Persistent conflict in the Palk Bay : a critical analysis of the role of politics in a fisheries dispute in the Palk Bay (2009-2015)

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Persistent Conflict in the Palk Bay

A Critical Analysis of the Role of Politics in a Fisheries Dispute in the Palk

Bay (2009-2015)

By Caspar Wanders

MSc Conflict Resolution and Governance

Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam Supervisor: Dr. David Laws

Second Reader: Dr. Maarten Bavinck

Student number: 10461434

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Acknowledgements

I wish to express my gratitude and appreciation to several people for helping me while conducting this research and in writing this thesis. I am grateful to Dr. Maarten Bavinck for making this research project possible, for his inspiration, advice, ideas and his contacts. I want to thank Dr. David Laws for his help, patience, ideas and understanding. Furthermore, I would like to extend a word of appreciation to all my interviewees, for their information, help, honest opinions and useful comments and contacts. A special word of appreciation to Mr. Manimohan for an overall great experience in Rameswaram, his help and translations, and Prof. Augustine Soosai and Barana Waidyatilake for their help and for putting up with me in Jaffna and Kandy. Finally, I want to thank my family, and my father in particular, for their love and support, for being strong in times of adversity and for helping me and each other out and onward to better things.

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Notes

This thesis does not claim to uncover all the reasons for the persistence of the Palk Bay fisheries dispute, it merely seeks to understand certain actions and inactions by the actors. The thesis, likewise, limits itself to a period spanning from after the ending of the Sri Lankan civil war (May 2009) to the end of May 2015. I recognise that circumstances are still changing rapidly in this very volatile context, as there are weekly reports of fishermen arrests, antagonistic statements from political actors may escalate the dispute, whereas political changes such as the UNP’s recent re-election1

in the Sri Lankan parliamentary elections may go a long way to improve the hopes of coming to a resolution in the Palk Bay. But I’ve had to limit my research at a certain point for the sake of practicality and clarity of argument.

Thus, speaking of the Sri Lankan government’s attitude or policy, I mainly talk of the former government, for it may be harsh to blame the new government for the continuation of certain aspects of policy, as it may still be too early days for drastic changes – and too early days to judge.

My thesis talks of the Sri Lankan Tamils, whilst I recognise that this may not be accurate at all times, as the Sri Lankan Tamil-speaking people are not a homogenous group, and differentiation is needed between Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils and Muslims within Sri Lanka. Furthermore, I try to use ‘dispute’ when referring to the Palk Bay fisheries dispute, and of ‘conflict’ when referring to the Sri Lankan civil war – for the sake of clarity, due to the repeated insistence of interviewees.

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I

INTRODUCTION: BLIND FISHERMEN AND BLIND GOVERNANCE

The end of the Sri Lankan civil war (1983-2009) signalled the return of the Northern Province fishermen to the waters of the Palk Bay. The fishermen were finally able to return to their livelihoods, after more than 20 years of intermittent fishing; only to find their waters depleted and facing competition from a large mechanised Indian fleet from Tamil Nadu. Fishermen from both sides have been crossing the border indiscriminately for centuries for fishing, but also for cultural and economic exchange; yet the competition for livelihoods between the two sets of fishermen has escalated over the years, as the Sri Lankans pushed its government to mandate its Navy to arrest trespassers, and Tamil Nadu politicians seek to defend their citizens against Sri Lankan aggression.

The dispute persists, even though there is international agreement on the inviolability of the borders and the fishermen have good relations and are both capable and willing to find a mutually beneficial solution. The fisher-

men had come to an agreement in 2010, and governance has taken a certain degree of ownership over the resolution process thereafter, yet the dispute remains unresolved. The fishermen’s incursions and the Navy arrests are recurrent, as the conflict follows a familiar sequence, which can be conceptualised in a circular diagram (fig.1)

Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen have long fished the same waters indiscriminately and peacefully; for much longer than that there has been a formal delineation of the seas. But, post-independence, disputes over the borders required delineation and agreements on movement and access to natural resources. The resultant International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL, fig. 2), spanning over 400 kilometres, was bilaterally agreed upon in 1974, with the subsequent 1976 Agreement barring fishermen from cross-border fishing. These agreements were controversial from the offset, as they cut through traditional fishing grounds and ceded the Tamil holy island of Kachchatheevu to Sri Lanka (Suryanaryan 2005).

fig.1 A recurring sequence

Indian (Tamil) fishermen cross Sri Lankan border (following the fish) to illegally fish with their highly mechanized trawlers;

Sri Lankan livelihoods are

threatened;

Sri Lankan Navy arrests (sometimes even injures or

kills) Indian fishermen on basis of IMBL and territorial

integrity; Indian pressure or Sri Lanka

goodwill gesture results in release of Indian fishermen

(and of their boats); Indian fishermen return to fishing;

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6 The maritime border is closest to the shores of both countries in the Palk Bay, which, at its narrowest, separates the shores of Tamil Nadu, India, and Sri Lanka by a mere 16 kilometres. The Palk Bay’s relatively shallow and calm waters are particularly rich fishing grounds, providing the main source of income for around 119.000 Sri Lankans and 263.000 Indians (Stephen et al. 2013).

With the IMBL within seven nautical miles off the Indian coast, and because of overfishing and seabed degradation in Indian waters, the Indian

fishermen have ventured outward into Sri Lankan waters for a long time, with controversies related to their incursions being reported from 1990 onwards (Scholtens et al 2012: 87). They became highly dependent on Sri Lankan waters during the civil war, as modernisation of the fisheries in India had led to overfishing and had led them to search for fish elsewhere. Simultaneously, the civil war had restricted Sri Lankan fishing; the waters of the Northern Province were declared High Security Zones (HSZ), suspending or limiting fishing in the Palk Bay, and both the Sri Lankan Navy and the Sea Tigers2 patrolled the waters. Indian fishermen were less inclined to follow these regulations, mainly because the border was less fixed due the Navy’s preoccupation with fighting the war. Only sporadically were these fishing bans removed, and even then, fishermen from Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu clashed. But the dispute escalated only after the ending of the civil war in 2009.

After the end of the war, the Sri Lankan fishermen slowly started returning to the waters of the Palk Bay to take up their livelihoods after years of repression. They were, however, confronted with overfishing and a lack of resources, as a large fleet of highly mechanised trawlers from Tamil Nadu is depleting their waters and threatening their livelihoods. Desperate Sri Lankan fishermen call for governmental intervention to curb Indian fishermen, who see no reason to stop what they had been doing for years.

