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The Gnostic pursuit of the terrestrial paradise: an account
on the radicalized self-appraisal respect claim of the
millenarian safe space movement of 2015
Name: Erik Wesselius
Student number: 10110046
Program: Political Science (Msc)
Specialization: Political Theory and Political Behavior
Thesis seminar: Global Justice
Supervisor: Dr. Rossi
Date: the 24th of June 2016
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“R-E-S-P-E-C-T, find out what it means to me” Aretha Franklin, 1967.
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Table of contents
Introduction……….5
Chapter 1………...12
1.1 The definition of respect: Darwall and Carter………...12
1.2 Four positions in the equal respect debate………..14
1.3 Human autonomy as the shared premise in the equal respect debate……….19
1.4 The global safe space movement: human autonomy as recognition respect………..23
1.5 Conclusion………...24
Chapter 2………...26
2.1 Human autonomy as an ideal future state of affairs………26
2.2 Human autonomy as End-Time………..29
2.3 The concept of End-Time as late medieval Gnosticism………...31
2.4 The Millenarianism of the Brethren of the Free Spirit………34
2.5 Two interpretations of the black legend thesis………37
2.6 The new religion of humanity………...………..39
2.7 Radical Enlightenment in Gray’s postmodern writings………..40
2.8 Conclusion………..41
Chapter 3………...43
3.1 Cohn’s five criteria applied to the global safe space movement of 2015………...43
3.2 The safe space movement in Gray’s radicalized black legend thesis……….51
3.3 The global campus revolutionaries as radicalizing self-appraisal respect………..54
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Conclusion………59 List of references………...64
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Introduction
In 2015 a discussion on campuses world-wide has started about equal respect. If one believes recent publications on the internet in this debate there are two sides that find it hard to reach agreement about what equal respect should look like exactly.1 On the one side one could say
there are the historically marginalized students who argue that they are oppressed by the dominant privileged groups, who on their turn claim for unrestricted free speech. What one could understand as historically marginalized are those groups that consist of humans from above all racial, ethnic, religious, sexual and economic communities that feel subordinated in the world they find themselves.2 These groups argue to be consistently confronted with for instance racism, ethnic exclusion, religious discrimination, sexual assaults and economic powerlessness on campuses and beyond.3 Consequently, the members of these groups believe that creating safe spaces in which they are protected from group discrimination would be the solution to this political problem.4 Safe spaces in this sense could be seen as zones on campus in which the marginalized are protected from all the sorts of oppression that are thinkable.5 In some literature the concept of safe space is described as a place where students ban words, speakers and ideas, as Jonathan Haidt argues, whereas in other readings a safe space is considered as a place where oppressed students seek love from an institution incapable of loving them, as Robin Kelley claims.6 Later in this thesis I develop my own interpretation of a safe space, which tends to move into the direction of portraying a safe space as literally a holy place on earth. For now I think it suffices to say that the marginalized communities seem to demand equal respect in that their members call for a treatment from these dominant groups
1McWorther, J., ‘The ‘racist’ American campus’, Politico, 2015, retrieved from
http://www.politico.eu/article/racist-american-campus-tolerance-human-rights/ on Thursday the 23th of June 2016.
2 Ibidem. 3 Ibidem.
4Amenabar, T., ‘The new language of protest’, Washington Post, 2016, retrieved from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/style/wp/2016/05/19/2016/05/19/what-college-students-mean-when-they-ask-for-safe-spaces-and-trigger-warnings/ on Thursday the 23th of June 2016.
5 Ibidem.
6Haidt., J., ‘Campuses are places for open minds – not where debate is closed down’, The Guardian, 2016,
retrievred from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/10/students-censorship-safe-places-platforming-free-speech on Friday the 24th of June 2016 and Kelley, R., ‘Black study, black struggle’, Boston Review, 2016, retrieved from https://bostonreview.net/forum/robin-d-g-kelley-black-study-black-struggle on Friday the 24th of June 2016.
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that to a larger extent than according to them happens now recognizes their dignity as humans by allowing safe spaces on campus. From this one could believe it to be correct that the call of these subordinated groups is a demand for equal respect from the privileged groups that are dominant in society.
On the other side one finds the dominant groups, who claim that the equal respect the marginalized demand can only be found in the free expression of words. That is, these voices argue that only in societies where humans are able to express themselves without interference from any authority true equal respect is to be found.7 In this sense I believe equal respect is about letting every human being have their say, even if some might feel hurt by a particular choice of words, since censorship in any form in this interpretation ends up in treating humans unequally. If we are to believe recent online contributions this side in the discussion is
represented most of the times by the larger, native higher middle-class in society that holds that the equal respect that the marginalized demand is to be found in free speech only.8 I believe Greg Lukianoff to be the most influential of these free speech proponents in the debate going on now. The members of Lukianoff’s group believe that restricting free speech in order to prevent the discrimination that the marginalized students experience should be seen as censorship.9 One could argue, then, that this global discussion, that finds its roots in American university campuses10, is a debate about the most adequate way for humans to
demand equal respect: from censorship or from the negative freedom that Isaiah Berlin presented as freedom from interference by a higher authority.11
I believe, however, that in a sense this is not a debate at all. On the one side one could indeed say that there are two groups with conflicting interpretations of how best to reach a state of equal respect, as sketched above. On the other, however, one could hold that both camps agree in that what is at stake here is a claim for equal respect. In this thesis I work out this latter interpretation. That is, I claim that the two groups involved in fact do not disagree with each other at all, but are rather confirming one another in that they continue to talk in the equal respect paradigm. What I mean by this is that both the marginalized and the dominant groups think this discussion is about respecting one another equally. I reject this
7Lukianoff, G., Haidt, J., ‘The coddling of the American mind’, Atlantic, 2015, retrieved from
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/ on Thursday the 23th of June 2016.
8 Ibidem. 9 Ibidem. 10 Ibidem.
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interpretation. That is, in this thesis I take in a third position in this debate by claiming that the two sides involved are consistently talking about equal respect at large, whereas I believe the demand of the marginalized in this global event is about a state of affairs totally different. That is, inequitable respect. One could say here I mean a claim for the opposite of equal respect, that is, unequal respect, but I believe phrasing this demand in terms of inequitable respect is more adequate, in that then it becomes clearer that a substantive social issue is at stake here rather than only a semantic one, namely the claim of the marginalized to possess a superior soul that seems reasonably unfair to the world we live in now.
