Cracks in the blue wall of silence: A comparative case study into the effects of integrity violations on integrity management in the Dutch police force

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Cracks in the blue wall of silence

A comparative case study into the effects of integrity violations on

integrity management in the Dutch police force

Master Thesis Public Administration

Supervisor: Prof.dr. Z. van der Wal Second reader: Dr. A.D.N. Kerkhoff

Author: Bas Opdam, BSc

Student number: S1281925

Track: Public Management

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to provide an answer to the following research question:

“To what extent have incidents of integrity violations within the Dutch police force, led to a change in integrity policies and ethics standards within the organization?”

In order to answer this question, a comparative case study was conducted with three instances of integrity violations within the Dutch police force. The cases were described in detail and subsequently analyzed on characteristics discussed in the theoretical framework, and compared to each other on similarities and differences. The results show that the presence of sustained external pressure is the main driving force that leads to changes in integrity management measures after incidents of integrity violations in the Dutch police force. This research was limited in scope but provides leads for future research which can expand upon ours by including more cases and other public organizations.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Integrity in the police force: a hot button issue

Integrity is of vital importance to the police as an institution. The police is tasked with upholding the law and enforcing the rules and norms that make up the foundation of society. When they themselves do not uphold these same rules and norms, it leads to a breach of trust, and the loss of authority and credibility (Huberts & Naeyé, 2005: 13). While the police should be the last institution to fall prey to corruption, it unfortunately is also one that is extraordinarily vulnerable to it due to the specific nature of the job. Police officers work with a significant amount of discretionary leeway, have access to sensitive information, and operate under stressful working conditions. All of these aspects that are unique to the police profession, not only increase the chances of integrity violations, but also make it difficult to detect and combat them. The difficult working conditions have led a strong sense of cohesion among officers. Loyalty towards the organization and each other result in many unreported violations and an inaccurate image of the full scope of the issue, the so called dark number problem (Lamboo, 2005: 102).

Despite these problems and the relative recent introduction of the concept of integrity management, the Dutch police force has acknowledged the importance of integrity, and has developed a number of different measures to protect integrity and to combat violations. Despite this, new cases of high profile integrity violations are still plentiful, from wasting public resources for private purposes (Graaf, 2018), to passing along confidential information to criminals for large sums of money (Nos.nl, 2018). The negative attention that these incidents bring to the police force would suggest that they could provide a catalyst for new instances of integrity management measures, or a change in current policy. After all, the organization would want to prevent future incidents, and provide a signal to the outside world that integrity is a priority for the organization.

There has, however, been very little research into the effect of integrity violations on the integrity management policies of police organizations, or public organizations in general. This is surprising, considering the increased attention for integrity in recent years, both in society as well as in academia. This research will attempt to shed some light on this underexposed relation, and will look at cases of integrity violations within the Dutch police force to contribute to our understanding of how, why, and when integrity violations can lead to changes in integrity management policy.

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1.2 Research question, aims, and objectives

In order to uncover the relation between integrity violations, and integrity management policies, we have posed the following research question.

“To what extent have incidents of integrity violations within the Dutch police force, led to a change in integrity policies and ethics standards within the organization?”

This research is explanatory and aims to understand the relation of the effect of integrity violations on the changes in integrity management in the context of the Dutch police force. The research aim explains what we are trying to achieve, the research objectives are the intermediate steps that explain how we go about trying to achieve this. First, we have to explore the factors that make up integrity violations. Next, we make a detailed description of our selected cases and establish which of the factors we can identify in these cases. Then we determine to which degree these factors played a role in the occurrence of changes in integrity violations, or the lack thereof. Finally, we present our findings and propose hypotheses for future research. In section 1.4, we will provide a complete outline of our research, and in which chapters these research objectives will be addressed.

1.3 Academic and societal relevance

This research is relevant in an academic sense because despite increased attention for ethics and integrity in the last couple of decades, we have noticed a gap in research on the subject of integrity violations and the effect they have on integrity management. Rorh (1989) was one of the first authors to make the distinction between the compliance based, and the value-based approach to integrity. His work, in addition to that of Paine (1994) and her contribution to this distinction have shaped the concept of integrity management to what it is today. Research on integrity and integrity violations in regards to the Dutch police force has been done as well. Leo Huberts has made significant contributions with numerous publications on this subject, as has Lamboo (2005) with her extensive work on the integrity policy of the Dutch police force. Yet academic literature on the mechanisms of how integrity violations influence integrity policy appears to be limited, and is completely absent in the context of the Dutch police force. With this research, we will attempt to make our contribution in filling this gap, and provide a better understanding of the circumstances surrounding integrity violations and management, specifically in regards to the Dutch police force.

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6 On a societal level, this research is relevant as well. Ien Dales, then Minister of the Interior, is credited with making integrity a priority in the Netherlands in 1992. The Ministry of the Interior, from that moment on, has taken the lead with developing the national integrity policy for the public administration. The ministry has in particular highlighted the importance of integrity within the police, as it considers the execution of police responsibilities one of the governments’ core functions (Lamboo, 2005: 15). The police has repeatedly reaffirmed this sentiment, yet in recent years, stories about integrity violations have dominated the conversation regarding the Dutch police force. These issues are more than just the public’s perception, as the number of investigations into integrity violations within the police force in 2017 have sharply increased from the year before (Nos.nl, 2018). This research can contribute to the better understanding of the circumstances that allow for significant integrity policy changes and measures to occur. This in turn can potentially prevent some violations, and help respond more adequately to other.

1.4 Outline

This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 consists of the theoretical framework for our research. In this chapter, we define the concepts of integrity and violations thereof, we discuss the concept of integrity management and its role in the Dutch police force, and finally we discuss existing literature on the relation between integrity violations and integrity management. In chapter 3, we provide the methodology and justify the choices we have made in selecting certain research methods. Chapter 4 contains the detailed descriptions of our selected cases of integrity violation scandals in the Dutch police force. The three cases that we discuss are the Bureau Warmoesstraat scandal, the IRT affair, and the Central Works Council scandal. In chapter 5, we will analyze and discuss the cases in relation to the theoretical framework, and in relation to each other. We will present our empirical findings on the causal relation between integrity violations and integrity management, and compare these findings with the existing literature to identify the significant differences and similarities. Chapter 6 is our conclusion in which we will answer our research question, discuss the implications and limitations of our research, and make recommendations for future research.

