Idealism or security : what is Europe’s actual motive? : about the impact of energy security on the EU’s effort to promote liberal values

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Idealism or security:

what is Europe’s actual motive?

About the impact of energy security on the EU’s effort to promote liberal values

Steven de Jong January 2015

Bachelor Thesis

Political Science, University of Amsterdam Thesis Project Energy and Geopolitics in China and the European Union Supervisor: dr. M. P. Amineh Student: Steven de Jong, 10266925 Version: 19 January 2015

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ABSTRACT

Key words: European Union; EU foreign policy; EU energy policy approach; EU and liberal values; EU’s material interests

The promotion of the so-called ‘liberal values’, human rights and democracy, is often presented as one of the main aims in the external policy of the European Union (EU). It is questionable,

however, whether these attempts are always consistent and honest. Other interests are likely to influence the EU’s external policy. The EU is dependent on non-EU countries for a big share of its energy consumption, something that influences both its economic interests in other countries as well as its internal energy supply security. This study suggests that energy interests are the key determinant in understanding the true motives of the EU’s external position, and investigates the tension between the idealistic attempts to promote liberal values and the existence of realistic energy interest. The study focuses on the region where the main EU energy partners are to be found, a region that is also characterized by a low level of liberal values: the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) and Central Eurasia (CEA).

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PREFACE

On many occasions during the bachelor Political Science, students are reminded of what would be a great closure of one’s study and the appliance of all the skills one would have developed: the writing of a bachelor thesis. It becomes something that many fear, and some look forward to. I started a bit sceptical with my thesis as well, but during the process, I became more and more engaged with the topic and with the writing of my own research. It is therefore with much pride, excitement, and maybe some surprise, that I present my thesis.

I want to express my gratitude towards many that supported me in this process, including my supervisor Mehdi Amineh and my dear friends Yael Aartsma, Sam van Noort, Kasper Goosen, Mara Soekarjo and Manuel Buitenhuis. They all understood that ‘supporting’ does not contradict expressing criticism. Without you, I would never have been able to present this study.

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Political map of Central Eurasia (CEA)

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Political map of the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA)

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Political map of the 28 European Union member states (EU-28)

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LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Figure 1.1 EU’s normative basis...13

Figure 1.2 Argument of the thesis...16

Table 2.1 results of independent variable ‘The position of the EU’...25

Table 3.1 data of main variables...28

Table 3.2 data of control variables...29

Figure 3.3 scatterplot of Energy Dependency and Position of the EU...30

Table 3.4 model testing Energy Dependency and Inclusiveness on Position of the EU...31

Table 3.5 model testing interaction of Energy Dependency and Inclusiveness on Position of the EU...31

Table 3.6 model testing the reserves of oil and gas on the Position of the EU...32

Table 3.7 models testing five different variables on the EU’s Position...33

Table 3.8 predicting the EU’s position based on a country’s level of inclusiveness...35

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CEA Central Eurasia

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

EC European Commission

EEAS European Union External Action Service

EIA United States Energy Information Administration

ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

EU European Union

EU-28 The 28 European Union member states

MENA Middle East and North Africa

NATO North Atlantic Trade Organization

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

UAE United Arab Emirates

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

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1 . Introduction

1.1 Introduction and Objectives

The European Union’s (EU) energy supply security is at stake. According to the European Commission, the EU member states are currently importing 53% of their energy from non-EU countries. Compared with other continents, the EU is the biggest global importer of energy (Eurostat, 2014). Europe’s dependence on non-EU energy sources might even increase in case the Union does not implement fundamental changes. This large dependence on external resources can be dangerous, as the recent tensions between the EU and Russia have shown. Therefore, the Union has decided to decrease this dependency by means of implementing various measures – we may though have to wait for manifest results till 2030 (European Commission, 2014).

Meanwhile, the EU wants to exercise its external normative power and promote liberal values – mainly democracy and human rights – over the world. It perceives itself as the cradle of these values (Youngs, 2001: 192). Tension can arise between the idealistic and energy-securing purposes, especially as energy resources are relatively often found in countries that do not score high on liberal values. It is challenging to achieve both at the same time in one country.

The current situation shows a rather diffuse picture. There are for instance some concerns about the situation of human rights and democracy in Russia - but energy security is a big determinant in the relationship between the EU and Russia. Another country that offers a huge energy reserve for Europe yet has a serious lack of liberal values is Iran, often blamed for the way the regime pursues its principles. There is no serious European-Iranian cooperation due to the sanctions for the Iranian nuclear activity that have been initiated by the United States. Neither does a realistic possibility to build up an energy-based relationship exist. Europe's foreign position towards Saudi-Arabia is, however, much more positive - and this country is an important energy partner, even though its very critical situation concerning liberal values.

This thesis will analyse to what extent energy dependence of the EU on non-EU countries harms the agenda of the promotion of liberal values. When we learn more about these underlying factors that explain how the EU takes its stance on this matter, we will get a better understanding of how the Union takes position in the global order and how it pursues its interests. Thus this study offers us not only a better understanding of the global political realm, but also of the working of the EU. A lot of research has been conducted about the distinctive interests of and between the EU’s member states. In addition, research has been done about the normative power of the EU, energy security and about the way the European Union shapes and implements its common foreign policy. It is, however, unexplored how these currently affect each other.

In this introductory chapter, an outline of the theory will be presented, followed by the research question and method of this research.

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1.2 Theoretical framework

1.2.1 Introduction

This framework, consisting of three different parts, will provide a basic background of the topic and will lead to the formulation of the research question as well as the research design. First, this framework will outline an understanding of the global energy market and the notion of energy security. Then, the EU’s normative power will be discussed. The final part attempts to describe the dualism between these two previous topics.

1.2.2 Global Energy Market

For the understanding of the global energy market, the scarcity model gives an explanation for the trade of energy resources and its effects for the global security. This comprises different types of scarcity: supply-induced scarcity, demand-induced scarcity and structural scarcity. The difference between these three types is determined by their cause: scarcity can either by caused by an increased demand or a decrease of supplying resources, whereas structural scarcity is caused by the political realm The supply of resources can be affected by the control and specific preferences of major powers (Amineh and Houweling, 2007: 374). Demand can increase due to the growth of a population, the increase of per capita income and technological change (industrialization) that requires more energy. All of these may cause scarcity if they occur on a too profound level, especially globally. The supply of energy is also decreasing because non-renewable energies run out over time. This means that when we discuss scarcity in this model, we are referring to scarcity of fossil fuels, and not to scarcity of energy in general, which would also include renewable and alternative energy sources (ibidem: 375-376). An increased scarcity further complicates the international relations between actors, because it is a cause for tensions and opposing interests. As the European Union’s supply security is decreasing, it is also supposed to have quite some influence on the European foreign policy. The theory of Amineh and Houweling provides an understanding of the acting of the EU and helps in understanding the impact and origins of energy scarcity.

