the EU’s legal personality (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 41). The EU`s unique identity contributes to giving it a certain role in international relations, having some collective interests as well as manifesting a specific behavior. The EU`s identity is defined through common values inside the Union as well as values that arise from the interaction with third states. The identity and the roles that other states give to the EU are reflected also in the external action that this promotes.

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Chapter 2 – The EU and its role in the global arena

This chapter of the thesis will highlight the main steps that the EU took in the international arena in the area of climate change and which were the developments on the external side that made the EU to gain the credibility and legitimacy that it has today. By starting with the main frameworks at the international level, it will further be described how the EU build an internal capacity in dealing with climate change which it after transposed into its external behavior to strengthen its position. This made the EU to grow into an actor on the international stage which was capable of brokering an agreement such as the COP21 in Paris, recognized as being a major step towards tackling probably the most important challenge that humanity has ever faced.

Climate has been one of the few policy fields in which the EU has had coherent positions and spoke with a single voice since the start of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. Up to the 15th COP the EU has been has demonstrated its preference for multilateralism. The outcome of the COP15 in Copenhagen, meaning that fact that a binding agreement could not be achieved, brought with it the need for the EU to reconsider its strategy. Since the US decision not to ratify Kyoto, the EU has been a main actor, and during the 2000 climate policy has been a key feature of the EUs foreign and security policy identity. The external policy of the EU is reflected in domestic policymaking such as the Burden-Sharing Agreement (Fischer and Geden 2015, 2)

Even though the EU had a long standing position as leader, the Copenhagen Acord in 2009 (COP15) has been an example of failure for the EU. This Copenhagen Acord constituted one of the turning points for the EU behavior on the international arena. The EU had a decline as a climate change leader and was marginalized from negotiations. During the negotiations, the EU had some very ambitious goals and it wanted to radically reduce emissions (Backstrand and Elgstrom 2013, 1370), a proposal which caused dissension between the developing countries. However, in the Durban COP the EU had a more moderate stance and focused on coalition-building and more moderate goals (Backstrand and Elgstrom 2013, 1370). The EU has been leading by example through the promotion of its vision. No matter what the opinions on EU`s failure in Copenhagen are, the certain thing is that the other actors were not responsive to the EU and the EU needed to focus on some other factors for

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success, such as coalition building and new leadership which it did in Durban. In these COP in Durban, all the actors had, in the end, the same legal obligations to reduce carbon emissions.

In the international arena, the EU promotes principles such as sustainable development, multilateralism, scientific evidence etc. In international negotiations, the EU has also insisted on the adoption of legally binding targets as well as compliance mechanisms, which constitutes in fact a reflection of its own internal mechanisms. This behavior is very different from the behavior of other players such as China, which regards the matter as predominantly economic and the USA which almost denies the existence of climate change (Backstrand and Elgstrom 2013, 1372), and also the growth of developing countries such as Brazil, South Africa and India has brought changes in the global climate diplomacy.

The March 2007 decision of the European Council to establish and integrated energy and climate policy, was a decision derived from international climate negotiations as well as the conditional target of 30% reduction, and a fallback strategy of 20%. There is therefore a close connection between the international climate negotiations and EU domestic climate policy (Fischer and Geden 2015, 2). In 2009, the European Council asked the Commission to analyze the economic effects of such measures and the Commission provided 3 roadmaps: one on the low-carbon economy, one on the energy sector and one on the transport sector (Fischer and Geden 2015, 3) which provided models and projections. However, the roadmaps were never adopted in the Council of the European Union, highlighting that the EU is under an organized inconsistency (Fischer and Geden 2015, 4).

However, the Paris Agreement and its ratification by 150 out of 197 Parties to the Convention has constituted a shifting point in international negotiations. The Agrement entered into force in November 2016. This has established a new rhythm for the international regime. The adoption of the Paris Agreement meant that the signatories agreed to limit global warming to below 2 degrees Celsius and in order to do that they adopted bonding commitments to make nationally determined contributions which are called NDC`s. These NDC`s are to be renewed every 5 years, to promote a proactive approach. (UNFCCC 2016). The signatories of the Agreement also have to provide regular rapports on what progress has been made and the developed countries will have to provide support for the developing countries through contributions. The COP21 has also provided mechanisms to address loss and damage or mechanisms to be set up for the reduction of emission in one country to count

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for another country`s NDC (Outcomes of the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Paris, center for climate and energy solutions, page 1). The Paris Agreement has received support from non-state actors and numerous governments except for three countries which have not signed or are withdrawing from the agreement: Nicaragua, the United States and Syria.