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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

2.1 Introduction

To get started on the theoretical framework, we reiterate the main research question: “To what extent have incidents of integrity violations within the Dutch police force, led to a change in integrity policies and ethics standards within the organization?” Section 2.2 defines the concept of integrity and how it fits within the broader context of ethics and morality. In addition, the concept of integrity violations will be expanded upon with the use of a typology first introduced by Huberts (1998). Section 2.3 deals with the topic of integrity management and its two main approaches as first introduced by Paine (1994). Furthermore, we will pay specific attention to the Dutch approach to integrity management. In section 2.4 we will get into the intricacies of integrity and the Dutch police force. We discuss the specific challenges a police officer faces and the current state of integrity management in regards to the Dutch police force. In section 2.5, we conclude the theoretical framework by exploring the literature, or lack thereof, that attempts to link integrity violations to subsequent changes in integrity policy.

2.2 Defining Integrity and Integrity Violations

Integrity is an example of what Bovens (1990) labels a “Hoera-begrip”, a hurray concept. It is a concept that receives widespread support among organizations and people, something that everybody intuitively agrees with. To have your integrity be called into question is to have your most inner moral being questioned, the moral aspect that differentiates right from wrong and is the foundation of all human interaction (Huberts & Naeyé, 2005: 20). Despite the presumed importance of this concept, a lot of misunderstanding and confusion remains over the concept of integrity, and violations thereof. This section seeks to define the concept of integrity the way it will be used in this research and will expand upon the concept of integrity violations by use of a typology first presented by Huberts (1998). This typology will help us to identify and classify different types of integrity violations.

The word integrity is derived from the Latin word ‘integritas’, meaning wholeness, being intact, honesty, decency, and chastity. Some of these words such as honesty and intactness (of character) still apply to the concept of integrity as we know it today (Lamboo, 2005: 34). Montefiore (1999: 7) defines the concept of integrity as “Soundness of moral principle; the

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8 character of uncorrupted virtue, honesty, sincerity”. According to this definition, integrity does not just refer to behavior, but puts the focus of integrity on the person. The definition provided still seems vague however without an explanation of the concept of moral principles.

Morality is often interchanged with the concept of ethics, but they are in fact distinct from each other. While both concepts deal with determining right from wrong, ethics is seen as the science that lays at the foundation of morality. Ethical systems consist of moral principles of right and wrong, which lead to moral rules, which in turn leads to moral judgements. Ethics are the theoretical groundwork, while the moral principles derived from it are what is used in practice (Lamboo, 2005: 36). The content of these moral principles, of right and wrong, are determined by standards and values. Different standards and values are relevant in different situations, and in different cultures. Values are the moral principles that come into effect when making a decision. When you take the example of police organizations, relevant values for example are legality, service to the public and collegiality. Standards are more concrete and specific and refer to instructions on what to do in certain situations. Such standards or norms are, in turn, derived from the relevant values (Huberts & Naeyé, 2005: 21). When a value in police organizations is service to the public, the standards derived from that prescribe that police officers are to assist any citizens in need of help. To act according to these moral principles and standards, is to act with integrity. Those who do not act with integrity and in accordance with the prevailing values, morals and rules, are those who commit integrity violations (Lasthuizen et al, 2011: 387). This is the definition of integrity violations that will be used in our research.

2.2.1 Typology of integrity violations

The concept of integrity violations is not always entirely clear either. Many people use the terms fraud and corruption as the collective noun for unethical behavior among public servants. While these are very clear and comprehensible examples of integrity violating behavior, there are many other types of violations that public servants can make themselves guilty of, some of which less clear-cut or obvious. Because of this large variation in possible offenses, there are numerous ways in which these violations can be grouped. This research will make use of the “typology of integrity violations” by Huberts. Huberts first presented his typology in 1998, which focused specifically on police integrity, but has seen various updates and alterations since (Lasthuizen et al, 2011). The specific version that we will be using is from Huberts & Naeyé (2005), and is focused on policy integrity specifically, as it is the object of our research. Huberts works with ten categories of integrity violations (figure 1) (Huberts & Naeyé, 2005: 27-31).

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Type of violation Description Examples

1. Coruption The abuse of public office for private gain with the involvement of a third party.

Bribes, nepotism.

2. Fraud and theft Unlawfully acquiring means, without doing so in favor of a third party.

Embezzlement, theft on a crime scene, using

resources for private ends. 3. Dubious gifts and

promises

When a police employee is influenced by accepting a gift.

Presents, gifts, kickbacks.

4. Questionable sideline activities and jobs

Side activities that could blur police activities and cause a potential conflict of interest.

Side jobs, moonlighting.

5. Misuse of physical force

Physical force is used in conflict with the appropriate norms

Abuse of force against civilians or detainees. 6. Misuse of other

powers

Misuse of powers other than physical force for personal gain or police goals (noble cause

corruption).

Illegal investigative measures, perjury.

7. Misuse of (access to) information

Misuse of information for private or organizational goals.

Leaking classified

information, unauthorized access to files or data. 8. Manners and

treatment

Unacceptable behavior against colleagues or citizens / detainees.

Discrimination, sexual intimidation, bullying. 9. Waste and abuse

of organizational resources

Negligent or inattentive use of public materials, funds, or time.

Breach of contract, non-performance, alcohol and drugs use during shift. 10. Misconduct in

private time

Misconduct outside of function in private time.

Alcohol and drug abuse, assault, contacts with known criminals.

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2.3 Integrity Management

The previous section dealt with the definition and classification of the concepts of integrity, and integrity violations. Now we are taking a look at the measures designed to maintain this moral integrity within (public) organizations and to prevent or sanction integrity violations. These measures are collectively referred to as integrity management. The academic literature on the topic of integrity management recognizes two main approaches when it comes to guiding and controlling the behavior of officials in the public sector: the compliance approach, and the

integrity or value-based approach. In this section, we will describe the intended goals of and

the differences between both approaches. In addition, we will characterize the approach to integrity management in the Netherlands specifically. This will help us differentiate between the different types of integrity measures that we might encounter in our own research, and the effect they are trying to achieve.

