Covering Politics
Changes in the quality of Dutch television political news
John M. Tyler
June 2014
MSc Thesis Political Science: Political Theory and Behavior Supervisor: Wouter van der Brug
Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam
Abstract
Through a longitudinal content analysis of news broadcasts and current affairs news
magazines covering four cabinet crises in the Netherlands, this study shows that the quality of television news reporting on politics has not deteriorated. This holds true for both public and commercial broadcasters. A unique coding scheme was created to measure the quality of news programs based on generally accepted journalistic standards. News programs were coded which reported on four cabinet crises: the land reform crisis of the Den Uyl cabinet in 1977, the travel cost crisis of Lubbers’ second cabinet in 1989, the Verdonk-Hirsi Ali crisis of Balkenende’s second government in 2006, and the Catshuis crisis which brought down
Rutte’s first cabinet in 2012. Forty-seven programs were analyzed, representing news broadcasts and current affairs magazines, and the range of public broadcasters and then commercial stations for the last two crises. The results run counter to expectations generated by the media logic theory.
Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 4
Quality of television news 4
Media logic 7
Media malaise and video malaise 8
Changes in quality 9
Chapter 3 The scope of the study 11
Changes in the television landscape 11
The four crises 13
Program choice 15
Chapter 4 The Data 16
Coding Scheme 16 Chapter 5 Results 21 Expected results 25 Unexpected results 25 Chapter 6 Discussion 28 Bibliography Appendix
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Quality of political news on television 21
Figure 2 – Quality of Public Broadcasters in 2006 and 2012 22 Figure 3 – Quality of Commercial Broadcasters in 2006 and 2012 22 Figure 4 – PowNews compared to other public broadcasters, 2012 23
Figure 5 – Quality of news broadcasts 24
Figure 6 – Quality of news magazines 24
Figure 7 – The balance of time between politicians 27
and journalists/experts
Chapter 1 Introduction
How has the quality of television news reporting about politics changed over the last few decades? Has the quality of television news deteriorated, as the dominant theory in the study of media and politics predicts? Or has quality of television coverage of politics actually stayed the same, or even improved?
The goal of this study is to establish whether or not the quality of television reporting about politics in the Netherlands has gone down in the past 35 years. This will be done using a longitudinal content analysis of Dutch news broadcasts at four points of time, namely, four cabinet crises. The study uses an original coding scheme to measure various aspects of quality.
This type of research on possible changes in the quality of television news coverage of politics is rare. Research on the topic tends to look at particular aspects of political coverage, such as how it has become more personalized or more sensational (Van Santen 2012, Kriesi 2011, Reinemann and Wilke, 2007) or at changes in the quality of how the print media cover politics (Hofer, van der Brug & van Praag 2013, Van Aelst et al 2011, Vliegenthart et al., 2010). But there is a lack of research into how the quality of politics as reported by TV news has changed.
This study aims to fill that gap, at least when it comes to the Netherlands over the past 35 years. Television in this country underwent a transition from a basic, monopolistic public system of television broadcasters to a competitive, fragmented, combined public and commercial system. This transition makes the study particularly relevant for analyzing potential changes this type of transition may (or may not) bring about. In addition, the
Netherlands, albeit a small country, is seen as representative of media systems which evolved from fully-state supported television broadcasters to a fragmented, commercialized system (Van Santen 2012).
Much of the academic literature concerning such a transition predicts a deterioration in the quality of television news coverage of politics (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995, Blumler & Kavanagh 1999). As commercial broadcasters are allowed access to the airwaves (and the
cables), competition for viewers becomes a factor in how all broadcasters cover political news. Fragmentation of the supply of news content leads to fragmentation of the demand for the news. So broadcasters go to increasing lengths to make the news interesting in order to attract more viewers, and quality suffers.
Others question the above reasoning, and research has not been conclusive. Kees Brants puts it nicely in the title of his literature overview/research on campaign communications in the 1994 Dutch elections, ‘Who’s Afraid of Infotainment?’ (Brants 1998). He goes so far as to call the warnings of a loss of quality in television news a ‘scare’, and proceeds to show that new developments in how reporters portray politicians is, in most cases, benign.
The results of the present study bring into question the assumption that commercialization leads a deterioration in the quality of television political news. According to the findings reported below, the quality of television reporting on politics has not gone down significantly in the past 35 years, and in some ways it has even improved.
Of course, the fact that television reporting on politics is a cause for concern is
understandable. Until the internet started taking over the role, television was steadily growing as the main source of political and policy information for a large part of the electorate in western liberal democracies. Due to the perceived drop in the quality of television news just as that medium was increasing in importance, some saw the essential role the media plays in western liberal democracies of informing citizens to be weakening.
Looking only on the side of the provider of information (not on the affects), this study in part should ease those concerns. The content providers, when it comes to television political news, are still doing their job.
After discussing the theoretical underpinnings of the study in chapter 2, including what defines quality for television coverage of politics and the ideas behind the theory of media logic, chapter 3 will lay out the scope of the research. I describe the Dutch television
landscape over the course of 35 years, and then briefly explain what happened during each of the four cabinet crises.
Chapter 4 presents the data resulting from the content analysis, including the coding scheme and examples of how broadcasts were coded. The discussion of what the results of the data mean in terms of the quality of television news reporting on politics in the Netherlands makes up chapter 5.
Finally, in chapter 6 I will discuss the conclusions and the implications this study may have on current thinking about the quality of political news coverage on television, and I will discuss further areas of study indicated by this research project.
Chapter 2 Theoretical framework
Politics and the media have a symbiotic relationship. Each needs the other. As both sectors have evolved, concerns have been raised about the quality of the media’s coverage of politics. But are these concerns justified? Has the quality of media, and most importantly, television news media’s coverage of politics gotten worse?
The first problem in answering this question is defining quality. This requires filtering out changes in style, presentation and audience expectations to come up with elements essential to the quality of television news reporting. After presenting criteria for defining the quality of television news, I will then discuss the theory of media logic. Finally, the chapter closes with a look at which quality indicators would be expected to change over time according to media logic theory.
Quality of television news
The aim of this study is to measure the quality of television news, and whether or not that quality has changed. Quality can be difficult to define and even then, it can also be difficult to measure. While stylistic changes can be quantified and measured, it is not always clear to what extent a stylistic change affects the quality of coverage. For the purposes of this research, I have defined quality based on journalistic standards that have remained more or less constant (Renckstorf et al 2001, Meijer 2003, Muir and Muller 2009, Schatz & Schulz 1992). This is not to say that quality was defined in the 1970s by the same criteria that it is defined today. Indeed, the criteria used in this research may have a bias toward current standards. But the elements included as criteria measuring quality for this paper were also present in the 1970s.
