1
‘Terrorism’ and the Media in Flanders. A Comparison
between the Media Coverage of the Hans Van Themsche
shooting in 2006 and the Mehdi Nemmouche shooting in
2014.
Author: Alexander Lindemans
Student Number: 11108991
Main Supervisor: Krisztina Lajosi
Second Supervisor: Marjet Brolsma
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
X. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ... 3
1. INTRODUCTION ... 4
2. THEORY: TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA. ... 7
2.1 Tracing the ‘origins’ of Terrorism ... 7
2.2 Defining Terrorism: The Impossible Task? ... 12
2.3 The Role of the Media: Framing. ... 20
2.4 Influence of the Media ... 27
3. METHODS AND CASE STUDIES ... 30
3.1 Relevance of this study ... 30
3.2 Sources ... 31
3.3 Content Analysis: How does it work? ... 34
3.4 The Cases ... 35
3.4.1 Antwerp 2006 ... 35
3.4.2 Brussels 2014 ... 36
4. FINDINGS ... 38
4.1 Total amount of coverage ... 38
4.1.1 Coverage over time... 40
4.2 First day of coverage ... 41
4.2.1 Antwerp 2006 ... 41
4.2.2 Brussels 2014 ... 42
4.2.3 Comparison ... 43
4.3 Labelling the Perpetrators... 44
4.3.1 Antwerp 2006 ... 44
4.3.2 Brussels 2014 ... 46
4.3.3 Comparison ... 48
4.4 Labelling the Act ... 48
4.4.1 Antwerp 2006 ... 48
4.4.2 Brussels 2014 ... 49
4.4.3 Comparison ... 51
4.5 Labelling the Targets ... 51
4.5.1 Antwerp 2006 ... 52
4.5.2 Brussels 2014 ... 52
4.5.3 Comparison ... 52
4.6 Reactions after the events ... 53
3 4.6.2 Brussels 2014 ... 55 5. CONCLUSION ... 57 6. BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 61 7. APPENDIX ... 71 X. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CCC: Cellules Communistes Combattantes
DM: De Morgen (Newspaper)
DS: De Standaard (Newspaper) FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization USA: United States of America
4 1. INTRODUCTION
“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”.
After the attacks on 11 September 2001, former president of the United States, George W. Bush, divided the world into two sides: those who stand for freedom, and those who support or harbor terrorism. The United States grabbed with pleasure the role of leading force within the ‘world of freedom’ and succeeded in creating a huge NATO-coalition for the nation’s “War on
Terror”.
Since this infamous quote, words like ‘terrorism’, ‘terror’, and ‘terror-group’ are omnipresent in contemporary media and politics. More than ever, we are being confronted with these words on our radio’s, our television screens, and our social media. Attacks from organisations like
Daesh, Boko Haram, or Al-Shabaab are weekly news subjects. On the G7 summit from June
2015 in Germany, the fight against terrorism was one of the most important points on the agenda. The stance against terrorism seemed unanimous:
“The scourge of terrorism has affected countless innocent victims. It denies tolerance,
the enjoyment of universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, including religious
freedom, destroys cultural heritage and uproots millions of people from their homes. In
light of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters phenomenon, the fight against terrorism and
violent extremism will have to remain the priority for the whole international community.”1
The border between ‘freedom’ and ‘terror’ seems easy to draw, but is that really the case? If we may believe the American linguist and philosopher Noam Chomsky, George Bush will have to start with taking on his own country when he declares a “War on Terror”. Chomsky called the
1 G7, “Leaders’ Declaration G7-Summit” In
<http://www.interaction.org/sites/default/files/Schloss%20Elmau%20G7%20Communique%206-8-2015.pdf>, (14/1/2016) 9.
5 United States the “world’s leading terrorist state”: her historical campaigns in Cuba, Angola, and Nicaragua, and the current drone operations in Pakistan are according to him part of “the world’s biggest terrorist campaign”.2
Although there exists a certain unanimity that terrorism is something evil and must be fought against, it seems like this unanimity does not really exist when one has to determine who or what is a terrorist. Could we say terrorism is a ‘neutral’ and independent phenomenon and that it should be objectively possible to define who or what is a terrorist? Which criteria are then being used to define who or what is a terrorist? This thesis will demonstrate the difficulties that rise when one wants to define a terrorist and terrorism, and will discuss the relativity and complexity of this phenomenon.
The main goal of this research is to connect the theoretical problems that rise while trying to define terrorism to the everyday usage of this concept. Since terrorism has become a very ‘hot’ and much used concept in the contemporary mass media, it is not only interesting but also relevant and useful to analyse the usage of this concept within the mass media. Because of its relevance, analysing the usage of the word terrorism within mass media has been fairly popular in recent decades, especially in the United States. However, in Belgium, and more specifically Flanders, there is still room for the improvement of our knowledge on the media usage of the words terrorist and terrorism. This thesis therefore consists of a comparison of the Flemish media coverage of two similar violent incidents that happened in Belgium during the last ten years. The first incident occurred on 11 May 2006. On this day, the young, white Belgian Hans Van Themsche shot three people in the centre of Antwerp, killing two and severely injuring one person. The second incident occurred eight years later, on 24 May 2014. On this day, the French-Algerian Mehdi Nemmouche shot and killed four people in the Jewish Museum in
2 Press TV, “Chomsky says US is world’s leading terrorist state” In:
6 Brussels. By comparing the media coverage -of the Flemish television news and two Flemish newspapers- the ultimate goal is to answer the following research question: “How does the Flemish media label the perpetrators, actions and victims of two similar violent incidents but with perpetrators from a completely different background?”.
Media channels are often accused of not being consistent enough in the usage of concepts like ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’. This thesis wants to test if such accusations could also be applied on the Flemish media. More than just analysing the labelling of both incidents by the media, this research also intends to analyse the public debate that emerged after both shootings. How did politicians, intellectuals but also ordinary people react to the events in Antwerp and Brussels? What was the main discourse that appeared in the media after the shootings? Eventually, the purpose is to consider how the incidents were being framed and reported during the first three weeks since they happened.
The thesis is divided into five chapters, whom this introduction is the first. After a theoretical and conceptual second chapter that will focus on the defining of terrorism and the relation between terrorism and the media, it will continue with an explanation of the methodology in the third chapter. The fourth chapter ultimately represents the results of the research. It is important to notice that the findings in chapter four are supported by a series of graphs added in the appendix. Chapter five is the general conclusion in which the final thoughts on the research results will be discussed.
7 2. THEORY: TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA.
It is hard to neglect the contemporary omnipresence of terrorism. Before 9/11 terrorism was a rather minor concern of public policy, and in academia only a few select scholars devoted to its study. However, since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the amount of publications on this topic exploded. From that infamous day onwards, we live in a “terrorism-saturated world”.3 Ever since researchers have investigated the causes, the fight against it, and the various forms it can take. Unfortunately there is only a rather small amount of publications that investigates terrorism from a historical perspective, which is incomprehensible because the contemporary problems that the world faces can only be understood by paying attention at the historical context.