2.3.1 Compliance and value-based approach

Paine (1994) was one of the first to make the distinction between the compliance and value-based approach to integrity management. According to Paine, many managers like to dismiss integrity violations as isolated incidents by lone actors, rather than a sustained management problem. Paine disagrees and claims that the organizational culture and management plays a large part in the issue of ensuring ethical standards. Managers who fail to take responsibility and ignore ethics run the risk of opening themselves up to personal and corporate liability. According to Paine, the fear of legal proceedings and of damage to an organizations’ reputation and relations due to an ethical lapse, is what sets in motion the introduction of many compliance-based integrity programs (Paine, 1994: 106, 109). Compliance based programs are often called the hard approach to integrity management: “top down imposition of rules and regulations intended to prevent non-compliant behavior” (Huberts & Hoekstra, 2016: 18). The idea behind this approach is that people are primarily driven by self-interest, but by implementing clear rules and regulations under strict control and the threat of disciplinary measures, unlawful conduct can be prevented. The underlying model behind this way of thinking is the deterrence theory, which sees people as “rational maximizers of self-interest”, looking out for themselves but “indifferent to the moral legitimacy of their choices” (Paine, 1994: 110). This explains the focus on deterrence and punishment as a way of channeling behavior in lawful directions.

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11 Examples of measures in accordance with the compliance approach are codes of conduct, and anti-corruption agencies. Paine does not dispute the necessity for legal compliance regulations, and admits that some people need the threat of sanctions, but notes that this approach is not sufficient in “addressing the full range of ethical issues that arise every day” (Paine, 1994: 109). A problem with the compliance approach is that even if an action is in accordance with the rules, it does not necessarily mean that it is ethical. An example is buying products from suppliers that run sweatshops in developing countries under abysmal working conditions. Another criticism of the compliance approach is the notion that the deterrence theory is flawed, and that people’s tendency to obey the law is strongly influenced by the belief in its legitimacy and moral correctness, rather than the threat of detection and punishment. Finally, compliance approaches rarely address the root causes of misconduct, which is why Paine introduces an alternative or complementary approach to integrity management (Paine, 1994: 111).

The integrity-, or value based approach is often referred to as the soft approach, in contrast to the hard approach of compliance programs. This approach focuses on “the joint (bottom-up) formulation and internalisation of organisational values” (Huberts & Hoekstra, 2016: 18). It is about teaching employees responsible and ethical decision making and strengthening their moral competence, what the right thing is to do in a specific situation. The underlying idea behind the value-based approach is that ethics are the driving force of enterprise and provide a common frame of reference that serves as a unifying factor and represents the core values of organizations. This has, according to Paine, in some cases led to some important and sometimes unexpected results such as increased competitiveness, work environment and interpersonal relationships (Paine, 1994: 112). It does however require a bigger commitment from the management, as responsibilities and the organizations’ core ethical compass needs to be defined and clearly communicated. Examples of measures in accordance with the integrity approach are developing ethical decision-making models, and providing educational programs of ethical decision-making.

The way it is presented makes it seem like the compliance and value-based approach are two polar opposites. In some regards, this holds true. Compliance is rooted in avoiding legal sanctions and is externally imposed, while the value-based approach is about internal growth and self-governance. Despite these significant differences in core foundation, most authors do agree however that both approaches can, and probably should be complementary to each other. Lewis and Gilman (2005) argue for a ‘fusion road’, where integrity and compliance come together, which is the same road advocated by the OECD (1996). Paine (1994) admits to this

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12 as well and states that many value-based initiatives share characteristics with compliance-based approaches and vice versa. An example of this are codes of conduct, which often contain legal restrictions and sanctions, but can include core organizational ethics and beliefs as well. Huberts (2014) illustrates with research done on the subject that, “a balance of compliance-based, and value-based approaches may work best, because it is the interaction of policies that appears most crucial” (Huberts, 2014: 179).

Karssing and Spoor (2009) however, plea for a slightly different relation between the two approaches. They consider the compliance-based approach as the first generation of integrity management. In this phase, integrity isn’t thought of as a positive contribution to the effectiveness and quality of public administration, but rather as a necessity aimed at preventing violations. The value-based approach is considered the second generation, an evolvement in integrity management. Concepts such as values and responsibilities become more important and integrity becomes increasingly more common practice. However, distinctions are still made between integrity issues and acting professionally, and many public servants still experience integrity as a topic imposed from the top (Karssing & Spoor, 2009: 75). They argue in favor of a third generation (integrity 3.0), in which this positive development continues, and in which integrity becomes a self-evident dimension of professional conduct, instead of a separate topic (Karssing & Spoor, 2009: 76).

2.3.2 Integrity management in the Netherlands

This project examines a Dutch public institution, the police force, and therefore we need to take a look at the Dutch approach to integrity management, if a specific approach can be distinguished at all. While policies regarding integrity management are not formal competencies of the European Union, discussion of this topic among member states is certainly taking place. The Netherlands has taken an important role in this context. Initial talks on disciplinary rules in EU member took place in 1994. These discussions were mostly normative in nature and didn’t extend past compliance approaches or legal matters. Only in 2004 the issue resurfaced under the Irish and Dutch EU Presidencies and studies were issued to serve as discussion documents of voluntary standards of integrity. A Dutch initiative of an informal EU-wide code of ethics failed, but another Dutch initiative to professionalize ethics policies in ten new member states did succeed. The Netherlands has since taken a frontrunner’s role by prioritizing integrity as a topic for the 2016 Dutch EU Presidency (Huberts & Hoekstra, 2016: 186-188).

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13 On a national level, where the emphasis of Dutch integrity management once lay on compliance-based policy, it is now primarily focused on a values-based strategy. Instead of focusing just on avoiding criminal behavior, the Dutch public sector emphasizes the importance of the moral and ethical aspects of its public officials’ behavior. Integrity policies in the Netherlands are therefore not just fixed on avoiding criminal acts such as fraud and theft, but also on ethical issues such as bullying, intimidation, and discrimination. Public officials are trained to make the right ethical decisions within a specific situation. This focus on value-based integrity management is not without risks. A value-based strategy without clear rules and sanctions has no bite, and can be taken advantage of. The Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations has acknowledged the potential dangers of blindly following a single strategy and aims for a mix of compliance- and values-based integrity approaches and instruments (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2014). This balanced policy has compliance-oriented rules aimed primarily at preventing integrity problems through rules and procedures and has values-based policy aimed at stimulating positive behavior through education, training, and risk assessment (Huberts & Hoekstra, 2016: 22, 50-51).