I am defining quality as a normative measure for two types of news programs which
broadcast news about politics – the main evening news broadcast itself, and news magazines. I am not making a distinction here between ‘quality’ news programs and ‘popular’ news programs, between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ news, or between ‘serious’ and ‘popular’ news, other than the initial decision to analyze programs which have traditionally been placed in the first of all these categories. I am measuring the extent to which these two types of news programs
be interesting (Meijer’s Public Quality, Zaller’s Burglar Alarm and Porto´s News Diversity (Meijer 2003, Zaller 2003 and Porto 2007)), this paper uses a normative definition of quality widely accepted among journalists.
As journalist Sydney Schanberg said at a Harvard University symposium in 2006, “While the ways by which one receives news are going through rapid change, the principles and
requirements of good journalism have remained the same” (Principles of Good Journalism, 50 Years in the Media – Changes in Journalism, Harvard University Symposium,
http://athome.harvard.edu/programs/fym/fym_video/fym_9.html).
So what are those principles? Starting here in the Netherlands, the Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation (de NOS) states in their code of ethics: ‘The NOS maintains the highest
journalistic standards of balance, thoroughness, reliability, independence, pluriformity and objectivity’ http://weblogs.nos.nl/ombudsman/nos-code/, translation mine). The news magazine Heart of the Netherlands (Hart van Nederland), produced by the commercial SBS Broadcasting, states that “the editors strive for a broad and deep reporting that is characterized by objectivity and absence of bias. In carrying out their tasks the editors will follow the
principle of journalistic thoroughness and balance” (Redactiestatuut Hart van Nederland, translation mine).
Using a panel of 60 experts in the Netherlands, van der Wurff & Schönbach compiled the following essential criteria for quality journalism: carefully checking facts, separating editorial from commercial content, full disclosure of sources, working as a journalist under your own name and not under false pretenses, no manipulation of images or statements, hearing both sides, comprehensible for the audience, and transparency (van der Wurff & Schönbach 2011: 412).
Schatz and Schulz set out five dimensions of program quality for television news: diversity, relevance, professionalism, acceptance and legality (Schatz & Schulz 1992, translation by Google translate).
As part of a study in the United States of the quality of local television news, Belt and Just cite a team of news professionals who came up with criteria for quality television news. These
included: significance, journalistic enterprise, balance, authoritativeness and community relevance (Belt & Just 2008: 197).
Extrapolating from the aforementioned lists, I have compiled a list of basic criteria necessary for quality television news coverage. Some criteria listed above I have left off my list because they are not relevant to the programs I have chosen (e.g. legality and working under your own name). Others I have omitted due to time or resource constraints (e.g. fact checking,
community relevance). The list is concise, yet provides a good overview of the quality of a television news program. It includes the following: the substance of the content, not excessive appeal to the audience’s emotion, objectivity, transparency of sources, accessibility for the audience, professionalism and balance between politicians and journalists/experts. Programs which score high on the first six, and in the middle on the last, meet the minimum
requirements deemed necessary to provide quality news on television.
Research is sparse regarding changes in the quality of television news coverage of politics. More has been done regarding print media. This is due in part to the greater challenges in studying television: it takes more time to codify television broadcasts than it does to codify print, and television archives are not always complete and are less accessible than print archives. At the same time, the medium of television involves more elements than does print media, incorporating sight and sound. This further complicates defining the quality of television news.
While research into quality in and of itself is lacking, there is a body of work measuring personalization and sensationalism, both on television and in the print media. (Kriesi 2012, Reinemann and Wilke 2007, Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2009, Hofer, van der Brug & van Praag 2013)Vliegenthart et al. 2010, van Santen 2012). But the results of these studies are disparate, and are looking at only one aspect that goes into quality television news coverage of politics.
What most of these studies have in common is their reliance on or reaction to the dominant theory in the political communication literature.
Media logic
In the study of communication science as it pertains to politics a concept emerged called media logic. This concept describes the ‘assumptions and processes for constructing messages with a particular medium’ (Altheide 2004:294). Journalists’ assumptions and processes have changed over the years as media has evolved from monopolistic, often ideologically oriented institutions catering to broad, well-defined audiences to a plethora of institutions competing in a marketplace for an increasingly fragmented audience (Blumler & Kavanagh 1999, Brants & van Praag, 2006). In many countries, including the Netherlands and what Hallin and Mancini refer to as Democratic Corporatist media systems typical of northern European countries, this evolution is not without an important nuance: public broadcasters are mandated by law to inform citizens through at least a certain percentage of their programming. So the demand-driven system in these countries is not entirely a laissez-faire system.
The supply-driven system featured media institutions which enjoyed either an outright monopoly, or a de facto monopoly, and therefore were not concerned with attracting new audiences. In this era, editors and producers were able to make decisions about what to cover, and how to cover it, based on their own criteria. Some authors refer to the early phase of supply-side media as following partisan logic, due to the evolution of media outlets within certain sectors of society (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999, Brants and van Praag 2006). The working class voted for a certain party, and read the newspaper, listened to the radio or (far more rarely due to its later arrival) watched the television channel associated with that party. Editors and producers made decisions according to that partisan world view, knowing their audience shared that world view.
As a supply side paradigm gave way to a paradigm defined by demand, it passed through a transition era which is referred to as public logic (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). This era was characterized by the striving for a manner of covering politics which rose above partisan differences. Brants and van Praag go so far as to call this period ‘the heyday of political Communication’ (Brants and van Praag 2006:29), due to the elevation of the journalist as an autonomous, neutral observer guarding the democratic process. Certainly, the general public was able to watch more television than before, as production and broadcasting expanded, and as more and more people could afford television sets. And journalists found a new level of independence. But Hallin has a point when he claims ‘there never was a golden age of
television.’ Even as he criticizes the evolution of the sound bite, Hallin says TV news ‘is now much better in many ways than it was two decades ago’ (Hallin 1992: 36-7). Technology and editorial decisions made the news more accessible, and more attractive to watch.