Umbach (2010) explains that the first time the long-standing assumptions that form

European energy policies were questioned, was after the 2005-2006 gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine. These assumptions comprise a trust in the power of the market and in long-term stability (Umbach, 2010: 1230). Umbach also discusses the role of the EU’s common foreign policy in coping with newly raised global and geopolitical challenges. Beyond 2030, European energy supply security is regarded to be quite safe. Moreover, the focus of Umbach lies on the period until 2030 which is much more uncertain due to a predicted energy import share of up to 70% (ibidem: 1234). The preferred balance carefully lies between supply security, competitiveness and

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environmental sustainability. The EU has meanwhile finally acknowledged that an active and coherent (energy) foreign policy is needed to sustain its energy security. Therefore, the EU aims to include this in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The article calls for a Europe that speaks with one voice (ibid.: 1239). A discussion paper from Bauman and Simmerl comes to roughly the same conclusion. It also underlines the interdependence of inner market and external policy, and is carefully optimistic about the future possibilities (Bauman and Simmerl, 2011: 34).

Ross (2001) argued in a well-known article that the existence of oil in a country would impede democracy. This is not only based on the high correlation between countries with oil and countries with a lack of democracy (or inclusiveness). Governments in energy-rich countries would use the high revenues they gain from exporting oil to repress (criticism within) their population and lower the tax burden (Ross, 2001: 356). This claim is relevant because it combines the

dependency of the demand for energy (or in this specific case: oil) with the existence (or rather: lack) of something that is so important for the EU’s normative power: democracy. Let’s now take a closer look at that.

1.2.3 The EU’s Normative Power

The Union’s normative power can be considered the power that the EU uses when it wants to promote liberal values. Manners introduces the notion of ‘European normative power’ that does not solely focus on military or economic power, but examines the ideational impact (Manners, 2002: 238-239). This implicates that the being of a normative power does not necessitate the willingness to use (military) force. Manners’ statement is in line with the idea that the EU represents a new and different political entity, using a hybrid of multilevel forms governance (ibidem: 240). The article furthermore describes the background of the EU’s willingness to become a normative power: this would be a combination of the historical context (the EU’s origins in the post-World-War-II period) and the hybrid governmental structure as a political entity (ibid.: 241).

Then, Manners outlines the normative basis of the EU, extracted from different European treaties. In table 1, Manners’ explanation of the background of the different principles can be found. The EU tries to gain legitimacy for being more than the sum of its member states with the

reinforcement of these norms (ibid.: 244).

The specific background and the set of norms proposed by Manners make the EU a rather unique actor in the world. The EU’s normative power supposedly stems from six factors: 1) contagion: the unintentional diffusion of the EU’s ideas to other actors; 2) informational diffusion: the result of strategic communications (for example new policy initiatives); 3) procedural diffusion: the institutionalization of the relation between the EU and a third partner; 4) transference: diffusion through exchange based on financial means that cause the export of norms and standards; 5) overt diffusion: caused by the physical presence of the EU in/by other political actors; 6) cultural filter: based on the interplay between knowledge and social or political identity (ibid.: 244-245).

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Figure 1.1: EU’s normative basis

Source: Manners, 2002: 244

Pace adopts this normative power to analyse how challenges of EU normative power (NPEU) negatively influence any attempts the EU undertakes, especially in the Middle East. This is an interesting adaption of the theory. The article ‘unpacks’ different means of normative power, and concludes that in many cases, the construction of an external actor’s power has not worked in cases outside of Europe (Pace, 2007: 1059-1061).

1.2.4 Dualism between Normative Power and Energy Interests

Having outlined the energy market and normative power, it is now time to search for a

(non-)compatibility between these two concepts. This emanates from a more theoretic dualism between the theories of realism and liberalism; the focus here lays on more specific theories.

A study of Wood (2009) concerns the normative dilemmas that energy security is raising for the EU. Wood believes that the EU is compromising its liberal values (mostly: promoting human rights and democracy) for material purposes (i.e. the securing of energy supply), especially

regarding the EU’s relations with Russia and Central Asia. Following, he states that the EU should not be seen as a normative power. Nevertheless, the EU is using a pragmatic paradigm to

overcome these dilemmas between the promotion of liberal values and energy interests (Wood, 2009: 625). In a more recent analysis, Wood states that energy policy is a field that could be quite adversarial (Wood, 2013: 34). He also recognizes the clash between values (like the promotion of democracy) and ‘material-strategic interests’ that occurs especially in the European context (ibidem: 21; 26). In yet another study, Wood argues that there is a tension between the

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‘self-interested pragmatism’ of EU member states that characterizes its external relations and the more ethical, normative way of thinking within the EU (Wood, 2011: 256). The use of pragmatism in the Union’s foreign relations especially accounts with regards to main actors like Russia and China that would form ‘normative black holes’; i.e. they do not seem to prioritize liberal values or to accept the exercise of Europe’s normative power. The decrease of energy dependence could increase the influence, in a pragmatic manner, of the EU’s normative power (ibidem).

Woods goes a step further than Manners (2002), because he also describes the tensions due to the exercise of normative power and the challenges the EU faces. His beliefs are highly interesting for understanding the EU’s behavior.

Youngs argues that the EU has not yet applied a comprehensive political approach to the problem of energy security, and balances too much between market (i.e.: economy-based) and geopolitical solutions. In addition, by analysing EU policy documents he also shows that energy security has become a much more important determinant in European foreign politics in the last years (Youngs, 2007: 1-3). It recognizes that the backing of autocrats usually does not even improve energy security (ibid.: 15).

Boonstra (2011) analyses the EU’s regional approach to Central Asia regarding energy interests and the promotion of liberal values. His study finds that not many projects regarding the promotion of democratization in this region exist. In addition, the EU focuses on human rights and the rule of law rather than on other topics. This preference would exist because of the approval of the local leaders in Central Asia. The Union focuses still too much on official dialogue, and not on the civil society and the people (Boonstra, 2011: 10-11). Furthermore, fossil fuel interests mainly focus on Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and for a small part on Uzbekistan. According to Boonstra, the energy relationship between the EU and these countries could be expanded (ibidem: 15). The study suggests that the EU should further integrate its value and energy policy (ibid.: 20). Boonstra also introduces other factors that affect the EU’s approach, like security and stability (also in the context of Russia and China) and other economic interests. A comparable conclusion can be derived from Melvin (2012: 3). He states that the EU should focus on promoting democracy in Central Asia, but currently is not (ibidem: 5).