The research question of this thesis, then, is: “Should we accept the global safe space movement as consisting of a demand for equal respect?”. In this thesis I claim that we should not accept the argument that the world-wide call from revolutionaries for a safe space is a demand for equal respect. What I will try to make clear here, instead, is that the global safe space movement rather claims inequitable respect, in that it assumes to be of a superior kind. More specifically, my argument is that the global call for a safe space consists of radicalized self-appraisal respect that can only be understood in millenarian terms. That is, believing in the start of a new millennium to be realized here on earth. I think making this argument could have far-going implications for the global discussion about equal respect going on today inside and outside of university campuses. What I mean by this is that this thesis could be seen as an attempt to transform the safe space debate from one about the most adequate premise for equal respect, which is the traditional censorship versus free speech discussion discussed above, to one which focuses on the question whether we deal here with equal respect or not. It is precisely in this latter discussion I want to take part here.
I claim that the global safe space movement promotes inequitable respect by
radicalizing self-appraisal respect. In this thesis I try to show why I think this claim is correct by aiming to let it rest upon three premises. The first premise is that the recognition respect in the global safe space movement is about the human autonomy that is so characteristic for millenarian thought. The second says that marginalized groups in society claiming autonomy are to be considered as millenarian movements. The third consists of the argument that the global safe space movement as a millenarian movement radicalizes self-appraisal respect and, consequently, perhaps to some degree could reasonably be seen as diminishing recognition respect to those who are not part of their own community. It is in this part of the introduction that I want to explain how exactly I think these three premises lead up to the claim of this thesis that the global safe space movement radicalizes self-appraisal respect and,
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recognition respect, as the dominant interpretation to be found in online contributions has it today.12
My first premise holds that recognition respect in the global safe space movement is about human autonomy, and as such in my opinion is already placing itself in a millenarian tradition. To understand this argument I have to explain that this thesis to a large extent continues in the tradition of the concept of two kinds of respect that has been laid down by Stephen Darwall in the late 1970s.13 For present purposes I think it suffices to tell, briefly, that on the one hand recognition respect is the respect given to a human being qua human being whereas, on the other, appraisal respect is the respect given to a human being because of its praiseworthy inner characteristics. What I see in recent academic literature on equal respect is that its authors to a large extent could be categorized as portraying equal respect in one of these two concepts of Darwall. In that sense, then, I believe one could hold that in the literature on equal respect the authors involved differ about whether this concept should be seen as being closer to recognition or appraisal respect.
I believe, however, that this separation into two camps would not be an adequate interpretation of this literature. Instead, I try to argue that the academic equal respect debate is not a discussion at all, in the sense that I believe all four authors involved to a large extent seem to agree that equal respect is premised upon human autonomy, but they do not seem to make the connection with inequitable respect as I try to do here. Consequently, when I turn to the global safe space movement of today, I see that the representative figures of this group act in accordance with the notion of recognition respect as human autonomy as laid down by Sarah Buss14 and Valeria Ottonelli15, who are I think two of the leading figures that see equal respect as recognition respect in the recent academic debate. After all, it seems as if these marginalized activists ask for autonomy as a human being qua human being. From this I tend to conclude that the sort of recognition respect the marginalized global safe space activists nowadays seem to promote could be seen as being a demand for human autonomy at large, and as such that it here already moves in the direction of millenarian politics.
12Oh, H., ‘CMC students feel marginalized, demand resources and resignations’, Claremont Independent, 2015,
retrieved from http://claremontindependent.com/cmc-students-feel-marginalized-demand-resources-and-resignations/ on Thursday the 23th of June 2016.
13Darwall, S., ‘Two kinds of respect’, Ethics, volume 88 (1), 1977.
14Buss, S., ‘Respect for persons’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, volume 29 (4), 1999.
15Ottonelli, V., ‘Equal respect, equal competence and democratic legitimacy’, Critical Review of International
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My second premise consists of the argument that marginalized groups in today’s society claiming autonomy are to be considered as millenarian movements. Here I draw my conclusions to a large extent from what I believe is largely ignored historical work on late medieval religious sects. However, before I get there I will discuss recent academic literature on human autonomy, trying to show that autonomy above all could be seen as an imagined ideal state of affairs to be realized in the future, as I see happening in the global safe space movement of today. From this I try to make the connection between human autonomy as an ideal, marginalized movements at large and the claim for inequitable respect by the global safe space movement. That is, I want to explain the argument that marginalized revolts that claim for autonomy from the dominant order are to be portrayed in millenarian terms. What I try to say by this is that these are communities that believe their members are qualified to bring about an ideal state of affairs to the imperfect world in which they find themselves. Here I owe a great deal to the contributions of Norman Cohn.16 The relevance of his work on revolutionary millenarianism in the late Western Middle Ages I think in academic circles in general, but above all in the ongoing discussion on the global safe space movement in particular, is unfortunately to a large extent underappreciated. For this thesis I make use, for instance, of Cohn’s elaborate characterization of the medieval Gnostic heretical sect called the Brethren of the Free Spirit, in order to try to confirm the in the literature of today largely ignored connection between human autonomy, medieval millenarianism and inequitable respect. I continue by discussing the extent to which marginalized movements today are spiritually contaminated by Gnosticism, by discussing the literature in which its secular version called Radical Enlightenment is studied. It is in this second and largest chapter, I think, that my argument that today’s global safe space revolutionaries claim to possess divine-like qualities that makes them in a sense superior to non-members outside of their community, and as such demand inequitable respect, takes root.
My third premise, then, is that the global safe space movement, to come back to Darwall again, radicalizes self-appraisal respect and perhaps could be said to diminish recognition respect to those outside of their own group. What I mean by this is that I believe the activists of the safe space community world-wide believe themselves to be of a more superior kind than non-members, who in their eyes I think do not possess supernatural agency as long as they remain outside of their group of faith. I think this conviction could imply two attitudes. First, the attitude of a radicalization of self-appraisal respect in that the members of
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the global safe space community themselves claim to possess divine characteristics. Second, the attitude of a diminishing of recognition respect to the dominant groups outside of their movement in that the global safe space activists act a-moral by tending to believe that those outside of their community are inferior objects and, as such, do not necessarily deserve to be treated with equal recognition respect. Here I accept the first and tend to reject the latter interpretation.
I arrive at this conclusion of an inequitable respect demand by the global safe space movement after a discussion of the writings of, above all, Cohn and John Gray. I believe the work of the former makes a more than significant contribution to my discussion in that he lists five family resemblance criteria to judge a community upon whether or not to be millenarian. After discussing these five characteristics I think I could reasonably conclude that the global safe space movement of 2015 is to a large extent to be portrayed in millenarian terms. I argue, however, that this characterization does not imply that one could accuse today’s global safe space movement to be on a par with the political extremism of secularized religious sects in more recent times. What I mean by this, and here I come to Gray, is that the terror and individual Messianic leadership cults of secularized millenarian movements in what he refers to as modern times are, at least until now, not yet to be seen in the global safe space
movement of 2015.
