When Memories Become Duty

(1)

Colombia’s Memory House Museum and Argentina’s

Space of Memory and Human Rights

V A L E R I A P O S A D A V I L L A D A

WHEN MEMORIES

BECOME DUTY

(2)

Photograph taken from

(3)

War is not a life: it is a situation; One which may neither be ignored nor accepted, A problem to be met with ambush and stratagem, Enveloped or scattered. A Note on War Poetry T.S. Eliot

(4)

i

WHEN MEMORIES BECOME DUTY:

Colombia’s Memory House Museum and Argentina’s Space of Memory and Human Rights

Written by

Valeria Posada Villada 11127554 Advised by Dr. Ihab Saloul Second reader Mirjam Hoijtink Master Thesis

Masters in Museum Studies Universiteit van Amsterdam

(5)

ii

Abstract

In Latin America, Duty of Memory, or Deber de memoria, forms part of Transitional Justice measures that strive to symbolically address mass historical violations through the public recognition of victims and the incorporation of their stories of pain, exclusion, and repression into their national narratives. Within this context, Argentina and Colombia are two examples of the complexities inherent in attempting to restore the social networks. Scarred by a past military dictatorship (1976-1983) and a continuing internal armed conflict (1946-), both nations have applied Transitional Justice Systems and Duty of Memory as state policy. However, even when the two countries share the same framework, the political dynamics of each country and the ways their civil societies conceive of justice, vary considerably. Argentina is closer to a Retributive Justice model in which individual criminal accountability for the past is prioritized of over other forms of symbolic reparation. Colombia frames its past and present through Restorative Justice, defining violations as collective wrongdoings and basing reparation on dialogue, negotiation, and restoration of the bonds of trust. These two distinct viewpoints can be contrasted through the analysis of the material aspect of Duty of Memory, that is, the memorial museums and trauma sites that have emerged as spaces of reflection and commemoration in both countries. This study takes one memorial museum and one trauma site as embodiments of two outlooks on Duty of Memory. The memorial museum is the Museum House of Memory in Medellín, Colombia, which focuses on clarifying the effects of the armed conflict, acknowledging its victims and survivors and re-signifying violence to support peacebuilding interventions. The trauma site chosen is the Space of Memory and Human Rights (SMHR) of Argentina located in the Navy-Petty Officers School of Mechanics (ESMA), one of Buenos Aires’ former Secret Detention Centers, and now functioning as a humanitarian platform to condemn state Terrorism. Within this thesis, I explore how the architectural, spatial, aesthetic and programming practices of these two sites are influenced by the obligations required by Duty of Memory but also establish a two-way relationship with this framework defining the content that is to be included within it.

(6)

iii

Acknowledgements

Looking back, I can say this thesis is the final product not only of months of research but of the experience I acquired while working in museological projects on memory back in Colombia. Therefore, I want to thank former colleagues, supervisors, friends and Human Rights advocates whose valuable approaches and experiences on the subject have contributed to shaping the methodology used in this research.

With regards to the editorial process, I am deeply indebted to Laura Alexander who stood beside me on nights without end to help me make sense of Argentina's and Colombia's painful past both narratively and emotionally, becoming a fundamental source of support. I also want to express my gratitude to my supervisor Ihab Saloul for his interest in Latin America's museological approach to painful pasts and his remarks on Duty of Memory as part of state policy. The historian Arij Ouweneel should also receive a heartwarming thank you. Ouweneel's disposition to share with me his insights on regional memory politics, Duty of Memory and cognitive psychology have certainly left an imprint on this work. He, as well as the CEDLA institute overall, received me with open arms and sharpened my knowledge by engaging with my research in multiple conversations and provided me with an extensive collection of bibliographic references unattainable in other Dutch universities.

It is also worth mentioning the CRAM documentation center in the Memory House Museum, Diego Guiñazu from SMHR's educational program and Celeste Orozco from the Museum Site of Memory ESMA, who generously granted me access to an essential number of documents and provided me further contacts to develop my research. Micaela García and Nora Poggio in Buenos Aires and Maria Paula Pérez in Medellín also became my second eyes, taking photographs of the places I did not get to be or which I did not previously register, helping me have a closer look on the social landscape of both countries.

Even when miles away, I express my most profound gratitude to my parents and brothers, who have relentlessly supported me throughout this journey and have revealed to me the traces of the conflict in our hearts and family history in the hope that these will, someday, become a matter of the past.

Last but not least, I undertook this research with the goal of communicating my admiration towards the individuals who have endured the painful effects of repression and

(7)

iv

violence in Colombia and Argentina, creating alternative pathways to deal with the past and becoming personal and political referents in my career path. I hope this work does justice to them.

(8)

v

List of Abbreviations

SMHR Space of Memory and Human Rights

MHM Memory House Museum

TJS Transitional Justice System SDC Secret Detention Center

ESMA Navy-Petty Officers School of Mechanics ERP Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo

CONADEP National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons Abuelas Abuelas of the Plaza de Mayo

Madres Madres of the Plaza de Mayo Madres L.F Madres Foundational Line Liga League for the Rights of Men

APDH Permanent Assembly for Human Rights SERPAJ Peace and Justice Service

CELS Centre for Legal Studies

MEDH Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights Familiares Family members of Disappeared-Detainees AEDD Ex-Detainee/Disappeared Association

H.I.J.O.S Sons for Identity and Justice against Oblivion and Silence MC Complete Memory

AFFyAPPA Association for Families and Friends of the Political Prisoners of Argentina IEM Institute Space for Memory

EAAF Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team GAC Street Art Group

CPM Provincial Commission for Memory FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia M-19 19th of April Movement

ELN National Liberation Army EPL Popular Liberation Army

(10)

vii

MAQL Quintín Lame Armed Movement MAS Death to Kidnappers

AUC United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia

CNRR National Commission on Reparation and Reconciliation GMH Historical Memory Group

SNARIV National System for the Attention and Integral Reparation for the Victims CNMH National Centre for Historical Memory

EDU Urban Development Company

PUI Urban Integral Project

POT Spatial & Territorial Planning

CRAM Centre of Resources for the Activation of Memory OIM International Organization for Migration

AECID Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation EPM Medellín Public Enterprises

ASFADES Association of Relatives of the Disappeared CINEP Centre for Research and Popular Education IPC Popular Training Institute

AFAVIT Association of Relatives of the Victims of Trujillo

ASOVIDA Association of United Victims of the Granada Municipality

CARE Centre for Approach, Reconciliation and Reparation of San Carlos PROVISAME Promoters of Life and Mental Health