2.4 The Dutch police force and integrity

In the previous section, we have discussed the different types of integrity management approaches and the specific situation in the Netherlands. Now we are getting even more specific and discuss integrity in regards to the Dutch police force. In section 2.2, we have already discussed the “typology of integrity violations” by Huberts (2005) that we are going to use in this research. This typology focused specifically on police integrity and violations, and that wasn’t a coincident. A number of aspects in regards to the police organization and police work makes it particularly sensitive for integrity and integrity violations. Officers work on the fringes of society, with a large amount of discretion, out of view of the organization, in a surrounding full of temptations. These factors, combined with the risks they face, dependency on other officers, and the hostility they can get exposed to from civilians, could lead to a police culture in which “the corruption virus” thrives (Huberts & Naeyé, 2005: 34).

A constant factor in the description of this police culture is this self-contained group with a strong sense of solidarity. This loyalty is supported by a code of silence, in studies about the police often referred to as ‘the Blue wall of silence’. An officer doesn’t “snitch” on a colleague on account of integrity violations, and supervisors are part of this culture. This loyalty makes integrity violations linger, and makes it difficult to tackle these issues (Lamboo, 2005:

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14 66). In fact, this culture makes it difficult to even ascertain the scope of the integrity problem. The official numbers on deviant behavior are seen as the tip of the iceberg as many instances aren’t reported or recorded. This is called the “dark numbers” problem and is exacerbated by the police culture of protecting the organization and its people, and closing the ranks (Lamboo, 2005: 102). Other characteristics that can be present in this police culture is a sense of cynicism and distrust against humanity in general, and certain populations in particular. An us versus

them mentality against citizens and those who deviate from the norm is frequent in police

culture. Furthermore, there is often a focus on practical knowledge, while intellectualism, bureaucracy, and formal rules are mistrusted and disliked. Legislation is seen as cumbersome, while fighting crime is often considered the “real” work (Lamboo, 2005: 66).

In addition to this typical police culture, other factors have been identified as frequent causes of integrity violations within the police force. First are the category of factors that are attributed to the individual and the work they conduct. These can be private circumstances such as financial troubles, gambling problems, and relationship problems. Certain character traits fall under this category as well such as a lust for power, or greed. Factors that are related to the profession include the amount of discretion that officers are allowed, the people they interact with, and the temptations they come across. The second category of factors are those related to organizational features such as, management (lack of interest, decisiveness, expertise), organizational structure (size and complexity, control and supervision, separation of functions), personnel policy (recruiting, training, guidance, reward), and finally organizational culture (mission, norms and values, working atmosphere). The third category are environmental factors, these include changes in crime or law and regulations, a working political-administrative system, and the societal environment (public opinion, state of the economy). All of these factors, in addition to the police specific factors and culture we discussed earlier, can lead to incidents of integrity violations, and should be taken into account by the organization (Huberts & Naeyé, 2005: 33-34).

Despite incomplete data on the scope of the problem, integrity management has certainly been a priority for the Dutch police force in recent years. The Minister of the Interior is responsible for integrity management within the Dutch public administration, and in extension, within the Dutch police force. The speech of then minister Ien Dales in 1992 about corruption and the necessity to ensure the integrity of public administration is widely regarded as the start of nationwide integrity policy (Lamboo, 2005: 135-136). Lamboo (2005) has investigated the formulation and implementation of integrity policy in the Dutch police force since then. According to Lamboo, Dutch police integrity does not solely lay the responsibility

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15 of integrity with the individual, but rather with the organization. Policy is preventive in nature and aims to promote integrity and an organization that values the importance of integrity. This falls in line with the value-based approach. Criticism on the policy however mentions that the importance of integrity is formulated rather abstract, and does not contain any urgency. This can lead to a policy that loses priority, and becomes symbolic in nature (Lamboo, 2005: 387). Lamboo has identified this problem in some regional forces where undesirable behavior is still insufficiently recognized as a problem, and some managers fail to set the right example. The research still shows however, that managers are vital in the effectiveness of integrity policy, and that a role model, attention to integrity, and the addressing of employees truly works. This leads under employees to an increase in knowledge, acceptance of the policy, and to changes in behavior. To reach these results however, recognition of the urgency of the problem appears to be a prerequisite. Overall, the research was positive about the development of integrity and integrity policy in the Dutch police force (Lamboo, 2005: 395-396).

2.5 The relationship between scandals and policy reform

We have established the definitions and implications of the concepts of integrity violations and integrity policy; it is now time to establish the connection between the two. This proposed connection is at the core of our research, and the key in answering our research question. While the connection between integrity violations and subsequent policy reform seems important, few authors have dealt with the questions of when, why, and how integrity violations lead to comprehensive policy change. The little research that does exist on the subject often uses the term scandal rather than integrity violations. There are two commonly used definitions of the term scandal. “According to one definition, scandal is deviant behavior. According to the other definition scandal is a social reaction to deviant behavior, a reaction of disapproval and outrage” (Sherman, 1989: 887). In this research, we will adopt the latter definition. While we have established with this that scandals and integrity violations are two different concepts, all the cases of integrity violations that have been selected in our research include the element of scandal and controversy. Previous research on the relation between scandals and integrity policy is therefore relevant to our research as well. We will discuss an article by Maesschalck (2002), who proposes two frameworks to explain the relation between scandals and policy reform. In addition, we will discuss an article by Grimmelikhuijsen and Snijders (2016) who investigate three conditions under which local governments change integrity policy after scandals. By discussing these articles, we are providing an overview of the contemporary

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16 literature on the subject, or lack thereof. Furthermore, it allows us to discuss what the implications are of those articles on our research.

2.5.1 Discussing relevant literature

Maesschalck (2002) wonders, with the emerging literature about scandals, how it is that no one has yet provided a framework of the circumstances under which a scandal will lead to comprehensive policy change. In his article, he presents two frameworks that can be useful for the task, the agenda-setting framework and the grid-group framework. The agenda-setting framework was first presented by Kingdon (1984, 1995) and later adapted by Baumgartner and Jones (1993), who presented their own take on the framework. Maesschalck uses a combination of the two and considers them complementary. The agenda-setting framework aims to describe the process in which the status quo can be disrupted and policy changes can occur. Both version start off with a situation of relatively stability until an event, such as a scandal, challenges this stability. In Kingdons version, policy change can occur when an event leads to the three streams that influence agenda setting (problems, policies, and politics) to converge. In this case a “window of opportunity” opens, and a policy entrepreneur pushes its preferred policy alternative. In the case of Baumgartner and Jones, an event (sometimes driven by the media) challenges the policy monopoly and a situation of disequilibrium arises. If challengers to the monopoly can successfully push their own policy alternative, they can form a new policy monopoly and the relative stability returns (Maesschalck, 2002: 172-174). Maesschalck considers Kingdons model better suited for a more narrative driven perspective, and particularly designed to account for comprehensive policy shifts. Baumgartner and Jones’ model on the other hand is useful for codifying the process of policy change.