2.1 Tracing the ‘origins’ of Terrorism
Analysing the existing literature of authors that did decide to pay attention to the historical context of terrorism, teaches us that there is no such thing as ‘the origins of terrorism’. A consensus on how far one has to go back to find the first acts of terrorism does not exist. Some scholars, like Randall Law, Walter Laqueur, Gérard Chaliand, Arnaud Blin and Gus Martin go back as far as to antiquity to trace the first ‘terrorists’. The American historian Randall Law argues that terrorism is “as old as human civilization, and as new as this morning’s headlines”.4
Law’s history of terrorism starts with the reign of the brutal Ashurnasirpal II, who was the leader of the Assyrian empire and allegedly ‘terrorized’ his people from 883 to 859 BC.5 Afterwards he continues his historical overview with examples from ‘terror’ in ancient Rome and ancient Greece. The American historian Walter Laqueur, who can be considered as one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the study of terrorism, mentions a group known as the Sicarii as one of the oldest terrorist organizations. This Palestine based group strongly opposed the Roman
3 Richard Jackson and Samuel Sinclair, Contemporary Debates on Terrorism. (New York: Routledge, 2012) 27. 4 Randall Law, Terrorism. A History. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009) 1.
8 occupation of Judea and tried to make that clear by burning granaries and sabotaging Jerusalem’s water supplies.6
Probably the most commonly used example of pre-modern terrorism is the case of the medieval Assassins in Syria. The rise of this notorious Islamic faction was a direct consequence of the many schisms in Islam.7 The Assassins were originally based in Persia but spread to the neighboring Syria. Because the size of their group remained fairly limited and they thus could not wage an open war, they unleashed a campaign of ‘terror’ killing governors, caliphs, and even the crusader king of Jerusalem: Conrad de Monferrat.8 Law, quite affirmatively and almost teleological, states that in many ways the Assassins “appear to be the forerunners of today’s
jihadis”.9
Although some scholars thus argue that the first examples of terrorism can be found in the ancient civilizations, it is more or less accepted that the words ‘terrorism’ and ‘terror’ were not consistently used before the French Revolution. The French historians Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin call the period starting from 1789 the “invention of modern terror”.10 The period
immediately after the beginning of the French revolution was characterized by the so called “régime de la terreur” under the leadership of Robbespierre. During this violent period thousands of people that were considered enemies of the revolution were executed. The word ‘terror’ in this period thus became strongly associated with Robespierre’s brutal regime, and more extensively with the abuse of office and power.11 This association definitely differs from
the contemporary one. The American political analyst and terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman
6 Walter Laqueur, A History of Terrorism. (New Jersey: Little Brown & Co, 1977) 8. 7 Randall Law, op. cit., 39.
8 Walter Laqueur, ibid., 8. 9 Randall Law, op. cit., 40.
10 Gérard Chaliand, and Arnaud Blin, A History of Terrorism. From Antiquity to Al Qaeda. (London: University
of California Press, 2007), v.
11 Walter Laqueur, op. cit., 7 ; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006)
9 however, sees two comparisons between the reign of terror and contemporary terrorism, namely that it is meant to change society and politics and that it is “organized and systematic”.12 After the French Revolution, the word terrorism spread rapidly over Europe, Russia and some other parts of the world. More or less three quarters of a century after its ‘birth’ during the French Revolution, the meaning of terrorism changed. More and more it received the revolutionary and anti-state connotation that it still has today.13 Hofmann argues that this shift in meaning was a result of the emergence of a new socio-economic context with the advent of the industrial revolution and the rise of socialism and Marxism.14 But besides socialism and Marxism, it were mainly anarchism and nationalism that gave new impulses to the meaning of terrorism. It is in this period, the mid -and late nineteenth century, that most historians begin their history, or at least modern history, of terrorism. The British historian Michael Burleigh for example argues that he “could venture back to the medieval Syrian Assassins, but does not regard them as helpful in understanding contemporary terrorism.”15 Burleigh therefore begins
his Cultural History of Terrorism with the story of the Fenian Brotherhood, an Irish Republican nationalist organization. Also Laqueur admits that, although he goes back to antiquity (cfr. supra), systematic terrorism only began in the mid-nineteenth century.16
Starting from this period, most histories of terrorism more or less follow the same chronology and use the same divisions of different ‘eras of terrorism’. The mid –and late nineteenth century period came to be known as the era of anarchist terrorism, although some authors also brand this as a period of nationalist terrorism. It was probably the Russian organization Narodnaya
12 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., 3. ; Recent examples however, show that it could be questioned whether terrorism
really is as organized and systematic as Hoffman argues.
13 Paul Wilkinson, “Is Terrorism still a Useful Analytical Term or should it be Abandoned? Yes.”. in: Richard
Jackson and Samuel Sinclair, Contemporary Debates on Terrorism. (New York: Routledge, 2012) 43.
14 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., pg. 5.
15 Michael Burleigh, A Cultural History of Terrorism. (London: Harperpress, 2008) ix. 16 Walter Laqueur, op. cit., 11.
10
Volya17 that put the anarchist dictum “propaganda by the deed” into practice for the first time. This group killed individuals whom they considered the embodiment of the autocratic, tsarist regime. They immortalized themselves by killing tsar Alexander II in 1881, a deed which inevitably also led to their demise due to the fierce repression they had to undergo afterwards.18
After the anarchist era, some authors chose to include the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan in their historical overview of terrorism. All of them agree however on the period between the late nineteenth century until the beginning of World War 1. This era is known as the dawn of ethno-nationalist terrorism, more specifically in Ireland, the Balkan, and Armenia. Out of all nationalist ‘terror attacks’ during this period, the one conducted by Gavrilo Princip on Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary (cfr. infra) is by far the most infamous since it unleashed a world war. The chronology then continues with an era of ‘state terror’ in the 1930’s. Although the word terrorism was still being used to depict non-state actors, the word ‘terror’ became associated with the fierce practices of dictatorships like the Nazi and Soviet regimes.19
The period after the Second World War is seen in the historical literature as the era of anti-colonial terrorism in Africa and Asia, at least in the Western narrative. During the late 1960’s and 70’s these revolutionaries were again joined by ethno-nationalist groups outside a colonial or neo-colonial framework and various leftist, Marxist, and Leninist organizations.20 Good examples from this period are groups like Yasser Arafat’s PLO and the Basque ETA. In the 1980’s terrorism kept its revolutionary and ethnonationalist undertone but it became -according to Western historians- more and more associated with a calculated means to destabilize the West, orchestrated by the Soviet Union.21 In Belgium, the Cellules Communistes
Combattantes or CCC caused consternation and a fear-psychosis after bombing and sabotaging