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The naval wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

fig.2 the International Maritime Boundary Line (National Hydrographic Office, Sri Lanka – adapted)

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After increased tensions among the fishermen, and in order to protect the livelihoods of its citizens, the Government of Sri Lanka has empowered its Navy to arrest Indian fishermen. It has done so under International Law, as Sri Lankan sovereignty and territorial integrity was marked in bilateral agreements between India and Sri Lanka in the 1970s demarcating the IMBL (Chandrahasan 2014). In an assertion of sovereignty and territorial integrity the Navy has tried to fend off Indian fishers, with reports of arrests, injuries and even killed Indian fishermen, making the headlines of Tamil Nadu newspapers weekly – with recent data suggesting that around 240 Indian fishermen have been killed in clashes with the Sri Lankan Navy, and over 80 are missing at sea (Stephen 2013)3.

Yet, soon after these arrests, the Indian fishermen are released – on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the states or a Sri Lankan gesture of good will – and return to fishing in Lankan waters; and, thus, the dispute persists. For example, in anticipation of newly elected President Sirisena’s maiden visit to India, Sri Lanka announced the release of 86 Indian fishermen, in March 2015, yet a week later reports of Sri Lankan Navy “attacks” on Indian trawlers were made (Srinivesan 2015b, The Hindu 2015a).

A fertile ground for a resolution process

Both Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen bear the costs of the dispute in the Palk Bay, as they fear for their livelihoods and their “traditional rights” to fish in these waters. Competition and overcapacity are increasingly proving too big a problem for the both sides of the Palk Bay, with especially the Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen unable to compete with the big mechanised trawling fleet from Tamil Nadu.

Both sets of fishermen have long fished the same resources, with both Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen crossing borders in search of fish, and, as such, it seems the dispute is not a direct consequence of illegal border crossing, as the political actors in India and Sri Lanka may state. This is reinforced by the fact that both communities are Tamil, share longstanding ethnic and cultural bonds, and have long trespassed the IMBL indiscriminately for cultural exchange. Moreover, the Sri Lankan Tamils have received a lot of support from Indian Tamil Nadu during and after the war, which saw many Tamils seek refuge in the southern state, where they were accepted warmly (Destradi 2012). My respondents and past research indicate

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Although it should be noted that my sources within Indian External Affairs state that there are, currently, no Indian fishermen missing.

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that the Sri Lankan Tamils are, thus, not so much bothered by these fishermen crossing the border, as they recognise that fishermen follow fish4. But eventually overfishing and environmental degradation lead to the escalation of the dispute (Scholtens et al. 2012). The Sri Lankans face Indian competition for their livelihoods post-war, and their frustration and desperation is due to size of this competition, and the technological mismatch. The fact that Indian fishermen venture over the border illegally in thousands is aggravated by their use of certain fishing methods, which have been deemed illegal in Sri Lanka. The resulting competition and seabed degradation lead to increased calls for resolution – and political interference.

Indian livelihoods are also threatened, as they are forced abroad in a desperate search for fish and have become highly dependent on Sri Lankan fishing ground due to problems of overfishing in their own waters. Furthermore, they now encounter an assertive Sri Lankan Navy and, thus, face serious risks at sea – arrests, loss of fishing gear and loss of income.

Both Sri Lankan and Indian fishermen are unhappy with the current situation, and both parties have an interest in a resolution process which could sustainably enhance fisheries on both sides of the border. Their long-lasting bonds add another incentive to maintain good relations and seek a mutually beneficial outcome. Furthermore, the clear demarcation of the Palk Bay and the fact that Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity over an area infringed by Indian fishermen is recognised by the Indian Union Government, should provide a legal basis for any resolution process. There is a mutually agreed upon IMBL and a principle of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), which limits foreign economic activity, is recognised by both Sri Lanka and India and backed by International Law (Chandrahasan 2014). Yet the dispute persists and the resolution remains far from clear cut, as the Indian fishermen continue to poach the Sri Lankan waters and call for protection, whilst the Sri Lankan fishermen call for arrests and legislation.

The problem for this thesis is to understand how a fertile ground for a comprehensive resolution process is not being used at the moment, and is, indeed, soured by the entanglement of political agendas and interests and the marginalisation of the fishermen in question.

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Sri Lankan fishermen, as my sources in the Sri Lankan Fisheries Ministry admitted, also venture into Indian waters of, for instance, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

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Both fishermen communities look to governance and politicians to represent their claim, guarantee its sustainability, or to calm things down and negotiate, as I explain in Chapter IV. However, these political actors have done little to solve the dispute. Because they have their own, non-fisheries related, reasons for their involvement, and the extent to which they are involved, governance doesn’t always act in accordance to what its citizens require. Moreover, the dispute’s setting in Sri Lanka comes with a history of ethnic conflict, a powerful neighbouring country with co-ethnics, and incongruent ideas on development and on fisheries governance on both sides of the IMBL.

Research question

For both fisheries communities, the dispute arises from scarcity and overcapacity, and the dispute actually persists because of the release of arrested Indian fishermen and their return to the waters of the Palk Bay. This thesis seeks to understand why Indian fishermen come to Sri Lanka in the first place; why they are violently attacked, but then released; why they return to Sri Lankan waters; how they are able to return; and why don’t the political actors resolve the dispute? The aim, essentially, is to understand the persistence of the dispute in relation to political actors’ involvement, their relations and their interests. As such, the research question of this thesis is, “How does the broader context of political relationships and interests contribute to the persistence of the fisheries dispute in the Palk Bay?”.

The answers to these questions lie mostly in that the focus of the dispute has been obscured by political considerations, which often neither seek to address the problems faced by the fishermen on a day to day basis, nor the aim of creating sustainable fisheries. Crucially, the external political actors are not recognising the dispute as a fisheries issue, because of other agendas tied up to the issue.

In its essence, the Palk Bay dispute is a local economic issue of competition for scarce resources between two sets of fishermen desperate to secure their livelihood. Therefore, the rationale of the dispute’s persistence lies not at the local level – where the problem is as manageable as in other common resource disputes, especially considering the willing and capable fishermen and the area’s delimitation by a bilaterally recognised International Maritime Boundary Lines – but at the level of governance and politics. Political actors either don’t do enough or intervene wrongly due to certain considerations. The resolution process is

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complicated by the non-fisheries-related considerations which are drawn in because of the involvement of political actors and the volatile context of post-civil war Sri Lanka.

The political actors obscure the focus of the process by the restrictions they force on the fishermen in negotiations and the emphasis they put on relations, ulterior agendas and multilevel political games. Thus far, there has been a real lack of strategies or genuine efforts to solve the dispute, address the grievances of the fishermen and improve the fisheries of the Palk Bay. Political actors have taken up ownership to varying degrees, as certain considerations have drawn certain governmental actors in India and Sri Lanka into the dispute, whilst others can be characterised by their inaction, as I will explain in Chapter IV. Both Sri Lanka and India give a certain weight to political considerations and external agendas which are not in line with the requirements of what the fishermen need to resolve the dispute.