But the public logic era gave way to the ‘third age’ or ‘digital age’ of political
communication. As commercialization of the media spread, the public increasingly gained the ability to choose what to read, listen to or watch. Demand took over as the underlying logic to what constituted news and how it got reported. This in turn led to increasing pressure on broadcasters to entertain the public, and not just inform them. Hence, journalistic standards were sacrificed in news broadcasts in the interest of better entertainment (Graber, McQuail & Norris 1998, Strömbäck 2008).
An important aspect of this change in how political news gets reported is the assumption that drama and conflict will attract more viewers. Journalists therefore are expected to seek out stories, or aspects of stories, that emphasis drama and conflict. The cliché ‘if it bleeds, it leads’ illustrates an aspect of this phenomenon: it is assumed that bad news contains more drama and conflict than good news, and therefore bad news gets reported on more than good news. This is also thought to have had a negative influence on the quality of television news.
Media malaise and video malaise
While the theory of media logic describes a set of assumptions journalists make when
producing their product, the idea of video malaise refers to affects of the media on the public. Video malaise describes a causal relationship between how the television news became increasingly critical of, if not cynical toward, politics. This is thought to lead to public mistrust in politicians. This idea, first popularized by Michael Robinson in the 1970s
(Robinson 1976), has been further developed and continues to hold sway for many scholars, notwithstanding a growing body of criticism and counter-evidence. Thomas Patterson took the idea further in his book Out of Order (Patterson 1994), citing a combination of declining political party influence and increasing influence of the media, in the creation of a ‘mediated’ system in which the press has too much control over politics. Using three experiments on the cynicism of voters, Capella and Jamieson also conclude that the press is at fault (Capella and Jamieson, 1997).
A related way of describing this phenomenon is that if the media is only reporting the negative aspects of politics, then the public will naturally form a negative impression of politics (Entman 1989). This became known as vicious cycle, or the spiral of cynicism, as Capella and Jamieson called it.
The aforementioned authors were all describing the situation in the United States, where media competition has a much longer and more robust history than in most European countries. But others have extended the argument outside the US. Blumler and Gurevitch, while focusing mainly on the US and the UK, include other countries in their analysis of how cheap forms of infotainment are replacing serious information (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995).
But the premise on which the idea of video malaise or the vicious cycle rests, that changes in the media lead to a different, more cynical, more entertaining manner of reporting politics, has also been questioned. Kees Brants argues that across northern Europe, and in particular in his case study of the 1994 elections in the Netherlands, the reporting of politics was not crossing over into the realm of entertainment, or infotainment (Brants 1998). He also questions the assumption that even if it was, it was not necessarily causing mistrust of politicians in the public.
Changes in quality
So which of the seven quality criteria set out above would be expected to change according to the framework of media logic?
The substance of the news, what gets covered, is expected to become increasingly about personalities, and the personal lives and motivations of political actors, and less about the contents of the issues they are dealing with, be it governing policy, or politics.
It is expected that the news will appeal increasingly to viewers’ emotion, as that is perceived to attract more viewers than appealing to their reason. A slight increase in emotional appeal does not affect the quality of the broadcast. It could even be considered better quality, as it improves accessibility. But if the broadcast becomes solely an emotional appeal, with no other content, then it has a negative effect on the quality of the broadcast.
Henrdriks Vettehen et al have shown that in three categories that could emotionally arouse viewers in western Europe and China, the frequency of use indeed went up (Henrdriks Vettehen et al 2012).
Television coverage of politics is expected to become increasingly subjective, as journalists continue to profile themselves and as broadcasters, due to the large variety of competitors, seek out a smaller and more defined segment of the general public. Broadcasters are expected to present the news to people in a frame they already understand, a frame which conforms to their subjective experience.
The sourcing of stories is expected to become less rigorous, as journalistic standards give way to decisions based on entertainment value, undercutting the competition, and budgetary constraints.
The news is expected to become more accessible as journalists increasingly cater to the needs of the audience.
Professionalism in news broadcasting is expected to increase in some areas, including production qualities and presentation, while decreasing in areas regarding journalistic standards, which may cost more money or time than broadcasters are willing to spend in a competitive market.
Finally, it is expected that the journalists and experts will be granted much more time during news broadcasts to explain news items, rather than broadcasting the political actors
themselves. This helps journalists profile themselves with their audience, it saves broadcasters production money and time, since journalists can summarize an item in less time than it takes to broadcast political actors in action during debates or press conferences.
These expectations are based on the academic literature on media logic. But it is not just academics who subscribe to the assumptions above predicted by media logic. No less than the Dutch Council for Social Development (RMO) warned back in 2003 that the public debate in this country was increasingly defined by media logic (RMO 2003).
Chapter 3 The scope of the study
This research is a longitudinal content analysis of news programs reporting on four cabinet crises in the Netherlands. The study covers a 35-year period, encompassing cabinet crises in 1977, 1989, 2006 and 2012.
Cabinet crises were chosen in order to eliminate as many external variables as possible. The events surrounding a cabinet crisis are comparable. Most cabinet crises follow a similar pattern, which hasn’t changed dramatically over the years. A disagreement among the parties in the governing coalition which has been simmering suddenly boils over. The crisis
continues for some period of time until it reaches a breaking point, at which time one or more party removes its support from the coalition. A parliamentary debate is held at the time of the break, and frequently also at the time the disagreement boils over.
Media coverage of a cabinet crisis is straightforward. The media seeks out the main actors within the cabinet, in addition to the main opposition figures. The media explains to the public both the contours of the disagreement, and the implications that a fall of the cabinet would have on policy in general, and on the parties themselves.
While cabinet crises are comparable and straightforward, they also provide another useful element when analyzing media coverage: they involve issues of policy with drama and conflict. Personal relationships often play a major role. Hence the media have quite of bit of leeway in how they cover the crises – whether they focus on policy and content issues, or prefer to focus on the personal and the dramatic.
Changes in the television landscape
In the spring of 1977, the Netherlands had two television channels, both public. Air time was divided up amongst eight broadcast organizations (the original four, NCRV, KRO, VARA and AVRO plus membership-based TROS, EO, and VO, and the NOS, created by the rest to produce news and sports programs). The broadcasting law of 1969 has ushered in the era of a multitude of publicly financed broadcasters. At the same time, Dutch news broadcasting was beginning to come into its own. A number of broadcast organizations launched current affairs news magazines, which in turn led to significant changes in the evening news broadcast, Het
Journaal. The Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation (NOS) was controlled by the other broadcasters, and had been restricted in how it broadcast the news. In the mid-seventies, it started claiming more independence, and for the first time news presenter were shown on camera, and journalists started explaining political situations to the viewers for the first time (Gijsenbergh 2005).