Having discussed actorness in the theoretical chapter, this section will discuss what the elements that make the EU an actor in the international regime of climate diplomacy are. Taking the lead in the Kyoto Protocol, pushing for multilateralism and legally binding agreements, but also adopting flexible mechanisms has made the EU an example of good practices in tackling climate change. The participation in the international climate regime and the International Agreements that have been signed have constituted the structural framework that provided the EU with the opportunity to become an actor. Therefore, the entire participation of the EU on the international arena constituted the opportunity framework to consider the EU as an actor.

The presence of the EU refers to the EU`s influence on the global arena, which is determined by its internal mechanisms and values (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 27). Therefore, the main actors which are involved in the international arena as well as the strategies and action plans the EU adopts are part of the presence framework of actorness. In the climate negotiations, the EU seems to be an actor with a single voice, namely having one unitary position in topics where different positions of the MS have characterized the negotiations. This will further be detailed in the analysis, in relation to the unitary position of the EU in climate negotiations. However, there is a difference between the unitary position taken by the EU and the actual number of actors belonging to the EU which take that position. In this respect, we can talk about the EU talking in international negotiations through multiple mouths, thereby several actors in the EU taking up positions in these negotiations, making the EU`s cohesiveness therefore very strong in these settings.

The actors which have the capability of undertaking positions in these negotiations are the third part of the actorness framework, which entails the fact that the EU has competencies and acts based on policies and strategies. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is in this case the fundament of the EU acting externally. The basis of this is in Article 191 of The Lisbon Treaty. The EU is a body which exerts direction leadership (Oberthür and Kelly 2008, 36), meaning an approach towards soft leadership strategy through diplomatic

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mechanisms, persuasion and argumentation. The EU external policy is a shared competence between the MS and the EU, therefore the representation is shared between the two.

The Lisbon Treaty and the previous treaties make reference to who are the actors who should represent the Union in international negotiations. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the main negotiator in international climate regime should be the Commission (Delreux 2014, 1023), but also the Council has the right to choose a Union negotiator and a head of the Union`s negotiating team. Given that this is a shared competence, MS can also choose to delegate their representation and this is generally towards a common negotiator, which is the rotating Council presidency (Delreux 2014, 1023). Therefore, there is no clear stipulation on who represents the Union in international negotiations in shared competences and this sometimes causes tensions between the EU institutions, particularly the Commission and the Council (Delreux 2014, 1023). The creation of the EEAS has brought a situation where the Commission loses even more power in representation and is sometimes pushing for being the sole representative of the EU in shared competencies (Delreux 2014, 1024). The Council of Ministers has been so far one of the most important actors in representing the Union in climate negotiations. The Council is represented by a EU rotating presidency and this is a very relevant institution when it comes to adopting common positions. The fact that the Presidency of the Council leaves spaces for other actors diminishes the Presidency influence in the Council and it also gives up part of its power to influence what is happening outside the EU (Delreux and Van den Brande 2013, 114). This means that the Presidency assumes a role of coordination of the informal actors involved.

The Council is the predominant body for the EU`s external climate policy-making (Delreux and Van den Brande 2013, 121) and the system of informal leadership has been introduced during the 2004 Irish EU Presidency, because it considered it did not have sufficient capacity to adequately deal with climate change on its own. In climate negotiations, there are two types of tasks that are divided among actors: representation delegated to lead negotiators and direct support for the negotiator, which is delegated to issue leaders. This has been happening since 2004 and the number of negotiators has changes depending on the agenda.

Within the Council of Ministers a working group was established, named Working Party on International Environmental Issues (WPIEI). This working group is the one that establishes the list of lead negotiators and issue leaders. The group has a central place when it

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comes to decision-making in the Council, being at the same time the main preparatory body for the COREPER and the Environmental Council, which is the one adopting Council conclusions determining the general EU position for climate change negotiations. The EU positions on climate change are adopted at the ministerial level and the main EU coordination meeting take place in the WPIEI. Due to the fact that the issues are multiple and complex, there is one more level set below this group, which is an expert group level, constituted of MS and Commission officials (Delreux and Van den Brande 2013, 117).