While the two models in the agenda-setting framework, according to Maesschalck, can be used to account for situations of both stability and change, the preferences and beliefs of the actors involved are not taken into consideration. Maesschalck states that “a good understanding of these processes of preference formation is necessary to understand the mechanism through which people react to scandal, and hence through which policy making is affected by scandal” (Maesschalck, 2002: 174). He has therefore included the grid-group framework to account for this missing link in the question of when, why, and how scandals lead to comprehensive policy change. The grip-group framework is developed as a theory that deals with the question of how beliefs and preferences originate. The premise of the theory is that there is a mutually supportive relationship between social relations and dominant values and beliefs. Adherence to a certain

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17 social relationship gives a certain outlook on the world, and a certain outlook on the world legitimizes a corresponding type of social relations (Thompson et al, 1990: 1). According to this theory, when confronted with new facts or changes in circumstances such as with scandals, most people will respond in alignment with their culture. People tend to be pattern maintaining, and if changes are to be made, they are usually made within their institutional framework (Maesschalck, 2002: 175). According to Maesschalck, the agenda-setting framework manages to explain the complex situation regarding a scandal, while the grid-group framework can explain the preferences and beliefs of the actors involved. Put together they can supposedly explain the relation between scandal and policy change.

Rather than providing a clear-cut framework, Grimmelikhuijsen and Snijders (2016) take a different approach, and try to determine which conditions eventually lead to the improvement of integrity measures and policies. In their research, they analyze integrity scandals in 17 Dutch municipalities and take into account three conditions: media attention, presence of external audits, and involvement of civil servants in the violation. Based on their findings they conclude the following: integrity-related changes only occur in integrity violations in which multiple civil servants were involved, which could be an indication that these are the type of organizational cultures where such violations could occur. Second, changes do not always occur after heavy media attention, and can also occur in cases of relative silence. Third, Strong media attention can play a part in organizational changes, but only if there is a strong external force prescribing specific changes; only in case there is an external audit report will an organization adapt its integrity policies. A final general conclusion is that in more than half of the cases, no change occurred, and that a scandal alone is not a sufficient condition for organizational change (Grimmelikhuijsen & Snijders, 2016: 355).

2.5.2 Implications for our research

After discussing some of the literature dealing with the connection between integrity violations / scandals, and policy change, the question remains: what are the implications of this to our research? The first thing that stands out is actually the lack of literature regarding this relation. Articles and books on integrity management, integrity in the context of the Netherlands and the Dutch police force, and on integrity violations themselves are readily available. This is certainly not the case when searching for literature combining integrity- violations, and policy. Maesschalcks article was published in 2002, when he noted this dearth in literature. The article by Grimmelikhuijsen and Snijders, released 14 years later in 2016, still mentioned the exact

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18 same problem. This can be seen as an indication of the potential academic value of our research, to contribute to a subject that has seen little academic research done on it. However, it is important to note that our research is very specific and does not contain the objective of making broad conclusions about integrity management and public organizations in general.

In regards to the specific literature we have discussed in this section, there are some observations we can make in relation to our research. First, the grid-group framework from the Maesschalck article is of little use to us. In our research, we focus little on the personal beliefs and preferences of the individual actors involved, and more on their acts and the events as they unfolded. It would be hard to map all individual preferences, especially from using just document analysis. In addition, it would add little to our research. The agenda-setting framework would fit our research better, but that one too presents some issues. Baumgartner and Jones’ version is not particularly suited for the issue of integrity violations. Their version works well with hotly contested policy areas such as ethical and medical dilemmas. In regards to integrity violations there is no such conflict, though people’s definitions may differ, nobody is openly in favor of violations and corruption. Kingdons original version of the agenda-setting framework looks promising, but Maesschalcks article is with a single case study too limited and exploratory in nature to base the entire foundation of our research on the agenda-setting framework. The conditions discussed in the Grimmelikhuijsen and Snijders article are interesting and show many similarities with the case characteristics that we will be looking at in our research. The role of the media, external forces, and the actors involved, are all included in our within case and across-case analysis. Their results are therefore relevant to our research, but we have to keep in mind that their research focused on integrity violations in Dutch municipalities, while ours is focused on the Dutch police force. We have discussed previously in this chapter that the police force is a very different organization than most, in regards to unique goals, challenges, and culture. We should be wary to assume that the results of their research would carry over to ours.

We have been able to build a theoretical framework on a rich collection of academic literature in regards to integrity violations, integrity management, and the Dutch police force. The academic literature on the connection between violations and policy however appears to be limited. Our research will therefore be very exploratory in nature in an attempt to contribute to the better understanding and definition of this relationship, and to be able to construct hypotheses to be used in future research. The next chapter on methodology will get into more detail on the design of our research.

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Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Multiple case study approach

In the context of this study, the term case study refers to research with a small number of cases which are examined in considerable depth. In case studies, large amounts of information are collected for a few cases across a wide range of features. On the contrary, quantitative surveys study large numbers of cases or respondents but usually only gather a relatively small amount of data on each one (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004: 93). This makes the approach qualitative in nature, rather than quantitative. More specifically, we will be using a multiple case study design, which is a type of case study that includes two or more observations of the same phenomenon.

This research studies the phenomenon of integrity management in the Dutch police force in response to incidents of integrity violations, and we are involving three different instances of integrity violations in order to do so. The benefit of using a multiple case design rather than a single case one is replication. That is, using multiple cases to independently confirm constructs and propositions. In addition, it allows us to reveal complementary aspects of the phenomenon (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004: 685). While the (multiple) case study method is mostly used for inductive research, in this research it will be used deductively as we start with theory to come to an observation about a certain phenomenon, instead of the other way around. This brings certain limitations in regards to validity and generalizability that we will discuss further on in this chapter.