These considerations are all reasonable and have some link to the dispute’s context, but should not impinge on the resolution of a conflict over livelihoods. Chapters V and VI will look into the relations and interests which determine the actions and inactions of political actors in, respectively, India and Sri Lanka.

Neither Sri Lankan, nor Indian political actors have fully backed their own fishermen in asserting their rights or, generally, in pursuing a resolution process. In Chapter V, I will discuss Indian governance, which sees the Palk Bay dispute as a problem for Tamil Nadu to deal with, whilst India has its own internal fisheries governance problems, and it can’t allow a state to antagonise foreign relations with Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, on the other hand, as discussed in Chapter VI, employs its Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to address the issue in terms of foreign illegal border crossing, and releases Indian fishermen as gestures of good will to India, rather than standing up for its citizens and representing the Northern Province fishermen, enhancing fishermen dialogue, or addressing its fisheries’ lack of competitiveness.

Considerations of international relations and strategy, of economic development, of minority rights and devolution, and of ethno-nationalism and rhetoric are entangled; and lead to inaction, contradiction and, ultimately, to the persistence of the dispute. But essentially the dispute is one between fishermen over scarce resources, rather than between two countries over borders or over Tamil rights. This hasn’t always shown in the resolution process, in

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which governments and politics often played a bigger part than they perhaps should have. The largest challenge to the resolution is therefore to focus the process on the actual problem, the victims and on finding a solution beneficial to both parties in need of one.

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II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Palk Bay fisheries dispute can essentially be explained as arising from competition between two sets of fishermen over scarce resources, as I explained in the introduction. Similar resource conflicts are common all over the world. They often arise from distributional problems, as the lack of access to or the allocation of certain resources and usage rights may threaten national or human security (Gupta and Lebel 2010, Biermann 2007). These disputes often have clear spatial and technological dimensions, as there are often pressing limitations, and innovation and development may be key to the resolution, but these conflicts can also be determined by socio-economic or political factors (Gupta and Lebel 2010, Ostrom 2010).

Natural resources, including fish, are finite, and these struggles tend to be more intense as the actors often need to deal with the risk of running out of these resources. Like with most natural resource conflicts, fisheries conflicts often arise due to a poisonous combination of ambiguous ownership, common resource dependency and scarcity. Fishing disputes, moreover, have the additional obstacle that they evolve around diminishing stocks, that are in flux and ignorant of human-set boundaries.

A lot has been written about conflicts over natural resources, and literature has also provided us with the conceptual tools to approach these and manage them. To govern access and avoid or diffuse conflict, clear delineation and the allocation of usage rights are common solutions, and theorists proclaim a need for collective action and integrative approaches (e.g. Ostrom 2007, Folke et al. 2005, Berkes 2003). But whilst a lot is written on common resource issues evolving around scarcity and competition, there isn’t much attention given to the role of political actors in these disputes and the resolution processes, nor to their relations and interests.

Conflicts over natural resources are already complex and challenging, but in the Palk Bay the dispute is deepened by the involvement of political actors and the embeddedness of the dispute in post-ethnic conflict Sri Lanka.

The Palk Bay fisheries dispute is essentially a dispute for a common resource, but it has been pulled out of its context – or, rather, its context has made the dispute harder to understand and to resolve, as political considerations at multiple scales are entangled. The

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Palk Bay dispute is particularly compelling because of the existence of a bilaterally established International Maritime Boundary Line, the friendly relations between the Tamil fishermen communities which compete over the same resources, the post-civil war situation in Sri Lanka, and the rapidly developing Indian neighbour. Moreover, in transboundary resource conflicts, there are the added dimensions of international relations and a plurality of national interests, identities, legal systems and strategy to consider (Scholtens and Bavinck 2014, Soosai and Stokke 2006).

In the fisheries dispute in the Palk Bay, allocation is officially regulated through the IMBL and access for the Indian fishermen is hampered through the Sri Lankan Navy’s presence and the legal status of the IMBL. But these problems of access seem too meagre5 , as the Indian fishermen continue trespassing and fishing in Sri Lankan waters. This thesis will seek to understand why their access isn’t hampered more, and why they are willing to take the risks they take. Moreover, this thesis will look at the socio-economic problems faced by the Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen, as political representation neither enhances their access to the resource, nor responds to their calls for resolution, and is, in fact, decreasing their competitiveness.

My thesis is analytical and is embedded in political science, as it seeks to understand the persistence of the dispute as a failure of governance. Governance does not grasp the nature of the dispute as a conflict over scarcity, due to its considerations of international relations, economic development and post-conflict. To study this I will work from a framework inspired by multiple theories and concepts mostly on how governance can be incongruent with the needs and aspirations of its citizens, and I will try to link these in order to get my own understanding of how Indian and Sri Lankan governance is pulled into the dispute’s resolution, but is not aiding the process whatsoever – worse yet, obscuring the dispute’s nature from its actual problem by bringing ulterior agendas and considerations into play.

This thesis follows James Scott in his writing on incongruent governance, which misunderstands its population’s make-up, interests and desires in its policies and decision making. Although, this thesis neither suggests that India or Sri Lanka are high modernist states, nor argues that they aim to make their populace ‘legible’ – Scott’s central conception,

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Although it must be mentioned there have been incidents where Indian fishermen were severely injured or even killed (Stephen 2013).

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which is the aim of making the social comprehensible in order to control it (Scott 1998). But this thesis is inspired by Scott’s suggestion of governance being blind and irresponsive to the needs of its people. The possibility of this being deliberate brings me to the importance of ulterior considerations and agendas in determining governance’s actions and decision making. Sure, state borders may have been drawn by governance without too much sensitivity for tradition or the movements of fishermen, who also happen to be co-ethnics; but the real “state violence” lies in that the state gives a certain pregnancy to political considerations which may not be in line with what the citizens require (ibid.)

Similarly, public or rational choice writers theorise about the importance of self-interest in politics, thereby hoping to uncover the intentions and considerations behind decisions and actions. One of its most famous proponents, James Buchanan, calls rational choice theory the science of political failure, as it uncovers certain motives which should perhaps not determine political decisions in the way it does; for, is there a need for political representation if it can’t represent anything other than itself (Buchanan 1988: 3)? Political actors act rationally to the extent that their preferences are based on political interests. In this line of argument the desires to win votes and to maintain and enhance the political base necessary to stay in office are often the intention behind certain rhetoric and decision-making. Political actors’ decisions and acts are often motivated by public opinion and, ultimately, electoral results; for these can gain you power, trust and legitimacy (Schumpeter 1942, Downs 1957).