The Commission mainly intervenes through mechanisms such as the Emission Trading System (ETS), the Green Diplomacy Network. Having capability also entails the use of various mechanisms and strategies such as the European Trading System. The ETS is a representative for the EU efforts to tackle climate change and reduce emissions and it is the main focus of the Commission. The UNFCCC was the first stage in creating the ETS and it represented a turning point for the EU leadership in the area. The ETS is a mechanism which was also linked with the mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol, namely the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism. The system is the largest carbon trading market in the world and it issues about two thirds of allowances which are then traded on the market. The ETS functions on a system of cap and trade (Egenhofer 2007, 455), namely the Commission establishes a limit and allocated these allowances to actors which participate in the market. The ETS had been controversial, being both applauded as well as criticized for being a market approach to a problem that was caused by the market in the first place.

Since launching the ETS, the EU has gone beyond the Kyoto targets and has committed to 20% reduction by 2020 (Youngs 2010, 124). The ambitious goals of the EU mean that the ETS sectors are subject to a smaller cap. Also, investments in the renewable energy technologies are increasing from the European Investment Bank. The support for renewable energies is not only a measure which is being promoted inside the EU, but is becoming a part of the EU`s foreign policy, since the EU is actively developing alternative energy sources in North Africa and other areas (Youngs 2010, 124). There is a strong agreement therefore that the EU is an important actor in climate change policy, however, there have been criticisms that it has a better image than is actually implements measures. In the first phase of the ETS, countries over-states the emissions from 1990 in order to have more space for maneuver and for the price of the carbon to be small. Also, there have been

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numerous sectors which were not included in the ETS until the second phase of the process, due to opposition from Central and Eastern European MS in particular and interested stakeholders, such as for example, the aviation sector.

The Green Diplomacy Network was established during the Thessaloniki European Council in order to promote integration the policy sector of environment into the external dimension. This means that a network of environment experts was created between foreign ministers of MS, in order to increase the consistency and effectiveness of the actions that the EU takes in the field of environment (European Commission, 2011). The Green Diplomacy Network is under the responsibility of the EEAS since 2012 and it has two levels where it acts. First of all, at the level of MS, foreign ministry officials communicate and secondly, in third countries, EU Delegations and EU Member States Embassies coordinate in order to implement EU priorities (EEAS 2016) especially regarding the Climate Diplomacy Action Plans.

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009 created the EEAS and also added two new DG`s to the Commission, namely DG Climate Action and DG Energy. The EEAS represented an attempt to increase the coherence of the Union in terms of external representation. According to the Treaty provisions, the EEAS works in close cooperation with the diplomatic services of the MS, but it also has officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission (Smith 2013, 1300). The EEAS has been influenced by the intergovernmental politics between the MS, which have attempted to make decisions about how the structure of the EEAS should be. The fact that the role of external representation is not very well defined for the actors dealing with external policy led to a situation where the Commission and the EEAS are disputing about higher powers in terms of foreign policy. In these disputes, what also matters is that the High Representative of the EEAS is also a Commission vice-president and that the Commission President and the President of the European Council have more powers that the HR.

What is important is the EU ability to understand what are the interests and policies of third countries with which it engages and this depends on the institutional, human and financial resources that the EU invests in these relationships (Torney 2015, 2). The EU`s capacity to engage with partners and exert power is seen as a process with three steps (Torney 2015, 3): intelligence gathering, transmitting this to Brussels and European capitals and the effective incorporation of data into the foreign policy decision-making process. The EU

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gathers its information through many channels, or a process that one can refer to as `listening with many ears` and it is essential that the data which is gathered be transmitted effectively to where decisions are made and that the data is utilized at its maximum potential.

After Lisbon, the role of the EU delegations changed, being staffed with EEAS personnel and also policy experts from the Commission. The EU delegations began coordinating MS embassies and also conducting demarches on behalf of the EU. The EEAS has had difficulties in the beginning of its existence, especially in sectoral policies. The changes that were made when the two new DG`s were created, because all the sectoral experts were sent to the new DGs and EEAS was left without sufficient staff and expertise.In the period prior to 2015, the EEAS took a very important role. The Green Diplomacy Network was re-launched under the coordination of the EEAS. The Green Diplomacy Network includes actors such as DG Clima, DG Environment, Devco and representatives from MS governments as well as operations of the network in this countries. The GDN is a soft body which has capacities in more countries and it also entails a role of coordination for the Ministries of MS (Interview Respondent A 2017), therefore having a very important role for the EU and the EEAS.