MAMM Modern Art Museum of Medellín

RCLM Network of Colombian Sites of Memory

(11)

viii

List of Figures

Appendices

A. Map of the City of Buenos Aires including percentage living under poverty

line and SMHR location 124

B. Map of the SMHR including crime spots and Human Right Organization

Headquarters 125

C. Map of the City of Medellín including the sixteen communas and population

density 126

D. Construction Plan for the Bicentenary Park made by Planta Baja Architects 127 E. Tree of Life sculpture assembled by the artist Leobardo Pérez Jiménez with the cutting blades collected from the Comunas in the Municipality’s Week of

Disarmament. 128

F. Mahatma Ghandi Sculpture made by the artist Ram Sutaren donated by the Indian Embassy as a gift. The quote translates: “If you are at peace with yourself, at least there is one place at peace in the world”. 129 G. Siluetazo in Buenos Aires, Argentina on September 22 1983. 130 H. Photographs of the disappeared in the Cuatro Columnas, Madres de la Plaza

Building and Museum Site of Memory ESMA 131

I. GAC (2013) Presentes installation in the SMHR precinct, Nazza Stencil ‘Juicio y castigo’ mural in the H.I.J.O.S building and Carlson’s (2014) Apparitions

exhibit at the Infirmary. 132

J. The Cuatro Columnas Building in 1928 and 2017. 133 K. Cuatro Columnas base floor blueprint with the objects displayed by

December 10, 2017 134

L. The artistic installation of grey and red ‘marble tiles’ displayed at the Cuatro

(12)

ix

M. Preserve to Transmit Memory cabinets that contain the four objects found in the forensic research. Close-up to the left lateral cabinet that showcases the

cigarette buts and the coca-cola cap. 136

N. Glass panels displayed in the Basement of the Museum Site of Memory

ESMA. 137

O. Video testimonies presented in Capucha, the third floor of the Museum Site

of Memory ESMA 138

P. Passage to the Flights of Death 139

Q. Trujillo Park Monument with a view of the Ossuary above and the Route of

Memory below 140

R. A view of the photographic display at the Never More Salon in Granada and the Garden of Memory in San Carlos, Antioquia Department. 141 S. MHM’s permanent exhibit divided according to three functions: Memorialization (blue), Clarification (orange) and Restoration (green). 142 T. The nine hundred eighty commemorative plaques displayed on the lateral side of the MHM. The message inscribed in the upper plaque states “My lovely

boy, I am still waiting for you”. 143

U. A view of MHM’s commemorative plaques and testimony cylinders in the

evening 144

V. One of the six life-size screens presented in Experience no. 12: Life Stories 145

W. Experience no.15 or Chamber of Memory 146

X. The Timeline (no.8) displays documentary sources that narrate the onset and evolution of Colombia’s armed conflict on a local, regional and national scale 147 Y. Two of the visual metaphors included within the experience no.11, Tables. The first one depicts the life paths of children, adults and elders as a roulette in which violence creeps in hindering their dreams, taking their loved ones and inserting them into the conflict. The second table uses one indigenous language (non-identified) to show how these communities experience of the

(13)

x

Z. Video art representation of the concept of Solidarity presented in Experience no.9. The video states “Alone we are vulnerable. Together we are much

stronger” (1996) 149

AA. A photograph of the exit corridor or Resistances with Andrea Valderrama, the current director of the House of Memory Museum. 150

AB. Memory Landmarks that have been initiated and inaugurated after the

(14)

1

Introduction

As soon as I began working with the Air Force as an adjunct researcher in the year 2015, navigating through the stormy seas of Colombia's armed conflict, I heard the term Duty of Memory repeatedly mentioned in conversations, interviews, and symposiums. Every time this concept was invoked, any opinion acquired a solemn character but its concrete meaning always eluded me and I was unable to find an interpretation that seemed adequate. However, I was able to grasp the term once I started to hear the stories. Stories like that of Johan Steven Martinez, a boy who never got to meet his dad because he was only three months old when the army sergeant was captured by the guerrilla, never to be seen again. Or Carlos, a student who I briefly met on my way to work and who revealed to me that white flowers always reminded him of his father who had been killed just five years before by the paramilitary group who ruled his hometown. These stories showed me that I could not comprehend Duty of Memory until I was able to grasp its social weight. Duty of Memory goes beyond a concept, a Law, a monument or a one-day commemoration. It is not solely about counting the dead, or counting stories about the dead, it is about making their stories count.

Within the Latin American context, Duty of Memory forms part of political transitions which strive to symbolically redress mass historical suffering through the public recognition of victims and the integration of their stories of pain, exclusion, and repression into their national narratives. After the fall of the dictatorships in the Southern Cone and the peace agreements in Central America, and thanks to the joint effort of victim´s associations and Human Rights groups to keep the past on the political agenda, public institutions in this region, including its museums, became forerunners in reparation programs for victims, survivors, and their families. Having learned this, I became interested in researching the ways in which cultural institutions in Latin America, especially museums, responded to this state-sanctioned demand, and in the strategies they have developed over the years to address their difficult pasts and presents.

Limiting my field of research, I decided to focus on two countries and two museological institutions within Latin America, choosing Argentina since it was the first country in the region to implement a Transitional Justice System (TJS) and subsequently memorialization to compensate the victims. I also chose to focus on Colombia, the most recent country in the region to implement a TJS. In both cases, Duty of Memory has been ratified by the state, the victims, and Human Rights organizations as an attempt to clarify

(15)

2

the facts and to seek accountability for the crimes committed on the last few decades. However, the way this framework has been inserted into the public sphere varies according to the political dynamics of each country and the ways in which each civil society conceives of justice. As part of the material aspect of Duty of Memory, museological institutions are ideal points of departure in examining how the particular historical contexts and social landscapes of Argentina and Colombia have resulted in two different approaches to this shared framework.

In order to carry out my research, I have based my museological analysis on one trauma site and one memorial museum. The memorial museum is the Museum House of Memory (MHM) in Medellín which focuses on mourning the victims of the armed conflict (1946-) and on re-signifying violence to support peacebuilding interventions. The trauma site chosen is the Space of Memory and Human Rights (SMHR) located in the Navy-Petty Officers School of Mechanics (ESMA), one of Buenos Aires’ former Secret Detention Centers, and now functioning as a humanitarian platform to condemn State Terrorism. I will explore how the architectural, spatial, aesthetic and programming practices of these two sites are influenced by the obligations required by this framework but, at the same time, determine the content that is to be included within it, establishing a two-way relationship with the painful pasts of the nations. Four questions guide my research: What are the main functions assumed by these commemorative sites? What are the role victims, survivors and their relatives play within the administration of these institutions, and in the exhibitionary and educational activities they promote? In which ways do the MHM and the SMHR represent the State’s commitment to Truth and Reparations? And finally, what lessons can these two institutions teach other cultural centers which are dealing with, or will deal with, transitional contexts?