We use the multiple case study approach in this research for several specific reasons. First of all, there hasn’t been much research about how, why, or when integrity violation scandals lead to changes in integrity management. Describing and analyzing more comprehensively and in more detail a smaller number of cases makes it easier to uncover this relationship, than by analyzing a larger number of cases, but in much less detail. Second, the topic of integrity violations is rather complex. Violations can take many forms and it is likely that various, interdependent factors determine to what extent changes in integrity policy take place. A case study is more likely to identify these relevant factors than other types of research methods. It is unlikely however, that exploratory focused research like ours will result in very definitive proclamations on the connection.

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3.2 Comparative case study and case selection

The comparative case method is typically used when researchers have substantial knowledge of each case included in an investigation and there is a relatively small number of such cases (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004: 149). In this sense, the comparative case design complements the multiple case study perfectly, as the small-N study and comprehensive case-oriented aspects are already encapsulated in the multiple case study approach. Several arguments can be made to combine the two approaches. Toshkov (2016) argues that small-N comparative research is of itself a hybrid, using the strengths of both cross- and within-case research. By combining cross-case evidence with detailed studies of the individual cases, it can improve the validity and reliability of measurement. In addition, within-case evidence can uncover causal mechanisms, and questions about alternative explanations can be further scrutinized during the in-depth within-case stage (Toshkov, 2016: 261). While small-N comparative case studies are, just like case studies, often more suited for inductive and theory testing studies, a deductive approach can be used as well, though it is critical to keep in mind the different goals and strategies of both approaches (Toshkov, 2016: 260).

Vital to the design of a small-N comparative study, is the selection of cases. Cases are selected by a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) or according to a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). A most similar design chooses cases that are as similar as possible; except for the phenomenon we are interested in assessing. The ambition of the MSSD is to keep as many extraneous variables as possible constant, to determine whether the main explanatory variable is responsible for differences in the dependent variable. On the other hand, with a most different design the strategy is to choose cases that are as different as possible in regard to the extraneous variables, while having the same outcome in the phenomenon we’re assessing. With this design, an attempt is made to find a common explanatory variable that explains a similar outcome despite the variety in cases (Carsten, 2008: 389-390). The most different design is as such more compatible with inductive research, rather than deductive.

Our research is deductive as we investigate the effect of integrity violations on the phenomenon of integrity management. Our dependent variable is integrity management, while our independent variables consist of the elements that make up the circumstances surrounding cases of integrity violations (figure 2). With the selection of our cases, we have searched specifically for cases that were controversial, and were significant in scope. In addition, going in to this research, we have not selected cases taking into account the outcome of the cases, i.e. the presence or absence of changes in integrity management following an incident. Our case

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21 selection is therefore primarily in line with the most similar design: we analyze three integrity incidents in the Dutch police force: Bureau Warmoesstraat, the IRT affair, and the Central Works Council.

Figure 2 – Independent and dependent variables

3.3 Validity and generalization issues and limitations

Validity can be split up in two separate concepts: internal validity and external validity. Internal validity refers to the confidence with which researchers can make causal inferences from the results of a particular empirical study (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004: 503). In other words, are we actually measuring what we are trying to measure? External validity or generalizability however, is a concept that deals with the question whether research findings can be generalized to a larger population. In regards to internal validity, we have tried to mitigate many of these issues. This is due to the in-depth and comprehensive study of the selected cases and relevant variables. This allows us a detailed analysis of the cases and the causal relationship we are trying to uncover. Such an issue becomes a greater concern once the amount of cases increases, and the amount of variables that is investigated decreases. It would be irresponsible to think however that we can draw foolproof conclusions from our study. There may have been factors at play that we have no knowledge of, even if our research is limited to the Dutch police force. One common threat to internal validity still needs to be addressed however, namely history. Because our three cases are from three different time periods (70’s, 90’s and the 2010’s), differences in outcomes on the dependent variable measured at different times may result from events other than the independent variables we selected, and occurred instead during the passage of time between measures (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004: 504). For example, a call for more accountability and transparency in the public sector could have an influence on

Independent variables

- Types of integrity violations - Actors involved

- Perceptions and context - Causes

Dependent variable

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22 differences in integrity management before and after, without it being accounted for, as it would not relate specifically to any of the cases. Part of this issue can be accounted for however, as the cross-case analysis takes into account the differences in time period, and possible trends throughout the years.

The issue of external validity, or generalizability is a more pressing one. Due to the nature of small-N research, these studies will always encounter a problem with generalizing their findings to a larger population. The biggest problem of small-N research is the susceptibility to measurement error and random variability. The fact is that the number of cases is too small to filter out noise and outliers (Toshkov, 2016: 282). In addition, the cases were selected by convenience and availability (due to a reliance on document analysis), rather than by random sampling. In this research however, generalizability is not our primary aim. The research is confined to a very specific population, namely cases of integrity violations in the Dutch police force.

Put shortly: we are looking at those incidents that occupy a certain grey area on the integrity violation spectrum, and those that have been of a significant scope. The aim of this research is not to make grand and sweeping pronunciations about integrity management strategies by organizations in general, but rather come to conclusions about the actions of specific organization under specific circumstances.

3.4 Sources and their limitations

This research contains qualitative data that has been collected primarily by ways of document analysis. These documents consist of newspaper articles, academic articles and books, web pages, public statements, and investigative reports. Our goal has been to provide an unbiased, thorough, and careful representation of the truth, and to reflect this in our sources. The case descriptions contain segments of debate in which the multiple conflicting viewpoints of different actors involved are represented. Other segments, however, contain fewer sources and present a more homogeneous narrative. These include sections about the verdicts on integrity violations for example. In these instances, the source is often an investigative report, or another reputable document that represents the official reading of the truth. In this official reading, an assessment between different readings has often already transpired. In medicine, they make use of levels of evidence; this is a ranking system that determines the strength of the results measured from different types of sources of evidence (figure 3). Evidence from sources higher in the ranking are considered more reliable and less biased (Burns et al., 2011). With the use of

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23 document analysis, our research primarily makes use of the bottom two levels of evidence, expert opinions and case studies. While this ranking system is not necessarily designed for social sciences, it proves as a reminder that we cannot automatically accept all sources of evidence and results as irrefutable truth. The danger of providing incorrect information is always lurking, but by using multiple, reputable sources and the official reading of the events, an attempt has been made to minimize these risks best as possible.