In this thesis, then, my aim is to transform the ongoing debate on equal respect. What I mean by this is that I believe we would do better to move away from the discussion whether a state of equal respect is best to be realized by censorship or freedom. Consequently I want to make a first suggestion to reorganize the debate into one where the demand for inequitable respect itself is at stake. What I try to say here is that I believe discussing whether the global safe space movement is indeed claiming equal respect or is rather campaigning for inequitable respect is more interesting than the more traditional censorship versus freedom debate. I suggest this might transform the discussion from one in which the marginalized and dominant groups stand opposed to each other into one in which these two groups together are debating with me. What I try to say here is that since the marginalized and dominant groups together argue that this is a debate on a claim in favor of equal respect, and I hold that this is rather a discussion about a demand for inequitable respect, I as a third party involved try to oppose these two groups together here.
I end this introduction with providing the structure of my thesis. In the first chapter I discuss the human autonomy claim in three sections. I begin with my interpretation of Darwall’s two kinds a respect, since in a sense this influential contribution provides the
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framework of the second section of this chapter, namely for the academic equal respect debate in the 21st century. Then, to end the first chapter, I try to show how human autonomy as
recognition respect might be used by activists of the current global safe space movement to support their millenarian claims we see later on. In the second chapter I will start off by trying to provide the reader with a sense of how the concept of human autonomy as equal respect is portrayed in recent literature, but I argue that it only becomes inequitable when demanded by the marginalized. To provide this statement with evidence I go deeper into the historical writings by trying to connect human autonomy with medieval millenarianism. From these findings, then, I want to conclude the second chapter with showing how in the literature the religious sects of the late Middle Ages are linked to the revolutionary movements that are said to represent the Radical Enlightenment of modernity.
In the third chapter, then, I want to go deeper into the resemblances and differences between millenarianism and today’s safe space movements than I think hitherto in the literature has been done. I will do so first by discussing the family resemblance criteria of Cohn. From this I believe it to be useful to interpret the claims of Gray on modern secular millenarians in light of the current global safe space movement. I end the third and last chapter by returning to Darwall again. That is, I suggest to reframe the censorship versus free speech debate of today into a discussion on the claim of inequitable respect by pointing out the implications of the millenarianism of the global safe space movement of 2015 for the way I expect their community members to interpret the concepts of recognition and appraisal respect. In the conclusion that follows I want to make use of the opportunity to reflect upon these findings.
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Chapter 1
1.1 The definition of respect: Darwall and Carter
In the literature on respect in general, that I think is of much use to my later discussion of the global safe space movement as radicalizing self-appraisal respect, I believe there are two works that stand out and that have, consequently, influenced the 21st century academic equal respect debate substantially. Here I refer to the contributions of Stephen Darwall17 and Ian Carter18. I argue that these two publications do not form a debate on itself, because both authors show completely different intentions. What I mean by this is that Darwall sets out a distinction between two kinds of respect one could make, whereas Carter’s project could be seen as a search for the basis of equality in general. However, I do believe that one could say that Carter, in a certain sense, is working in the tradition of the recognition respect as laid down by Darwall. I try to explain here what I mean by this seeming overlap.
Darwall’s grand project is to divide the concept of respect in general into two separate definitions. That is, according to Darwall respect can be seen either as recognition respect or appraisal respect.19 What he means by recognition respect, on the one hand, is the deserved appreciation that is to be given to a thing or being in itself.20 To put this in different terms, one could say that recognition respect is all about recognizing something in an object that
deserves respect. This respect, then, is not only to be given to persons, although one could do so as well, but has rather a number of different sorts of things as its object. As such, Darwall argues that, for instance, the law, someone’s feelings and social institutions in general can be the object of this kind of respect.21 When persons are given recognition respect, then, one
could hold that all persons deserve this form of respect, simply for the matter that we all have some notion of what sort of respect the fact of being a person requires.22 Recognition respect as used in this thesis, then, is the respect that is given to a human being qua human being. On the other hand, Darwall to a large degree distinguishes recognition respect from appraisal respect. Whereas recognition respect is about respecting a thing or being in itself qua thing or being, one could say that appraisal respect is about respecting a person’s specific
17Darwall, S., ‘Two kinds of respect’, Ethics, volume 88 (1), 1977.
18Carter, I., ‘Respect and the basis of equality’, Ethics, volume 121 (3), 2011. 19Darwall, S., ‘Two kinds of respect’, Ethics, volume 88 (1), 1977, pp. 38. 20 Ibidem.
21 Ibidem. 22 Ibidem.
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character.23 I think what Darwall means by this is that for appraisal respect its exclusive
objects are persons or their features, which are held to manifest their excellence as persons or as engaged in some specific pursuit. In a certain sense, then, this kind of respect consists of an attitude of positive appraisal of that person either as a person or as engaged in some particular pursuit. According to Darwall one could, for instance, have respect for someone’s integrity, someone’s excellent qualities in practicing a certain sport or for someone as a musician.24 To
deserve appraisal respect, then, requires a certain behavior for which one could receive esteem or high regard.25 As such, I believe it is correct to say here that appraisal respect is about the positive considerations of one’s character. The appraisal respect that will be used in this thesis, then, is about the respect one has for human’s individual character, that is believed to deserve positive appraisal.
The work of Carter on respect and equality, in my opinion, cannot be seen apart from Darwall’s distinction between recognition and appraisal respect I discuss here. What I mean by this is that I think that Carter in his search for the basis of equality ends up promoting Darwall’s notion of recognition respect. I think this is correct in the sense that Carter in his entire argument stresses that we need to avoid looking inside people to seek for respect.26 I take from this that one should not look for a person’s specific character to find a ground for equal respect, but that one needs rather to respect persons in the sense of recognition respect instead, in that persons ought to be considered as things or beings in themselves that deserve equal respect qua thing or being in itself. After all, Carter maintains that one should respect the outward dignity of humans as agents in order to treat them as equals.27 He labels this
respect for the outside ‘opacity respect’, I believe meaning to pay attention only to people’s outward features and not their specific characters in giving them equal respect.28
I take from this that Carter’s definition of respect as the basis of equality functions within Darwall’s concept of recognition respect, as standing apart from appraisal respect. After all, in the work of Carter all human beings have an equal moral standing when demanding respect, regardless of their personal characteristics.29 This, in my opinion, corresponds to Darwall’s recognition respect as receiving respect for the fact of being a person itself and not for, as in appraisal respect, one’s particular praise-worthy characteristics
23 Ibidem, pp. 39.
24 Ibidem, pp. 38. 25 Ibidem, pp. 39.
26Carter, I., ‘Respect and the basis of equality’, Ethics, volume 121 (3), 2011, pp. 551. 27 Ibidem.
28 Ibidem, pp. 553. 29 Ibidem.
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as an individual. In the academic equal respect debate nowadays, however, this tendency to support recognition respect I believe is not widely shared. What I mean by this is that one side in the discussion goes along with Carter in considering equal respect as being most adequately represented in Darwall’s recognition respect, whereas the other side maintains that the notion of equal respect is more correctly formulated in Darwall’s appraisal respect. It is to this current academic equal respect debate that I turn now, because I think this helps in understanding the demands of the global safe space movement of today.
