The role of nuclear weapons in the conflict between India and Pakistan

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The role of nuclear weapons in the conflict between India and

Pakistan

Citation for published version (APA):

Pasmans, P. L. E. M., & Schippers, J. L. (2009). The role of nuclear weapons in the conflict between India and Pakistan. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven.

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The role of nuclear weapons

in the conflict between India and Pakistan

Peter Pasmans

July 2009

Eindhoven University of Technology

Supervisor:

Dr.

J.L.

Schippers

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Chapter 1. Introduction

The nuclear weapons of Pakistan withheld India from a military attack on Pakistan after the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008. This was stated by former chief of the Indian army Shankar Roychowdhyry (1). The tensions between India and Pakistan increased strongly after the Mumbai terrorist attacks. India declared that the attacks were organized by the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (literally: the army of the pure), which was co-founded in the 1980s by the Pakistani secret service in order to fight India in Kashmir. India accused Pakistan of taking too little action against (or even providing support to) this and other terrorist organizations and also expects more help from Pakistan in finding the responsible terrorists. Pakistan, on the other hand, claimed that there was no prove for the Indian statement that Pakistani citizens were involved in the attacks (2).

The onset of the conflict between India and Pakistan dates back to 1947. In that year, the former British Indian Empire became independent and was divided into a secular India and a Muslim Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan claimed the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which led to the first war between the two countries in the same year of the independence. After this first war, two other major wars have been fought in 1965 and 1971 (3).

A new dimension entered the conflict after these three major wars: nuclear weapons. Both countries had declined to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which became effective in 1970. Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan, intended for civilian purposes in the first place, transformed towards development of nuclear weapons during the 1970s. Since then, the conflict between India and Pakistan led to a number of crises but not to war, except for the fourth Inda-Pakistani war in 1999. This war is considered as a minor one as the conflict was limited to a single front in the Kargil region of Kashmir. Remarkable about this war is that one year earlier both India and Pakistan had tested nuclear weapons, which marked both countries as nuclear weapon states. Therefore, the war was also the second and most recent war between two nuclear-armed countries (the first one being a war between the Soviet Union and China in 1969) (3; 4; 5).

Estimates are that both countries possess approximately 60 (strategic) nuclear weapons at this moment; for comparison, the total number of nuclear weapons worldwide is estimated to be more than 23.300 (6). India's nuclear policy is based on 'no-first-use': India will not use nuclear weapons as a mean of warfare unless first attacked by an adversary using nuclear weapons. India also favours a worldwide ban on nuclear weapons. Pakistan considers a 'no-first-use' policy beneficial for India, since India is a stronger conventional military power. Therefore, Pakistan's nuclear policy is that they will only use nuclear weapons if they are attacked by an adversary using nuclear or conventional weapons (7; 8; 9). This Pakistani policy may have prevented India last year from taking retaliation measures for the Mumbai terrorist attacks by attacking terrorist camps in Pakistan.

In this report the Inda-Pakistani conflict will be discussed with as central question: What is the role of nuclear weapons in the conflict between India and Pakistan? The possession of nuclear weapons on both sides makes the issues between India and Pakistan quite worrisome, although on the other hand the nuclear weapons may have prevented the escalation of a number of disputes between the countries to (conventional) wars. Nuclear weapons lead to increased tensions between both countries, while the fear for escalation to a nuclear conflict may improve the willingness of Pakistan, India, and especially as well of the international community to resolve the conflict.

The outline of this report is as follows. In the second and following chapter, which is also the major chapter of this report, the history of the conflict between India and Pakistan is described. The

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Chapter 1. Introduction

(deeper) origin of the conflict is discussed and also how both countries became nuclear weapon states. The latter includes their motivation of becoming nuclear weapon states, how the nuclear technology was obtained, and the history of testing and producing nuclear weapons. Nuclear policies with respect to the development and use of nuclear weapons will be discussed in chapter 3. In this chapter also a short overview is presented, for as far as possible, of both countries nuclear weapons

and technology. Recent developments are discussed in chapter 4, which include the nuclear

agreement between the US and India which became effective in 2008 and the increased tensions after the Mumbai terrorist attacks. Possible developments in the future are (briefly) considered in chapter 5, like the risk of a nuclear attack, the possibility of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of terrorists, India as a growing economic power, and the role of the international community in preventing escalation of the conflict. The conclusions of this report are presented in the sixth and final chapter.

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Chapter 2. How India and Pakistan became nuclear states

The conflict over Kashmir originates from the independence of the former British Indian Empire in 1947. In the period from 1947 to 1972, three wars have been fought between Pakistan and India. This period is described in the first section of this chapter. In the following years, the conflict became more and more influenced by the development of nuclear weapons in both countries. In 1998 both countries performed tests with nuclear weapons. The period before 1998 is described in the second section. The period from the nuclear tests in 1998 is described in the third section. The conclusions of this chapter are presented in the fourth and final section.

A number of questions are addressed in this chapter: What is the (deeper) origin of the conflict? What were the motivations of India and Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons? Why have they performed nuclear tests? How was the nuclear technology obtained? Also the role of nuclear weapons during the wars and crises that have occurred is discussed. The book "Fearful Symmetry -India-Pakistan Crisis in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons" by Ganguly and Hagerty (3) has been used as a major reference for this chapter.

2.1 Independence and three wars {1947-1972)

The origins of the Inda-Pakistani conflict over the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir are complex and rooted in the process of British colonial withdrawal from the subcontinent. In the years before 1947, two competing independence movements had arisen in India. One movement led by the Muslim league (founded in 1906) strived to partition India into a Muslim and a Hindu state, while the other movement (with Mohandas Gandhi as a pre-eminent leader) wanted to create a secular India and opposed the partition of India. These two movements failed to find agreement and Lord Mountbatten, the last British Governor-General of India, decided to separate the British Indian Empire into two states: Pakistan ("land of the pure") and India {3; 10).

For the division of the empire, Mountbatten decided that predominantly Muslim areas of British India which were geographically contiguous would become Pakistan. The new state of Pakistan was formed by West Pakistan (nowadays Pakistan) and East Pakistan (nowadays Bangladesh), separated geographically by India. In general, the partition of India went violently: up to 12.S million people in the former British India were displaced with estimates of loss of life varying from several thousands to a million (3; 10).