These changes did not go unnoticed. Some politicians accused the NOS of being subjective,
solely based on the fact that journalists began speaking to the camera and giving dry, objective versions of events.
Skip ahead to 1988, one year before the next crisis under consideration, and a third television channel was introduced. This was at least in part an answer to increasing pressure to allow commercial broadcasters into the country. But the law, passed one year earlier, that created the third channel rejected commercialization. Rather, the law mandated that Dutch
broadcasters form a solid front in the face of potential competition from over the border. The distinct profiles of each public broadcaster, some of which dated since the time of
pillarization, were seen as detrimental to the public broadcasting system as a whole. By the late 1980s, most Dutch households owned a color television, and it had become the medium of choice for at home entertainment.
Technological advancements, alongside production decisions, made it possible for journalists to shape the news more and more. The advent of video made it possible to edit quickly, so more image was available on the inevitably short deadline. It became possible to report on location, and therefore to include more common people in the news. Television journalists became increasingly less dependent on politicians for their material.
Almost inevitably, as journalists saw their role expand, they began to shape the stories. By 1989, reporters began giving their own interpretation of what politicians were doing. Gijsenbergh cites an example of a reporter using the phrase, ‘What he means to say is…’(Gijsenbergh 2005: 87). This was new in 1989.
Commercialization was inevitable. In 1989, RTL began broadcasting from Luxembourg, and in 1992 the Dutch parliament finally gave its blessing. Six other commercial broadcasters
public channels (divided amongst 22 public broadcasting entities) and seven commercial channels (after a maximum of 13 commercial channels in 1998). Commercial stations did not shy away from news programs. RTL in particular has produced a highly regarded evening news program since it started broadcasting in the Netherlands in 1989. SBS, an originally Scandinavian commercial broadcaster, also produced straight news for a short time, and has produced a news magazine for a number of years.
By 2012, once again, the television landscape had changed. On the one hand, commercial stations had begun stepping back from producing informative, news-oriented programs. At the same time, two new broadcasters were allowed access to the public system, in part in order to correct a perceived left-wing bias among public broadcasters. The new, right-leaning broadcaster, WNL (initiated by the editor of the popular right-leaning daily newspaper, de Telegraaf), produced a number of news programs. Another broadcaster to the right on the political spectrum, PowNed, was also allowed into the public system. PowNed produced a unique daily news program PowNews, created by the makers of the website No Style. Both the website and the television news program aimed to report the news in an irreverent manner.
The four crises
The first crisis in the study took place in the spring of 1977. Labor Party leader Joop den Uyl was prime minister in a cabinet consisting of his own Labor Party, and four other parties: the PPR, D66, KVP and ARP. The latter two parties would later join to form the Christian
Democratic Appeal. The cabinet was rife with tension between the right-wing elements in the KVP and ARP and the left-wing labor party and PPR, and left-leaning elements in the other parties (the primary source for this overview is a section headed ‘Kabinetscrises’ on the Parlement en Politiek website, a site maintained by the Parliamentary Documentation Centre of the University of Leiden, http://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrpmxvf/kabinetscrises).
A crisis had long been averted, but it finally came when the cabinet dragged its feet in submitting to parliament a law reforming land policy. This reform was sensitive for the labor party, which backed a reform measure favoring municipalities in claiming land for eminent domain. This would in part ease the construction of affordable housing. But the two Christian parties in the cabinet, the KVP and ARP, represented many farmers who saw the reform as threatening to their land rights. In addition, the KVP and ARP were on the verge of merging
with the CHU, which was in the opposition at the time, creating an inherent tension. After much delay submitting the land reform to parliament, the cabinet could not come to a final agreement, and the ARP ministers joined their KVP colleagues in submitting their
resignations. The cabinet fell on 22 March 1977.
The second cabinet crisis in this study took place in the spring of 1989. The second cabinet under the leadership of Ruud Lubbers fell as a result of a split within the coalition party, the VVD. The parliamentary caucus of the VVD disagreed with the pro-environmental policy of the cabinet. (The policy involved limitations on a tax-refund people commuting by car could claim – hence, it was seen as discouraging commuting by car.) This difference within the VVD was particularly stark as the minister in charge of the policy in question was from the VVD, and supported the policy.
The third cabinet crisis took place in the spring of 2006. The second cabinet under prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende fell after the third and smallest coalition partner, D66, withdrew their support. This crisis, similar to that of 1989, also features a parliamentary caucus seemingly at odds with its own ministers. The crisis revolved around Minster for Immigration and Integration Rita Verdonk, and her handling of a citizenship question involving a member of her own VVD parliamentary caucus, Ayaan Hirsi Ali. When it was revealed that Hirsi Ali may have lied on her asylum application years earlier, Minster
Verdonk declared that she was therefore not a legal Dutch citizen. Only after getting Hirsi Ali to sign a statement accepting blame for the fiasco, and stating that she had not lied after all, was Hirsi Ali allowed to keep her citizenship. However, the six D66 MPs felt that Verdonk had bungled the whole affair, and called for her resignation.
As with earlier crises, the immediate cause for the fall of the cabinet exposed a longer-running tension, in this case over the performance of Minister Verdonk and cabinet policy regarding immigration.
The last cabinet crisis under study here took place in 2012. This crisis was unique in that one of the parties involved was not a member of the coalition government, but supported the government from parliament. This was the first time Dutch government had had such a structure.
Aside from this unique feature of Mark Rutte’s first cabinet, the 2012 crisis does not differ greatly from other cabinet crises. The government had been in power for more than sixteen months when disappointing economic figures made it clear more cuts would be necessary in the next budget. The three parties entered into talks in which their original coalition
agreements were re-negotiated. But just when these negotiations appeared to be nearly finished, Geert Wilders pulled the support of his Party for Freedom, spelling the end of the cabinet’s term.
Program choice
The programs that were coded for this research were chosen based on the date of the
broadcast, falling on or just after the moment a crisis erupted, and the moment the cabinet fell. In the case of the first crisis, programs were coded from the following dates: 3, 10, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24 and 26 all in March, 1977. (In many cases, the dates were determined by the fact that the news magazines each have a set day in the week for their program.) In 1989, the dates coded included April 29 and 30, and May 1, 2, 3 and 5. For the year 2006, programs were coded from June 27, 29 and 30 and finally in 2012, the dates were March 5, 27, 28, 29 and April 13, 19, 21, 22, and 23. (For a complete list of the programs coded for this research, see the Appendix.)