1.2 Four positions in the equal respect debate
The academic equal respect debate in the 21st century, to restate, I think could be seen as working in the tradition of Darwall’s two kinds of respect. What I mean by this is that the authors writing on equal respect nowadays could in a certain sense be categorized within the concepts laid down by Darwall, that is, recognition and appraisal respect. As I study this debate now, I think there can be distinguished four separate positions in the current equal respect discussion. In a sense one could argue that of those four different interpretations two contributions could be categorized as favoring Darwall’s recognition respect and two as promoting his definition of appraisal respect. More specifically, I argue that one could place the works of Buss30 and Ottonelli31 in the tradition of recognition respect and that the arguments of David Schmidtz32 and Christian Rostbøll33 are to be seen as interpretations of equal respect as appraisal respect. In the end, however, I believe these four positions have more in common with each other than one would expect at first sight.
I start off with discussing the two contributions that present equal respect as recognition respect. The first of these two authors I study here is the Kantian scholar Buss. She argues that equal respect should be considered as working in the tradition of recognition respect, because it is grounded in the Kantian notion of human dignity.34 I believe this to be an outspokenly Kantian position of equal respect, because one could argue that Kant reasoned that an account of equal respect for persons must in part be one of a very special way of perceiving persons.
30Buss, S., ‘Respect for persons’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, volume 29 (4), 1999.
31Ottonelli, V., ‘Equal respect, equal competence and democratic legitimacy’, Critical Review of International
Social and Political Philosophy, volume 15 (2), 2012.
32Schmidtz, D., ‘Equal respect and equal shares’, Social Philosophy and Policy, volume 19 (1), 2002. 33Rostbøll, C., ‘Freedom of expression, deliberation, autonomy and respect’, European Journal of Political
Philosophy, volume 10 (2), 2011.
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That is, equal respect according to Kant is premised on the notion of human dignity.35 Buss,
as I take it, continues in the Kantian interpretation of equal respect by referring to this concept as consisting explicitly of an attitude of respect that people have towards each other.36
According to this author this attitude could be seen as a moral commitment to treat one another with equal respect.37 I think to Buss, then, as well as to Kant, humans should not be used as means to some end, but are rather to be regarded as ends in themselves.38
The true ground for equal respect in the opinion of Buss, then, could be found in the Kantian notion of human dignity. According to Kant, in short, persons are worthy of dignity because they possess the power to reason.39 Buss, on her turn, takes from this that we all have reason to believe that the attitude of respect really reveals something to us about other persons and their relations to our own reasons for action.40 I think this author here is referring to the Kantian idea that our moral attitude towards persons is grounded in our respect for their superior capacity to reason in comparison to other species. Buss herself, however, seems to turn this Kantian notion around in that she argues that it is in the moral significance we attribute to the rational capacity of persons that our anticipation of them as persons worthy of dignity is to be found.41 It is to this recognition of other humans as subjects, I think, that Buss refers to when talking of equal respect. After all, she maintains that since other persons are worthy of dignity, because each has his own point of view, she herself, too, must be worthy of dignity.42 And, consequently, that since their human dignity makes them worthy of respect
she, too, must be equally worthy of respect.43
Next to Buss, the second contribution in this debate that presents equal respect as recognition respect, I think, comes from Ottonelli. She argues that human beings should treat each other as equals rather than judging one another on one’s specific character. Equal respect in this sense, then, is all a matter of respectful treatment between persons qua persons. After all, Ottonelli acknowledges that human beings are not equally capable of, for instance, rational decision-making in a public deliberation process.44 In fact, she claims that the
35 Ibidem. 36 Ibidem. 37 Ibidem. 38 Ibidem, pp. 536. 39 Ibidem, pp. 535. 40 Ibidem, pp. 540. 41 Ibidem, pp. 539. 42 Ibidem. 43 Ibidem.
44Ottonelli, V., ‘Equal respect, equal competence and democratic legitimacy’, Critical Review of International
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principle that equal respect in public deliberation can only be obtained when being an equally competent decision-maker is unacceptable.45 As such, this author holds that although human
beings are empirically not equally competent the concept of equal respectful treatment requires that one at least is compelled to treat human beings as if being equally competent in decision-making.46 Ottonelli, then, argues that people should be publicly recognized as equally competent, even though in reality this view does not hold.47 After all, when equal respect is given as a response to people’s actual competence, as Ottonelli maintains, the notions of democratic legitimacy and substantive justice are conflated.48 That is, the better trained decision-makers then would deserve more respect than the ones without decent training.
I think, in the end, then, Ottonelli’s argument that human beings should be treated as if being equally competent is all about recognition respect. Persons, in this interpretation, are not to be judged on their character traits, but are rather to be seen as respect-worthy objects in themselves. I think in the contribution of Ottonelli, who applies her notion of recognition respect to political decision-making processes in particular, one could most clearly see this idea coming through in her example of the vicious circle of political competence.49 That is, if in principle political rights are only granted to those perfectly capable of exercising them, those who for whatever reason do not possess these rights equally inevitably fall outside the public deliberation process.50 After all, in this interpretation the relevant skills for public
decision-making on an equal standing can only be acquired when developed by exercise.51
Ottonelli argues that equal respect, in the end, is about emancipating people who possess less intellectual and practical skills in the deliberation process than the privileged citizens by breaking this circle of political competence.52 Therefore, I think, what Ottonelli holds as equal
respect is the idea that by treating humans as if they are equal in decision-making, even though in fact they are not, they are emancipated. I take this as recognition respect, since here not the character, but the human being qua human being is respected.
In a sense one could argue that these two recognition respect interpretations of Buss and Ottonelli are to be distinguished from the contributions of Rostbøll and Schmidtz. Although I