The methodology used was primarily based on qualitative research. The historical analysis was based on a bibliographic review of secondary and primary sources such as newspaper articles, Truth Commission reports, national legislations, Human Rights Reports, and museum proposals. For the museographic analysis, the information was collected either through on-site research of the permanent and temporary exhibitions of both museums or through the curatorial scripts and guide manuals drafted by the SMHR and MHM. Since I was not able to do field work on the Educational and Public Outreach programs of each institution, I gained access to these contents with the help of staff members or through institutional websites. In the thesis layout, the curatorial, educational and outreach programs have been grouped thematically. Nonetheless, each of the

(16)

3

programs was examined separately to comprehend how different cultural products revealed different aspects of Duty of Memory. The thesis also included the personal outlooks of victims, their relatives, staff members, Human Rights advocates, artists and intellectuals working at the institutions. I reference two personal communications with staff members of the SMHR, while the remaining ones were taken from online interviews, documentaries, and speeches.

The thesis has been divided into four chapters, and its structure follows a chronological and thematic logic. The initial section of the first chapter outlines the theoretical framework which guides the research. The second part of this chapter provides a historical background on the dictatorial regime in Argentina and the armed conflict in Colombia and gives an insight into the debates surrounding the construction plans and layouts of the two museological institutions. The second and third chapters focus respectively on the SMHR and the MHM. Each of these chapters gives an initial overview of the actors involved in the memorialization process and the previous initiatives which have affected the two institutions. They also conduct an analysis of their exhibitions and educational programs. The conclusion provides an explanation of the differences between the two museological models, and uses their strengths and weaknesses to reflect on how their methodologies may be helpful for other institutions dealing with transitional contexts.

(17)

4

Theoretical Framework

Although its exact attribution is unclear, the expression Devoir de Mémoir, or, its translation in Spanish, Deber de Memoria, is generally assumed to derive from French philosophical responses to the Holocaust. By contrast to English or German, in which it can be translated as Duty of Memory, Duty to Remember, Duty of Remembrance or Debt of Remembrance, in French and Spanish the term has no variants.1_{Both the French devoir and the Spanish deber}

spring from the same Latin root, debere, which refers to 'something that is owed'. By adding mémoire, the combination points towards Devoir de Mémoir, or its more common translation, Duty of Memory: 'I must remember that I am indebted to somebody.' Regardless of the different translations, in all these languages, Duty of Memory is defining the act of remembrance as an ethical imperative, one that commands certain obligations and a particular treatment of memory.

However, this concept of Duty of Memory remains somewhat obscure. Which concept of memory does this term refer to? What is its content such that it can be prescribed as a duty? And whom does this duty address? In this case, memory goes beyond the individual process of storing and recalling information and designates the social process of endowing recollections with meaning. This process, of a predominantly narrative nature, is one which takes place in the public sphere through individuals’ interaction and negotiation (Arenas, 2012; Jelin, 2002). Through it, collectives connect the past with the present and transform a sequence of mere happenings into a storyline. Since the process of negotiation involves various actors in different points of history, it is a process that implies selection and is subject to change. Yet what changes is not the information or the historical events, but the meaning collectives give to these memories in the present and what they decide is worthy of conserving or leaving behind (Pollak, 1989).

1_{According to Bienenstock, M. (2010) the most accurate translation from French to English would be Debt of}

Remembrance. However, since most of the academic texts in the present refer to it as Duty of Memory, I

(18)

5

When the meaning-making process of memories turn to past experiences of mass suffering, such as genocide, dictatorship or warfare, in which the proclamation of certain historical narratives may disregard the losses of an injured party and potentially lead to the reoccurrence of violence, it is believed that the act of remembrance carries with it a weight, a duty. Memories become a social imperative and are subsumed into justice because it is believed that collectives should not overlook or remain impassive towards painful histories. Instead, they should take responsibility for the past, acknowledging the voices of those who were wronged and giving them a space to express themselves (Teitel, 2014). As Barón & Marín (2011) assert, Duty of Memory “is a duty towards the wrecked (the ones who did not make it) and a responsibility for those who were saved (the ones who made it) to give an account of what happened. It is also a call to society so that through the exercise of telling, it can exorcise, liberate, and reconstruct itself” (130).2

Therefore, it is possible to equate Duty of Memory to Todorov's (2000) concept of Exemplary Memory. Considered as a form of social remembrance, Exemplary Memory strives to incorporate stories of pain, exclusion and repression as part of a community's history to allow individuals process collective wrongdoings and extract lessons from them. Contrary to Literal Memory, in which the memories of difficult events are seen only in terms of grief, Exemplary Memory serves as a referent of action in the present and helps tackle prevailing social inequalities and injustices. Thus, Duty of Memory attempts to transcend guilt and culpability by establishing itself as a political exercise to confront the horrors of history and overcome its legacies by creating inclusive and nondestructive ways of social coexistence (Ševčenko, 2011).

Fundamentally, the role of Duty Memory as a framework with which to confront the past is based upon the idea that "there is a core of innate rights to human beings, in such a way that if they are violated they would be violating, in the end, the core of humanity itself" (González Jácome, 2007, p. 50)3_{. Endorsed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights}

(1948) that resulted from the aftermath of the Holocaust, states have been made responsible for guaranteeing and protecting these basic rights to prevent the recurrence of

2_{Translated from Spanish by the author: “Es un deber para con el hundido (el que no lo logró) y es una}

obligación para el salvado (el que lográndolo) debe dar cuenta de lo que pasó. Pero también es un llamado a la sociedad, para que a través del relato, exorcice, libere, reconstruya” (Barón & Marín, 2011, 130)

3_{Translated from Spanish by the author: "Las reparaciones están reconociendo que hay un núcleo de derechos}

innatos a los seres humanos, de forma tal que si se les vulneran se estaría violentando, en últimas, la propia naturaleza” (González Jácome, 2007, p. 50)

(19)

6

mass-scale destruction of populations (Tate, 2007)4_{. When a violation has already taken}

place, Duty of Memory makes itself present, so that nation-states confront the transgression and actively seek to make amends through what Bonner (2014) has termed ‘discursive accountability’. Defined as a reframing act, discursive accountability is meant to involve state and civil society actors in the task of deeming unacceptable something previously tolerated, so future violators can be held responsible. Through this form of accountability, memories of painful events expose the faults of societies and contribute to the public edification of citizens. In this sense, discursive accountability is seen as a key step in activating legal and other forms of responsibility.