Besides provinces ruled directly by the British, the Indian Empire also consisted of indirectly ruled princely states. The princely states on the border between India and Pakistan were free to choose whether to join India or Pakistan, while the option of independence was ruled out. A distinct problem was formed by the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, with a predominantly Muslim population but a Hindu monarch. The state adjoined both India and Pakistan (see figure 2.1) and both countries wanted to incorporate this state (with a geographical size approximately five times the size of the Netherlands). For India, possessing Kashmir would demonstrate India's fundamental commitment to civic, secular nationalism and that a Muslim-majority could thrive within a secular polity. Pakistan was envisioned and created as a homeland for the Muslims in South Asia and Pakistan decision makers believed that Pakistan's identity would remain incomplete without the incorporation of Kashmir (3).

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Chapter 2. How India and Pakistan became nuclear states

Kashmir Region

- International boundary

- - Line of separation

- -- State (India)' or prtMnoe (Pakistan) t>oundary"·

Highway - - - Region -IY Provincial road (paved In parts)

Figure 2.1. Map of Kashmir region showing the former border of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (red line) and the regions nowadays administrated by India, Pakistan, and China (25).

First Inda-Pakistani war {1947-1948) (3)

The Hindu monarch of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, wanted to maintain his power and therefore preferred not to join the socialist and democratic India, while he neither wanted to join Pakistan since he had done litter to better the lives of the Muslim population. After the independence in August 1947, maharaja Singh refused to join one of the two countries, although he did start to cooperate with Pakistan. However, in October 1947 a tribal rebellion broke out in Punch (see figure 2.1) supported by tribes from Pakistan and by forces of the Pakistani army. The maharaja

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2.1. Independence and three wars (1947-1972)

called for assistance from India, which set a condition that the Kashmir state had to accede to India in order to obtain assistance.

When the accession was accepted, India sent troops to Kashmir to suppress the rebellion. The Indian troops managed to stop the tribal incursion, but only after the rebels had managed to secure one third of the former princely state. When the Indian army started to make territorial gains

in the late spring of 1948, the Pakistani army sent units into the battlefield and became directly involved in the conflict. India realized that the conflict would drag on indefinitely unless Pakistani military support for the insurgents was stopped. India was not able and willing to extend to scope of the conflict in order to accomplish this, and therefore referred the dispute to the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

Resolutions from the Security Council required Pakistan to withdraw its troops from Kashmir, while India should reduce their military presence in the state to a minimum for the maintenance of law and order. Also a plebiscite was to be held to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri population. Neither India nor Pakistan carried out the mandate and the issue languished for the next two decades in the Security Council. The first Inda-Pakistani war ended in December 1948 with the

"Cease-Fire Line" dividing the former state of Jammu and Kashmir into territories administered by

Pakistan and India (see figure 2.1).

Sino-Indian border war (1962) (3)

The region of Kashmir was not only disputed by India and Pakistan, also China claimed parts of the region. During colonial rule in the subcontinent, the British had sought to extend the frontiers of their empire to the northernmost parts of the Indian subcontinent. However, the limits of cartography in the vast, inhospitable Himalayan range had prevented a precise delineation of the empire's and subsequently India's, northern borders. The Indian government wanted to limit defence expenditures and to focus on domestic issues like fighting poverty and promotion of economic prosperity. Therefore, India tried to avoid a confrontation with China. Nevertheless, the conflict led to a war in 1962. The Chinese army struck the Indian army which was completely unprepared, and Indian forces needed to retreat. The war proved to be a complete military debacle for India.

Second lndo-Pakistani war (1965) (3)

The war with China made Indian leaders aware of the importance of military strength to secure India's borders and guarantee its national security. As a result, India significantly strengthened and modernized their army. However, the Indian effort at military modernization unintentionally led to a 'security dilemma' for Pakistan. Many of the military capabilities that India was acquiring, though designed to cope with a potential Chinese threat, could just as well be used to counter Pakistani capabilities. After the Sino-Indian war, Pakistan and India started negotiations to resolve the conflict over Kashmir. Despite several rounds of talks, the two sides failed to reach an agreement.

The failed negotiations and the perceived threat from the Indian re-armament convinced Pakistani decision-makers that the window of opportunity to obtain larger parts of Kashmir was rapidly closing. This made Pakistan to adopt a politico-military strategy to promote rebellions in the Indian-controlled part of Jammu and Kashmir, and then to send in the Pakistani army to seize the territory in a short, sharp war.

In August 1965 Pakistan crossed the Cease-Fire Line from 1948 and India responded by crossing the line as well. This led to the second war between India and Pakistan. Soon the Indian and

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Pakistani air forces became involved in the war. At the point when India feared that Pakistan would occupy the city Akhnur, India decided to expand the war outside Kashmir by attacking the city Lahore (see figure 2.1). By mid-September, the war was reaching a stalemate and both countries accepted UN Security Council cease-fire resolutions.

After the war, the Soviet Union accommodated new talks between Pakistan and India. The two countries agreed to abjure the use of force to settle the Kashmir dispute. However, no final settlement of the dispute over Kashmir was addressed.

Third lndo-Pakistani war {1971) (3)

The third war between India and Pakistan was not fought over the question of Kashmir. Instead, this war resulted from a political conflict between West- and East-Pakistan after elections in 1970. Political discontent and cultural nationalism grew stronger in East-Pakistan, the call for separation increased, and in March 1971 the Pakistan military began a harsh crackdown against all possible dissidents among the Bengali population of East-Pakistan. This led to a stream of refugees into India's north-eastern states and within a couple of months the total refugee population had numbered to close to ten million.

India concluded that it was cheaper to resort to war against Pakistan than to absorb the refugees, and came up with a strategy to separate East-Pakistan from Pakistan and to arrange for a return of refugees. When diplomatic efforts of India and Pakistan to resolve the crises failed, India started to support the separation movement of East-Pakistan. Pakistan, frustrated by the Indian support, launched an air strike at India's northern military bases at the beginning of December 1971. India responded by striking a number of key air bases in West-Pakistan with their air force, obtaining complete air superiority over Pakistan, while the Indian navy established a virtual naval blockade between the two parts of Pakistan. By mid-December, Indian troops in East-Pakistan had defeated the Pakistani troops and the war came to an end with a cease-fire. The war resulted in the creation of the new state Bangladesh (the former East-Pakistan).