This thesis employs rational choice theory to theorise about the importance of ulterior reasons, it does, however, not lay claim to any generalisable knowledge of the motivations of political actors. The thesis will look at why they may have ulterior considerations and why prioritising this may not be up to scratch to what the citizens need. I argue that votes are important for politicians in both Sri Lanka and India, who often come across very nationalistic and populist so as to appeal to their ethnically defined electorates. This can explain the important role of rhetoric and it can explain how decisions are made regarding the fisheries dispute or Indo-Sri Lankan relations without a clear link to the fisheries dispute.

Authors such as Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer (2001) think that states act similarly self-interested in the global stage. According to realist political theory, a desire for power determines states’ foreign policy. In line with realism, Rehman (2009) thinks China and India

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battle it out to become a world power and dominate the region. He claims Chinese containment of India, and Indian counter-containment are logical consequences of strategic aspirations.

Conversely, other authors write about how foreign policy can be determined by considerations and agendas outside realist aspirations of power accumulation, or ideas on domination and mistrust. Rongjiu Ma (2014) writes about how Indian China-policy during the 1950s and ’60s was determined by Indian internal considerations. Domestic politics affect foreign policy making, through the deliberations and roles of domestic actors. . Actors’ preferences, information flows and the political leaders will largely determine whether these entangled considerations and roles compromise the balance between domestic and international factors. In this line of argument, Destradi (2012) stresses that ‘historical, domestic, regional, and international factors, and not merely its relative regional clout’ determine the ‘ability and willingness of regional powers to act as effective conflict managers’ (Destradi 2012: 616). Similarly, Mayilvaganan (2007) writes about how Tamil Nadu has influenced India’s Sri Lanka policy, and Pattanaik (2014) writes about the influence of Tamil Nadu in Sri Lanka. Moreover, I use Keethaponcalan (2014) to study Sri Lanka’s stubborn foreign affairs, which was able to ‘effectively relieve hegemonic pressure from powerful states’ (Keethaponcalan 2014: 167).

This thesis uses Copeland’s economic interdependence theory (1996) as a basis for discussing whether economic considerations, rather than strategy, can determine the intentions of states and their aims to partner economically. Considerations of economics and development are very important, in international relations, but also in domestic affairs, especially because of the importance poor, but rapidly developing countries like India and Sri Lanka give to it. I looked into Sri Lankan economics and development with Sarvananthan (2015b) and Athukorala and Jayasuriya (2013), who both point to the flaws in Sri Lankan development.

In order to critically assess Sri Lankan development and post-war reconstruction, I used used Johan Galtung’s writings about positive peace (1996), enriched by Isaiah Berlin’s conception of positive freedom (1958). Conflict is a dynamic process, according to Galtung, in which the structure, the attitudes and the behaviour of the parties are constantly changing and influencing one another. Galtung argues that after a conflict is formally ended and the

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direct causes of conflict have been addressed and direct violence may have stopped, the underlying tensions and the fraught relations may actually still remain. His conception of “positive peace” goes beyond the mere changing of conflict behaviour – the cessation of violence (“negative peace”). Only in a situation in which structural and cultural violence are dissolved by the removal of structural contradictions and injustices, and by the change in attitudes, only then, can a sustainable peace be built. Thus positive peace, and enhancing the people’s positive freedom to constructively do something with the cessation of violence, should be the ultimate goal of post-war reconstruction. In order to assess Sri Lanka’s peace, I use, besides the aforementioned economic works, Melegoda’s (2011) and Balasooriya’s (2012) research into Sri Lanka’s peacebuilding efforts.

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III

RESEARCH DESIGN

The Palk Bay makes for a very interesting case study for economists, geographers, historians and political and international relations scholars alike, as it is the location of a transboundary conflict between co-ethnics over natural resources, embedded in a context of post-civil war Sri Lanka, which has obscured the economic conflict by raising questions on development, ethnicity and state design. The theoretical framework mentioned in the previous chapter will help me understand these dimensions, and so will extensive past research and various articles on the dispute, ranging from 2001 to 2015. The preceding articles mostly worked from geographical or sociological frameworks on the governance of commons and on communal responses and agency, and have been quite focused on the local dimensions of the problem; what is going wrong; why is there a conflict; what are the responses; and what should be done? Past research has mainly focused its attention on the history of the dispute and the nature of the problems faced by the fisheries (Suryanaryan 2005, Bavinck 2003, Vivekanandan 2001); fisheries communities, their ties, their political agency and their fluid identities (Stephen et al. 2013, Scholtens et al. 2013); but also on the governance of commons, post-war reconstruction, government responses and dealing with multiple sources of law in transboundary disputes (Bavinck 2005, Soosai and Stokke 2006, Scholtens and Bavinck 2014, Soosai and Stokke 2006). The articles displayed the entanglement of issues in the Palk Bay dispute, the inflammable context, and the wide array of agendas which play a role in the decision making and acts of the fishermen and the various political actors.

This thesis builds on past research on the Palk Bay fisheries dispute, and focuses on the role the broader political environment, and particularly the interaction between Indian and Sri Lankan actors at different levels, plays. It will focus on the Palk Bay fisheries dispute, but will look to understand it in a broader context of political relations, interests and involvement. This thesis will focus on the period following the end of the Sri Lankan civil war (1983-2005) up until May 2015, as it is in this period that the fishermen of the Northern Province have been able to return to fishing on a daily basis and this period is characterised by changes in Sri Lanka and reconstruction efforts. Besides the two the sets of fishermen, this thesis will look at the national governments and the Tamil representation in both countries, the provincial government of Tamil Nadu in India and the Tamil National Alliance in Sri Lanka, the umbrella-political party of Sri Lankan Tamil politics and, since 2013, the governing party in the Northern Province.

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During my field research in India and Sri Lanka, I sought to enhance literature analysis with expert interviewing to explore the case study, whilst also critically analysing English-language popular media and political statements, and spending time in the Palk Bay to speak to fishermen and cooperative leaders as well.

This thesis relies on semi-structured interviews conducted in India, Sri Lanka and The Netherlands with experts, varying from diplomats, government officials and economists to academics, journalists, and fishermen, in order to interpret governance and certain events. The interviews enhanced my understanding, interpreted findings, shed light on theories and ideas, and served as hardening evidence to my findings.