Figure 3 – Levels of evidence, based on cebma.org (no date)

Randomized

controlled studies

Controlled

longitudinal studies

Uncontrolled longitudinal

studies

Cross-sectional studies and case studies

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Chapter 4: Case Descriptions

Case 1: Bureau Warmoesstraat1

Context

In 1903, the police added a location in the center of Amsterdam and established an official police station named Bureau Warmoesstraat. This was in many ways a special office because of its location in the heart of the city with specific many problems as a result of the red light district (prostitution, drugs etc.). When Chinese immigrants brought heroin to Amsterdam in the 1960s, this created an additional problem. Bureau Warmoesstraat suddenly had to deal with not just the trade in heroin, but with the many more problems associated with the business, some affecting the police force itself. Many of the police officers stationed at Bureau Warmoesstraat had a good relationship with the local Dutch-Chinese community. They dined in their restaurants, received presents for Christmas and – as a result – often turned a blind eye to illegal conduct. As such, some members of the Dutch-Chinese community in Amsterdam acquired much influence in the police force. Many police officers who were not directly involved, were at least aware of this situation. It was common knowledge that some officials overlooked misconducts of the Chinese in return for money or goods (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 1977).

The affair

In the course of the 1970s, the police office at Warmoesstraat got an ever worse reputation. It was rumored that prostitutes were being abused and prisoners were being robbed when thrown in jail. There were also rumors of misconduct such as illegal arms trafficking. Some officers also appeared to be active participants in dealing heroin (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 1978). The latter especially became a problem. Former police chief Kuiper and deputy police chief Van Riessen started an internal investigation because of the persistent rumors of corruption. Following this internal investigation, an ‘external’ investigation by the Rijksrecherche

1_{Permission to use and edit this case description has been given by: Kerkhoff, A.D.N. & Overeem, P., Database}

Corruption & Integrity in the Netherlands (1945 – present), Center for Public Values & Ethics, Institute of

Public Administration, Leiden University, the Netherlands. https://vre.leidenuniv.nl/vre/publicvaluesandethics/corruption

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25 (National Criminal Investigation) followed in September 1976. This investigation also specifically dealt with accusations of bribery of officers by Heroin dealers and other criminals. This second investigation was became public knowledge after newspaper De Waarheid published about it (Lamboo, 2005: 237).

In the beginning, the Rijksrecherche investigation focused on the murder of a certain Chung Mon on March 3 1975. Chung Mon had been the owner of a gambling house in Amsterdam for which permission had been given by the police together with public prosecutor Van Everdingen. The gambling house was regarded as the beginning of the arrival of the Chinese mafia in Amsterdam, the start of the heroin dealing circuit and the subsequent bribery of police officials (De Waarheid, 1978). Van Everdingen was said to have given advice to Chung Mon on how to exploit his gambling houses without getting in trouble with the authorities, although Van Everdingen would maintain he had never heard of Chung Mon. He did admit to having once visited a gambling house because the police wanted to know about the legality of the gambling house. He recognized this could have been a visit to Chung Mon (Het vrije volk, 1977).

On 4 August 1976 public prosecutor E.H. van Renesse said that members of the Dutch-Chinese community in Amsterdam had increasingly tried to bribe police officers when arrested for owning heroin. They supposedly offered thousands of guilders to prevent from getting arrested. Van Renesse added that a certain Chinese man with the initials S.P.Y had tried to bribe chief officer of police Van Riessen with 5000 guilders after the latter had found 135 gram of heroin in his possession. Van Renesse stated that “bribery seemed to have become a Chinese hobby” (De Telegraaf, 1976). Mayor of Amsterdam Ivo Samkalden however maintained in December 1976 that he had never heard anything about the corruption affair.

In 1977, more fuel was thrown on the fire. The magazine Nieuwe Revue published an article with the title “Politie bezwijkt voor geld” (Police succumbs to money), in which a former police officer spoke of the (mal)functioning of Bureau Warmoesstraat. Chief commissioner Sanders filed a complaint against the magazine for defamation but this did not seem to have had any consequences (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 1978). The conclusion of the final police report showed what most people presumably already expected: a high level of corruption within the police corps of Bureau Warmoesstraat was reported, especially bribery in the form of acceptance of money and dinners by officers in return for overlooking misconduct and illegal activities in their district. The report added this could have been the consequence of a lack of supervision and management (Terhaar, 1977).

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The results of the first investigation and the trial

The investigation resulted in the arrest of eight police officers, of which five were eventually sentenced and given a fine for accepting bribes in the form of money (Lamboo, 2005: 237-238). In April 1977 chief officer Teun V. was the first who was arrested. Later that month, members of the so-called Burgerpot (plain-clothes police officers) Anne B., Willem van O., and Arie B. were arrested, as well as Johan B. and Hendrik S., two detectives of the Vreemdelingendienst (Immigration police). All of these officers were suspected of bribery (in money and/or goods) in return for their ‘service delivery’ to Chinese gambling houses. The Chinese-experts Arie Damsteegt and Rinus Waterloo were also arrested, but in the end not prosecuted (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 1978). The eight officers were later released awaiting trial, with Teun V. being the last one on May 23 1977. Since their arrest, all had been suspended from active duty (Nederland Dagblad, 1978).

In November 1977 the prosecution was suspended because two of the accused officers (Teun V. and Anne B.) asked for a reopening of the investigation. They wanted the public prosecutor to examine the allegations against the other police officers more closely (Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 1978). Public prosecutor F.H. von Meyenfeldt agreed. The result was that the prosecution of two other officers (Damsteegt and Waterloo) was ended because of a lack of evidence and their case was closed (De Waarheid, 1978). Three of the remaining four police officers also objected to further prosecution, but this was rejected by the court. Teun V. and Anne B. objected to the proceedings again with the result that it would take even more time to proceed with the trial. Nevertheless, at the beginning of January 1978, Von Meyenfeldt announced that he wanted to start in March the case against the remaining six suspects (Nederland Dagblad, 1978).

After having been out of service for almost a year awaiting trial, on 17 May 1978 the six police officers appeared in court. The second day in court was 31 May 1978. Different people had criticized the trial before it started. The way in which testimonies were treated was said to have been improper. Anonymity was supposedly guaranteed but not honored in the end. Witnesses feared retaliation and would therefore have weakened or even withdrawn their statements (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 1978). Perhaps because of these issues, punishment was not as severe as had been expected. None of the officers were sentenced to prison. They all received fines instead. Furthermore, none of the officers were dismissed. They were in fact only transferred to other police stations (Andere Tijden, 2011).