Line of Control (3)

After the third Inda-Pakistani war, Pakistan and India held bilateral talks in May 1972 in Simla (an Indian hill station). These talks led to a reiteration of the prior agreement to settle the Kashmir dispute without resort to the use of force and to a decision to convert the nomenclature of the Cease-Fire Line in Kashmir to the Line of Control reflecting the disposition of troops after the 1971 war. Once again, the question of the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute was addressed but not reached at Simla.

2.2 Towards nuclear weapon states (before 1998)

In the first 25 years after the independence and partition in 1947, three wars had thus been fought between India and Pakistan. After the Simla Agreement, the relations between India and Pakistan became relatively peaceful during the 1970s. However, another problem started to dominate the relations between India and Pakistan: nuclear weapons. In this paragraph the motivations for the development of nuclear weapons and the development itself are discussed. Also three crises (in 1984, 1987, and 1990) are briefly considered which occurred during the development of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan.

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2.2. Towards nuclear weapon states (before 1998)

Indian motivations to develop nuclear weapons (3; 4)

India's nuclear program dates back to the 1940s. The program was initially intended for civilian purposes; although, India also used the program to keep the option open of building nuclear weapons in short order should India's security situation eventually warrant such a move. There are several motivations for the gradual change towards the development of nuclear weapons by India, mainly due to events during the 1960s and 1970s.

The tense relations between Pakistan and India due to the partition and due to the conflict over Kashmir were motivations for both countries to develop nuclear weapons in order to gain advantage over the other. However, India's main concern for most of the period was with China, India's chief competitor for power and prestige in Asia. The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 and the test of a nuclear explosive devise by China in 1964 demonstrated to India the potential threat and regional challenge presented by the nuclear-armed state of China, which faces India along much of its northern border. Indian nuclear weapons could work as a deterrent against a potential assault by China.

Another motivation for the development of nuclear weapons was a matter of international recognition and prestige for India (being the largest democracy in the world). As a result of their nuclear test in 1964, China was able to join the exclusive nuclear weapon club established in 1970 by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (see paragraph 3.1). In 1971, the People's Republic of China replaced the seat of the Republic of China (commonly known as Taiwan since the 1970s) in the UN Security Council, the world's most influential and powerful international body. This made that, de facto, the permanent members of the Security Council and the "nuclear club" of the NPT were one and the same.

The crucial importance of the desire for recognition of India as a world power in driving forward the nuclear weapons program, even overshadowing considerations of military necessity and deterrence, is underscored by remarks by former weapons program leader Raja Ramanna: "There was never a discussion among us over whether we shouldn't make the bomb. How to do it was more important. For us it was a matter of prestige that would justify our ancient past. The question of deterrence came much later. Also, as Indian scientists we were keen to show our Western counterparts, who thought little of us those days, that we too could do it" (4; 11). In 1972, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi authorized the building of a nuclear explosive device that could be tested, and in 1974, she gave the final go-ahead for India's first nuclear explosion.

Pakistan's motivations to develop nuclear weapons (3; 5)

The nuclear program of Pakistan dates back to the 1950s and was also initially intended to explore the idea of using nuclear energy for civilian purposes. After the second Inda-Pakistani war of 1965, foreign minister Bhutto (later President) argued that Pakistan needed a nuclear equalizer to the stronger conventional military power of India. Pakistan's nuclear aspirations were further fuelled after the devastating defeat in the 1971 Bangladesh war. In 1972, now President Bhutto ordered Pakistan's own strategic enclave to begin developing nuclear arms.

The goal of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was to punish any Indian attack so severely that consideration of such an attack would be deterred from the outset. At the point when India started to develop nuclear weapons, the motivation of Pakistan for the development of nuclear weapons became not only to equalize the stronger conventional power of India, but also to match their nuclear power.

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Development of nuclear weapons by India (4)

India's indigenous efforts in nuclear science and technology were established remarkably early. A

proposal for a nuclear research institute by Dr. Homi Bhabha to the Sir Dorab Tata Trust led to the

foundation of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) already in 1945, with Bhabha as its

first director. In 1948 the Indian government passed the Atomic Energy Act and the Indian Atomic

Energy Commission (IAEC) was established.

The Indian nuclear program began to move in a direction that would eventually lead to

establishment of nuclear weapons capability in 1954: the IAEC decided to set up a new facility, the

Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay (AEET) which was renamed to Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) after Bhabha's death in 1966; also the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was created with Bhabha as Secretary, answering directly to the Prime Minister (until the present day).

The nuclear program grew swiftly and the DAE consumed one third of India's research budget by

1958.

In 1955 construction began for India's first nuclear reactor (the 1 MW Apsara research reactor) with British assistance and in the same year Canada agreed to supply India with a powerful research reactor, the 40 MW Canada-India Reactor U.S. (CIRUS), using heavy water supplied by the U.S. (hence its name). The CIRUS reactor was a design ideal for producing weapons-grade plutonium, and was also extraordinarily large for research purposes, being capable of manufacturing enough

plutonium for one to two bombs a year. India further developed the techniques and plants to

manufacture the reactor fuel material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) for CIRUS indigenously, which made India self-sufficient for their nuclear fuel.

When during the beginning of the 1960s tensions between China and India grew and India

became aware of China's nuclear program, the impetus to India's efforts to build nuclear weapons

grew. With projects underway to provide the materials for nuclear weapons, Bhabha turned his

attention to acquire information about nuclear weapons and initiating preliminary studies of weapon

physics. After the Inda-Chinese border war of 1962, the first formal demand for the development of

nuclear weapons was made in Parliament (by the Bharatiya Jana Sangh party).

Prime Minister Shastri agreed with Bhabha in 1964 to work on "peaceful nuclear explosives"

(PNE) for future engineering use. Although the difference between PNE and a nuclear bomb are

relatively vague, Shastri could neutralize the lobby for an explicit weapon program and prevent

possible sanctions that an acknowledged weapon program could produce. The PNE can be

considered as a cover for a program aimed to develop a weapon capability; however, there was no

involvement of the military in the development program.