In her study of the EU’s response to emerging security crises, Maier-Knapp (2014) concludes in describing the EU as a normative actor that the Union was often driven by a comprehensive set of different motivations. Sensibility to domestic context and orientation on demand are key characteristics of the EU’s behaviour. The study also concludes that the normative dimension is still – to a specific level – visible in the EU’s response (Majer Knapp, 2014: 231-232).

The study of geopolitics, and especially critical and radical geopolitics, helps us to understand the incentives and the impact of the acting of actors in, amongst others, the energy market. Harris (2010) includes the rise of China in his analysis of the transformation of the global energy market. He finds different dimensions: the rising trend of energy prices; the changing role of the current international oil companies and the rise of national oil companies; and the growing

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energy importance of the Middle East and Russia (Harris, 2010: 166). The changing geopolitics of energy has many implications for the major economic powers, according to Harris. The global role of the US and Europe might decrease or at least will be challenged (ibidem: 180). Especially the latter sees its position constrained by its reliance on Russia and is affected by the coercive way Russia uses its resources (ibid: 181).

Mercille (2008) explains the study of ‘radical geopolitics’ as investigating the way political events unfold, involving geopolitical en geoeconomic factors (Mercille, 2008: 570). Especially the explanation of the geoeconomical logic is interesting. This perceives economics as dominant over politics and describes the unevenness of the global economy. It is conceived to point out the flows of capital (also trade) across the border with the use of political aspects or to politics of controlling natural resources in a specific region (ibidem: 576). The theory is presented by many others as well and follows a neo-Marxist, neo-Weberian way of thinking (ibid.: 577). The geoeconomic logic of the radical geopolitical theories contribute to this analysis, as they include the role of the economy and developments on the global energy market. Both influence the EU's position.

To sum up, this framework has shown how the European energy supply security is currently decreasing and how this causes dilemma’s for the Union’s exercise of normative power, which has impact on its attempts to promote liberal values. Combining the previous theories, it seems

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1.3 Research Question and Hypothesis

The theoretical framework has described the tension between the promotion of liberal values (democratization and human rights) and securing energy supply security. It seems rather problematic for the EU to combine these two distinctive efforts. This thesis is based on that

statement and explores one of its facets by analysing two main determinants of the position of the EU towards other countries. The improvement of energy supply security is one of the most

important challenges for Europe in the foreseeable future, especially as politicians now question the reliability of Russia as an important gas import partner. Furthermore, geopolitics and economic interests can, based on the provided theory, still be considered as the main determinants for political action - also in the European framework. It follows the research question of this study is: to what extent does energy dependence currently harm the European Union’s agenda of the

promotion of liberal values?

The hypothesis is that in its external relations, energy supply security is of more importance for the European Union than its presumed efforts to promote liberal values. This means that there is a negative impact of energy dependence on the relationship between the level of inclusiveness of a country on the EU position towards this country. Promoting liberal values is a core value for the EU, but when energy supply security is at stake, the preference will go to its energy/material interests. H1 believes that the interaction effect is negative. The argument of this research can be visualized as following:

Figure 1.2: argument of the thesis

EU’s energy dependency on other countries

How dependent is the EU-28 on the country for its energy supply?

Domestic level of

inclusiveness

how liberal and inclusive is the country that exports

energy to the EU?

Position of EU on

another country

How does the EU endorse the domestic political

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1.4 Research Design

This study mainly uses quantitative methods to investigate the described presumed interaction effect. However, several qualitative sections will explicate the context of the situation, and will help us interpret the results. Also, the measuring of one of the independent variables (see below) is done using mainly qualitative methods.

1.4.1 Defining the Case Counties

In an ideal situation, the design would include as many countries as possible. More specifically, the inclusion of a large amount of countries that export energy to the EU-28 is important. The believed explaining power of energy dependency on the Union’s position on a country would then be fully tested. However, a modest number of countries will be chosen to be analysed in this research. This is not just because of feasibility, but because the appliance of the regional position of a country on the selection of countries increases the reliability of the research. We are then able to control for fixed effects that countries in the same region share. A less convenient consequence is the decreased possibilities to apply the outcomes of this study on the entire world.

The selected regions are the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Central Eurasia (CEA; also known as Inner Asia) because these include the most EU energy partners1 and the more of these partners that are included in the research the more relevant it becomes. The MENA region consists of Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza and Yemen2 (World Bank, 2014a). Malta, as EU-member, will obviously not be included. The CEA region includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan3 (Amineh and Houweling, 2005: 2–3; Papava, 2013: 64). Because of the political and energy importance of Russia, its big energy reserves and its regional position nearby the other actors and partially as part of the described regions (Papava, 2013: 64-66), it is relevant and justifiable to also include Russia.

Another possible factor that could exclude irrelevant research units, is a very high level of liberal values in the country. When a country already is highly developed in a democratic society with liberal values, it is unlikely that the EU wants to promote liberal values in such a country and it therefore becomes irrelevant to include in the analysis. However, in 2013 only one of the countries in the regions is identified by Freedom House as ‘free’: Israel. Of the other countries, only Georgia and Tunisia score a 3 (on a 1-7 scale of free to not free) on both political rights and civic liberties, all the other countries score lower (Freedom House, 2015). For West Bank and Gaza and Yemen, no data was available. Only Israel will be excluded because of its irrelevance for the analysis.

1 Based on Eurostat (2014), see also table 3.1 in chapter three

2

Different definitions of the MENA region exist, but this study uses the World Bank definition 3

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Furthermore, when a country is of very low importance for the global order and especially for the EU, it is not very likely that the EU adopted an extensive position towards the country and it is not very relevant to include such a country in the analysis. This only applies to Djibouti, because it has both an extraordinary low population (872.900 in 2013) and a small economy (GDP of $1.456 billion in 2013) (World Bank, 2014b). Some other countries also score relatively low on these measures, but not low enough to make a clear distinction. Carefulness at this point is very important - also because size of the economy and population does not say everything about a country’s importance. Therefore, only Djibouti is excluded.

At last West Bank and Gaza (or Palestine) is excluded. This country is not yet recognized as a state by many European countries and neither by the EU. Partly therefore, there is no comparable foreign policy of the EU towards this country and there might be quite some missing data. In addition, some specific political factors that are not included in this research might influence the EU’s position towards the West Bank and Gaza. Regarding the last point, the same goes for Israel, that is already excluded of this research.

This brings us to the following list of 26 countries that are the research units: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Russia.

1.4.2 The Variables

For every variable, the most recent data is used. This is in all cases data from 2011 - 2015. Assumed is that this data still represents the current situation good enough. If this is questionable in a specific case, context can be provided.