The semi-structured nature of the interviews gave me the space to prepare some questions, in order to try to get to certain answers and explanations, whilst not intervening unnecessarily and being capable to react and adapt as my interview went along. Moreover, this gave me the possibility to show my knowledge on the topic and my ability to understand, which could help me in getting to know what I wanted and determining the level of the conversations, rather than listening to, for example, a lot of introductory information or peripheral waffle. Although, I did take care to avoid using suggestive questions or a particular frame, and thereby preordaining certain replies – which I struggled with at first, as I would often finish interviewees’ sentences in order to further my understanding if the English of my interviewee was wanting.

My interviews started off with opening questions or hypotheses with which I hoped to provoke an animated response and deliberation. I followed this up with general questions with regards to my research, namely, on the persistence of the dispute, on changes, on the role of governance, and what is needed for the resolution? I then continued to ask specific questions relating to the interviewee’s job, his role in the dispute or his expertise – for instance, on foreign affairs, economic development, or post-conflict development, and either India or Sri Lanka-specific. Hereafter, the interviews mostly opened up, and due to the semi-structured nature of the interviews, I could invite the respondent to discuss his thoughts and opinions, whilst being able to resort back to questions I had prepared. A rough set of guiding questions is listed in Appendix II.

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It was a challenge to be as well-informed as possible before the interview and to do prior in-depth research. This made the thesis more valuable as well, because without in-depth knowledge, it would be hard to add to existing literature, and I might have gotten lost in the web of interesting neighbouring issues. It also helped me to understand certain narratives or emotional replies the interviewees gave. It was necessary to be sensitive to these, because of the difficult issues bound up to the dispute. Moreover, showing my knowledge and capabilities also benefitted me afterwards, as I felt that they would not shy away from giving me their contacts. For, most of my contacts I got through my interviewees, snowball sampling and networking. My interviewees are listed in Appendix I.

Snowball sampling is getting your sample population by setting a chain in motion; which comes to down to, basically, asking those I had interviewed for new interviewees. Snowball sampling is a useful way to get to interview those who I’d otherwise find difficult to reach out to or to know about in the first place (Heckathorn 1997). This was needed I arrived with little contacts in both India and Sri Lanka. I started off with a handful of contacts, which I had been linked to by other researchers from the University of Amsterdam6. Furthermore, on arrival, I bought newspapers and contacted their political editors and Sri Lanka-correspondents. I contacted thinktanks, NGOs and looked up relevant academics – by looking at the literature I had and at the university web pages; emailing over fifty people in my first two weeks in India.

In Rameswaram and Jaffna, I spoke to around six fishermen and a few fisher cooperative leaders in order to understand the relation toward the other and toward governance. But a lot has been covered in extensive interviews and surveys with the fishermen by the aforementioned researchers. Stephen et al. (2013), for example, conducted 13 in-depth interviews with Indian fishing leaders in a research examining why the August 2010 Agreement remains unimplemented, and Scholtens et al. (2012) had 1120 surveys filled in by sea-going Sri Lankan fishermen and conducted extensive semi-structured and open interviews with fisheries leaders in Sri Lanka. Besides the fact that the views of the fishermen on the dispute, on each other and on governance has been widely recorded, my research hypothesised that the rationale of the dispute’s persistence lies not at the local level, where the

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problem is as manageable as in other common resource disputes, but at those in governance and politics.

In order to get their views, answers and interpretations on certain things, I interviewed experts on topics varying from fisheries governance, federalism and peace building to international relations, geopolitics and economics. Through these experienced and relevant actors, I hoped to reach out to politicians, government officials, diplomats and others involved in governance. For these actors were harder to get a hold of, and this was best done through networking – and by not giving up.

However, when I did speak to politicians or government officials, it was very hard to go beyond party rhetoric or peripheral issues, and I would often get replies that were either straight out of popular media or party brochures, or outright paranoid and antagonistic. For rhetoric and populism remain very hard to pierce through in talk with these actors on the Palk Bay dispute, as sensitive issues are entangled in the dispute and these issues struggle with each other for salience. Moreover, strategy is never out in the open, and is always concealed. I had a very hard time getting interviews with governmental actors, and even when I did, most would shy away from overstepping what has been said in official statements.

So to find out what these political considerations were and how they determine the fisheries dispute, I used expert interviewing to be able to determine governments’ considerations, as I thought this would best protect me from losing myself in official government rhetoric or perhaps emotive local accounts.

The downside of both expert interviewing and the use of popular media, though, remains that it very hard to get more than speculation, for a lot of information is based on interpretations, whilst governmental rhetoric will mostly portray ideals of development and other things appealing to the public. For instance, for many political theorists, it is appealing to think of the international ‘game’ in which the Indian influence in Sri Lanka can be seen as pressure based on strategic desires and Sri Lankan fear, whilst government officials will stress the importance of legitimate development aims and an interest in regional stability, cordial relations and Tamil rights. Unfortunately, interpretation remains a bit overbearing on this highly sensitive subject. However intelligent or aware of the use of narratives, many of the

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interviewees often still succumbed to viewing certain issues through a particular lens, as the issues tied up to the fisheries dispute are still very emotive and sensitive.

Moreover, interviewing experts proved hard academically, as interviewees preferred not to be recorded as they were either unwilling or unable to talk on tape, and wished to remain unquoted. So, I have worked from my notes and have not always been able to give full disclosure on my references in this thesis. I will refer to my interviewees where it becomes explicit and in each chapter I will give a short overview of the references that I draw on and where they come into play, but this thesis seeks to respect the confidentiality that I promised to my respondents by preserving their anonymity with respect to certain statements.

A further issue arises with the desire of many interviewees to show all their knowledge of the subject and related issues, as they want to completely explain their own theories, and often fail to critically assess these or can’t think past them – continually stating “look at my article”, rather than answering a question.

These issues all point to the importance of triangulation. Data triangulation refers to the collection and analysis of multiple sources of evidence, in order to obtain and compare distinct views about a topic (Guion et al. 2011). Triangulation is needed to increase the credibility, validity and integrity of sources. . I have paid special attention to triangulation, to cross-check certain information and opinions on validity or grounding. Thus, I spoke to over 40 different actors, from politicians to fishermen, from bureaucrats to journalists, and from strategists to economists. I have included Indian Tamil, Indians in Delhi, Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamil and Sri Lankan Muslim respondents in my research.

Moreover, It was necessary to keep up to speed with the English media in India and Sri Lanka, and I mainly focused on The Hindu, a quality Indian-wide newspaper based in Tamil Nadu, in order to keep up to date, and appreciating the frames and opinions offered in the paper. But I also frequently read Tehelka and Outlook, political magazines from New Delhi, watched NDTV, an Indian news channel, and I also read The Times of India, Chennai edition and the Sunday Times and the Daily Mirror in Sri Lanka.