The design group Study of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP) with Raja Ramanna as its leader was set up in 1965. In the next year, both Shastri and Bhabha died. The initial effort to develop a PNE existed almost entirely as an unwritten personal understanding between the Prime Minister and de secretary of the DAE. India's impressively large nuclear establishment was suddenly left without any official plan or policy to give it direction. Some of the numerous positions held by Bhabha where distributed among his top scientists working on SNEPP, like Raja Ramanna and Homi Sethna, but the principal successor to Bhabha was Vikram Sarabhai, personally chosen by the new Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The pacifist Sarabhai became chairman of the IAEC and Secretary of the DAE, and ordered a halt to SN EPP in 1966.

Late in 1967 a new effort to develop nuclear explosives started at BARC. The new effort may be related to the explosion of a thermonuclear device by China in 1967 and the developments

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around the NPT (see paragraph 3.1). India, an advocate of non-proliferation, considered that as long as existing nuclear powers resisted disarmament, they left other nations no choice but to pursue the same option as they saw necessary.

In 1971 Sarabhai died and was replaced by Sethna as the Secretary of the DAE, who was a strong advocate of nuclear weapons. In the same year the third Inda-Pakistani war was fought and in this period, the U.S. had grown closer to Pakistan and China, while India had grown closer to the Soviet Union. The U.S. took a hostile attitude towards India during the 1971 Inda-Pakistani war. These developments shifted India's view towards the nuclear option. Indian arguments for the bomb now were: without it India could not be admitted to the corridors of global power, nor enjoy the status of the dominant regional power; the bomb might quicken the process of normalizing relations with China; it would proclaim India's independence of the Soviet Union and compel the United States to change its attitude of hostility or benign neglect.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gave permission to build a nuclear device and to prepare it for testing on 7 September 1972. The nuclear test was performed on 18 May 1974 and took place at Pokhran in the Thar Desert. The tested device was formally called the 11

Peaceful Nuclear Explosive11 ,

but is commonly called the 11

Smiling Buddha". The device was manufactured from 6 kg of plutonium

produced at the CIRUS reactor at BARC. The device was a nuclear fission bomb of the implosion type, about 1.25 m in diameter, and weighted 1400 kg. Officially the yield was reported at 12 kt (kilotons of TNT equivalent), though a more realistic yield is 8 kt. As a reference, the U.S. 11

Little Boy" (Hiroshima) and the 11

Fat Man" (Nagasaki) had a yield of 15-16 kt and 21 kt, respectively. The nuclear fusion bomb 11

Tsar

Bomba" tested by Russia in 1961 (and the strongest nuclear weapon ever detonated) had a yield of 50 Mt, thus roughly 5000 times more powerful than the Indian explosive.

International reactions on the nuclear test were negative and led to the foundation of the nuclear suppliers group (NSG), an international body concerned with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapon development and by improving safeguards and protection on existing materials. The tests were especially received badly in Canada, which supplied the CIRUS reactor to India.

A cut-off of supplies and technical assistance for Indian nuclear power plants after the test had a severe impact on India's civilian nuclear program. After the tests the progress of the nuclear program slowed down although the researchers at BARC continued to work on a fusion device and on more compact fission devices.

In 1981 Indira Gandhi returned to power with a renewed interest in the nuclear weapons program (in 1977 Moraji Desai, an opponent of the nuclear option, had become Prime Minister), motivated by Pakistan's growing nuclear program. A year later preparations were made for new tests, which were eventually cancelled under U.S. pressure. Also. programs were started to package the nuclear explosive such that it can be delivered and to develop the necessary support system for integration in military operations: aircrafts have to be modified to carry the nuclear explosive, and techniques for everything from delivery, to routine maintenance, and to security must be developed. Establishment of an ambitious ballistic missile program in 1983 would lead eventually to the successful development of the short range Prithvi missile and the long range Agni missile series intended to carry nuclear warheads. These missiles are a key element of India's nuclear arsenal today.

In 1984 Indira Gandhi was assassinated by Sikh bodyguards and succeeded by her son Rajiv Gandhi, an airline pilot by profession. Rajiv Gandhi opposed proceeding with testing or deployment

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of nuclear weapons because of his technology orientation. Rajiv recognized that India needed access to the advanced technology of the U.S. and that detectable progress on nuclear weapons would limit this access.

However, in 1985 India estimated that Pakistan had enough weapons-grade uranium for three to five atomic bombs. India's first effort was taken to formulate a nuclear policy and to determine the means of implementing it. A study group recommended a minimum deterrent force of 70 to 100 warheads with a strict no first use policy, which would require a 9% boost of the defence budget for ten years (about $ 5.6 billion). No formal action was taken, but in 1986 Gandhi gave

instructions to develop an aircraft delivery system. The Mirage 2000 fighter jet was made suitable to

deliver nuclear weapons, and provided India with its first genuinely usable nuclear weapons capability. By the end of the 1980s the Indian Air Force, now equipped with nuclear capable Mig-27s as well, began routinely practicing loft bombing techniques for nuclear bomb delivery.

Development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan (5)

The Pakistan nuclear program started later than the Indian program. In 1956 the Pakistan Atomic

Energy Commission (PAEC) was set up. The program started progressing in 1960 when it acquired a new patron, the Minister of Mineral and Natural Resources named Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Also in 1960

Pakistan received funding from the U.S. for its first research reactor, a 5 MW reactor (PARR-1) which

began operating in 1965 at Pinstech (Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology) in Nilore.

During the 1960s Pakistan further developed nuclear facilities with assistance from foreign

companies (including companies from Canada, France, and the UK) which later on provided a

valuable basis for establishing a weapons program, including a 137 MW power reactor for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) build by the Canadian General Electric Co. and completed in 1971. The technology for KAN UPP was the same as used in the Indian CIRUS.

After the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, India's interest in nuclear weapons grew and this

concerned Pakistan. In March 1965 Pakistan held a meeting with China which gave impetus to the

growth of mutual ties between the two countries. Shortly after this meeting, then Foreign Minister Bhutto made his famous oath (5): "If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no other choice."