17 Translated this means “People’s Will”. 18 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., 5-6.
19 Ibid., 15. 20 Ibid., 16. 21 Ibid., 16-17.
11 several ‘Western’ companies and NATO infrastructure during the period between 1983 and 1986.22 During the nineties, the concept of ‘narco-terrorism’ popped up, as it was believed in the West that illegal drug trafficking was used to advance the objectives of governments such as those in Bulgaria or Cuba.23
The shocking and almost iconic attacks on the eleventh of September 2001 inevitably redefined terrorism yet again.24 Although already some Islamic orientated organizations committed ‘terrorist’ attacks in the pre-9/11 era, it was only since this date that terrorism almost exclusively became associated with radical Islam. Historians thus branded this post-9/11 era up until today as the era of Islamic terrorism, without neglecting its pre-9/11 roots. In Chaliand’s and Blin’s history of terrorism, almost the whole post 1968 period is dedicated to radical Islam, Islamic terrorism, and most of all the icons of this radical movement: Al Qaeda.25 All other histories of terrorism -if written in the post 9/11 era- dedicate at least one chapter to “the rise of jihadist terrorism”26, “l’obmbre chaud de l’islam”27 or “Islamist terrorism”.28
Reading the various ‘histories of terrorism’ exposes two things. First of all there seems to be a majority of scholars who agree that the modern era of terrorism as we know it today began somewhere in the mid-nineteenth century. From that period onwards, most authors follow more or less the same, sometimes even teleological, chronology. Secondly it shows that, during the course of history, the words terrorism and terror did not always have the same meaning and have been associated with a big variety of phenomena. The latter causes the rising of an important question: does a clear definition of terrorism actually exist?
22 Katrien Temmerman, Terreurbestrijding in België en Europa. De interactie tussen inlichtingendiensten,
politie en justitie. (Antwerpen: Maklu, 2007), 19.
23 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., 18. 24 Ibid., 19.
25 Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, op. cit., 221-419. 26 Randall Law, op. cit., table of contents.
27 Gilles Ferragu, Histoire Du Terrorisme. (Paris: Perrin, 2004), table of contents. 28 Michael Burleigh, op. cit., table of contents.
12
2.2 Defining Terrorism: The Impossible Task?
The explosion of literature since the attacks of 9/11 created a vast amount of debates on terrorism within the academic world. In Contemporary Debates on Terrorism for example, university scholars Samuel Sinclair and Richard Jackson bundle some glaring questions that are topical within contemporary terrorism studies: they discuss categories of terrorism, the causes of terrorism, how to deal with terrorism, etc.29 It is, however, pointless to debate all of this without having a clear understanding of what terrorism actually means. That is why Jackson and Sinclair choose to begin their book with the most important and heavily discussed debate: defining terrorism.
It is a fact that there is still no academic consensus on the definition of terrorism. The main problem with the recent rise of literature on terrorism is that hundreds of authors and scholars have proposed various different definitions of terrorism. When one scholar mentions terrorism, this could thus mean that he is not using the same parameters as another scholar. Gilles Ferragu, a French historian who wrote a brilliant and up to date history of terrorism, calls it “an undefinable crime”.30 He even claims that even if there would be academic unanimity, some
would still reject that definition because of ideological reasons. 31
Not only within the academic world, but also on the political level a consensus has still not been reached. The United Nations have upon this day still not succeeded to reach a consensus on the definition of terrorism. Several propositions have yet been pushed forward, but those have never been accepted unanimously. The lack of international agreement has negative consequences on the fight against terrorism, because now each nation uses its own criteria to define what terrorism is. In other words: a terrorist according to the USA might not be a terrorist according to Russia. Even within the United States, the FBI, the US Department of Homeland Security,
29 Richard Jackson and Samuel Sinclair, Contemporary Debates on Terrorism. (New York: Routledge, 2012). 30 Gilles Ferragu, Histoire du Terrorisme (Paris: Perrin, 2014) Kindle location 125-126.
13 and the US department of Defence all use different definitions of terrorism.32 Terrorism is a potential threat to everyone but divides the international community. The various criteria and definitions cross and entwine each other, and sometimes even lead to diplomatic conflicts. Ferragu calls this lack of international agreement “the first big victory of terrorism” since international division can impossibly lead to international cooperation against terrorism.33 Although there is still no agreement, several attempts have already been made in the past to establish an internationally accepted definition of terrorism. After disastrous incidents such as the attacks on 9/11 or various highjacks in the seventies, a more compelling demand for a universally accepted definition grew. 34 The very first attempt was done by the League of
Nations in 1937, but was only accepted by 24 countries. 35
The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research -a bible for terrorism researchers- attempts to assemble the huge amount of literature on terrorism in order to shape an image of the contemporary debates and theories of terrorism. On the basis of this book, it is more or less possible to ban several misconceptions about terrorism. According to Alex P. Schmid, author of this self-proclaimed handbook and one of the great experts in terrorism studies, the biggest problem is the use of definitions that are too broad. The broader the definition, the more people will use the same term while they are actually speaking about different phenomena. Very common according to Schmid is for example the confusion of terrorism with political violence. Terrorism is actually a subcategory of political violence and not the other way around.36 Hoffman argues that the media is to blame for the latter, since they would describe a too wide range of violent acts as ‘terrorism’.37
32 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., 30.
33 Gilles Ferragu, Histoire du Terrorisme (Paris: Perrin, 2014) Kindle location 169-170. 34 Gilles Ferragu, Histoire du Terrorisme (Paris: Perrin, 2014) Kindle location 145.
35 Alex P. Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (New York: Routledge, 2011) 50. 36 Alex P. Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (New York: Routledge, 2011) 5. 37 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., 1.
14 The common consensus about the meaning of terrorism is that it is a method, an activity, or a tactic with the purpose to produce ‘terror’. Groups or individuals use this tactic to invigorate certain political or ideological convictions. Terror is a state of mind, characterized by an intense fear of a threatening danger. The purpose of the terrorists can be to intimidate a couple of individuals or to frighten a whole society. More or less every researcher agrees on this basis theory of terrorism, but beyond this fundament lie various problems.38
The contemporary public opinion often sees terrorists as small organizations or ‘lone wolves’, executing deadly attacks. But what about the violence of nation states? As mentioned above, the 1930’s are traditionally considered as the era of state terror in totalitarian states like the Soviet-Union or Nazi-Germany. What about the murders on political personalities like Martin Luther King, Abraham Lincoln, or Archduke Franz Ferdinand? If the ultimate goal of terrorism is to create chaos, destabilization and in the end change, then this last example is more than ever a form of terrorism.39 However, a fair amount of researchers argue for a strict separation between ‘assassinations’ and ‘terrorism’, because one can just have the purpose to get rid of an individual without having terrorist motives.40 Should the victims of terrorism always be ‘innocent’ civilians? What about attacks on material property, could this also be considered as terrorism? If we would include this, then we could consider the Boston Tea Party of 1773 as an act of terrorism. Schmid argues that this inclusion is too risky because then random acts of vandalism or sabotage could be considered as terrorism.41 Norris on the other hand argues that also sabotage could possibly be viewed as a form of terrorism.42 And finally: can organizations carry out terrorist attacks during an ‘official’ war? These are only a small fraction of subjects
38 Alex P. Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (New York: Routledge, 2011) 3. 39 Gilles Ferragu, Histoire du Terrorisme (Paris: Perrin, 2014) Kindle location 2061-2062.