45 Ibidem, pp. 203. 46 Ibidem, pp. 211. 47 Ibidem. 48 Ibidem, pp. 215. 49 Ibidem. 50 Ibidem. 51 Ibidem. 52 Ibidem.
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see for instance the work of Rostbøll as very similar to that of Ottonelli, as in that both write about public deliberation processes, I do believe that the former could be categorized in the appraisal respect group whereas the latter cannot. That is, where Ottonelli talks of equal respect as the emancipation of human beings qua human beings I argue that Rostbøll speaks of equal respect as in valuing the specific human characteristic of an attitude of openness towards agreement. What I mean by this is that I think Rostbøll’s conception of equal respect is one of appraisal respect in that he specifically refers to a state of affairs between human beings in which they agree on how to live together.53 After all, in this reasoning, to live on terms that are mutually respectful we must agree on what equal respect requires of us. To reach such a state of agreement, I believe, one must at least hold a positive esteem of one another’s attitude in that one is willing to compromise on different conceptions of the good. I believe Rostbøll argues that equal respect, as such, could be seen as appraisal respect in that one praises the other of taking at least more than one perspective into account.54
From this I argue that it is plausible to categorize Rostbøll in the appraisal respect group, as opposed to Buss and Ottonelli. In the account of this author, after all, I see clearly coming through the notion that human beings have the characteristic that is worthy of appraisal to open one’s mind to assume the perspective of the other in the decision-making process.55 That implies, I think, that human beings could be said to possess the character-trait
of broadening one’s horizon on public matters. Rostbøll here refers to the example of a process of public deliberation in which participants hold incompatible conceptions of the good to illustrate his argument.56 That is, in order to equally respect someone whose culture is
foreign to your own it is according to this author not sufficient merely to recognize that he or she is a person worthy of dignity in the Kantian sense, as Buss holds. What counts for
Rostbøll, instead, is that equal respect requires that one cannot respect one another without being open to the character traits of that particular person.57 It is precisely in this praise-worthy openness to a person’s specific characteristics I believe one could find Rostbøll’s conception of equal respect as appraisal respect. As such, equal respect as agreement respect I argue is to be seen as appraisal respect, in that here one cherishes a particular human trait, namely one’s capacity to open oneself for someone else’s conception of the good.
53 Rostbøll, C., ‘Freedom of expression, deliberation, autonomy and respect’, European Journal of
Political Philosophy, volume 10 (2), 2011, pp. 7.
54 Ibidem, pp. 9. 55 Ibidem. 56 Ibidem, pp. 11. 57 Ibidem, pp. 12.
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Finally, I also think the contribution of Schmidtz is to be placed in the appraisal respect group. I think this is appropriate since this author grounds equal respect in the notion of humans as characters that produce and, as such, deserve respect from the community they are a member of.58 In this sense, then, Schmidtz’s appraisal respect is seen as premised upon human production. What I mean by this is that according to this interpretation equal respect is a meritocratic concept.59 That is, to be deserved by people because of a combination of their specific talents and efforts in society. Human beings, in short, are judged on the merits of their performance in the community. In this interpretation of Schmidtz, who talks of equal respect as producer respect60, people cannot command equal respect in every aspect of their lives, but can only obtain it in their role of productive persons in a democratic society. In this sense equal respect is never given to human beings qua human beings, as in the works of Buss and Ottonelli, but must be earned by individuals themselves through their contributions to society.61 To Schmidtz, then, only productive human beings are to be given equal respect in the sense of appraisal respect.
In short, this notion of equal respect is to be considered as appraisal respect, because I believe it is the kind of respect that human beings to a certain degree value in one another. That is, it is the sort of respect that makes societies function. This producer respect is not unconditional in that it is to be given to all in society, but is limited to those who possess character traits that, for instance, promote economic growth.62 In this sense Schmidtz’s equal
respect is distinct from that of Buss or Ottonelli, because producer respect is not to be given to human beings qua human beings. Rather it is a form of respect that is to be deserved by agents, because democratic society praises them for their specific contributions to the community at large.63 As such, Schmidtz argues that society could be seen as a private
company insofar as it ties promotions to human character traits.64 Equal respect in this sense, then, is one of those promotions human beings earn on the basis of their performance in a democratic society. I think what this author means by this is that societies encourage people to work hard and contribute to their community by truly respecting people equally who work as hard as their individual characteristics allow them to. I think producer respect, then, is also really about appraisal respect.
58Schmidtz, D., ‘Equal respect and equal shares’, Social Philosophy and Policy, volume 19 (1), 2002, pp. 250. 59 Ibidem. 60 Ibidem, pp. 251. 61 Ibidem. 62 Ibidem, pp. 253. 63 Ibidem. 64 Ibidem.
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1.3 Human autonomy as the shared premise in the equal respect debate
I believe, however, that the debate as sketched above in a sense is not a debate at all. That is, it might seem as if these four authors are talking past each other about what equal respect really is, but I think when one reads their work closer there is in fact stronger agreement than one would expect. At first sight, however, it is reasonable to argue that these four authors to a large degree disagree about what equal respect is. After all, Buss maintains, first, that equal respect is about recognizing human dignity, since all human beings are to be considered as ends in themselves. Second, Ottonelli holds that equal respect is about human emancipation in that she promotes the interpretation that human beings should be treated as if they are all equal even though empirically they are not. Third, Rostbøll claims that equal respect is about praising persons openness towards the perspectives of others. Fourth, Schmidtz talks of equal respect as being producer respect, since equal respect according to him is only obtainable for persons when substantially contributing to the economic needs of a democratic society. As stated above, this interpretation of the debate as consisting of four separate positions is a plausible one, but I think in the end is not the most correct one. What I mean by this is that I argue that these four authors on equal respect in fact are not discussing with each other whether equal respect is recognition or appraisal respect and, consequently, what these
concepts consist of, but are instead by their writings confirming their mutual agreement. What I mean by this is that all four positions discussed here carry with them the argument that equal respect is premised on one assumption about human nature in general. That assumption is, I believe, that there exists something as human autonomy. Here I want to show that, although it might seem as if the concept of equal respect could be explained in four different versions, in the current academic discussion there is consensus that, in the end, equal respect is grounded in the idea of human autonomy. I believe, consequently, that the most important academic contributions on equal respect that have been written in recent years take the notion of human autonomy as a premise and, as such, have important implications for the way one should see the equal respect claim in the global campus debate, as I will discuss later on in this thesis. That is, I think a common agreement on human autonomy on itself does not yet lead up to inequitable respect, but I argue when taken over by the revolutionary marginalized it will. It is, therefore, that I now turn to these four positions on equal respect again to see how these authors incorporate the notion of human autonomy into their arguments more precisely. In Ottonelli’s interpretation of equal respect as recognition respect, for instance, I see the notion of human autonomy being very present. What I mean by this is that in the writings
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of Ottonelli I believe this conclusion could be drawn from her argument that equal respect is about considering humans as equally autonomous persons.65 In this sense, equal respect is an
attitude towards those persons who in general are not regarded as autonomous, but who do deserve to be treated as autonomous beings in themselves. I think Ottonelli’s statement, then, comes down to the idea that human beings should treat and respect each other as equals, because of our natural human autonomy as persons qua persons. From this, I believe, her claim that all people should be given the social and institutional tools to exercise their autonomy without previously making sure whether they are capable of doing so makes good sense.66 After all, Ottonelli holds that treating people with the respect due to competent decision-makers not only is an essential condition for their being able to develop this required competence, but also, and even more, provides the marginalized with recognition respect.67 As such, Ottonelli believes that there is no way to emancipate historically subordinated groups from their status as unequally respected citizens other than granting them human autonomy.68 I think here she refers to her concept of the vicious circle I earlier discussed, in which she maintains that when equal rights are only granted to those capable of exercising them the historically marginalized cannot acquire the political competence that is necessary for being treated by others with equal respect, that is, recognition respect.69 I take from this, then, that Ottonelli’s equal respect comes down to recognizing humans as autonomous beings in themselves.