It is therefore unsurprising that in the last two decades Duty of Memory has become a framework through which states are attempting to restore social trust and the legitimacy of democratic institutions (Jelin, 2002; Orozco, 2009). Currently, Duty of Memory forms part of the TJS, a distinctive conception of justice employed in periods of political change after authoritarian governments or armed conflicts with the aim of state-building. TJS is formed by a series of judicial and non-judicial measures implemented to process violations through the use of a Human Rights discourse (Teitel, 2014). Judicial measures include criminal prosecutions and reforms of laws and institutions such as the police and military. Non-judicial actions include Truth Commissions and other symbolic and economic forms of compensation (International Center for Transitional Justice, n.d.).5_{Duty of Memory forms}

part of the symbolic reparation scheme which helps dignify victims by clarifying the circumstances that lead to mass suffering, establishing a public disclosure on the truth and counteracting denial or censorship (International Court of Transitional Justice, 2013; Jelin,

4_{Since the concept of Human Rights remains ambiguous in meaning, I decided to base my analysis on Tate’s}

(2007) definition. “Human Rights hold the individual as the ultimate rights-bearing subject. Through international legal standards and multilateral treaties, Human Right claims are made against the state because it is the institution that promises to protect its citizens and holds the monopoly of power” (p.5).

5_{These judicial and non-judicial measures integrate two conceptions of justice that resulted from the}

Nuremberg Trials (1945-1946) and Argentina's (1984) and South Africa's (1994) Truth Commissions. On the one hand, the TJS assimilates the Nuremberg Trials’ Retributive Justice, setting up the principle of individual criminal accountability for gross violations of universal human dignity. On the other hand, it integrates South Africa's and Argentina's focus on the victims and the need to repair the damage caused by revealing a past wrongdoing through Truth Commissions reports and other symbolic acts of reparation (Paige, 2009; Teitel, 2014).

(20)

7

2014). “According to the guidelines adopted by the UN's General Assembly, victims are entitled to have three different demands met: (a) access to justice, (b) the right to reparation, and, lastly, (c) the right to know what happened” (Morte, 2014, p. 439). In this case, Duty of Memory acts upon the rights to truth and reparation as it emphasizes a crime has taken place, focuses on the verification of facts, ensures adequate access to information on the violations and gives families and communities the possibility of mourning and commemorating their losses.

Initially, Truth Commissions were seen as the preferred method through which Duty of Memory could fulfill the victim's right to truth and reparation. Created as official bodies to investigate, document and report upon Human-Rights abuses that occurred over a historical period, commissions produce written documents based on the victims’ and survivors’ accounts of history, accuse perpetrators and show the scale of damage inflicted in society (Morte, 2014; Zalaquett, 2004). However, the implementation of various TJSs has demonstrated that these rights can also be implemented through other formats to make reparation have a greater and long lasting social impact (González Jácome, 2007). This is why artistic, cultural and memorialization initiatives are now seen as alternative methods through which states can pay the social debt they owe to victims, survivors and their relatives. Memorialization can assume either material or immaterial forms. The latter include the announcing of specific dates as holidays of remembrance, the dissemination of mourning rituals and activities that pay homage to the survivors and the dead, and the promulgation of the victims’ perspective within state educational programs. The former acknowledges painful pasts through the installation of physical markers such as memorials, plaques, parks, museums, and archives. These markers integrate Duty of Memory into the physical landscape of a nation and make them accessible parts of everyday life (Williams, 2007).

Argentina and Colombia are two examples of the complexities inherent in attempting to restore the social networks scarred by a past military dictatorship and a continuing internal armed conflict through the application of a TJS and Duty of Memory as state policy.6

6_{As Teitel (2014) outlines, Transitional Justice chronology implies a “nonlinear approach to time. This}

phenomenon is reflected in legal responses that are taken often in the form of delayed litigation, to extend the span of transitional, case by-case” (p.61). Therefore, even though thirty-five years have passed since Argentina made its transition towards democracy (1983), judicial prosecutions are still being filed against former military members and civilian collaborators. Colombia’s implementation of transitional justice mechanisms even before the end of an internal armed conflict also demonstrate that these normative shifts do not necessarily

(21)

8

Both countries have resignified the meaning of crucial historical dates, so the stories and lives of the victims of state repression and armed conflict achieve public recognition. Argentina has renamed March 24th, the anniversary of the Coup d'Etat, as the Day of Remembrance for Truth and Justice. Meanwhile, Colombia has selected April 9th, a date that previously commemorated the 1948 assassination of the liberal presidential candidate, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, and converted it into the National Day of Memory and Solidarity with the Victims. Thirdly, Argentina and Colombia have installed, or plan to install, National Memory Archives responsible for collecting and preserving all official and personal documentation related to the theme of state terrorism and armed conflict. These initiatives provide access, for both government and civil society, to information that helps reconstruct events in the interests of academic research or effective judicial investigations (Mercosur IPPDH, 2012). Moreover, both states have also funded the establishment of landmarks, such as monuments and memorial tiles, in the places where violations took place or where victims used to live, work or study, and have included these as part of the symbolic reparation measures. Nevertheless, since Duty of Memory is a political exercise there are inherent in it additional obligations which differ between the two countries (Bienenstock, 2010). Therefore, it is necessary to understand the historical contexts of the two nations in order to comprehend the obligations and functions this duty assumes within the cultural sphere.

The Contexts of Duty of Memory

In Argentina, Duty of Memory is used to overcome the lack of retributive justice towards the crimes of a state which used extreme forms of repression to maintain its political hegemony. Argentinian's refer to this historical period, which lasted six years, as ‘Dirty War’ (J. Dávila, 2013). During this time the military dictatorship turned mass imprisonment, torture, and disappearance of civilians into a state policy which was supposedly aimed at neutralizing the 'Communist menace' in Argentina (Vezzetti, 2002). From 1976 until 1983, the military converted a "vast network of shop fronts, private residencies, auto mechanic shops, factories, hospitals, and public military schools into makeshift torture centers" (Bishop E. K, December 2014, 566).

to follow a standard post-agreement procedure and can be used to instigate reforms that actually contribute to curtailing violence (Orozco, 2009; Skaar, García-Godos, & Collins, 2016).

(22)

9

According to Human Rights organizations, 10,000 were imprisoned, 30,000 adults and 300 teenagers disappeared, 30,000 became exiles and 500 children were born in Secret Detention Center (SDC) and then taken away from their mothers (Brodsky, 2005). Family members of the disappeared and ex-detainees condemned this repression as a form of 'state terrorism.' By contrast, the Military Junta considered it the only way to restore a sense of order and stability in Argentinian society, a sense that was indeed lost during the turbulence of the 60s and 70. In this period, characterized by a general disbelief in democratic forms of government and recurrent financial crises, antagonisms between left-wing and right-left-wing parties were heightened. Successive coups d' état by military and civilians (1955, 1962 and 1966) and increased participation of the youth in urban guerrilla movements, such as Montoneros and Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), discredited the belief in the rule of law (Miguez, 2016; Vezzetti, 2002). As Argentina made its transition to democracy in 1983, the elected president, Raul Alfonsín, transformed the families’ search for the disappeared into a quest for justice. For a short period of time, both the government and social movements agreed that the foundation of a new democratic order should disassemble the repressive state apparatus in the courts. Alfonsín created aNational Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) which published the official report about the Human Rights violations committed by the military dictatorship and entitled it Nunca Más (Never More). Moreover, Alfonsín signed Decree No.158 a measure that ratified legal proceedings against nine of the former junta members and established a National Court to prosecute them, and members of other guerrilla groups who were responsible for the violence lived between the 60s and 80s. The Trial of the Juntas (1985), though frowned upon by some sectors of society, left an indelible mark on the collective imagination and became the foundational act of Argentina's contemporary democracy (Cultura Argentina, n.d.; Romero, 2012; Van Drunen, 2010; Vezzetti, 2002).