In 2015, an “EU climate diplomacy for 2015 and beyond” action plan was set up and identified the priorities of the EU climate diplomacy. The emphasis was put on dialogues, low-carbon development and the nexus between climate, resources, prosperity and security (Torney 2015, 7). The EEAS had a very important role for negotiations in terms of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC`s) which represented plans for the countries to come up with actions. Despite all these successes of the EEAS, its capabilities are still limited and its limited capabilities are replicated abroad in the EU delegations (Torney 2015, 8). In the Council conclusions on climate diplomacy from 2015, the assessment of the IPCC is restated, namely the fact that climate change poses risks to economy, prosperity, sustainable development, peace and security (Council of the EU 2015). Climate change is viewed as a multi-risk threat which necessitates actions taken at the global level and the EU level. The Council states that `is committed to addressing the security dimension of Climate Change, including by building up its climate diplomacy component` (Council of the EU 2015).

In the Council Conclusions on climate diplomacy after COP21 the need for sustained political and diplomatic mobilization at the global level is highlighted and the emphasis is placed on keeping climate change a strategic priority, providing support for the

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implementation of the Paris Agreement and increasing efforts to address climate change. Climate change is once again identified as a factor which poses security risks. The Climate Diplomacy Action Plan set up for the year 2016 expresses the EU intentions to concentrate on climate diplomacy and strengthen the relationships between countries. There are three types of actions promoted, each related to a different area. First types of actions refer to advocating climate change as strategic priority in dialogues, public diplomacy as well as external policy instruments (Council of the EU 2016, 7). This is the most relevant strand for action for the subject of the research, even though the other two strands of actions are of great importance as well: strand two: Support implementation of the Paris Agreement, in the context of low-emission and climate resilient development and strand three: Increase efforts to address the nexus between climate, natural resources, prosperity and stability.

All these institutions are highly relevant when it comes to assessing what the role of the EU in the global arena of climate negotiations is. It is however very important to underline that when it comes to the EU role, there is no single pipeline for pushing for climate change policies (Interview Respondent A 2017). This is also related to the idea of the EU speaking with a single voice, however through multiple mouths (Delreux 2014, 1021). This translated into a coherence that the EU promotes through all its channels. EU Delegations in third countries, MS embassies as well as the type of communication undertaken are highly relevant when analyzing this area of climate change. These actors and their roles will serve as a starting point in identifying what are the precise elements that the EU approaches in terms of security through all these institutions and mechanisms.

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Chapter 3 – The EU, a security community

As the previous chapter has focused on the EU as an actor in the international arena of climate change, this chapter will go deeper into the analysis and try and prove that the EU is a security community which uses the process of securitization to expand its powers and ways of governing in climate change. The changes after the end of the Cold War have brought numerous other challenges for which the state lacks the mechanisms to deal with. The numerous areas in which new actors are involved and in which the EU has started to gain more and more competencies are diverse and bring new challenges for the model of governance and development promoted by the EU. By looking at what are the policy areas in which the EU practices a logic of securitization, this chapter will try and see in what manner if climate change included in these multiple securitizations and what is its role in other policy areas.

The actors which drive the EU climate policy are interdependent and they are mainly revolving around institutions and structures which are interacting in a complex way. There have been numerous assessments of the EU as a civilian power (Duchêne 1973), as a normative power (Manners 2002) as well as actors being situated in a complex set of interdependencies. The idea around actors being located in a set of interdependencies, institutions and structures entails that MS behavior is altered because of the states that operate in a European institutional context. The EU has also been identified as an epistemic community which is characterized by a common causal belief, a principled belief, a common notion of validity and a common policy enterprise (Zwolski and Kaunert 2011, 25).