I think having this attitude towards persons as treating them as autonomous
self-governing beings, as Ottonelli promotes, can also be explicitly found in the thinking of Buss. I believe her main argument is that we live in a society of rational human agents.70 She derives this notion from Kant, who spoke of persons as worthy of dignity, because human beings have the power to reason.71 Therefore, Kant argued, we are rational beings, who are by this very natural rationality capable of transcending the limitations of our sense experience.72 Buss takes from this, as I believe it, that human dignity is in fact human’s capacity to reason as autonomous beings. Humans are, as such, capable of setting their own ends instead of being
65Ottonelli, V., ‘Equal respect, equal competence and democratic legitimacy’, Critical Review of International
Social and Political Philosophy, volume 15 (2), 2012, pp. 202.
66 Ibidem, pp. 215. 67 Ibidem.
68 Ibidem. 69 Ibidem.
70Buss, S., ‘Respect for persons’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, volume 29 (4), 1999, pp. 521. 71 Ibidem.
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overruled by a higher authority of some kind. Buss holds that human beings can and should rely on this capacity to reason and from this determine which of their desires are really worth satisfying and which ones are not.73 In short, human beings should use their reason to figure
out what is best to do in this world. I take from this that Buss thinks that because each person has agency in him or herself all persons are rational autonomous beings. That is, every human being in this world is a subject on itself and, therefore, should be treated with an attitude of equal recognition respect.74 Although Buss herself in her argument does not talk that much specifically of autonomy as such, I believe this author, by her use of Kant, does lay down the preconditions for human rationality most explicitly from all four authors engaged in this enterprise. As such, I think it is correct to say that Kant’s idea of human dignity as a ground for equal respect is, in the version of Buss, translated into a reading that tells that humans deserve recognition respect, because they are all autonomous subjects on their own.
I think that the argument of Rostbøll on equal respect as appraisal respect, in the end, also boils down to the presumption of human autonomy. After all, as I believe it, in his interpretation certain human beings possess the praise-worthy characteristics of openness towards other perspectives, because of the very reason that they regard one another as autonomous persons.75 That is, I think that Rostbøll here formulates his conception of equal respect on the premise of human autonomy. What I mean by this is that I think this author argues that we should work towards mutual equal respect for the very reason that human beings are all autonomous individuals.76 In this sense the argument Rostbøll makes does
perhaps move more into the direction of Ottonelli’s notion of equal respect as human
emancipation than one expects on forehand. I think this might be correct, because Rostbøll’s idea that we must work towards mutual agreement in order to reach equal respect rests on the assumption, as we have also seen with Ottonelli, that all human beings, in the end, should be treated as equals when deciding upon conceptions of the common good.77 In this sense I argue both Rostbøll and Ottonelli hold that equal respect rests on the premise of human autonomy in that one should include the perspectives of other persons in public decision-processes for the very reason that others are to be accepted as autonomous human beings in the same way as
73 Ibidem, pp. 536.
74 Ibidem, pp. 550.
75 Rostbøll, C., ‘Freedom of expression, deliberation, autonomy and respect’, European Journal of
Political Philosophy, volume 10 (2), 2011, pp. 14.
76 Ibidem. 77 Ibidem, pp. 15.
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one thinks of oneself. Here once again, then, I see clearly restated the notion of humans as autonomous agents, that deserve to be treated in that manner.
One could argue, I think, that the assumption of human autonomy in a certain sense is most difficult to be found in the writings of Schmidtz. After all, he is the only author
discussed here who does not so explicitly use the term autonomy in his work on equal respect as the others do. However, I believe that, when one studies his contributions more closely, one could in the end extract the premise of human autonomy on which his notion of equal respect is based. More specifically, I think that Schmidtz’ claim that equal respect is grounded in human autonomy works via his promotion of producer respect in a democratic society. That is, it is in the effort and talent of people who contribute to their own community that one could envision, according to him, their natural capacity to self-government.78 Thus, in the merits Schmidtz refers to as leading to equal respect of the production respect kind, I believe the idea of autonomous human beings who are able to develop their talents by hard work comes through very clearly. I think it is fair to say that, therefore, Schmidtz’s concept of equal respect is to be earned, because people are judged on the merits of their actions.79 Then, one already presumes, I hold, that human beings in general are, in fact, quite capable on
themselves to earn equal respect by the very idea that they are hard workers and talented. Even more, I think that Schmidtz’s equal respect as producer respect in the end rests on the very idea that human beings are able to shape the world by their workings with their very own powers. That is, in the writings of Schmidtz I clearly see coming through the argument that all human individuals share this natural capacity to transform the world in which they live by their rational self-governance.80 In this sense, then, I think also Schmidtz takes human autonomy as an assumption that leads, via appraisal respect as producer respect, up to equal respect. From this I draw the conclusion, then, that the four authors engaged in the equal respect debate do not rest their arguments on different premises, but are all grounding equal respect on one and the very same premise. That is, I believe, the premise of human autonomy that I see coming back in the writings of the global safe space activists of today very
consistently. I emphasize that it is only then, however, that it leads up to an inequitable respect claim.
78Schmidtz, D., ‘Equal respect and equal shares’, Social Philosophy and Policy, volume 19 (1), 2002, pp. 251. 79 Ibidem.
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1.4 The global safe space movement: human autonomy as recognition respect
Following the 21st century academic debate on equal respect, I believe one could say that the
notion of human autonomy as recognition respect, as could be found in the writings of Buss and Ottonelli most explicitly, seems to be dominant in the thinking of the global campus activists of today. Later on in this thesis I try to explain that this demand for human autonomy by the marginalized is a millenarian one and, therefore, a call for inequitable respect. For now I see that the representatives of the global safe space movement in their contributions argue that they deserve more recognition respect than they receive now, because in their opinions nowadays they are by the majority of the campus population not considered as equally worthy of recognition as things or beings in themselves. This argument on the lack of recognition respect I believe is most adequately spelled out by the campus activist figure of Aeman Ansari.81 She holds, after all, that marginalized groups have a right to claim spaces in the public world in order to share personal stories about the discrimination they face in their daily lives, without being confronted by the judgment of the members of the dominant privileged society.82 That is, to create spaces where the marginalized could meet as full equals and treat each other as such.83 In this section I want to go deeper into the political thought of a figure as representative as Ansari than until so far has been done. However, before I start doing so I want to make clear that I do not say that Ansari is the most influential figure of the movement, which is probably not the case, but only that I believe her writings are the most representative of the articles I studied so far. It is from this that I believe that a discussion of only Ansari’s political thinking for present purposes suffices.