Nevertheless, the newly established republic was fragile and both the persistence of economic instability and political pressures from civilian and military groups that had served during the dictatorship (ex. Carapintadas), foreclosed the possibility of legitimizing the rule of law. By the end of his government in 1989, Alfonsín had signed the laws Punto Final (23.492 of 1986) and Obediencia Debida (23.521 of 1987) through which the government officially stopped the prosecutions against the military and guerrilla members found responsible for violations. Moreover, Alfonsín's resignation amidst hyperinflation and social animosity enabled the following president, Carlos Menem, to sign ten presidential pardons in 1989 and 1990 revoking the need for accountability and neutralizing the rebellious sectors within the

(23)

10

military forces that were provoking social upheaval (Romero, 2012). Menem’s claim was that the victims’, survivors’ and relatives’ need for accountability blocked the possibility of reconciling with the past because it kept the wounds open and deepened polarization. In this case, pardons were “understood as part of a broader program of ‘eradication of resentment’ […] however, like in many Latin American countries, reconciliation became a code for impunity” (Van Drunen, 2010, p. 85)

For the following years, victim and solidarity organizations, later combined under the umbrella term ‘Human Rights organizations’, challenged the state's law of silence and struggled to reverse the rules that had pardoned military officials and kept the crimes of the past unpunished. These groups joined forces during the dictatorship to publicly denounce the state's rule of silence and actively search for the whereabouts of the disappeared in police stations, churches, ministries and international organizations. Solidarity organizations, mainly composed of social scientists, as well as lawyers and politically engaged churchmen, provided relatives and victims with legal assistance. They filed each of the disappearance cases reported by the families and published lists in the newspapers to demonstrate the state's complicity in the criminal acts (Van Drunen, 2010, p. 50). Victim associations, on the other hand, defied the juntas through public acts of resistance such as the weekly demonstrations of mothers of the disappeared in the Plaza de Mayo. The relatives’ appeal to blood ties, instead of political affiliations, made it difficult for the military to claim them as ´subversive elements´ and to openly attack the movement. As a result of their combined actions during the dictatorship, these two groups became leading actors in the accountability process of post-Dictatorship Argentina. In the production of CONADEP’S official report about the disappearance labeled as Nunca Más as well as in the Trial of the Juntas, these organizations provided researchers and judges with the testimonies and documentation required to prosecute the military.7_{Since then organizations like League for}

the Rights of Men (Liga), Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ), Centre for Legal Studies (CELS) and Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights (MEDH) and victim associations such as Family members of Disappeared-Detainees (Familiares), Abuelas, and Madres of the Plaza de Mayo motivated the search for Justice,

7_{Even when it does not stand as such, CONADEP stands as the first modern-day Truth Commission. However,}

the investigatory model is associated with the response adopted in post-apartheid South Africa in the 1990s since it was the first one to employ the term (Teitel, 2014).

(24)

11

Truth and Reparation (Espacio Memoria y Derechos Humanos, Dic 15 2014)8_{. Together with}

post-dictatorial victim and solidarity organizations such as Ex-Detainee/Disappeared Association (AEDD), H.I.J.O.S, Argentinian Historical and Social Memory Foundation, these groups mobilized citizens in their resistance against promoted silence and impunity. For these groups, the lack of reform to the security forces, and the fact that many who had benefited economically or politically from the repression continued to play significant roles in the democratic administration, proved the fragility of the rule of law. In this context, to combat impunity was not only to keep the memories of the victims alive but to fight against the lack of justice for ordinary citizens who could be vulnerable to new form of state violence (Van Drunen, 2010).

In 2003, with the advent of president Ernesto Kirchner, the official discourse about the Dictatorship changed and Duty of Memory became an official state policy. As a former prisoner of an SDC and opponent of Menem's abuses of presidential powers, Kirchner decided to make the addressing of the unsolved crimes of the Dictatorship a central part of his political agenda (Feld, 2017). The National Congress supported this approach towards the past. That year, the Congress annulled the laws Obediencia Debida, Punto Final, and the presidential pardons by declaring them anti-constitutional. Meanwhile, Kirchner revoked the legal measures that prohibited the extradition of military officers accused of Human Rights abuses. Both legal actions gave the state and the victim's organizations the ability to re-initiate the trials against the perpetrators and collaborators that had been foreclosed since the Trial of the Juntas (Lessa, 2017). This legal opening gave way to new case trials, now called Megacausas which collected extensive evidence and gathered testimonies from ex-detainees, relatives and solidarity organizations to legitimate their claims (Lakitsch, 2014). These legal proceedings are entitled as "mega" because they carry out collective trials prosecuting according to the crime committed or its location: imprisonment, torture, disappearance in SDC’s such as Olimpo, Atlético, etc. (Espacio Memoria y Derechos Humanos, n.d.-d). One of the main Megacausas was enacted in 2007 by the Supreme Court to research and prosecute the Human Rights violations that had taken place in the ESMA.

8_{In 1986, after an internal dispute over the state’s exhumation of NN graves, economic reparations to}

victims and the leadership of the mother Hebe de Bonafini, the Mother’s Plaza De Mayo group split into two. The half commanded by Bonafini kept the name Mothers de la Plaza de Mayo while the twelve members that left the association christened their new group Madres L.F (Mothers- Foundational Line-L.F.), since most of them had formed part of the social movement at the moment of its creation in 1977 (Forcinito, 2004; International Institute of Social History, n.d.)

(25)

12

This Megacausa has been divided into four different trials of which three have already returned a verdict.

In order to facilitate collection processes for the Megacausas, the government sanctioned a decree in which a National Archive of Memory was created to safeguard any documentation related to the Human Rights violations committed during 1976 and 1983. Furthermore, the government also enacted a law (26.691) and two decrees (1986/2014 and 1259/03) in which former centers of detention and torture are now legally conceived of as Memory Sites. This implies that the state is responsible for preserving the material memory of the Military Dictatorship to assist in any ‘’judicial investigations of grave Human Right violations” committed in this period (SAIJ, 2011).