40 Alex P. Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (New York: Routledge, 2011) 62. 41 Alex P. Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (New York: Routledge, 2011) 71. 42 Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion Just (eds.), Framing Terrorism. (New York: Routledge, 2003) 3.
15 that are being debated in the study of terrorism but they already demonstrate that the defining and determining of terrorism is very complex and difficult, since there are so many ‘grey areas’.
Because of these difficulties, some scholars gave up on trying to define terrorism. Walter Laqueur for example, despaired of defining the concept, arguing that it is neither possible to do so nor fruitful to make the attempt.43 Dominic Bryan, who is a political anthropologist at the Queen’s University of Belfast, goes as far as to argue that the concept of terrorism is too simplistic and compromised to be of real use in the study of political violence.44 He thus claims that ‘terrorism’ is not a useful analytical term and should be abandoned. The Belgian Marxist historian Julien Dohet tries to solve the definitional problem by proposing a “minimal” definition, which defines terrorists as non-state actors, and a “maximal” definition which includes state terror.45
However, most of the scholars who are active in the study of terrorism, actually try to formulate their own definition. Paul Wilkinson, chairman of the Advisory Board of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the Saint Andrews University in Scotland, refutes Bryan’s argument by stating that there is a sufficient amount of consensus on the term and it can thus clearly be distinguished from other forms of political violence. According to him, the potential for misuse does not automatically disqualify it from being used.46 Also Bruce Hofmann has a more ‘positive’ approach towards the defining of terrorism. He argues that the least we can do is distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence like for example guerrilla.47 Other experts in the field like Brian Jenkins, who is the Senior Adviser to the President of the RAND corporation, David Whittaker, Ted Gurr, Alex Schmid, Beatrice De
43 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., 33.
44 Richard Jackson and Samuel Sinclair, Contemporary Debates on Terrorism. (New York: Routledge, 2012)
30-31.
45 Julien Dohet, “Terrorisme ou Terrorismes”. In: Espace de Libertés. 2005, afl. 328, 11. 46 Richard Jackson and Samuel Sinclair, op. cit., 30.
16 Graaf, Rik Coolsaet, and many more, all proposed their own definition. Moreover, besides the academic terrorist experts, hundreds of politicians, journalists, political commentators, institutions, etc. attempted to define terrorism.48
Despite the existence of various different definitions, there is one point on which everyone agrees, namely that terrorism has a strongly negative connotation. This has not always been the case. In the late nineteenth century for example, the connotation was definitely not as bad as today. The above mentioned Narodnaya Volya for example did not care to brand themselves terrorists. Recent and contemporary organizations on the other hand, strongly prefer to name themselves freedom, liberation, or self-defence movements.49 Today’s most infamous
‘terrorists’, Islamic State, however does not seem to care at all to be called a terrorist organization. In their propaganda videos or in their self-made nasheeds they openly call to ‘terrorize’ their enemies.50 Could this be the beginning of a revaluation of the word ‘terrorist’
among alleged terrorist organizations? Time will tell.
The consequence of this multiplicity of definitions, the lack of consensus and the many ‘grey areas’ is obviously problematic. Academic and political disagreement inevitably results in politicians, media, or other powerful forces using their own criteria to define who or what is a terrorist. Hence the decision to call someone a terrorist becomes almost unavoidably subjective.51 Since everyone agrees that terrorism has a strong negative connotation, this word will always be used to depict the enemy, or as Ferragu describes it: “le terrorisme est l’ennemi,
un adversaire à qui l’on dénie toute légitimité.52 Since governments have the opportunity to do this, they also have the opportunity to legitimize the existence and actions of themselves and
48 Icons like for example Noam Chomsky, Christopher Hitchens or Benjamin Netanyahu have all tried to define
the concept.
49 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., 20-21.
50 A nasheed is an Islamic chant that are most of the time sung acapella. IS has released some of their own
nasheeds in which they thus call to terrorize the kuffars.
51 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., 23.
17 delegitimize the actions and existence of their enemies. Israel and Palestine for example, both use the word terrorism to depict each other and delegitimize each other’s actions. After the massacre in Munich during the Olympic Games of 1972, Western countries in the UN argued that the Palestinian perpetrators were terrorists. However, many Arab and African nations claimed that the attackers should not be depicted as terrorists but that the attacks should rather be contextualized within a ‘liberation struggle’ due to the ‘illegal occupation’ of Palestine.53 It
is tempting to apply the unfortunately much used cliché “one’s terrorist is another one’s freedom fighter” on this case. It has to be stressed however that terrorism is a violent method or tactic and ‘resistance’ or ‘freedom-fighting’ is the legitimation of certain violence.54 This
quote is thus inherently wrong. Someone can perfectly fight for ‘freedom’ while deploying terrorist tactics. Despite this cliché being theoretically meaningless, it has an important influence in practice. The latter can be illustrated with the case of the Kosovar KLA.
The Kosovo Liberation Army or Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës was a violent Kosovan-Albanian ethno-nationalist organisation that was active during the 1990’s. The creation of the KLA was a consequence of the Serbian nationalist policies that were conducted in Yugoslavia since the infamous Serbian president Slobodan Milošević in 1989 decided to make an end to the relatively great amount of autonomy that Kosovo had been enjoying for a long period of time. During the reign of Milošević, an increasing number of Albanian-Kosovars55 became frustrated as socio-economic conditions deteriorated, human rights conditions worsened, and the prospect of realising their political objectives through peaceful means dimmed.56 In 1996, the radical KLA left their first big impression by carrying out various attacks on Serbian refugees from Croatia, Serbian police stations, etc. and thereby declared the beginning of their guerrilla war
53 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., 24.
54 Alex P. Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (New York: Routledge, 2011) 20. 55 The ethnic Albanians are the great majority of the population in Kosovo.
56 David L. Phillips, Liberating Kosovo (London: The MIT Press, 2012) 67. ; Part of the cause was that Kosovo’s
wish for independence was neglected at the Dayton peace agreement of 1995, the agreement which made an end to the Bosnian war.
18 against what they called “Serbian oppression”.57 The rising tensions inevitably worried the
international community.