According to Ansari having these safe spaces in the public realm is essential for the oppressed groups in society, because within these places the marginalized are given the opportunities to engage with people who understand what they go through in terms of for instance racial, sexual, ethnic, religious or class discrimination.84 Safe spaces, in this sense, could then be seen as private forums where minority groups are protected from mainstream stereotypes and marginalization and thus, I believe, are intended to give the members of this oppressed community the feeling of recognition respect. Ansari holds, as such, that these
81Ansari, A., ‘Ethnic minorities deserve safe spaces without white people’, Huffington Post, 2015, retrieved
from http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/aeman-ansari/ethnic-safe-spaces_b_6897176.html on Thursday the 23th of June 2016.
82 Ibidem. 83 Ibidem. 84 Ibidem.
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forums are crucial for resisting the societal oppression by dominant groups.85 Consequently,
she claims that schools and society at large have a duty to respect them.86 This author, then,
argues that the historically marginalized have a right to claim parts of the campus, and the world at large, in hope of creating broader social change, meaning being given equal recognition respect by all.87
The safe spaces in this interpretation are to be created in order for all to become aware of the rights to recognition respect of the marginalized people at large. If one is to believe Ansari, the oppressed groups and the dominant ones today still need to find a way to live together peacefully.88 Creating safe spaces, in this argument, is to the members of the global campus movement the most adequate way of reaching this peaceful state of affairs. After all, as Ansari maintains, these spaces need to remind the oppressed that they are human beings too and that, therefore, they deserve equal recognition respect.89 From this I take it that the global safe space movement consists of a group of marginalized activists that is on the search for a state of affairs in which all their followers are treated as autonomous human beings who, just as the privileged members of the dominant groups in society, are to be considered as complete human equals with full recognition respect. I believe equal respect in this sense, then, is believed to reach a state of human autonomy by means of Darwall’s recognition respect, that in the next chapter turns out to be of a rather millenarian kind, and as such moves in the direction of radical self-appraisal respect.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to show that the global safe space movement of today seems to demand human autonomy as recognition respect as in the writings of Darwall is explained. That is, recognition respect I think could be seen as the respect that is given to a human being qua human being. In this sense I argue that the safe space activists work in the tradition of the 21st century debate, which I believe really consists of a consensus on human autonomy as the premise of equal respect. More specifically, I think that the safe space group as represented by Ansari more tends to agree with the thinking of Buss and Ottonelli in that human autonomy is seen as recognition respect than with the contributions of Schmidtz and Rostbøll that portray human autonomy as appraisal respect. In this claim of the global safe space movement that
85 Ibidem. 86 Ibidem. 87 Ibidem. 88 Ibidem. 89 Ibidem.
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the historically marginalized deserve human autonomy as recognition respect I believe to see a tendency in the direction of millenarian thinking, because here the activists try to set themselves free from the dominant order by claiming autonomy. Questions for further research here, I think, could be: What exactly is the ideological position of Ansari in relation to other members of her movement? Is it more moderate or more radical? And: Does the apparent tendency of this group to agree with Buss and Ottonelli indicate that they reject the interpretations of Schmidtz and Rostbøll on human autonomy as deserved by praise?
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Chapter 2
2.1 Human autonomy as an ideal future state of affairs
In the first chapter I have tried to show that the global safe space movement demands recognition respect from the dominant groups in society in order to reach a state of human autonomy. Here I want to investigate how we should appreciate this concept of human autonomy as advanced by the oppressed ones. What I mean by this is that I believe the global safe space movement itself portrays human autonomy in a-teleological terms, whereas there is a relatively underappreciated body of literature written so far that might frame the concept of human autonomy in rather teleological words. That is, the safe space activists hold that the sort of human autonomy they themselves claim is to be considered as an end in itself for human beings to live a decent life being worthy of equal recognition. However, other writers seem to claim that human autonomy might rather be seen as instrumental, in that it serves as a means to some other end. Before we get into that discussion I believe it is necessary first to get a more accurate idea of the direction in which the dominant contributions on human autonomy work than we have now, in order to more fully understand the premises of millenarian movements. The question I pose here is: how exactly should we understand the concept of human autonomy? This paragraph, then, is to be understood as contributing to the later argument I make about inequitable respect in connection with millenarianism in that I think it adequately shows the utopian character of human autonomy.
Here I believe, then, that the widely shared writings on human autonomy today describe a tension between the reality and the future. What I try to say by this is that the important contributions here agree upon the notion that human autonomy is not yet realized in our own world, but might in the future be accomplished. In this sense, then, I hold that human
autonomy in the dominant literature of today is very much presented in idealist terms, meaning that human autonomy is still about to come, an assumption I see coming back in millenarian thought at large. In fact, I believe the authors engaged here do not consider human autonomy as a state of affairs human beings live in nowadays, but rather as an ideal situation to be realized in the future. From this I take it that in today’s dominant literature on human autonomy two conceptions are generally shared. The first agreement rests on the finding that human autonomy has not yet been realized in the imperfect world we live in currently. The second consensus is to be found in the idea that human autonomy indeed is an ideal that is worthy to be realized in a future world. From these two shared premises I argue that the
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human autonomy literature as it stands today might be seen as presenting human autonomy as of yet another world, as millenarians do.
I think the various human autonomy contributions in recent times can be narrowed down by focusing on the arguments of Joseph Raz90, Kenneth Baynes91 and Ben Colburn92. In these three contributions, I think, one could clearly see coming through the concept of human autonomy as an ideal state of affairs. I believe the most dominant interpretation of human autonomy of the three authors I discuss here is the one of Raz. What I for present purposes find the most relevant in his account is that he consistently emphasizes that the world of human autonomy is not so much the state of affairs in which we currently live, but should rather be considered as an ideal world to which we as a human species should work to complete it. As such, I believe one could argue that the work of Raz on human autonomy could considerably more than is now the case be seen as a hopeful utopian text on political freedom grounded in a description of the imperfect situation in which we find ourselves now. What I try to say with this is that Raz throughout his writings refers to human autonomy as an ideal state of affairs to be reached in the future, but is not yet to be found in the present world, which is a line of thought used by millenarians to a large degree, as I later on hope to show. I think this utopian interpretation of human autonomy by Raz is most explicitly to be seen in his ideal of human autonomy as human self-realization. That is, according to this author the ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is the argument that people should shape their own lives.93 Raz himself refers to this conception of human autonomy as
autonomous persons being the authors of their own lives.94 The ideal of free choices of goals
and human relations in life is to be regarded, as Raz holds, as an essential ingredient of individual well-being.95 I believe in a sense the interpretation of Raz of human autonomy,
then, consists of the ideal of personal autonomy in which the person is the author of his or her life.96 I think this ideal to a large extent entails the vision of human beings controlling their own destiny. Human autonomy in the contribution of Raz, I argue, is then to be regarded as the ideal of a harmonious situation in which all human beings are the authors of their own lives that is to be pursued now by humanity at large. I believe it is therefore correct to state
90Raz, J., The morality of freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
91Baynes, K., ‘Freedom as autonomy’, in: Rosen, M., Leiter, B., (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Continental
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
92Colburn, B., Autonomy and liberalism, New York: Routledge, 2010. 93Raz, J., The morality of freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 370. 94 Ibidem.