Security in the EU is defined in many terms, but less in military terms. Economic security, in relation to the liberal principles is identified at the regional and global level. Political security is more identified in regional terms or in relation to minorities, however these are not defined as threats which can have implications at a higher level. State security is defined more in terms of identity, however there is a fear of integration in terms of fear for national identity and fear for sovereignty (Buzan et al. 1998, 358). One can notice that state security is no longer defined at horizontal level, but at the vertical level, the states do not fear each other but they fear the EU or regional conflicts. Ethnic conflicts are also a securitizing factor as well as globalization and migration, which can be perceived as threats to national

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identity, but also as threats to independence and welfare. European integration is somewhat seen as a price to be paid by states to avoid the danger that globalization has created (Buzan et al. 1998, 359). Securitizing the environment means using a discourse which securitizes problems like nuclear waste, pollution etc. The problems of terrorism, organized crime, drug traffic and illegal migration are yet again securitized as a means to balance for the opening of internal borders. This multiple securitizations which are taking place in the EU constitute a proof of the fact that the state is not the major actor in this process, but it is a network of connections in which the European speech is dominant and not the national one.

The relation with the non-member states is dominated by the fact that these see the Union as a source of security and prosperity but also as a possible menace, since these is the possibility of EU mechanisms being transposed into their policies, a phenomena which is not always desired. The regional and global levels are intertwined in the EU and securitization issues are passed from an internal level to an interregional level. Even though the military aspect of security is not as present as before, the Balkan wars also showed that the EU has not removed all sorts of conflicts and the US is still key when it comes to certain domains. Despite that, the expansion of the concept of security at the EU level proves that the EU is capable of managing conflicts through non-military means. One can affirm that the EU is a security community which was established in a unique way. The states establish between them a peaceful order, while their roles get less important. The EU as a global actor is an economic and commercial power, but also a power which addresses environmental issues and promotes environmental norms, sustainable development and methods of combatting climate change (European Security Strategy 2003). In terms of relations with neighboring states, for many states the EU has become `the only game in town` (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 157).

Climate security – main actors

There are numerous expert opinions as well as documents and reports which identify climate change as magnifying the existing security challenges as well as giving birth to new ones. This type of security is not a traditional type and it goes back as far as 1987. The UN secretary general`s report on climate change and its possible security implications from 2009 (UN General Assembly 2009) was also a plea for more attention to this area. The joint report by the European Commission and High Representative to the European Council from 2008

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identifies that in 2007 the UN had the majority of appeals for humanitarian aid caused by climate change. One of the main challenges is that climate change may overburden states and regions which are fragile and conflict prone (European Commission 2008, 2). The risks identified are humanitarian, political and security risks. This report identifies how the EU instruments can be used for mitigation and adaptation. After identifying the threats, the report also refers to the manner in which climate change can put pressure on vulnerable regions, such as North Africa and the Middle East. Since these are neighboring regions, the report identifies the threats that instability in these regions poses for the EU. Even from 2008, some strands of action have been identified to deal with these challenges such as: enhancing capacities at the EU level, maintaining multilateral leadership to promote global climate security as well as cooperating with third countries.

Inside the EU, it is difficult to identify who pushed for the idea of climate security. In 2007, EU MS requested the High Representative and the European Commission to produce the Joint Report on Climate change and international security and in March 2008, the Joint Report was published (European Commission 2008). The idea of the EU as an epistemic community also implies that the members diffuse their policy advice transnationally through scientific bodies, international organizations, conferences, publications and other methods. For the international level, the EU has linked climate security with developing countries, discussing the issues with more than 40 countries (Zwolski and Kaunert 2011, 26). The year 2009 is very important for it was the year when the EU tried to take its policies at the UN level, however, at the UN level there was still some reluctance for countries such as China or Pakistan. This was also reflected in the outcomes of Copenhagen, where climate security was not discussed as much as the EU wanted (Zwolski and Kaunert 2011, 27).

The actors involved in climate security in the EU are grouped around three main strands: EU institutions, EU member states and think-tanks. The European community is a very important actor in climate security, having a role of negotiator with the MS and the UN. DG Environment prepares policies and has the biggest representation at the COP, having a lot of technical expertise (Zwolski and Kaunert 2011, 28). The Council Secretariat is a very big part of developing the climate security agenda and along with the European Commission it coordinates a Steering Group. The Steering Group deals with moving the norms upwards at the UN level but also downwards through developing capacities, studies and scenarios on regional risks (Zwolski and Kaunert 2011, 34). The European Parliament is also a very