After the 1971 Bangladesh war, in which Pakistan faced a devastating defeat, Bhutto became President in December 1971. One month later, on 24 January 1972, President Bhutto held a secret meeting in Multan with top scientists from Pakistan and committed Pakistan to acquiring nuclear weapons. During the first half of the 1970s Bhutto approached the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("North Korea") for military assistance (to obtain conventional weapons) and reached out to the rest of the Islamic world, including Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iran for financial support for their

nuclear weapons program.

The Indian nuclear test of 1974 had two important effects: it increased Pakistan's efforts on their nuclear weapons program; it also made it more difficult for Pakistan to obtain foreign technology since the test increased attention to proliferation and led to increased restrictions on nuclear exports to all nations, not just India.

Also in 1974 a new avenue for obtaining fissile material (plutonium or enriched uranium, required to make a fissile bomb) opened up. Pakistan began receiving invaluable intelligence about

uranium enrichment technology (the most sophisticated such technology by then) from Dr. Abdul

Qadeer Khan (later called the "Father of the Pakistani Bomb"). Khan moved to Europe in 1961, studied in Germany (West-Berlin) and the Netherland (Delft), and received his Ph.D. in metallurgy in

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Belgium (Leuven) in 1972. After graduation Khan went to work for the Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO) in Amsterdam. FDO was a subcontractor to Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN), the Dutch partner of the European uranium enrichment centrifuge consortium (URENCO), made up of Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands. Khan had little trouble getting a (limited) security clearance, since he had lived in Europe from 1961 and was married to a Dutch national (as the Dutch security service BVD believed, since she was actually a Dutch-speaking South African holding a British passport).

The multi-lingual engineer Khan was tasked with translating highly classified technical documents describing the centrifuges in detail. In September 1974 Khan wrote to Prime Minister Bhutto offering his services to Pakistan and provided Pakistan with designs and suppliers for the centrifuges. In 1975 Pakistan started to order parts from West-European companies. Although export controls existed on nuclear usable materials and on plants and complete systems, at that time weak export controls existed for components. In 1976 Khan abruptly left the Netherlands on invitation of PM Bhutto, before his espionage was detected. In Pakistan Khan started to develop a uranium enrichment site at Kahuta.

With Khan's efforts, the slow recognition of the program by western intelligence, and due to weak export controls at the time, Pakistan made rapid progress in developing uranium enrichment production capability. In 1977 Army General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq launched a coup which took over the Pakistani government. From that time, the military took control of the nuclear weapons program (until the present day).

In the 1980s, the PAEC developed Pakistan's first generation of nuclear weapons. Pakistan performed cold tests, i.e. using bombs without enriched uranium but with natural uranium instead, in 1983-1984. From 1983-1990 Pakistan developed techniques for delivery of nuclear weapons, including delivery with F-16s obtained from the U.S. During the 1980s Pakistan exchanged nuclear technology with China and North-Korea, and received (possibly) the design of an actual tested nuclear device from China in 1983 and acquired complete ballistic missiles from China in 1988.

After the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan became an important ally for the U.S. in order to fight against the Soviet occupation. The U.S. policy towards Pakistan was divided between economic and military aid for Pakistan on the one hand, and preventing Pakistan from obtaining nuclear weapons on the other hand. This made the U.S. to supply Pakistan with conventional defence capabilities (including F-16s jet fighters) and not to impose sanctions, as long as Pakistan did no acquire and test nuclear weapons (a compromise known as the Pressler Amendment). Therefore, Pakistan did not test a nuclear explosive device, but instead chose to quietly develop all of the capabilities necessary to keep its nuclear weapon options open. During the 1980s Pakistan walked a fine line between demonstrating its nuclear muscle to India but not to violate the agreements with the U.S.

Crisis of 1984 (3)

The relations between India and Pakistan were relatively peaceful during the 1970s. This changed in the 1980s when both countries accused each other of meddling in its internal ethnic disputes. Particularly important was Pakistan's alleged support for the Sikh insurgency that was raging in the Indian border state of Punjab. Further, fears grew in Pakistan that their enrichment facility in Kahuta might be sabotaged or attacked by India (or by Israel or the U.S.). India actually considered a possible attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities. However, as was also pointed out by Pakistan to India, uranium might be dispersed in Pakistan if India blew up the facilities at Kahuta, but a likely counterattack on

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Trombay (near Mumbai) would release the much more toxic plutonium close to highly populated areas.

The tensions related to possible preventive strikes on nuclear facilities came to a climax in September 1984 when U.S. intelligence agencies were unable to locate two squadrons of Indian Jaguar fighter-bombers on an airfield roughly three hundred miles from Kahuta. Pakistan feared an imminent attack, raised defensive measures, and threatened India with counterattacks. Actually, the planes had been hidden in the woods as part of a military exercise. After this minor crisis, indicating the growing tensions between India and Pakistan, the two countries made a verbal agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities.

Crisis of 1986-87 (3)

The largest Indian military exercise in peacetime, operation Brasstacks, lead to another crisis in 1986-87. India had started to modernize their military as a response to Pakistan's military modernization

with U.S. aid. India started the large military exercise in 1986 which was probably aimed at sending a

message to Pakistan about their military capacities and willingness to use them as the occasion demanded. The exercise may also have served to stop the Pakistani support for the Sikh insurgency going on in the Indian state Punjab.

Pakistan felt threatened by the Indian exercise. As a response to the large Indian military build up in Rajastan (an Indian state adjacent to Pakistan), Pakistan started to move troops towards the border of Punjab in January 1987. Now India became afraid that Pakistan might invade Punjab to support the Sikh insurgency and started to deploy troops to counter a potential Pakistani thrust into Punjab. At this stage, both sides started to fear the onset of a spiral of hostility that could easily lead

to war. De-escalation took place at the end of January, when Pakistan proposed talks with India. Both

sides pledged not to attack each other and to avoid any actions along the border that could be considered as provocative.