The dependent variable ‘the position of the EU’ is operationalized by a self-developed measure that shows the level of endorsement of the Union regarding the domestic situation in a specific country. EU sources are interpreted for this variable. Chapter two describes the methods and outcome of this variable.

The first independent variable ‘inclusiveness of the country’ is operationalized as the level of Political Rights and Civic Liberties in a country. This comprises the described ‘liberal values’ and is based on the fundamental rights, outlined by Manners (2002) in the theoretical framework. This operationalization, based on the Freedom House Index, is chosen because it includes not only the official institutional situation regarding rule of law and democracy, but also the situation in practice and human rights. The Freedom House Index has furthermore proven to be the most reliable and objective source for this purpose. The Index provides a 1 – 7 scale on both Political Rights and Civic Liberties, based on a comprehensive set of measurements. The total score for a specific country is the mean of the two indicators, so also between 1 (positive situation) and 7 (negative situation). Scores are from 2014 (Freedom House, 2015).

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The second independent variable ‘EU’s energy dependency’ is operationalized as the level of the EU’s dependency on oil and gas imports from a country. Oil and gas dependency rates are combined and this variable encloses the total amount of oil exports from a country to the EU-28 as share of the total global oil exports to the EU-28, combined with the total amount of natural gas exports from a country to the EU-28 as share of the total global natural gas exports to the EU-28. This means that the score for this variable is a percentage of the total oil and gas dependency of the EU. Also, the outcome is weighted for the share of oil and gas on the total energy exports to the EU. 60% of all the EU-28 energy imports are oil products, and 25% is natural gas (Eurostat, 2015a). For oil, all petroleum products are chosen, whereas for gas only natural gas (this is the main sort of gas exported to and consumed in the EU). Coal, other solid fuels and electricity are not included in this variable because oil and gas still form around 85% of the EU-28’s energy imports. Data is derived from Eurostat’s database and encompasses 2012 (ibidem). It is important to note that the EU-28 is perceived as a ‘black box’: it does not matter to which specific EU

member state a country exports oil or gas to; the internal divide within the EU is neglected. This could be seen as problematic. When a country exports a reasonable amount of gas and oil, but only to a few relatively small EU states, for instance, the importance for and consequences for the energy dependency of the entire Union are limited. Tthis research however analysis the EU’s energy policy and not the internal division within the EU. Nevertheless, a control variable about the ‘black box’ is included (see below).

As it is believed that an interaction effect exists between the promotion of liberal values and the dependency of energy, the model is based on this interaction effect between the two described independent variables on the dependent variable. To overcome an omitted-variable bias, the design will include several control variables.

The first one is based on the described geo-economical reasoning of Mercille: not just the dependency on energy, but economic dependency in general is a major determinant for the EU’s position. This will be done by analysing the total amount of trade between the EU-28 and a

country. This is the sum of all the imports and exports of goods. Data is derived from Eurostat and has been issued in 2014 (Eurostat, 2015b).

Comparable is the control variable for a country’s economy. operationalized as its GDP and measured in current US dollars. This data is derived from the World Bank and encompasses 2013 (World Bank, 2015). When a country’s economy is bigger, it might be of bigger influence on the EU’s position and make the promotion of liberal values less important, also according to Mercille.

To partly entail the internal divide within the EU and to overcome the described ‘black box’ problematic, the research will check whether a country also exports energy to either France or Germany. If the export of a country comprises a minimum of 20% oil or gas export to France or Germany, the country scores on this variable. This is a way to see how important the energy relation between a country and the EU-28 for a big part of the Union’s economy is. France and

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Germany are perceived as the main EU actors, especially regarding their political, economic and energy position within the EU.

A next control variable comprises a country’s spending on its military. The EU’s position on a country could be influenced by the size of its army, because this has impact for the geopolitical and security meaning of a country. The 2011 results are measured in current million US Dollar, and derived from the independent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2015).

The amount of both oil and gas export from a country to the EU-28 are also separately included in the design. The ‘total petroleum products’ is measured in thousands of tons, and natural gas in Terajoule. The data is from 2012 and the source is the same as for the common independent variable (Eurostat, 2015a).

Also the proven reserves of both natural gas and petroleum are a control variable. Not just the current energy relationship with a country could influence the EU’s position on that country, but also the possibilities for an enhanced relationship. This can be measured by investigating a

country’s proven reserves. The 2014 data is measured in trillion cubic feet and derived from the EIA (EIA, 2015).

Whether or not a country has even been offered a seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a dummy variable. This determines the geopolitical relevance of a country, which also might influence the EU’s position on the country. The data is of 2015 and derived from the UN (UNSC, 2015).

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1.5 Research Structure

The following chapter two serves as the formation of the dependent variable ‘The position of the EU’. Both the construction and the results of this variable are described. After this part, all the information is ready to be analysed in the entire model.

Chapter three is the complete analysis of this research. First, a scatterplot will show the possible coherence. Then, the relationship between the inclusiveness of a country and the position of the EU is tested, after which a regression analysis that also includes the energy dependency variable is conducted. The interaction variable will subsequently be tested in a regression model. At last, the control variables are step for step included in the model.

Chapter four draws the conclusions of the analysis, and gives recommendations for further research.

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2 . DEFINING THE EU’S POSITION ON THE 26 CASE COUNTRIES

2.1 Introduction

It is this chapter’s aim to analyse the current foreign position of the European Union on the 26 non-EU countries in the MENA and CEA region. This is conducted on a scale of endorsement by the EU regarding the domestic political situation. This scale will form the dependent variable of the entire model1_{. The following section will discuss the construction of this scale; the final section will}

analyse the results.

2.2 Constructing the Scale

This analysis has been executed by interpreting official documents of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s diplomatic service. The EEAS was created by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty and supports the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, currently Frederica Mogherini, in carrying out the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The service is steered by the European Council and cooperates with the European Commission, which means that it encompasses both the political and executive branch of the Union (EEAS, 2014a). To guarantee the validity and comparability of the analysis, no other sources will be used.

The digital database of the EEAS contains country-specific profiles about the relationship between the EU and the MENA and CEA-countries. This includes recent EU press releases and statements, a general description about the relations and finally background information such as current and superseded treaties, agreements and mememoranda. Especially association and cooperation agreements between the Union and the third country are highly useful for this thesis, because they are legally binding and constitute the willingness to establish a close political relation. Treaties and agreements can be found in the Treaties Office Database (EEAS, 2014b). Older treaties are only included in the analysis if the context of the country report shows that they still represent the current relationship. Because this research focuses on the political position of the EU, it will not consider the trade relation with the country. In addition, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Instrument is included. This instrument covers several specific policies aimed at Eastern and Southern neighbours. Economic and political association or even integration are the objectives, and it builds on so-called common interests and liberal values (EEAS, 2015a).