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However, to the detriment of triangulation, I deliberately chose not to put too much effort in trying to arrange meetings with politicians in Tamil Nadu, after having some tough conversations with a few hard-line, ethno-nationalist Indian Tamils. They were also notoriously hard to reach out to, but I mainly decided this because of their use of strong, populist rhetoric, which are either quite confrontational or already expressed in all popular media. I did, however, put much effort into speaking to Tamil politicians in Sri Lanka. Whilst in India, Tamils are represented quite fairly, with a powerful government in Tamil Nadu and a long history of democratic rule; in Sri Lanka, the Northern Provincial government has only been elected in 2013 and Tamil politicians remain unhappy with the system and its accountability. So I thought it was important to speak to Tamil representatives, for they are held in high esteem in both the Northern Province and in India, and the lack of support they give to the fishermen raised a few questions.

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IV

POLITICAL ACTORS: ENTANGLEMENT OF RELATIONS & INTERESTS

As discussed in previous chapters, the Palk Bay is host to multiple parties with a multiplicity of interests and relations. The major parties involved all have competing interests, and face considerable trade-offs in addressing the Palk Bay fisheries dispute. As such, the Palk Bay is a microcosm of Indo-Sri Lankan relations, as it displays the bound-up, yet volatile, international relations and the longstanding ethnic ties, yet also the issues of marginalisation, local conflicts and ethno-nationalism.

Chapter I introduced the local level economic conflict between fishermen from Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka over competition for livelihoods, and I stated that the problem for this thesis to understand lies not in the conflict between fishermen, but in the involvement of political actors, which has contributed to the persistence of the dispute – or, at least, hasn’t resolved it. It is necessary to understand why the fishermen, who seem capable and willing, do not solve the issue themselves, and why this leads to political involvement. Moreover, this chapter will also argue that political actors have their own particular reasons, outside of those regarding fisheries governance, for taking a stand on the matter. These aren’t always as straight forward as they may seem, as the political actors don’t necessarily stand up for their own fishermen, nor do they pursue cordiality and the resolution of the dispute. This chapter will show the trade-offs made, by introducing the actors and give an idea of the entanglement of various interests and wider political relationships in a local, economic conflict. The chapter will discuss the various difficult interrelations at different levels which characterise the intricate Indo-Sri Lankan relations, as summarised in fig. 3, which lie at the heart of the dispute, as they shape the process and determine the actors’ attitudes and their willingness to come to an agreement.

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In this chapter I rely on interviews with experts on various topics, in both India and Sri Lanka. I will refer to them where it becomes explicit, but, on the whole, this thesis respects the confidentiality that I promised to my respondents by preserving their anonymity with respect to certain statements. To understand the need for the involvement of political actors, I interviewed both political and fisheries experts, and I interviewed people with extensive knowledge on the Palk Bay, and who had themselves been active in the resolution process as facilitators. In order to understand Indo-Sri Lankan relations, and the influence of the ethnic question, I interviewed senior diplomats, politicians, foreign policy advisors and political scholars in both India and Sri Lanka. Moreover, I interviewed fishermen in India and in Sri Lanka, government officials, civil society leaders and journalists, in order to get information from different sources and through different lenses.

All four political actors – the central governments and Tamil representation in both countries – have, thus far, failed to support the fishermen, as is illustrated by the failure of the 2010 Agreement. This chapter will discuss the 2010 agreement, as an illustration of the favourable conditions, conducive to a resolution, but also its falling through, which illustrates both the need for and the lack of political support.

The 2010 Agreement and the lack of political support

Due to their longstanding relations, similar interests and their organisational setup, the fishermen of the Indian and Sri Lankan sides of the Palk Bay were able to have constructive negotiations and even managed to reach an agreement in August 2010. The agreement established rules for all stakeholders with regards to sustainable fishing in the Palk Bay. It restricted the movement and methods of Indian fishermen, but it recognised the livelihood problems they faced and allowed for a certain degree of transboundary fishing. The Indian fishermen were able to admit their wrongdoings, and were willing to find a solution, whilst the Sri Lankans also recognised that the negotiations deal with the Indian fishermen’s livelihoods, and that this couldn’t be disregarded (Stephen et al. 2013).

According to respondents involved in the resolution process, the negotiations sought to include the whole of society – ranging from the Bishop of the Catholic Church of Mannar to government officials – as the fishermen recognised that trust, relations and support were important (Kumara 2015, Vivekanandan 2015). The volatile context of post-civil war Sri Lanka, which is characterised by suspicions and antagonisms, and the resultant uncertainty

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faced by the actors in the resolution process, gives much weight to public opinion and political support. Problems of ownership and representation are ever present in dialogues, but these worries are heightened in this case by fears of minority marginalisation, issues of power devolution and ethno-nationalism, respondents have found in negotiations and in trying to bring political actors to the table (ibid.). The volatility of support and room for an agreement have been a real problem throughout the negotiations, leading to uncertainty among the actors and stagnation of the process. The main challenges for the resolution process relate to winning the trust of the people and of the governments. Fishermen sought governmental formal recognition to render their claims and the agreement legitimate and meaningful. For, it would have been a statement of governmental support and of a willingness to provide the incentives for upholding the agreement and deterrents for breaking it. Governance and politicians can support the fishermen and represent their claim, wave carrots and sticks, or calm things down and negotiate; but these actors have done little to solve the dispute. The governments did not endorse the agreement and the 2010 Agreement fell through consequently (Stephen et al. 2013).

India did not formally sign the 2010 Agreement, which did not do much to keep their fishermen at bay. But especially the Government of Sri Lanka’s rejection was a disappointment, as it neither showed support to the efforts of their fishermen, nor did it commit to working from this agreement to one which it could agree on. Sri Lanka wasn’t prepared to make any required compromise on its sovereignty (ibid.).

Whereas the fishermen are more than capable of looking after themselves, as their close relations, their strong associations and their internal set-up show; the lack of governmental recognition or alternative action proved to be highly unfavourable for the fishermen’s commitment to the deal. Political actors failed to support the fishermen. The Indian fishermen continued to fish Sri Lankan waters in big fleets of mechanised trawlers, and the Sri Lankan Navy continued to arrest them violently, whilst releasing them shortly after.

The role of political actors in the resolution process

Both communities look to political actors, and governance in particular, for support, in the shape of representation, advice, legislation and enforcement. Governance can help in negotiations and it can provide the carrots and the sticks to an agreement, as it can enhance

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fisheries management and it can ensure the sustainability of a deal by enforcing certain laws and regulations.