95 Ibidem. 96 Ibidem.
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that human autonomy, according to Raz, is premised on the notion of humans as pursuers of self-realization, as millenarians hold, that some day in the future will take us to a more harmonious world than we live in now.97
When studying the other literature on human autonomy I believe one could clearly see the utopian work of Raz coming through, in which human autonomy is to a large extent presented as a future ideal state of affairs that should be considered as standing apart from today’s reality. I argue that in this discussion the contributions of both Colburn and Baynes on human autonomy show this persistence of treating the concept of human autonomy as an ideal of human self-realization that is yet to be realized as well. From this I hold the opinion that in the literature the agreed upon conception is that we ourselves do not yet possess a state of self-realization as autonomous humans, but that in some millenarian future such an ideal state of affairs could in fact be realized. In the work of Colburn on human autonomy, for instance, I believe one could clearly see the notion of an ideal future state of affairs yet to be realized coming through. After all, this author claims that human autonomy is an ideal situation of people deciding for themselves what a valuable life is and who themselves, consequently, live their lives in accordance with that decision.98 According to Colburn, then, an autonomous life is one in which the values which guide it are the ones that agents had decided upon for
themselves.99 Colburn in his writings refers to this as the notion of self-governance.100
As such, one could reasonably argue that Colburn sets himself apart from Raz, in that the former speaks in terms of governance, whereas the latter instead refers to self-realization. I, however, believe the terms self-governance and self-realization in this context should rather be considered as synonyms. That is, what Colburn means with human autonomy as self-governance should be understood, I think, as humans pursuing a plan of life on their own after reflection on their preferences, meaning on what in the end is valuable to them.101 Similar to Raz’s self-realization, or self-authorship, I think Colburn talks of self-governance as an ideal situation in which the agent decides on what is valuable and what not.102 In this sense I argue that both Raz and Colburn are consistently referring to an ideal situation of human autonomy that by this generation has not yet been achieved in a full sense.
97 Ibidem, pp. 389.
98Colburn, B., Autonomy and liberalism, New York: Routledge, 2010. 99 Ibidem.
100 Ibidem. 101 Ibidem. 102 Ibidem.
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This consensus on human autonomy as a desirable state of affairs yet to be reached in the future I also see coming through in the third contribution, the one of Baynes. I think of the three this author is the least dominant figure in the discussion, mostly because in his work I see above all the writings of Raz and Colburn restated. After all, I think Baynes to a large extent imitates Raz in that he also in his work repeatedly speaks of human autonomy as an ideal state of affairs, that rests on the premise of human flourishing. That is, to paraphrase Baynes, the real and effective capacity to develop and pursue one’s own conception of a worthwhile life.103 Consequently, Baynes refers to the idea of human autonomy as
self-governance104, as Colburn did, in that a human being is himself the author of the life he lives. What I think for present purposes is most important to extract from this discussion is that human autonomy in the dominant literature is above all to be seen as an ideal state of affairs to be reached in the future, that we will see later on coming back in my discussion of millenarian groups. I believe this notion is most adequately promoted by Raz. One could argue that the authors engaged here provide different premises for the concept of human autonomy, namely self-authorship and self-governance, but I believe that in fact these writers agree upon Raz’s premise of self-realization for human autonomy to be reached in general. As such, I think in the literature there is fairly widespread agreement that humans are
autonomous when they are able to shape the world according to their own life-plans. That situation, these three authors seem to agree, is however a future ideal state of affairs that cannot yet be seen in present reality. I believe here one could already connect this literature with the current millenarian global campus movement, in that the global activists of today claim reality to be imperfect and believe that there is a future state of affairs to be reached in which all human beings are to be given recognition respect, that is, human autonomy, equally.
2.2 Human autonomy as End-Time
So far I think we have concluded that the global campus activists are to be seen as an oppressed marginal group in society claiming for recognition respect in order to realize a future state of human autonomy which is, in the dominant literature of today, to be considered as an ideal state of affairs that should be separated from today’s world of reality. Here I believe one would do well to study the literature that deals specifically with marginalized groups that claim to bring about an ideal state of affairs in the future in which all would live in
103Baynes, K., ‘Freedom as autonomy’, in: Rosen, M., Leiter, B., (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Continental
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
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harmony, that is, as autonomous human beings that are no longer to be oppressed by the privileged forces in society. The leading figures in this strand of literature, I believe, are Gray105, Cohn106 and, to a lesser extent, Eric Voegelin107 and Carl Becker108. These authors
provide a more historical picture than the authors discussed so far in which the motivations of global movements such as the global campus activists could be placed in a larger tradition of teleological theological uprisings. So what is it that they argue for and what we consequently can learn from this body of historic-theological literature in relation to the motivations of the global safe space movement of today?
I think for present purposes it is best to start the answer to this question with the
contributions of Gray. This author namely argues that marginalized movements that claim for a radical break with the past in order to emancipate themselves from a society they can no longer identify with, such as I believe the current safe space movement does, are working in an early Christian tradition of an End-Time.109 This idea of an End-Time consists of the belief these movements hold that there is a permanent struggle going on in society between good and evil forces and that by eradicating evil with their own force in the end all might live in harmony.110 Movements that are striving to break radically with the society they do not longer identify with, then, are according to Gray pursuing an unnatural condition of total harmony here on earth in which all conflicts between human beings disappear.111 This condition of
harmony, the marginalized believe according to Gray, could only be reached by overthrowing the existing order and creating an ideal community that society could use as a model for future generations to live in. Gray claims that the core idea behind this utopian pursuit is that the normal conflicts of life will diminish, because clashes of interest among individuals and social groups, incompatible conceptions of the good life and choices among evils are reduced to insignificance.112 This perspective of a life without conflict has, according to this author, a powerful appeal to many marginalized groups in society in the past and nowadays.113 From this one could argue that history for these oppressed groups was believed to have an end-point
105Gray, J., Black mass: apocalyptic religion and the death of modern utopia, London: Penguin Books, 2007. 106Cohn, N., The Pursuit of the Millennium, London: Pimlico 2004.
107Voegelin, E., The new science of politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952.
108Becker, C., The heavenly city of the eighteenth-century philosophers, New Haven: Yale University Press,
1932.
109Gray, J., Black mass: apocalyptic religion and the death of modern utopia, London: Penguin Books, 2007,
pp. 8.
110 Ibidem, pp. 9. 111 Ibidem. 112 Ibidem, pp. 45. 113 Ibidem, pp. 46.