In an ideal situation, the encoding of the EU’s position should be done by several people using a method of random sampling to guarantee the inter- and intra-coder reliability. This would make sure that an analysis of the position taking of the EU is conducted in an objective manner, and that no subjective and/or personal preferences or even mistakes are part of it. Unfortunately,

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neither this nor a discourse analysis or a measure of the tone of the Union in all its expressions is feasible. Such a discourse analysis could provide a deeper understanding of the EU’s meaning in its expressions. It is possible to link the Union’s criticism of a country to the intensity of the events in the country, but only to some extent. In order to meet the preferred reliability as much as possible, three criteria are developed to test the position of the EU on the 26 countries. These criteria are the subvariables that together form the scale of the common variable ‘position of the EU’.

Current (political) incidents and events will be of influence on the EU’s position. It is regarded as undesirable if the score on the variable is influenced too much by a temporarily occurring

incident. However, the EU’s response to an incident does also represent its position on the country and could comprise its energy interests. Therefore, the response of the EU on occurring (political) incidents in the context of these incidents are included in this analysis.

For each subvariable (or: criterion), the EU’s position on the particular country can score on a Likert scale. The overall score of the variable is the sum of the scores on the three subvariables and is between 0 and 10. The EU’s normative power, outlined in the theoretical framework, is the basis for the criteria. The three criteria are shown below.

C1 Criticism

The amount of criticism of the EU on the political line of the third country. Under this criterion, statements that the EEAS produces and reports on its country-specific profile of the last year are investigated. The score is based on the relative amount of critical expression’s and the EU source that expressed these concerns. Criticism from the Union’s leaders has more impact than criticism from a Commission’s spokesperson. Criticism is always perceived in the context of the level of inclusiveness1 in the country.

Scale: 0: The EU expresses very strong criticism of the political line of the third country

1: The EU expresses a moderate level of criticism of the political line of the third country 2: The EU expresses some criticism of the political line of the third country

3: The EU expresses only very little criticism of the political line of the third country; it is mostly positive

4: The EU expresses no criticism of the political line of the third country

C2 Sanctions

The amount of sanctions or other punishments against the third country. This includes a wide variety of possible punishments, including economic sanctions, the non-adoption of planned agreements or a decrease in EU diplomatic representation due to political changes. The belief is that strong economic sanctions, or the combination of diplomatic and economic sanctions, express a more serious and negative position of the EU than purely diplomatic or predominantly symbolic

1

Based on the Freedom House Index

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sanctions do. The source for existing sanctions is a special EEAS sanctions database (EEAS, 2014c). The scale encompasses only three scores instead of five, which gives this criterion less influence on the definite variable ‘position of the EU’. Since I assume that the EU does not easily deploys sanctions on a country, this would in a zero to four scale lead to many high scores and a disproportionate influence.

Scale: 0: The EU deploys a very serious set of economic and diplomatic punishments and/or sanctions on the third country

1: The EU deploys a set of economic and/or diplomatic punishments and/or sanctions on the third country

2: The EU deploys no sanctions and/or punishments on the third country

C3 Nature of cooperation

This comprises the amount and nature of topics and aims that are in a serious manner included in the Union’s cooperation with the third country. This will be encoded based on the formulations of the treaties and other EEAS documents, with a focus on association and cooperation agreements. If these exist, the score for the country will be higher. In addition, it is defined by the way the EEAS and other EU sources designate the nature of the cooperation. The nature of the cooperation can be – among others – humanitarian, economic, cultural, developmental and/or political. This criterion is based on the belief that a broader cooperation emanates from a more positive position of the Union. The political context is important for this criterion: when a state is for example regarded as a very weak state, not many agreements with the country might exist, but the level of commitment to develop the country would be a major defining factor. On the other hand, when a state is better developed but the cooperation still mainly aims to improve the humanitarian or developmental situation, this commitment is lower (and subsequently the score on this criterion). Scale: 0: The cooperation between the EU and the third country comprises no serious

agreements, and nor is there a serious EU commitment to improve this in the foreseeable future

1: The cooperation between the EU and the third country comprises some agreements, and/or some EU commitment to improve this in the foreseeable future.

2: The cooperation between the EU and the third country comprises legal agreements that consist of various topics, including economy/trade and political dialogue.

3: The cooperation between the EU and the third country comprises legal agreements that consist of various topics, including economy/trade, political dialogue and others. Also, the EU commitment to the (development of the) country is visible.

4: The cooperation between the EU and the third country comprises a comprehensive set of legal agreements that show the high commitment of the Union to the country and reflect the strong cooperation between the EU and the country.

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2.3 Results

A comprehensive and thorough encoding document is added to this thesis (see: Appendix 1). That document contains the sources and background information for every country can be found. The final scores for each country can be found in table 2.1 below. The higher the score (on a scale of 0 – 10), the more positive the EU’s endorsement of the country’s situation. Scores are given per criterion and per country, in alphabetic order.

Table 2.1: results of independent variable ‘The position of the EU’

country C1: criticism C2: sanctions C3: topics overall

Algeria 3 2 3 8 Armenia 2 1 2 5 Azerbaijan 2 2 3 7 Bahrain 3 2 4 9 Egypt 3 2 4 9 Georgia 3 2 3 8 Iran 1 0 0 1 Iraq 3 2 3 8 Jordan 3 2 3 8 Kazakhstan 3 2 3 8 Kuwait 4 2 4 10 Kyrgystan 2 2 2 6 Lebanon 3 2 2 7 Libya 4 2 3 9 Morocco 3 2 3 8 Oman 4 2 4 10 Qatar 4 2 4 10 Russia 1 1 2 4 Saudi Arabia 4 2 4 10 Syria 1 0 2 3 Tajikistan 3 2 2 7 Tunisia 4 2 3 9 Turkmenistan 2 2 1 5

United Arab Emirates 4 2 4 10

Uzbekistan 2 2 2 6

Yemen 3 2 2 7

Author’s calculation1

This section discusses some remarkable results1. The countries Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen are experiencing difficult political times. In Syria, the EU acted relatively late in its use of sanctions against the regime. Even though the current restrictive measures and the commitment to change the situation are visible, the Union still mainly calls for a political situation and decided to respect

1

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the country’s territorial integrity. This caused low measures in the above table. The situation was further complicated when the fight against the Islamic State began (Appendix 1: 25).