Governmental and other political actors have a part to play, as the resolution process requires the backing of the whole society to be both credible and legitimate. The resolution process can’t just be a technical discussion, and discussions over representation are highly necessary. Moreover, governments can grant the stakeholders their support, trust, legitimacy and guarantee the sustainability of the agreement. Political backing is necessary, otherwise the resolution may not stand for another ten years, and the other party will feel less inclined to uphold their part of the bargain.

Moreover, the governments are also drawn into the issue because this is a transboundary issue and the livelihoods of citizens from both states are threatened. The border intrusion, breach of sovereignty and the arrests of and attacks on fishermen are the formal reasons for the states taking up the issue. It’s an issue of importance for both states because their citizens’ livelihoods and the economic development of either country is harmed. One country’s citizens impinge on the sovereignty of the other, without too many obstacles, and, hereafter, the other country arrests them and determines how they are treated and when they are released.

Governments can provide support, legitimacy and sticks and carrots and thereby guarantee a certain sustainability, but the way the conflict is handled by the government of either country is down to the relations between the two countries. The longstanding Indo-Sri Lankan relations, determined by proximity and cultural links, should mean fertile ground for the resolution process. But the relations are volatile and subject to many different considerations, ranging from minority rights protection to regional hegemony. The volatility and ambiguity of the relations is detrimental to the focus of governance on its fisheries and also to the resolution’s progress. They determine the actions and inactions of both central states, as they influence the willingness to cooperate, come to a consensus and solve the problem.

The interrelations between the various central and state actors in India and Sri Lanka are relevant because they may help explain the vacuum of political agency on the Sri Lankan

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side, the actions of Tamil Nadu governance and the inaction of New Delhi. The relations and ulterior agendas of governance may explain the actors’ stance in the dispute. These will also explain some mistakes governance makes in trying to deal with the dispute, as it falls short of committing to the needs of the fishermen and to sustainable fisheries in the Palk Bay. The political actors don’t seem to have strategies or genuine efforts to solve the dispute, but only act in line with particular agendas, whilst the fishermen continue to suffer.

Both countries have longstanding close ties, as they are not only tied through proximity, culture and history, but also economically, politically and strategically. They share a long history, all Sri Lankans – Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim – believe their nation’s origins lie in India, they share religions and culture, and they were united under the English rule (Manoharan 2011). Moreover, Sri Lanka has always been quite dependent on India, whether culturally – everyone watches Indian film and wears Indian garments – or economically – for trade and aid (Pattanaik 2014).

On the basis of these close ties and interdependencies, it would be beneficial for both India and Sri Lanka to look for a solution to the Palk Bay dispute. Correspondingly, as respondents state, the respective governments have actually taken up more dominant roles since 2010, as they aim to facilitate negotiations and communicate their positions increasingly in the media and through official statements. This is enhanced by the current Sri Lankan and Indian regimes’ recognition of the need for cordiality, as they are mending bilateral relations, both economically and diplomatically, which had severely deteriorated in the past ten years or so. Hawkish regimes and insensitive foreign policies , as I will argue in Chapters V and VI, and a few factors which have always been problematic in Indo-Sri Lankan relations; namely, borders and national security, the Tamil minority in both countries and human rights, and the existence of extra-regional actors.

Political involvement hasn’t necessarily been conducive to the resolution of the dispute, as political actors have been largely influenced by considerations outside of the fishermen’s direct concerns. They don’t become involved solely out of concern for the fisheries or because of fishermen’s calls, as they has its own reasons involvement or non-involvement. Political actors have taken up ownership to varying degrees, as certain considerations have drawn them into the dispute, whilst others can be characterised by their inaction. Their involvement is determined mainly by other agendas; ranging from national

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security to economic development, from foreign policy aims to minority rights, and from winning votes to the devolution of power.

Governing and opposition politicians alike face the political consequences of taking a stand in the process. Political actors know that any change in policy or in discourse has domestic distributional and electoral effects. As such, political actors will rationally weigh up their options and make certain trade-offs, as they will consider many different interests and options to decide on their attitudes and actions in a certain dispute. They can slow down the process, as it may obscure non-political matters and make negotiations unnecessarily hard and laborious. This is perhaps exacerbated in an ethno-nationalist, populist environments of Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka, in which democratic values can come second to the desire of appealing to public opinion.

The dispute persists because these political considerations on various scales are entangled in an economic conflict that may perhaps otherwise be locally resolved. The political actors bring in restrictions, outside considerations, and elevate the importance of relations, other agendas and multilevel political games.

Both the Sri Lankan and the Indian governments haven’t done much to impact the conflict behaviour, as both are also influenced by outside considerations. The interests and agendas of both countries in the fisheries dispute and their attitude in the resolution process aren’t as clear-cut, partisan and hawkish as they may be in other transboundary disputes, due to the special relationship the two countries have. Many domestic political considerations determine Indo-Sri Lankan relations, and this may come at the cost of the fisheries. Clearly, both countries don’t understand the conflict as a fisheries issue, because of all the other considerations bound up to it. Neither Sri Lankan, nor Indian actors see, to want to fully back their own fishermen, nor fully support a resolution process.

Rather than choosing to centre its attention on fisheries governance, Sri Lanka arrests fishermen, employs its Ministry of External Affairs to address the issue, and releases fishermen as gestures of good will to India, whilst India lets its state of Tamil Nadu decide, use populist rhetoric and question the legitimacy of the border, whilst trying to pick up the pieces so as to not alienate an important neighbour. They don’t have any real strategies, nor

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have there been genuine efforts to solve the dispute by governance; their action has been inspired by ulterior agendas, whilst the fishermen suffer.

Whereas the fishermen, having strong bonds and the same interests, are actually inclined to come to an agreement centred on similarities and setting clear goals with regards to the fisheries and their livelihoods, political considerations are obscuring the process’ clarity. Both countries fail or choose to understand the conflict as a fisheries issue, because of all the other considerations bound up to it. Neither Sri Lankan, nor Indian actors want to fully back their own fishermen, nor fully support a resolution process. To keep the dialogues centred on the actual problem – threatened fishermen livelihoods – politics need to be taken out. However important these issues may be, a governmental focus on these peripheral issues takes away from the actual fisheries conflict and the resolution process. The emphasis governance places on international relations, for instance, is not apt for the dispute’s resolution, because this is neither needed for the negotiations due to the capacities and relations of the fishermen, nor does it help in reaching a mutually beneficial solution. For, an emphasis on international relations and political considerations may take away from the actual subject of negotiations – sustainable fisheries in the Palk Bay. Moreover, even if foreign policy does have a role to play, it is often too much determined by national affairs and petty politics, as in India’s case; or it is not capable of representing the fishermen due to issues of marginalisation and devolution, as in Sri Lanka.