Crisis of 1990 (3)

In the Kashmir crisis of 1990 two issues came together: the disputed territory of Kashmir and nuclear

weapons. The situation in Kashmir had been peaceful since the Simla agreement of 1972, but in the late 1980s agitation grew against the central Indian government in New Delhi among Kashmiri

Muslims. This happened after the 1987 state elections in Jammu and Kashmir, which were rigged by

the Indian government and the National Conference Party to ensure the defeat of a coalition of

pro-independence and pro-autonomy parties. Violence erupted in the (Indian) Kashmir region in

November 1989. When in December the daughter of the Indian Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed was kidnapped, the government decided to take a harder stance against the separatist rebels and sent thousands of paramilitary soldiers to Kashmir. The situation escalated on 20 January 1990, when the police opened fire with automatic weapons on a group of demonstrators, in which an estimated thirty two people were killed.

Violent events in January made the Indian domestic affair into a renewed Inda-Pakistani conflict. India accused Pakistan of supporting the insurgents, while Pakistan charged that the insurgency was produced by decades of Indian abuses in Kashmir, and not by Pakistani meddling. Pakistan had established training bases for Kashmiri rebellions months before, but from now the Pakistani support for the insurgents increased.

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In February both sides started to build up troops along the border in the regions of Kashmir,

Punjab, Rajasthan (India), and Sindh (Pakistan). The countries started to threaten each other with a war, threats which were loaded with possible references to the use of nuclear weapons for defence. The bellicose rhetoric on both sides escalated during March and April, and both governments appeared to be too weak to back out of the confrontation.

The U.S. became concerned over the developments: they estimated the chance of war at

fifty-fifty and feared an escalation possibly to the nuclear level. In May Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates visited the region. He warned Pakistan that they would likely lose a possible war with India, that Pakistan could not expect assistance from Washington, and that Pakistan should stop their support to the terrorism in Indian Kashmir. Gates message to India was that India should avoid provocation that could spiral out of control and that, although India was likely to win a war, the long-term costs would exceed the short-term benefits. One potential cost according to Gates was "that it might go nuclear." Within two weeks of the Gates mission to South Asia, the crisis had passed and both countries started to pull back their forces.

Nuclear weapons played an important role during the conflict, although it is not clear what the actual nuclear capabilities were of both countries at that point. The common view was that both countries were able to produce and deliver a nuclear bomb on short notice, and it is likely that the fear for nuclear escalation has prevented both countries to start a war, although opinions on this vary (3; 4).

Towards 1998 (3; 4)

Two events in 1988 changed the situation in South-Asia: the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the dead of President Zia ul-Haq. Democracy returned to Pakistan, and Benazir Bhutto, the daughter

of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, became Prime Minister of Pakistan. Remarkably, Bhutto had no influence on

the nuclear program which remained under military control. The Soviet withdrawal changed the relations between the U.S. and Pakistan, and the U.S. now started to focus on preventing Pakistan and India to become nuclear weapon states.

The year 1989 marked a turning point in the strategic situation in South Asia because

Pakistan, and in response India, began creating real nuclear arsenals by stockpiling complete,

ready-to-assemble weapons. After the 1990 crisis the relations between India and Pakistan, which were

tense but manageable before, became hostile. From 1993-1994 the (U.S.) Clinton administration

tried to overcome the impasse between India and Pakistan and to restrain nuclear competition, but the diplomatic efforts didn't lead to the desired effects.

In 1995 the NPT had been into force for 25 years and came up for review and extension. The

nuclear powers came up with additional treaties: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to

prohibit all nuclear tests, and a treaty to cut-off the production of fissile materials for weapons. These treaties would not seriously inconvenience the states already possessing extensive stockpiles of tested weapons, but they would have serious effects on states with less well developed arsenals, like India and Pakistan. Pressure on India grew to attend this treaty, but India feared to become locked into a permanent status of a "second tier state". Further, China and France decided to perform tests before the CTBT would become effective, which insulted India. Pressure in India grew

to test its new weapons, but eventually India did not perform tests because of economic

considerations. When the CTBT was brought into vote in the UN General Assembly on 9 September 1996, India voted against the treaty and Pakistan, which would have accepted to sign the CTBT if India would, withheld from voting.

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Indian elections in 1996 were won by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party and a strong advocate of a nuclear-armed India. A coalition was formed by the BJP with Prime Minister Vajpayee, but the new government took office for only 13 days when support for the new coalition appeared to be insufficient. Under the next Indian Prime Minister Gowda the relations with Pakistan (with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif), China, and the U.S. improved. In 1998, new elections were held and the BJP achieved a strong victory. The new government took office in March 1998, and Vajpayee declared the day before he was sworn in as Prime Minister (4): "There is no compromise on national security. We will exercise all options including nuclear options to protect security and sovereignty."

2.3 Two nuclear states in conflict (after 1998}

Nuclear tests of 1998 (3; 4; 5)

India surprised the world with a series of nuclear explosive tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. The tests were performed at Pohkran, like the test of 1974. India announced to have tested on 11 May a thermonuclear device (using two stages with fusion and fission) with a yield of 43 kt, a fission device of 12 kt, and a low-yield device of 0.3 kt, and on 13 May two low-yield devices of 0.5 and 0.2 kt. These yields were exaggerated according to non-Indian assessments which estimated that the total yield of the tests on 11 May was 10-20 kt (it is in principle not possible to determine the individual yields of the nuclear explosions from seismologic data).

These tests put a lot of pressure on Pakistan, and in particular on Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif. Pakistani opposition parties and the public asked for a strong stance of Pakistan by demonstrating their own nuclear power. India put even more pressure on Pakistan by stating that if Pakistan would not perform tests this would demonstrate Pakistan had been 'bluffing' about their nuclear capabilities. India further mentioned that India's testing signifies that they were resolved to deal firmly with Pakistan's hostile activities in Kashmir. On the other hand, the international community tried to withhold Pakistan from testing. U.S. and multilateral economic and military aid was promised to Pakistan if they would not perform nuclear tests.

Eventually, Pakistan gave in to national sentiments and did perform tests on 28 and 30 May in the Chagai District. Pakistan claimed to have carried out five nuclear explosive tests on 28 May with yields of 25 and 12 kt, and below 1 kt for three devices and one test on 30 May with a yield of 15-18 kt. Later non-Pakistani analyses suggest total yields ranging from 6-13 kt on 28 May and 2-8 kt on 30 May. Pakistan's nuclear warheads used an implosion design with a solid core of highly enriched uranium (8). With these tests India and Pakistan declared themselves openly as nuclear weapons states, after having tested the delivery of nuclear weapons (using ballistic missiles and aircrafts) in the years before. There had been, although, little doubt about their nuclear capabilities before the 1998 tests.