The Argentinian government does not have a specific Victims Law. Despite the state points out that since 1994 a specific set of individuals have been able to apply and receive economical reparations for the suffering through the laws 24.411, 24.043 and 26.564 (República Argentina, n.d.). Their categorization agrees with what the Human Rights organizations consider a victim within the Argentinian context, that is, those individuals whose rights were violated by the 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1976 dictatorial regimes. Those who can apply for compensation are: 1) any civilian who was detained and disappeared between the 16th of June of 1955 and the 9th of December 1983, 2) any civilian who has been injured or has died in the hands of any security, police or paramilitary forces in the uprisings of the 16th of June 1955 and the 16th September, 1955, 3) any family member of a disappeared civilian, 4) any child who has been born in prison or whose parents have been detained and 5) any civilian judged in a Drumhead court and detained for political reasons between 1974 and 1983 (Solís Delgadillo, 2015).

Moreover, the president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner drafted and signed a bill in 2010 which intended to ratify the right of individuals and groups to the historical memory of the Dictatorship, as well as the state's obligation to preserve this memory. The law was meant to expand the Archive's access to the confidential information of military intelligence. However, the bill was rejected by the Chamber of Deputies (Página/12, 2015). The state compensated for the absence of this law by subscribing to the Mercosur IPPDH guidelines on public policies with regards to the management of Sites of Memory:

"Deber de Memoria. The obligation States have of arranging effective mechanisms to investigate and, eventually, sanction and judge the alleged responsible for human rights violations as well as guaranteeing the rights to truth, memory, and integral

(26)

13

reparation. It is important to note that these obligations are not alternative or selective. That is, the state cannot choose only one of them and discard the rest" (Mercosur IPPDH, 2012, p. 7).9

The subscription to the Mercosur guidelines, along with the economic compensations, laws and decrees ratified by Ernesto Kirchner show that Duty of Memory has become an official state policy as a way to acknowledge both the victims, survivors and relatives’ loss and the work Human Rights groups have done to counteract impunity and its effects on present-day political configurations. Thus, the materialization of Duty of Memory, through the transformation of SDC’s into Site of Memory, as well as the creation of archives and regional commissions, responds to a need to preserve the traces of crime and avoid any form of historical negation in the name of reconciliation.

In Colombia's case, Duty of Memory seeks to determine the causes of Colombia’s armed conflict and learn the truth beneath major Human Rights violations in order to curtail its ongoing presence. According to the three Academic Commissions which have analyzed the conflict, its roots trace back to the 1946-1958 bipartisan conflict labeled as La Violencia (The Violence).10_{Dispossession and appropriation of lands by the bipartisan self-armed}

groups, limited political opportunities and lack of employment for the displaced farmers in the cities led many citizens to resort to military ends or illegal economic activities, such as smuggling and drug trafficking. Between the 60s and 80s, five important guerrilla groups consolidated their presence in the territory: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the 19th of April Movement (M-19), the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Popular

9_{Translated from Spanish by the author. “Los Estados tienen la obligación de disponer de mecanismos}

efectivos para investigar y eventualmente juzgar y sancionar a presuntos responsables de dichas violaciones, así como de garantizar los derechos a la verdad, a la memoria y la reparación integral. Cabe destacar que estas obligaciones del Estado no son alternativas o selectivas, esto es, no puede elegirse una o más de ellas para su cumplimiento, descartando las otras” (Mercosur IPPDH, 2012, p. 7).

10_{Historically, three academic Commissions have become the leading interpreters of violence in Colombia.}

The names of the investigating bodies are: La Investigadora in 1958 (The Researcher), Comisión de estudios

sobre la violencia in 1987 (Study Commission about Violence) and Grupo Nacional de Memoria Histórica

(National Historical Memory Group) from 2007 to the present. The Researcher dealt with La Violencia (1946-1965) and the fight between Liberal and conservative parties. The Study Commission, analyzed the proliferation of criminal enterprises that pursued political and economical motives and employed direct aggression to threaten and eliminate individuals and social groups in the 80s and 90s. Finally, the National Historical Memory Group explains the emergence of guerrilla insurrectional warfare and the legal and illegal responses offered by the state and the paramilitary, as well as monitoring the demobilization of illegal armed groups and the reparation of victims (Allier, E., & Crenzel, 2015).

(27)

14

Liberation Army (EPL) and the Quintín Lame Armed Movement (MAQL). Additionally, guerrilla self-defense groups, later labeled ‘Paramilitary Organizations’, strengthened their power with the support of wealthy landowners and drug cartels in the 80s (ex. Death to Kidnappers- MAS). The revenues provided by cocaine exportation strengthened both guerrilla warfare and organized crime and led to the persecution of political leaders, public personalities, and academics.

By the beginning of the 1990s, the bipartisan conflict had transformed into a complex “interlinking of guerrilla warfare, dirty war and organized crime, the war on drugs, and the prevalence of social/everyday violence” which has had and continues to have a strongly destabilizing power in Colombia (Riano-Alcala, 2006, p. 5). The term ‘internal armed conflict’ has become widely accepted in both academia and the state to designate this interlinking (Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus víctimas, February 2015). This concept signifies a series of collective armed actions within a nation between governmental and non-governmental forces, but does not imply a complete collapse of the state (Pécaut, 2001). Additionally, this definition coheres to the 1949 Geneva Convention’s distinction between the concept of international and non-international armed conflicts (ICRC, 2014).

Since guerrilla and paramilitary groups, as well as military forces and organized crime gangs, are involved in the confrontation, there is not one single expression of violence but an extensive repertory of Human Rights violations. While the paramilitaries have turned to massacres and forced disappearances, the guerrillas have primarily relied upon kidnappings, terrorist attacks, forced recruitment and loss of immovable property. Infringing International Humanitarian Law, armed forces have sometimes also resorted to torture, arbitrary detention, targeted killings and disappearances in order to mark territorial control. Finally, criminal gangs employ all the aforementioned violations, excluding the loss of movable and immovable property, land dispossession or anti-personnel mines. Most of these confrontations have taken place in the rural areas and city slums of Colombia, where state absence and poverty make it easier for illegal armed forces to assert their control over the population and go mostly unnoticed by those living in the main urban centers:

hWar has been waged mostly in the countryside of Colombia, in the hamlets, villages

and municipalities, far off and distant from the central country or large cities. It is a war that many Colombians do not see, do not feel, a war that does not threaten them. A war of which they have notice through the lens of the media, which others suffer

(28)

15

and which allows thousands of people to live in the illusion that the country enjoys prosperity and full democracy […] (GMH, 2013, p. 22).11