When on 8 January 1998 the KLA claimed responsibility for several attacks in Kosovo and Macedonia, and Serbian units eliminated one Albanian in a reaction to the attacks, the USA decided time had come to intensify the dialogues in order to maintain peace in the region. Robert S. Gelbard was chosen as envoy of the United States and Special Representative of the President in the Balkan region. In February 1998 he travelled to Belgrade for a meeting with Milošević and informed the world in the subsequent press conference about the American point of view on the Kosovo-question: “We condemn very strongly terrorist actions in Kosovo. The KLA is,
without any question, a terrorist group.”58 Also, he rejected any possible changes concerning
the internationally recognized borders within Yugoslavia. Although everyone agrees that Gelbard really depicted the KLA as a terrorist organization, researchers can’t seem to find an agreement whether or not this was also the official stance of the United States. According to David Phillips for example, Gelbard “slipped” and took the State Department by surprise when he called the KLA a terrorist organization.59 Reveron and Stevenson on the other hand, are convinced that the KLA was part of the America’s “list of terrorist organizations”.60 Anyway,
the damage was done.61 Public opinion saw the Americans as anti-KLA and Milošević received his legitimation to attack Kosovo.
The branding of the KLA as a terrorist group, without equally condemning Serbian policies, indirectly meant the American support to Miloševićs policies.62 However, that was how the
57 David L. Phillips, Liberating Kosovo (London: The MIT Press, 2012) 68.
58 Wolfgang Petritsch and Robert Pichler, Kosovo-Kosova. Der lange Weg zum Frieden (Klagenfurt: Wieser
Verlag, 2005) 135.
59 David L. Phillips, Liberating Kosovo (London: The MIT Press, 2012) 87.
60 Dereck Reveron and Jeffrey Stevenson, Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006)
68.
61 David L. Phillips, Liberating Kosovo (London: The MIT Press, 2012) 87.
62 Wolfgang Petritsch and Robert Pichler, Kosovo-Kosova. Der lange Weg zum Frieden (Klagenfurt: Wieser
19 Serbian president interpreted Gelbard’s words. For Milošević, this meant that the Americans had given him a free passage to militarily take on Kosovo and the KLA, in the name of a ‘War on Terrorism’. Few days after the statements of Gelbard the Serbs took action. Armed with tanks, heavy artillery, helicopters, and machine guns, the Serbian military launched a big offensive against villages and KLA-hubs in the region of the Drenica valley.63 This marked the ‘official’ beginning of the Kosovo War.
The Serbian offensive was fierce. Not only KLA-members were victims of the attacks, but also the civilian population suffered because of the Serbian violence. Serbian brutality and stories of ethnic cleansing made the amount of KLA-members swell. Whereas they had ca. 500 members in the beginning of 1998, by the beginning of 1999 the organization counted at least 12000 members.64 The West could not watch and do nothing.
The Serbian war crimes and growing popularity of the KLA directed the USA and with it a NATO-coalition towards openly supporting and even supplying the KLA, whose reputation more and more changed from a terrorist organization to a legitimate resistance force. Even France, a historical ally of Serbia, decided to remove the KLA from its terror-list after strong lobbying of the United Kingdom and the USA.65 NATO ended up being the more useful ally, as in 1999 it eventually chose to start a military intervention campaign in Yugoslavia while backing the KLA. After the infamous NATO bombing campaign of 1999 Milošević finally withdrew in June of that year. The KLA was ‘victorious’.
The KLA-case clearly shows how the lack of consensus on a definition and many of what I have named ‘grey areas’ result in a carte blanche for politicians and governments to choose
63 Wolfgang Petritsch and Robert Pichler, Kosovo-Kosova. Der lange Weg zum Frieden (Klagenfurt: Wieser
Verlag, 2005) 135.
64 Dereck Reveron and Jeffrey Stevenson, Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006)
68.
65 Dereck Reveron and Jeffrey Stevenson, Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006)
20 who is a terrorist, and who is not. Serbia used ‘a war on terror’ to justify their brutal offensive in Kosovo. The USA, based on the statements of special convoy Gelbard, and France originally defined the KLA as a terrorist organization, but when Milošević made himself more and more
persona non grata they reversed their stance against the organization. It is striking that not a
change in the nature of the KLA-attacks -the organization kept on using the same guerrilla tactics during the whole war- caused this reversed stance, but a change in NATO-policy did. NATO promoted the KLA from a terrorist organization to a group of ‘freedom fighters’.
2.3 The Role of the Media: Framing.
The same arbitrariness concerning the usage of the word terrorism also applies to the media. Some American media for example seem to have a tendency to brand political or ideological violence from subversive and ‘non-Western’ individuals or organisations as terrorist. Dylann Roof was the perpetrator of a “racist shooting” in Charleston where he killed nine Afro-Americans on the 17th of June 2015. Siyed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, two Muslims that killed 14 people in the San Bernardino shootings on the 2nd of December 2015, were the perpetrators of a “terror attack”. Hence it does not seem a coincidence that the Republican nominee and potential president of the United States Donald Trump constantly refers to the San Bernardino attack to stress the threat of radical Islam but remains silent about the shootings in Charleston.
Maybe even more striking is the coverage given by the Washington Post and The New York
Times on the Beslan school hostage crisis in September 2004. During this massacre in a Russian
School in the region of North-Ossetia, at least 331 hostages, including many children, were killed by ruthless Chechen hostage-takers. Despite the horror and revulsion that this deliberate targeting of children evoked, the two American newspapers mentioned above reported this massacre in a quite neutral and anodyne manner. The words ‘terrorism’ or ‘terror’ were not used in the first stages of the reporting, except in the context of quotations and statements made
21 by various Russian official spokespersons. The newspapers’ reluctance to use the term ‘terrorism’ provoked a lot of critique from several readers.66 One can only guess how the
American newspapers would have reported this tragedy when it would have occurred on American soil and not in Russia.
Probably one of the best studies ever on the American media broadcasting of ‘terrorist’ attacks is Elite Ambiguity: Framing the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City Bombings by American researcher Paul Fucito. This comparative study of the media reporting of the bombings of 1993 in the World Trade Center and the similar bombings in 1995 in Oklahoma City attacks was designed to test the accusation that the American media tend to externalize threats of terrorism.67 Fucito aspired to answer the question how the Americans, particularly Caucasians, are labelled when committing terrorist activities in comparison to other international actors. Moreover he investigated how the media defined both attacks: as terrorism or was another label assigned?68 By extensively analyzing evening network newscasts from
ABC, NBC, and CBS, Fucito came to the conclusion that the Muslim perpetrators of the attack
in 1993 were more easily branded as terrorists, while the white American citizen Timothy McVeigh who carried out the attack in 1995 was predominantly named a “bomber” or a “bombing suspect”.69
This more or less subjective and sometimes even unfair reporting of certain events by the media is known within the academic world but also with the broader public as ‘framing’. Professor of Media and Public Affairs and of International Affairs at the George Washington University in
66 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., 30.
67 Paul Fucito, Elite Ambiguity: Framing the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City Bombings. (Washington:
George Washington University, 2008) 21.