In general, three common arguments which explain why countries develop nuclear weapons are (3): national security / military power, international respect

I

political power, and a variety of domestic political reasons. The Indian and Pakistani decisions of 1998 exhibit elements of all three arguments. In terms of national security, India's acquisition of nuclear weapons has been driven primarily by concerns about China and secondarily by concerns about Pakistan. India further strives for the same degree of international respect enjoyed by China. It is thereby interesting to consider that the first test was performed shortly after the NPT became effective in 1970, while the second round of testing came shortly after the NPT was extended in 1995. The relation between the first two

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2.4. Conclusions

arguments was indicated by India's foreign minister in 1998 (3): "Nuclear weapons remain a key indicator of state power. Since this currency is operational in large parts of the globe, India was left with no choice but to update and validate the capability that had been demonstrated 24 years ago in the nuclear test of 1974." The third argument provides an explanation why the tests were performed in 1998: before, Indian decision makers considered that additional nuclear tests would not outweigh the (economic) costs associated with tests; however, the BJP party had focused during their election campaign on restoring the Indian national greatness, and the BJP-led government elected in 1998 saw it therefore necessary to perform nuclear tests in order to maintain their (political) credibility.

For Pakistan, mainly the national security argument was applicable: especially with the hard-line BJP in the Indian government, Pakistan feared an Indian attack on Pakistan's nuclear plants, an invasion of India into the Pakistani-held part of Kashmir, and a repetition of 1971 in the province Sindh where insurgencies took place among Sindhi Hindus. By declaring its nuclear status, Pakistan leaders tried to deter a potential Indian attack. With respect to international recognition, it had a small role that the tests would demonstrate the first "Islamic bomb" developed by Pakistan. The fear for a military coup can further have influenced Prime Ministers Sharif decision to perform the nuclear tests.

Kargi/ war of 1999 (3)

From early May until mid-July 1999, India and Pakistan fought the fourth war in their independent history. This was the second war ever fought between two nuclear-armed states, after a conflict between China and the Soviet Union in 1969. The war arose after Pakistani forces had crossed the Line of Control (Loe) in the Kargil district of Kashmir (see figure 2.1). Pakistan's goal was to disrupt the Indian control of the Sachien Glacier (see figure 2.1) by cutting-off the military supply to Indian forces in the glacier. The LoC across the Sachien Glacier had not clearly been demarcated in 1949 and in 1972 when, respectively, the Cease-Fire Line and the LoC were agreed; by then, India and Pakistan considered the glacier a no-man's-land. However, after Pakistan had issued mountaineering permits to foreign nationals, India started to deploy troops in the glacier in 1984. Since then, there have been pitched artillery duels between Indian and Pakistani forces in Sachien.

The Pakistan military actions came rather surprisingly. After the disapproval of the nuclear tests by the international community, India and Pakistan tried to find reconciliation in February 1999. Indian PM Vajpayee visited Pakistan in that month and issued with Pakistani PM Sharif the Lahore Declaration, which among other matters called for a series of nuclear-related confidence-building measures and reaffirmed the two sides' wish to resolve the Kashmir dispute through peaceful means. Possibly the military actions were initiated by the Pakistani military (under army general Pervez Musharraf) without approval of PM Sharif, otherwise PM Sharif deceived India during the talks in February.

The relatively peaceful situation in Kashmir may have been a motivation for the actions of Pakistan: the insurgencies in Kashmir which had been going on since 1989, started to fade towards the end of the 1990s and India began to gain back control over the region; the Pakistani Army, which had done much to support the insurgencies, tried to undermine this process. Further, the low military alertness of India may have stimulated Pakistan to perform the move, as India did not expect such an action because of the nuclear deterrence and the Lahore agreement.

Nuclear weapons may have played another role in the conflict (3): Pakistan considered that this "limited probe" would be without serious consequences, since India would be afraid to let the conflict escalate because of fear for eventual nuclear escalation; Pakistan estimated that the conflict

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would draw international attention to Kashmir, because of the fear for a nuclear conflict. India fought the Pakistani intruders using air support for the first time since the 1971 war. Though, India clearly limited the war to their side of the Loe (according to India), likely because of fear for nuclear escalation. By crossing the Loe and cutting-off the communication between Pakistani troops, or by extending the conflict outside Kashmir like in the 1965 war, India could have ended the war much earlier. The war finally ended when Pakistan found no support from the U.S. to mediate in the conflict and decided to withdraw their troops in the middle of July.

Crisis of 2001-2 (3)

On 13 December 2001, six individuals believed to be members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) attacked the Indian (national) parliament building in New Delhi after easily penetrating an inattentive security cordon. The six attackers were killed in a gun battle with security forces, along with eight security guards. This attack was the boldest one in a series of terrorist attacks from LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), both terrorist groups based in Pakistan (see following paragraph). Following the terrorist attacks against the U.S. on 11 September 2001, these and other groups had undertaken a series of increasingly bold acts of terror against non-military targets in Indian-controlled Kashmir and beyond.

Indian officials linked the attackers on the national parliament to LeT and some officials even claimed that they acted at Pakistan's behest. India made a numbers of demands to Pakistan and simultaneously started a significant military mobilization. The demands were: ban the JeM and LeT; extradite twenty individuals accused of terrorist attacks on Indian soil; put an end to infiltration of insurgents into Kashmir. Also Pakistan mobilized their forces and bellicose statements followed from both sides. The conflict attracted international attention, and eventually under U.S. diplomatic and Indian military pressure, Pakistan arrested a number of terrorist including the founder of JeM and the leader of LeT.

The situations became worse when a series of terrorist attacks followed in Kashmir in May 2002. A number of countries, including the U.S., the U.K., Japan, and Germany issued negative travel advisories for Pakistan. Under intense international pressure, the Pakistani military dictatorship (at least temporarily) changed course. India observed in early June a decreasing activity of insurgents in Kashmir and the conflict faded towards the end of June.