Even when overlooked by many, these armed actions continue to drive the conflict and severely impact the social tissue. The figures speak for themselves. Recent registries show that only between 1982 and 2012, the conflict has registered over 220,000 homicides, 95 terrorist attacks, 154 massacres, 5,7 million victims of forced displacement, 25,007 disappearances, 23,154 targeted assassinations, 27,000 kidnappings, 10,000 victims of anti-personnel mines and 1,754 victims of sexual assault (GMH, 2013). Conflict has also left its mark in the political sphere since armed actors have gradually infiltrated local and regional governmental bodies, establishing a nexus with politicians through bribery, cooptation or fear, increasing corruption and decreasing citizens’ belief in official institutions (Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas, 2015; Londoňo, 2013). Within this turbulent context, Human Rights organizations have striven to remain united amidst the constant threat from the armed groups that tend to silence dissenting voices. These groups have undertaken three major roles: protecting human lives, encouraging democratic forms of participation and political empowerment of communities affected by the conflict and raising awareness within society to discourage the use of violence. Similar to Argentina, Human Rights organizations are made up of victim organizations (relatives and survivors) as well as solidarity groups of syndicalists, intellectuals, and social workers. As in other Latin American countries, solidarity associations formed in the late seventies precisely following Argentina’s example and implemented some of their strategies to question the state’s involvement and negligence towards the conflict. However, grassroots organizations, religious congregations and international NGOs have played a more predominant role in Colombia’s struggle for Justice, Truth and Reparation since activist identity emerged from the political culture of the communist and Catholic institutions, as well as the external appeal to international standards of justice (Tate, 2007). Moreover, victim associations did not signal the beginning of Human Rights movement in the country, since most of these groups flourished within or as a response to the work of solidarity organizations in the

11_{Translated from Spanish by the author: La guerra se ha librado mayoritariamente en el campo colombia, en}

los caseríos, veredas y municipios, lejanos y apartados del país central o de las grandes ciudades. Es una guerra que muchos colombianos no ven, no sienten, una guerra que no los amenaza. Una guerra de la que se tienen noticias a través del lente de los medios de comunicación, que sufren otros y que permite a miles de personas vivir en la ilusión de que el país goza de democracia plena y prosperidad (GMH, 2013).

(29)

16

regions (Comité Permanente por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, 2004). Nevertheless, these groups have acquired more visibility in Colombia’s political sphere since the 2000s, and along with intellectuals and Human Rights advocates, demand that the state redress the damage caused by acknowledging their right to clarification, economic compensation, land restitution and commemoration initiatives.

On various occasions the state has attempted to find a negotiated solution to the conflict with both right-wing paramilitaries and left-wing guerrillas. These attempts took place between 1990-1994, 1998-2002, 2003-2006 and 2012-2016. One of these has achieved the partial demobilization of three major paramilitary groups (AUC, Cacique Nutibara and Bloque Metro) between 2003 and 2006. This process has since been referred to as the Justice and Peace agreement. The remaining negotiations have been made separately with each of the four guerrilla groups in the territory: M-19 (1989), EPL (1991), MAQL (1991) and FARC (2016). All five agreements have included the disarmament process and the reintegration of illegal groups into civilian life. However only once the Justice and Peace Law was ratified in 2005 were the rights of victims acknowledged and Duty of Memory become part of the state’s reparation strategy.

In the articles 5 and 56 of Law 975 of 2005, the Justice and Peace Law defined victims as all civilians or members of the military forces who have suffered either direct damage from a violent act committed by illegal armed groups, or indirect damage through the killing or disappearance of a family member. They have the right to know the truth about the crimes committed, the whereabouts of their loved ones and the reasons why the violations took place. Within the clarification process, the state is now endowed with the task of explaining to its victims the historical causes, dynamics, and consequences involved in the armed conflict. Henceforth, the state should guarantee the victims access to justice as well as “foster restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and […] guarantees of non-repetition behavior" (República de Colombia, 2005, p. 10).

Through Law 975 the Colombian state gave in to the plea of Human Rights advocates to consider the process of reparation and restitution for the victims as key elements in decreasing the prevalence of violence and encouraging structural changes in society that would pave a road to long-lasting peace. In order to fulfill the victim’s rights, as well as demobilization and reinsertion of paramilitary members into society, Article 50 of this same law created the National Commission on Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR). This Commission was to last for eight years and was divided into different sub-commissions, one of them being the sub-commission on Historical Memory. Named the Historical Memory

(30)

17

Group (GMH), this entity gathered social scientists, lawyers, social workers and photojournalists, such as director Gónzalo Sánchez, with experience working on armed conflict, to construct a historical account of Human Rights violations in areas affected by the mass killings perpetrated by paramilitaries and guerrillas (Altuzarra, 2011; González Jácome, 2007). In order to produce reports on exemplary cases of violations, the GMH approached victims and Human Rights groups “to collect their testimonies, legitimate the process of reconstructing historical memory and activate or support local processes of truth telling. Victims became documentary sources and participants in the processes of characterizing these damages”(Alcalá & Uribe, 2016, p. 15).12_{Furthermore, along with other}

sub-commissions, the GMH created a pilot scheme of collective reparations in which marginalized communities (farmers, syndicalists and ethnic groups) were entitled to benefit from additional material, symbolic and political forms of reparations (Unidad de victímas, n.d.).

Initially, the GMH would cease to exist along with the CNRR in 2010. However, through the implementation of the Law 1448 of 2011, known as Victims’ Law, the government created a National System for the Attention and Integral Reparation for the Victims (SNARIV) and transformed the GMH into the National Centre for Historical Memory (CNMH). As a result of this law, the CNMH has assumed new roles. It is now responsible for the publication of reports on violations, and for the musealization and pedagogization of the past intended for future generations. Since then, the organization has reached a wider public by capturing the victims’ outlook on war through educational products, seminaries and temporary exhibits. However, its biggest project is the establishment of a National Museum of Memory. In order to carry out this project, the CNMH has arranged more than a hundred regional meetings and oral history workshops, establishing a wide network of alliances with Human Rights groups and stimulating the construction of memory landmarks around the different regions of Colombia (Museo Nacional de la Memoria, 2017)(See Appendix AB).

Additionally, this law has refined the concept of victim to include both individuals and groups whose Human Rights have been violated in the context of the armed conflict after January 1st, 1985 (Presidencia de la República & Congreso Nacional, 2011). They can seek

12_{The reports and investigations published by the GMH between 2005-2010 were: Trujillo: A tragedy that does}

not cease (2008), Remember to Narrate the conflict (2009), Memories in Times of War (2009), El Salado: That war was not ours (2009), Land in Dispute (2010), Bahía Portete Massacre. Wayuu women on the look (2010), La Rochela. Memories of a crime against justice (2010), Bojayá. A war without limits (2010), A history of peace to tell, retell and not forget (2010) and Concepts and Tools of Historical Memory from a Gender Perspective (2010).