In Libya, meanwhile, the EU seemed very committed to establish strong ties with the country and to contribute to its development, even given the current unstable political situation and the fact that the Union called Libya a ‘weak state’. This led to relatively high scores on the

measures, regardless the current low number of agreements (Appendix 1: 17). A comparable case is Iraq, in which the political and security situation also raises huge challenges. The EU is

nevertheless committed to support the situation to a very high level, also due to the recent history (Appendix 1: 10). The EU shows itself less concerned with the serious humanitarian situation in Yemen and presents its current cooperation as mostly a humanitarian one. It also expresses some criticism of the country, or at least calls the government for action on some points (Appendix 1: 30).

Between the Union and the countries in the Gulf region, no official bilateral cooperation exists. Instead, there is a joint cooperation with the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG) that includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The main aim of this cooperation is economic and includes some agreements on specific sectors, especially the energy sector. Outside this form of cooperation, the relation with these countries is mostly cultural. The EU does only very rarely comment on country-specific developments, whereas most of these countries don’t have high liberal values at all. So even without an extensive political dialogue, the position of the Union on these countries can be characterized as positive (Appendix 1: 4).

The relationship with Russia suffered under the recent crisis in Ukraine. This has played the key role in the analysis of the EU position on this country. Indeed, Russia faces a comprehensive set of serious restrictive measures, and the EU seriously condemned Russia’s behaviour.

However, the Union never decided to risk even more to protect Ukraine. Finally, this analysis takes into account that – especially in the beginning of the crisis – the energy interests have always been emphasized by the EU in relation to Russia, as well as the historical divide within the EU on the position on Russia (Appendix 1: 22-23). That resulted in an overall score ‘4’.

The EU has a specific strategy on the inclusion of several former Soviet countries. On the one hand, it tries to find economic and political cooperation with these countries, while on the other hand it wants to improve the liberal values and the general development. For the latter, the EEAS Human Rights Dialogue serves. In this analysis, these countries and the EU attitude towards them have been compared with one another to get to the scores.

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3 . ANALYSIS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the complete analysis of the research. The chapter starts with an outline of all the data in one comprehensive table. It will then turn to testing the main hypothesis: the

influence of energy dependency on the position of the EU on a particular country. This is done both through a scatterplot and through a regression analysis, which also includes the interaction

between inclusiveness and energy dependency. Subsequently, the control variables are included in the analysis to see how these influence the relation. Depending on the outcomes, further explanations for the variance are sought.

3.2 Overview of the Data

In table 3.1 on the next page, the scores on the main variables are shown per country. Oil and gas are combined in the variable ‘energy dependency’ but also shown separately; in the analysis, only the combined variable is used1. In table 3.2 on page 28, the distributions of the control variables are shown. ‘NA’ means Not Available, and implies that some data (military expenditures and GDP) was not present for all countries. Fortunately, all the results in both tables denote only a few missing values.

1

See paragraph 1.4.2 for a full explanation on all variables and their realization. Note that the results are similar when gas and oil are analysed separately (data not shown).

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Table 3.1: data of main variables

Country EU's Pos.1 Energy Dep.2 Inclusiveness3 Oil4 Gas5

Algeria 8 0.05022 5.5 23264 1737510 Armenia 5 0.00000 4.5 0 0 Azerbaijan 7 0.01593 6 20251 0 Bahrain 9 0.00000 6 0 0 Egypt 9 0.00576 5.5 5628 72867 Georgia 8 0.00070 3 890 0 Iran 1 0.00524 6 6666 0 Iraq 8 0.01694 5.5 21541 0 Jordan 8 0.00000 5.5 0 0 Kazakhstan 8 0.02277 5.5 28951 0 Kuwait 10 0.00634 5 8064 0 Kyrgyzstan 6 0.00000 5 0 0 Lebanon 7 0.00000 4.5 0 0 Libya 9 0.04062 4.5 45900 246469 Morocco 8 0.00000 4.5 0 0 Oman 10 0.00026 5.5 333 0 Qatar 10 0.02061 5.5 989 1079762 Russia 4 0.25149 5.5 223981 4101710 Saudi Arabia 10 0.03880 7 49335 0 Syria 3 0.00000 7 0 0 Tajikistan 7 0.00000 6 0 0 Tunisia 9 0.00275 3 3496 0 Turkmenistan 5 0.00047 7 595 0

United Arab Emirates 10 0.00270 6 3428 0

Uzbekistan 6 0.00041 7 19 21565

Yemen 7 0.00002 6 31 0

We see that the EU – as expected – is by far the most dependent on Russia for oil and gas, scoring over 25%. Other important energy partners are Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan and Qatar. The countries Bahrain, Armenia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Syria, Tajikistan and Yemen export (almost) no energy to the EU-28.

1

The position of the EU on a scale of 0 (negative) to 10 (positive). Author’s calculation (see chapter 2)

2

Energy dependency, as a part of the total EU’s energy dependency (which would score ‘1’). Author’s calculation based on Eurostat, 2015a

3

Based on Freedom House Index, on a scale of 1 (positive) to 7 (negative). Author’s calculation based on Freedom House, 2015

4

In thousands of tons. Author’s calculation based on Eurostat, 2015a

5_{In terajoule. Author’s calculation based on Eurostat, 2015a}

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Table 3.2: data of control variables

Country Military1 Economy2 Trade3 Oil Reserves4 Gas Reserves5 UNSC6 Entire EU7

Algeria $8652 $210.2 €54216 12.2 159.1 1 0 Armenia $391 $10.43 €982 0 0 0 0 Azerbaijan $3079 $73.56 €17936 7 35 1 1 Bahrain $878 $32.89 €2713 0.12 3.25 1 0 Egypt $4287 $271.97 €22856 4.4 77.2 1 1 Georgia $469 $16.14 €2702 0.04 0.3 0 0 Iran $11007 $368.9 €6223 157.3 1193 1 0 Iraq $5905 $229.33 €16053 140.3 111.52 1 0 Jordan $1385 $33.68 €4074 0 0.21 1 0 Kazakhstan $1804 $231.88 €30959 30 85 0 1 Kuwait $5393 $175.83 €11556 104 63.5 1 0 Kyrgyzstan $211 $7.23 €477 0.04 0.2 0 0 Lebanon $1627 $44.35 €7039 0 0 1 0 Libya NA $74.2 €31078 48.47 54.7 1 1 Morocco $3343 $103.83 €27320 0 0.05 1 0 Oman $6668 $79.66 €4885 5.5 30 1 0 Qatar $1877 $203.24 €15129 25.24 885.29 1 0 Russia $70238 $2096.78 €326253 80 1688 1 1 Saudi Arabia $48531 $748.45 €63867 268.35 290.81 1 1 Syria $2495 NA €885 2.5 8.5 1 0 Tajikistan NA $8.51 €287 0.01 0.2 0 0 Tunisia $715 $46.99 €20521 0.43 2.3 1 0 Turkmenistan NA $41.85 €1958 0.6 265 0 1 United Arab Emirates $19182 $402.34 €53876 97.8 215.04 1 1 Uzbekistan NA $56.8 €1654 0.59 65 0 0 Yemen $1164 $35.96 €1699 3 16.9 1 0

There is more potential to build up an energy relationship than this relationship currently reflects, according to the proven oil/gas reserves in Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates (UAE),

Turkmenistan and others. Almost all countries have been offered membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC), except for Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and

Turkmenistan – most of these lie in the same region. Only eight countries export a substantial amount of energy to France or Germany and may thus have more influence on the entire Union’s policy.