During the conflict India followed a course of coercive diplomacy, which is a strategy to desist an adversary from hostile actions by threatening to resort to force if the advisory fails to comply with the stated demands. India also considered air strikes against terrorist camps, for which India had enough military power and intelligence about camp locations, and even a total war. Air strikes were rejected because of the temporarily effect and the risk of counterattacks. The option of a total war with Pakistan was omitted due to the deterrence of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

Lashkar-e-Taiba & Jaish-e-Mohammad

The two Pakistani-based terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad were both formed to separate Kashmir from India. Both groups have had a dominant rule in the recent developments of the conflict between India and Pakistan.

Lashkar-e-Taiba, which means Army of the Pure, was formed in the eighties with cooperation from the secret service (ISi) of the Pakistani army to fight India's rule over disputed territories in Kashmir. The terrorist group is held responsible for the December 2001 attack on the Indian

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2.4. Conclusions

parliament building in New Delhi, for a strike at an amusement park in Hyderabad in August 2007, and for the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008 (see paragraph 4.2). Al Qaeda and LeT share similar ideologies and are allies in the global Islamic jihad according to U.S. officials. After the terrorist attacks in 2001 in New York and in New Delhi, LeT was officially outlawed in Pakistan, but India has repeatedly accused Islamabad of failing to clamp down on the organization and its training camps. The membership of LeT is around 150.000 people, while sympathies for LeT and its jihadist and anti-Indian culture run deep in Pakistan, raising a serious challenge to any long-lasting moves to dismantle the network (12).

Jaish-e-Mohammad, which means the Army of Mohammad, was formed in 2000 and is a major Islamic mujahedeen organization in South Asia with its basis in Pakistan. The group's primary motive is to separate Kashmir from India and it has carried out a series of attacks primarily in Indian-administered Kashmir (13).

2.4 Conclusions

The conflict between India and Pakistan originates from their violent separation in 1947 and surfaced

in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The conflict resulted into three wars in the first 25 years of their independent history. During the 1970s the dimension of the conflict changed when nuclear weapons came into play. India's ambitions to develop nuclear weapons resulted mainly from their competition with China for international recognition and power in South-Asia, while later on also the nuclear weapons program of Pakistan provided an important incentive to India's nuclear program.

Pakistan's motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons is mainly a result of the conflict with India. India developed their nuclear capabilities mainly through indigenous research, though with substantial use of foreign technology, while the acquaintance of foreign technology was more essential in Pakistan's efforts to become a nuclear power.

Nuclear weapons had a significant role in the conflict between India and Pakistan from the 1980s. On one hand, the development and possession of nuclear weapons increased the tensions between Pakistan and India and led to crisis situations in 1984 and 1998. Nuclear weapons further played a role in the motivations for the Pakistani incursions across the LoC in 1999. On the other hand, the deterrence of nuclear weapons may have prevented wars or an escalation of war. Without nuclear weapons, it would have been more likely that: India had tried to punish Pakistan for their support to Kashmiri insurgent in 1990; India had extended the war of 1999 outside the region of the incursions; and that India would have taken actions against terrorist camps on Pakistani soil in 2001-2. Further, the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides increased the international attention for the conflicts between India and Pakistan due to fear for nuclear escalation; the resulting international diplomatic efforts may also have prevented wars between India and Pakistan (3).

An interesting theory is the stability-instability paradox, which says that nuclear weapons do contribute to stability at one level for fear of nuclear escalation (macro/global level), while they simultaneously create incentives for conventional conflicts in peripheral areas (micro level) as long as either side does not breach certain shared threshold. The war of 1999 provides support for this theory: Pakistan performed the "limited probe" across the Loe supported by the consideration that an Indian counterattack would be limited due to India's fear for nuclear escalation; on the global level, nuclear weapons prevented an escalation of the war outside the region of the incursions (3).

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Chapter 3. Nuclear policies and technology

During their course towards becoming nuclear weapon states, Pakistan and India developed distinct policies on nuclear weapons. Also different nuclear weapon technologies were developed and acquired. In this chapter, the India's and Pakistan's stance towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), their policies on the use of nuclear weapons, and their nuclear weapon technologies are briefly considered.

3.1 Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The treaty was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. A total of 190 parties have joined the treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon states: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the People's Republic of China (14).

Both Pakistan and India have declined to sign the NPT. Their motivation is that the NPT discriminates between "nuclear haves" and "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967; the treaty never explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid. Since India and Pakistan did not test nuclear weapons before 1967, they can only join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. At present, being nuclear weapon states, this implies that if India and Pakistan want to join the NPT, they should disarm from their nuclear weapons and subject themselves to nuclear inspections. Pakistan and India have a different public stance on non-proliferation (15): Pakistan has proclaimed its willingness to engage in nuclear disarmament and to sign the NPT if India would do so; India has taken the view that solutions to regional security issues should be found at the international rather than the regional level, since its chief concern is with China. India is also a supporter of nuclear disarmament and was even an initiator of the NPT, but will only accept a disarmament treaty in case of equal rights for all states.

3.2 Use of nuclear weapons

First of all, there exists a clear difference between India and Pakistan with respect to the control of nuclear weapons: India's nuclear weapons are under strict control of the civilian authorities, while Pakistan's nuclear weapons are controlled by the Pakistan Army. It is believed that neither India nor Pakistan keep their nuclear weapons in deployed form, but rather store the components separately, ready to be assembled in a matter of hours or a few days (3).

The Indian policy on the use of nuclear weapons is based on two pillars: minimum credible nuclear deterrence and no-first-use. India has developed a second strike nuclear capability (i.e. a sufficient large and diverse arsenal that could not be disabled by a first strike from an adversary) and does not try to quantitatively match with the Chinese (or Pakistani) arsenal. The no-first-use policy (opposed to doctrines of launch-on-warning) is a pledge to never be the first party in a dispute to resort to nuclear weapons, which is aimed at making its peacetime nuclear stance appear unthreatening to its potential opponents. India has proposed to Pakistan and other countries to sign a no-first-use treaty. This treaty has however been rejected by Pakistan; a no-first-use policy agreed