(31)

18

justice and reparation if they have endured one or more of a list of twelve victimizing facts. These are threat, torture, kidnapping, homicide, forced disappearance, displacement, youth recruitment, loss of movable and immovable property, land dispossession, anti-personnel mines, offenses against sexual integrity and terrorist attacks (Unidad de victímas, 2017). From then onwards, any official organization which wishes to narrate the conflict has to take this categorization into account. For example, the latest comprehensive report of the armed conflict produced by the CNMH named Basta ya! (Enough!) has included this classification within its analysis (GMH, 2013). However, it is still uncertain if future memorialization initiatives will be grouped according to the victimization facts they respond to. There is still no consensus as to how much and in what ways these projects should comply with the goals established by the law in order to fulfill the state’s Duty of Memory (Unidad para las víctimas, 2015). Overall, the most relevant fact is that within the Victims’ Law, Duty of Memory is not only limited to the timeline of a peace treaty, as with the Justice and Peace agreement. That is, Duty of Memory has acquired a permanent status, signaling the beginning of a new relationship of society with its past and present.

Undoubtedly, Human RIghts groups in Argentina and Colombia have played a key role in determining the role painful pasts should assume in the present of their societies, enhancing democratic forms of participation and encouraging institutional reforms that prevent the recurrence of violent events (Allier, E., & Crenzel, 2015). Following Jelin (2002), these Human Rights groups can be considered ‘memory entrepreneurs’ because they act as figures who "mobilize their energies around the past as a common cause to call attention to certain deviant behaviors and fight to prevent its repetition" (p.79).13_{Nonetheless, in}

Argentina’s case, the implementation of Duty of Memory as a state policy was a result of a series of disputes between the state’s repeated attempts to pardon the violations committed by the military and the Human Rights groups opposition to such measures. In Colombia, this framework is a result of negotiations between the armed actors and the state that has been endorsed by the latter through the mediation of Human rights groups working within and outside official entities. Therefore, the historical trajectory of these groups and the relationship they have established with the State has shaped Duty of Memory into two different approaches even when both are products of TJS and the Memory, Truth and Justice paradigm.

13_{Translated from Spanish by the author.}_“[…]_{es quien llama la atención del público sobre ciertas conductas vistas como} desviadas, movilizan sus energías en función de una causa relacionada con el pasado y buscan incidir para evitar su repetición” (Jelin, 2002, p. 79).

(32)

19

On the one hand, Human Rights groups emphasis on condemning State terrorism and implementing legal accountability on behalf of the disappeared-detainees in Argentina is closer to the Retributive Justice model (Conflict Solutions Center, n.d.; Gooley, 2012). The focus of reparation is placed on preserving the traces of crime and pressuring the criminal justice system to establish blame for these past abuses because social groups believe punishment to be an effective measure in deterring violence and validating the rule of law. Measures that focus on reconciliation, due to Alfonsín’s and Menem’s setbacks on accountability, are equated with amnesty and impunity.

By contrast, Colombia’s longstanding conflict and the simultaneous involvement of diverse armed actors that feed on the country's social, political and economic inequalities, has led the state to lean towards a more Restorative approach when considering reparation. Within this model, the state understands that punishment alone will not be effective in curtailing violence or repairing the damage caused to the social networks. Crime goes beyond an individual dimension of responsibility and reparation is based on encouraging dialogue, negotiation and restoration of the bonds of trust, both between civilians and between civilians and the state (Uprimny & Saffon, 2006).

Regardless of their differences, it cannot be said that the two countries embrace either a ‘pure’ Retributive or Restorative model, as that would suggest either that Colombia has disregarded the need for accountability completely or that Argentina has not pondered on the collective dimensions of responsibility for its painful past. They both exhibit a mixed approach on the spectrum between Retributive and Restorative justice models in which victims assume a prominent role and determine the direction and outcome of the TJS and the role of Duty of Memory within it. It is interesting that that difference between Colombia’s and Argentina’s approach to justice is immediately visible when one turns to examine the museological projects they have produced. In this respect, the Memory House Museum (MHM) in Medellín and the Space of Memory and Human Rights (SMHR) in Buenos Aires stand out as good points of departure to examine how this shared framework has resulted in two different outcomes.

Retaking control of a Secret Detention Center

The Navy-Petty Officers School of Mechanics (ESMA) is a complex of thirty-four buildings covering approximately fourteen and a half acres of land. The land was sold to the City Council in 1904, and handed over to the Navy in 1924 with the purpose of building a military

(33)

20

training school (Bishop, 2014; Brodsky, 2005). The ESMA is located in the neighborhood of Núñez on the northern bank of the river Plata, one the four wealthiest comunas (district) of the city of Buenos Aires. Its proximity to a residential area, and the visibility of its sumptuous architecture along one of the principal thoroughfares of Buenos Aires, made it difficult for citizens to imagine that the complex housed one of the biggest SDCs in the country (Arnold-de Simine, 2013). This disbelief was accurately (Arnold-depicted in Walter Goobar’s statement, “The ESMA was the only place in which, if you ask people in the street if it used to be a concentration camp, people will respond 'The ESMA? Why?’ It is a well-known building; everybody has seen the ESMA at least once’’ (Levey, 2016, p. 157)(See Appendix A. Map of Buenos Aires).

During the Dictatorship, approximately 5,000 prisoners were detained in the ESMA. Therefore, it was no surprise to find that the School’s facilities figured prominently in CONADEP's Nunca Más report. Since then, the building's relationship with the military juntas was consolidated in the public opinion, but this did not lead to an immediate change in its use. In post-dictatorship times, the ESMA resumed its former use as a Naval school. While this act could be seen as evidence of the state's refusal to confront the crime, at that time victims’ organizations did not consider the retake of the ESMA as a necessary component of their fight for justice and truth. When the first initiatives to commemorate the disappeared through a museum were designed, the idea of transforming former SDC's into museological institutions was not seriously considered. In fact, when solidarity organizations, such as Memoria Abierta, or city councilors proposed three different museum projects, House of the Disappeared (1990), Museum of memory and Nunca Más (1997) and Work Commission for the Foundation of a Museum of Memory (1999), all three proposed locations were outside of military spaces (Guglielmucci, 2013; Van Drunen, 2010). Only one project, in 1995, suggested that the former SDC of El Olimpo in Buenos Aires become a Museum of Memory, and it was met with opposition from both the Head of the Federal Police and members of the city council (Jensen, K., 2007). Regardless of their differences, the four projects failed either because Human Rights groups could not reach a consensus or because victim organizations such as AEDD, Familiares, H.I.J.O.S and Madres of the Plaza opposed the projects, asking "How was our problem to become a museum?" (Van Drunen, 2010, p. 249).

However, the state's decision to symbolically erase the detention centers from Argentina's landscape through active destruction or neglect led Human Rights organizations to consider turning these places into memory markers in order to maintain