The governments haven’t aided the resolution process, anyway, as the deadlock in the negotiations has long been hard to break because of the severe restrictions – whether official or unofficial – faced by the fishermen from both countries. Neither could the Sri Lankans agree to an Indian proposal because of suspicions of Indian imperialism or even LTTE terrorism from Colombo, nor could Indian fishermen make any concessions due to the pressure from Tamil Nadu hardliners. Moreover, in an environment of ethno-nationalism and extra-regional interest, it’s become an issue of prestige which either country uses for their own agendas.

A context of ethnicies, marginalisation and the civil war

Chapters V and VI will explain the factors that shape Indian and Sri Lankan governance in the Palk Bay in detail, but in the following section I will give a short overview of the role of ethnicity in both countries and the Sri Lankan civil war (1983-2005) are important

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determinants both in Indo-Sri Lankan relations and in understanding the positioning of the Tamil fishermen in the Palk Bay.

Both Indo-Sri Lankan relations and the Sri Lankan efforts for their fishermen can’t be looked at without taking the Tamil question into consideration. The interrelations between Colombo, the Northern Province, Tamil Nadu and New Delhi are all distorted due to the civil war, Tamil marginalisation, and ideas on devolution. ‘India has (...) been the most important external actor in the Sri Lankan ethnic issue, as a result of geo-strategic interests, its internal political milieu and because of a sincerity to help find a permanent solution as a responsible regional power’ (Manoharan 2011: 227).

Ethnic tensions and discrimination of the Tamil minority by the Sinhalese majority post-independence turned into a full-fledged civil war in 1983. India played a significant role from the offset, as it sought to manage the conflict because of its interest in regional stability and in keeping Tamil Nadu close. India initially supported Tamil separatists with training and arms, in order to appease its province and to hinder Sri Lankan independent governance, which had increasingly opened up the country to extra-regional actors. But Rajiv Gandhi’s government (1984-1991) took on more of a mediating role, as it imposed an agreement on both parties in July 1987, providing for a cease-fire and a certain degree of devolution of power. This agreement also saw the inclusion of the Thirteenth Amendment (13A) to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, which created Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka, effectively devolving some powers to the provinces, and made Tamil an official language. In order to supervise the implementation, ceasefire and the required disarmament of the conflicting parties, India deployed a peacekeeping mission. This mission, however, got caught up in a bloody guerrilla war with the LTTE, unhappy with the agreement. Eventually, India was forced to withdraw its troops, as they were not adequately trained for a guerrilla war, and India had to recognise ‘the limits of its military power and the risks of interventionist policies’ (Destradi 2012: 601).

The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 by a LTTE suicide bomber further curbed India’s desire to influence Sri Lankan internal issues and its aspirations of being the assertive regional maintainer of the peace. India classified the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, but thereafter pursued a largely “hands-off policy” in the neighbourhood.

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Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected in 2005, and he promised to bring peace to the country. As Rajapaksa looked for support abroad to once and for all end the civil war, India took the chance so as to maintain good relations with Sri Lanka in all spheres and to keep away extra-regional powers from gaining a foothold. It supported the Rajapaksa regime covertly, as India wanted to take the heat out of a conflict on its doorstep, yet it still took into consideration sentiments from Tamil Nadu and the interests of Sri Lankan Tamils. As such, India provided the essential behind-the-scenes support, cracking down on LTTE networks in India and supplying military hardware and cooperation, as the Sri Lankan Army violently ended the civil war by eliminating the LTTE-top (Destradi 2012: 605). But after the end of the civil war, the 13th Amendment remains largely unimplemented, and Tamils remain marginalised.

The Palk Bay fisheries dispute characterises the different levels of concern the two countries have with their Tamil minorities and the different ideas on minority rights, representation and devolution. Tamils are the perpetrators and victims in the Palk Bay, and should perhaps be the political agents in the front seat, but whereas the Indian federal design empowers the Tamils to make their own policy, the Tamil fishermen of Sri Lanka are left begging for representation and support.

The Sri Lankan state design is less empowering of its minorities and of the provinces than India’s Union is. The difference is heightened by the historical disadvantaging of Tamils and the Northern Province. Sri Lanka is in a phase of post-conflict peace building in which it needs to look after the Northern Province, livelihoods and the fisheries sector, one of the most vulnerable sectors post-war and post-2004 Tsunami. But its Tamil minority, which compose 90% of the Northern Province population, are still marginalised, both politically and socio-economically (Sarvananthan 2015b, Balasooriya 2012). The livelihoods of the Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen are threatened in the Palk Bay dispute, but various respondents state that this might be less of a concern to Colombo than the infringement of its borders. In Chapter VI, I will explain that the fisheries in the Northern Province and the representation of Tamil fishermen are integral components to understanding Sri Lankan post-war development. Moreover, Chapter VI will stress that India’s continued meddling in Sri Lankan internal matters may help to explain a certain fear for Indian domination, and the reasons for a Sri Lankan foreign policy centred on non-alignment and independence.

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The plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils is still cause for concern in India, and in Tamil Nadu in particular, which remain the main foreign advocates for Sri Lankan Tamil rights. Post-war, India’s position regarding the Sri Lankan government and the Sri Lankan Tamils remains quite volatile, as a result. The Government of India wants to be in good relations with Colombo, because of its cultural connections, trade and Sri Lanka’s strategic value, but can’t compromise on human rights, because of its belief in the merits of a federal state and the inclusion of minorities. It also can’t afford any disinterest in Tamil rights due to pressure from Tamil Nadu. India still advocates the adoption of the 13th Amendment of the Sri Lankan constitution, through which Colombo should concede some power to the Tamils of the Northern Province.

Although, in the Palk Bay, this concern with Sri Lankan Tamil development is largely offset by Tamil Nadu’s own fisheries’ interests. For Tamils from both countries oppose each other diametrically in competition over fish, as Indian Tamil fishermen threaten Sri Lankan Tamil livelihoods – a contradiction the Tamil Nadu politicians seem keen to pass over, as they seek to make the issue about Sinhala aggression, as I will explain in Chapter V. Chapter V will, however, also stress that the Government of India’s desire of guaranteeing regional stability and Sri Lankan Tamil development shimmers through in its recent statements of intent, e.g. its desire to facilitate fishermen dialogue and its increased curbing of Tamil Nadu politicians (Srinivesan 2015d).

Persistent conflict in the Palk Bay : a critical analysis of the role of politics in a fisheries dispute in the Palk Bay (2009-2015)