1

Government spending on military in constant million US$. Author’s calculation based on SIPRI (2015)

2_{Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 2014 in current billion US$. Author’s calculation based on World Bank (2015)}

3

Trade relation with the EU-28 in 2014. Sum of imports and exports in 2014 in €. Author’s calculation based on Eurostat, 2015b

4

Proven reserves of petroleum products in 2014 in billion barrels. Author’s calculation based on EIA, 2015

5

Proven reserves of natural gas in 2014 in trillion cubic feet. Author’s calculation based on EIA, 2015

6

Geopolitical relevance of the country, based on dummy variable of offered membership of UN Security Council. Author’s calculation based on UNSC, 2015

7

Relevance for the entire EU, based on dummy variable of substantial energy relationship with France or Germany. Author’s calculation based on Eurostat, 2015a

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3.3 The main Analysis

In the below scatterplot below, the correlation between Energy Dependency and the Position of the EU is shown. Here too it is visible that many countries score low on energy dependency. This has serious implications for the model. Testing the normality of the distribution confirms this – it is distorted by the countries that don’t export energy to the EU-28. Only the right upper corner denotes a tenuous connection and this relationship seems quite strong. Cases that have a higher score on the EU energy dependency variable also seem to perceive a more positive EU

endorsement. Under the hypothesis, a clearer correlation would have been expected. The low amount of cases could be problematic, however.

Figure 3.3: scatterplot of Energy Dependency and Position of the EU1

If there really exists a correlation between these two variables, it should be visible in a regression analysis. At first, the variable of energy dependency is regressed on our dependent variable (EU position). Then, the inclusiveness of a country is also added to the model: after all we would like to know if countries where the EU is more dependent upon in terms of energy are still dealt with in friendlier terms after we controlled for the actual internal human rights situation. Results are shown in table 3.4 below. It could be expected that the multicollinearity of the model would be problematic,

1

Author’s calculation based on Eurostat, 2015a and EEAS (see chapter 2). Russia’s score is not reported. Its score was too much an outlier (data that include Russia available on request).

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as the energy dependency of a country might influence a country’s inclusiveness, according to Ross (2001). However, the VIF scores give no indication of multicollinearity at all 1.

Furthermore, none of the results is significant. The explained variance of the EU’s position is also very low, irrespective of the lack of significance. A singular regression of inclusiveness on the position of the EU – a correlation that would be very logical under the hypothesis of this framework - gives comparable results2.

Table 3.4: model testing Energy Dependency and Inclusiveness on Position of the EU

Coefficient Standard deviation Bèta Sig.

(constant) 10,590 2,427 0,000

Energy Dependency -9,040 9,217 -0,194 0,337

Inclusiveness3 -0,556 0,437 -0,252 0,215

N 26

Adjusted R2 0,026

* Two-tailed significance test: * α= 0,05 **α= 0,01 ***α=0,001

Not finding any direct correlation between inclusiveness and energy dependency still leaves the possibility that it is actually the interaction between these two that determines the EU position on a particular country. In other words, a particular level of human rights guarantees could only be a significant determinant of the EU position given a particular level of energy dependency. But, as is shown in table 3.5 below, this is not the case. The predictive power of the model is even lower than it was before. A separated analysis of oil and gas dependence gives even less significant results, which means that the insignificance4 is not caused by the fact that we summed the variance of both variables. Finally, the described ‘Black Box’ assumption in this model could interfere with the correlation. Maybe energy dependency is only of influence when a country exports a substantial amount to Germany or France, perceived as the main EU member states. However, when this control variable is included, results are still not significant5. This means that the main hypothesis of this research, that the energy dependency rate of the EU on a country is a predictor of the position the EU takes on a country than the inclusiveness of a country, is rejected.

Table 3.5: model testing interaction of Energy Dependency and Inclusiveness on Position of the EU

(constant) 7.556 0.487 0,000 Inclusiveness -0.748 0.483 -0.338 0.136 Energy dependency -190.515 194.264 -4.082 0.337 Inclusiveness X Energy dependency6 32.982 35.266 3.896 0.360 N 26

1

The model knows a tolerance score of 0.999 and a VIF score of 1.001

2

Data on request

3

Author’s calculation based on Freedom House, 2015

4

Data on request

5

Data on request

6_{Variable of the interaction between energy dependence (source: see footnote 1) and inclusiveness (source: see footnote 2)}

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Maybe it is not so much the current energy relationship, operationalized as the EU’s energy dependence on a country, but the potential future energy relationship that determines the EU’s position today. The amount of oil and gas a country has as reserves would then predict the EU’s position. This would still partially confirm the hypothesis. When we test both the variables of proven oil and gas reserves of the countries on the EU’s position, significant results are found (see table 3.6 below) for the correlation between a country’s proven gas reserves and the position of the EU on that country. However, the effect size (see coefficient) of the gas variable is very low (-0,003 on a ten points scale) and its direction is opposed to the expectation (one additional terajoule of more gas reserves correlates with the EU being -0,003 less friendly to this country). In addition, the explained variance of this model (the adjusted R2) of this model is negative. This means that it predicts less of the variance in the EU positions than pure chance (flipping a coin) would do. This all taken together, leads me to conclude that this is not a very substantial or important finding.

Table 3.6: model testing the reserves of oil and gas on the Position of the EU

(constant) 7,618 0,497 0,000

Gas reserves1 -0,003 0,001 -0,515 0,017*

Oil reserves2 0,009 0,007 0,263 0,202

N 26

Adjusted R2 -0,158

In the first scatterplot, Russia turned out to be a huge outlier. Furthermore, the government of Syria does currently not hold the complete authority over the country. With regards Iran’s case, it is clear that we are dealing with a very specific (geo)political situation that could interfere with this research’s hypothesis3. An analysis that excludes these research units gives an increased significance and predictive power, though the model still remains far from significant4.