A balance was sought between straight news broadcasts, and current affairs broadcasts, or news magazines. Both genres existed throughout the course of the study. Balance was also sought between commercial and public broadcasters (for the latter two crises), and among a representative variety of public broadcasters.
There were some limitations. Archiving was not complete prior to the 1990s, and in particular many of the programs from 1977 included in this study were not archived as complete
programs. Rather, the individual items in the program were archived. In addition, the total number of hours coded was limited by the presence of just one coder. (I am grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision for their cooperation in granting me access to view archive material from the public broadcasters. The same goes for RTL and SBS, who also allowed me to view their archive material.)
Chapter 4 The Data
Coding schemeI have devised a coding scheme based on the criteria listed in chapter 2. The scheme includes 17 variables covering seven main criteria for quality. The programs were scored a one for present, or a zero for not present, for sixteen questions (listed in the text below). (The 17th involved timing the speakers in the broadcasts.) These scores were then changed into quality percentages for each of the six criteria – one criteria would receive a quality percentage of 80 if two out of ten of the programs coded for that criteria scored present for one of the markers of lower quality.
The first group of variables measures the substance of the content of the item. Given the trend toward increased personalization of the coverage of politics (what Van Aest et al refer to as the privatization of coverage of politicians, i.e. coverage of the private lives of public figures, as opposed to the coverage of issues from the perspective of individual politicians (Van Aest et al 2011)), the three variables measuring substance involve coverage of the person, as opposed to coverage of the issue at hand. If the substance of the coverage includes some personal elements, alongside coverage of the issue, that does not receive a score for lower quality. A program received a score for lower quality on the substance variable only in cases where the story revolved around a personal aspect of a politician´s life.
The three questions are the following: is the main topic of the item a personal issue? Is the politician asked questions or shown making statements about his or her personal life? Are there images of the politician outside his or her work environment?
Broadcasts were coded with lack of issue substance if any of these three questions could be answered in the affirmative. For instance, an item on PowNews on April 13th, 2012, was scored as lacking issue substance. The reporter asked various politicians if they believed that Friday the 13th brought bad luck.
The second group of variables measures the extent to which the news broadcast is making an appeal to the viewers´ emotions. Similar to the previous group of variables, the mere presence
of an appeal to emotions is not an indication of a drop in quality. It is only when such appeals become dominant in the broadcast that the quality of the broadcast is negatively affected.
Five variables measure the appeal to emotions. Is the politician asked a question or shown making a statement that pertains only to his or her emotional state? Is there dramatic or silly music accompanying the item? Is there dramatic imagery accompanying the item? Does the item discuss what the politician has to gain or lose by certain actions? Are there other people in the item reacting in an emotional manner?
Broadcasts that were scored with a one for presence of an emotional appeal include an item on the evening news magazine Eenvandaag by the TROS from March 28th, 2012. Under all the b-role shots of the negotiations taking place at the Catshuis (the official residence of the prime minister), there is ominous-sounding piano music, similar to music one hears in a film when the plot is thickening. Another broadcast which received a present for appeal to emotion was the 8 o´clock NOS news broadcast on June 27th, 2006, in which the interviewer asked Ayaan Hirsi Ali if she felt Minister Rita Verdonk had treated her fairly.
The third set of variables measures the objectivity, or lack of bias, of the broadcast.
Journalists are expected to be as objective as possible. If a broadcast displays a bias toward one party or another, the quality of the broadcast suffers. It then crosses the line from news broadcasting to opinion. As an editor´s committee at the Dutch public news broadcaster NOS wrote in response to a researcher´s inquiry, the NOS seeks to be “factual, reliable, and, if possible, attractive, but always independent” (Meijer 2003:18). The presence of any of the following variables indicates low quality of the broadcast. Does the journalist ask leading questions? Does the introduction display an inherent bias? Are the speakers shown in an unfavorable manner? Does one side get more time than the other?
The level of objectivity was very high through all the time periods, and across all the
broadcasters in this study. In a number of instances where objectivity was found to be lacking, the data may not accurately represent the objectivity of that broadcaster over time. An item coded as including only one side of the story, and therefore subjective, may have been balanced out by coverage of the other side during another broadcast which was not coded. This is due to the time and accessibility limitations of this study.
The scores where a lack of objectivity was detected involved for the most part an imbalance in the time allocated when both sides of a story were represented. But while these represented an imbalance, the scope of this study is too small to detect any patterns behind the imbalance. So the fact that one side of the story appeared to be granted more broadcast time may have been coincidental. Further study is necessary to determine that.
In addition, in just eight cases did a journalist ask a leading question. None of these eight cases represented a discernable political bias in the program, rather these leading questions demonstrate a way of covering the story by using a pre-conceived view of the frame of the story (similar to the example in chapter 3 above). For instance, the broadcast of Eenvandaag of March 28th, 2012, included questions such as “An anxious situation, isn´t it?”, “The negotiations are dragging on, aren´t they?” and “Are the negotiations about to fail?” (“Zorgwekkend situatie? Het duurt wel een beetje lang, eh? Dreigt het te mislukken?”, translation mine.) This broadcast received a score for lack of objectivity.
The fourth set of variables measures the transparency for the sourcing of a broadcast. Of the programs coded, a score indicating lack of transparency in sourcing the story occurred rarely, just eight times in 1989, 2006, and 2012. (It does occur 10 times in 1977, but many of those were items in which only one speaker was shown. It is likely that the same broadcaster showed another speaker on a different evening, or during a different time slot.)
Questions measuring transparency of sourcing are the following: Are there claims made that are not backed up by sources? Is there only one source for the story? The presence of either of these indicates either a lack of transparency in sourcing the story, or the existence of only one source.
A related variable measures the level of professionalism of the broadcast. By definition, a lack of professionalism indicates a lower quality broadcast. The presence of two or more
production mistakes, including misspeaking, bad editing or a mistake in the script, received a score for lack of professionalism. The question is as follows: are mistakes made during the broadcast that would be noticeable to the average viewer?
broadcast of just over four minutes. Another element which indicates a lack of
professionalism is not identifying a speaker. The RTL news broadcast of March 5th, 2012, received a score of lack of professionalism because the politicians shown speaking in the item were not identified, whether with text on screen or verbally.