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A second investigation

In June 1978 however, the Rijksrecherche started another investigation into the activity of, among others, former narcotic chief commissioner Gerard Toorenaar due to signals that the narcotics brigade had had close contacts with Chung Mon and other heroin dealers, and they too had overlooked misconduct in return for bribes (De Telegraaf, 1978). The only known repercussion, as noted by newspaper Nieuwsblad van het Noorden on 30 January 1979, was that Toorenaar was transferred to another district bureau.

In November 1978 Damsteegt and Waterloo argued that their former chief superintendent K. Sietsma had not said anything about the supposed corruption of the corps leadership of Bureau Warmoesstraat, even though he had been aware of the situation (De Waarheid, 1978). Damsteegt and Waterloo stated this in their defense against the decision of the police management to suspend them. The information they now provided was taken as evidence in the investigation into corruption in the Amsterdam police force. According to chief commissioner Sanders this yielded new information which he had never heard before. In the midst of the accusations against Sietsma, Waterloo and Damsteegt also argued that Sanders himself had received cheap traveler’s cheques in return for favors but Sanders denied this (De Telegraaf, 1978).

Apart from the investigation of the Rijksrecherche, several younger police officers decided to conduct their own investigation, led by chief inspector A.J.A. Steen. They collected data about their former colleagues. In order to do this, the police officers told their suspended colleagues, Damsteegt and Waterloo, that if they would collaborate in their investigation, they might get away with a reprimand. Chief inspector Steen was able to do this, because he had led the investigation against these accused police officers. Nevertheless, Damsteegt and Waterloo refused to collaborate in this investigation (Koring, 1978).

In August 1979, the second investigation into misconduct by members of Bureau Warmoesstraat was closed. Mayor of Amsterdam W. Polak was asked to make a final judgement call. In the end, the mayor concluded that there was no hard evidence for corruption (by Toorenaar and others) of police officers of Bureau Warmoesstraat (Koring, 1979). After the investigations and the trial, both Steen and Van Riessen argued that only low ranked police officers had been summoned to appear in court, while their supervisors had remained out of view. According to them, this was unreasonable. The higher echelons of the police were seen as partly responsible for their lack of proper management. By 1980 though, the corruption

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28 scandal was petering out, and no further charges were taken against anyone else (Punch, 1982: 223).

Perceptions of the actors involved

While the media can’t take responsibility for sparking the inquiry in this case, as the investigation was already ongoing when the media first made mention of it, they were the major driving force behind the events that followed after. The media mounted a sustained campaign when the corrupt practices became known which lasted the entire duration of the scandal and the aftermath. The interview in the Nieuwe Revu, “Police Succumb to Money”, in 1977 brought the affair to a wide public (Punch, 1982: 214). After that, virtually every daily paper and weekly magazine turned their attention to the issue of corruption within the Amsterdam police force (Punch, 1982: 215). The downside to this is that the media coverage started to lead a life of its own. In a time where terms such as integrity weren’t thought of as a priority, this was one of the first cases in the Netherlands where the line would be drawn between gifts (acceptable), and bribery (unacceptable).

Ex police officer Jac Zijlstra in his interview with the Nieuwe Revu was one of the first in this case to openly call out unethical behavior with his accusations against former colleagues. He called out officers who made use of the services of prostitutes, paid for by a Chinese gambling house owner. Money was stolen from suspects, goods were stolen at the scene of burglaries, and confiscated heroin was sold back to the streets (Punch, 1982: 214-215). These allegations, if indeed true, weren’t concerning victimless crimes or efforts to keep a close connection to the area, instead they concerned various types of integrity violations and corruption.

On the other side of the argument were the accused officers. In the trial, the defense claimed that the men behaved as they did in order to do their job, refusing to behave a certain way could have ruined the contacts they had built within the community. While confessing to accepting money and gifts, they denied corruption, as they did not reciprocate with neglect or favoritism towards the criminals (Punch, 1982: 218). Though most of the accused officers were convicted in court, none of the punishments were particularly as severe as the prosecution asked for, and discussion would remain about other accused members in the organization who did not had to stand trial. Regardless of who was in the right, the discussion and results of this case would set a precedent for all future allegations and suspicions of integrity violations in the Dutch police force.

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Causes of the scandal

The scandal and the events leading up to it took place in the 1970’s in Amsterdam. At this time, the Dutch police was old-fashioned, poorly equipped, amateuristic, decentralized, and complacent (Punch, 1982: 211). This was the case for the Amsterdam police force as well, and specifically for Bureau Warmoesstraat with its location in the middle of the red light district. In these working conditions the police had traditionally developed a degree of tolerance for deviance. The police and the underworld had an understood relationship of mutually agreed cooperation and conflict, and the sixties had dictated cultural norms favorable to the use of soft drugs and amphetamines by young people (Punch, 1982: 211-212). While the city was free and cosmopolitan in nature, the police operated in an unsophisticated and provincial style, rather following developments instead of anticipating them. This mentality combined with the problems that plagued the Dutch police force were no match for the enormous increase in drug trafficking that Chinese immigrants brought to the city. This was the first time they were confronted with syndicated crime and they found themselves ill equipped and legally hamstrung to deal with it. These factors put together created the ideal circumstances for corruption. (Punch, 1982: 212). Once corruption took hold, combatting or even discussing it was no easy feat. At this time, corruption was a nonissue and was never openly talked about (Punch, 1982: 211). There was a strong esprit de corps among the officers, everyone was in this together and you didn’t snitch on your fellow officers. This organizational culture was ingrained within the corps at the time and proved to be difficult to change, even years after the scandal (Lamboo, 2005: 253).

Integrity management

As a result of this affair, there was an increased desire in the police organization to change the culture of the organization. In the late 1970s a first attempt was made to change the culture, but a critical rapport on the organization from the TerHaar Committee was dismissed without being acted upon. A second attempt was made when a committee was tasked with uncovering the causes of ‘deviant’ behavior, and what could be done against it. This rapport was presented in 1981 under the name ‘Binnenspiegel’. The main conclusion of this rapport was that norms and expectations within the organization were unclear, due to an unclear corps policy. The rapport stirred up the conversation, but was eventually dismissed as the subject was considered too

Cracks in the blue wall of silence: A comparative case study into the effects of integrity violations on integrity management in the Dutch police force