68 Ibid.
69 Paul Fucito, Elite Ambiguity: Framing the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City Bombings. (Washington:
22 Washtington D.C., Robert Entman, is one of the most important names in the study field of ‘framing’. Entman was the one who in 1993 first theorized the concept of framing as followed:
“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”70.
An example of a frame is what Entman calls the “cold war frame”. This frame dominated U.S. news of foreign affairs until the end of the cold war. It highlighted certain foreign events, like for example civil wars, as problems. Afterwards it identified their source, for example communist rebels, offered moral judgments like atheistic aggression, and commended particular solutions, in the form of U.S. support for the other side. Hence frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe problems.71 The power of framing is that it can, if done well, lead to people accepting one meaning over another. 72 The media can choose which news topic has to be considered as ‘important’, but it also has to the power to report that specific topic in a coloured way.
Whenever dramatic events such as hijackings, plane crashes, bombings or shootings –whether terrorism or not- we rely on the mass media to report these events to the public. According to Pippa Norris, lecturer at Harvard University, the role of the media is central for the impact of these events upon the general public. After all, journalists have a role as “facilitators” in the sense that without their decision to give publicity -in the form of front-page headlines or news reports on live television- to certain events, some violent organizations like terrorist groups
70 Robert Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm” in: Journal of Communication,
1993, 52.
71 Ibid., 52.
23 would fail their objectives, namely getting publicity.73 What is more important however, is that the media can choose which frame they are going to apply on a certain event. It has to be stressed that, in many cases, the constructing of a frame happens subconsciously. But media thus have the choice to use a terrorism frame to report a hostage in Russia, a knife attack in Israel, or attacks of communist rebels. Norris interestingly states that “without knowing much, if anything, about the particular people, groups, issues, or even places involved, the terrorist and anti-terrorist frame allows us to quickly sort out, interpret, categorize, and evaluate these conflicts”.74 Hence, when certain events are being framed as ‘terrorist’ events, the
information-absorbing public ‘knows’ or ‘feels’ how these events should be interpreted within a particular community. Norris remarks that in ‘obvious’, one sided cases, the conventional news frame is likely to be so strong that few voices from within the own community will offer alternative perspectives.75 In two-sided cases however, like for example the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Belfast or Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem, a debate over ‘how to frame’ these cases will more likely be conducted.76
Hence, media shapes people’s thoughts and is most people’s primary source of information to events that happen around the world. Without the necessary media coverage, we are unaware that certain events that we did not experience or witnessed happened. Contemporary terrorists are also aware of this. Dutch historian Henri Beunders demonstrates this by giving the example of the above mentioned Timothy McVeigh, who wanted to have his revenge on the American government. However, he did not really express any political demands but what he did want to achieve was a ‘celebrity status’.77 Mass media and terrorism combined allowed him to reach
73 Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion Just (eds.), Framing Terrorism. (New York: Routledge, 2003) 5. 74 Ibid., pg. 6.
75 Ibid., pg. 7. 76 Ibid., pg. 7.
77 Henri Beunders, “Media en Terrorisme”, in: Muller, E., et. al., Terrorisme. Studies over terrorisme en
24 this celebrity status. Also the infamous Iron Lady Margaret Thatcher was very aware of this. She called publicity “the oxygen of terrorists” and hence reinforced her control over the media by basically censoring them.78 Terrorists from IS for example know that the mass media will report their acts if they strike in Paris or Brussels. Hence contemporary terrorism and mass media -in se two totally different phenomena- are completely entwined with each other. Some go as far as to state that the media is actually an ‘ally’ of terrorists. Beunders nuances this statement by pointing out that media indeed play an important role in the considerations of terrorists but that those are not the only channels that they use to make a clear point. Moreover, media can create more ‘understanding’ for the terrorists’ cause but also -and this mostly happens when terrorist attacks occur in the West- more aversion.79
This contemporary and very important connection between media and terrorism manifests itself in the many studies on media coverage of terrorist events that have been done in recent years. Very popular has been the representation of terrorist attacks in the media, more specifically the labelling of the events itself but also the labelling of the perpetrators, the time spent on its coverage, etc. Some studies have already been mentioned. Another typical example of such a study is Developing terrorism coverage: variances in news framing of the January 2015 attacks
in Paris and Borno. In this article, Eric Nevalsky compared the news coverage in American
media of two different terrorist attacks that happened in July 2015 in France and Nigeria. His analysis revealed –not surprisingly- significant differences in the coverage of both events: the Paris attacks were covered more extensively and contained language that highlighted the importance of the topic.80 Also Framing terrorism: geography-based media coverage
variations of the 2004 commuter train bombings in Madrid and the 2009 twin suicide car
78 Ibid., 376. 79 Ibid., 389.
80 Eric Nevalsky, “Developing terrorism coverage: variances in news framing of the January 2015 attacks in
25
bombings in Baghdad by Sarah May Patrick is one of the typical studies. She concluded that
“news frame analysis reveals that coverage of an attack on a Western nation – Spain – compared to one on an Eastern nation – Iraq – contributes to Islamophobia and exacerbates an us against them mentality”.81
The literature on the media coverage and framing of ‘terrorist’ or similar events is massive. A rather large proportion of this is however conducted by Americans on events that happened in the United States.82 As above mentioned studies already demonstrated, also within Europe this kind of research has been conducted. However, when we look at Belgium and more specifically Flanders there is still space for improvement. Therefore, this research makes an effort to fill up these empty spaces. Why and how this will happen will be explained in the next chapter.
Not only for academics and their students the study of media-framing has been a ‘hot topic’, but also the general public has become more and more aware of framing, media subjectivity, and media dishonesty. Donald Trump for example, constantly refers to what he calls “the dishonest media” in order to frame himself as a victim of subjective news reporting. Another recent example of how framing-awareness has become more and more present in our society was the protest of a couple of hundred Belgian football fans, or “casuals” as they call themselves, on the 27th of March 2016 in Brussels. During this protest, several days after the
attacks in Brussels Airport and the Brussels metro, football fans from different clubs in Belgium marched from the Brussels North station to the Beursplein in the centre of the city, while singing anti-Daesh and Belgian nationalist chants. Several minutes after their arrival at the Beursplein they were booed by a part of the crowd that did not appreciate the arrival of what they called
81 Sarah May Patrick, “Framing terrorism: geography-based media coverage variations of the 2004 commuter
train bombings in Madrid and the 2009 twin suicide car bombings in Baghdad”, in: Critical Studies on Terrorism, (vol. 7, nr. 3, 2014) 479.
26 ‘fascists’. After some fierce discussions and even some violence in the form of pushing, pulling, and punching, between the football fans and some alleged ‘left-wing activists’ in the crowd, the police decided to drive the football fans back to the North station. When this happened, the ‘hooligans’ began throwing stones and other material to the police. After some clashes and arrests, the police managed to successfully drive the fans back to the original starting place of their march.