The penultimate variable measures the lack of context the item is given during the broadcast. Quality news broadcasting involves a combination of showing the viewer actual events or developments, and explaining why those events or developments are significant (what Zaller refers to as the feasibility of news broadcasting, in other words, what the viewers of news are able to incorporate (Zaller 2003: 11)). Too much on either side of this balance negatively affects the quality of the broadcast.
The Australian Broadcasting Service mandates that its journalists must “always be mindful of the primary audience” (Muir and Muller 2009:8). In addition, Meijer says the NOS has adopted a standard she refers to as proportional relevance, which “requires that journalists or reporters reflect on whether their news items are presented in a way that makes them relevant to viewers in their abstract role of engaged citizen” (Meijer 2003:24).
The question is the following: Is the context in which the item takes place insufficiently explained? The presence of this variable indicates a lower quality.
Lastly, the data includes the timing of every broadcast, including the following times: the length of the entire broadcast, the length of time a journalist or expert is speaking, and the length of time a politician is speaking. (Members of the public shown speaking on screen, referred to as vox populi, were not measured. Nor were interludes between speakers.)
The amount of time political actors are shown speaking compared to the amount of time journalists or experts are shown speaking indicates an aspect of quality. The two extremes are present in the current study. The news broadcast from March 22nd 1977 showed fourteen minutes of Prime Minister Den Uyl in parliament, with no commentary. (These time measures must also take into account the caveat mentioned above: the archives do not include complete broadcasts of the news until late in the 1990s. Hence, it is impossible to measure the time the presenter spends introducing an item. However, given the sheer length of time give to actual footage of politicians, not broken into by commentary, is significant.) At the other extreme,
the four-minute news magazine Editie NL broadcast of 28th of March 2012, consisted entirely of journalists speaking, with no politician shown speaking.
Chapter 5 Results
The results of this study show that the quality of television news coverage of politics has not deteriorated during the past thirty-five years. Reporting has changed as television
broadcasting has expanded. But in some ways these changes have brought about improvements in the quality of reporting about politics (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 – Quality of political news on television
I will discuss first what the data show regarding the expected negative impact
commercialization and competition in television news were supposed to have on reporting according to the media logic concept. Secondly, I will discuss the implications in the data for the unexpected consequences of the changed media landscape, including increased
professionalism and increased accessibility of the reporting of politics. The implications emanating from these two discussions will be dealt with in the final chapter.
The results show some changes in television news coverage of politics in the Netherlands over time. But the data does not indicate an overall deterioration in the quality of the
coverage. This is true even when including commercial television in the analysis. Commercial 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1977 1989 2006 2012 Quality, in percent
Quality of political news on television
Substance Appeal to Emotion Objective Transparent sources Professionalism Contexttelevision is included in the last two measuring points of the study, not having been present at the time of the first two measurements. The expectations according to the theoretical analysis are that the quality of commercial television would be less than that of public television. This was not the case, as you can see in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2 – Quality of Public Broadcasters in 2006 and 2012
Figure 3 – Quality of Commercial Broadcasters in 2006 and 2012
Commercial broadcasters used appeals to viewers’ emotions slightly more than did public broadcasters (a difference of between 20 and 40 percent more appeals by commercial
broadcasters than by public). The other major difference is the lack of professionalism among 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Quality of Public Broadcasters
2006 2012 0 20 40 60 80 100 120Quality of Commercial Broadcasters
2006 2012commercial broadcasters in 2006 (45 percent of the commercial broadcasts were free of obvious production mistakes in 2006, compared to 85 percent in the same year among public broadcasters).
PowNed´s PowNews broadcast in 2012 is an exception among the public broadcasters.
PowNews scored as having a lower quality on some of the variables more often than did other public broadcasters (see Figure 4).
Figure 4 – PowNews compared to other public broadcasters, 2012
A more significant difference in quality can be found by comparing nightly news broadcasts with news magazines (see Figure 5 and 6). The news broadcasts scored consistently better in each period. In particular, the variables measuring issue substance and emotional appeal indicate a difference in approach between these two types of news programs. The news magazines, launched in the 1970s, by definition add an element of entertainment to the news. In the Dutch system, the institution responsible for the evening news broadcast (NOS) is mandated with presenting the news in as dry a fashion as possible (Wijfjes 2005).
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
PowNews compared to other public
broadcasters
PowNews Public (without PowNews)Figure 5 – Quality of news broadcasts
Figure 6 – Quality of news magazines 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1977 1989 2006 2012 Quality, in percent
Quality of news broadcasts
Substance Appeal to Emotion Objective Transparent sources Professionalism Context 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1977 1989 2006 2012 Quality, in percentQuality of News Magazine programs
Substance Appeal to Emotion Objective Transparent sources Professionalism ContextExpected results
The first three topics in the data set, substance, appeal to emotion and objectivity, more or less follow the theoretical expectations. As commercialization, and along with it increased
competition for viewers, increases, news broadcasts increasingly personalize political actors, appeal to viewers emotions, and relax standards of objectivity.
The expected trend is somewhat skewed by data from 1977 regarding substance and objectivity. The low score for objectivity for this time period can be explained due to the limitations of the archive material available (see discussion in chapter 4 above). The relatively low score for substance comes from just two broadcasts of the news magazine Brandpunt by the KRO, which both scored unusually low in this category.
Aside from these two outliers, the trend among these three topics follows expectations. However, while the trend is evident, it is not outspoken. Scores measuring the presence of greater personalization and objectivity rose only somewhat over the thirty-five year time period, varying between a low of 11 percent in 1989 to a high of just under 18 percent in 2012.
Scores measuring appeals to emotion changed more dramatically, from a low of 13 percent in 1989 to 53 percent in 2012. This is in large part due to increased use of editing and production techniques, with a more use of dramatic music and dramatic imagery, in addition to changes in the way journalists frame an issue verbally.
Unexpected results
The three major unexpected changes in television reporting about politics over the past thirty-five years, as demonstrated by the data in this study, were an increase in transparency of sources, and increase in professionalism and increased accessibility to the issues.
Transparency of sources varied from 30 percent only one source, or impossible for the viewer to verify the sourcing, in 1977 to just 6 percent in 2006, while professionalism swung from 54
percent highly professional in 1989 to 96 percent in 2012. These are related. As
professionalism increases, so does do the standards for meeting the basic criteria for sourcing the coverage.