We can thus conclude that the hypothesis is definitely rejected. This is in itself a very remarkable outcome. Apparently, in contradiction to what the majority of the theorists5 have argued in the last decades, energy dependency nor the domestic political situation concerning liberal values is of decisive influence on the Union’s endorsement of these countries in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Eurasia. The analysis will now turn to alternative explanations and a thorough

interpretation of the data.

1

Proven reserves of natural gas in 2014. Author’s calculation based on EIA, 2015

2

Proven reserves of petroleum products. Author’s calculation based on EIA, 2015

3

See chapter 2 and appendix 1 for justification of these statements

4

Data on request

5_{See also the theoretical framework}

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3.4 Alternative Explanations

Another way to find other sources that influence the position of the EU on a country, is to use the original control variables and analyse their influence on the variance on the EU’s position as substantive independent variables. A multiple regression including these variables is shown in table 3.7 below.

Table 3.7: models testing five different variables on the EU’s Position

Model: (I) Inclusiveness (II) Trade (III) Economy (IV) military relevance (V) Geopolitical relevance (UNSC) Inclusiveness1 ,004 (.542) Trade2 -5,656E-6 (.000) Economy3 -1,224E-12 (,000) Military relevance4 -1,756E-5 (,000) Geopolitical Relevance (UNSC)5 1,308 (1,011) R2 -,054 -,017 ,016 -,034 ,026 N 26 26 25 22 26

Note: coefficients are shown and confidence intervals are in parentheses. * Two-tailed significance test: * α= 0,05 **α= 0,01 ***α=0,001

The assumed influence of inclusiveness on the EU’s position is already described earlier. The amount of trade between the EU-28 and the partner country and the size of the economy of the country is assumed to have influence because not just the energy dependency, but economic dependency in general could determine the position of the Union. Furthermore, when a country has more military relevance, it could influence the Union’s position because of its military and geopolitical relevance. The latter is also the reason why offered membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is included. None of the five models is significant, and only the UNSC dummy variable has some predictive power. These outcomes, too, are very remarkable and unexpected. It is not just energy dependency that has no substantial explanatory power for the EU’s position on the countries in the region, the same is the case for these other geopolitical and economic variables. This also contradicts the main theorists and assumptions, and shows that all the used variables at least have no decisive systematic influence in the chosen case regions (MENA and CEA).

1

2

Trade relation with the EU-28 in 2014. Sum of imports and exports. Author’s calculation based on Eurostat, 2015b

3

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 2014. Author’s calculation based on World Bank (2015)

4

Government spending on military in 2011. Author’s calculation based on SIPRI (2015).

5_{Based on dummy variable of offered membership of UN Security Council. Author’s calculation based on UNSC, 2015}

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3.5 A New Explanation of the EU’s Position

Given that all previously proposed explanations for the EU positions have failed, we should take a closer look at the data itself to see which groups of countries score systematically lower or higher on the EU position scale given what we would expect in terms of their domestic human rights situation. This grouping and interpretation of country scores could possibly lead to another

explanations that we haven’t tested. These results, combined with the other data of this research, will be used to interpret the country- and region specific situations. Also, systematic deviations that lead to other explanations of the EU’s positions will be sought.

For this purpose, the variable of inclusiveness has been rescaled and turned around to be able to compare it with the EU’s position1. In the new measure, a 10 on ‘inclusiveness’ means a very inclusive democracy, and a 10 on ‘position of EU’ means a very positive EU endorsement of the domestic political situation. The difference between the new inclusiveness variable and the regular position of the EU, as shown in table 3.8 on the next page, shows the deviation of the expectation. If the score is below zero, the EU is less positive about the country than would be expected based on their inclusiveness, and if the score is positive, the EU’s endorsement is more positive than expected. The table is ordered on this difference, from negative to positive.

In general, the differences between inclusiveness and the EU’s position are relatively big, with an average of 4.8. The Union positions itself to almost all countries more positively than expected based on the level of inclusiveness of the countries and Freedom House rates most of the counties in the region (on their original scale) with a score of 5 - 7. This can partly be explained because of the different compositions of both measures, but more importantly, it suggests that the Union is not as critical as an organization like Freedom House in positioning itself on these

countries.

1_{A country that scored 1 on the old scale (1-7) now scores 10 on the new scale (0-10); a score 3 is now 6.7, a score 7 now 0, etc.}

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Table 3.8: predicting the EU’s position based on a country’s level of inclusiveness Country Inclusiveness (1-7)1 Inclusiveness (0-10)2 Position of EU (0-10)3 Difference Iran 6 1.7 1 -0.7 Armenia 4.5 4.2 5 0.8 Georgia 3 6.7 8 1.3 Russia 5.5 2.5 4 1.5 Tunisia 3 6.7 9 2.3 Kyrgyzstan 5 3.3 6 2.7 Lebanon 4.5 4.2 7 2.8 Syria 7 0 3 3 Morocco 4.5 4.2 8 3.8 Libya 4.5 4.2 9 4.8 Turkmenistan 7 0 5 5 Azerbaijan 6 1.7 7 5.3 Tajikistan 6 1.7 7 5.3 Yemen 6 1.7 7 5.3 Algeria 5.5 2.5 8 5.5 Iraq 5.5 2.5 8 5.5 Jordan 5.5 2.5 8 5.5 Kazakhstan 5.5 2.5 8 5.5 Uzbekistan 7 0 6 6 Egypt 5.5 2.5 9 6.5 Kuwait 5 3.3 10 6.7 Bahrain 6 1.7 9 7.3 Oman 5.5 2.5 10 7.5 Qatar 5.5 2.5 10 7.5

United Arab Emirates 6 1.7 10 8.3

Saudi Arabia 7 0 10 10

In an attempt to find a pattern in the data, it is interesting that the countries that score

relatively low on the ‘difference’ variable, have or have had a rather struggling relationship with the United States. Two important cases in this perspective are Iran and Russia, in addition to some former Soviet states that we find on top of and in the middle of the list. On the other hand, countries that score high on the ‘difference’ variable (and on which the EU is the most positive compared to the expectation based on domestic inclusiveness) have a substantial relationship with the U.S. This goes for all the Gulf counties and especially Saudi Arabia, which has an

extraordinary score on both measures and a tight relationship with the U.S.), but also for Egypt.4 This of course should be further investigated before actual conclusions can be drawn, but it is at least a very striking result.

1

2

3

Author’s calculation (see chapter 2)

4_{Information about the relationship is based on what is found in chapter 2 – all sources can be found there, and in Appendix 1}

Idealism or security : what is Europe’s actual motive? : about the impact of energy security on the EU’s effort to promote liberal values