Following these events, various national and international media reported that ‘hooligans’, ‘extreme right wing militants’, and even ‘neo-Nazi’s’ had ‘hijacked’ a peaceful memorial for the victims of the attacks in Brussels.83 Some media claimed that several football fans had made Hitler salutes. The Socialist Mayor from Brussels, Yvan Mayeur, blamed the Belgian interior minister Jan Jambon, member of the Flemish nationalist party, that he had not done anything to stop the march and that the football fans were ‘right wing extremists’ and thus the Flemish nationalists’ electorate. A couple of days after the controversial march however, the ‘casuals’ reacted in an official press statement, saying that they only wanted to give a sign that fans from different Belgian clubs were willing to unite in a march against terrorism and against Islamic State. They argued that the media misinformed the public about the events, that they were not connected to Flemish right wing extremists since there were Walloons and Belgian-Moroccans among them, and that they were being provoked by ‘left-wing militants’ which ultimately led to the violence. They deplored the fact that they, unwillingly, ended up in the middle of a political controversy.84 On social media, people widely discussed the events, with one group
83 Julian Robinson, “Riot police use water cannon on the streets of Brussels: 'Peace' march organised in wake of
terror attacks is hijacked by far-right protesters making Nazi salutes” in:
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3511398/Riot-police-water-cannons-called-far-right-protesters-hijack-Brussels-peace-march-make-Nazi-salutes-terror-victims-memorial.html>, (7/5/2016).
84 HLN, “Hooligans: “wilden enkel onze afschuw voor IS tonen.”” In
<http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/36484/Aanslagen-Brussel/article/detail/2661690/2016/03/30/Hooligans-Wilden-enkel-onze-afschuw-voor-IS-tonen.dhtm>l, (7/5/2016).
27 supporting the statements of the football fans and blaming the press of being ‘politically correct’, and the other group more or less confirming what the bulk of the media originally reported. This case clearly demonstrates how the framing of particular events can create two completely different stories of one event. It also shows how framing can have political implications, in this case in the form of the Brussels Mayor transforming this case in a story of Flanders versus Wallonia. Finally, it also demonstrates that in our contemporary society many people are aware of the concept framing, and hence use it to show that they have been misrepresented in the media.
2.4 Influence of the Media
Analysing the content of mass media only matters if this mass media exercises a certain influence. It is indeed widely assumed that it does, why would the concept of censorship otherwise exist?85 Professor John Street gives the example of an American radio station that in 1938 transmitted a report that the Martians had landed. This caused panic and mass confusion among the many listeners and this result seemed to confirm the persuasive power of mass media.86 There is however, an ongoing debate about the effects of media on the public opinion and political behavior. It is for example widely believed that the media had an important influence on the public opinion during the war in Vietnam. However, this view is also widely contested.87
Several scholars warn us not to take the influence from the media for granted. What does ‘influence’ mean? What is it about? Does it influence people’s voting behavior or only their opinion on certain politicians and political topics? Those are some primary and critical questions that need to be asked.88 While some researchers claim that the influence of the press
85 John Street, Mass Media, Politics and Democracy. (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 80. 86 Ibid., 81.
87 John Street, op. cit., 83. 88 Ibid., 85.
28 on voting behavior is limited, others argue that it is big and even decisive. Concerning the influence of newspapers and magazines, there is still an active disagreement between scholars. On the influence of television however, scholars have almost reached a consensus. Somewhat surprisingly, the overall view seems to be that television is a less potent source of influence, especially when it comes to voting behavior.89 But ‘influence’ does not only evolve around voting behavior, it extends beyond it. Some argue that television shapes viewers’ feelings, the way they respond emotionally to politics. Several experimental research projects show that television network news affect how people judge crime, other ethnicities, poverty, etc.90 News is not only about text. Some studies argue that viewers remember the news better when it has visuals. Moreover, some researchers have pointed out that people will remember visual messages better than verbal messages.91 The images that are remembered best are mostly ‘negative’ images, like for examples images of war or terrorist attacks. According to Renita Coleman they have a greater effect. People are thought to read more of a certain story and remember it better when it is accompanied by negative images. Visuals are even more important when certain news topics are not part of a reader’s or viewer’s personal experience, like for example international news. Studies have shown that people tend to learn the most about foreign places and people through visual media.92
While some scholars claim media influence is direct, others follow the influential ‘presumed-influence’-theory. This theory was established in 1983 by Columbia University sociologist W. Philips Davison. It argues that mass media’s biggest influence on society takes place just because people think that media is influential. Parents for example, could be convinced that their children have a high risk to be influenced by certain television programs or cartoons. As
89 Ibid., 87-89. 90 Ibid., 89-93.
91 D’ Angelo, P., et. al., Doing News Framing Analysis. (New York: Routledge, 2010) 242 92 D’ Angelo, P., op. cit. 243-245.
29 a result they buy a television with a V-chip, which allows certain programs to be blocked. This hypothesis claims that people exposed to mass media often believe that it has a greater influence on other people than on themselves. As a consequence, this ‘third-person perception’ leads to action.93
93 Nurit Tal-Or et al., “Testing Causal Direction in the Influence of Presumed Media Influence”. In:
30 3. METHODS AND CASE STUDIES
3.1 Relevance of this study
For this study, two similar incidents that shocked Belgium in the last ten years have been chosen as the centre of analysis. The first of these incidents was a shooting that happened in Antwerp on the 11th of May 2006 in Antwerp. On this day, the young, white Belgian Hans Van Themsche
shot three people in the centre of Antwerp, killing two and severely injuring one person. The second incident occurred eight years later, on the 24th of May 2014. On this day, the French-Algerian Mehdi Nemmouche shot and killed four people in the Jewish Museum in Brussels. There are several reasons why a comparison of the media coverage of these events is interesting and important. First of all, both incidents belong to the most shocking and mediatised crimes that have happened in Belgium in the last ten years. Hence, an analysis of the media coverage of these events does contribute to the knowledge of the history of violence, crime, and ‘terrorism’ in Belgium. Secondly a comparison between these similar shootings allows us to investigate the arbitrary use of the word terrorism in the Flemish media. The interesting aspect about this comparison is that both incidents are quite similar but the perpetrators are from completely different backgrounds: Hans Van Themsche is a white, autochthonous Belgian male while Medhi Nemmouche is a French-Algerian Muslim. As explained in the first chapter, the contemporary era is by various historians being labelled as the era of ‘radical Islamic terrorism’, associating terrorism almost exclusively with radical Islam. It is therefore interesting to see how the shootings and perpetrator in Antwerp have been labelled in comparison with the events and perpetrator in Brussels. Studies have already shown that the American media often use different standards when it comes to international actors committing violent crimes on US-territory, compared to autochthonous Americans committing crimes on US-territory. This research can show if this is also the case in Europe, more specifically Flanders. Lastly, it is interesting to analyse the consequences of the media coverage as well, something which is often neglected in media coverage studies. This is, of course, not an easy task and actually requires a separate
31 research including for example survey’s since the causal influence of certain media coverage is difficult to prove. It is however possible to make some hypotheses of how influential the media reporting in these case studies was.