Accessibility, measured as journalists giving an adequate context to the political news, varied from 42 percent in 1977 to 100 percent context in 2012. This increase in accessibility would have been somewhat less dramatic had the integral broadcasts from the 1977 and 1989 measurement been available. However, the two integral broadcasts available in the 1977 group confirm the general pattern of a different standard at the time, one in which a high degree of viewer knowledge appears to have been assumed.
While taking the viewer into account has led to an increase in quality, it can be argued that some broadcasts have taken it too far. While news producers in the 1970s erred on the side of broadcasting politicians in their own words, without aiding the viewer in how to interpret those words, some producers in the 2000s now make the opposite mistake of not showing the politicians at all, or showing brief clips of the politician. A news broadcast in which the viewer only hears journalists and experts talking about a story completely removes any chance for the viewer to form his or her own thoughts, or to check the accountability of the journalists. Hence, the quality of the news broadcast suffers under both extremes.
Looking at the figure subtracting the amount of time a journalist or expert is shown speaking, subtracted from the amount of time a politician is shown speaking, gives us in one figure a measure of the aforementioned balance (see Figure 7). Too far on the positive side indicates that the broadcaster is allowing the politicians too much time, without adequate explanation. A figure too far under zero indicates that the journalists or experts are taking up too much time, without letting the viewer come to their own conclusions.
Figure 7 – The balance of time between politicians and journalists/experts. The score is the percentage of time a politician is speaking on air minus the percentage of time a journalist or expert is shown speaking on air. A high percentage means politicians get most of the air time, while the more negative the percentage, the more journalists/experts are on the air.
From this analysis, the balance in 1977 was skewed in favor of the politicians (65 percent), whereas in 2012 the balance had tipped to the journalists, but by about half as much (-36 percent). Hence, on the whole, news broadcasts in the later part of the study were finding a better balance than those early in the study.
‐60 ‐40 ‐20 0 20 40 60 80 1977 1989 2006 2012 Percentage Politician ‐ Journalist/E xpert
Balance of Time
All Magazines News Public CommercialChapter 6 Discussion
According to the results of this study, the quality of Dutch television coverage of politics has not deteriorated over the past 35 years. This finding is contradictory to the expectations described in the framework of media logic that increased commercialization, fragmentation and competition lead to lower quality television reporting of politics.
There may be several explanations as to why this is so. First, the presence of a strong public sector which is mandated by law to inform the public is underestimated in the media logic framework. The public broadcasters in the Netherlands have not watered down their mandate. Rather, commercial broadcasters entered into competition with public broadcasters in
providing news programs. The original strategy of the first commercial broadcaster in the Netherlands relied on its news program to increase its stature among the viewers (Hendriks et al 2012: 182, Wonneberger 1012:62). Far from diluting the quality of television news, it was part of RTL’s strategy to provide a quality news program.
This brings into question the assumption that commercialization will necessarily lead to lower quality of news coverage of politics. While this defies the expectations of the media logic theory, it should not come as a surprise. A number of other studies, while not measuring television news quality in and of itself, have come to a similar conclusion. In his overview of research on western European media systems, Brants’ states that ‘in most countries
commercial television has not marginalized political news’ (Brants 1998: 322). In his study of commercial news production, McManus says market forces influence journalists to take the needs of the public into consideration (McManus 1994:2-3).
Even a study which does show an increase in sensationalism in Dutch television news in general, which could indicate lower quality, nonetheless found no increase in sensationalism in the subject of news stories (Hendriks et al 2005:292). In that sense, Dutch television news is shown to be maintaining a high standard of quality.
Other research shows that the quantity of political news programs has not suffered due to fragmentation and commercialization. The number of news and current affairs programs
actually increased following commercialization in the Netherlands (Aalberg, van Aelst, & Curran, 2010). In another longitudinal analysis looking at what information programs were aired, De Beus, Brants and van Praag show a more nuanced picture. The public broadcasters are indeed offering more news, while the commercial broadcasters are cutting back (De Beus, Brants & van Praag 2011). They also decry the lack of research on the quality of television news programs, a gap which this study begins to bridge. The findings here are in line with that of De Beus et al.
Rosa van Santen comes to the same conclusion regarding programming, and in turn finds no evidence for increasing personalization in Dutch television (Van Santen 2012:24). She quotes one anonymous expert as saying the quality of television information programs in the
Netherlands has increased, although viewership has decreased (ibid.: 149). The findings in this research confirm this expert’s claim.
There are also a number of studies looking at the other side of the communication equation, the viewers, which provide further evidence that Dutch television news is not following media logic predictions. Wonnenberger et al found that a mix of public and commercial news still reaches a wide audience, and that viewers watched more news even as their choices for alternative programs increased (Wonneberger et al 2012). In a US context, Belt and Just show that good reporting leads to better viewer ratings than tabloid journalism (Belt & Just 2008).
A strong public sector, with a legal mandate to inform the public, is likely to keep the quality of television news high, even after the introduction of commercialization. But Arbaoui, van Praag and van der Brug provide a further nuance. They look into the level of fragmentation, in part due to technological development, but even more interestingly, the level of commercial income across the system, including in the public sector. The Dutch television market is fairly unique in that the government has been steadily cutting back the budget for public
broadcasters, making them increasingly dependent on commercial income (Arbaoui, van Praag & van der Brug 2013: 144). Yet, quality has not suffered, as may be expected if the government funding for the public broadcasters is cut.
Attributing the maintenance, or improvement, of the quality of Dutch television political news to a strong public sector thus does not fully explain the phenomenon.
A second explanation for why the media logic framework has missed the fact that television news quality has been maintained is the overemphasis in the literature on changes in style, rather than changes in quality. More research is needed into changes in the quality over time of television news about politics, and not just changes in style.
A related issue is the elitism of television news prior to the current era. A number of authors deal with this question by redefining what constitutes quality (Meijer 2003, Zaller 2003 and Porto 2007). But short of jiggering with decades old quality criteria, it should be possible to evaluate the quality of television political news on an elitist and or accessibility scale. Taking into account accessibility when measuring quality, and the attempt even in the midst of fragmented supply and demand to reach average people, puts the differences between the public logic era and the commercial era in a new light.
Finally, production aspects of television also deserve more attention. Bucy and Grabe provide interesting insight into the visual aspects of how the news is presented (Bucy and Grabe 2007). I would like to see more research into both the visual, and the audio, quality considerations in television political news.
At a broader level, the findings of this research have implications in the current debate about the role of the media in western liberal democracies. There is perhaps less reason for the alarmist contention that the information role of the media is suffering. News programs on both public and commercial television in the Netherlands are, contrary to expectations, maintaining their information function.
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Appendix
Broadcasts coded, coding questions, and scores Quality criteria: 1. Substance 2. Appeal to Emotion 3. Objectivity 4. Transparent sources 5. Professionalism 6. Context 7. Balance of time (percentage of broadcast politician is speaking minus Percentage of broadcast journalist/expert is speaking)The scores for criteria 1-6 represent the number of times a question received a 1 for present. These scores were converted into percentages for use in the figures.
1. Substance: Is the main topic of the item a personal issue? Is the politician asked
questions or shown making statements about his or her personal life? Are there images of the politician outside his or her work environment?
2. Appeal to Emotion: Is the politician asked a question or shown making a statement that pertains only to his or her emotional state? Is there dramatic or silly music accompanying the item? Is there dramatic imagery accompanying the item? Does the item discuss what the politician has to gain or lose by certain actions? Are there other people in the item reacting in an emotional manner?
3. Objectivity: Does the journalist ask leading questions? Does the introduction display an inherent bias? Are the speakers shown in an unfavorable manner? Does one side get more time than the other?
4. Transparent sources: Are there claims made that are not backed up by sources? Is there only one source for the story?
5. Professionalism: Are mistakes made during the broadcast that would be noticeable to the average viewer?
Programs coded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Brandpunt KRO 3.3.77 1 0 0 1 0 0 37 Journaal 10.3.77 0 0 0 0 1 0 62 Den Haag Vandaag NOS NPS VARA 10.3.77 0 0 0 1 0 1 ‐3 Aktua TROS 15.3.77 1 2 1 1 1 1 94 Brandpunt KRO 17.3.77 0 0 1 0 1 0 95 Kamerdebaten NOS 17.03.77 0 0 0 0 1 1 100 Aktua TROS 18.3.77 0 0 1 0 0 1 99 Hier en Nu NCRV 19.3.77 1 1 1 1 0 1 100 Jounraal 21.3.77 0 0 1 1 0 0 100 Achter Het Nieuws VARA 21.3.77 0 0 1 0 1 1 97 Journaal 22.3.77 0 0 1 1 0 0 72 Televizier AVRO 22.3.77 1 1 0 0 0 1 100 Brandpunt (1st story), KRO 24.3.77 2 3 1 1 1 1 43 Brandpunt (2nd story), KRO 24.3.77 3 2 1 1 0 1 13 Hier en Nu (1st story), NCRV 26.3.77 0 2 0 1 0 0 ‐100 Hier en Nu (2nd story),NCRV 26.3.77 0 1 0 1 1 1 91 Polygoon #13, 1977 0 1 0 0 0 0 43 Journaal 29.4.89 0 0 1 0 0 1 21 Achter Het Nieuws VARA 30.4.89 0 3 1 0 0 0 ‐16 Journaal 1.5.89 1 0 0 0 0 0 34 Televizier AVRO 1.5.89 1 1 0 0 1 1 73 Journaal 2.5.89 0 0 0 2 1 0 ‐12 Journaal 2.5.89 0 0 0 0 1 0 ‐26 Hier en nu NCRV 2.5.89 1 2 0 0 1 1 13 Journaal 3.5.89 0 0 0 0 0 0 ‐16 Brandpunt KRO 5.5.89 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 Journaal 27.6.06 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 RTL Nieuws 27.6.06 1 0 1 1 1 0 ‐4 Nova NOS NPS VARA 27.6.06 1 2 1 0 0 0 61 Journaal 29.6.06 1 0 0 0 0 0 ‐34 Nova/DhvD NOS NPS VARA 29.6.06 0 3 0 0 0 0 ‐9 Twee vandaag AVRO TROS 29.6.06 0 1 0 0 1 0 ‐45 Netwerk EO 29.6.06 0 2 0 0 0 0 ‐31 Hart van Nederland, SBS 29.6.06 0 0 0 0 1 0 ‐40 RTL Nieuws 29.6.06 0 0 0 0 0 0 ‐27 Netwerk KRO 30.6.06 0 3 1 0 0 0 3 RTL Nieuws 30.6.06 0 0 0 0 0 0 ‐55 RTL Nieuws 5.3.12 0 0 0 0 1 0 ‐59 Een vandaag AVRO 5.3.12 0 3 0 0 0 0 ‐73 PowNews, PowNed 5.3.12 1 5 1 0 0 0 1 Editie NL, RTL 5.3.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 ‐88 Hart van Nederland (1st story), SBS 5.3.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 ‐17 Hart van Nederland (2nd story), SBS 5.3.12 2 4 1 0 0 0 ‐35 Journaal 27.3.12 0 0 1 0 0 0 ‐27 RTL Nieuws 28.3.12 0 1 0 0 0 0 ‐69 Een vandaag TROS 28.3.12 0 4 1 0 0 0 ‐82 Editie NL, RTL 28.3.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 ‐100
PowNews, PowNed 29.3.12 1 3 2 0 0 0 15 PowNews, PowNed 13.4.12 2 3 2 0 0 0 49 PowNews, PowNed 19.4.12 1 2 3 1 0 0 75 Journaal 21.4.12 0 0 1 0 0 0 53 Journaal 21.4.12 0 0 1 0 0 0 ‐27 RTL Nieuws 21.4.12 0 1 0 1 0 0 ‐36 Een vandaag AVRO 21.4.12 1 4 1 0 0 0 ‐18 Hart van Nederland, SBS 21.4.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 ‐20 RTL Nieuws 22.4.12 0 1 0 0 0 0 ‐66 Eva Jinek op Zondag, WNL 22.4.12 1 2 2 1 0 0 67 Vandaag de Dag, WNL 23.4.12 0 1 2 0 0 0 ‐71 PowNews, PowNed 23.4.12 1 3 1 0 0 0 39 Editie NL, RTL 23.4.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 ‐66 Hart van Nederland (1st story), SBS 23.4.12 0 1 0 0 0 0 ‐46 Hart van Nederland (2nd story), SBS 23.4.12 3 2 0 2 0 0