3.2 Sources
The results of this research are based on a content analysis of four different Flemish media channels. The chosen channels are firstly the two main television news channels in Flanders: VRT and VTM. The VRT or Flemish Radio and Television Broadcasting Organization is the national public-service and therefore subsided broadcaster for the Flemish part of Belgium. The VTM or Flemish Television Company is by far the largest commercial television broadcaster in Flanders. The bulk of the Flemish population that watches the news on television chooses between one of these channels, whereas the success of other Flemish news broadcasts is rather small. Both television stations have a news-department which usually broadcasts live on television at 1pm, 6pm, 7pm and late at night. This study provides the results of the analysis of the 7pm news broadcasts of both VTM and VRT. The time span of the content analysis is 21 days. This means that every 7pm news broadcast of the first 21 days, starting with the day of the shootings, will be analysed. The reasons why the 7pm broadcasts have been chosen are obvious: these broadcasts are the most extensive and have by far the most viewers, compared to the 1pm, 6pm, or late evening broadcasts.
Secondly, this analysis is based on the content of two reputed Flemish newspapers: De
Standaard and De Morgen. DS and DM are not the most read newspapers in Flanders. However,
the reason that these newspapers were chosen is not because of their popularity but because they have a certain ‘quality-image’ and because of their alleged ‘ideology’. Both newspapers are in the public opinion considered as ‘quality-newspapers’ with a more ‘intellectual’ core of readers. The ideological origins of both newspapers differ profoundly. DS originated from a catholic background. The beginning of DM on the other hand, has to be contextualized in
left-32 wing, socialist circles.94 The advantage of this selection is that this study cannot be accused of focussing on one side of the ideological spectrum. It has to be said that today, the ideological backgrounds of the newspapers are not that obvious and visible anymore. However, it cannot be stated that it is completely gone. Here also, the newspaper contents of the first 21 days since the day of the shootings will be analysed. Slightly different than with the television coverage is that the newspapers published on the day of the shootings –11 May 2006 and 24 May 2014- are not included in the analysis. This is of course a logical consequence of the fact that the shootings did not yet happen on the moment of publication from these newspapers.
It is possible to consult the 7pm news broadcasts of VRT and VTM news online, thanks to the ‘Elektronisch Nieuwsarchief’ or ‘ENA’ project. This project is the result of a collaboration between the Flemish universities of Leuven and Antwerp. Its purpose is to offer researchers a chance to consult all complete 7pm news broadcasts of VRT and VTM from 2003 until 2015.95 The VRT news broadcasts from the year 2014 are also digitally archived and consultable on the VRT-news website.96 De Standaard also has its own archive. On the newspaper’s official
website, every published newspaper from 2006 up until today is digitally archived and consultable for subscribed readers.97 The articles from De Morgen were consulted on ‘GoPress’, a Belgian press-database that digitalizes millions of articles from Belgian newspapers and magazines.98
I believe that with the two main television news broadcasts and two reputed newspapers of the Flemish region, the analysis represents a great majority of the media coverage that has reached the Flemish public during the three weeks after both shootings. Also, by opting for newspapers
94 The same remark applies on VTM and VRT. VTM is mostly seen as a more ‘right-wing’ news channel,
whereas VRT is known as a ‘left-wing’ environment.
95 ENA, “Project Elektronisch Nieuwsarchief”. In: < http://www.nieuwsarchief.be/index.php?pg=2> ,
(6/4/2015).
96 The website of VRT-news is http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws.
97 De Standaard’s archive can be consulted on http://www.standaard.be/plus/archief. 98 GoPress’ website is http://www.gopress.be/info/nl.
33 that are on different sides of the ‘ideological spectrum’, enough ideological diversity is guaranteed. However, the results remain limited. First of all there are several other Flemish newspapers with a fair amount of readers, like Het Laatste Nieuws, Het Nieuwsblad, De Gazet
van Antwerpen or Het Belang van Limburg, that are not included in this study because analysing
them would simply make this research too extensive. Other television news channels, besides VRT and VTM-news, are mostly local news channels with very low viewer ratings. It is therefore not interesting and relevant enough to include them in this analysis. Other limitations are to be found in the fact that I have only chosen to analyse the 7pm news broadcasts, and neglect the ones at 1pm, 6pm, and late in the evening. However, this limitation should not be exaggerated since the news broadcasts repeat each other quite often and are therefore very similar. Lastly, radio news broadcasts have also been excluded.
One could remark why I have only chosen to analyse the media coverage during the three weeks following the shooting events and not the trials of the perpetrators. Trials of mediatised criminals and alleged terrorists very often receive a lot of media attention and could therefore be an interesting case of analysis as well. The reasons why they are not included here are however very simple. First of all, Mehdi Nemmouche did not yet had to appear in court. According to several media sources his trial has been planned for 2016.99 Secondly, Hans Van Themsche’s trial and the associated media coverage has already been documented in several articles and even a book written by the Flemish author Gust Verwerft.100 As a result, the inclusion of the trials’ media coverage would therefore be impossible and would not lead to new results.
99 D.H., “Tuerie du musée juif: Procès envisagé pour 2016”, in: <
http://www.dhnet.be/actu/faits/tuerie-du-musee-juif-proces-envisage-pour-2016-555f5ca035704bb01c6c2861>, (05/06/2016).
34
3.3 Content Analysis: How does it work?
The analysis itself consists of both quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative part is partly based on Paul Fucito’s model, who in his turn based himself on the model of the American professor of Media and Public Affairs Steven Livingston. Fucito uses but also expands the “routinely cited” model of Livingston to define important variables within the news coverage.101 The quantitative approach in this study firstly implies a counting of words and labels. How are both perpetrators, both violent acts, but also the targets from both incidents labelled? Which labels -and how many times- are being used in the news broadcasts and in the newspaper articles? Secondly, I have also analysed the duration of the media coverage. How much time has been spent in covering the topic on television, and how many pages and articles have been dedicated to the events?
The qualitative part demands a certain background knowledge of the political and ideological climate in the Flemish region. This segment contains an analysis of the opinions and reactions that followed the violent acts. Which persons are interviewed and chosen to react in front of the camera, and which persons are allowed to publish their opinions in the newspapers? More importantly, what do these reactions and opinions include? In other words, what is the content of their opinion and for what kind of a reaction do they call? Based on the content of these opinions and reactions, one can determine the main focus of the public debate and the public opinion that arose in the first three weeks after the incidents.
The quantitative and qualitative segments should not be viewed as completely separate from each other. The labelling of the perpetrators and the acts is for example connected to the persons using these labels in their opinion pieces or reactions. It is therefore also important to mention
